Week 8

Slides:
Elite-led transitions: Pacts
• Agreements among elites, both opposition and rulers
○ No violence
○ Alternate office
○ Elections and rule changes made by regime insiders
○ Amnesty for previous rulers
➔ Examples: Venezuela 1958, Colombia 1958-1972, Chile 1923-1970

Positives:
● ‘Safest’ way out of authoritarianism
● Reduces uncertainty (gets buy-in of key actors)
● Establishes rules about the rules

Negatives:
● The process is undemocratic, and subverts majority rule:
● This leads to exclusionary politics & marginalizes sectors
● Restricts competition
➔ ”[Pacts] tend to reduce competitiveness as well as conflict; they seek to limit
accountability to wider publics; they attempt to control the agenda of policy
concerns; and they deliberately distort the principle of citizen equality.”
(O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 38)

Elite-led transitions: Coups

Definition:
➔ “Successful efforts ‘by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to
unseat the sitting executive using unconstitutional means’”
(Powell and Thyne, 2011: 252).
● Coups succeed (Powell and Thyne, 2011):
○ 1950-2010 (48%)
○ 2000-2010 (67%)

Mass-led transitions: Mass Protest

● Grievances + Political Opportunity → Mass Protest
 Protest coordination: tipping models
Tipping models explain the mass protests that occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989.
● An individual must choose whether to publicly support or oppose the dictatorship.
● She has a private and a public preference regarding the dictatorship.
● Preference falsification: Because it is dangerous to reveal your opposition to a
dictatorship, individuals who oppose the regime often falsify their preferences in
public.
● There is often a protest size at which individuals are willing to publicly reveal their
true preferences.
● A revolutionary threshold is the size of the protest in which an individual is willing to
participate.
Individuals naturally have different thresholds.
● Some people with low thresholds are happy to oppose the government irrespective
of what others do.
● Some people with higher thresholds will protest only if lots of others do.
● Some people with very high thresholds support the regime and are extremely
unwilling to protest.
The distribution of revolutionary thresholds is crucial in determining whether a
revolution occurs or not.
● Society A = {0; 2; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10} Only one person will protest.
● Preference falsification means that a society's distribution of revolutionary
thresholds is never known to outsiders or even the individuals in that society.
Thus, a society can come to the brink of a revolution without anyone knowing.
● Our inability to observe private preferences and revolutionary thresholds conceal
potential revolutionary cascades and make revolutions impossible to predict.

Protest and Repression

● Size matters:
○ Security service → selective repression
○ Military → large-scale repression
 Readings:
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic breakdown and regime
transitions: A new data set." Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-331.

Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New

Data Set
​ Introduction of Key Cases (First Person Perspective):
● President Anwar Sadat's replacement by Hosni Mubarak in Egypt exemplifies a
common pattern where the same leadership group continues to control the regime.
However, not all authoritarian changes follow this model. Zine Ben Ali's ouster in
Tunisia led to cooperation for democratization, contrasting sharply with the Shah of
Iran's replacement by a different autocratic regime.

​ Investigating Regime Outcomes (First Person Perspective):

● Despite extensive studies on democratization, research is scarce on the other
outcomes of post-autocratic leadership changes. The authors introduce new data
enabling the investigation of outcomes such as regime survival under new leadership
and replacement by a new autocratic regime.

​ Arab Spring and Ouster Consequences (First Person Perspective):

● The Arab Spring raised questions about the potential outcomes of dictator ousting.
The data aim to answer when the removal of a dictator is likely to lead to renewed
autocracy or chaos instead of democratization, offering baseline odds for such
scenarios based on observable factors.

​ Theoretical Basis and Data Set (Third Person Perspective):

● Regimes are defined as informal and formal rules determining the representation of
interests in the leadership group and their ability to constrain the dictator. The
Autocratic Regimes Data Set covers breakdowns from 1946 to 2010, identifying
transitions and providing details on regime collapses, violence during transitions, and
successor regimes.

​ Comparative Analysis of Data (Third Person Perspective):

● The text highlights the importance of using accurate measures for testing theories
related to autocratic stability. Substituting leader change for regime change or using
Polity democratization thresholds as proxies can lead to substantial under- or
over-estimates of the effects of causal factors on authoritarian breakdown.

​ Applications of the Data (First Person Perspective):

● The data are applied to the subjects of war and democratization. Preliminary
evidence suggests that dictators ousted with their regimes or replaced by new
autocracies face higher odds of punishment, contributing to our understanding of why
dictators start wars. Additionally, regimes with dictators having wide personal
 discretion are less likely to democratize after breakdown, questioning optimistic
predictions for the contemporary Middle East.

​ Policy Implications (First Person Perspective):

● The findings hint that foreign military intervention while aiding in ending repressive
dictatorships, may not necessarily contribute to democratization. This adds nuance to
policy discussions on the potential outcomes of such interventions.

​Central Concepts
​ Definition of Regimes:
​ The text emphasizes that regimes are defined by the rules that identify the group
from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and
policy. This definition includes both formal and informal rules, as many autocracies
hide de facto rules behind a facade of formal democratic institutions.

​ Leadership Group:
​ The concept of the "leadership group" is crucial in classifying autocratic regimes. This
group makes key policies, and leaders must retain its support to remain in power.
The composition of this group and the interests it represents influence domestic and
international policies in autocratic regimes.

​ Regime Classification:
​ Regimes are classified based on the interests represented in the leadership group,
rather than solely on formal institutions or the size of the winning coalition. The ability
of the leadership group to constrain the dictator's discretion also plays a role in
regime classification.

​ Regime Transitions:
​ The text highlights that multiple autocratic leaders can rule during a single autocratic
regime, and a single continuous period of authoritarianism can conceal multiple
consecutive autocratic regimes. Understanding regime transitions requires
distinguishing between leader tenure, regime duration, and continuous years of
autocracy.

​ Implications:
​ The frequency of transitions between autocratic regimes has implications for
understanding comparative politics and international relations. For example, using
democratization as a proxy for autocratic regime collapse can lead to underestimates
of autocratic vulnerability to economic crisis.

Measuring Autocratic Regimes

​ Introduction of Data Set (Third Person Perspective):
● The data set covers 280 autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2010 in independent
countries with over one million inhabitants in 2009. Each country-year is categorized
as Autocratic, Democratic, Not independent, Occupied by foreign troops, Ruled by a
 transitional government overseeing democratization, or Lacking a central
government.

​ Origins and Evolution of Classification (Third Person Perspective):

● Barbara Geddes initially proposed the regime classification to test theoretical
arguments about different types of dictatorship, including dominant-party rule, military
rule, and personalist dictatorship. The classification evolved, incorporating new
variables and updating regime classifications.

​ Refinement of Start and End Dates (Third Person Perspective):

● The data now provide more precise information about the emergence and collapse of
autocracies. Start and end dates for each regime are recorded using rigorous criteria,
including the identification of political events marking regime changes and variables
describing the collapse of autocracies.

​ Defining Regime Start and End Dates (Third Person Perspective):

● Regime start dates are determined by events such as undemocratic ascension to
power, changes in formal or informal rules limiting competition in elections, or military
interference in party competition. Regime end dates include scenarios like
competitive elections leading to a change in leadership, regime ouster by coup or
popular uprising, or significant rule changes by the ruling group.

​ Classification of Regime Types (Third Person Perspective):

● The data classify leadership groups into dominant-party, military, personalist,
monarchic, oligarchic, indirect military, or hybrid regimes. These classifications reflect
control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus, capturing
different aspects of autocratic rule.

​ Comparative Analysis with Other Data Sets (Third Person Perspective):

● The data set distinguishes itself from others like CGV by its focus on interests
represented in the leadership group, leading to different rules for coding regime
types. Complex concepts are operationalized through a detailed coding scheme,
balancing simplicity with capturing relevant features.

​ Judgments and Interpretations (Third Person Perspective):

● While some coding depends on judgments about contextual meanings of events,
coders are tasked with providing factual information rather than subjective
assessments. The goal is to maximize replicability and interpretability while ensuring
consistency in coding criteria.

Which Measure Is "Right"? Autocratic Leaders versus Autocratic Regimes

​ Divergence Between Leader Tenure and Regime Survival (Third Person Perspective):
● Analysis of leadership data from Milan Svolik and Archigos reveals differences
between leader tenure and regime survival rates. While leader failure rates are
generally higher across all types of dictatorships, regime failure rates are
comparatively lower. Personalist dictatorships exhibit the closest alignment between
leader and regime failure rates due to the predominance of one-man rule.
​ Implications for Theoretical Application (Third Person Perspective):
● Recent theories suggest that dictators' expectations about post-ouster fates influence
their behavior. The data demonstrate that the treatment of leaders after ouster varies
significantly based on the type of dictatorship. Personalist dictators face higher risks
of punishment, indicating a potential explanation for their propensity to start wars.

​ Effects of Regime Transition on Leader Fate (Third Person Perspective):

● The data also highlight how leader fates change depending on whether the regime
collapses simultaneously with their ouster. Monarchs face increased risks of
punishment when the monarchy is abolished, while leaders in other autocracies are
more vulnerable when the regime ends. Democratization significantly improves the
chances of a favorable outcome for ousted leaders compared to transitions to new
autocracies.

​ Policy Implications and Decision-Making (Third-Person Perspective):

● The findings suggest that third-party interventions during transitions from violent
conflict in dictatorships may need to offer safe exile to personalist dictators.
Additionally, the greater likelihood of punishment after the ouster by a new
dictatorship implies potential strategies for autocrats facing insurgencies or protests.

​ Nuanced Investigation Enabled by Data (Third Person Perspective):

● The data facilitate nuanced investigations into authoritarian decision-making
influenced by dictators' expectations about their future. By analyzing post-exit fates
and regime transitions, researchers can better understand how leaders' expectations
shape their behavior during periods of instability.

Autocratic Regimes and Autocratic Spells

​ Definition of Autocratic Spells (Third Person Perspective):
● Autocratic spells represent consecutive calendar years during which a country
is ruled by a dictatorship until democracy interrupts. This definition focuses
solely on the duration of undemocratic rule, regardless of other regime
characteristics.

​ Usage and Limitations of Autocratic Spells in Research (Third Person Perspective):

● Researchers often use data coding country years as democratic or not, equating
autocratic regimes with autocratic spells. However, this approach can introduce bias
when analyzing autocratic breakdowns or post-breakdown outcomes, such as
transitions to democracy or intensified dictatorship.

​ Comparison of Data Sets: Polity vs. CGV (Third Person Perspective):

● Polity scores measure the qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in
governing institutions, while CGV data classify countries as democratic or autocratic
based on leader type (civilian, military, or monarchic). However, both approaches
have limitations in identifying regime changes accurately.

​ Issues with Polity Data (Third Person Perspective):

● Polity scores may fail to identify regime changes when movements on the Polity
spectrum occur without democratization. For instance, the ouster of civilian president
 Milton Obote of Uganda by General Idi Amin would not be recognized as a regime
change by Polity scores.

​ Challenges with CGV Data (Third Person Perspective):

● CGV data classify autocratic regimes based on leader type but lack information on
regime start and end dates. This approach may lead to misclassifications, such as
grouping together periods of collégial military rule with civilian-led regimes.

​ Discrepancies in Duration Measures (Third Person Perspective):

● Comparison between autocratic spells derived from Polity and CGV data and actual
regime durations reveals discrepancies, particularly for military and personalist
regimes. Autocratic spells tend to be longer than the durations of individual autocratic
regimes, impacting the analysis of regime collapse and post-breakdown outcomes.

​ Implications for Research (Third Person Perspective):

● The choice of data set affects the accuracy of identifying regime changes and
understanding the dynamics of autocratic regimes. Using autocratic spells as a proxy
for regime duration may overlook important nuances in the timing and nature of
autocratic breakdowns, particularly in military and personalist dictatorships in poorer
countries.

Theoretical and Policy Applications: What Promotes Democratization?

​ Variation in Democratization Across Autocratic Regime Types (Third Person
Perspective):
● Democratization probabilities differ across autocratic regimes, with military
dictatorships being more likely to transition to democracy compared to personalist
dictatorships. Dominant-party regimes also exhibit higher democratization prospects
than personalist ones, especially during the post-Cold War era.

​ Implications for Policy Interventions (Third Person Perspective):

● Aid directed towards peaceful opposition groups may be more effective in promoting
democratization than support for armed opponents or military intervention.
Understanding the characteristics of regime collapse, such as violence and coercion,
can inform policymakers about the likely consequences of different intervention
strategies.

​ Assessment of Regime Collapse Characteristics (Third Person Perspective):

● Non-violent regime collapses are more prevalent and tend to result in a higher
likelihood of democratization compared to violent collapses. Similarly, non-coerced
transitions, including elections and insider-initiated changes, are more conducive to
democratization than coerced transitions involving foreign invasions, coups, or
uprisings.

​ Differential Impact of Coercion on Regime Collapse (Third Person Perspective):

● Coercion plays a significant role in regime collapse across various autocratic
contexts. While dominant-party regimes, personalist dictatorships, and monarchies
often experience coerced ousters, military dictatorships are more likely to undergo
 negotiated transitions, reducing the likelihood of violent exits and increasing
prospects for democratization.

​ Challenges and Future Research Directions (Third Person Perspective):

● Understanding when coercion contributes to democratization remains an important
area for future research. Factors such as the institutional vacuum in personalist
dictatorships and the limited prospects for political careers for individuals associated
with these regimes influence the likelihood of coercion leading to democratization.

Implications for the Arab Spring

​ Comparison with Post-Communist Transitions (Third Person Perspective):
● The outcomes of the Arab Spring are expected to differ from the transitions following
the fall of communist regimes. While many post-communist countries democratized,
the majority of original autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
have survived, indicating a lower likelihood of democratization.

​ Predictions for Democratization (Third Person Perspective):

● Democratization is more likely to follow dominant-party regimes than personalist
regimes. Tunisia, a dominant-party regime, has democratized, while Egypt, also
classified as a dominant-party hybrid, faces uncertainty. Personalist regimes, such as
those in Yemen and Libya, have lower prospects of democratization.

​ Role of Monarchies (Third Person Perspective):

● Monarchies in the MENA region are less likely to democratize, based on historical
trends where monarchy ousters rarely led to democracy. Monarchical transitions
often resulted in instability, civil war, or the rise of authoritarian leaders.

​ Impact of Popular Uprisings and Violence (Third Person Perspective):

● Popular uprisings, although common in the Middle East, are less likely to lead to
democratization compared to opposition election victories. Coercion, including
violence during transitions, reduces the prospects for democratization. High levels of
violence, as seen in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, diminish the chances of
democratization.

​ Need for Tentative Conclusions (Third Person Perspective):

● Conclusions drawn from the analysis are tentative, given the complexity of factors
influencing regime transitions. However, the new data facilitate further research to
predict the likelihood of democratization following autocratic breakdowns, aiding
policymakers in responding to instability and potential regime collapse in autocratic
countries.

Conclusions
​ Introduction of New Data Set (First Person Perspective):
● The authors present a new data set allowing quantitative analysis of autocratic
regime survival, challenges, and post-breakdown scenarios. This data set includes
 beginning and end dates for autocratic regimes, details on regime collapse, violence
during transitions, and classifications for various political outcomes.

​ Distinctive Features of the Data Set (First Person Perspective):

● The data set offers unique features, such as identifying regime start and end dates,
distinguishing periods of autocratic rule from provisional government and warlordism,
and providing user-friendly regime-type classifications. These features enhance the
ability to analyze political outcomes associated with different regime types.

​ Comparison with Existing Data Sets (First Person Perspective):

● Comparative analysis with existing data sets reveals that autocratic regimes last
approximately twice as long, on average, as individual dictators. This insight
emphasizes the importance of using appropriate data for testing specific theoretical
implications.

​ Addressing Proxy Issues in Previous Research (First Person Perspective):

● Previous research often used leader tenure or continuous spells of autocracy as
proxies for regime duration. The new data set provides an alternative, enabling more
accurate testing of theories related to systems of government and regime transitions.

​ Examples of Data Application (First Person Perspective):

● The authors showcase how the data set can answer questions relevant to scholars
and policymakers. They emphasize the need to include both democratic and
autocratic outcomes in studies related to regime change, such as the Arab Spring,
and discuss the implications for foreign policy choices.

​ Insights from Preliminary Investigations (First Person Perspective):

● Preliminary investigations highlight that fear of punishment after ouster can lead
dictators to international conflict. The conditions increasing the likelihood of
democratization after an autocratic breakdown are discussed, providing insights into
expectations following the Arab Spring.

​ Global Perspective on Autocracy (First Person Perspective):

● Despite optimism post-Cold War, many countries and people still live under autocratic
rule. To better understand contemporary autocracies, their vulnerabilities, and
potential outcomes following their collapse, comprehensive and accurate data, as
provided by the new data set, are crucial.
Kuran, Timur. "Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European
revolution of 1989." World politics 44, no. 1 (1991): 7-48.

NOW OUT OF NEVER: The Element of Surprise in the

East European Revolution of 1989
I. UNITED IN AMAZEMENT
Introduction: The Shock of 1989
● Surprise and Astonishment: The collapse of Eastern Europe's communist regimes
in 1989 left observers worldwide astounded. Seasoned political analysts, champions
of stability in totalitarian systems, and even futurologists were caught off guard by the
rapidity and extent of the political transformations.

● Unanticipated Change: Scholars, diplomats, journalists, and dissidents alike were

ill-prepared for the sudden upheaval. Despite some recognition of systemic
vulnerabilities, few foresaw the imminent collapse of communist rule. Even those who
predicted change did not anticipate its swiftness or peaceful nature.

● Historical Context: Historical accounts and personal recollections reflect

widespread disbelief and shock among both Eastern Europeans and the international
community. Anecdotal evidence highlights the unexpected nature of the events, with
individuals expressing disbelief and struggling to comprehend the magnitude of the
changes.

Factors Contributing to Surprise:

● Complexity of Prediction: The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was not
inevitable but rather the culmination of various factors, including economic
discontent, political disillusionment, and pent-up social frustration. However, the
interaction of these factors made prediction challenging, leading to widespread
surprise when revolution erupted.

● Paradox of Predictive Theories: Existing theories of revolution struggle to explain

the rapid pace and unexpected nature of events in Eastern Europe. While some
theories claim predictive power, none have consistently foreseen revolutionary
upheavals, highlighting the limitations of traditional approaches to understanding
political change.

Proposed Theory and Approach:

● Narrow Definition of Revolution: Revolution is defined narrowly as a
mass-supported seizure of political power aimed at transforming the social order.
This definition emphasizes the political aspect of revolutionary change, irrespective of
subsequent social or economic outcomes.

● Theory of Mobilization and Prediction: A new theory is proposed to illuminate the

process of revolutionary mobilization and the inherent difficulty of predicting when
 and where such mobilizations will occur. This theory aims to reconcile the surprise of
1989 with the broader historical context of revolutionary change.

Conclusion:
● Continued Characterization as Revolution: Despite ongoing debates about the
success of post-revolutionary reforms, the events of 1989 are unequivocally labeled
as a regionwide revolution. The surprise and astonishment surrounding these events
underscore the complexity of predicting political change and the need for a nuanced
understanding of evolutionary dynamics.

II. RECEIVED THEORIES OF REVOLUTION AND THEIR PREDICTIVE

WEAKNESSES
Theda Skocpol's Structuralist Theory:
● Skocpol's theory of social revolutions attributes them to a combination of weakened
state control and elite opposition, leading to popular uprisings aimed at transforming
society.
● The appeal of this theory lies in its focus on structural causes rather than subjective
factors like beliefs or intentions.
● However, it lacks predictive power as it does not account for the suddenness or
extent of revolutionary events, focusing instead on long-term structural conditions.

Rational Choice Theory:

● Rational choice theory posits that individuals are unlikely to participate in revolutions
due to the personal risks involved, leading to a collective action problem where
individuals prefer to free-ride on others' efforts.
● While effective at explaining why revolutions are rare, it fails to explain why they
occasionally occur and why individuals choose to challenge the regime despite
personal risks.

Deficiencies and Limitations:

● Neither structuralist nor rational choice theories adequately predict revolutionary
events, highlighting their respective weaknesses in explaining the East European
Revolution of 1989.
● Attempts to incorporate additional factors into these theories may improve their
explanatory power but cannot achieve perfect predictability due to inherent
complexities in human behavior and social dynamics.

Challenges with Retrospective Explanations:

● Retrospective explanations of revolutions often highlight overlooked signs and events
that seem significant in hindsight but were not recognized as such before the
revolution.
● The availability heuristic biases retrospective accounts, emphasizing information
consistent with actual events while downplaying inconsistent information.
Critique of Relative Deprivation Theory:
● The relative deprivation theory, which attributes revolutions to economic
disappointments and widespread discontent, fails to predict or explain revolutionary
events adequately.
● While relative deprivation may contribute to instability, it is too common in stable
societies to serve as a reliable indicator of impending revolution.

III. THE REVOLUTION

Individual Choices in Revolution:
● The author emphasizes that revolutions are not sparked by a collective entity but
rather by individual choices to participate in movements for change. These choices
are influenced by both internal (private preferences) and external (public
rewards/punishments) factors.

Preference Falsification:
● This concept is central to understanding why individuals may publicly support a
regime while privately opposing it. It highlights the discrepancy between public
expressions of allegiance and true personal sentiments.
● Preference falsification can be driven by various factors, including fear of
persecution, desire for personal rewards, or social pressure to conform to the
dominant narrative.

Revolutionary Thresholds:
● The idea of revolutionary thresholds provides a framework for understanding
individual decision-making in revolutionary contexts.
● An individual's revolutionary threshold represents the tipping point where the
perceived benefits of openly opposing the regime outweigh the perceived costs of
remaining silent or supportive.
● Factors influencing revolutionary thresholds include personal convictions,
perceptions of the size and strength of the opposition, and expectations of potential
rewards or punishments.

Revolutionary Bandwagons:
● Revolutionary bandwagons occur when a small change in one individual's decision
triggers a cascade of defections from the regime, leading to rapid growth in public
opposition.
● These bandwagons illustrate how seemingly minor shifts in individual preferences
can have significant collective outcomes, leading to the destabilization or overthrow
of a regime.

Role of Structural Factors:

● While individual choices play a crucial role in revolutions, structural factors such as
economic conditions, international relations, and social dynamics also shape the
environment in which revolutions occur.
● Structural factors can influence the distribution of private preferences and
revolutionary thresholds, thereby affecting the likelihood and dynamics of
revolutionary movements.
 Post-Revolutionary Narratives:
● The excerpt discusses how post-revolutionary narratives may distort the true level of
support or opposition to the ousted regime.
● Individuals may revise their past public expressions to align with the prevailing
narrative of the new regime, leading to a retrospective perception of widespread
discontent and opposition.

Power of the Individual:

● The analysis acknowledges the dual nature of individual agency in revolutions:
individuals may feel powerless due to the collective nature of revolutionary
movements, yet they also possess the potential to instigate significant change under
certain conditions.
● This recognition of individual agency underscores the importance of examining both
macro-level structural factors and micro-level decision-making in understanding
revolutionary dynamics.

Role of Organized Opposition and Unorganized Crowds:

● The excerpt highlights the complementary roles of organized opposition groups and
unorganized crowds in revolutionary movements.
● Organized groups provide resources, coordination, and support networks, while
unorganized crowds may initiate or amplify dissent, especially in the early stages of
revolutionary mobilization.

IV. EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM AND THE WELLSPRING OF ITS

STABILITY

Initial Promise vs. Reality:

● Communist parties came to power in Eastern Europe promising freedom, equality,
and prosperity but failed to deliver on these promises. Instead, they became
associated with repression, censorship, and economic backwardness.

Limited Public Opposition:

● Despite the failures of communism, public opposition remained rare prior to 1989.
The few uprisings that occurred, such as those in East Berlin (1953), Hungary (1956),
and Czechoslovakia (1968), were exceptions.

Factors Sustaining Communism:

● Official Repression: The communist establishment punished dissenters harshly,
leading to fear and self-censorship among the population.
● Public Compliance: People publicly supported the regime out of fear of punishment,
desire for stability, and social pressure to conform.
● Preference Falsification: Citizens outwardly endorsed communist ideology and
policies, even if they privately opposed them. This maintained the illusion of public
support for the regime.

Role of Individuals:
● Individuals often complied with regime demands to avoid trouble or gain benefits,
reinforcing the perception of regime stability.
 ● Dissidents faced ostracism and punishment, leading many to conform outwardly
while privately sympathizing with dissenters.

Cognitive Implications:
● Marxist discourse and propaganda conditioned people to think in terms of communist
ideology, blunting their ability to critique the system or articulate alternative economic
models.

Preference Falsification as Stability Mechanism:

● Preference falsification, rooted in fear and social pressure, prevented widespread
public opposition to communism. Without it, the regimes might have faced greater
resistance and potentially collapsed earlier.

V. THE REVOLUTION

Vulnerability of Communist Regimes:

● Despite outward appearances of stability and support, the regimes in Eastern Europe
were more vulnerable than commonly perceived. Public discontent and grievances
existed beneath the surface, waiting for the right conditions to emerge.

Role of Gorbachev's Reforms:

● Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) in
the Soviet Union catalyzed change across Eastern Europe. Economic problems and
internal dissatisfaction within the Soviet Union itself led to a shift in policy towards
accommodation and cooperation with the West.

Skepticism and Uncertainty:

● Even as Gorbachev's reforms signaled a potential for change, there was skepticism
about his ability to implement them effectively. Many doubted whether Gorbachev
could overcome opposition from conservative elements within the Soviet leadership
and the military.

Impact on Public Sentiment:

● Gorbachev's reforms and the accompanying discourse of openness (glasnost)
influenced public sentiment in Eastern Europe. They undermined the legitimacy of
communist regimes and reduced the perceived risks of challenging the status quo.

Turning Points in the Revolution:

● Several events served as turning points in the revolution, such as the refusal of East
German officials to use force against demonstrators and Gorbachev's renunciation of
Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe (the "Sinatra doctrine"). These events
emboldened opposition movements and discouraged governments from resorting to
violence.

Role of Leadership and Security Forces:

● The response of government officials and security forces played a crucial role in
determining the course of the revolution. In many cases, officials either defected to
the opposition or refrained from using force, contributing to the swift collapse of
communist regimes.
 Contagious Nature of Revolution:
● The success of opposition movements in one country lowered the perceived risks of
dissent in neighboring countries, accelerating the spread of revolution across Eastern
Europe.

Speed of Change:
● The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe occurred rapidly, with
long-standing dissidents assuming positions of power and countries transitioning to
democracy and economic liberalization.

VI. THE PREDICTABILITY OF UNPREDICTABILITY

Predictive Failure:
● Despite retrospective analysis suggesting that the events leading to the revolutions in
Eastern Europe were foreseeable, the essay argues that the warning signs remained
unclear until the revolutions occurred.

Historical Examples:
● The essay provides historical examples such as the French Revolution, the Nazi
takeover of Germany, the Russian Revolution, the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and
the Prague Spring of 1968 to illustrate how major social upheavals have often taken
by surprise even those directly involved.

Complexity of Revolutions:
● Revolutions are portrayed as complex events with numerous interacting variables,
making them difficult to predict with precision.

Human Rationality:
● The essay argues against attributing predictive failure to human irrationality,
suggesting instead that it stems from the calculated, purposeful actions of individuals
responding to changing incentives.

Limitations of General Theories:

● While acknowledging the complexity of revolutions, the essay suggests that general
theories can still offer insights into the process of revolution, even if they cannot
reliably predict specific outcomes.

Preference Falsification:
● The concept of preference falsification is introduced as a key factor contributing to
the unpredictability of revolutions. It refers to individuals publicly expressing beliefs or
preferences that differ from their true beliefs due to social pressures or fear of
reprisal.

Imperfect Observability:
● The essay distinguishes between imperfect observability and unobservability,
suggesting that while preferences and revolutionary thresholds are not always fully
observable, they are not entirely hidden either.
 Scientific Understanding:
● Emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the limits of scientific knowledge and
accepting unpredictability as a necessary aspect of studying complex phenomena
like revolutions.

Falsifiability:
● The essay asserts that while the theory presented is falsifiable, it remains valid until
proven otherwise by the development of a theory that accurately predicts revolutions
without relying on preference falsification.

Barany, Zoltan. " The Role of the Military." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011):
24-35.

The Role of the Military

Importance of Military Support:

● The excerpt emphasizes the critical role of the military in determining the success or
failure of revolutions within states. While not the sole determinant, military support or
acquiescence is seen as a necessary condition for revolutionary success.

Characteristics of Sultanistic Regimes:

● The regimes in the Arab-majority states under consideration are described as
"sultanistic," characterized by rigid authoritarianism and reliance on coercion. The
rulers often come from military or security backgrounds and maintain control over the
armed forces through personal command or trusted family members.

Variability in Regime Responses:

● Despite similarities in their authoritarian nature, the responses of the six regimes to
the uprisings varied widely, from rapid collapse to robust survival. Similarly, the roles
played by the military in these events also differed significantly.

Factors Influencing Military Response:

● Several factors influence how a military responds to a revolution, including the
legitimacy of the regime, its relationship with civil society, internal cohesion within the
armed forces, and the regime's track record in meeting political and socioeconomic
demands.

External Variables:
● External factors such as the threat of foreign intervention, the spread of revolutionary
movements, and officers' foreign training or education also influence military
decision-making.

Context-Specific Analysis:
● The response of the military to an uprising depends on the specific context of each
country, highlighting the importance of detailed knowledge of the country and its
armed forces.
 Opacity of Military Establishments:
● Gathering reliable information about the armed forces in these countries is
challenging due to their opacity to outsiders, making it difficult to predict military
responses accurately.

Response Categories:
● The six states are categorized based on how the regular military responded to the
uprisings: backing the revolution (Tunisia, Egypt), splitting (Libya, Yemen), or turning
against the demonstrators (Syria, Bahrain).

Siding with the Rebels: Tunisia and Egypt

In Tunisia, the military played a crucial role in supporting the uprising against President
Ben Ali. General Rachid Ammar, the army chief of staff, defied Ben Ali's orders to
deploy troops in support of the regime's crackdown on protesters. Instead, Ammar
positioned his troops between the security forces and the demonstrators, effectively
saving the revolution and forcing Ben Ali into exile. This decision stemmed from
several factors:

Tradition of Military Non-Interference:

● Tunisia's military had a tradition of staying out of politics, dating back to President
Habib Bourguiba's tenure. Unlike other North African armies, Tunisia's military had
never attempted a coup or involved itself in political decision-making. Ben Ali
continued this policy, keeping the armed forces small and focused on border
defense.

Professionalism and Disdain for Corruption:

● Despite its limited budget and equipment, Tunisia's military was among the Arab
world's most professional forces. Military officers were trained in the United States,
where they learned about civil-military relations under democracy. The military had no
vested interest in supporting Ben Ali's regime, especially given the corruption within
his inner circle.

Regime's Last Resort:

● Ben Ali's decision to turn to the military for support was a sign of desperation. The
military, having no special stake in the regime's survival, refused to shoot fellow
Tunisians on behalf of the regime, leading to Ben Ali's downfall.

In Egypt, the military's decision to back the uprising against President Mubarak was
less straightforward. Initially, the military elites hedged their bets and worked to
advance their position within the government. Some army units detained and abused
protesters, but they did not open fire on them or prevent demonstrations in Tahrir
Square. The turning point came when security agents and Mubarak loyalists
unleashed extensive violence on protesters on February 2, shattering whatever
remaining support the regime had among the people.
Several reasons explain the Egyptian military's decision to abandon Mubarak:
 Privileged Status of the Military:
● Unlike Tunisia, Egypt's military enjoyed privileged status and economic benefits
under Mubarak's regime. The military was involved in various economic sectors,
generating revenue that went directly to its coffers.

Disdain for Gamal Mubarak:

● Military elites despised Gamal Mubarak, the president's son and potential successor,
who represented a faction of "state entrepreneurs" seeking to profit from economic
reforms.

Concerns about Radicalism and Economic Malaise:

● The military was growing increasingly concerned about youth alienation, Islamist
radicalism, and economic stagnation under Mubarak's rule.

Ties to Society and Reluctance to Use Force:

● Egypt's conscript army had deep ties to society, and many officers and enlisted men
would likely have refused to obey orders to shoot demonstrators, further undermining
the regime's authority.

In both Tunisia and Egypt, the military's decision to side with the uprising was influenced
by a combination of factors, including professional norms, disdain for corruption, and
concerns about the regime's legitimacy and stability.

Divided Loyalties: Libya and Yemen

In both Libya and Yemen, the armed forces were divided in their response to the
uprisings, reflecting deep-seated societal divisions and differing levels of institutional
development:

Yemen:
● President Saleh initially attempted to quell protests by making concessions such as
tax cuts, food subsidies, and promises not to extend his rule beyond 2013 or allow
his son to succeed him.
● However, the killing of protesters by security forces on March 18 sparked greater
opposition and divisions within the armed forces.
● General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a longtime ally of Saleh, defected along with other
generals, leading to a loss of loyalty among ordinary soldiers.
● Saleh relied on better-equipped and -trained elite army units, the Republican Guard,
and Central Security Forces to maintain power while facing significant opposition
within the military ranks.

Libya:
● Qadhafi responded to the uprising by unleashing his paramilitary organizations
against the rebels, prioritizing them over the regular military.
● Qadhafi had deliberately neglected the regular military and favored elite and
paramilitary forces, many of which were commanded by his relatives.
● Despite attempts to ensure loyalty through coercion and bribery, significant
defections occurred within the military, particularly in eastern Libya.
● NATO's bombing campaign against Qadhafi, along with international isolation and
efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council, further weakened his regime.
● The conflict escalated into civil war, with the poorly organized rebels struggling to
take control of western Libya, despite NATO support.
● Qadhafi remained determined to fight on but was eventually ousted in late August
2011.

In both cases, societal divisions, tribal affiliations, and dissatisfaction with the regime
contributed to divisions within the armed forces. Coercion, bribery, and external
factors such as international intervention also played significant roles in shaping the
outcomes of the conflicts. However, by mid-2011, both countries remained in states of
civil war, with the outcomes of the fighting still uncertain.

Sticking with the Status Quo: Bahrain and Syria

Bahrain:
● Bahrain's military, while modest in size, is well-equipped and well-trained.
● It primarily consists of Sunni Muslims tasked with protecting the Sunni ruling family
and Sunni political elites in a country where the majority of the population is Shia.
● The monarchy's fear of Iranian influence among local Shias further cements the
military's allegiance to the Sunni ruling elite.
● The Bahraini military swiftly suppressed the Shia-led revolt that began on February
14, 2011, with additional support from the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Syria:
● Syria's military, dominated by Alawites, has been loyal to Bashar al-Assad's Baath
Party dictatorship.
● The Assad family, belonging to the Alawite community, has maintained control since
Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970.
● Tensions between majority Sunnis and minority Alawites have a long history, with the
regime using force, such as the Hama massacre in 1982, to suppress opposition.
● The military has been using heavy weapons against unarmed protesters since March
2011, resulting in hundreds of casualties.

Overall Analysis:
● Military support or lack thereof is a reliable predictor of revolution outcomes.
● Regimes backed by the military (Bahrain, Syria) tend to survive.
● Where the military doesn't support the regime (Tunisia, Egypt), the regime likely
collapses.
● Divided military (Libya, Yemen) outcomes influenced by external factors and
opposition strength.
● Civil-military relations mirror broader political developments.
● Tunisia's genuine transition to democracy offers a positive civil-military relations
outlook.
● Egypt's military withdrawal from politics is unlikely due to tradition and vested
interests.
● Indonesia offers a potential model for military disengagement from politics.
● Dim prospects for democracy in Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
● Stronger nexus expected between governments and armed forces in Bahrain and
Syria.
● Uncertain outcomes for civil wars in Libya and Yemen, with Western involvement
offering hope for Libya's future.

Week 9

Slides:
Press Freedom in the EU:
● In the EU, press freedom is considered a fundamental right, enshrined in the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
● Additionally, press freedom is supported by the European Convention on Human
Rights, which provides a legal framework for protecting human rights, including
freedom of expression and the press.
● The Court of Justice of the EU serves as a judicial body that upholds these rights and
ensures compliance with EU law, including press freedom.

Challenges in Hungary:
● Despite being part of the EU and thus bound by its principles, Hungary has faced
criticism for challenges to press freedom.
● The passage suggests that some media outlets in Hungary remain critical of the
government, indicating that not all media are controlled or censored.
● However, the reference to "challenges" implies that there are significant obstacles or
threats to media freedom in Hungary, which may include government censorship,
legal restrictions, or other forms of pressure on journalists and media organizations.

International Support:
● Despite these challenges, international entities occasionally provide support to
Hungarian media outlets that are critical of the government.
● This support may come in various forms, such as funding, advocacy, or raising
awareness about threats to press freedom in Hungary.

II. The Regime and the Media

Advertising
● The single largest advertiser
○ Direct Government Communication: This likely involves advertising or
communication campaigns directly funded and managed by the government
to convey official messages or information to the public.
 ○ National Bank: The national bank may engage in advertising campaigns to
promote its services, and financial products, or to communicate with
customers and the public.
○ Tourism Agency: A government-owned or controlled tourism agency
responsible for promoting tourism and travel within the country.
● State-controlled actors
○ Energy (MVM): This likely refers to an energy company owned or controlled
by the state, which may engage in advertising related to its services or
initiatives.
○ Lottery (SZRT): A state-controlled lottery organization that conducts
advertising campaigns to promote lottery products and games.
● Private Entities Owned by the Regime's "Clientele": These are private
businesses or entities owned or controlled by individuals or groups closely
associated with the regime. They may benefit from government contracts or
favorable treatment.
● State-Dependent Actors: These could be organizations or individuals whose
livelihoods or operations depend on their relationship with the state or government
contracts.
● Actors Willing to Work with State-Related Entities: This likely refers to businesses
or individuals who are willing to collaborate with state-related entities on advertising
campaigns or projects.
● Clientele of Agencies Representing Regime-Related Entities: This suggests that
some agencies or firms represent the interests of regime-related entities, and their
clients may include businesses or individuals closely connected to the government.
● Agencies Owned by Regime-Related Entities: These are advertising agencies or
firms owned or controlled by entities associated with the regime, which may handle
advertising campaigns for government or regime-related clients.

Ownership

State Media:
● Fully controlled by the government.
● Directives on content come directly from government authorities.
● Monopoly on news agency services.
● Often mixes entertainment with propaganda messaging.
● NGOs are not allowed on screen, while government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) are
promoted both on and off-screen.
● Features exclusively government-approved faces, with no representation of
opposition views except for a limited time during elections.

Created Media:
● Includes tabloids, daily newspapers, and online platforms.
● Significant funding allocated for annual communication of the Prime Minister's
Cabinet, which has tripled over time.

Bought Media:
● All regional media outlets are under control.
● Government influences the largest print, TV, and online platforms.
● Over 500 entities donated funds to the Central European Press and Media
Foundation (KESMA).
● No regulatory oversight due to claims of "strategic national interest."

Discontinued Media:
● Examples include Népszabadság and Streetfighter media.
● Government reportedly engages paid influencers and front fighters to influence public
opinion.
● Media landscape dominated by government-controlled entities, with apparent
opposition media having limited impact.
● Outdoor advertising is completely dominated by government messaging.

Departure of International Companies:

● Several international media companies, including Deutsche Telekom,
ProSiebenSat1, RussMedia, Sanoma, Lapcom, Modern Times, and Axel Springer,
have exited the market.

Legislation

Media Law:
● Governed by specific legislation.
● Oversight by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the Media
Council, which operate as a joint institution.
● The leader of this institution has a 9-year mandate.
● Responsibilities include managing streaming rights, allocating regional broadcast
radio frequencies, regulating state-financed advertisements, and overseeing
commercial television channels.
● The Media Council has the authority to issue excessive fines for newsrooms.

Capture of State Media:

● Implications of state control or influence over media outlets.

Civil Act (NGOs):

● Pertains to regulations for non-governmental organizations.
● Requirements for registration and self-labeling for organizations supported by foreign
entities.
● The European Court of Human Rights intervened to force the cancellation of this act
after four years, suggesting a violation of human rights principles.

Advertising Tax:
● Previously imposed at a rate of 7.5% on all advertising revenues.
● Current status is suspended, indicating a temporary halt to its enforcement.

National Sovereignty Protection:

● Purpose and implications of measures to protect national sovereignty, with specific
details to be determined.
Access to Information:
● Concerns regarding access to parliamentary proceedings and public interest data.
● Instances of exclusion from press events and limitations on coverage of street
events.

The Draft Legislation:

● Aims to prohibit the acceptance of foreign financial support by political actors.
● Proposes the establishment of a Sovereignty Authority with extensive powers:
○ Unlimited agency to define the cause, scope, and targets of its actions.
○ Authority to access information without limits.
○ Obligation for subjects to provide all "relevant" information.
○ Mandate for state and private institutions to enter cooperative agreements
with the Sovereignty Authority.
○ No legal oversight, including immunity from legal remedy, even from courts.

Readings
Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 27,
No. 1.
On Democratic Backsliding
​ Defining Democratic Backsliding
● A broad term, denoting state-led debilitation or elimination of political institutions
sustaining democracy.
● Encompasses diverse political institutions and state actors, requiring specification for
practical meaning.

​ Conceptual Opacity
● Likened to an old steamer trunk, opaque and unwieldy but valuable when unpacked.

​ Major Varieties of Democratic Backsliding

● Six major varieties were explored to clarify the concept.
● Varieties vary in frequency over time.
● Some blatant forms decline, while more complex forms increase.

​ Legitimation Through Institutions

● Modern backsliding is legitimized through democratic institutions.
● Irony in that democracy promoters' prioritized institutions can be used for backsliding.
● Trends reflect slow progress, not democracy's demise.

​ Historical Look at Backsliding Varieties

● Analysis reveals changing forms of backsliding.
● Classic coups were replaced by "promissory coups."
● Executive coups were replaced by executive aggrandizement.
● Election-day vote fraud replaced by long-term strategic harassment.
​ The etymology of "Backsliding"
● Originating in 1554, it linked to turning away from an ideal.
● The secular meaning of "democratic" signifies a willful turning away from democratic
ideals.

​ Endpoints of Backsliding
● Rapid, radical change leads to outright democratic breakdown.
● Gradual changes across limited institutions yield ambiguously democratic or hybrid
systems.
● Democratic backsliding can constitute a breakdown or serious weakening of
democratic institutions.

​ Challenges in Fluid and Ill-Defined Situations

● Fluid and ill-defined situations result from backsliding.
● Taking action to defend democracy becomes challenging.
● Highlights difficulties in responding to ambiguous political scenarios.

Positive Trends
● Democratic backsliding changes post-Cold War.
● The decline was observed in three major forms: coups d'état, executive coups, and
blatant election-day vote fraud.

​ Decline of Classic Coups d'État

● Coups: illegal attempts to oust a sitting executive.
● Historical analysis reveals a significant decline in all coups, especially open-ended
military coups.
● The probability of democracies being targeted by any coup dropped drastically after
1995.
● The likelihood of a democratic government facing a successful coup dropped to
nearly zero in the early 2000s.

​ Decline of Executive Coups

● Executive coups or "self-coups" involve elected leaders suspending the constitution
to amass power.
● Associated with dictatorships, they were common post-Cold War.
● The decline observed since the 1990s, with only Niger experiencing an executive
coup between 2000 and 2013.

​ Decline of Election-Day Vote Fraud

● Reported drop in blatant election-day vote fraud.
● Electoral malpractice overall may persist, but open fraud on election day decreases.
● Reasons for the decline debated, including normative change, election monitoring, or
deterrent effects of parallel vote tabulation.
● Observers note fraud has become more subtle, with blatant manipulation less
common.
​ Summary of Positive Trends
● Positive shifts in democratic backsliding since the Cold War.
● Declines in classic coups, executive coups, and blatant election-day fraud.
● Overall, a positive trajectory in these dimensions indicates progress in safeguarding
democratic processes.

Continuing Challenges
● The gratifying decline in some forms of backsliding.
● Unfortunate rise or persistence in other varieties requiring immediate attention.

​ Promissory Coups
● Definition: Say that when a government is removed from power, it means that they
are fighting for democracy, promising to hold new elections, and then returning to
democracy.
● The share of successful coups in this category rises significantly from 35% (before
1990) to 85% (afterward).
● Aftermath analysis shows dismal results:
● Few promissory coups followed by competitive elections.
● Elections often favor coup backers.
● Post-coup elections are not a reliable route to democratic reinstatement.

​ Post-Coup Election Outcomes

● Examples of election outcomes after promissory coups:

● Haiti: Coup leader's promise of elections not fulfilled; international intervention
needed.
● Honduras (2009): Questionable elections; coup coalition perceived as winners.
● Madagascar (2013): Elections follow coup leader's surrogate winning; no
improvement in freedom.
● Mali (2013): Coup leader's ally wins presidential election; no deepening of
democracy.
● Fiji (2014): Coup leader returns through elections, Fiji First party wins decisively.
● No substantial improvement in democracy after promissory coups.

​ Democratic Deepening After Promissory Coups

● Absence of democratic improvement, even when coup opponents win post-coup
elections.
● Lesotho (1994): Substantial improvement in political and civil rights recorded.
● Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Pakistan: Remained Partly Free, precarious status.
● Thailand (2006): Shifts from Free to dictatorship after the coup in 2014.

​ Unfulfilled Promises
● Promissory coups raise expectations but often fail to deliver.
● Examples: Thailand's (2006) military coup followed by a return to dictatorship in
2014 without promised elections.
​ Conclusion
● Continuing challenges in democratic backsliding.
● Rise in promissory coups, unfulfilled promises, and dashed expectations.

Executive aggrandizement

● Definition: Executive aggrandizement involves elected executives weakening

checks on power through legal channels, without executive replacement.
● Contrast with coup making: Slower pace, no executive replacement, institutional
changes through legal means.
● Institutional changes are framed as democratic mandates due to being decreed by
freely elected officials.

​ Examples of Executive Aggrandizement

● Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)

● 2002-2011: Resounding electoral victories for AKP; "quiet revolution" with record
legislative changes.
● Legal measures curtail media freedoms and judicial autonomy.
● Constitutional changes in 2010 and 2014 consolidated executive power over the
judiciary.
● Thousands of judges removed; National Intelligence Organization gains sweeping
surveillance powers.

● Ecuador (Rafael Correa)

● 2007: Proposal for a Constitutional Assembly endorsed by 82% in a referendum.
● The government has made some changes to the country's constitution that have
given them more power and made it difficult for the opposition to challenge them.
● They have also made it easier for their political party to stay in power by changing the
rules around elections. Some programs and laws have also been put in place to limit
the power of the opposition.
● In addition, the government has removed the limit on how long they can stay in power
(2015).

● Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade)

● 2006-2008: Curtailment of protest rights, manipulation of the electoral calendar,
changes in legislative rules, creation of a new upper house.

● Ukraine (Viktor Yanukovych)

● Before the 2014 ouster: Meddling with courts and police, engineering changes in
parliamentary composition, manipulation of the Constitution to centralize power.

​ Diverse Examples Across Countries

● President Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, President Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, and
examples from Sri Lanka and Mozambique.
● Illustrates the widespread occurrence of executive aggrandizement across varied
ideological and geographic contexts.
​ Conclusion
● An executive aggrandizement is a common form of democratic backsliding.
● Legal changes undermining checks on executive power.

Manipulating elections strategically

● Strategic election manipulation is a rising form of backsliding.

● Often coupled with executive aggrandizement.
● Aimed at favoring incumbents by tilting the electoral playing field.

​ Forms of Strategic Manipulation

● Hampering Media Access:

● Restricting media coverage for opposition candidates.
● Using government influence to control narratives and coverage.

● Use of Government Funds for Incumbent Campaigns:

● Unfair allocation of state resources to benefit incumbent candidates.

● Keeping Opposition Candidates off the Ballot:

● Legal hurdles, disqualification tactics, or restrictive eligibility criteria.

● Hampering Voter Registration:

● Impeding the registration of voters likely to support opposition parties.

● Packing Electoral Commissions:

● Manipulating the composition of electoral commissions to favor incumbents.

● Changing Electoral Rules to Favor Incumbents:

● Altering rules to create advantageous conditions for the ruling party.

● Harassing Opponents:
● Intimidation, legal actions, or threats against opposition candidates and supporters.

​ Strategic vs. Blatant Election Manipulation

● Timing:
● Strategic manipulation occurs before polling day.
● Blatant fraud typically involves violations on election day.

● Visibility and Criticism:

● Strategic manipulation is less likely to be caught or criticized by international and
domestic observers.
● Blatant fraud attracts more scrutiny and criticism.

​ Unintended Consequences and Rise of Strategic Manipulation

● Linked to the rise of international election monitoring.
● Politicians adapt tactics as blatant fraud becomes costlier.
● Scholars agree that much election-related backsliding now happens before election
day.
​ Conclusion
● Strategic manipulation poses challenges to fair and transparent elections.
● Adaptation to monitoring mechanisms highlights the evolving nature of
election-related backsliding.
● Need for continued attention and vigilance to safeguard democratic processes.

Confronting Backsliding
● Shift like de-democratization: Incremental decline rather than sudden breakdowns.
● Challenges presented by democratic erosion and the need for scholarly attention.

​ Challenges for Scholars

● Focus on clear cases of democratic collapse rather than incremental regime
changes.
● Research on "hybrid" regimes is a step forward.
● Democracy is a collage of institutions that can be dismantled piece by piece.

​ Political Challenges
● Alterations in electoral laws, district boundaries, etc., may seem arcane but are
crucial.
● Court-packing and media restrictions as challenges to democracy.
● Difficulty in mobilizing mass resistance against incremental erosion.

​ Fragmented Resistance
● Slow slides toward authoritarianism may provoke fragmented resistance.
● Civic organizations representing disadvantaged groups may face framing as "special
interests."

​ Lack of Bright Spark and Opposition Leaders

● Slow slides often lack a bright spark to ignite effective action.
● Opposition and movement leaders may be absent to voice a clarion call.

​ Executive Aggrandizement and Strategic Electoral Manipulation

● Backsliding occurs where the majority support for it is already taking root.
● Opposition weakened by performance failures and internal divisions.
● Difficulty in mustering the power of numbers to reverse backsliding.

​ Dependence on Foreign Allies

● Success in mobilizing mass action often depends on foreign allies.
● Challenges of countering backsliding in the absence of strong domestic opposition.

​ Conclusion
● The need for a shift in scholarly focus toward understanding incremental regime
changes.
● Recognition of democracy as a dynamic system that requires constant attention and
protection.
● Addressing the challenges posed by fragmented resistance and the absence of clear
opposition leaders.
Rational Responses to Backsliding
​ Introduction
● Recognition that current trends in backsliding are rational responses, not random
events.
● State actors restructuring institutions defensively to prevent reenactments of past
assaults.

​ Defensive Reactions
● Examples of Correa's and Erdoğan's aggrandizing policies as reactions to troubled
institutional landscapes.
● Rational responses to recent history and challenges faced by their predecessors.

​ International Incentives
● Backsliding as rational reactions to international incentives.
● Democracy promotion's impact on reducing coups and framing them as promissory to
avoid sanctions.

​ Impact on Electoral Malpractice

● Aid sanctions drive down the number of coups.
● Clean elections as a focus of international resources and prestige.

​ Democracy Promotion's Impact

● Elections as "the only game in town" leading to resource investment in manipulating
them.
● Impact of the liberal-democratic project on executive aggrandizement.

​ Increased Scrutiny
● Push for free and private media increasing scrutiny on elected executives.
● Strengthening parties and legislatures as critical tasks for chief executives.

​ Active Civil Society

● Push to make civil society more active and the influence of past mass mobilizations.
● Current attempts to control media, legislative majorities, and associational life as
predictable responses.

​ Conclusion
● Backsliding is a rational and calculated response to changing domestic and
international dynamics.
● Recognition of the impact of democracy promotion on shaping the strategies of state
actors.
● Understanding the interplay between global and local incentives in the context of
backsliding.

Vexing ambiguity
● Recognition of the profound ambiguity in contemporary forms of democratic
backsliding.

​ Legitimation through Institutions

● Backsliding is legitimized through prioritized democratic institutions: national
elections, voting majorities, and the "rule" of laws.
● Challenges in deploying leverage under these conditions.

​ Challenges in Challenging Laws

● Challenging laws crafted by democratically elected bodies risk sovereignty concerns.
● Difficulty in proving nefarious purposes behind changes in democratic institutions.

​ Targets of Backsliding’s Institutional Changes

● Ambiguity in defending institutions that shield corrupt or undesirable elements.
● Weakening credibility in defending these institutions in the short run.

​ Tactical Challenges from Promissory Coups

● Promissory coups seek legitimacy by vowing to produce a better democratic regime.
● Backing from jurists, legislators, and mobilized citizens complicates responses.

​ Effectiveness of Sanctions
● Sanctions are effective when imposed but may be lifted due to security concerns.
● The backsliding-security tradeoff in the context of the War on Terror.

​ Populist Support and Mobilization

● Ambiguity and difficulty in reversing backsliding when it has broad popular support.
● Coping with mobilized supporters who may support an elected official's unlawful
removal.

​ Policy Challenge with Democratizing Agenda

● Policy challenges when supporters of backsliding have a credible democratizing
agenda.
● Backsliding to deepen democracy rather than destroy it.

​ Consideration of Citizens' Motivations

● Need for an individual, historically informed response to each country's experience.
● Understanding the motivations of citizens involved in backsliding.

​ Conclusion
● Recognition of the multifaceted challenges posed by the ambiguity in contemporary
democratic backsliding.
● The need for nuanced and context-specific responses to different forms of
backsliding.

A Better Mix
● Acknowledgment of daunting challenges but emphasis on their surmountability.
​ Preferable Mix of Backsliding
● Incremental and ambiguous change is preferable, preserving mixed landscapes for
correction.
● Possibilities for clawing back power, countermobilization, and reversing negative
trends.

​ Examples of Positive Change

● Examples from Venezuela and Ecuador illustrate countermobilization and changed
incentives.
● Real possibilities for reversing backsliding before unambiguous regime change
occurs.

​ The outcome of Regime Change

● A marked decrease in the duration of autocracy after democracy is toppled.
● The average authoritarianism of successor dictatorships is less than their
predecessors.

​ Positive Trends
● Positive trends in the decline of egregious forms of backsliding.
● Decline in the longevity and brutality of successor regimes.

​ Open Questions
● The relationship between positive trends and changes in varieties of backsliding
remains an open question.
● Need for more systematic thinking on coping with backsliding.

​ Conclusion
● Optimism about democracy's prospects despite challenges.
● Emphasis on systematic thinking to further improve responses to backsliding.
​
Scheppele, Kim. 2022. How Viktor Orbán Wins. Journal of Democracy, 33(3),
45-61.
How Victor Orbán Wins
In the lead-up to Hungary's April 3, 2022, parliamentary election, the opposition
coalition, United for Hungary, appeared to have a fighting chance against Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party. Despite Fidesz's control, the opposition aimed to
break Orbán's two-thirds majority, essential for constitutional amendments. The 2022
election was critical, with the opposition seemingly united and the polls suggesting a
close race.

Background
● Structural Bias: Orbán's electoral system revision a decade earlier favored Fidesz,
creating a structural bias.
● Opposition Strategy: The opposition, united in a coalition, fielded a single candidate
against Fidesz in each district, aiming to maximize its chances.
Challenging the Two-Thirds Majority
● Importance of Two-Thirds Majority: Orbán's supermajority allowed constitutional
changes at will.
● Potential Victory: Even if the opposition couldn't win, stripping Orbán's two-thirds
majority would be a significant achievement.

Unexpected Triumph for Orbán

● Pre-election Predictions: Days before the election, polls hinted at a potential loss of
the two-thirds majority for Orbán.
● Election Outcome: Contrary to predictions, Orbán's Fidesz secured its biggest
triumph, maintaining the two-thirds majority comfortably.

Election Rigging Strategies

● Legal Manipulation: Orbán's success highlights legal strategies employed by
autocrats to rig elections.
● Changing Laws: Using parliamentary majorities, autocrats can change laws to
neutralize opposition strategies.

Implications
● Democracy's Defenders: Understanding Orbán's victory illustrates the challenges
democrats face when autocrats establish legal frameworks to secure power.
● Lessons Learned: The Hungarian case provides insights into how autocrats can
manipulate elections, emphasizing the need for vigilance and strategic responses.

The 2022 Campaign

Hungary's 2022 parliamentary election, despite early expectations of a close race,
resulted in a significant victory for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party.
Analyzing the election outcome involves understanding the tactics Orbán employed,
the media environment, and the strategic voting behavior of Hungarian citizens.

Factors Influencing the Election Outcome

​ Orbán's Base of Support:
● Historical trends show Orbán's support around a third of the electorate.
● Massive pre-election benefits, such as a "thirteenth-month" pension and tax
exemptions, aimed to secure more voters.

​ Public Sector Employment:

● Orbán leveraged make-work public-sector jobs to gaA decade earlier, in support.
● The National Public Employment Program replaced social welfare benefits with
public-sector jobs, creating dependency.

​ Media Control and Chain Voting:

● Orbán established media control through economic pressure rather than direct
censorship.
● Chain voting, where voters are influenced to cast predetermined ballots, was used to
manipulate the outcome.
​ Opposition Struggles:
● Opposition media faced financial challenges, limiting its reach.
● Fidesz outspent the opposition tenfold on political ads, drowning out the opposition's
message.

​ Media Dominance and the War in Ukraine:

● Orbán's "peace and security" message during the Ukraine crisis resonated with
voters.
● Skillful messaging and control of media narrative contributed to Fidesz's popularity
boost.

​ Wedge Issues and Referendum:

● Orbán exploited divisive issues like anti-LGBTIQ legislation and initiated a
referendum alongside the election.
● Changes to referendum laws allowed Orbán to use this strategy effectively.

​ Jobbik's Role:
● Jobbik, once a far-right party, lost support to Fidesz, aligning with its nationalist
agenda.
● Orbán's divisive tactics, especially around LGBTIQ issues, might have swayed Jobbik
voters toward Fidesz.

​ Election Observations:
● The OSCE reported persistent violations of standards and deemed the election unfair
due to unequal access to resources and media.

The Illiberal Electoral System

The roots of Hungary's illiberal electoral system trace back to 1989, with Orbán
intentionally shaping election laws to disadvantage the opposition. The system
prioritizes legal manipulation, media control, and strategic division of opposition
forces.

Conclusion
Hungary's 2022 election showcased Orbán's adept use of legal and strategic tools to
secure a significant victory. The combination of media dominance, divisive issues,
and strategic voting patterns played crucial roles in Fidesz's success. Understanding
these dynamics is essential for those concerned with preserving democracy in the
face of illiberal electoral practices.

The Genesis of Hungary's Illiberal Electoral System

Historical Background

​ 1989 Constitutional Changes:

● The Hungarian Roundtable in 1989 led to a new constitution and election law.
● The lack of recent multiparty elections influenced the drafting of election laws.

​ Complicated Election System:

● Two-vote system: one for a constituency representative and another for a party list.
● A 4 percent threshold for parties to enter parliament.
● The system was complex, making it challenging for average voters to comprehend.

​ 1990 Election Disproportionality:

● In the first election under the new law, only six of 28 parties entered parliament.
● The largest vote-getter did not proportionally match the seats, highlighting the
system's flaws.

​ Threshold Increase:
● The threshold to enter parliament was raised to 5 percent after 1994.
● Disproportionality increased, with parties winning a higher percentage of seats than
their vote share.

Supermajority Concerns

​ Socialist-Liberal Coalition:
● The Socialist Party won a significant share in 1994 but formed a coalition with the
Liberals.
● Concerns arose over the constitutional power a coalition with four-fifths of parliament
seats could wield.

​ Constitutional Amendment:
● To limit supermajority power, a constitutional amendment required four-fifths of
parliament's approval for a complete redraft.

Changing Governments and the 2010 Election

​ Election Swings:
● Power alternated between parties in various elections, indicating voter dissatisfaction
with incumbents.
● Financial mismanagement and scandals contributed to changing governments.

​ 2008 Financial Crisis:

● Hungary faced bankruptcy after the 2008 financial crisis, leading to a caretaker
government under IMF austerity.

​ 2010 Fidesz Victory:

● Fidesz, led by Orbán, won the 2010 election with 53 percent of the vote but secured
68 percent of seats due to the disproportionate system.
● Orbán's leadership within Fidesz consolidated power and eliminated internal
leadership rotation.

​ Unconstrained Power:
● The combination of easy constitutional amendments and a disproportionate election
system gave unprecedented power to Fidesz.

Orbán's Dominance
● Orbán's control over candidate selection and ministers solidified his influence.
● Fidesz's coalition with the Christian Democratic Party was symbolic, with the latter
lacking independent support.
Conclusion
Hungary's illiberal electoral system, rooted in the early post-communist era, evolved to
favor the party in power disproportionately. The interplay of constitutional changes,
supermajority concerns, and changing governments set the stage for Viktor Orbán's
dominance, leading to a concentration of power within Fidesz. Understanding this
historical context is crucial for grasping Hungary's contemporary political landscape.

Gerrymandering in Hungary
2010 Election and Constitutional Changes

​ Orbán's Unprecedented Power:

● The 2010 election empowered Viktor Orbán, allowing him to amend the constitution
at will.
● Orbán made twelve constitutional amendments in his first year, including the removal
of the four-fifths hurdle for rewriting the Constitution.

​ Hasty Constitution Drafting:

● Orbán introduced a new constitution within a year, drafted without transparency or
public input.
● Debated in parliament for only nine days and passed on a party-line vote.

​ Impact on Elections:
● The 2011 Constitution led to significant changes, including the halving of the
parliament's size.
● The reduction required nationwide redistricting, but the Constitution provided no
guidelines for the process.

Gerrymandering and Redistricting

​ Opaque Redistricting Process:

● Rather than a transparent process, the government conducted redistricting behind
closed doors.
● Law CCIII/2011, containing literal district boundaries, was passed as a "cardinal law"
amendable only by a subsequent two-thirds parliamentary vote.

​ District Size Disparities:

● The redistricting resulted in districts varying widely in size, with Fidesz strongholds
having smaller districts.
● Sizes ranged from sixty to ninety thousand voters, and deviations from the ODIHR
standard were not corrected by the 2018 redistricting.

​ Gerrymandering in Fidesz's Favor:

● By the 2022 election, 25 out of 106 districts exceeded the ODIHR standard, with
deviations of over 10 percent.
● A study showed that under these districts, if Fidesz and the left opposition received
equal votes, Fidesz would gain ten more seats.
​ Historical Impact:
● The initial districts' study suggested that if the 2006 election had used these districts,
Fidesz would have won, altering historical outcomes.

​ Persistent Bias:
● The gerrymandering bias persisted through 2022, noted by election monitors citing a
significantly unequal distribution of registered voters.

Conclusion
Gerrymandering in Hungary, particularly in the redistricting process following the 2011
Constitution, favored Fidesz by creating disparities in district sizes that benefited the
ruling party. The lack of transparency and the use of "cardinal laws" limited
amendments, solidifying an electoral system that consistently favored the dominant
political force. The impact endured influenced electoral outcomes and raised
concerns about the fairness and equality of the electoral process in Hungary.

Dividing to Conquer
Changes in Individual Constituency Elections

​ Runoff Elimination:
● Orbán eliminated the second-round runoff in individual constituency elections,
allowing candidates with fewer than half the votes to prevail.
● The change favored single parties overbroad coalitions.

​ Proliferation of Parties:
● Loosened rules for creating new parties led to financial incentives for forming "fake
parties," resulting in numerous choices for voters.
● Over 250 new parties emerged in 2018, contributing to voter confusion.

​ Fake Parties and Confusion:

● Fidesz-friendly parties with names resembling real opposition parties, such as MEMO
vs. MOMENTUM, added to voter confusion.
● The elimination of runoffs made it easier for Fidesz-friendly candidates to win with a
fragmented opposition.

Challenges for Opposition Unity

​ High Hurdles for Opposition Unity:

● A 2013 law required parties offering a national party list to run candidates in at least
27 constituencies in at least nine of the nineteen counties and Budapest.
● Opposition parties needed to unite to have a chance, but challenges included higher
entry thresholds for combined parties.

​ Unified Opposition's Dilemma:

● In 2014, the Unity Alliance of five center-left parties faced challenges as one party
(LMP) refused to join, splitting the opposition vote.
● In 2018, despite gaining strength in Budapest, the fragmented opposition lost due to
infighting.

​ Orbán's Rule Changes:

● In 2020, Orbán increased the threshold, requiring all parties running a party list to
also field candidates in at least 71 of the 106 constituencies.
● Orbán aimed to ensure a divided vote even if the opposition united, discouraging
cooperation.

​ United for Hungary Coalition:

● Six parties, including center-left and Jobbik, formed the United for Hungary coalition,
agreeing to a common list.
● Individual party names disappeared from the party-list ballot in favor of the joint
coalition name.

​ Primary Elections and Péter Márki-Zay:

● Primaries were held to select candidates, with Péter Márki-Zay chosen to stand
against Orbán at the head of the joint party list.
● Despite preparation, Fidesz still won 83 percent of the constituencies in the 2022
election.

Why the Opposition Lost

The opposition faced challenges, including Orbán's rule changes, gerrymandering, and
the difficulty of uniting ideologically diverse parties. The elimination of runoffs,
combined with complex election laws, favored Fidesz, allowing them to secure a
significant majority in the constituencies despite the opposition's efforts to unite.
Orbán's strategic changes ensured the opposition's plan only marginally loosened his
grip on the gerrymandered districts.

Choosing the Voters

Voter Tourism Law (November 2021):

​ Introduction of "Voter Tourism":

● Orbán introduced a law legalizing "voter tourism" in November 2021.
● Voters could register anywhere in the country, regardless of their legal residence.

​ Manipulation Strategy:
● Voters, especially Fidesz supporters, were moved strategically to districts where their
presence could secure Fidesz victories in closely contested races.
● The legal change allowed Fidesz to adapt its voter distribution according to the
opposition's unity.

​ Registered Voters and Impact:

● Approximately 157,551 voters registered in 2022 to vote in locations other than their
legal residences.
● The impact of voter tourism was challenging to assess due to the mingling of
Fidesz-supporting voter tourists and opposition-supporting expatriates' absentee
ballots.

​ Use of Fidesz Voter Database:

● Fidesz's extensive voter database, compiled over years in power, provided detailed
knowledge about its supporters.
● The opposition lacked access to such data, putting them at a disadvantage in
leveraging the voter-tourism law.

Near-Abroad Voters and Past Influence:

​ Laws Before 2014 Election:

● Laws enacted before the 2014 election granted citizenship and voting rights in
domestic elections to Hungarians who had never lived within Hungary's current
borders.

​ Significant Voting Group:

● Near-abroad voters, numbering over 450,000, became a significant voting bloc.

​ Voting Trends and Impact:

● Near-abroad voters consistently voted overwhelmingly for Orbán, securing additional
party-list seats for Fidesz in 2014, 2018, and 2022.
● In 2018, Fidesz moved some near-abroad voters into Hungary before the practice
became legally permissible.

Expat Voters:

​ Challenges for Expatriate Voters:

● Educated Hungarians opposing Orbán left the country in significant numbers since
2010.
● Expatriate voters, with home addresses in Hungary, could vote for party lists and
individual constituencies but had to vote in person at embassies and consulates.

​ Comparison with Near-Abroad Voters:

● Unlike near-abroad voters who could vote by unsecured mail ballots, expat voters
faced more checks.
● The impact of expat voters was unclear, but the difficulty of voting might have
influenced results.

​ Expat Vote in 2022:

● Expatriate votes were grouped with those of voter tourists in the election results.
● Expatriate votes switched one district in Budapest from Fidesz to the united
opposition in 2022.
Winning the Party List Vote
Changes to Party-List Vote Calculation:

​ Pre-Orbán System:
● Under the pre-Orbán system, losing candidates' votes in the constituencies were
added to the party-list votes to balance party votes with parliamentary seats.
● This "loser compensation" aimed to address discrepancies between party support
and parliamentary representation.

​ Orbán's Alterations:
● Orbán introduced "winner compensation" in the new election system ahead of the
2014 election.
● Any vote not strictly necessary for electing a candidate in a constituency, even for the
winning candidate, is deemed "lost."
● This change disproportionately benefits parties winning big, further skewing the
system.

Impact of Winner Compensation:

​ Supermajority Gains:
● Winner compensation contributed to Orbán securing a two-thirds supermajority in
three consecutive elections (2014, 2018, and 2022).
● Additional seats gained through winner compensation played a crucial role in
achieving a constitutional majority.

​ Seat Gains by Election:

● Orbán gained six additional parliamentary seats in 2014, five in 2018, and six in 2022
through winner compensation.
● The three-seat buffer beyond a simple majority in 2022 was primarily due to
winner-compensation seats.

Manipulation of Minority Representation:

​ Changes to Minority Representation:

● Orbán's 2014 reset altered how minority ethnic groups are represented in parliament.
● Minority groups can offer a "minority list," and voters opting for this list must register
and forgo their party-list vote in exchange for the minority-representative vote.

​ Minority List Benefits and Criticisms:

● Minority voters receive a bonus, with designated representatives requiring fewer
votes (20,000) compared to party-list seats (around 60,000).
● Fidesz MPs have exploited this mechanism, running under a minority banner to gain
seats with fewer votes.
● Orbán's government received praise for minority representation, but it has been used
to benefit Fidesz disproportionately.
The Future of the Opposition in Hungary
Post-2022 Election Analysis:

​ Orbán's Adaptability:
● Orbán has demonstrated an ability to tweak laws and adapt his political message to
counter opposition strategies effectively.
● Despite the united opposition's attempts to navigate electoral barriers, Orbán's
adjustments, including voter relocation, have preserved his dominance.

​ Challenges for the Opposition:

● Jobbik's Dilemma:
● Jobbik's shift toward the center did not resonate with its voter base, leading to
defections to Fidesz.
● Jobbik MPs may need to realign with right-leaning positions to recover voters and
remain viable in 2026.

● Left-Leaning Parties and Voter Concerns:

● Some left-leaning voters found it challenging to support a coalition with Jobbik,
possibly reflected in votes for unconventional parties.
● The Two-Tailed Dog Party, mocking politics, received a notable share of votes,
signaling concerns about left-right collaborations.

● Conservative Voter Behavior:

● Conservative voters, especially in rural areas, prioritized right-leaning parties over
democratic renewal, perceiving no acceptable alternative to Orbán.
● Despite the united opposition's potential to oust Orbán, many conservative voters did
not support it.

Post-Election Opposition Landscape:

​ Opposition Figures and Strategies:

● Péter Márki-Zay resigned from parliament but remains active in opposition media.
● Some opposition figures propose alternative parliamentary models or consider
boycotting the parliament given its limited influence.
● Established leaders stepping down, paving the way for the next generation, but
transformative ideas are uncertain.

​ Parliamentary Challenges:
● Opposition MPs face restrictions in parliament, with limited speaking time, no ability
to introduce bills or amendments, and minimal impact on legislative proceedings.
● Past legal challenges regarding freedom of expression in parliament have not led to
substantial changes.

Economic Challenges and Potential Impacts:

​ Financial Strain on Orbán's System:

● Orbán's costly pre-election giveaways have strained the state budget, putting
Hungary in a deficit.
● EU funds, crucial for Hungary, face potential cuts, and support from Russia and
China may be constrained by global factors.

​ Potential Scenarios:
● Orbán's system of supporting oligarchs could face challenges if funds dwindle.
● A democratic death spiral, as seen in Russia, Turkey, or Venezuela, could unfold,
characterized by political repression, fleeing investors, and economic decline.

​ EU Moderation and Economic Impact:

● EU membership may moderate economic consequences, but even a less dramatic
economic downturn would be painful for Hungary and the EU.
● Economic challenges could be the most challenging scenario for Orbán to prevent.

Conclusion:
The united opposition faces substantial challenges, including navigating voter concerns,
adapting strategies, and contending with Orbán's political acumen. Economic strains
could potentially lead to shifts in Orbán's system, but the future remains uncertain.
Hungary's political landscape appears challenging for democratic forces, and the next
four years will be crucial for the opposition's reevaluation and strategic planning.

Week 10

Slides:
What is democratic backsliding?
● Backsliding as the “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political
institutions that sustain an existing democracy.” (Bermeo 2016: 6) → autocracy to
democracy transition
● Multiple processes, multiple agents
○ Open-ended coups vs. promissory coups
○ Executive coups vs. executive aggrandizement
○ Election-day fraud vs. strategic harassment and manipulation
Positive Trends Continuing Challenges
● More subtle, slow-paced, ‘legal’ and often democratically mandated changes,
compared to a democratic breakdown in earlier periods
● How to subvert democracy, according to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018)?
○ Capture the referees
■ Judicial system, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, tax office,
statistics bureau, ombudsman, etc.
○ Sideline opponents
■ Politicians, business leaders, media, etc
○ Rewrite the rules of the game
■ Electoral system, constitutional reform
● How is backsliding possible, despite democratic institutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt
2018)?
○ Institutions rely on unwritten rules, or norms
○ Norms as “shared codes of conduct”
○ Two guardrails of democracy:
■ Mutual toleration: collective willingness to accept political rivals as
legitimate
■ Institutional forbearance: “Avoiding actions that, while respecting the
letter of the law, obviously violate its spirit” (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018:
106).
○ Incumbents violate these norms
● Discussion
○ Bermeo mentions the “vexing ambiguity” of backsliding
■ How to distinguish efforts to deepen democracy from those aiming to
destroy it?
■ Departure from a given set of institutions
○ E.g. mobilization of indigenous groups by Chavez, lower castes by BJP,
resistance against reapportionment in India

Explaining democratic backsliding

● Good theorizing connects structural conditions with actors, their preferences, and
actions (Geddes 1999)
● Structural developments
○ End of the Cold War and lack of external threat
○ Deindustrialization
○ Globalization of supply chains and finance
○ Technological changes in computing and information technology
➔ Uneven gains and losses, increasing inequality within countries

● Linking structural developments to actors, preferences, and actions

● Political elites
○ Mainstream parties seen as unresponsive
○ Political entrepreneurs give voice to losers of globalization
○ New platforms give politicians direct access to voters
● Voters
○ Willing to sacrifice democracy against partisan goals
➔ Increasing interparty polarization and risk of backsliding

Patterns of backsliding
● Democratic decoupling (Ding and Slater 2021)
○ Gaps between the practices of different institutions of a democratic regime
○ Democracy as multi-dimensional (see lecture 2)
■ Not all dimensions move together
■ They study decoupling between electoral institutions and individual
rights (electoral vs. liberal democracy)
■ E.g. India, steep decline in rights vs. (largely) free and fair elections
 Readings:
Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. How Democracies Die. New York: Penguin
Random House. Chapters 4 and 5.

Ch. 4: Subverting Democracy

​ Fujimori's Unplanned Ascent to Power:
● Alberto Fujimori, a little-known university rector of Japanese descent, entered the
presidential race in 1990.
● Peru faced a severe economic crisis and the threat of the Shining Path insurgency,
leading to widespread disillusionment with established parties.
● Fujimori, with the populist slogan "A President Like You," unexpectedly finished
second in the polls.

​ Inaugural Address and Reform Ambitions:

● In his inaugural address, Fujimori highlighted Peru's profound crisis and pledged
drastic economic reforms and intensified anti-terrorism efforts.
● Faced with limited experience and opposition-controlled institutions, Fujimori lacked a
clear implementation plan.

​ Obstacles and Outsider Challenges:

● Fujimori faced opposition from traditional power brokers, an opposition-controlled
congress, and a skeptical media.
● His attacks on the political elite during the campaign left him at odds with those still
holding power in various institutions.

​ Rocky Start and Bypassing Institutions:

● Initial challenges included a non-functional congress and ineffective courts in
addressing the growing terrorist threat.
● Fujimori, impatient with legislative politics, bypassed Congress, relying on executive
decrees and governing more autonomously.

​ Strain on Democratic Institutions:

● Fujimori's aggressive approach led to tensions with congress and the judiciary, with
accusations of bypassing democratic norms.
● Concerns arose about his commitment to democratic institutions as he questioned
Peru's democratic status in public.

​ Establishment Pushback and Impeachment Talks:

● As Fujimori bypassed the courts to release prisoners, accusations of authoritarianism
grew, leading to declarations of his decrees' unconstitutionality.
● By early 1991, talk of impeachment circulated, and media portrayed him as
authoritarian, with critics viewing him as a threat to democracy.
​ Fujimori's Defiance and Escalation:
● Feeling under siege, Fujimori intensified his efforts to break down taboos and push
through decrees.
● In response, congress rejected crucial decrees and passed legislation curbing
Fujimori's powers, escalating the conflict.

​ Dissolution of Congress and Authoritarian Turn:

● In April 1992, Fujimori, facing heightened conflict with congress, dissolved both the
congress and the Constitution.
● Less than two years after his surprising election, Fujimori transformed from an
outsider to a perceived tyrant.

​ Democracy's Unplanned Decay:

● Democratic breakdown often results from an unforeseen sequence of events, a
tit-for-tat between a demagogic leader and a threatened political establishment.
● The process begins with provocative rhetoric, labeling critics as enemies,
subversives, or terrorists.

​ From Words to Action:

● Demagogues' harsh words create polarization, panic, and mutual distrust in society.
● Threats against the media and opponents, if widely accepted, justify subsequent
actions against them.

​ Frustration with Democratic Processes:

● Democratic politics requires negotiation, compromise, and acceptance of setbacks,
which frustrates demagogic leaders.
● Checks and balances may feel like constraints, leading demagogues to seek ways to
break free.

​ Subtle Undermining of Institutions:

● Elected authoritarians gradually erode democracy through imperceptible steps, often
appearing legal and pursuing seemingly legitimate public objectives.
● The erosion occurs incrementally, with each step seemingly minor and not an
immediate threat to democracy.

​ Soccer Game Analogy: Capturing the Referees:

● Consolidating power involves capturing institutions that act as referees in the
democratic game.
● Key institutions include judicial systems, law enforcement, intelligence, tax agencies,
and regulatory bodies.

​ Capturing Referees: Shield and Weapon:

● Control of judicial and law enforcement agencies shields the government from
investigation and censure.
● It provides a powerful weapon for selectively enforcing the law, punishing opponents,
and protecting allies.

​ Methods of Capturing Referees:

● The capture is often achieved by replacing nonpartisan officials with loyalists or by
hijacking institutions through covert means.
● Examples include packing courts with loyalists, secretly influencing judges, and
manipulating appointments to key bodies.

​ Impeachment and Court-Packing:

● Independent judges may face impeachment, especially if they oppose the
government, to replace them with loyalists.
● Court-packing involves expanding the size of judicial bodies and appointing loyalists
to secure a favorable majority.

​ Dissolving and Creating New Courts:

● In extreme cases, governments dissolve existing courts, create new ones, or
manipulate the constitution to ensure control over the judiciary.
● These actions render the judiciary compliant and eliminate constitutional checks on
governmental power.

​ Buying Loyalty:
● Elected autocrats begin by offering public positions, favors, perks, or bribes to key
political, business, or media figures in exchange for support or quiet neutrality.
● Media outlets, politicians, and business leaders may receive financial benefits or
exclusive privileges.

​ Media Manipulation:
● Control over media outlets is crucial for elected autocrats.
● Media figures may be bribed or coerced to align with the government's narrative.
● Adverse outlets face legal challenges, libel suits, or financial pressure to enforce
self-censorship.

​ Legal Repression:
● Modern autocrats prefer legal means to sideline opponents, hiding repression behind
a veneer of legality.
● Politically loyal law enforcement and judiciary investigate, arrest, and imprison rivals
on charges such as tax evasion, fraud, or incitement.

​ Business Leaders as Targets:

● Business figures capable of financing opposition movements are prime targets.
● Putin's Russia exemplifies the warning given to oligarchs to stay out of politics or face
legal repercussions.
● Seizing assets, imposing fines, or using tax evasion charges weakens opposition
funding.

​ Silencing Cultural Figures:

● Influential cultural figures with moral standing are potential threats.
● Co-optation or intimidation is employed to ensure their political neutrality.
● Silencing dissenting voices among artists, intellectuals, and athletes weakens
potential opposition.

​ Co-opting Cultural Icons:

● Governments may co-opt cultural figures by allowing them to continue their work as
long as they stay apolitical.
● Funding for cultural programs may depend on compliance with government
narratives.
● Co-opted figures provide a façade of cultural vibrancy while aligning with the regime's
agenda.

​ Consequences for Opposition:

● Silencing key opposition, media, and business players leads to the deflation of the
opposition.
● Jailing or ruining influential figures economically demoralizes others, leading to
withdrawal from politics.
● Dissenters may choose to stay silent or retire from active opposition, contributing to
the government's consolidation of power.

​ Manipulating Electoral Systems:

● Autocrats reform constitutions and electoral systems to disadvantage the opposition.
● Gerrymandering, as seen in Malaysia, tilts parliamentary districts to favor ruling
parties.

​ Hungarian Example: Orbán's Institutional Advantage:

● Hungary's Fidesz party, led by Orbán, rewrote electoral laws and gerrymandered
districts after winning a supermajority in 2010.
● Despite a decrease in Fidesz's vote share, institutional changes maintained its
dominance in the 2014 election.

​ Antidemocratic Measures in the United States: Reconstruction Era:

● Post-Civil War Reconstruction in the U.S. led to authoritarian single-party regimes in
Confederate states.
● Southern states reformed constitutions and electoral laws to disenfranchise African
Americans, effectively ending democracy.

​ Legal Maneuvers to Suppress Black Votes:

● Southern states introduced poll taxes, literacy tests, and complex ballots under the
guise of neutral measures.
● Disenfranchisement of African Americans resulted in white supremacist rule and
single-party dominance for nearly a century.

Crisis as a Tool for Authoritarians

​ Using Crises for Power Consolidation:
● Autocrats exploit economic crises, natural disasters, and security threats to justify
anti-democratic measures.
● Wars, terrorist attacks, or security crises create a "rally around the flag" effect,
increasing public support.

​ Post-9/11 USA: Expanding Executive Power:

● The 9/11 attacks led to increased public support for measures like the USA PATRIOT
Act, expanding executive power.
● Crises provide opportunities for leaders to concentrate power and weaken
democratic institutions.
​ Authoritarian Turns: Marcos in the Philippines and Putin in Russia:
● Marcos used bombings and a supposed communist threat to declare martial law in
the Philippines, extending his rule.
● Putin capitalized on bombings in Russia in 1999 to launch a war in Chechnya and
consolidate power.

​ Erdoğan's Power Grab in Turkey: Coup Attempt as Opportunity:

● Erdoğan in Turkey used ISIS attacks and a failed coup in 2016 to tighten his grip on
power.
● The coup attempt justified a crackdown, leading to mass arrests, purges, and a
constitutional amendment expanding presidential authority.

​ Crises as Opportunities for Autocrats:

● Crises, whether real or fabricated, offer opportunities for autocrats to dismantle
democratic checks and balances.
● Leaders exploit public fears during crises to justify power grabs and secure their
positions.

Ch. 5: The Guardrail of Democracy

The Limitations of Constitutional Safeguards
​ Faith in the Constitution:
● Americans historically placed great faith in the Constitution, considering it a symbol of
the nation's success.
● A 1999 survey revealed 85 percent believed the Constitution was a key factor in
America's success.

​ Checks and Balances Success Stories:

● Constitutional checks and balances prevented abuses of power in American history.
● Examples include the reversal of Lincoln's power concentration and Nixon's
resignation post-Watergate.

​ Constitutional Failures in History:

● Despite well-designed constitutions, failures occurred, as seen in the collapse of
Weimar Germany's constitution under Hitler.
● Postcolonial Latin American republics, modeled after the U.S., faced civil wars and
dictatorships despite constitutional frameworks.

Constitution Alone Is Insufficient

​ Incomplete and Ambiguous Nature of Constitutions:
● Constitutions, though well-designed, inherently have gaps and ambiguities.
● No set of rules can anticipate all contingencies, and constitutions are subject to
different interpretations.
​ Competing Interpretations:
● Constitutional powers are open to multiple readings, leading to debates and
conflicting interpretations.
● The potential for diverse interpretations allows for the use of powers in ways not
initially anticipated.

​ Letter vs. Spirit of the Law:

● Strict adherence to the written words of a constitution might undermine its intended
spirit.
● Similar to disruptive labor protests, following rules to the letter can lead to
dysfunction.

​ Constitutional Gaps in the U.S.:

● The U.S. Constitution, while brilliant, has gaps and lacks explicit safeguards against
certain actions.
● The "thin tissue of convention" prevents presidents from capturing independent
agencies without violating constitutional rules.

The Role of Democratic Norms

​ Democracy Relies on Unwritten Rules:
● Strong democratic norms, not solely constitutions, are vital for the functioning of a
democracy.
● Unwritten rules or norms serve as soft guardrails, preventing political competition
from becoming unrestrained.

​ Norms as Shared Codes of Conduct:

● Norms are shared codes of conduct within a society, accepted, respected, and
enforced by its members.
● They go beyond individual dispositions and are essential for the smooth functioning
of democratic processes.

​ Mutual Toleration and Institutional Forbearance:

● Fundamental democratic norms include mutual toleration and institutional
forbearance.
● These norms prevent political conflicts from escalating and ensure the stability of
democratic institutions.

Importance of Mutual Toleration

​ Definition of Mutual Toleration:
● Mutual toleration entails recognizing political rivals' equal right to exist, compete, and
govern as long as they adhere to constitutional rules.
● Despite disagreements, opponents are considered legitimate, decent, and
law-abiding citizens who respect the Constitution.

​ Historical Context of Mutual Toleration:

● Historical opposition to those in power is often considered treason; legitimate
opposition parties were heretical during America's founding.
● Early partisan battles between Federalists and Republicans viewed each other as
threats to the republic.

​ Evolution of Mutual Toleration:

● Gradual recognition over decades that political rivals could coexist as rivals, not
enemies, was foundational for American democracy.
● Both parties realized the importance of coexistence and circulation of power, moving
away from early suspicions and hostility.

​ Challenges Without Mutual Toleration:

● Without strong norms of mutual toleration, democracy is at risk.
● Viewing rivals as existential threats justifies authoritarian measures, leading to
political instability and potential abuses of power.

Institutional Forbearance in Democracy

​ Definition of Institutional Forbearance:
● Institutional forbearance involves refraining from actions that, while legal, violate the
spirit of the law.
● Politicians avoid exploiting institutional prerogatives to the fullest extent to preserve
the existing democratic system.

​ Origins of Forbearance:
● Forbearance has roots in predemocratic monarchies where kings, despite divine-right
rule, acted with wisdom and self-restraint.
● In democracies, forbearance is essential to keep the democratic game ongoing by
avoiding actions that could incapacitate or antagonize opponents.

​ Examples of Institutional Forbearance:

● The selection of the British prime minister, although a matter of royal prerogative,
relies on forbearance and parliamentary majority.
● Historical examples like George Washington's two-term limit and the informal norm in
American history.

​ Importance in Presidential Democracies:

● Crucial in presidential democracies to prevent deadlock, dysfunction, and
constitutional crises.
● Unrestrained actions by presidents or legislatures can threaten democratic processes
and lead to abuses of power.

​ Contrast: Constitutional Hardball:

● Constitutional hardball involves exploiting institutional prerogatives without restraint,
potentially endangering democratic principles.
● Examples from Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador showcase the
consequences of constitutional hardball.
 The Interplay of Mutual Toleration and Institutional Forbearance
​ Mutual Toleration and Forbearance Reinforcement:
● Mutual toleration and institutional forbearance are interlinked, often reinforcing the
other.
● Forbearance is more likely when politicians view opponents as legitimate rivals,
fostering a virtuous circle of mutual acceptance.
● Acts of forbearance, such as cross-party approvals, strengthen the perception that
the opposition is tolerable.

​ Erosion of Mutual Toleration and Its Consequences:

● The erosion of mutual toleration can lead to the broad deployment of institutional
powers.
● When parties perceive each other as mortal enemies, political competition becomes
high-stakes, prompting the abandonment of forbearance.
● This may result in a cycle of escalating constitutional brinksmanship, where norm
violations further undermine mutual toleration.

​ Politics without Guardrails - Constitutional Brinksmanship:

● Politics without guardrails refers to a situation described as a "cycle of escalating
constitutional brinksmanship."
● Historical examples, such as the collapse of Charles I’s monarchy in England during
the 1640s, demonstrate how norm breakdowns led to a civil war.

​ Tragic Democratic Breakdowns:

● Tragic democratic breakdowns are often preceded by the degradation of basic
norms.
● The example of Chile highlights the erosion of democratic norms in the 1970s,
leading to the breakdown of the country's successful democracy.

​ Chile's Path to Dictatorship:

● Chile's culture of compromise, a key norm sustaining democracy, eroded due to Cold
War polarization and extreme partisanship.
● Mutual intolerance grew, undermining negotiations and fostering a death spiral for
democracy.
● Hard-liners in both government and opposition rejected compromise, leading to an
authoritarian seizure of power in 1973.

​ Polarization's Threat to Democracy:

● Deep societal polarization, especially when coupled with mutually exclusive
worldviews, poses a significant threat to democracy.
● When mutual toleration disappears, politicians may abandon forbearance,
encouraging the rise of antisystem groups and putting democracy in jeopardy.

Ding, Iza and Slater, Dan. 2021. Democratic Decoupling. Democratization, 28(1),
63-80.
 Democratic decoupling
Context:
● The primary concern in the literature on contemporary democratic backsliding is the
erosion of democratic institutions.
● Democracy's modern definitions and practices are closely tied to institutions,
including political parties, elections, and constraints imposed by institutions like
parliaments and courts.

Democratic Backsliding Defined:

● Backsliding is defined as the "state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political
institutions that sustain an existing democracy."
● Erosion often occurs through the weakening or manipulation of democratic
institutions by leaders seeking unchecked power.

Institutional Change and Backsliding:

● Democratic backsliding is viewed as a process of institutional change.
● The literature primarily focuses on the agency of autocrats, paying less attention to
how democracy's institutional complexity makes it vulnerable to endogenously driven
decline.

Concept of Decoupling:
● The article introduces the concept of "decoupling" as a form of institutional change in
contemporary democratic regimes.
● Democratic decoupling is defined as the emergence of gaps between the practices of
different democratic institutions or between the designated purpose and actual
outcomes of these institutions.

Focus on Elections and Rights:

● The theoretical and empirical analysis focuses on the gap that emerged between two
core features of democracy: elections and rights.
● While elections improved, individual rights protections, especially for minorities,
declined in the past decade.

Democratic Backsliding through Popular Mobilization:

● Backsliding is not always incremental but can occur when charismatic leaders with
illiberal agendas win electoral landslides and use their mandate to attack rights.
● This form of backsliding is discussed in the context of the literature on populism,
where institutions are portrayed negatively as part of a corrupt elite.

Examples from Asia:

● The article provides illustrative examples from Asia, focusing on the case of Narendra
Modi and the BJP in India.
● It highlights how fully competitive elections can play a role in undermining individual
rights.
 Global Trend and Identified Pattern:
● Global data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is used to show that
electoral improvements and rights retractions often occur in the same cases,
indicating a global trend and an identifiable pattern.

Why democracies decouple

Critique of Linear View:
● The linear view of democracy and autocracy is critiqued for oversimplifying the
qualitative differences between regimes and for not accounting for the coexistence of
autocratic and democratic elements within the same political system.

Definition of Democracy:
● The definition of democracy is debated, with questions about whether rights are a
core trait of democracy or merely an outcome promised by democratic institutions.

Institutional Multiplicity and Ambiguity:

● Democracies are characterized by institutional multiplicity and ambiguity in their
practices, indicating that democratic backsliding can involve multiple modes of
institutional change on various dimensions.

Focus on Decoupling:
● The article focuses on democratic backsliding through the concept of "decoupling"
borrowed from organizational theory.
● Decoupling can occur when institutions symbolically adopt policies without
substantive implementation or when compliance with a policy fails to achieve its
intended goals.

Policy-Practice and Means-Ends Decoupling:

● Two types of decoupling are discussed: "policy-practice decoupling" when regimes
adopt democratic institutions symbolically, and "means-ends" decoupling when
majoritarian rule doesn't lead to common good policy outcomes.

Democratic Decoupling in Multiple Directions:

● Decoupling may occur when institutions within a system move in divergent directions,
leading to a specific mode of democratic decoupling where free and fair elections
coexist with widespread rights violations.

Structural Tension in Democracy:

● There is an intrinsic structural tension between elections and rights, leading to
decoupling, not only in contemporary populism but as an inherent challenge in
combining majority power with minority protection.

Lack of Complementarity and Isomorphism:

● The likelihood of decoupling increases when institutions lack complementarity or
isomorphism, meaning their operating logic may contradict and undermine each
other.
 Chronic Vulnerability of Elections and Rights:
● The lack of complete complementarity between elections and rights makes them
chronically vulnerable to democratic decoupling, regardless of whether democracy
operates as a "loosely coupled" or "interdependent" system.

Interpretation of Democratic Decoupling:

● Interpretations of democratic decoupling may focus on the personal inclinations of
politicians exploiting tensions or a more structural interpretation, emphasizing the
inherent tension between elections and rights.

Decoupling between elections and rights: global trends

Data and Definitions:
● V-Dem project collects data on indicators and correlates of democracy globally.
● Core election indicators and protection of rights and liberties are distinguished.
● Decoupling does not imply a necessary causal relationship but identifies a substantial
gap between the quality of different democratic institutions.

Global Trends in Elections and Rights (2007-2017):

● Global decline in rights amid improvements in elections from 2007 to 2017.
● V-Dem data shows a pattern where elections advanced while individual rights
receded on a global scale.

Analysis of Changes (1990-2019):

● Three decades analyzed: 1990–2000, 2000–2010, and 2010–2019.
● Key indicators include V-Dem’s Clean Elections Index and measures of freedom of
expression, association, and core civil society.

Democratic decoupling across Asia

Introduction:
● The concept of democratic decoupling is explored, emphasizing the divergence
between the quality of elections and the protection of individual rights.
● The linear view of regime variation is criticized, highlighting the qualitative and
institutional diversity within democratic systems.

Global Trends in Elections and Rights (2007-2017):

● V-Dem data shows a global trend where elections improved while individual rights
receded from 2007 to 2017.
● Focus on democratic decoupling, emphasizing the simultaneous decline in rights
amid improvements in elections.

Democratic Decoupling in Asia:

● Asian cases, including a detailed study of India, illustrate how rights protections can
decline even with high-quality electoral institutions.
● India, historically a stable democracy, has experienced democratic backsliding under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
● The analysis suggests that democratic decoupling is a global phenomenon, and Asia
exemplifies this trend.

Case Study: India:

● India's democracy, historically robust, took a negative turn under Narendra Modi's
leadership since 2014.
● Despite democratic backsliding in rights protection, India maintained high-quality
elections.
● Modi's emphasis on Hindu nationalism, illiberal policies, and the erosion of civil
liberties are highlighted.
● The case of India exemplifies how electoral mandates can be used to undermine
democratic rights.

Other Asian Cases:

● The Philippines, under Rodrigo Duterte, showcases the coexistence of state
repression and electoral popularity.
● Sri Lanka, with the Rajapaksa family, witnessed democratic backsliding in rights while
maintaining electoral quality.
● Indonesia experienced a crackdown on civil society after Joko Widodo's re-election,
despite fair electoral processes.

Conclusion: interpreting democratic decoupling

​ Democratic Decoupling Defined:
● The past decade has witnessed a global decline in individual rights protections, often
framed as democratic backsliding.
● The analysis focuses on a specific form of backsliding – democratic decoupling –
characterized by uneven performance among different democratic institutions.

​ Institutional Tensions and Resilience:

● The concept of "institution" may oversimplify the complex interplay between various
rules, norms, and organizations in a democracy.
● The inherent tensions among democratic institutions, their resistance to change, and
their varying adaptability to societal shifts are acknowledged.

​ Power Dynamics and Direct Access to Masses:

● Institutions can both constrain and embolden leaders. In times of systemic strain,
leaders may find direct access to the masses more appealing than restructuring
institutions.
● The legitimacy of institutions influences whether leaders work through established
channels or directly address the public, raising questions of institutional design and
change.

​ Empirical Coexistence of Electoral Expansion and Rights Retraction:

● Existing research proposes interpretations for the simultaneous expansion of
elections and retraction of rights.
● International pressure to maintain the appearance of competitive elections,
socioeconomic modernization, and the impact of communication technologies are
considered as contributing factors.

​ Challenges in Measuring Electoral Quality:

● Questions are raised about the adequacy of current measures of electoral quality,
highlighting potential gaps in capturing the true nature of elections.
● Fundamental questions about the openness, fairness, and freedom of elections are
posed, urging a reevaluation of how democracy is conceptualized and measured.

​ Call for Enriched Conceptions of Democracy:

● The conclusion emphasizes the need for improvements in measuring democratic
institutions and a broader understanding of democracy itself.
● Critical questions about the essence of free, open, and fair elections prompt a deeper
exploration of democratic ideals.