Harvard Round 4 – 1NC vs Keshav

1
1] Interpretation: affs must defend substantially reducing U.S. military presence in BOTH
West Asia and North Africa. To clarify, they may specify particular countries, but they
must defend reduction in SOME part of West Asia and SOME part of North Africa.
The resolution specifies West Asia Hyphen North Africa, Hyphens are used to link two
parts of a word together

Western Michigan University, No date, Punctuation: Hyphen and Dash,

https://wmich.edu/writing/punctuation/hyphen, accessed 1/5/24 | DD JH
A hyphen ( - ) is used to link parts of a compound word. This includes most dual heritages (Mexican-
American), and all words in a compound modifier except "very" and adverbs that end in "ly." (The Broncos
scored a first-quarter touchdown.) Use a hyphen to form a single idea from two or more words (socio-economic),
and whenever its omission would change the meaning of a phrase: President Dunn will speak to small-businessmen. A
hyphen can also be used to avoid duplicated vowels and tripled consonants (anti-oppression, pre-empt, hill-like). Use a hyphen, not a
slash, to illustrate joint entity or ownership (faculty-staff newsletter).

Definition: The WANA region includes the following countries:

CEMERI n.d. (The Mexican Center for International Relations (CEMERI) is an
independent and nonpartisan digital media whose ultimate goal is the generation and
dissemination of specialized knowledge through multidisciplinary analysis and research of
international phenomena.) “Northern Africa and Western Asia”,
https://cemeri.org/en/region/africa-norte // ghs-PG //

North Africa and Western Asia is a region that is triangulated with Europe, Asia and Africa . It crosses part
of the Mediterranean Sea to the mountains of Iran and, from north to south, it begins at the Black Sea and
ends at the coasts of Saudi Arabia and Oman. It has great natural and cultural diversity, in addition to protecting different
communities with various organizations, traditions and ideologies . Based on the metrics used by the Mexican Center for
International Relations (CEMERI), the countries that make up this geographic space are: Saudi Arabia,
Algeria, Bahrain (Bahrain), Qatar, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Western Sahara (Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic), Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey (including Eastern Thrace) and Yemen.

2] Violation: their plan text is, “The United States ought to substantially reduce its military
presence in the West Asia region.”
C. Standards:
1. ANTI-BLACKNESS — they CHOSE not to talk about North Africa — that’s an
ACTIVE CHOICE to not discuss a KEY issue of U.S. colonialism. KILLS RACE-BASED
EDUCATION — we can’t learn about the specific anti-Blackness in WANA if they literally
don’t talk about it
Isilow: Isilow, Hassan. [Journalist at Anadolu Agency; Diplomacy, Security & Politics in Africa] “‘Chains of colonialism’: Western powers
in Africa vying for control, geopolitical edge.” Anadolu Agency, July 28, 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/-chains-of-colonialism-western-
powers-in-africa-vying-for-control-geopolitical-edge/2956190# CH

JOHANNESBURG For decades, Africa has been teeming with foreign military personnel , with more than
a dozen countries known to have deployments and bases on the continent . A key area of interest for foreign powers, particularly Western
countries, has been the Horn of Africa. At least 13 countries have a military presence in Africa, while there were about 11 foreign military bases
in the Horn of Africa, according to a 2019 report by the Institute of Security Studies, a think tank headquartered in South Africa. The
US and its allies such as France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and India make up a large chunk of the countries with a military
presence on the continent, the report said. Among Horn of Africa nations, none has garnered more attention from world powers than Djibouti,
which hosts at least eight foreign military bases, including the US, France, Japan, and China. The primary reason is Djibouti’s location at the
southern entrance to the Red Sea, acting as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. While the US has numerous outposts across Africa, the
US military presence in Africa at Camp Lemonnier.” It was established in
State Department says Djibouti has the “only enduring
2003 through a formal agreement that also gives the US access to Djibouti’s port facilities and airport. France,
the other Western power with the largest military presence in Africa, has a major military base in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The base plays a
crucial role in France’s operations in the troubled Sahel region, where militant activities are a major concern, besides also serving as a training
and equipment hub for local forces. The base has gained even more importance for France after neighboring Burkina Faso forced the withdrawal
of French troops from its territory this year. Additionally, last year, France decided to pull out its forces from Mali, where they were stationed for
years to fight militants in the Sahel region. The future of the French base in Niger is also now up in the air, following Wednesday’s apparent
coup, with a group of soldiers claiming to have overthrown President Mohamed Bazoum, a key ally of the US, France, and the wider West.
Resources and geopolitics However, these military installations are more to advance the interests of their
own countries, rather than contributing to Africa’s development and security, according to African experts .
“Superpowers compete to at least have their deployments at strategic positions so that should the
need arise to go all out in any form of warfare, they will have access to resources and ammunition ,”
Lesiba Teffo, a political analyst, told Anadolu . He pointed out that Western powers are scrambling to set up strategic military bases all over the
world, not just in Africa. “Why is there war in Ukraine? Because all NATO wants is to deploy its armaments in Ukraine so they can have the
closest access should the need arise to attack Russia,” he said. “That’s at the heart of it. All other platitudes are for the average mind.” Ahmed
Jazbhay, a professor at the University of South Africa, said the rush for “foreign military bases in Africa is wide-ranging and goes beyond
resource extraction.” “It has to do with competing geopolitical interests,” he said, adding that all the world powers present in Africa want to
advance their own interests on the continent and around the world. Colonialism and control Jazbhay also touched on how the drive for
military presence ties in with colonialism and a desire for political power. “We see these global powers, including former
colonial powers, wanting to hold influence on the continent,” he said. “While some countries in Africa are attempting to break off the chains of
unstable African countries, particularly those
Western influence, for instance, Burkina Faso, others are holding on to it.” Certain
ruled by authoritarian figures, are open to hosting Western military bases or forces because it helps
them stay in power, he explained, citing Niger, Chad and Mali as examples . Some Western powers also try to
influence election results to ensure they have leaders who are more easily controlled, he added.
“They don’t want Africa to break the chains of colonialism , so they can continue looting
resources and ensure economic dominance,” Jazbhay asserted. Teffo delved into the economic aspect of Western
military presence, particularly how it brings in money and generates jobs. “Wherever there are military bases, Africans have jobs and there is
economic activity. If you take them away, locals lose out too,” he said. On the African Union’s inability to dissuade countries from hosting
foreign military bases, he said the bloc “has failed dismally” on that front. “If a long time ago, they acted against dictators, against leaders who
destroyed their economies, and said we would rather starve in dignity than eat in shame, maybe Africa would be far more advanced today and
would be able to raise its voice,” he said. Right now, Africa is treated like a child that is expected to express gratitude to those providing
donations or aid, even though these resources originate from the continent itself, said Teffo. “Africa must take responsibility for its own future
and its own path,” he asserted.

2. NON-BLACK FRAGILITY — their aff creates models of debate where non-Black

people can just OPT OUT of anti-Blackness discussions because it makes them
uncomfortable — DECKS RACE-BASED EDUCATION, since they never have to engage
in the racial issues the TOPIC ITSELF presents — think of this like them reading skep
triggers or presumption for 6 minutes — IT’S A CHOICE AND THEY SHOULD BE
PUNISHED FOR IT
D. The voter is RACE-BASED EDUCATION — that means CONFRONTING whiteness
and learning about strategies that deal with issues of race — THIS TOPIC IS
LITERALLY HALF-SET IN AFRICA — they should lose for undermining our ability to
engage African scholarship
Ndlovu-Gatsheni: Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J [Professor & Chair of Epistemologies of the Global South, University of Bayreuth in
Germany] “On Gladiatory Scholarship.” Review of African Political Economy, May 20, 2021. http://tinyurl.com/532cvpmn CH

In gladiatory scholarship, winning arguments is an end in itself – not a means to an end. Wrestling characterises gladiatory scholarship. Poking
holes in another scholar’s work is privileged over seeking to understand what other scholars are providing. Reviewing another scholar’s work
often degenerates into writing oneself into another’s work. The aim is to dismiss the work under review and affirm one’s own ideas. Writing
one’s book into another’s book rather than reviewing what one is given to review is a common disease of gladiatory scholarship: its intention is to
destroy rather than to engage with another scholar’s ideas. In gladiatory scholarship, there is very low appreciation of other ways of knowing.
What the intellectual and academic gladiator does not know is always deemed to be wrong, shallow or unscholarly. Sustaining gladiatory
scholarship are colonial ways of knowing, and at the centre of this arena is resilient civilizing mission mentality. The gladiator is always the
in gladiatory scholarship. There is epistemic deafness. This is
teacher; all others are pupils. Inevitably, there is always fundamentalism
There is also epistemic racism and epistemic xenophobia. This takes the form of
an inability to hear other scholars.
dismissing all other knowledges from the rest of the world except that from Europe. Behind the scenes there is ceaseless looting
of others’ ideas, only to present them as the gladiator’s original thinking. In gladiatory scholarship, there is always very strong paternalism. This
takes the form of listening to those who belong to my generation and think like me. My generation is always the best. All others are engaged in
pseudo-scholarship and pseudo-science. All other generations which come before mine and did not go the schools and universities that I attended
and where I studied must be looked at suspiciously. They were not there where I was, hence they can’t know as much as me. There is a lot of
effort spent on infantilizing other generations’ scholarship. There is patriarchy and sexism in gladiatory scholarship. Works of women scholars
are generally ignored. There is uneven citational politics in gladiatory scholarship.African scholarship is often ignored and never
cited. If scholarship informed by critical race theory, postcolonial theory, decolonial thought, and intersectionality is not outrightly dismissed as
subjective … it is just ignored. Pretend it does not exist. Let’s write as though it does not exist. Invisibilize it. Don’t give it attention.
Push it to the margins. Don’t include it in curriculum. Exclude it. The consequences of gladiatory scholarship reveal themselves in
their most detestable forms in assessments and examinations. Some universities still see no problem in inviting a scholar to be an ‘opponent’ in
the public ‘defence’ of doctoral theses. These two words ‘opponent’ and ‘defence’ reveal the paradigm of the war tradition informing gladiatory
scholarship. The other consequences are negative assessment of the student’s work, whereby the examiner just looks for what is wrong with the
student’s work and ignores all that is correct, using the former to make a judgement and to give a mark. Gladiatory scholarship instils fear in its
victims. It is intimidatory scholarship. But there is now turmoil in the kingdom of gladiatory scholarship and the situation is excellent for
epistemic freedom. Claims of objectivity are always the refuge of gladiatory scholarship. Beyond objective scholarship
Thought from nowhere! Knowledge from nowhere! Theory from nowhere! I am,
and towards a decolonization of knowledge
therefore, a scholar. My scholarship is: neutral, objective, unsituated, truthful, universal, and scientific. In this scholarship,
there is no room for the personal, emotion, ideology, and politics. There is no room for geopolitics and body-politics. In this
scholarship, I totally hide myself and indeed you can’t see me. Why hide yourself and pretend to be a god who cannot be seen? What is the logic
behind concealment of self in knowledge generation and dissemination? This hiding and concealment is belied by a simple fact that we all write
our names on the book covers we write. Our journal articles and book chapters always carry our names. Perhaps those who use pseudonyms have
tried even harder. But a pseudo-name is a form of identity all the same. So, there is identity in knowledge generation. There is the wish to be
known as the authors of our works. We always wish to own our work, hence we affix our names to it. This means there is always us in our work.
We can’t hide and conceal ourselves successfully. The veteran educationist and intellectual Paulo Freire urged us to reveal ourselves.
Decolonial thought urges us to reveal ourselves. Feminist and womanist scholars urge us to reveal ourselves. What is there to
hide anyway? We are human beings. We are social and political beings. We are spiritual beings. We are many things at once. Can we
successfully hide from these identities as we generate knowledge? Can we suspend ourselves, banish ourselves from ourselves for the sake of
producing objective, truthful, universal, neutral, and unsituated knowledge relevant across time and space? There are no ways to do this, it is
impossible. We research and write as ourselves. Our race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, spirituality and other vectors of our identity constructed as
they may be, we cannot escape from them as we generate knowledge. They are in us and are us. Those who pretend to be able to escape
these identities are simply more capable than others of hiding them and then denying their existence . By revealing ourselves we come
nearer to the truth and reality of being human in the first instance. This nearness to truth and reality is delivered more forcefully
by decolonial thought: it is an epistemic perspective which is unmasking us and revealing us so that we stop
lying to ourselves and avoid myths of objectivity and neutrality. Our gift from decolonial scholarship includes coming to terms
with such realities as: ego-politics of knowledge, body-politics of knowledge, and locus of enunciation of knowledge. An epistemic
revolution is on offer, where a new agenda that is beyond exhausting one another over disciplinary
knowledge is unfolding, and where a new focus on troublesome existential problems is the focal point of
knowledge generation.

A] NO RVIs — they shouldn’t win for showing they weren’t anti-Black — don’t
give them the ballot on it even if you think they win T, since that prevents negs from
calling out affs that don’t defend the topic
B] DTD – hold them accountable for promoting anti blackness – DTA doesn’t solve since it
means kicking the aff – destroys debate with nothing to advocate for or against.
 2
[Pratt et al] AMERICAN EDUCATION IS BUILT ON A COLONIZING LEGACY

– schools prioritize Western knowledge production at the expense of Indigenous thought.

The Role of the Judge is to Decolonize Educational Spaces, which means keeping the

space open to non-Eurocentric ways of knowing.

Pratt et al – brackets in text: Pratt, Yvonne Poitras [The University of Calgary], Dustin Louie [The University of Calgary], Aubrey
Hanson [The University of Calgary], Jacqueline Ottmann [University of Saskatchewan]. “Indigenous Education and Decolonization.” Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Education, January 2018. https://tinyurl.com/5zpb8kz2 CH

Even when explicitly assimilative institutions no longer exist as such—as is the case with Canada’s residential schools— colonizing

dynamics can prevail in contemporary schooling. Hegemonic forces such as Eurocentrism, paired with

vestigial colonial structures and policies, can persist in marginalizing Indigenous people and perspectives. Jacob et al.
(2015) assert that “[s]ome countries such as Vietnam continue to perpetuate active assimilation policies that in many ways threaten indigenous

peoples’ ability to preserve their languages, cultures, and identities” (p. 7). In another example, colonial structures in postcolonial contexts in

Africa have “impeded the inclusion of bearers of local, indigenous knowledges in formal, institutionalized education” (Dei, 2000, p. 44).

Colonization in contemporary schooling can occur at multiple levels despite an ethos of multiculturalism

or other inclusive discourses: at the epistemological level of knowledge systems, at the material level of representation, at the

discursive level of curriculum, or at the human level of whose bodies are safe and whose experiences are valued . Colonization may

occur in the name of integration or “under the disguise of equality,” but ultimately works “to suppress and

destroy cultural identities of Indigenous students” (Almeida, 1998, p. 7). Hidden curriculum and the streaming of

students into non-academic versus academic programming are two examples of how colonizing dynamics exist in contemporary schooling. The

curriculum in formal schooling immerses students into the assumptions and language of the dominant or

colonial culture. The “hidden curriculum” includes the “unwritten rules, regulations, standards and expectations that form part of the
learning process in schools and classrooms, not specifically taught to students through the planned or open curriculum and the content” (Rahman,

2013, p. 660). The hidden curriculum conveyed through the colonizer’s language reflects dominant

worldviews, beliefs, and value systems and informs how the written, mandated curriculum is delivered.

Rahman (2013) explains that this hidden curriculum forces Indigenous students to negotiate, and perhaps
abandon, their own cultural ways of being and doing within inflexible dominant systems in order to

survive in school.

[ROB] Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to Endorse the Better Resistance Strategy

Against Colonialist Violence. This means each side offers a method of rejecting

oppression to promote authentic freedom.

[Inwood & Bonds 1] THE AFF ADDS FUEL TO THE FIRE – they invest in the

settler colonial system they try to reduce – the K’s a prior question.

Inwood & Bonds 1: Inwood, Joshua [Senior Scientist in the Rock Ethics Institute; Professor of Geography, Penn State University] and
Anne Bonds [Professor of Geography, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee]. “Confronting White Supremacy and a Militaristic Pedagogy in the
U.S. Settler Colonial State.” Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 2016. http://tinyurl.com/3jdz3wns JB/CH

To illustrate how these configurations of power work, we engage with the uprisings in Ferguson, Missouri, and in Baltimore, Maryland, over the

deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of the police. We theorize these events within the framework of settler colonialism and militarism.

Finally, we offer some concluding thoughts about the role of peace and antiviolence and the incorporation of these themes more broadly into our

pedagogy. Importantly, we argue that this effort is not situated exclusively in the realm of human geography. As Francis's (2014) recent editorial

in Progress in Physical Geography illustrates, physical geography has much to offer in challenging and mitigating the environmental harms and

violences of war. A settler colonial framework illustrates the connections among racial hierarchies, environmental destruction, and geographies of

violence and militarism. The analytic of militarism requires first a focus on the United States as produced through

settler colonialism (Morgensen 2011; Smith 2012; Hixson 2013; Veracini 2013). A. Bonds and Inwood (2015) explained settler colonialism as

a continuously unfolding project of empire that is enabled by and through specific racial configurations that are tied to

geographies of white supremacy. In a U.S. context, settler colonialism begins with the removal of first peoples from the land and the
creation of racialized and gendered labor systems that make the land productive for the colonizers. This includes the removal of Native peoples

and geographies of indentured servitude, slavery, sharecropping, and, more contemporarily, urban abandonment and practices of mass

imprisonment. Settler colonialism, therefore, emphasizes the ongoing processes of racialized capital accumulation and displacement

necessary to sustain the permanent occupation of a territory. In this sense, it is an enduring structure -

an interrelated political, social, and economic process that continuously unfolds - requiring continued reconfigurations and

interventions by the state (Wolfe 2006). Because of the constant reworking of social and political economic hierarchies necessary
to sustain settler relations, this sociospatial dialectic is central to understanding how particular place-based

configurations of race, class, ethnicity, and gender come to predominate in the United States (for a broader discussion see S.

Hall 1996; Gilmore 1999; A. Bonds and Inwood 2015). According to Smith (2012), settler colonialism is sustained by three primary

logics that enshrine white supremacy. The first of these logics is that of slavery, which is usually premised on the enslavement of
black people, the devaluation of black life, and the racialized political economy established through this system. Rather than being located in the

past, the logic of slavery mutates and mobilizes across time and space, systematized through various structures of social control that dispossess

and retain black bodies as permanent property of the state. This logic connects slavery, sharecropping, welfare programs, and mass imprisonment

(Smith 2012). The logic of slavery rationalizes racial exploitation and is the cornerstone for the very notion of private property. As Harris (1993)

argued, "The origins of property rights in the United States are rooted in racial domination" (1734) that is connected to slavery and gives rise to a

very specific form of U.S.-style political economy built on and through the subordination of persons of color. Thus, slavery introduces into the

life of the nation the routine and naturalized "statesanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to

premature death" that is the heart of U.S.-style racism (Gilmore 2007, 28). The associated practices and systems not only justify death as the

"collateral consequences" of U.S. development, but they undergird the social and premature death of structural racism (Gilmore 2007). A second

and interconnected logic is genocide, premised on the ongoing disappearance of indigenous peoples in support of the appropriation and

privatization of indigenous lands (Smith 2012). Genocide sustains a spatial politics of erasure and exclusion, institutionalized by state practices

that justify indigenous removal and settler land claims. The practices of genocide are animated by and through logics of private property that

connect geographies of indigenous disappearance with labor systems meant to make the land productive. Finally, a third pillar is orientalism,

grounded in the belief of the inferiority and threatening menace of non-Western nations and peoples (Smith 2012).1 This

introduces into the United States a state of permanent warfare in which the nation is consistently besieged by

enemies (externally and internally); as a consequence, there is a constant need to protect “the well-being of empire” (Smith 2012, 69). The

foundational rationales of slavery, genocide, and orientalism contour the white supremacist settler state: The founding moments of US

nationalism [meaning the social and cultural identity of the nation] are foundational to both state and culture. The US was

conceived in slavery and christened by genocide. These early practices established high expectations of state

aggression against enemies of the national purpose and that valorized armed men in uniform as the nation’s true

sacrificial subjects. (Gilmore 2002, 20) These logics are reformulated and continue to take shape in an era of ostensible color-blindness
predominated by official discourses and government commitments to racial equality. Even as overt racism is eschewed, taken for granted

socioeconomic hierarchies, racial exploitation, and the redistribution of wealth reproduce and sustain white supremacy. The U.S. settler state

internalizes a “righteous violence” predicated on an expanding “quest for total security” that has come to characterize domestic and foreign policy

(Hixson 2013, 198). Although there are myriad ways to explore the interrelations between state-sanctioned violence and militarism, we find the

connections between domestic policing and the U.S. military-industrial complex to be particularly illustrative.
 A. Links
1. [Araya] The idea that U.S. moral authority is gone presupposes it existed to begin

with – ask yourself when the U.S. has had moral authority – it NEVER HAD

IT and their framing of it as smth that vanished bc of China is settler blaming and

a lack of accountability – puts the blame on Chinese alternatives as being the

reason why moral authority is gone

2. The idea we can “move things” back to the time when we had moral authority is a

link – settler move to innocence

3. [Brands and Edel] They say the U.S. needs to maintain primacy, otherwise

fragmentation – this props up American settlerism as being key – their argument

is the U.S. has to be the world leader, and that means that the U.S. is always

positioned as untouchable – that’s a form of settler invincibility – and they try to

salvage U.S. hard power which is part of the idea of US heg

4. [1AC Brands and Edel 2] They say U.S. deterrent is catalyst for great power

conflict – that’s settler centering – the idea that the U.S. is at the focal point of the

U.S. international order and they determine war or peace – erases the idea that

there can be internal conflicts that aren’t related to the US – this is what happened

in the scramble for Africa when European colonizers split up Africa and redrew

the borders with no understanding of already existing conflicts – their assumption

that the U.S. is the make-it or break-it is a link

5. [Gates 23] Settler silencing – it’s the idea that if we criticize, we are responsible

for global war – means a) no check on settlerism and b) they only allow us to

understand violence from a hegemonic perspective

 6. [De Sarto] AND THE AFF LEGITIMIZES COLONIAL BORDERING – in

reducing USMP reduction specifically in WANA, they reify existing borders at

the root of regional violence.

De Sarto: De Sarto, Raffaella. [Senior Lecturer of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS
Europe campus; Visiting Fellow at the European University institute]. “Contentious borders in the Middle East and North Africa: context and
concepts.” International Affairs, July 1, 2017. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/4/767/3897496 JB/CH

Profound disjunctures between state authority, legitimacy and territoriality lie at the heart

of the state-formation process in the Middle East. As the European colonial powers drew many

of the borders of the modern states in the Middle East after the end of Ottoman rule in the region, European colonial

interests and aspirations by and large created a new regional order in the Middle East.Certainly, many Arab countries, not
to mention Iran or Turkey, had a history as distinct political and social units. For instance, the ‘imam–chief type’ system of Morocco, Yemen and

Oman dates back to a period between the seventh and ninth centuries CE; Lebanon and Syria have been cultural and political centres since the

Middle Ages; the political roots of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait go back to the seventeenth century; and Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia emerged as

‘bureaucratic–military oligarchies’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the fourteenth century Ibn Khaldun, in his work Muqqadimah,

described feelings of belonging and group solidarity (‘asabiyah) based on blood ties and geography, and non-sectarian nationalism certainly has a

longer tradition than is commonly assumed, for example in Iraq. Ilya Harik thus emphasizes that many countries in the Middle East are not only

old societies but also ‘old states’. However, the responsibility for creating the ‘modern nation-state’ with defined

borders, such as Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and the smaller Gulf monarchies, lies with the

European colonial powers. In the Maghreb, where rule had been based on ‘tribal’ allegiances, the French and Spanish colonial powers
imposed borders where there had been none, ‘regardless of any historical local pre-existing factors and without any consultation with the local

populations’. As a result of these processes of external imposition, and given the incapacity of many states to manage their disagreements, the

territorial scope of state authority remained contested. Border disputes continue to characterize the region, almost every

MENA state having a border demarcation problem with its neighbour(s). To give just a few examples, Algeria

and Morocco fought a border war in 1963, and the Western Sahara problem remains unresolved today; the Iran–
Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 involved the question of control over the Shatt-al-‘Arab waterway; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was motivated

by, inter alia, a border dispute (the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein considered Kuwait an integral part of Iraq); Lebanon and Syria have a

contested border; and borders are of course also a prominent factor in the Arab–Israeli conflict. In some rather rare cases, the
redrawing of state borders resulted from peaceful negotiations, as for instance between Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 1956, between Jordan and Iraq
in 1982, and in the Arabian peninsula in the 1980s and 1990s. Of course, all borders are artificial in one way or another, and the

Middle East is no exception to this. Thinking specifically of geography, few of the borders in the Middle East and North Africa

follow geographical features, such as rivers, mountains or deserts. Conversely, many state borders were defined according to the old
administrative boundaries of the Ottoman empire, which delimited different districts, subdistricts and provinces. Straight lines, particularly those

cutting through deserts, are fairly frequent, reflecting British and French colonial officers' use of the ruler when defining the borders of new

states. In the Mashreq and in the Gulf, oil also played a prominent role in the colonial delineation of borders. Colonial policies towards different

ethnic and religious groups contributed considerably to the friction between the legitimacy of state authority and its territorial control. While

Middle Eastern borders did not usually delineate ethnic or religious communities, the colonial powers

often manipulated ethnic and religious divisions for their own interests, following the old Roman strategy of

‘divide and rule’. France created Lebanon, in which the Christian Maronites would become a majority—albeit a thin one—and sought to
establish two distinct legal systems for Arabs and Berbers respectively in Morocco. Britain, on the other hand, consented to the creation of a

Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine. Yet, in general, colonial policies resulted in the creation of multi-ethnic and and/or multi-confessional

entities within the newly established borders. Moreover, particularly in the Arab Middle East, the colonial powers assigned authority to specific

clans or tribes, which were not always local, reflecting their ignorance of local realities, strategic calculations, and a general sense of

superiority.23 In some cases, the new ruling elites hailed from what would become ethnic or religious minorities within the newly composed

citizenry, while some groups, such as the Kurds, the Palestinians and the Armenians, failed to obtain a state or were prevented from doing so.

The problem of weak popular legitimacy of regimes in the Arab Middle East, which has remained a significant factor

in explaining the contentious nature of borders in the region, is thus also deeply embedded in, and owes its origins to,

colonial state-formation practices. As the European colonial powers controlled the governance of,

and admittance to, the international system, the Middle East would remain under their

control. Altogether, the new regional order was contested from the outset: a revolt against the British in Iraq took place in 1920; there were
anti-British and anti-Zionist disturbances in Palestine from the 1920s on; and anti-French uprisings took place in Syria in 1925–7. In Egypt,

although it was nominally only a British protectorate, there were widespread revolts in 1919, after Britain initially wanted to prevent the

Egyptian wafd (delegation) from attending the peace conference in Versailles to present its claims for independence—which it eventually did, but

without success. There was also resistance against European attempts to create zones of influence in Anatolia in 1922, with the resistance

movement rallying behind General Mustafa Kemal, or Atatürk. Thus, between the early twentieth century and 1956, ‘the basic framework for

Middle Eastern political life was firmly laid—together with many of its still unresolved problems involving disputed boundaries, ethnic and

religious tensions and the existence of national minorities’.

 Impacts
[De Sarto 2] SERIAL POLICY FAILURE – the aff’s colonial cartography relies on

settler concepts even as they reduce MP – they INCREASE the use of settler borders

after the U.S. leaves. Creates an accountability-free plan where the U.S. causes regional

violence and then gets to walk away.

De Sarto 2: De Sarto, Raffaella. [Senior Lecturer of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS
Europe campus; Visiting Fellow at the European University institute]. “Contentious borders in the Middle East and North Africa: context and
concepts.” International Affairs, July 1, 2017. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/4/767/3897496 JB/CH

In addition to a massive investment in the police and security forces, usually at the expense of education, health and other social services, central

administrations were established. The new borders, often challenged by nomads, became the subject of tight policing. As elsewhere, the states in

the Middle East were generally subjected to colonial economic policies, entailing that the economy was geared towards the benefit of the

nationals of the colonial powers, including European settlers, who forged alliances with the large landowners and sheikhs who controlled the rural

areas.27 The distortion of political and economic processes, at the expense of simple peasants and other population groups, was thus partly the

result of the colonial powers' reliance on specific segments of society to exert control over the territory under their formal rule. The colonial

practices of state formation also included attempts to create a territorially defined nationality , usually based

on a population census. However, reflecting the practice of the Ottoman millet, specific ethnic or religious groups were given the right to
manage their own affairs; and in some states (Lebanon being the best example), privileges were allocated on the basis of ethnic or religious

communities. Once more, the old principle of divide and rule defined the management of religious and/or ethnic differences in the colonial state.

Yet sectarian politics not only contradicted the idea of the modern nation-state but also undermined the legitimacy of political rule from the

outset. The process of transferring political power after independence varied across the region, creating

instability and a series of military coups. In all cases, however, the new rulers faced the challenge of how to reduce the tension
between state authority and territoriality that they had inherited from the former colonial rulers. Perhaps an even greater challenge was to gain

legitimacy in the eyes of the new citizens. The struggle for independence usually placed the nation-state at the centre, creating vested interests on

a territorial basis. Thus, the leaders of an independent and territorially defined nation-state promoted the idea of a national identity

that was based on the Westphalian model and its inherent trinity of state territory, state authority and people .
The new national loyalties, however, continued to coexist in an uneasy way with tribal, ethnic or religious identifications, as in the decolonization

process in other parts of the world. As almost all states in the Middle East developed into autocratic regimes or

dictatorships, often of a secular type, religious or ethnic groups that had now become national minorities often remained
disfranchised. Simultaneously, however, the idea of a greater Arab nation that transcended colonial borders

remained influential.28 This feature distinguished the anti-colonial struggle in this area from the experience of many Asian and African

states. As Arab regimes started engaging in the discourse of pan-Arab unity, tension with the territorially

defined national identity emerged, with pan-Arabism also affecting the relationship between the

legitimacy of political rule and the Arab states' territorial scope . In the name of pan-Arabism, the 1950s and 1960s also
witnessed frequent interferences in the domestic affairs of fellow Arab states, together with growing tensions and competition for regional

hegemony within the Arab state system.29 As Etel Solingen notes, pan-Arabism thus camouflaged the fragility of the state

while feeding assaults on the sovereignty of neighbouring Arab states.30 In their quest for legitimacy, the new regimes
often used or manipulated religion. The strategic use of religion certainly applies to the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, where the kings

regularly invoke their sharifian lineage to legitimize their political authority.31 But even Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, the champion of secular

pan-Arabism, used fatwas (religious rulings) to justify major policy decisions;32 he also chose to address the Egyptian people during the 1956

Suez War from the pulpit of the Al-Azhar mosque. In addition to persisting ethnic and religious divisions and the frictions generated by pan-

Arabism, the new regimes faced widespread poverty and illiteracy among their citizens, together with various developmental needs. They

generally responded to these challenges by extending the powers of the state bureaucracy and the military.33 These measures would generally

ensure the deference of the population, but they would not necessarily enhance the popular legitimacy of the regimes. This is the origin of much

of the pressure exerted on the state and its boundaries in the Middle East that we can observe today. While colonialism laid the foundations of the

contentious nature of statehood and sovereignty, specific domestic practices of state- and nation-building after independence, together with

regional and international policies and developments, would increase the pressures exerted on MENA borders even further. Authority, legitimacy

and territoriality after independence The politicization of religion and religious sectarianism The rise of political Islam and the growing

politicization of religious sectarianism have been, and continue to be, major factors affecting the relationship between authority, legitimacy and

territoriality in the Middle East. Postulating religious identifications as the only valid organizing principle of politics, political Islam and religious

sectarianism have emerged as extremely powerful challengers to the legitimacy of political rule. The rise of Islamism and sectarianism is a result

of a range of domestic, regional and international dynamics, with individual agency being crucial in the process of manipulating religious

identities for political ends.

 Alt
[Flowers] REJECT THE AFF’S SETTLER APOLOGY AND EMBRACE

DESUBJECTIFICATION, in which WANA people DESTROY settler norms and

affirm their OWN laws. NO PERMS – this alt DIVESTS from the state, so doing

both is impossible.

Flowers: Flowers, Rachel. [University of Victoria, Political Science] “Refusal to forgive: Indigenous women’s love and rage”
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015, pp. 32-49, 2015. https://tinyurl.com/j4w24ast CH

While there is pressure on Indigenous peoples to forgive during this era of reconciliation, as Coulthard (2014) explains, Federal Indian policy has

not changed but merely shifted from genocidal practices of forced exclusion and assimilation to a mode of colonial governmentality that works

through politics of recognition and reconciliation. Colonial violence has not ended. These discourses that emphasize accommodation are

seemingly more conciliatory; regardless of this shift, the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state remains colonial. State violence

continues to constitute the regulative norm of colonial dispossession directed at Indigenous women. Even though the settler polity is ostensibly

dedicated to a new relationship and reconciliation, it is predicated on the disappearance of Indigenous peoples, women in particular. The story of

the settler colony is founded on disappearing peoples, from terra nullius to missing and murdered Indigenous women. Colonialism

operates as a form of structured dispossession and the current relationship between Indigenous peoples and

the state is part of that continuum. Ongoing extractionist politics continue to inform our place-based arts of resistance and critiques

in our struggles not only for land but also informed by the land. Indigenous peoples’ resistance to the calls for forgiveness is a

legitimate rejection of a new relationship that is simply the old relationship with new clothes. In our hwulmuhw
snuw’uy’ulh6 , we have stories and dances that demonstrate that some beings are duplicitous and must be approached with caution or outsmarted

in order to stop them from causing any further harm to the people or the village; suspicion, anger and resentment cannot be disqualified. To

disregard anger and resentment as destructive emotions is an uncritical move to absolve the unforgiven, whereby blame is places on the injured

party, who is seen as an irrational ‘blockade’ blinded by their rage compared to the ‘reasonable’ apologist. Moreover, when apologies offered (by

the state and individuals) can be understood as displays of virtuousness, as spoken desires to forget the past and to move forward in a shared

future, how can forgiveness be expected? These apologies are events that express regret and ask forgiveness for an event in the past, they are not

commitments to structural change that acknowledge and identify the processes and structures that permit atrocities to occur and which continue to

dispossess and dominate Indigenous peoples. For example, the Canadian state’s 2008 apology for the residential school system revealed the

country’s escapist forgetfulness. Many elders and residential school survivors believe that the apology lacked substance, but it still provided a

necessary piece of their healing. I have a sense that the apology contributed to a process of desubjectification for many residential school

survivors. Here, desubjectification is a process of breaking free from one’s subject position. This involves
adopting a critical attitude toward, or destroying, the discourses and norms by which one is made a

subject, namely, a colonized subject. In Foucauldian terms, through a process of desubjectification, individuals stop

comparing themselves with the ‘legitimate’ norms and ethics imposed by power/knowledge and stop

changing themselves/their behavior in order to align with structural and institutionally ordered

power/knowledge. Residential schools were a fundamental overseer of discipline and subjectification yet there is little to no acknowledgement
that the violence of the residential school system is connected to the forms of violence that Indigenous women continue to experience throughout

their lives. Advocacy for forgiveness is steeped in promises of peace and healing; it is not surprising that forgiveness is desired and tempting

because of its seemingly redemptive quality and appeals to basic Indigenous principles of harmony. Refusal to forgive, then, must be

understood as not only negation, but also affirmation. In refusing the ongoing violence of the colonial state, it demonstrates a

commitment to affirm my hwulmuhw teachings as a Leey’qsun woman and direct my love inward. One of

the ways we accomplish this is by giving authority to our own laws and governance. It is essential that the revival
of our laws and practices is not undertaken in the spirit of competition. By this I am referring to ways in which claims of authenticity or cultural

authority are used by some to assert power over others; this is not resurgence. One of the first laws we learn is to be kind and help one another, to

conduct oneself with kindness. Treating each other with kindness instead of lateral violence is one simple gesture that should go without saying,

and makes our communities stronger and healthier. Our laws also provide our original responsibility to love and care for

the lands, the waters, the sky, and all its beings. The law to be of good mind and heart is a law of the everyday. A good mind

and a good heart, or ‘uy shqwaluwun’, is the core of our way of being.
 REPS FIRST
1] Our interpretation is that the judge ought to evaluate the ethicality of the aff
prior to to its hypothetical impacts. They don’t get to weigh case if we win the case
shouldn’t have been read in the first place.
2] Accessibility comes prior to the flow – it’s a prior question to any issue in this
round since we need debaters to engage in their model.
3] “Plan” focus is bad – they should be able to defend their entire project and not
just 7 seconds of it i.e. the advocacy text.
Debate is key to challenge assumptions – don’t just conform to policy
solutions but question their premises
Shanahan: Shanahan 93 William Shanahan (Ft. Hays State University, Kansas) “kritik of thinking” Debater's Research Guide,
Health Care Policy, 1993

Policy has a stranglehold on debate worthy of any NYC transit cop. Argument must

conform to rigid policy prescriptions - not only are particular types of arguments

deemed unacceptable, whole ways of thinking are excluded also. A caveat must follow on the

heels of these seemingly scathing denunciations of current debate practices: debate is excellent! Debate opens paths of

thinking that compulsory statist education maliciously denies. Intellectual obedience

to authority is schooled, beginning in kindergarten and continuing throughout the remainder of the

students' captivity (3). Debate teaches students to question the dogma spewed forth

daily in their classrooms, to inquire into the matter at hand rather than simply

accept the intellectual authority of their teachers. Students initially are protected from the stultifying
effects of educational institutionalization by the argument and thinking skills learned in and brought from debate.

Unfortunately, debate cannot resist its own calls to "face reality," cannot resist its

own dogma. In debate though, those calls rally around the policy pole, demanding

allegiance to the real world. Debate has opened many paths for its participants and

helped them to travel extraordinarily far. This article attempts to open additional pathways for debaters, not
shut down the current ones.
Case
 Framing
Off the standard proper:
1. The fact they don’t explain whose wellbeing or what it means to maximize means

they take a universalized notion of the good – supercharged by their 2nd reason to

prefer of aggregation – their approach is to ignore nuance and culture – Buddhist

monks and Muslim scholars often prioritize things other than pleasure/hedonism –

their focus is only on the universal

Off Mitchell

1. DOESN’T JUSTIFY THEIR FRAMEWORK — that just shows extinction matters,

not that it comes FIRST — the card isn’t comparative to any other framework

2. This STILL MISSES THE POINT — we don’t say extinction doesn’t matter, just that

it shouldn’t be the ONLY consideration — for them, it is

Off of Tutton

1. THIS LINKS THEM HARDER TO THE K – massive footnoting DA – they

just add indigenous people onto the list of groups that are impacted by extinction

– but the link story PROVES state intentions are rooted in colonialism, which

means this doesn’t solve

Off Dyvbig + Iverson:

1. Obviously predictable – a) set col is a very common K read in debate b) you are

responsible for ur reps just as you would be for using ableist/racist langiage in

round – you are responsible for defending the way you try to get to those

consequences and c) incredibvly arbitrary – they shouldn’t get to decide the stasis
 point – by that logic, they can arbitrarily rule out any layer by saying it’s not part

of their stasis point – net worse for debate – they kill argument innovation bc they

make it much harder for ppl to do unique forms of research

Off of Kim + Boas:

1. Turn – they do the literal opposite – they get the opposite of social change b/c

nobody walks out of this room and goes to Congress

2. We don’t need evidence specifically to presence b/c we are talking about the

ideology that undergirds presence – their conflation of military presence and

militarism is the exact problem that we refute

3. Their card says absolutist language is bad – but we have specific

contextualization’s for why the harms are bad – eg when the US moved from Iraq

– Afghanistan – Libya – it is specific and we point out patterns - makes them

aware of the harms they have to defend

Off of Jarvis

1. REPS COME FIRST – we need to examine the representations BEFORE

pragmatic solutions – these solutions assume that their representations are good –

if we win they aren’t, you negate

Off of Wong:

1. Not comparative between the U.S. and China –the card is independently

powertagged

2. The aff doesn’t solve – the links story proves the aff just INCREASES U.S.

hegemony – turns all solvency for indigenous groups

Off of Gates:

1. Turn – heg is a huge contributor to international backlash and violence – it paints

a target on the U.S.’s back bc its seen as being a dominant global force – increases

violence bc the U.S. tries to be seen as the world’s police officer

Off of Davis:

1. Turn – they get less political change because the process won’t ever adapt to

indigenous demands – eg when indigenous ppl took over Alcatraz or when they

have marched on Washington or run for/been elected into Congress, it hasn’t

produced political change – their card doesn’t mention a singular card of that

happening

2. Turn – engaging in the process leads to cooptation – tribes have repeatedly been

disempowered after trying to use the political process – treaties signed with

indigenous groups deny them sovereignty – think abt FFS – when indigenous ppl

agreed for their land to be used for appropriation, they lost access to their

resources – everytime they negotiate with the state, the state forces them into

unequal treaties

Off of Ravenal:

1. This assumes they win solvency for the aff – we prove they can’t access this

unless they get rid of the ontological nature of the state

Off of Reiter
 1. Turn – the track record is terrible – the reason the system keeps reproducing

violence is bc it hasn’t reconned with the underlying colonialism within it

2. Double-turn with their own tag – they say no monolithic IR theory and then say

IR is good and we an’t have sweeping criticisms – but their entire card is

sweeping generalizations

1. Not true – the US has wrongly intervened militarily – 2003 war in Iraq and Iran –

obviously IR doesn’t lead us in that direction

Off of Waever and Buzan:

1. [Zvobgo & Loken 1] Misunderstands the criticism of IR – the arg is that IR is

positioned by antiBlack scholars who aren’t talking about the specific reasons

why that violence occurs.

Zvobgo & Loken 1: Zvobgo, Kelebogile [Founder and Director, International Justice Lab at William & Mary] and Meredith Loken
[Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst]. “Why Race Matters in International Relations.”

Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020. CH

Race is not a perspective on international relations; it is a central organizing feature of world politics.
Anti-Japanese racism guided and sustained U.S. engagement in World War II, and broader anti-Asian sentiment influenced the development and

structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the Cold War, racism and anti-communism were inextricably linked in the

containment strategy that defined Washington’s approach to Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. And today

race shapes threat perception and responses to violent extremism, inside and outside the “war on

terror.” Yet mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship denies race as essential to understanding

the world, to the cost of the field’s integrity. Take the “big three” IR paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These

dominant frames for understanding global politics are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations

that limit the field’s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization.

Core concepts, like anarchy and hierarchy, are raced: They are rooted in discourses that center and favor
Europe and the West. These concepts implicitly and explicitly pit “developed” against “undeveloped,”

“modern” against “primitive,” “civilized” against “uncivilized.” And their use is racist: These invented

binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe. While realism and liberalism

were built on Eurocentrism and used to justify white imperialism, this fact is not widely acknowledged in

the field. For instance, according to neorealists, there exists a “balance of power” between and among

“great powers.” Most of these great powers are, not incidentally, white-majority states, and they sit atop

the hierarchy, with small and notably less-white powers organized below them. In a similar vein, raced

hierarchies and conceptions of control ground the concept of cooperation in neoliberal thought: Major

powers own the proverbial table, set the chairs, and arrange the place settings.
 Adv

The 1AC’s negative view of China is premised on a racist insecurity that seeks to

keep a world order closer to pure whiteness. The 1AC can never see other races as

anything else but something to be fearful off.

Freeman et al 22 [Bianca, a 6th year PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science
at UC San Diego D.G. Kim, an Inequality in America Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University,
who received his Ph.D. in Political Science from University of California San Diego (UCSD) in
2022. His dissertation, Anti-Asian Racism and the Racial Politics of U.S.-China Great Power
Rivalry, has been recognized by the American Political Science Association’s Merze Tate best
dissertation award in international relations, law, and politics and the UCSD Chancellor’s
Dissertation Medal in social sciences. David A. Lake, a Distinguished Professor of Political
Science at the University of California, San Diego. He has published widely in international
relations theory and international political economy. Race in International Relations: Beyond the
“Norm Against Noticing” Annual Review of Political Science 2022 25:1, 175-196] Karan

The Second Face of Racism: Racial Hierarchy and Foreign Policy The recent worldwide surge in anti-Asian hate at the height of
the pandemic calls for renewed attention on how race and racism connect to international politics. Fueled by inflammatory elite rhetoric, deep-

seated racial animus has far-reaching implications for not only domestic racial re- lations but also interstate, and most importantly, great power

relations (Dionne 2020; Kim 2020, 2021; Reny & Barreto 2020). As we shall see, race and racism can affect the way foreign

threats are perceived, competing visions of national interest are deliberated, and foreign policy responses

are selected. Having elucidated international law as a projection of racial deficiency, we now turn to the second face of racism, namely the

perception of racial others as potential threats. Notions of deficiency and hostility, though seemingly contradictory, straddle a key

feature of racial hier- archy. Subordinate racial groups are considered not only inferior but potentially threatening

to the status quo. Dominant actors within a racialized international order, in other words, perceive racial others as a latent threat to their

own interests, and by extension, their identity. Racial hier- archy thus directly conditions how state actors interpret the

behavior of racial others, assess their own interests, and cope with felt challenges to their status.
Understanding this element of racial hierarchy can help us reexamine the overlooked role of race and racism in shaping a wide range of foreign

policy preferences and decision making. In the language of Reus-Smit (2017, p. 879), though he avoids explicit reference to race, an in-
ternational order is a configuration of political authority in which the need for legitimacy requires

complex heterogeneity to be converted into authorized forms of cultural—including racial— difference.

Racial hierarchy, by extension, provides a key source of legitimacy for an unequal global order, engendering “intersubjective understandings

about. . .the appropriateness of its constituent role identities” (Reus-Smit 2017, p. 879). Under such prevailing “diversity regimes,”

subordinate groups are perceived as a latent existential threat with potentially revisionist intent and

incom- patible interests. Sociological and psychological understandings of racial hierarchy also suggest that it is through the effect of
racial prejudice that dominant groups evaluate threats from racial others and formulate their behavioral responses. Building on Blumer’s (1958)

group position the- ory of prejudice, Bobo (1999) posits that racial prejudice involves more than negative feelings or stereotypes and instead

derives more fundamentally from a felt challenge to the sense of relative group position. The long tradition of social dominance theory also

attributes the source of racial prejudice and violence to the human predisposition to maintain group-based social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto

1999). Conceived in this way, racism is related to but goes beyond social iden- tity theory, which posits an innate human tendency toward in-

group favoritism and out-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner 1979). By socializing state actors into constituent identities

and interests, racial hierarchy turns attention away from simple out-group tensions to threats to group

status and, thus, shows how racism can play a deeper role in shaping perceived foreign threats, na- tional interest, and ultimately foreign policy

behaviors (see Hanania & Trager 2020). Foreign security policy. First, racial hierarchy, through “colored” perceptions of

foreign threats and national interest, has direct implications for how countries conduct foreign policy on a

wide range of security and military issues, including alliance politics, regional order building, and terri-

torial expansion. A few exceptional works on race in IR have emphasized that racial identity can be an important factor in the formation,
stability, and durability of alliances in international politics. Focusing on the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–1923), Búzás (2013)

proposes that racial prejudice inflates perceptions of threat and aggressive intentions from racially dissimilar

countries. He finds through extensive archival research that racial difference came to inflate British threat

perceptions of Japan, predisposing the two allies toward discord and eventually the termination of the

alliance at the 1921 Washington Conference. At the same time, Anglo–American racial similarity saved the United

States and Britain from such racialized fears, despite frequent military tensions including the Venezuela crisis of

1895–1896. The dominant racial discourse of the trans- Atlantic Anglo-Saxon brotherhood drew the two

countries toward foreign policy cooperation to a greater extent “than any other comparable pairs of states”

(Vucetic 2011a, p. 403). Bell (2013) fur- ther notes that this prevailing White supremacist vision undergirded the fin de

siècle discussion of racial utopianism—the claim that an Anglo-Saxon security community would eliminate all forms of interstate
conflict (see also Vucetic 2011b). Racialized beliefs can also have far-reaching effects on other types of foreign security and military policies

such as regional institution-building and territorial expansion. Hemmer & Katzenstein (2002) argue that perceived racial identity, among

other components of collective identity, played an important yet underappreciated role in shaping starkly different

American ap- proaches to regional orders in postwar Europe and Asia. Despite a huge disparity in material capabilities

between the United States and its regional allies in both regions, American policy makers established multilateral security

institutions in Europe while opting for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia . Postwar foreign
policy elites viewed their potential Asian part- ners as part of an inferior race who were less trustworthy and thus ineligible for membership in a

NATO-like multilateral security community. Maass (2020) shows that the perception of the native population as racially inferior, dangerous, and

thus inherently unsuited for republican governance also explains the limited American territorial expansion in Mexico. Foreign economic policy.

The effects of race and racism can also be found in foreign economic policy. Critical race scholarship in IR has long pointed out the enduring

legacies of colonialism as manifested, for instance, in the global labor regime. Immigrant laborers continue to be subject to the racialized

practices of labor exploitation (Persaud 2001). Racialized global inequality also permeates other domains such as North–South trade relations and

aid regimes. Rosenberg (2019) provides systematic evidence of how racism affects global migration flows, showing that migrants from majority-

Black states migrate significantly less than they would under a racially blind hypo- thetical scenario. Focusing on the role of more subtle forms of

modern-day racism, Singh (2017) shows that the global North continues to offer unfavorable trade terms to the global South. Schol- ars have also

placed racism at the center of the global aid regimes, finding that paternalism (Baker 2015, Baker & Prather 2021) and racial resentment (Simon

& Moltz 2019) play a large role in garnering public support for foreign aid. One particularly promising area of research centers on the increasing

racialization of interna- tional trade, engaging conventional theories of trade policy preference in international political economy. Utilizing survey

experiments and multiyear public opinion surveys, a group of schol- ars finds that the racial identity of a potential trading partner has become

increasingly important for American public support for overseas trade, often at the cost of the respondent’s material self-interest. These recent

studies find that such racial considerations are most prominent among White Americans who have become far more protectionist than other racial

groups in the coun- try (Guisinger 2017). Supported by evidence from multiple surveys, Mutz et al. (2020) point to higher levels of racial

prejudice among Whites as one potential source of the growing race gap in trade attitudes. As the United States comes closer to becoming a

“majority-minority” nation, future research might further investigate the sources and political consequences of the race gap in trade and other

foreign policy issues. Power shifts. As Reus-Smit (2017) notes, challenges to prevailing regimes of cultural stratification become most

pronounced in the face of shifting material balances of power. Racial prejudice, after all, is activated by perceived competition with subordinate

racial others in order to maintain the status quo hierarchy (Bobo 1999). Racialized threat perceptions, in other words, can have the most palpable

effects on world politics under the condition of major power shifts. In conjunction with their newfound material capabilities, rising but

racially subordinate states can trigger racialized fears and foreign policy aggression from declining but

racially dominant states. As Adler-Nissen & Zarakol (2021) point out, the current challenge to the liberal international order partly

comes from rising non-Western powers such as China who seek to redress their grievances against what they perceive
to be a Western-centric, and thus White-dominant, global order. Historically, Japan’s revisionist foreign policy in the
early 1930s has also been explained as motivated in large part by the rising power’s frustration with the then more explicitly racialized Western-

dominated inter- national order (Ward 2013). Dominant powers simultaneously tend to perceive such challenges with

a racial lens, giving rise to racialized foreign policy narratives, most famously exemplified by the still

popular “Yellow Peril” discourse (Búzás 2013, Ward 2013). Perceived racial affinity, on the contrary, appears to

substantially ameliorate fears and uncertainty under power shifts , again as suggested by the fin de siècle Anglo–American

rapprochement (Vucetic 2011a,b; Edelstein 2017). Future research should investigate whether racial fears inflate threats from a

rising China, pro- duce public support for hawkish policies, and potentially aggravate military tensions.
More stud- ies are needed, for example, on the extent to which contemporary public opinion on China is racialized, how top-down anti-China

rhetoric can activate racial fears, and the potential mecha- nisms by which racial prejudice affects actual policy making and crisis management

(see Miller & Taylor2017;Dionne2020;Han&Marwecki2020;Kim2020,2021;Ebner&Medenica2021).In parallel, researchers can pay more

attention to how a rising China produces and manages its own racialized narratives as it promulgates the discourse of the century of humiliation

by the West (see Cheng 2011, Zhang 2020).

[Pillar et al] USMP backfires: efforts to protect the state are the number one cause of

terrorism.

Pillar: Pillar, Paul [Ph.D., Princeton University; retired officer in the US army reserve], Andrew Bacevich [Professor Emeritus of International
Relations and History, Boston University], Annelle Sheline [Political Scientist], Trita Parsi [Founder and former president of the National Iranian
American Council]. “A New U.S. Paradigm for the Middle East: Ending America’s Misguided Policy of Domination.” Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft, Quincy Paper No. 2, July 2020. https://quincyinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Ending-America%E2%80%99s-
Misguided-Policy-of-Domination_FINAL_COMPRESSED.pdf AG/FW/CH

It was only as the enclave was collapsing that the dominant message shifted to encouraging mayhem overseas. As the ISIS case indicates,

focusing unduly on terrorist “safe havens” can divert resources and attention from more effective means to combat the majority of terrorists, who

live and operate in societies around the world. Clearly one should not wish for terrorist groups to hold any territory for prolonged periods of time,

but preventing that is more achievable if conducted by local actors and partners. False Assumption 3: Military interventions can contain terrorist

threats. The foremost driver of anti–U.S. terrorism has been the U.S. military presence and military

operations abroad.19 This finding is consistent with research on terrorism worldwide that has shown the chief purpose for suicide

terrorism to be resistance to military occupation.20 Responses to the U.S. military in the Middle East provide numerous

examples. Hezbollah’s anti–U.S. actions in the 1980s, including the April 1983 bombings of the Marine barracks and the U.S.
embassy in Beirut, were a direct response to U.S. military intervention in Lebanon, which, in turn, was an attempt to deal with the consequences

of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon a year earlier. The last time Hezbollah or its ally Iran was involved in a terrorist attack aimed at U.S. interests

was the bombing in 1996 of the military barracks at Khobar Towers in eastern Saudi Arabia—an attack aimed directly at the U.S.
military presence in the Persian Gulf area.21 The origins of al–Qaeda lie primarily in similar resentments over the U.S.

military presence. It was the U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that, more

than any other single development, radicalized Osama bin Laden.22 He saw this expedition as Western boots polluting the
soil on which the Prophet had walked. This was when bin Laden broke with the Saudi regime and embarked on the violent course that would

define al–Qaeda. It follows that the single most important step the United States could take to reduce anti–U.S.

terrorism is to draw down its military presence overseas, especially in the Middle East. False Assumption 4:
Counterterrorism centers on war. Military force is one of several counterterrorism tools. As with others, it has advantages and drawbacks.

However, among the available options, militaries are not particularly effective against terrorist groups. Most terrorist organizations are defeated

not by military operations but by police and intelligence actions and cooperation.23 Military action can occasionally be useful in assisting host

countries in striking a terrorist group, a mission best performed using offshore capabilities, as these do not involve the physical vulnerabilities and

resentments among local populations that an on-the-ground military presence often entails.

CIA fills in—turns the case. Causes more instability.

Prysner 10 (Michael Prysner is a former U.S. Army corporal who spent 12 months in the Iraq War, beginning with the invasion
in March 2003, Liberation News Contributor, Jan 12 “CIA’s changing role in U.S. imperialism’s expanding war”,
https://www.liberationnews.org/10-01-12-cias-changing-role-in-us-impe-html/)

The CIA has long commanded military operations, from its death squads in Latin America to bloody military coups in Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia. But there
has been a fundamental change in the CIA’s military role since 2001. Now,
the CIA is on the front lines in Afghanistan more so than in any other mission. Previously, the CIA primarily commanded U.S. military
special operations troops, as well as local militias. The CIA’s own paramilitary branch, known as the Special Activities Division, was small and rarely
used in lieu of U.S. and foreign troops. After the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration began the process of militarizing the CIA, which continues
today. The Special Activities Division was increased in size and funding. They
were given greater authority to clandestinely conduct
military operations in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and other countries where U.S. troops are not legally allowed. Now,
instead of commanding U.S. or foreign military units and local reactionary militias, the CIA is increasingly conducting military operations with their own
agents. They even operate out of their own firebases scattered all over Afghanistan and Iraq. This constitutes a major change in the structure of the CIA.
The growing trend of privatizing the military can be seen as the CIA militarizes. In addition to increasing their own number of troops, the CIA has
also absorbed sectors of the notorious mercenary company known as Blackwater (now known as Xe). It was recently revealed that the CEO of
Blackwater, right-wing evangelical billionaire Eric Prince, works directly for the CIA. Blackwater troops became CIA troops, and have been conducting
assassination campaigns and military operations in Pakistan and other countries. But the CIA’s
militarization spans beyond commanding
their own troops. The CIA established a vastnetwork of secret prisons, where suspects endure vicious illegal torture and absolutely no
legal rights. In addition, the CIA now has its own personal air force, commanding and piloting drones that are now being
regularly used all over the world, conducting bombing missions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere. The Obama
administration recently approved even more funds to increase the CIA’s drone capabilities, putting bombs and missiles at their fingertips. The CIA is
playing a more direct role in U.S. wars than ever before. The U.S. ruling class wants the so-called “war on terror” to be shifted into the shadows. The
anti-war movement exploded in late 2002, drawing the largest anti-war demonstrations in history against the invasion of Iraq. The anti-war movement
during the Vietnam War grew to a point where the U.S. government was forced to abandon its colonial aims in Vietnam. Now, the United States is
involved in what is already the longest war in U.S. history, which is growing more unpopular everyday. The occupation of Iraq still has no end in sight.
The Pentagon brass has made it clear that we should brace for a long and bloody fight in Afghanistan. Additionally, U.S. imperialism has goals elsewhere
in the region. Capitalism has developed into a global economic system. The United States and a handful of countries in Western Europe have competed
with each other to dominate the markets and resources of the rest of the world for the past century. They have also cooperated together in their joint
struggle against socialism or against independent non-socialist governments in the developing world. This has led to the bloodiest century in human
history and shows no signs of abating. One way that the militarization of the CIA benefits the ruling class is that it
allows the U.S.
government to substitute other forces for those the U.S. military would have deployed. U.S. military
operations are much more subject to publicity and scrutiny, but clandestine CIA operations are ambiguous. Working in the
shadows allows the government to deny its own role in secret bombings, targeted assassinat ions and
economic sabotage in other countries. The history of the CIA includes the most blatantly criminal military operations, using the most
brutal and murderous tactics to overthrow popular, democratically elected governments who do not submit to U.S. corporations, and installing the most
reactionary and repressive dictators, from Guatemala, to Iran, to Haiti, to the Congo, and countless others. If U.S. troops deployed to conduct these
operations, there would have been even greater public outcry. But they are instead conducted in the shadows, to mask the true nature of
the system we live under.