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CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY

AFRICAN

FOREIGN POLICIES

IN INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTIONS

EDITED BY
JASON WARNER
& TIMOTHY M. SHAW
Contemporary African Political Economy

Series Editor
Eunice Sahle
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
Durham, NC, USA
Contemporary African Political Economy (CAPE) publishes social sci-
ence research that examines the intersection of political, social, and
economic processes in contemporary Africa. The series is distinguished
especially by its focus on the spatial, gendered, and cultural dimensions
of these processes, as well as its emphasis on promoting empirically sit-
uated research. As consultancy-driven work has emerged in the last two
decades as the dominant model of knowledge production about African
politics and economy, CAPE offers an alternate intellectual space for
scholarship that challenges theoretical and empirical orthodoxies and
locates political and economic processes within their structural, his-
torical, global, and local contexts. As an interdisciplinary series, CAPE
broadens the field of traditional political economy by welcoming con-
tributions from the fields of Anthropology, Development Studies,
Geography, Health, Law, Political Science, Sociology and Women’s and
Gender Studies. The Series Editor and Advisory Board particularly invite
submissions focusing on the following thematic areas: urban processes;
democracy and citizenship; agrarian structures, food security, and global
commodity chains; health, education, and development; environment
and climate change; social movements; immigration and African diaspora
formations; natural resources, extractive industries, and global economy;
media and socio-political processes; development and globalization; and
conflict, displacement, and refugees.

Advisory Board
Bertha O. Koda, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Brij Maharaj, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Thandika Mkandawire, London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK
James Murombedzi, Council for the Development of Social Research in
Africa, Senegal
John Pickles, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Wisdom J. Tettey, University of British Columbia, Canada

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14915
Jason Warner · Timothy M. Shaw
Editors

African Foreign
Policies in
International
Institutions
Editors
Jason Warner Timothy M. Shaw
United States Military Academy University of Massachusetts-Boston
West Point, NY, USA Boston, MA, USA

Contemporary African Political Economy

ISBN 978-1-137-57573-9 ISBN 978-1-137-57574-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57574-6

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“This rich collection of essays by an impressive group of diverse African and
Western scholars is a substantial contribution to a much understudied field, and
deserves to be widely read by scholars and practitioners.”
—Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Institute for Pan-African Thought and
Conversation, University of Johannesburg

“African Foreign Policies in International Institutions is the right book at the

right time. As African foreign policies and multilateral institutions evolve to meet
the challenges of the 21st century, this book explains the complexities inherent
in Africa's pursuit of its collective interests in the world. It is essential reading for
anyone seeking to understand Africa’s place in the emerging global order.”
—Dr. Reuben Brigety II, Dean, Elliot School of International Affairs, George
Washington University, and former U.S. Ambassador to the African Union

“Shaw and Warner have studiously assembled a remarkable collection: well-­

conceived, impeccably executed, and all-encompassing in its breadth, depth,
and significance. The book provides valuable insights from diverse perspectives
on how African states conduct their foreign policies within international organ-
izations, demonstrating how international organizations matter in a globalized
world, and how African states can use them at sub-regional, continental, and
global levels to advance their foreign policy objectives. This work will truly be
acclaimed as a seminal contribution to our knowledge of the relationships
between African states and international organizations.”
—Dr. Joy Ogwu, Former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations

“It no longer makes sense to talk of uniquely ‘African’ foreign policies nor to
write off the impact of international organizations on the continent’s pol-
itics. Instead, this book’s case studies usefully illustrate the symbiotic relation-
ship between African states and international organizations in the formulation
and implementation of their foreign policies. They reveal how African heads of
state increasingly have to compete with other actors to determine their country’s
foreign policies and the considerable variety of foreign policy strategies African
states now adopt towards their peers and relevant international organizations.”
—Dr. Paul D. Williams, Associate Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs,
George Washington University
This book is dedicated to Jim Hentz, a scholar, friend, and mentor.
 Foreword

Conventionally, foreign policy is a set of strategies and actions conceived

by a state or group of states to advance national, regional or global
interests in interaction with other states and international organizations
regarding any areas of human endeavor, including political, military,
economic, social, cultural and environmental. Shaped by the relevant
social forces determining it and in whose interest it is adopted, foreign
policy is ultimately a reflection of the power dynamics in the national,
regional, or global arenas. Thus, to speak of African foreign policy in
international institutions, both African and global, is to interrogate its
determinants, objectives, and beneficiaries. Through this volume of
well-researched papers by both young and established scholars, Jason
Warner and Timothy Shaw have done an excellent job in addressing
these three issues with respect to the conduct of African foreign policies
in and towards international organizations.
With respect to the determinants of foreign policy, I wholeheart-
edly endorse the volume’s argument that “observers should understand
African states to make foreign policy along broadly similar logics as do
other non-African states.” For a long time, Western scholars have had
the tendency of treating Africa as a unique, if not abnormal, case in
world politics. Our leaders were always portrayed as patrimonial and cor-
rupt, as though patrimonialism, nepotism and corruption were unknown
in other parts of the world, including the developed Western democra-
cies. Foreign policy in African countries was usually portrayed as being

ix
x    Foreword

determined by the ruler’s obsession with self-enrichment and regime

security rather than national welfare and human security.
What this radical dichotomy between personal and national interests
seemed to ignore is that regime security was in many cases threatened by
foreign powers who did everything to keep in power those authoritar-
ian and corrupt incumbents they liked, while they sought to overthrow
leaders who were determined to use their countries’ natural resources
to improve the living conditions of their peoples. Examples of the latter
case include the Suez crisis of 1956 and Western hostility to Egyptian
president Gamal Abdul Nasser; Western-backed military coups d’état
against radical leaders like Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Modibo Keita
(Mali); and the assassinations of visionary leaders such as Félix Moumié
(Cameroon), Patrice Lumumba (DRC), Louis Rwagasore (Burundi),
Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde), Thomas Sankara (Burkina
Faso), and Chris Hani (South Africa).
In addition to advancing regime and national interests, African foreign
policy objectives do include peace and security as well as economic coop-
eration and integration at the sub-regional and continental levels. Several
of the contributions to the volume deal with these issues, including the
role of the African Union (AU) through its Peace and Security Council
(PSC) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in conflict pre-
vention and peacekeeping, and the AU involvement in developing a con-
tinental foreign economic policy. Except for the East African Community
(EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the
RECs seem to be more involved in peace and security matters than in
economic integration and development. In both areas, a major weakness
is their dependence on external funding, instead of mobilizing their own
resources domestically.
The challenges facing the continent in both areas of peace and secu-
rity and development include the fight against terrorism and improving
the quality of life of ordinary people through developmental regionalism.
The limits of the RECs in putting an end to terrorism and trans-border
crimes such as drug and human trafficking have been exposed in both
west Africa and the Horn of Africa. On the one hand, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), despite its positive con-
tribution in ending civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is currently
unable to cope with the proliferation of terrorist groups in the sub-­
region and the staying power of drug traffickers in Guinea-Bissau and
in the Sahel. On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Authority for
 Foreword    xi

Development (IGAD) is incapable of coping with the Al Shabab insur-

gency, piracy and banditry in Somalia and Kenya. New sub-regional
groups or arrangements are being created to deal with terrorism, particu-
larly in ungoverned spaces such as the Liptako-Gourma border region
between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. These three countries, along
with Mauritania and Chad, have established the G5 Sahel group to fight
Jihadists and other criminal groups active within their borders.
One way of defeating the Jihadists and other transnational threats
to security is to transform African economies so they could cease being
dependent on the export of primary commodities and begin producing
manufactured goods and thus generate more jobs. As outlined in the
Lagos Plan of Action, such a strategy can best be achieved through eco-
nomic cooperation and integration sub-regionally and regionally. At the
present, the best strategy for attaining the goal of economic transforma-
tion in Africa is the 5 major priorities of the African Development Bank,
which call for (1) electrifying Africa, (2) feeding Africa, (3) industrializ-
ing Africa, (4) integrating Africa, and (5) improving the well-being of
Africans. The ADB is already involved in the funding of the Grand Inga
project for the biggest hydroelectric dam in the world. If completed, it
will have the capacity to generate 40,000 MW, or twice the power of the
Three Gorges Dam in China, and furnish 40% of Africa’s electricity. With
its arable land, 80% of Africa’s fresh water and other assets, Central Africa
can feed the entire African continent. But, as Samir Amin has argued in
most of his writings on Africa, the industrialization of African agriculture
is the sine qua non of development and the amelioration of the standard
of living of Africans.
Finally, with respect to the beneficiaries of African foreign policy, it
is important to point out that African leaders, however self-centered
or corrupt they might have been, did not consider foreign policy as
designed exclusively for their own narrow interests. The most impor-
tant achievement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was its
unswerving opposition to colonialism and white minority rule. The
organization provided moral and material support to liberation move-
ments against Portuguese Fascism and white racism in southern Africa,
and succeeded in ostracizing apartheid South Africa and having it
excluded from many international organizations, including the Olympic
Games. Detractors of the OAU must remember that despite its weak-
nesses, it succeeded in promoting peace and stability through the princi-
ple of the inviolability of the colonially-inherited borders and that of the
xii    Foreword

peaceful settlement of all interstate disputes by negotiations, mediation,

conciliation, or arbitration. When it became evident that internal con-
flicts were the major issue, the OAU adopted in 1993 the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which is the precursor
to the AU’s PSC.
It is also significant to note that African leaders betrayed their
pan-African principles at the UN World Conference Against Racism (or
Durban 1) in 2001 by siding with their Western donors or “development
partners” in refusing to endorse the demand for reparations for slavery
by their brothers and sisters from the Diaspora. In this act, as in the lack
of commitment to pan-African solidarity with victims of armed conflict
or gross violations of human rights on the continent (Uganda under
Idi Amin, Central African Republic under Bokassa, Rwanda, Burundi,
DRC, etc.), the OAU and the AU are not that much different from one
another. The AU does in principle have beautiful documents on human
rights, democracy, elections and governance, in addition to an increased
role in internal conflicts as part of what former AU Chairperson Alpha
Oumar Konaré once referred to as “the pan-African right of interven-
tion in domestic conflicts” in cases of gross violations of human rights,
but there are severe limits to its ability to do so. Like the OAU, it is still
dependent on external funding for most of its programs.
Most of the issues raised in this foreword are discussed in detail in the
chapters of this book. Readers will find it very thought-provoking and
informative on African foreign policy in international institutions.

Chapel Hill, NC, US Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill
 Contents

1 Introduction: African Foreign Policies and International

Organizations: The View from the Twenty-First Century 1
Jason Warner

Part I African Foreign Policies in African International

Institutions

2 An Ambivalence to the Norm Cycle: The African

Union’s “New” Approach to Continental Peace
and Security 19
Jide Martyns Okeke

3 The AU and Continental Foreign Economic

Policymaking in Africa: Institutions and Dialectics
on Integration in the Global Economy 33
Kwame Akonor

4 The Troubled Socialising Agent: Democratic Governance

and the African Union’s Quest to Become an
Independent Foreign Policy Actor 49
Chris Landsberg

xiii
xiv    Contents

5 Beyond the Collective: The Comparative

Strategic Utility of the African Union and RECs
in Individual National Security Pursuits 63
Jason Warner

6 The Role of African Regional Organizations

in Post-Election Governments of National Unity 79
Alexander Noyes

7 Nationalism Underpinned by Pan-Regionalism:

African Foreign Policies in ECOWAS in An Era
of Anti-Globalization 95
Raheemat Momodu

8 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development:

Internal Culture of Foreign Policymaking and
Sources of Weaknesses 113
Redie Bereketeab

9 The Uses (and Abuses) of the Economic Community

of Central African States: The Hidden Functions
of Regional Economic Community Membership
for African Regimes 127
Graham Palmateer and John F. Clark

10 The Instrumentalisation of SADC

to Achieve Foreign Policy Agendas 149
Tim Murithi

Part II African Foreign Policies in Global

International Instituions

11 Partnering for Peace: United Nations and African

Union Cooperation in Peace and Security 165
Colin Stewart and Line Holmung Andersen
 Contents    xv

12 African Agency and the World Bank in the Twenty-First

Century 183
Karelle Samuda

13 South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the International

Criminal Court: Of African Lessons, Security Council
Reform, and Possibilities for an Improved ICC 199
Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers

14 The International Labor Organization and African

States: Internationalizing States and Dispersed
Foreign Policy 215
Nick Bernards

15 Global Humanitarian Organizations and African

Goals: The Case of Médecins Sans Frontières
in South Africa 229
Jessica L. Anderson

Part III Country Case Studies of African Foreign Policies

in International Institutions

16 Consistency in Inconsistency: South Africa’s Foreign

Policies in International Organizations 247
John Akokpari

17 Leverage in a Tight Space: Zimbabwean Foreign Policy

in International Organizations 265
Sarah J. Lockwood

18 Angola’s Measured Distance from International

Organizations 283
Assis Malaquias

19 Decolonizing International Relations: Insights

from the International Financial Institutions
in the Congo During the Cold War 297
Carol Jean Gallo
xvi    Contents

20 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Relation to the Economic

Community of West African States 311
Cyril Obi

21 Senegalese Foreign Policy: Leadership Through Soft

Power from Senghor to Sall 327
Mamadou Bodian and Catherine Lena Kelly

22 International Organizations as Shields in Cameroonian

Foreign Policy 353
Ada Peter and Remi Mbida Mbida

23 Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International

Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia 371
Michael Woldemariam

24 Djibouti’s Foreign Policy in International Institutions:

The Big Diplomacy of a Small State 389
Sonia Le Gouriellec

25 Conclusion: The Future Nexus of African Foreign

Policies, International Institutions, and Developmental
Regionalism 403
Timothy M. Shaw

Index 417
 Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Jason Warner is an Assistant Professor at the US Military Academy—

West Point in the Department of Social Sciences and director of the
Africa profile at the Combating Terrorism Center. His research interests
include African international relations, international organizations, and
security issues in Africa. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Timothy M. Shaw is a Visiting Professor and Foundation Graduate

Program Director of the Ph.D. in Global Governance and Human
Security at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. He taught
at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia for three decades and has
since directed graduate programmes at the University of London
(Commonwealth Studies) and the University of the West Indies
(International Relations). He has been a visiting faculty member in Japan
(Nihon), Uganda (Mbarara), Nigeria (Ife), Zambia, and Zimbabwe,
and continues as an adjunct professor at Aalborg, Carleton, Ottawa, and
Stellenbosch Universities. Shaw holds a trio of degrees from three con-
tinents: Sussex in the UK, Makerere in Uganda, and Princeton in the
USA. His pair of coedited collections on African international relations
has been reissued in paperback editions by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013
and 2015, and he continues to edit an IPE book series for Routledge
and Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature. Tim was awarded an honorary
degree by St Andrews University in mid-2015.

xvii
xviii    Editors and Contributors

Contributors

John Akokpari is an Associate Professor in the Politics Department

at the University of Cape Town. He holds a Ph.D. from Dalhousie
University, Canada. He has taught in Dalhousie University, St. Mary’s
University, (both in Canada), and in the University of Lesotho. He has
published widely in a number of local and international journals on
a variety of topics on African politics, including civil society, democra-
tization, development, foreign policy, international migration, conflicts,
regionalism, and the environment. He has also contributed chapters in
many edited books on Africa. He is the coeditor of The Africa Union
and its Institutions and Africa’s Human Rights Architecture, both pub-
lished in 2008.
Kwame Akonor is an Associate Professor at Seton Hall University (New
Jersey, USA), where he teaches international relations, human rights,
and African political economy. He directs the University’s Africana
Center and is also director of the African Development Institute, a New
York based think tank. He is president emeritus of the New York State
Africana Studies Association. In addition to other publications, he is
the author of three books: Africa and IMF Conditionality (2006) and
African Economic Institutions (2009), both published by Routledge, and
UN Peacekeeping in Africa (Springer 2017).
Jessica L. Anderson is an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington
University, where she earned her Ph.D. in political science. Her research
focuses on the behavior of international organizations with a focus on
humanitarianism and peacebuilding. She has been designing, implement-
ing, and evaluating aid programs in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past ten
years.
Line Holmung Andersen joined the United Nations Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) as Policy and Best Practices Officer
in September 2017. She worked as Reporting Officer at the United
Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) from 2014 to 2017.
Prior to joining the United Nations, she worked as program manager
on a broad variety of developmental and political party dialogue pro-
grams in Africa and Asia. She holds a M.Sc. in Political Science from the
University of Aarhus, Denmark.
 Editors and Contributors    xix

Redie Bereketeab is an Associate Professor of Sociology. Currently, he

is working as senior researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala,
Sweden, running a research project on conflict and state building in the
Horn of Africa. His research interests are political sociology, state, state
building, nation, nation building, nationalism, identity, governance, devel-
opment sociology, conflict studies. He has authored several books, chapters,
and journal articles. His latest publications include: Self-Determination and
Secession in Africa: The Post-Colonial State (Routledge, 2015), Revisiting the
Eritrean National Liberation Movement, 1961–1991 (Red Sea Press, 2016),
and Redefining National and Nation-Building in Post-Secession Sudans:
Civic and Ethnic Models (Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2014).
Nick Bernards is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
(SSHRC) Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Studies at
Queen’s University. His research focuses on the global governance of
labor issues. He holds a Ph.D. from McMaster University.
Mamadou Bodian is a Project Coordinator for the Trans-Saharan
Elections Programme (TSEP) and a member of the Sahel Research
Group, both based at the University of Florida. His current research
focuses on elections and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa with a par-
ticular focus on Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He was a Senior Researcher in
the Project Office “Islam Research Programme” at the Embassy of the
Netherlands in Senegal, a project sponsored by Leiden University and
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has published several works
on Islam and education in the Sahel. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of Florida.
John F. Clark is Professor and Chairperson of the Department of
Politics and International Relations at Florida International University
(Miami). He is the author or editor of four books on African politics
and foreign policy, and the author of over 50 articles and chapters. He
is currently writing a textbook on Africa’s international relations with
Professor Beth Whitaker.
Carol Jean Gallo is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge,
where she is writing about Congolese peacebuilders’ perceptions of the
World Bank’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program
in the DR Congo. She lived, worked, and did her fieldwork in eastern
DRC and contributes to the news site UN Dispatch. She holds an M.A.
in African Studies from Yale University.
xx    Editors and Contributors

Christopher Gevers teaches international law at the School of Law,

University of KwaZulu-Natal and is a Ph.D. candidate at Melbourne Law
School. He has previously studied at the London School of Economics
and Political Science and the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research
interests include international legal theory, global histories, law and lit-
erature, critical race theory, and postcolonial studies. Christopher is cur-
rently a residential fellow (2017) at the Harvard Institute for Global Law
and Policy.
Sonia Le Gouriellec is a Horn of Africa Researcher at the Institute
of Strategic Research at the French Military School and a lecturer at
Sciences Po. She holds a Ph.D. from Université Paris Descartes.
Catherine Lena Kelly is a Mellon/American Council of Learned
Societies Public Fellow in Washington, DC. She is an expert on democ-
racy and rule of law in West and Central Africa and has published arti-
cles, reports, and program evaluations on these issues for academic and
practitioner communities. She holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University.
The work published here reflects her personal view and does not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the institutions with which she is affiliated.
Chris Landsberg is South African Research Chair in African Diplomacy
and Foreign Policy, and Senior Associate at the School of Leadership,
both at the University of Johannesburg. Previously, he was Director of
the Centre for Policy Studies and founding Co-director of the Centre for
Africa’s International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand.
He obtained his doctorate from the University of Oxford, where he
studied as a Rhodes Scholar. Professor Landsberg is the author of The
Diplomacy of Transformation: South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft
(2010) and The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics
and South Africa’s Transition (2004). He is co-editor of nine volumes,
including South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era (2007), with
Adekeye Adebajo and Adebajo Adedeji; From Cape to Congo: Southern
Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (1993), with Mwesiga Baregu;
and South African Government and Politics: Coming of Age with Suzy
Graham (2017); as well as From the Outside In: Civil Society and South
African Foreign Policy with Lesley Masters (2017); and editor of Africa
Rise Up! Perspectives on African Renewal (2017).
Sarah J. Lockwood is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University, where
her research focuses on political violence and democratic accountability
 Editors and Contributors    xxi

in southern Africa. She also has extensive experience as a journalist and

political risk analyst in the region. She holds an M.Sc. in African Studies
from the University of Oxford, and an A.M. in Government from
Harvard University.
Assis Malaquias is Professor and Chair of the Department of Global
Studies and Maritime Affairs at the California State University (Maritime).
He was the Academic Chair and Professor of Defense Economics at
the National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS), where he oversaw curriculum and program development in the
area of defense economics focusing on sound practices for the manage-
ment of security sector resources in Africa. His previous positions include:
Associate Dean of International and Intercultural Studies and Professor
of Government at St. Lawrence University in Canton, NY; Extraordinary
Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape;
and Visiting Professor of Political Science at Stellenbosch University. He
has published extensively on African security, especially violent non-state
actors. He is also an internationally recognized expert on maritime secu-
rity in Africa. Malaquias holds a Ph.D. from Dalhousie University.
Remi Mbida Mbida is Senior Lecturer at in the Department of
Diplomacy and Professional Training at the International Relations
Institute of Cameroon. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Paris
Dauphine.
Raheemat Momodu is the ECOWAS Representative to the African
Union representing all ECOWAS Community Institutions at the AU
and all diplomatic missions and multilateral institutions in an all areas
of cooperation in Addis Ababa. She holds three Masters Degrees: an
M.A. in Managing Peace and Security in Africa from the Institute of
Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia;
an M.A. in Gender and Development, Institute of Development Studies
(IDS), University of Sussex, England; and an M.Sc. in Geography and
Planning, University of Lagos, Nigeria. She has over 25 years working
and research experience in media and development, gender studies, gov-
ernance, human rights, youth development, peace and security, African
integration, multilateral diplomacy and the African Peace and Security
Architecture, including the ECOWAS and African Standby Force.
Tim Murithi is Extraordinary Professor of African Studies, Center
for African Studies, University of Free State, South Africa, and Head of
xxii    Editors and Contributors

the Justice and Reconciliation in Africa Programme, Institute for Justice

and Reconciliation, Cape Town. He was previously Claude Ake Visiting
Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
and Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden. He has served as an Adviser/
Consultant to the African Union (AU), Southern African Development
Community (SADC), UNDP, UK DFID, and German GiZ. He is on
the International Advisory Boards of the Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development, The African Journal of Conflict Resolution,The African Peace
and Conflict Journal and the journal Peacebuilding. He has authored over
80 journal articles, chapters, and policy papers. He is the author and editor
of nine books, including as author: The African Union: Pan-Africanism,
Peacebuilding and Development (Ashgate, 2005) and The Ethics of
Peacebuilding (Edinburgh University Press, 2009); coeditor: Zimbabwe in
Transition: A View from Within (Jacana, 2011) and editor: Routledge in
Transition (Routledge, 2014).
Alexander Noyes is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. His research interests
include civil–military relations, conflict mediation, power-sharing, secu-
rity sector reform, and electoral violence. He holds a Ph.D. from the
Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University.
Cyril Obi is the Program Director of the Social Science Research
Council’s African Peacebuilding Network Program. He has published
extensively in the fields of African governance, international relations,
and environmental and resource politics. He serves on the boards of
many international journals and is a member of the board of directors of
the African Studies Association.
Jide Martyns Okeke is the Head of Policy Development Unit of the
Peace Support Operations Division within the Peace and Security
Department at the African Union Commission. He is responsible for
policy formulation, lessons learned studies, and knowledge management
on peace support operations. He is also a non-stipendiary research fellow
at the University of Portsmouth, England, where his research interests
include the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Standby
Force, and the politics of security in Africa. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics
and International Studies from the University of Leeds in England.
Graham Palmateer is a graduate student at Florida International
University. He is currently pursuing an M.A. in African and African
 Editors and Contributors    xxiii

Diaspora Studies and a Ph.D. in International Relations. His primary

research interests are American foreign policy and the international rela-
tions of Africa. He holds an M.A. in History from Marquette University
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Ada Peter is an Assistant Professor of Media and National Security at
Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria. She explores the processes of ter-
rorism, violent extremism, and conflicts to help governments curb ter-
rorist acts and violent extremism in her region. As a lead researcher of
investigations of online communication and social change in develop-
ing nations, she uses machine learning algorithms to analyze online big
data that could predict acts of terror and armed conflicts in some African
countries. She received her Ph.D. from Covenant University.
Max Du Plessis is a barrister in South Africa, associate fellow at
Chatham House London, honorary research fellow at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal (Durban), and a senior research associate at the Institute
for Security Studies (Pretoria). As a barrister in South Africa (and asso-
ciate tenant, Doughty Street Chambers, London), Max has an exten-
sive practice in public law, human rights, and international law. As an
international criminal lawyer, he has advised states before the ICC and
has been working on domestic (complementarity and universal jurisdic-
tion) cases dealing with arrest warrants for senior government officials
implicated in international crimes and litigating and advising on them
in South Africa and other countries. He most recently acted on behalf
of the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) in seeking to ensure
that the South African government complies with its obligations to arrest
President Bashir of Sudan—arguing against the government’s claim that
Bashir has immunity from arrest under customary international law on
account of him being head of state. He also acted for SALC in chal-
lenging the South African government’s decision to withdraw from the
Rome Statute and is representing SALC before the ICC in the current
Article 87(7) process before the Court.
Karelle Samuda is a Jamaica House Fellow in the Office of the Prime
Minister of Jamaica. She holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the Schar
School of Policy and Government, George Mason University. She
received her B.A. at Washington and Lee University and MPP at the
McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University. In 2014,
she was selected to be part of the first cohort of Africa Junior Fellows
xxiv    Editors and Contributors

at the World Bank. Her major research areas are the political economy
of distributive politics in the Caribbean and Africa, and the relationship
between African countries and international financial institutions.
Colin Stewart has been a practitioner in the field of international rela-
tions for over 25 years, half of these as a senior peacekeeping manager
and political adviser in United Nations field missions. In his most recent
role, he had responsibility for planning and building the UN’s peace and
security partnership with the African Union. Prior to that, he served in
three multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations, including the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor. Mr. Stewart was a Canadian
diplomat for seven years, serving in Ottawa and Jakarta. He has also con-
sulted and managed field operations for non-government organizations
working in democratic development in Palestine, Somaliland, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Michael Woldemariam is an Assistant Professor at Boston University’s
Pardee School of Global Studies. He is also affiliated with BU’s African
Studies Center. His research focuses on armed conflict and security
in the Horn of Africa region and has been published in a number of
peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes. His first, book, Insurgent
Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents, is
forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. He holds a Ph.D. from
Princeton.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction
African Foreign Policies and International
Organizations: The View from the
Twenty-First Century

Jason Warner

Beginning with Hegelian tropes describing Africa as a “land of ­childhood”

and “enveloped in the dark mantle of night,” even the more ostensibly
inclusive post-World War II Western academy found Africa as a gener-
ally an inadmissible, or at least, uninteresting, topic of study for a special-
ist of international relations (IR). This trend was squarely bucked in the
post-Cold War era, with Christopher Clapham’s (1996) Africa and the
International System, which remains the standard-bearer for rigorous anal-
ysis of African international relations. And, while no analogous single-au-
thored works have approached the topic of African international relations
as broadly, sundry edited volumes (Harbeson and Rothchild 2000; Dunn
and Shaw 2001; Brown and Harmon 2013; Murithi 2014; Bischoff et al.
2015) have worked to bring African states into the mainstream of the study
of IR. More narrowly, another series of excellent edited volumes—though

J. Warner (*)
Department of Social Sciences and Combating Terrorism Center,
United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, USA

© The Author(s) 2018 1

J. Warner and T. M. Shaw (eds.), African Foreign Policies in
International Institutions, Contemporary African Political Economy,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57574-6_1
2 J. WARNER

now decades old—(Mazrui 1969; Shaw and Aluko 1984; Wright 1998;
Khadiagala and Lyons 2001a) worked to interrogate the nature of African
foreign policies more acutely. Concurrently, editions too numerous to
­
be named individually have investigated the nature of foreign policy pro-
cesses of larger African states, especially South Africa and Nigeria. While
various factors account for the general aversion to the study of African for-
eign policies, – including problems associated with data collection, the dif-
ficulty of locating a purely “foreign” policy in many African states, and an
apathy of Western scholars toward African foreign policy generally (Wright
1998: 1) – scant focus has been given to African foreign policies in the past
several decades; nor have many of the sub-topics related thereto been inves-
tigated with rigor.
To that end, this volume addresses one of the most auspicious omis-
sions of the still seemingly inchoate study of African international rela-
tions: how African states conduct their foreign policies in international
organizations and international institutions. Thus, the contributors to this
volume were presented with the following motivating questions: How
do African states conduct their foreign policies within international insti-
tutions and organizations? What strategic utility do states attach to these
institutions? In short, how do we understand the relationships between
African states and international institutions and organizations at the sub-
regional, pan-African, global, and non-governmental levels of analysis?
More broadly, are there particular analytics, expectations, or logics that
undergird the enactment of foreign policies in Africa? If so, in what ways
might we apply insights from African experiences of statehood and state-
craft to better understand the dynamics of foreign policies and interna-
tional organizations in the world more broadly?
As an entry point to this edited volume, this introduction argues
that while at one point in time, it might have been rightfully argued
that there existed a uniquely “African” approach to the construction
and effectuation of foreign policy—undergirded by what this piece
refers to as the “Omnipotent African Executive” approach—the rise of
a multiplicity of geopolitical actors over the past two decades has less-
ened the power of African executives, thus leading to more variegated
African approaches to foreign policy—or what this chapter terms as
the “Decentered Inputs” model of African foreign policy enactment.
Precisely because of the contemporary diversity of inputs inform-
ing African foreign policy creation and effectuation, this introduction
asserts that it is analytically unhelpful to attempt to corral under one
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

rubric the interpretation of a singular, monolithic “African” approach to

foreign policymaking.

Historic Views of African Foreign Policies and IOs: The

“Omnipotent African Executive” Model
The prevailing orthodoxy in the limited study of African foreign policy-
making over the past 30 years has been an assumption of the outstripped
role of the executive, African head of state, in the creation of foreign poli-
cies. Or, as this chapter refers to the phenomenon, there has been a reliance
on the “Omnipotent African Executive” model of foreign policy analysis.
In brief, this paradigm for the study of African foreign policy understands
that foreign policy has historically been made by African heads of state,
who, wielding inordinate and often unchecked influence over the states
and statist apparatuses over which they preside (generally due to a lack of
democracy and/or an inordinate control of the military), could effectu-
ate foreign policy decisions for their own personal benefit, rather than for
the benefit of their country and its citizens. Indeed, an analysis of leader-
ship by heads of state shows the long-held intuition of this model. Among
others, the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm has been exemplified
by broad and deep control of foreign policy by executives like Mobutu
Sese Seko in Zaire; Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic;
Sani Abacha in Nigeria; Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea;
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; Ali Omar Bongo of Gabon; Isaias Afiwerki
of Eritrea; and, until January 2017, Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia. Given
the above, the Omnipotent African Executive model has been an unsur-
prisingly salient way to think about the origins of African foreign policy,
and one that understands African heads of state to be inextricably linked
to African foreign policy construction and effectuation, and the primary
­reapers of its spoils, be they financial, reputational, or security related.
The Omnipotent African Executive trope of African foreign policy
analysis is directly linked to the broader question of what constitutes
“foreign policy” at all. A foundational—if not somewhat pedantic—­
statement at this point is the recognition that the construction and effec-
tuation of “foreign policy” is an activity that is intrinsically undertaken
by states themselves. Thus, though it might seem obvious, to under-
stand what sorts of foreign policies have been produced on the African
continent, one must inherently look at the nature of states and statist
4 J. WARNER

apparatuses that create foreign policies. To that end, our discussion on

African foreign policymaking—in international institutions or other-
wise—must inherently begin at the emergence of the African state in
the late 1950s and early 1960s and the sorts of playing fields that such
sovereignties offered to African leaders as they ascended to power. More
acutely, then, the Omnipotent African Executive mode of analysis is
premised upon the notion that to the extent that a somewhat unique
genre of “African” foreign policymaking exists, it is derived from the
fact that Africa’s post-colonial states shared common features that were
more or less unique to them, to include: late entry into the global system
of states; independence by legal fiat of decolonization that required
no exertion of Weberian control over territory; and a general lack of
Lockean social contract between government and citizens. Put other-
wise, the nature of the emergence of African states has had a direct bear-
ing upon the nature of foreign policies that the leaders of these states
have elected to pursue.
For his part, Clapham (1996) has offered one of the most thorough dis-
cussions of how the nature of the post-colonial African state engendered
specific tendencies for foreign policy creation, centered on the whims of the
leader. Once assuming the top executive office, African leaders, he argues,
worked assiduously to command as much presence over the state and its
institutions as possible, a process he refers to as the pursuit of “monopoly
statehood” undertaken in the service of protecting newfound positions of
power. Controlling new states’ foreign policymaking portfolios was espe-
cially valuable, given early African leaders’ omnipresent threat environment,
which included rival politicians and their followers, elements of the national
military, non-co-ethnic groups within the country, belligerent neighbor-
ing states, and imperialist global states. Thus, the protection of individual
interests of leaders, most typically tied to regime security—and not broader
state interests of geopolitical power maximization—became the desired
ends that determined African foreign policymaking processes. Calculations
about the utility of managing nascent states’ foreign relations meant that
once assuming executive offices, African leaders realized:

[T]hey could use their role in the diplomatic game together with their
internal resources, in order to help keep themselves in power, to extend
their control over the national territory and to extract resources from their
domestic environment with which to strike further bargains on the inter-
national scene. They could well have general moral goals such as the eco-
nomic development and national unity of their states, or the achievement
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

of independence or majority rule for territories still under colonial or

minority control, which their foreign and domestic economic policies
were intended to achieve. They almost certainly had personal goals, such
as glory or perhaps merely self-enrichment. But all of these depended on
their ability to keep themselves going through the effective management of
their external as well as their domestic environment. This was what foreign
policy in African (and indeed most other) states was all about (Clapham
1996: 23).

Put in yet more explicit terms, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001b: 5)

describe that:

African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of
leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and
prime ministers has dovetailed with post-colonial patterns of domestic
power consolidation…The charismatic leader became the source, site, and
embodiment of foreign policy… From this perspective, foreign policymak-
ing emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their political opponents
and compensate for unpopular domestic beliefs.

The Omnipotent African Executive Model: African Foreign Policies

and IOs
Assuming that the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm of foreign
­policy analysis is true, we can also expect to derive useful sets of expec-
tations about how African states will formulate foreign policies toward
international organizations. If it is true that African foreign policies are pri-
marily derived from leaders whose primary goals are regime security, then
we can expect that: a) when African states create IOs, these IOs will hold
as their primary goal to ensure regime security; b) that if many African
leaders across the continent feel both insecure and can control foreign pol-
icy apparatuses, they might work together to protect mutual regime secu-
rity via IOs and; c) given the primacy of regime security over statecraft,
African foreign policy goals toward IOs will be rather narrow in scope.
Given these predictions of the Omnipotent African Executive model,
do we see these played out in reality? Yes: the historical record
indicates the profound saliency of this model in the analysis of early
African foreign policy action, wherein African states understood IOs to
primarily useful for the protection of incumbent regimes. To that end,
a review at the creation of African IOs—especially the Organization of
6 J. WARNER

African Unity (OAU) in 1963—gives tremendous credence to the

Omnipotent African Executive model of foreign policy analysis. While
space does not permit a thorough elucidation of the history of organ-
ization, its founding Charter (OAU 1963) vaunted, above all, non-in-
terference, non-intervention, the respect and inviolability of colonial
borders, and non-critique of member regimes. In the decades following
its inception, the OAU’s constituent decision to remain “ingloriously
silent” (Haggis 2009) led it, and the broader intra-African community,
to bear silent witness when state leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of
Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Moussa Traouré of Mali, Mengistu Haile
Mariam of Ethiopia, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Jean-Bédel Bokassa
of the Central African Republic, and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan ravaged
their populations of wealth, security, and representative governance,
only rarely challenging the right of these leaders to rule. In no uncertain
terms, the OAU served to ossify the privileged positions of African heads
of state: perhaps no wonder then that it was often ignominiously referred
to as “African Dictator’s Club.”

Contemporary African Foreign Policies and IOs: The Rise

of the Decentered Inputs Model

While the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm of African foreign pol-

icy analysis has been shown to have had merits during a certain era, the
general dearth of academic studies attempting to understand African for-
eign policies over the decades has meant that the literature has not moved
much beyond this trope. Although it accurately described the period of
African foreign policy creation and effectuation for a certain period of
post-colonial history, it is here argued that this no longer the case.
Instead, the more appropriate way to think about the ways that
African states now formulate their policies toward IOs and otherwise
is via what this chapter calls the “Decentered Inputs” model of African
foreign policymaking. In contrast to the Omnipotent African Executive
Model, this chapter proposes this paradigm to accurately account for
the sundry forces of globalization that have, in essence, “flattened” the
capacity of some (though not all) African leaders to unilaterally comman-
deer the foreign policies of their states for their exclusive benefits. The
Decentered Inputs approach therefore argues that African foreign policies
in the twenty-first century are more rightly characterized by a prolifera-
tion of inputs—described presently—which, when combined with the still
Another random document with
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were unsatisfactory to several of the concerted Powers, and
were sharply criticised in the British and German press. The
German government, especially, was disposed to insist upon
stern and strenuous measures in dealing with that of China,
and it addressed the following circular note, on the 18th of
September, to all the Powers:

"The Government of the Emperor holds as preliminary to

entering upon diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government
that those persons must be delivered up who have been proved
to be the original and real instigators of the outrages
against international law which have occurred at Peking. The
number of those who were merely instruments in carrying out
the outrages is too great. Wholesale executions would be
contrary to the civilized conscience, and the circumstances of
such a group of leaders cannot be completely ascertained. But
a few whose guilt is notorious should be delivered up and
punished. The representatives of the powers at Peking are in a
position to give or bring forward convincing evidence. Less
importance attaches to the number punished than to their
character as chief instigators or leaders. The Government
believes it can count on the unanimity of all the Cabinets in
regard to this point, insomuch as indifference to the idea of
just atonement would be equivalent to indifference to a
repetition of the crime. The Government proposes, therefore,
that the Cabinets concerned should instruct their
representatives at Peking to indicate those leading Chinese
personages from whose guilt in instigating or perpetrating
outrages all doubt is excluded."

The British government was understood to be not unwilling to

support this demand from Germany, but little encouragement
seems to have been officially given to it from other quarters,
and the government of the United States was most emphatic in
declining to approve it. The reply of the latter to the German
circular note was promptly given, September 21, as follows:
"The government of the United States has, from the outset,
 proclaimed its purpose to hold to the uttermost accountability
the responsible authors of any wrongs done in China to
citizens of the United States and their interests, as was
stated in the Government's circular communication to the
Powers of July 3 last. These wrongs have been committed not
alone in Peking, but in many parts of the Empire, and their
punishment is believed to be an essential element of any
effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such
outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China.
It is thought, however, that no punitive measures can be so
effective by way of reparation for wrongs suffered and as
deterrent examples for the future as the degradation and
punishment of the responsible authors by the supreme Imperial
authority itself, and it seems only just to China that she
should be afforded in the first instance an opportunity to do
this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world.

"Believing thus, and without abating in anywise its deliberate

purpose to exact the fullest accountability from the
responsible authors of the wrongs we have suffered in China,
the Government of the United States is not disposed, as a
preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic negotiations
with the Chinese Government, to join in a demand that said
Government surrender to the Powers such persons as, according
to the determination of the Powers themselves, may be held to
be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs. On the
other hand, this Government is disposed to hold that the
punishment of the high responsible authors of these wrongs,
not only in Peking, but throughout China, is essentially a
condition to be embraced and provided for in the negotiations
for a final settlement.
{139}
It is the purpose of this Government, at the earliest
practicable moment, to name its plenipotentiaries for
negotiating a settlement with China, and in the mean time to
authorize its Minister in Peking to enter forthwith into
conference with the duly authorized representatives of the
Chinese Government, with a view of bringing about a
preliminary agreement whereby the full exercise of the
Imperial power for the preservation of order and the
protection of foreign life and property throughout China,
pending final negotiations with the Powers, shall be assured."

On the same day on which the above note was written the
American government announced its recognition of Prince Ching
and Li Hung-chang, as plenipotentiaries appointed to represent
the Emperor of China, in preliminary negotiations for the
restoration of the imperial authority at Peking and for a
settlement with the foreign Powers.

Differences between the Powers acting together in China, as to

the preliminary conditions of negotiation with the Chinese
government, and as to the nature and range of the demands to
be made upon it, were finally adjusted on the lines of a
proposal advanced by the French Foreign Office, in a note
dated October 4, addressed to the several governments, as
follows:

"The intention of the Powers in sending their forces to China

was, above all, to deliver the Legations. Thanks to their
union and the valour of their troops this object has been
attained. The question now is to obtain from the Chinese
Government, which has given Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang
full powers to negotiate and to treat in its name, suitable
reparation for the past and serious guarantees for the future.
Penetrated with the spirit which has evoked the previous
declarations of the different Governments, the Government of
the Republic has summarized its own sentiments in the
following points, which it submits as a basis for the
forthcoming negotiations after the customary verification of
powers:

(1) The punishment of the chief culprits, who will be

designated by the representatives of the Powers in Peking.
(2) The maintenance of the embargo on the importation of arms.

(3) Equitable indemnity for the States and for private

persons.

(4) The establishment in Peking of a permanent guard for the

Legations.

(5) The dismantling of the Ta-ku forts.

(6) The military occupation of two or three points on the

Tien-tsin-Peking route, thus assuring complete liberty of
access for the Legations should they wish to go to the coast
and to forces from the sea-board which might have to go up to
the capital.

It appears impossible to the Government of the Republic that

these so legitimate conditions, if collectively presented by
the representatives of the Powers and supported by the
presence of the international troops, will not shortly be
accepted by the Chinese Government."

On the 17th of October, the French Embassy at Washington

announced to the American government that "all the interested
powers have adhered to the essential principles of the French
note," and added: "The essential thing now is to show the
Chinese Government, which has declared itself ready to
negotiate, that the powers are animated by the same spirit;
that they are decided to respect the integrity of China and
the independence of its Government, but that they are none the
less resolved to obtain the satisfaction to which they have a
right. In this regard it would seem that if the proposition
which has been accepted as the basis of negotiations were
communicated to the Chinese plenipotentiaries by the Ministers
of the powers at Peking, or in their name by their Dean, this
step would be of a nature to have a happy influence upon the
determinations of the Emperor of China and of his Government."
The government of the United States approved of this
suggestion from France, and announced that it had "instructed
its Minister in Peking to concur in presenting to the Chinese
plenipotentiaries the points upon which we are agreed." Other
governments, however, seem to have given different
instructions, and some weeks were spent by the foreign
Ministers at Peking in formulating the joint note in which
their requirements were to be presented to Prince Ching and
Earl Li.

The latter, meantime, had submitted, on their own part, to the

allied plenipotentiaries, a draft of what they conceived to be
the just preliminaries of a definitive treaty. They prefaced
it with a brief review of what had occurred, and some remarks,
confessing that "the throne now realizes that all these
calamities have been caused by the fact that Princes and high
Ministers of State screened the Boxer desperados, and is
accordingly determined to punish severely the Princes and
Ministers concerned in accordance with precedent by handing
them over to their respective Yamêns for the determination of
a penalty." The "draft clauses" then submitted were as
follows:

"The siege of the Legations was a flagrant violation of the

usages of international law and an utterly unpermissible act.
China admits the gravity of her error and undertakes that
there shall be no repetition of the occurrence. China admits
her liability to pay an indemnity, and leaves it to the Powers
to appoint officers who shall investigate the details and make
out a general statement of claims to be dealt with
accordingly.

"With regard to the subsequent trade relations between China

and the foreign Powers, it will be for the latter to make
their own arrangements as to whether former treaties shall be
 adhered to in their entirety, modified in details, or
exchanged for new ones. China will take steps to put the
respective proposals into operation accordingly.

"Before drawing up a definitive treaty it will be necessary

for China and the Powers to be agreed as to general
principles. Upon this agreement being arrived at, the
Ministers of the Powers will remove the seals which have been
affixed to the various departments of the Tsung-li-Yamên and
proceed to the Yamên for the despatch of business in matters
relating to international questions exactly as before.

"So soon as a settlement of matters of detail shall have been

agreed upon between China and the various nations concerned in
accordance with the requirements of each particular nation,
and so soon as the question of the payment of an indemnity
shall have been satisfactorily settled, the Powers will
respectively withdraw their troops. The despatch of troops to
China by the Powers was undertaken with the sole object of
protecting the Ministers, and so soon as peace negotiations
between China and the Powers shall have been opened there
shall be a cessation of hostilities.

{140}

"The statement that treaties will be made with each of the

Powers in no way prejudices the fact that with regard to the
trade conventions mentioned the conditions vary in accordance
with the respective powers concerned. With regard to the
headings of a definitive treaty, questions of nomenclature and
precedence affecting each of the Powers which may arise in
framing the treaty can be adjusted at personal conferences."
Great Britain and Germany were now acting in close accord,
having, apparently, been drawn together by a common distrust
of the intentions of Russia. On the 16th of October, Lord
Salisbury and Count Hatzfeldt signed the following agreement,
which was made known at once to the other governments
concerned, and its principles assented to by all:

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German

Government, being desirous to maintain their interests in
China and their rights under existing treaties, have agreed to
observe the following principles in regard to their mutual policy
in China:—

"1. It is a matter of joint and permanent international

interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China
should remain free and open to trade and to every other
legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all
countries without distinction; and the two Governments agree
on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as
far as they can exercise influence.

"2. The Imperial German Government and her Britannic Majesty's

Government will not, on their part, make use of the present
complication to obtain for themselves any territorial
advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy
towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of
the Chinese Empire.

"3. In case of another Power making use of the complications

in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such
territorial advantages, the two Contracting Parties reserve to
themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the
eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own
interests in China.

"4. The two Governments will communicate this Agreement to the

other Powers interested, and especially to Austria-Hungary,
France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States of
America, and will invite them to accept the principles
recorded in it."

The assent of Russia was no less positive than that of the

other Powers. It was conveyed in the following words: "The
first point of this Agreement, stipulating that the ports
situated on the rivers and littoral of China, wherever the two
Governments exercise their influence, should remain free and
open to commerce, can be favorably entertained by Russia, as
this stipulation does not infringe in any way the 'status quo'
established in China by existing treaties. The second point
corresponds all the more with the intentions of Russia, seeing
that, from the commencement of the present complications, she
was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of
the Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy in
China. As regards the third point relating to the eventuality
of an infringement of this fundamental principle, the Imperial
Government, while referring to their Circular of the 12th
(25th) August, can only renew the declaration that such an
infringement would oblige Russia to modify her attitude
according to circumstances."

On the 13th of November, while the foreign plenipotentiaries

at Peking were trying to agree in formulating the demands they
should make, the Chinese imperial government issued a decree
for the punishment of officials held responsible for the Boxer
outrages. As given the Press by the Japanese Legation at
Washington, in translation from the text received there, it
was as follows;

"Orders have been already issued for the punishment of the

officials responsible for opening hostilities upon friendly
Powers and bringing the country into the present critical
condition by neglecting to suppress and even by encouraging
the Boxers. But as Peking and its neighborhood have not yet
been entirely cleared of the Boxers, the innocent people are
still suffering terribly through the devastation of their
fields and the destruction of their houses, a state of affairs
which cannot fail to fill one with the bitterest feelings
against these officials. And if they are not severely
punished, how can the anger of the people be appeased and the
 indignation of the foreign Powers allayed?

"Accordingly, Prince Tuan is hereby deprived of his title and

rank, and shall, together with Prince Chwang, who has already
been deprived of his title, be delivered to the Clan Court to
be kept in prison until the restoration of peace, when they
shall be banished to Sheng-King, to be imprisoned for life.
Princes Yi and Tsai Yung, who have both been already deprived
of their titles, are also to be delivered to the Clan Court
for imprisonment, while Prince Tsai Lien, also already
deprived of title and rank, is to be kept confined in his own
house, Duke Tsai Lan shall forfeit his ducal salary, but may
be transferred with the degradation of one rank. Chief Censor
Ying Nien shall be degraded two ranks and transferred. As to
Kang Yi, Minister of the Board of Civil Appointment, upon his
return from the commission on which he had been sent for the
purpose of making inquiries into the Boxer affair he
memorialized the Throne in an audience strongly in their
favor. He should have been severely punished but for his death
from illness, and all penalties are accordingly remitted. Chao
Shuy Yao, Minister of the Board of Punishment, who had been
sent on a mission similar to that of Kang Yi, returned almost
immediately. Though such conduct was a flagrant neglect of his
duties, still he did not make a distorted report to the
Throne, and therefore he shall be deprived of his rank, but
allowed to retain his present office. Finally, Yu Hsien,
ex-Governor of Shan-Se, allowed, while in office, the Boxers
freely to massacre the Christian missionaries and converts.
For this he deserves the severest punishment, and therefore he
is to be banished to the furthermost border of the country, and
there to be kept at hard labor for life.

{141}

"We have a full knowledge of the present trouble from the very
beginning, and therefore, though no impeachment has been brought
by Chinese officials at home or abroad against Princes Yi,
Tsai Lien and Tsai Yung, we order them to be punished in the
same manner as those who have been impeached. All who see this
edict will thus perceive our justice and impartiality in
inflicting condign penalties upon these officials," It was not
until the 20th of December that the joint note of the
plenipotentiaries of the Powers, after having been submitted
in November to the several governments represented, and
amended to remove critical objections, was finally signed and
delivered to the Chinese plenipotentiaries. The following is a
precis of the requirements set forth in it:

"(1) An Imperial Prince is to convey to Berlin the Emperor's

regret for the assassination of Baron von Ketteler, and a
monument is to be erected on the site of the murder, with an
inscription, in Latin, German, and Chinese, expressing the
regret of the Emperor for the murder.

"(2) The most severe punishment fitting their crimes is to be

inflicted on the personages designated in the Imperial decree
of September 21, whose names—not mentioned—are Princes Tuan
and Chuang and two other princes, Duke Lan, Chao Shu-chiao,
Yang-yi, Ying-hien, also others whom the foreign Ministers
shall hereafter designate. Official examinations are to be
suspended for five years in those cities where foreigners have
been assassinated or cruelly treated.

"(3) Honourable reparation is to be made to Japan for the

murder of M. Sugiyama.

"(4) Expiatory monuments are to be erected in all foreign

cemeteries where tombs have been desecrated.

"(5) The importation of arms or 'materiel' and their

manufacture are to be prohibited.

"(6) An equitable indemnity is to be paid to States,

societies, and individuals, also to Chinese who have suffered
injury because of their employment by foreigners. China will
adopt financial measures acceptable to the Powers to guarantee
the payment of the indemnity and the service of the loans.

"(7) Permanent Legation guards are to be maintained, and the

diplomatic quarter is to be fortified.

"(8) The Ta-ku forts and those between Peking and the sea are
to be razed.

"(9) There is to be a military occupation of points necessary

to ensure the safety of the communications between Peking and
the sea.

"(10) Proclamations are to be posted during two years

throughout the Empire threatening death to any person joining
an anti-foreign society and enumerating the punishment
inflicted by China upon the guilty ringleaders of the recent
outrages. An Imperial edict is to be promulgated ordering
Viceroys, Governors, and Provincial officials to be held
responsible for anti-foreign outbreaks or violations of
treaties within their jurisdiction, failure to suppress the
same being visited by the immediate cashiering of the
officials responsible, who shall never hold office again.

"(11) China undertakes to negotiate a revision of the

commercial treaties in order to facilitate commercial
relations.

"(12) The Tsung-li-Yamên is to be reformed, and the Court

ceremonial for the reception of foreign Ministers modified in
the sense indicated by the Powers.

"Until the foregoing conditions are complied with ('se

conformer à') the Powers can hold out no expectation of a
limit of time for the removal of the foreign troops now
occupying Peking and the provinces."
CHINA: A. D. 1900 (November).
Russo-Chinese agreement relating to Manchuria.

See (in this volume)

MANCHURIA.

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (December).

Russo-Chinese agreement concerning the Manchurian
province of Fêng-tien.

See (in this volume)

MANCHURIA: A. D. 1900.

CHINA: A. D. 1900-1901 (November-February).

Seizure of grounds at Peking for a large Legation Quarter.
Extensive plans of fortification.

In February, 1901, the following from a despatch written in

the previous November by Mr. Conger, the American Minister at
Peking, was given to the Press by the State Department at
Washington: "I have the honor to report that in view of the
probability of keeping large legation grounds in the future,
and because of the general desire on the part of all the
European representatives to have extensive legations, all of
the Ministers are taking possession of considerable areas
adjoining their legations—property belonging either to the
Chinese Government or to private citizens, and having been
abandoned by the owners during the siege—with the intention to
claim them as conquest, or possibly credit something for them
on their account for indemnity. I have as yet not taken formal
possession of any ground for this purpose, nor shall I without
instructions, but I shall not for the present permit any of the
owners or other persons to reoccupy any of the property
between this legation and the canal to the east of it. While
this area will be very small in comparison with the other
legations, yet it will be sufficient to make both the legation
 personnel and the guard very comfortable, and will better
comport with our traditional simplicity vis-a-vis the usual
magnificence of other representatives.

"It is proposed to designate the boundaries of a legation

quarter, which shall include all the legations, and then
demand the right to put that in a state of defence when
necessary, and to prohibit the residence of Chinese there,
except by permission of the Ministers. If, therefore, these
ideas as to guards, defence, etc:., are to be carried out, a
larger legation will be an absolute necessity. In fact, it is
impossible now to accommodate the legation and staff in our
present quarters without most inconvenient crowding.

"There are no public properties inside the legation quarter

which we could take as a legation. All the proposed property
to be added, as above mentioned, to our legation, is private
ground, except a very small temple in the southeast corner,
and I presume, under our policy, if taken, will be paid for
either to the Chinese owners or credited upon account against
the Chinese Government for indemnity, although I suspect most
of the other Governments will take theirs as a species of
conquest. The plot of ground adjoining and lying to the cast
of the legation to which I have made reference is about the
size of the premises now occupied by us."

Before its adjournment on the 4th of March, 1901, the Congress

of the United States made an appropriation for the purchase of
grounds for its Legation at Peking, and instructions were sent
to make the purchase.

{142}

By telegram from Peking on the 14th of February it was

announced that a formidable plan of fortification for this
Legation Quarter had been drawn up by the Military Council of
the Powers at Peking, and that work upon it was to begin at
once. The correspondent of the "London Times" described the
plan and wrote satirically of it, as follows; "From supreme
contempt for the weakness of China armed we have swayed to
exaggerated fear of the strength of China disarmed. The
international military experts have devised a scheme for
putting the Legation quarter in a state of defence which is
equivalent to the construction of an International fortress
alongside the Imperial Palace. The plan requires the breaching
of the city wall at the Water-gate, the levelling of the Ha-ta
Mên and Chien Mên towers, the demolition of the ramparts
giving access to them, the sweeping clear of a space 150 to
300 yards wide round the entire Legation area, and the
construction of walls, glacis, moats, barbed wire defences,
with siege guns, Maxims, and barracks capable of holding 2,000
troops, with military stores and equipment sufficient to
withstand a siege of three months. All public buildings,
boards, and civil offices between the Legations and the
Imperial walls are to be levelled, while 11,000 foreign troops
are to hold the communications between Peking and the sea, so
that no Chinese can travel to Peking from the sea without the
knowledge of the foreign military authorities.

"The erection of the defences is to begin at once, before the

return of the Court to Peking. They are no doubt devised to
encourage the Court to return to Peking, it being apparently
the belief of the foreign Ministers that an Imperial Court
governing an independent empire are eager to place themselves
under the tutelage of foreign soldiers and within the reach of
foreign Maxims.

"Within the large new Legation area all the private property
of Chinese owners who years before sought the advantages of
vicinity to the Legations has been seized by the foreign
Legations. France and Germany, with a view to subsequent
commercial transactions, have annexed many acres of valuable
private property for which no compensation is contemplated,
while the Italian Legation, which boasts a staff of two
 persons, carrying out the scheme of appropriation to a logical
absurdity, has, in addition to other property, grabbed the
Imperial Maritime Customs gardens and buildings occupied for
so many years by Sir Robert Hart and his staff."

CHINA: A. D. 1901 (January-February).

Famine in Shensi.

A Press telegram from Peking, late in January, announced a

fearful famine prevailing in the province of Shensi, where
thousands of natives were dying. The Chinese government was
distributing rice, and there was reported to be discrimination
against native Christians in the distribution. Mr. Conger, Sir
E. Satow, and M. Pichon protested to Prince Ching and Li
Hung-chang against such discrimination. A Court edict was
therefore issued on the 26th instant ordering all relief
officials and Chinese soldiers to treat Christians in exactly
the same way as all other Chinese throughout the Empire, under
penalty of decapitation. Another despatch, early in February,
stated: "Trustworthy reports received here from Singan-fu [the
temporary residence of the fugitive Chinese court] all agree
that the famine in the provinces of Shen-si and Shan-si is one
of the worst in the history of China. It is estimated that
two-thirds of the people are without sufficient food or the
means of obtaining it. They are also suffering from the bitter
cold. As there is little fuel in either province the woodwork
of the houses is being used to supply the want. Oxen, horses,
and dogs have been practically all sacrificed to allay hunger.
Three years of crop failures in both provinces and more or less
of famine in previous seasons had brought the people to
poverty when winter began. This year their condition has
rapidly grown worse. Prince Ching stated to Mr. Conger, the
United States Minister, that the people were reduced to eating
human flesh and to selling their women and children.
Infanticide is alarmingly common."

CHINA: A. D. 1901 (January-February).

Submission to the demands of the Powers
by the Imperial Government.
Punishments inflicted and promised.
A new Reform Edict.

With no great delay, the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Peking

were authorized by the Emperor and Empress to agree to the
demands of the Powers, which they did by formally signing the
Joint Note. Prince Ching gave his signature on the 12th of
January, 1901, and Li Hung-chang, who was seriously ill,
signed on the following day. Discussion of the punishments to
be inflicted on guilty officials was then opened, and went on
for some time. On the 5th of February, the foreign Ministers
submitted the names of twelve leading officials, against whom
formal indictments were framed, and who were considered to be
deserving of death. Three of them, however (Kang Yi, Hsu Tung,
and Li Ping Heng), were found to be already deceased. The
remaining nine were the following: Prince Chuang,
commander-in-chief of the Boxers; Prince Tuan, who was held to
be the principal instigator of the attack on foreigners; Duke
Lan, the Vice-President of Police, who admitted the Boxers to
the city; Yu Hsien, who was the governor of Shan-Si Province,
promoter of the Boxer movement there, and director of the
massacres in that province; General Tung Fu Siang, who led the
attacks on the Legations, Ying Nien, Chao Hsu Kiao, Hsu Cheng
Yu, and Chih Siu, who were variously prominent in the
murderous work. In the cases of Prince Tuan and Duke Lan, who
were related to the Imperial family, and in the case of
General Tung Fu Siang, whose military command gave him power
to be troublesome, the Chinese court pleaded such difficulties
in the way of executing a decree of death that the Ministers
at Peking were persuaded to be satisfied with sentences of
exile, or degradation in rank, or both. On the 21st of
February the Ministers received notice that an imperial edict
had been issued, condemning General Tung Fu Siang to be
degraded and deprived of his rank; Prince Tuan and Duke Lan to
be disgraced and exiled; Prince Chuang, Ying Nien and Chao Hsu
 Kiao to commit suicide; Hsu Cheng Yu, Yu Hsien and Chih Siu to
be beheaded. Hsu Cheng Yu and Chih Siu were then prisoners in
the hands of the foreign military authorities at Peking, and
the sentence was executed upon them there, on the 26th of
February, in the presence of Japanese, French, German and
American troops. A despatch from Peking reporting the
execution stated that, while it was being carried out, "the
ministers held a meeting and determined on the part of the
majority to draw a curtain over further demands for blood.
United States Special Commissioner Rockhill sided strongly
with those favoring humane methods, who are Sir Ernest Satow
and MM. Komura, De Cologan and De Giers, respectively British,
Japanese, Spanish and Russian ministers. Others believe that
China has not been sufficiently punished, and that men should
be executed in every city, town and village where foreigners
were injured."

{143}

While the subject of punishments was pending, and with a view,

it was said, of quickening the action of the Chinese
government, Count von Waldersee, the German Field-Marshal
commanding the allied forces in China, ordered preparations to
be made for an extensive military expedition into the
interior. The government of the United States gave prompt
directions that its forces at Peking should not take part in
this movement, and the remonstrances of other Powers more
pacifically inclined than the Germans caused the project to be
given up.

Meantime, three Imperial edicts of importance, if faithfully

carried out, had been issued. One, on the 5th of February,
commanded new undertakings of reform, accounting for the
abandonment of the reform movement of 1898 by declaring that
it was seditionary and would have resulted in anarchy, and
that it was entered upon when the Emperor was in bad health;
for all which reasons he had requested the Empress Dowager to
 resume the reins of government. Now, it was declared, since
peace negotiations were in progress, the government should be
formed on a basis for future prosperity. Established good
methods of foreign countries should be introduced to supply
China's deficiencies. "China's greatest difficulty," said the
edict, "is her old customs, which have resulted in the
insincere dispatch of business and the promoting of private
gain. Up to the present time those who have followed the
Western methods have had only superficial knowledge, knowing
only a little of foreign languages and foreign inventions,
without knowing the real basis of the strength of foreign
nations. Such methods are insufficient for real reform."

In order to obtain a true basis, the Emperor commanded a

consultation between the ministers of the privy council, the
six boards, nine officers, the Chinese ministers to foreign
countries and all the viceroys and governors. Those were
instructed to recommend reforms in the seven branches of
government, namely, the central government, ceremonies,
taxation, schools, civil-service examinations, military
affairs and public economies. They were also to recommend what
part of the old system can be used and what part needs changing.
Two months were given them in which to prepare their report.

On the following day, two edicts, in fulfilment of demands

made in the Joint Note of the Powers, were promulgated. The
first provided, in accordance with article 3 of the Joint
Note, for the suspension of official examinations for five
years in places where foreigners are killed. The second edict
forbade anti-foreign societies, recited the punishment of
guilty parties and declared that local officials will be held
responsible for the maintenance of order. If trouble occurs
the officials would be removed without delay and never again
allowed to hold office.

CHINA: A. D. 1901 (March).

The murdered Christian missionaries and native converts.
Varying statements and estimates of their number.

To the time of this writing (March, 1901), no complete

enumeration of the foreign Christian missionaries and members
of missionary families who were killed during the Boxer
outbreak of the past year has been made. Varying estimates
have appeared, from time to time, and it is possible that one
of the latest among these, communicated from Shanghai on the
1st of March, may approach to accuracy. It was published in
the "North China Daily News," and said to be founded on the
missionary records, according to which, said the "News," "a
total of 134 adults and 52 children were killed or died of
injuries in the Boxer rising of 1899 and 1900."

On the 13th of March, the "Lokal Anzeiger," of Berlin,

published a statistical report from its Peking correspondent
of "foreign Christians killed during the troubles, exclusive
of the Peking siege," which enumerated 118 Englishmen, 79
Americans, Swedes and Norwegians, 26 Frenchmen, 11 Belgians,
10 Italians and Swiss, and 1 German. The total of these
figures is largely in excess of those given by the "North
China Daily News," but they cover, not missionaries alone, but
all foreign Christians. It is impossible, however, not to
doubt the accuracy of both these accounts. Of native
Christians, the German writer estimated that 30,000 had
perished. In September, 1900, the United States Consul-General
at Shanghai, Mr. Goodnow, "after making inquiries from every
possible source," placed the number of British and American
missionaries who had probably been killed at 93, taking no
account of a larger number in Chih-li and Shan-si whose fate
was entirely unknown. Of those whose deaths he believed to be
absolutely proved at that time, 34 were British, including 9
men, 15 women and 10 children, and 22 were American, 8 of
these being men, 8 women and 6 children.

In December, 1900, a private letter from the "Association for

the Propagation of the Faith, St. Mary's Seminary," Baltimore,
 Maryland, stated that up to the end of September 48 Catholic
missionaries were known to have been murdered. A pastoral
letter issued in December by Cardinal Vaughan, in London,
without stating the numbers killed, declared that all work of
the Catholic church, throughout the most of China, where 942
European and 445 native priests had been engaged, was
practically swept away.

A private letter, written early in January, 1901, by the

Reverend Dr. Judson Smith, one of the corresponding
secretaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions, contains the following statement: "The American
Board has lost in the recent disturbances in China 13
missionaries, 6 men and 7 women, and 5 children belonging to
the families who perished. The number of native converts
connected with the mission churches of the American Board who
have suffered death during these troubles cannot be stated
with accuracy. It undoubtedly exceeds 1,000; it may reach a
much larger figure; but some facts that have come to light of
late imply that more of those who were supposed to be lost
have been in hiding than was known. If we should reckon along
with native converts members of their families who have
suffered death, the number would probably be doubled."

There seems to be absolutely no basis of real information for

any estimate that has been made of the extent of massacre
among the native Christian converts. Thousands perished,
without doubt, but how many thousands is yet to be learned. As
intimated by Dr. Smith, larger numbers than have been supposed
may have escaped, and it will probably be long before the true
facts are gathered from all parts of the country.

{144}

In any view, the massacre of missionaries and their families

was hideous enough; but fictions of horror were shamefully
added, it seems, in some of the stories which came from the