African Psychology The Emergence of A Tradition Augustine Nwoye Full Chapter

African psychology: the emergence of a
tradition Augustine Nwoye

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/african-psychology-the-emergence-of-a-tradition-aug
ustine-nwoye/
African Psychology: The Emergence of a Tradition
Augustine Nwoye
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190932497.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780197630174 Print ISBN: 9780190932497
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/41528/chapter/352967902 by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill user on 31 August 2022
FRONT MATTER
Copyright Page 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190932497.002.0003 Page iv
Published: March 2022
Subject: Social Psychology
p. iv
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2022
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Nwoye, Augustine, author.
Title: African psychology : the emergence of a tradition / Augustine Nwoye.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identi ers: LCCN 2021050785 (print) | LCCN 2021050786 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190932497 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190932510 (epub) |
ISBN 9780197630174 (digital-online)
Subjects: LCSH: Psychology—Africa—History.
Classi cation: LCC BF108. A3 N96 2022 (print) | LCC BF108. A3 (ebook) |
DDC 150.96—dc23/eng/20211202
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050785
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050786
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190932497.001.0001
135798642
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

In loving memory of my beloved parents
Nwoye Uchebo, aka Nnakwenze
and
Amoge Uchebo, aka Egbe-Oyibo
and
In immeasurable Thankfulness to my beloved wife and best friend,
Dr. (Mrs.) Chinwe Miriam Agatha Nwoye
Preface
Although the need for the decolonization and diversification of the psy-
chology degree curriculum in African universities has been recognized for
many years (Holdstock, 1999, 2000; Mkhize, 2004; Nwoye, 2014, 2015a,
2017a), its urgency only attained prominence in the post-Apartheid period,
the time during which there emerged unprecedented increases in the popula-
tion of black students in South African universities. That experience brought
into sharp focus the persistent questioning by many of these students of the
appropriateness and relevance to their lives of a psychology that is exclusively
Eurocentric in perspective and that, consequently, has no space to accommo-
date the psychology and understanding of African realities. In responding to
this omission, many universities, particularly in the South and East African
subregions, took the matter seriously and called for the urgent creation and
inclusion of courses and modules in African psychology in their psychology
degree curricula.
Unfortunately, despite this important positive and progressive interven-
tion and momentum in favor of the presence of African psychology as a post-
colonial discipline (Nwoye, 2017a) in African universities, a major obstacle
arose to hamper its effective implementation. This is the absence of a founda-
tional/definitive text that evolves from the situated knowledges and experi-
ence of continental African realities and postcolonial concerns, one devoted
to defining and charting the content and scope of the field for scholars both
within and outside Africa. This means that there is no foundational text—
outside of those written by African American colleagues and aimed at
addressing their peculiar problems of existing in a racialized America and
in response to their post-slavery conditions, on which students and scholars
in Africa can draw regarding the definitional, epistemological, theoretical,
methodological, cultural, and spiritual perspectives of African psychology
associated with its critical and clinical scholarship in the continental African
context.
This book is an attempt to respond to this need. The book brings together
a coherent and organically cohesive selection of my essays, majority of them
already published in premier international psychological journals on various
x Preface
aspects of continental African psychology understood as a postcolonial aca-

demic discipline. The book describes the raison d’être, meaning, and scope,
as well as the epistemological and theoretical perspectives of African psy-
chology. This is in addition to a section on African therapeutics that draws on
publications that have appeared in the aforementioned journals from 2000 to
the present. Some of the book’s chapters are new as well. These have been spe-
cifically written to anchor and provide a conceptual unity to the book. Taken
together, the chapters constituting the book serve as an ally, not a substitute,
to the great work being done by African Americans in the United States to
articulate a psychology of black experience in America. The overall objective
of the book is, however, to insert African psychology within other contexts
of psychological knowledge that will allow African psychology in conti-
nental Africa to both argue against and partner with mainstream Western
psychology and other such externally generated psychologies imported to
Africa. The result is expected to promote mutual enrichment of Western and
African psychological perspectives in continental Africa.
In terms of content, the book consists of four parts. Part I presents the
background to the book. It proposes the Madiban tradition as a globalectical
(wa Thiong’o, 2012/2014) framework of inclusion for the study of African
psychology alongside Western and other psychologies in psychology de-
gree programs in African universities. Part II focuses on the epistemological,
methodological, and theoretical perspectives in African psychology. The
principal goal of the section is to illustrate some of the efforts that scholars of
continental African psychology are making to unbind themselves from the
restrictive ways of doing psychology as propagated in mainstream Western
psychology. In addressing these issues, my purpose is to provide a warrant
and direction for considering continental African psychology as a legitimate
and autonomous postcolonial field of psychology endowed with decolonized
epistemologies and methodologies and its own cultural and critical orienta-
tion to psychological scholarship. Part III of the book introduces the reader
to the field of African therapeutics and the perspectives and approaches
on which African psychological healing systems in continental Africa are
grounded. The aim of Part IV is to highlight the healing rituals and practices
which the culture and communities of indigenous and rural Africa provide
to the traumatized to enable them to transcend the challenges of their com-
plicated everyday experience in contemporary Africa.
The introductory chapter, “The Danger of a Single Story and the Problem
of Speaking for Others,” provides an anchor to the entire book. The chapter
Preface xi
draws inspiration from the classic, July 2009 TED talk by Chimamanda
Adichie on “The Danger of a Single Story,” the important article by Linda
Alcoff on the “Problem of Speaking for Others”; and from Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s
compelling book on the theme of Globalectics, as well as from Charles
Taylor’s remarkable work on the politics of recognition. Buttressed by the
thoughts of these four great intellectuals, the book projects the crying need
for the decolonization and opening up of the study of psychology in African
universities in such a way that African, Western, and other approaches to
psychology would be made to coexist and enjoy enduring mutual respect,
enrichment, and equitable participatory presence in psychology degree
programs in continental Africa. The term “Madiban tradition” introduced in
the first chapter is put forward to call attention to my belief in the transform-
ative power of postcolonial cosmopolitanism and its associated framework
of inclusion and diversity aimed at promoting the spirit of globalectics (wa
Thiong’o, 2012/2014), decolonization, and resistance to the hitherto hege-
monic and exclusive presence of Western psychology in African universities.
According to wa Thiong’o (2012/2014, p. 8), the term “globalectics” is related
to the notions of “wholeness, interconnectedness, equality of potentiality of
parts, tension, and motion. It is a way of thinking and relating to the world,
particularly in the era of globalism and globalization.” Thus, seen from wa
Thiong’o’s globalectical perspective, the goal of African psychology and in-
deed this book is to formalize the birthing and nurturing of the spirit of in-
clusive engagement or multilogue or mutual conversation between African
psychology and Western and other foreign-based psychologies (e.g., African
American, Asian psychology) of interest to psychology students and scholars
in Africa (Nwoye, 2018a). The successful practice of such a Madiban tra-
dition of inclusion and postcolonial cosmopolitanism in the study of psy-
chology in Africa is expected to hasten the emergence of harmony between
imported and African homegrown psychologies and, therefore, the opportu-
nity in contemporary Africa to reverse for good the many years of exclusion
of the significant African point of view in psychology degree programs in
African universities.
Having introduced the Madiban framework of inclusion within which
African, Western, and other postcolonial psychologies could work together
and share mutual enrichment, respect, and responsibility in the production
of psychological knowledge in African universities, the task of defining and
charting the content and scope of this new discipline in continental African
universities is taken up in Chapter 2. In implementing this aim, the chapter
xii Preface
addresses several fundamental questions (Nwoye, 2015a): (1) What foun-

dational influences precipitated the emergence of African psychology as a
postcolonial academic discipline? (2) How can the delayed arrival of African
psychology in African universities be explained? (3) What is a postcolonial
theory of African psychology? (4) What constitutes the major phases of ev-
olution of African psychology? (5) In what ways can African psychology
be defined and conceptualized? (6) What are the principal goals of African
psychology as a postcolonial discipline? (7) What key topics does African
psychology teach? (8) On what ontological foundations and cosmovision
is African psychology grounded? (9) And what is African in African psy-
chology? From responses to these questions, the chapter hopes to dem-
onstrate that African psychology as understood in continental Africa is a
postcolonial discipline within the parent field of psychological scholarship
in African universities. Through such postcolonial study, scholars of African
psychology emerging from formerly colonized African societies endeavor to
find a voice in the refashioning of a relevant psychology curriculum for use
in Africa (Nwoye, 2015a, 2017a).
In line with the postcolonial and cosmopolitan orientation of the new
field of African psychology, Chapter 3 draws from the available evidence in
the field of African archaeology to challenge and dismantle obsolete racist
images about Africa and Africans propagated in colonial psychiatry. The spe-
cific objective of that chapter is to promote a deeper knowledge of ourselves
by ourselves (wa Thiong’o, 1993). To achieve this aim, the chapter undertakes
a contrapuntal and psychological reading of Thurstan Shaw’s archaeolog-
ical finds at Igbo-Ukwu, Nigeria, to call into question and roundly dismiss as
products of bad science and hidden conspiracy the racist representations of
the African mind as essentially childlike and lacking in complexity as empha-
sized in colonial psychiatry (see McCulloch, 1995). Among the important
contributions of the chapter is the window of opportunity it offers in under-
standing the curvilinear orientation that accords with the polycentricity and
polyrhythmicity (see Asante & Welsh Asante, 1990) of the African mind and
the inclusive civilization of ancient Africans. The chapter ends with the im-
plication that, alongside ancient Nubian Egypt as a key source of pride in our
past, there are other sites and sources of pride in precolonial Africa where the
ingenious achievements of our ancestors are no less deserving of recognition
and celebration.
Chapter 4 highlights the epistemological and cultural perspectives of
African psychology. The principal goal of the chapter is to illustrate the
Preface xiii
efforts that scholars of continental African psychology are making to free

themselves from sheeplike adherence to Euro-American ways of doing
psychology as a natural/physical scientific enterprise. Overall, the chapter
aims to show that African psychology is a legitimate postcolonial field
of psychology endowed with its own epistemologies and critical meth-
odological orientation to psychological scholarship. Consequently, the
chapter discusses the epistemological stances of African psychology, in-
cluding the methodological philosophy of constructive alternativism that
advances the processes of research and scholarship in African psychology.
Also addressed are the principle of contestation of alterity and affirming
of endogeneity, the notion of African psychology as a human science, the
notion of human beings as cultural beings, and the idea of the modern
African child as a child of the “middle ground.” Each of these themes draws
attention to the fact that African psychology is a discipline grounded in
its own endogenously generated philosophical and cultural traditions. The
chapter argues that, owing to the broad and inclusive nature of its subject
matter (encompassing the study of the psychological relevance of visible
and invisible realities as understood in Africa) and in line with its effort
at quickening the decolonization process in the study of psychology in
Africa, African psychology in continental Africa must adopt an open phi-
losophy approach to psychological scholarship and must study psychology
as a postcolonial discipline in the spirit of globalectics as proposed by wa
Thiong’o (2012/2014).
Introduced and discussed in Chapter 5 are a number of foundational
concepts and principles of human thought and experience emerging from
African cultural phenomenology that form part of the knowledge base of
African psychology. Among these are (1) the principle of bifocality, (2) the
principle of duality and interdependent ontology, (3) the principle of diunital
rationality, (4) the principle of the guinea-fowl mentality, (5) the principle
of endotropism or kienyegism, (6) the Sankofa paradigm or the principle of
putting the past ahead, (7) the principle of the “seed yam mentality,” (8) the
concept of multilayered consciousness, (9) the ideology of the chameleon
perspective, (10) the detached attachment hypothesis, (11) the theory of the
limits of language, and (12) the notion of prophetic pragmatism.
The presentation and discussion of these principles and the impor-
tant concepts embedding them together illustrate that African psychology
as a postcolonial discipline is culturally situated and derives most of its
assumptions and foundational concepts from the mentalities, worldviews,
xiv Preface
moral visions, and orienting frames of reference of the people of Africa, past
and present.
Chapter 6 undertakes an African psychological rendering of that funda-
mental indigenous African assumption made popular by the Nguni pro-
verb that “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (often translated as “a person is a
person through other persons”). In pursuing this aim, an Africentric theory
of human motivation is offered to serve as an ally to—not a replacement
of—Abraham Maslow’s theory of motivation that is more grounded on the
framework of human interiority (Freeman, 2014). In grounding my indig-
enous theory of human motivation on an Africentric paradigm, my central
goal is to show how African personhood and its motivational wellsprings
are socioculturally derived and to point at the variety of enduring forces,
both ancient and modern, that determine the motivational dynamism of the
African person (Nwoye, 2017b).
Chapter 7 paints a synoptic picture of the holistic/interdependent fabric
of the modern African self. The chapter argues that the African notion of
the self is fundamentally opposed to the prevailing approach to the self
expounded in the literature of Western European philosophers such as
Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Hobbes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Heidegger,
and Sartre as well as by Euro-American personality theorists such as
Freud, Adler, Jung, Maslow, Allport, Murray, Rogers, Kelly, and Kohut.
The chapter explains that the Western model of the self is individuocentric
and less inclusive and extensive than the African view (Nwoye, 2006a). In
addition, the chapter draws attention to the fact that the Western self is
imbued with an emphasis on reason and, until quite recently, a denial of
the significance of the body in the determination of the overall destiny of a
human being (Holdstock, 1999, 2000; Freeman, 2014). The chapter there-
fore argues that, judged against the African view, the Western idea of the
self—as a disengaged and atomistic entity that is more or less independent
of the community (Taylor, 1989; Cushman, 1990)—is too self-contained
and exclusive to accurately reflect the communal perspective, the inter-
dependent ontology, and the theme of precariousness (Kalu, 1978) in the
notion of the self as understood in Africa. Throughout the discussion, em-
phasis is on the factor of multidimensionality and the holistic represen-
tation of the African self, with particular attention given not only to its
subjectivity but also to its communal attributes and a host of other elem-
ents unsung in the Western European/North American account of the self
(Kirschner, 2020).
Preface xv
Chapter 8 introduces the notion that, as understood in mainstream

Western psychology, people dream for themselves and are essentially self-
contained in their overall mechanism of dreaming. The chapter argues that
while this (Western) perspective on dreaming should not be ignored, it also
needs to be recognized alongside other dream perspectives. The chapter
examines the concept of dreaming from an African perspective, one beyond
the Eurocentric paradigm, suggesting that, in the Africentric paradigm, the
individual can dream not only for him-or herself but also for others. In the
African perspective, at times there occurs the phenomenon of triangulation
in dreaming, which posits that dreams originate from another source to give
messages to the individual for the benefit of others. The chapter presents
three anecdotes and some resulting implications that highlight descriptive
elements of African dream theory. The chapter makes an important contri-
bution in its major focus of establishing the tenets of African dream theory.
This attempt vindicates the view credited to Guba and Lincoln (2005) that
social science scholarship “needs emancipation from hearing only the voices
of Western Europe, emancipation from generations of silence, and emanci-
pation from seeing the world in one color” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 212).
Hence, the conceptual framework of African dream perspective discussed in
this chapter is necessary to add some fresh air to the literature on dreaming
in both the African and Western psychological traditions.
Chapter 9 highlights an Africentric theory of the “embodied gates of
stress” in ordinary life. Developing such a theory was deemed necessary in
light of the fact that, despite the existence of five or more main theories of
stress recognized in mainstream Western psychology, there is a need to ar-
ticulate some experience-near theories of stress that could facilitate a better
understanding of sources of stress among people in non-industrial settings
like those in Africa. The chapter presents one such theory, offered from the
perspective of the Africentric paradigm. In pursuing such a task, the chapter
places emphasis on the metaphor of the gates of stress in order to recognize
the determining role of the body and the spiritual view of people in stress-re-
lated illnesses in human beings.
In Chapter 10, my rainbow theory of eight stages of marriage develop-
ment is presented. The theory is constructed within the framework of the
Africentric paradigm and proposes that a rainbow of roles and expectations,
challenges/tasks, tensions, joys and crises, conflicts, strengths, and opportu-
nities constitute and determine the psychology and experience of the typical
marital pair in Africa from the mate selection stage to the last stage of marital
xvi Preface
life. Contributing such a theory was deemed necessary as one of the practical
efforts to respond to the current demand for the decolonization of scholar-
ship in African universities. The chapter argues that one important way that
African scholars could break away from the spells of colonialism, neo-co-
lonialism, and the current limitation of overdependence on foreign-based
theories in the study of psychology is to generate home-based theories en-
dogenously sourced from their African practice and experience. The chapter
aims to demonstrate that, unlike the family life framework to marriage de-
velopment emphasized in mainstream Western psychology, a comprehen-
sive rainbow theory of stages of marriage development could be formulated,
one originating from data arising from several years of my clinical and aca-
demic experiences in various universities in Africa.
The argument developed in Chapter 11 is that the emerging field of
African psychology needs an open research approach that is not avail-
able in mainstream Western psychology. The principal view of the chapter
is that, although the Africentric paradigm—like the Eurocentric approach
to knowledge generation— values controlled research-based knowledge
output, it also recognizes “other ways of knowing” (e.g., the power of per-
sonal and sibling epistemology) that are not accorded serious attention and
consideration in mainstream Western psychology. The chapter proposes that
due to the complex nature of the multiple realities (natural and supernat-
ural, visible and invisible, and the real and the miraculous) that constitute
the subject matter of African psychology, the qualitative and mixed-method
research methodology provides a more realistic and promising approach to
the task of doing research in African psychology. Given this understanding,
the principal aim of the chapter is to clarify the epistemology, theory, and
techniques of research in African psychology. The major qualitative research
approaches relevant for advancing knowledge generation in African psy-
chology are delineated. Specific attempts were also made to delineate dis-
tinctive conditions for doing good research in African psychology following
each of the models of qualitative research highlighted.
Chapter 12 offers a four-factor theory of psychopathology to extend the
limited model for understanding the basis for psychological disturbances
propagated in the Eurocentric paradigm of mental illness. It accomplishes
this task by first problematizing the prevailing biopsychosocial (BPS) theory
of psychopathology that forms the canon for understanding mental illness
and treatment within Western psychological literature. In contrast to the
Eurocentric paradigm of mental illness, the Africentric paradigm of mental
Preface xvii
illness (Nwoye, 2015b) traces causality for misfortune beyond the biological,
psychological, and social domains, or beyond the visible world, to the invis-
ible world of the spirits and ancestors, where the problem may arise. This
follows from the assumption in African culture and worldview that the vis-
ible and invisible worlds are highly interconnected and can influence one
another and that some people (such as the hermeneuts) have the capacity
to communicate as intermediaries with these invisible spirit forces to find
out their intentions when they bring illness to human beings (Animalu,
1990; Cheetham, 1975; Edwards, 1984; Erdtsieck, 2001; Holdstock, 2000;
Horton, 1962, 1967, 1995; Kalu, 1978; Ogbaa, 1992; Mbiti, 1969; Mkhize,
1998; Nwoye, 2011; Peek, 1991; Touche, 2009; Turner, 1968). The chapter
highlights that one of the aims of African psychology in general, and this
book in particular, is to enable clinicians in the South and other regions of
Africa to recognize the strength and limits of Western psychology, particu-
larly when confronted with the needs and problems of Black African clients
with difficult illness presentations.
Chapter 13 presents and expounds one model of how to do child and
family therapy in Africa, one that is grounded in the cultural demands and
realities of African traditions. The chapter uses one case vignette to show that
African children are great observers who take full notice of their parents’
malpractices, partialities, inconsistencies, and executive miscalculations and
that listening in child and family therapy in Africa must include an attempt
to discern some of these anomalies that might form the background of a
child’s symptom presentation. This is because African children frequently re-
sort to analogic communication, particularly through illness presentations, to
call attention to themselves and comment against and regulate their parents’
maltreatment. The chapter suggests the need for caution in not reading
these presentations in their literal rather than analogical meanings (Nwoye,
2006b). The chapter further explains that child and family therapy in Africa
is not compatible with the conjoint family therapy model emphasized by
Minuchin (1974) and others. The Western model valorizes the need for the
presence in the therapy room of both parents and children in “confrontation”
with one another. This chapter clarifies that the ethos of deference, which
African children by upbringing owe to their parents, makes such a model an
impractical option in Africa. The chapter proposes that the role of the thera-
pist in child and family therapy in Africa is not just to listen, but to also play
the role of “double agent” and collaborator in the production of narratives
that heal. As the chapter suggests, in narrative therapy in Africa, therapists
xviii Preface
often seek to repair stories by drawing attention to events not accounted for
by clients’ narratives (Nwoye, 2006b).
The main theme developed in Chapter 14 is that, in order to promote
effective practice of marriage therapy in the Africentric perspective, the
therapist must be very clear in his or her mind about the distinguishing
qualities that promote the development of a good marriage as understood
in Africa (Nwoye, 2006c). Because of their strategic importance in the
practice of the indigenous model of marriage therapy in the African con-
text, the chapter sets out and expounds the key issues to be engaged in,
the enduring qualities of viable marriages, and the negative orientations
to be shunned. The enduring qualities of viable marriages as understood
in my framework are discussed (Nwoye, 2006c). This undertaking is im-
portant since most marriage disturbances encountered in Africa arise
in conditions in which the virtues or capacities of healthy marriages are
disregarded. This understanding forms an essential background to the
therapy process.
Chapter 15 reports on the psychological processes and rituals of hope-
healing communities organized by religious ministers in two regions of
Africa. The chapter provides narrative accounts of the key hope-gener-
ating processes incorporated into the eight-stage structure of their prac-
tice, presenting new concepts and highlighting the healing factors in these
communities that are intended to help people cope with the devastating
conditions in today’s Africa. The chapter highlights the sources and com-
plexity of therapeutic hope, including the generative power of human lan-
guage and spirituality in promoting hope in people brutalized by life.
Chapter 16 draws attention to the psychological challenges and dilemmas
of “green- carded” African immigrants in Europe and North America,
whose special concerns and problems are often insufficiently addressed in
the professional literature. The chapter aims to broaden and extend the cur-
rent Western frameworks for understanding and treating the psychological
needs and challenges of transnational immigrants. The key argument of the
chapter is that, in addition to currently existing Western models for working
with established immigrants in Europe and North America like those pro-
posed by Falicov (2003, 2007), successful work with green-carded African
immigrants must begin by taking into account their journey motif (i.e., their
innermost aspirations for leaving Africa), their narratives of hope and signif-
icance, their failed constructions of finding a better life (in their country of
destination), and their cosmopolitan perspective. The chapter clarifies these
Preface xix
issues, introducing new concepts and strategies for working with African
immigrants in Europe and North America.
Because one of the major goals of African psychology as a postcolonial
discipline is to promote the knowledge of ourselves by ourselves, Chapter 17
highlights the social change mechanisms implemented by the oppressed ma-
jority in South Africa during the apartheid period (Nwoye, 2018b). Those
mechanisms drew inspiration from the pedagogy of the oppressed articu-
lated by Steve Biko and other members of his generation. That inspiration
enabled the Black majority in South Africa “to name their world by re-
flecting on their conditions, imagining a better world, and then taking ac-
tion to create it” (Freire, 1968, p. 253) through the use of revolutionary and
therapeutic songs that resulted in the collapse of apartheid. Importantly, the
chapter presents one typical example of the successful practice in Africa of
the notion of the pedagogy of the oppressed as articulated by Freire (1968).
The central argument developed in Chapter 18 is that, whereas some
influential Western theorists and scholars drawing from Sigmund Freud
have emphasized the role of intrapsychic factors in the course of grief and
mourning and have tended to give the impression that people grieve alone
and heal on their own in the face of bereavement, I contend that, across the
different cultural groups of Africa, bereaved persons neither grieve alone nor
heal on their own. They are rather assisted by the community and culture to
grieve and mourn the pain of their loss. The chapter offers a five-stage theory
of community participation in grief work in Africa to substantiate this claim.
The last chapter, Chapter 19, discusses an Africentric approach to treat-
ment of moral injury. The chapter aims to show that, despite its enormous
promise of being a good option for managing the psychological problems of
people overcome by the pains and grief of moral injury, adaptive disclosure
or its equivalent, which currently stands as a leading Western model in the
treatment of moral injury, has a number of limitations for use in Africa. This
is due to its emphasis on the individuocentric/intrapsychic perspective and
the implied notion that the process of rehabilitating the morally injured is a
clinic-based affair. No attention is given in its intervention dynamic or pro-
cedure to the notion of moral injury as entailing the social wounds of war;
neither does the Western approach consider how to redress the associated
cultural injury or disequilibrium brought about by the experiences of war
(through horrendous acts of omission or commission) by returning soldiers.
In addition, most of the discussions about moral injury in the Western lit-
erature tend to focus on the problem of the veteran, rather than the civilian
xx Preface
victim of such injuries. Yet, in Africa, the problem of moral injury among the
civilian population is never an exception to the rule. The aim of this chapter
is to work toward closing such gaps. The chapter discusses the causes and
consequences of moral injury among child soldiers in contemporary Africa
and the types of cleansing and repossession rituals used to treat the moral in-
jury of child soldiers and civilian clients in Africa. The chapter explains that
the use of rituals in mental health promotion is one aspect of psychological
practice in Africa that uniquely distinguishes it from the highly medicalized
traditional Western approach to treatment of moral injury.
Taken together, these chapters, in their various dimensions and
contributions and perspectives, represent my purposive attempt and vision
to create a comprehensive awareness and understanding among scholars
both within and outside Africa of what African psychology as a postcolonial
discipline stands for and deals with in the continent of Africa. The aim is to
provide a much-needed pioneering study of and light to an uncharted field.
The Notion of Africentric Paradigm
Having said all this, a pertinent question to explore here is, “How does one
understand the notion of the Africentric paradigm or the African perspec-
tive that is used repeatedly throughout this book? It is to this question that
I now turn. First, I use the terms “Africentric paradigm,” and “the African
perspective,” interchangeably throughout this book. They, in their var-
ious nuances, represent in my view the continental African equivalence of
that framework of thinking developed by prominent African scholars in
the 1960s and made popular by Molefi Asante (1987, 1998) in his foun-
dational and compelling book, The Afrocentric Idea, to call into question
various forms of marginalization of the African people (Mgbeadichie,
2015; Nwoye, 2017b). Seen in this respect, I use the terms “Africentric par-
adigm” or “Africentricity” here to stand for a theory that interprets Africa
in its own terms, perceiving rather than projecting it, or, in the words of
Mudimbe in his remarkable book, The Invention of Africa, as a framework
that gives the African “subject-object the freedom of thinking of him-
self or herself as the starting point of an absolute discourse” (Mudimbe,
1988, p. 200). This means that the term “Africentric paradigm” should be
understood here as referring to an anticolonial theory that aims to “lib-
erate Africans from the margins of western domination and colonization”
Preface xxi
(Mgbeadichie, 2015, p. ii; Asante, 1987, 1990). I take this position in line
with Ibrahim Sundiata, a leading Afrocentric scholar, who, in his article
“Afrocentrism: The Argument We’re Really Having” [American Historical
Review, 30 (1996), 202–239], proposed that “any theoretical move directed
at erasing inscriptions of inequality, marginalisation and subjugation
of any kind among African peoples could be classified as a version of the
Afrocentric impulse.” Seen in this perspective, I position my use of the
Africentric theory or the Africentric paradigm in this book to encom-
pass any ideology that resists forms of marginalization of African peo-
ples, places African culture at the center of inquiry, and promotes African
peoples as subjects rather than objects of humanity. Indeed, in line with
Mgbeadichie (2015), I extend the use of the term “Africentric paradigm” to
stand for that framework of thinking that not only critiques external forms
of discrimination in Africa, but also challenges debilitating or retrogressive
African cultural practices, structures, or traditions which marginalize cer-
tain communities and persons within African countries.
Thus, whenever I use the term “Africentric paradigm” or “Africentricity”
here, I do so to refer to that theory or ideology that provides “a critical cor-
rective to a displaced agency among Africans” (Conyers, Jr., 2004, p. 643).
And, paraphrasing Gerald Early, I also use the term “Africentric paradigm”
in various instances to emphasize the importance of centeredness, location,
voice, or agency in African scholarship and to empower Africans wherever
they are found to place themselves in the center of their scholarship and anal-
ysis so that their works (as in this book) are grounded in a relevant historical
and cultural context.
Now, a note on the title: African Psychology: The Emergence of a Tradition.
I chose this title to call attention to the fact that the recent inclusion of the
study of African psychology as a postcolonial discipline in the psychology
degree syllabuses of some forward-thinking African universities has led
to the irreversible emergence of an unprecedented tradition of inclusion
and diversity in the history of the study of psychology in Africa. As clari-
fied in Chapter 1, before this watershed occurrence, the negative practice
that prevailed was the exclusive hegemonic presence of Western psychology
masquerading as a universal psychology speaking for all cultures. However,
with the current formal inclusion of African psychology in the study of psy-
chology degree programs in some African universities, this colonialist prac-
tice of exclusion has yielded to what I refer to as the Madiban tradition. This
observation implies that, with the emergence of the Madiban tradition, a
xxii Preface
much-awaited globalectic framework of inclusion and African presence in

the study of psychology in African universities has dawned.
Now to those possible critics who may ask why another book on African
psychology when there is already in existence so much culturally relevant
African-centered psychological knowledge contributed by African American
scholars in the past 30–40 years. In response, I wish to answer that this book
is not largely intended to deal with African psychology as understood in the
African diaspora, such as in the United States or in the Caribbean. It is rather
written to make a novel contribution to the field of African psychology in
its present state of development in continental Africa. Seen in this way, my
conviction is that there is no book of its range and depth, vision, and mission
currently available in continental Africa.
Also, it is important to ask which field of African psychology do critics have
in mind? Do they assume the existence of one field of African psychology?
Or do they believe that everybody must be guided by what drives the field of
African psychology in the United States, for example? My guess is that such
critics must speak from the standpoint of the assumption that African psy-
chology in the United States and African psychology in continental Africa
comprise one discipline driven by a common philosophy and history. But
it is a grave mistake for any one in the African diaspora to assume that be-
cause we are both Africans we, scholars of African psychology in continental
Africa, must automatically reproduce their (e.g., African Americans’) own
notion of African psychology in the mother continent. Indeed, part of the
objective of this book is to show that this mentality is wrong and needs to be
resisted.
On the other hand, the urge to see the two disciplines as related but sep-
arate and independent from one another is as it should be, particularly
if we are to borrow a page from our sister discipline of African literature,
where this confusion does not exist between scholars of African literature
and those of African American literature. Thus, in 2001, Professor Simon
Gikandi, in an important article entitled “Chinua Achebe and the Invention
of African Culture,” tended to give the impression that Chinua Achebe, the
iconic African novelist, can be thought of as having invented African litera-
ture. He appeared to base that assumption on the stature of Achebe’s classic
novel Things Fall Apart, published in 1958, that became a canon for subse-
quent novel writing in the field of African literature in continental Africa.
The article in which Gikandi’s reference was made was published in the fa-
mous journal Research in African Literatures. The point I am trying to make
Preface xxiii
is that when Professor Gikandi declared Achebe the “inventor” of African

culture and literature, no African American literature scholars and critics
raised an objection on the grounds that Chinua Achebe’s novel came 18 years
later than Richard Wright’s famous novel Native Son, published in 1940. They
did not complain because they know that the two fields are both similar and
different, developing at their own pace in their respective cultural locations
and continents. If this is so, it is difficult to see why the situation in African
psychology should be assumed to be an exception. Seen in the same way, it
becomes rather difficult to appreciate why scholars of African psychology in
the United States, for instance, should see themselves—if they are at all in-
terested in doing so—as gatekeepers to what should constitute the field of
African psychology in continental Africa.
In this light, I can therefore foresee one of the major impacts of this book
to be that of establishing the fact of this difference. In this regard, I think
the key contribution of this book is its notion of seeing African psychology
in continental Africa as a postcolonial discipline driven by an urge for the
emergence of the Madiban tradition as a globalectical framework of inclu-
sion that is in sync with the current movement toward the decolonization of
psychology degree programs in Africa, a movement that offers a balance of
both African and Western traditions.
Of course, I can hear other critics complaining that a number of topics for
which African psychology in the United States is known are glaringly absent
in this book, such as the long history of psychological knowledge produc-
tion in Africa prior to westernization, meaningful treatments of questions
of identity, sociocultural disruptions due to the loss of millions of Africans
through chattel enslavement, the impact of colonization and psychological
oppression, the role of racism and the assimilation of Western ideologies,
contemporary examination and analysis of the psyches of the colonizer and
colonized, and health and sustainable well-being in the wake of neo-coloni-
alism and globalization.
In response, I would like to say that I am aware that some colleagues in
the diaspora do currently tend to approach the notion of African psychology
from the standpoint of what African American psychology deals with. But,
in doing this, they tend to forget that our realities are different, that we do not
completely share the same historical experiences as Africans (e.g., that we
here in continental Africa were not de-Africanized through the process of
slavery like they were, by loss of indigenous languages, culture and history,
ethnicity, and religion, etc.) and that, consequently, we cannot be expected
xxiv Preface
to forge a totally similar psychology. In particular, although I recognize the

importance of sharing with our students the long history of psychological
knowledge production in Africa prior to westernization, I believe I do not
need to write about this theme here since there are already in existence so
many good sources and references concerning it. Given this understanding,
my view and conviction is that this book, as earlier intimated, is meant to
be an ally to, not a substitute for the great and original work being done by
African Americans in America to answer to their needs and realities in the
United States. But our colleagues in the United States should not in any way
presume to be speaking for us when they are concerned with expounding the
phenomenon and challenge of Black experience in America.
African Psychology: The Emergence of a Tradition
Augustine Nwoye
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190932497.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780197630174 Print ISBN: 9780190932497
FRONT MATTER
Acknowledgments 
Published: March 2022
Subject: Social Psychology
Several institutions and individuals have been instrumental in the build-up that led to the publication of
this book. Among the most recent of these bene cial institutions is the US Fulbright Scholar Program, South
African o ce, Pretoria, which processed and recommended my application for the 2015 US Fulbright Grant
award. With the acquisition of that award (Grant No. 68150675), I gained the precious opportunity, space,
and time to do research that led to the writing of the new chapters in this book.
Be that as it may, nobody can enjoy the rewards of a Fulbright scholar program unless they are lucky enough
to nd a reputable US academic institution with the ambience to invite and accept a visiting Fulbright
scholar in their midst. In my own particular case, I had the good fortune to be invited by two great US
institutions. The rst is Howard University in Washington, DC, through its Department of African Studies
under the able leadership of its chair, Professor Mbye Cham. The second institution is the College of the
Holy Cross, in Worcester, Massachusetts, through the auspices of its Department of Psychology under the
charismatic leadership of Distinguished Professor and Chair Mark Freeman. Through the respective support
and immense contributions of these eminent scholars and other members of their respective departments,
such as Professor Suzanne R. Kirschner (the Director of College Scholar Program in the case of College of the
Holy Cross), my Fulbright Scholarship experience in the United States was a very fruitful, successful, and
memorable one. During that period, I was able to write the draft of the anchor chapters as well as the
proposal for the publication of this book before the period of my scholarship elapsed. I therefore owe an
immense debt of gratitude to these ne academics for the honor of their invitation and for their enormous
sacri ce, friendship, and collegial support in hosting me all through my stay in their respective universities.
The other institution that deserves particular mention here is the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South
Africa, that became my university of a liation from September 2012 to August 2021. It was through the
auspices of its inaugural lecture program that I was given the vital opportunity to re ect on and put together
p. xxvi my thoughts over the years on the critical question of “What is African psychology a psychology of?”
This was the topic of my lecture, the outcome of which is incorporated in Chapter 2 of this book. Through
the University’s vision and mission of serving as an African champion for the development and inclusion of
African psychology in its psychology degree programs and the enduring support and encouragement I
received from my colleagues in the School of Applied Human Sciences, particularly Professor N. J. Mkhize,
the current Deputy Vice Chancellor and Head of the College of Humanities, my work and scholarship in the
area of African psychology gained immense recognition and an enormous boost, for which I am ever
grateful.
Similarly, in the fall of 2001–2002, I received a 6-month visiting fellowship from the University of Toronto
under the auspices of its Department of Counselling Psychology of the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education (OISE) to develop and teach a course called Psychotherapy in Africa. I wish to thank Professor
Lana Stermac, who was at the helm during my fellowship period in that university and who was highly
helpful in making my stay in that university a very memorable one. In this regard, I would like to extend my
sincere appreciation to Professor Karl Tomm, Director of the Family Therapy Program, Faculty of Medicine
of the University of Calgary, for the kind invitation I got from him to give a workshop on Family Therapy in
Africa during the period of my Fellowship at the University of Toronto. It was for the purposes of that
workshop that the initial work on my Corroborative and Narrative Approach to Child and Family therapy in
Africa, the current version of which constitutes Chapter 13 of this book, was formulated. My sincere thanks
must therefore go to Professor Karl Tomm for the privilege of that invitation and for hosting me during the
period of the workshop and for his spirit of collegiality and friendship ever since.
The University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom must also be acknowledged. It was through the
presentation I made in the Sta Seminar of their Faculty of Education during the period of my 4-month
visiting fellowship there, in 2004, that the initial formulation of my synoptic theory of the modern African
self, the revised version of which is presented in Chapter 7 of this book was made. I thank Professor Colleen
McLaughlin who hosted me during that period for her spirit of collegiality that made my fellowship
experience in that university a very fruitful one.
Kenyatta University in Nairobi, Kenya, deserves a special mention here, too, for it was in that University as
well as at the University of Dodoma in Tanzania that the initial thoughts and writings that constitute the
p. xxvii majority of the chapters that make up this book were generated. I thank my colleagues in the two
universities for their spirit of collegiality and academic friendship.
My special thanks are also due to my teachers and mentors over the years, too numerous to mention. Some
of them are now of blessed memory: the Right Rev. Monsignor Martin Maduka, a genius of his kind and an
exemplary Catholic priest of the Awka Diocese in Nigeria, who taught me among other things the value of
taking pride in my blackness and in the importance and wisdom of our African culture and tradition. As well,
Professor Chinua Achebe, my unassailable teacher and mentor and the icon of African literature, deserves to
be mentioned very early in this list. It is from his novels and critical essays (such as “The Novelist as
Teacher,” “The Role of the Writer in a New Nation,” “The Black Writer’s Burden,” and “An Image of Africa:
Racism in Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ ”) that I took my rst lessons on African psychology as a
postcolonial discipline. Another of my great mentors and academic ancestors in this list of those of who
have passed on is Leopold Sedar Senghor, the former President of the Republic of Senegal. He was the
pioneer theorist of African cultural identity from whom I learned the invaluable wisdom of a rming the
spirit of inclusion in dealing with people of all cultures. From him, too, I learned and cherished the poetics
of the African way of seeing the world that is di erent from the Western way of doing so. As with Achebe, I
learned from Senghor that we “must rst be rooted in our native soil and culture, and only then, from that
base, must assimilate, in ever-widening circles, all other civilizations and cultures” (cited in Nespoulous-
Neuville, 1999, p. 135), a view that could easily serve as the philosophical underpinning for the study of
African psychology as a globalectical/postcolonial discipline. I equally agree with Senghor’s conviction that
“there are several civilizations, not just one.” And that “if indeed there exists but one human civilization, it
is dialectical, with each continent, each race, each people displaying a particular and irreplaceable aspect of
that civilization” (cited in Nespoulous-Neuville, 1999, p. xx).
Yet another of my hidden teachers and mentors in this list in our anchor eld of psychological humanities is
Professor Emmanuel Obiechina. Among his many writings that have in uenced my work and scholarship in
African psychology is his important 1994 Ahajioku Lecture entitled “Nchetaka.” From that presentation I
took the lesson that one key constituent of the modern African self is its narratological component (see
p. xxviii Nwoye, 2006a, and Chapter 7 of this book), an aspect of the African individual that is made up of the
sediments of the values, stories, and wisdom of the community inscribed in the African child through the
oral tradition.
Needless to say, most of my basic lessons on African psychology as a postcolonial discipline were not only
learned from Maduka, Achebe, Senghor, or Obiechina, but also from those who still live among us, such as
the Kenyan literary giant Ngugi wa Thiong’o. His three classic books of critical essays (Decolonizing the Mind
[James Currey Ltd./Heinemann, 2011], Moving the Centre [James Currey, 2008], and Globalectics [Columbia
University Press, 2014; originally published in 2012]) have directly or indirectly in uenced much of my
perspectives on the postcolonial theory of African psychology highlighted in this book.
Similarly, my great academic friend and mentor, Professor Len Holdstock, deserves to be thanked for his
pioneering e orts in generating arguments and rationale in favor of giving attention to the development of
an African perspective to psychology in African universities. His numerous writings in this regard were
highly instrumental in helping to shape and build a solid conviction in me of the importance of my attempt
to articulate my own view of the major merits of centering African psychology in the study of the discipline
of psychology in African universities. Prof. Holdstock is therefore a major inspiration in the making of this
book.
Also, my graduate supervisor and academic inspiration, mentor, and friend, Professor Christie Achebe,
Professor Chinua Achebe’s illustrious widow, deserves to be thanked for her ever-supportive
encouragement and mentorship over the years. In particular, it was through knowing her and learning from
her that I came to know and learn more from her husband, Professor Chinua Achebe. Thus, her presence in
my academic life has been a double blessing to me. And for this I remain deeply grateful and indebted to her.
To all my brilliant graduate students whom I came across in di erent countries (Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and South Africa), I am no less indebted for their critical reception of the various lectures that I
presented to them that served as springboards to the making of the various chapters that constitute the core
of this book.
The sta of Oxford University Press, New York, particularly my seasoned and dedicated editor Abby Gross
and her able, brilliant, and indefatigable assistant editor, Katharine Pratt, must be extended my special
gratitude and appreciation for the thorough attention given to the painstaking process of assessing and
p. xxix ensuring the academic merit and market potential of this book while in the manuscript stage. Similarly,
the sta at Oxford University Press (Ashitashah and Prabha) who took e ective charge of the book’s
production process are no less deserving of my heartfelt commendation.
Finally, to my indefatigable and ever-ready critical and captive audience and beloved wife, Dr. Chinwe
Miriam Agatha Nwoye, nee Mgbenwelu, I owe an immense debt of gratitude for always standing by me with
immeasurable support and sacri ces while this book was in the making!
References
Achebe, C. (1958). Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC
Animalu, A. O. E. (1990). A way of life in the modern scientific age (Ahiajioku Lecture). Owerri, Nigeria: Culture Division Ministry of
Information.
Asante, M. (1987, 1998). The Afrocentric idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Asante, K. A., & Welsh Asante, K (Eds.). (1990). African culture: The rhythms of unity. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Biko, S. (1978). I Write What I Like. London: Bowerdean Press.

Cheetham, R. W. S. (1975). Conflicts in a rural African patient treated in an urban setting. Medicine, 30, 1563–1566.
Google Scholar WorldCat
Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology. American Psychologist, 45(5), 599–611.
Edwards, F. S. (1984). Amafufunyane spirit possession: A report on some current developments. Religion in Southern Africa, 5(2),
3–16.
Erdtsieck, J. (2001). Encounter with forces of pepo: Shamanism and healing in East Africa. Tanzanet Journal, 1(2), 1–10.
Falicov, C. J. (2003). Culture in family therapy: New variations on a fundamental theme. In T. Sexton, G. Weeks, & M. Robbins
(Eds.), Handbook of family therapy: Theory, research and practice (pp. 37–55). New York: Brunner-Rutledge.
Falicov, C. J. (2007). Working with transnational immigrants: Expand meanings of family, community and culture. Family Process,
46(2), 157–171.
Freire, P. (1968, 1970, 2007). Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary edition). New York/London: Continuum.
Freeman, M. (2014). The priority of the other: Thinking and living beyond the self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gikandi, S. (2001). Chinua Achebe and the invention of African culture. Research in African Literatures, 32(3), 3–8.
doi:10.1353/ral.2001.0065.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. In N. K. Denzin &
Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed., pp. 191–215). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Holdstock, T. L. (1999). The perilous problem of neglecting indigenous cultures. American Psychologist, 54, 838–839.
Holdstock, T. L. (2000). Re-examining psychology: Critical perspectives and African insights. London: Routledge.
Horton, R. (1962). Kalabari world-view: An Outline and Interpretation. Africa, 1, 197–220.
p. xxx Horton, R. (1967). African traditional thought and Western science. Africa, 37, 50–71.
Horton, R. (1995). Patterns of thought in Africa and the West: Essays on magic, religion and science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kalu, O. U. (1978). Precarious vision: The African perception of his world. In O. U. Kalu (Ed.), Readings in African humanities:
African cultural development (Chapter 3). Enugu: Fourth Dimension.
Kirschner, S. R. (2020). Beyond the oversocialized concept of the subject in Psychology: Desire, Conflict, & the Problem of Order.
Theory & Psychology, 30(6), 768–785.
WorldCat
Maslow, A. H. (1962). Toward a psychology of being. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrad Company.
Mbiti, J. S. (1969). African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann.

McCulloch, J. (1995). Colonial psychiatry and the “African mind.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Minuchin, S. (1974). Families and family therapy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mkhize, D. L. (1998). Amafufunyane: Is it a culture-bound syndrome? South African Medical Journal, 88, 329–331.
Mkhize, N. J. (2004). Psychology: An African perspective. In D. Hook (Ed.), Critical psychology (pp. 24–52). Landsdowne, SA:
University of Cape Town Press.
Nespoulous-Neuville, J. (1999). Listen to Africa: A call from L. S. Senghor (Translated from the French by Pierre de Fontouvelle, 1st
ed.). Johannesburg: University of South Africa, Unisa Press.
Nwoye, A. (2002). Hope-healing communities in contemporary Africa. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 42(3, Fall), 58–81.
Nwoye, A. (2005). Memory healing processes and community intervention in grief work in Africa. Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 26(3), 147–154.
Nwoye, A. (2006a). Remapping the fabric of the African self: A synoptic theory. Dialectical Anthropology, 30, 119–146.
Nwoye, A. (2006b). A narrative approach to child and family therapy in Africa. Contemporary Family Therapy, 28(1), 1–23.
WorldCat
Nwoye, A. (2006c). Theory and method of marriage therapy in contemporary Africa. Contemporary Family Therapy, 28(4), 393–
504.
Nwoye, A. (2009). Understanding and treating African immigrants: New questions and strategies. Psychotherapy and Politics
International, 7(2), 95–105.
Nwoye, M. A. C. (2011). Igbo cultural and religious worldview: An insiderʼs perspective. International Journal of Sociology and
Anthropology, 3, 304–317.
Nwoye, A. (2014). African psychology, critical trends. In T. Teo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of critical psychology (pp. 57–65). New York:
Springer. doi:10.1007/978–1–4614–5583–7
Nwoye, A. (2015a). What is African psychology the psychology of? Theory & Psychology, 25(1) 96–116.
Nwoye, A. (2015b). African psychology and the Africentric paradigm to clinical diagnosis and treatment. South African Journal of
Psychology, 45(3), 305–317.
Nwoye, A. (2017a). A postcolonial theory of African psychology: A reply to Kopano Ratele. Theory & Psychology, 27, 328–336.
doi:10.1177/0959354317700000
Nwoye, A. (2017b). An Africentric theory of human personhood. PINS (Psychology in Society), 54, 42–66.
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-8708/2017/n54a4
p. xxxi Nwoye, A. (2018a). African psychology and the emergence of the Madiban tradition. Theory & Psychology, 28(1), 38–64.
Nwoye, A. (2018b). Family therapy and the pedagogy of the oppressed: Therapeutic use of songs in apartheid South Africa.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 39, 200–217. doi:10.1002/anzf.1297
Obiechina, E. N. (1975). Culture, tradition and society in the West African novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Obiechina, E. N. (1992). The dilemma of the African intellectual in the modern world. Journal of Liberal Education, 78(2), 16–21.
Obiechina, E. (1994). Nchetaka: The story, memory & continuity of Igbo culture. Ahiajoku Lecture. Owerri: Government Printer.
Ogbaa, K. (1992). Gods, oracles and divination: Folkways in Chinua Achebeʼs novels. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Peek, P. M. (1991). African divination systems: Ways of knowing. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
wa Thiongʼo, N. (1993). Moving the centre: The struggle for cultural freedoms. London: James Currey.
wa Thiongʼo, N. (2012/2014). Globalectics: Theory and the politics of knowing. New York: Columbia University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Touche, D. (2009). Worldview, challenge of contextualization and church planting in West Africa (West African Worldviews,
Contextualization 3). www.GlobalMissiology.org
p. xxxii Wright, R. (1940). Native son (1st ed.). New York: Harper & Brothers.
About the Author
In 2015, Augustine Nwoye, then a professor of psychology at the University
of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, visited Holy Cross as a Fulbright scholar
to work closely with Mark Freeman, professor of psychology at the College.
Prior to that meeting, Nwoye has read Freeman’s fascinating book, The
Priority of the Other: Thinking and living beyond the self (Oxford University
Press, 2014), and instantly took particular interest in Freeman’s research,
for which reason he reached out to work with him specifically through the
golden opportunity of the Fulbright grant tenancy during which period
Nwoye had the time and the space to work on a proposal for the present book
focusing on African psychology.
Dr. Nwoye’s argument has been that the accepted psychological canon is
comprised mainly of European and/or White psychologists who analyze the
human experience in their respective westernized cultures. This discourse,
Nwoye argues, is difficult to apply to the African human experience and often
leads to disconnects between accepted psychological theory and African re-
ality. Through this new book, Dr. Nwoye aims to create a new canon—African
psychology—that he asserts will more accurately relate to the African world
and which, furthermore, can be applied back to Western psychology and, by
extension, better inform it.
Dr. Nwoye has held distinguished teaching positions in several other
universities in Africa, including the University of Jos, Nigeria; Kenyatta
University, Kenya; and The University of Dodoma, Tanzania. During his time
at Kenyatta University, he helped to establish its Department of Psychology
and served as the pioneer Chair of that department. Also while at Kenyatta,
he was selected along with some few other academics to represent Kenyatta
University in the task of assisting the University of Rwanda when the latter
was struggling to reestablish itself at the cessation of hostilities and the return
of civil peace in that country. Dr. Nwoye has won several visiting fellowships
and given public lectures in many universities in continental Africa, Asia,
Europe, and North America, including the Universities of Cambridge and
Suffolk (England), Toronto and Calgary (Canada), Stockholm (Sweden),
xxxiv About the Author
Universiti Sains Malaysia (Malaysia), and the University of KwaZulu-Natal

(South Africa). Dr. Nwoye is a native of Nigeria and received all his grad-
uate education from the University of Nigeria. His Fulbright scholarship was
spent at the College of the Holy Cross and Howard University in the United
States.
1
Introduction
The Danger of a Single Story and the Problem
of Speaking for Others
One of the most unprecedented developments in the history of the scientific

study of psychology in postcolonial Africa is the recent welcome inclusion
of the study of African psychology within the psychology degree curriculum
of some foreword-thinking African universities. In each of those universi-
ties (such as the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa), there now
exists a gradual entrenchment of African-derived psychology in the cur-
ricular provisions of their psychology degree programs. With particular
reference to the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, for instance,
a number of African psychology–based modules have recently been devel-
oped, approved, and incorporated into the list of modules for psychology de-
gree students at the undergraduate, honors, and master’s degree levels (see
University of KwaZulu-Natal, College of Humanities’ Handbook, 2021).
Consistent with this development is the recent establishment of the Forum
of African Psychology (FAP) as a registered new division within the uni-
fied and prestigious Psychological Association of South Africa (PsySSA).
FAP held its first International Conference at the University of Limpopo,
Polokwane, Limpopo, South Africa, from March 27 to 29, 2014 (Nwoye,
2017). The theme of that conference was “From Psychology in Africa to
African Psychology.” Speakers and participants at the conference came from
both within and outside the continent.
These two significant occurrences came as a kind of rewriting of history in
the context of the scientific study of psychology in continental Africa: for the
past several years prior to these developments, the colonialist practices that
prevailed had favored the exclusive and hegemonic presence of mainstream
Western psychology in the study of psychology in African universities.
This awkward situation came into being during the period of colonialism,
European expansion and imperialism, and the emergence of missionary
Christianity in Africa. Supporting this observation, Nsamenang (2007)
African Psychology. Augustine Nwoye, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190932497.003.0001
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
and learn to know you, and feed tamely out of your hand, would you
not desire to have some food to give it?”
“O yes: I would give it part of my dinner.”
“But if you had very little dinner, scarcely enough to satisfy your
own hunger, you would buy more bread for your rat if you could. If
your jailer asked you much more than the bread would be worth out
of prison, you would give it him rather than your rat should not come
and play with you. You would pay him first all your copper, and then
all your silver, and then all your gold.”
“Yes, because I could not play with money so pleasantly as with a
live animal, and there would be nothing else that I could buy in such
a place. I had rather have the company of my rat than a pocket full of
gold.”
“So White thought,” observed Marguerite, “and he gave the
turnkey every thing he had left for bread, till his buttons, and his
pencil case, and even his watch were all gone. It was a long time
before he could bring himself to part with his watch; for the moving of
the wheels was something to look at, and the ticking kept his ears
awake, and made him feel less desolate: but when it came to giving
up his watch or his rat, he thought he could least spare his live
companion: so he carefully observed for some time the shifting of the
glimmering light upon the wall, as the morning passed into noon, and
noon into afternoon and evening, and then he thought this sort of dial
might serve him instead of a watch, and he gave it to the turnkey on
condition of having an ounce more bread every day for a year.”
“He must have been pleased to have made his bargain for a whole
year.”
“His pleasure lasted a very short while. The turnkey came earlier
than usual one day when the rat was there, and twisted its neck
before White could stop him.”
Julien stamped with grief and anger when he heard this; but
presently supposed the turnkey was honest enough to restore the
watch. Charles shook his head in answer, and told his little son that
poor White had been quite crazy since that day, and had talked
about nothing but a rat, and shown no desire for any thing but bread
and water since, though it was six years ago that his misfortune had
happened.
“Did you ever hear of paying for water, Julien; or for air?”
No: Julien thought that God had given both so freely that it would
be a sin to sell them. His father thought this not a good reason; for it
seemed to him fair that men should buy and sell whenever one
wanted something that another person had too much of; as much air
and water as corn and flax, which were also given by God.
“Ah, but, papa, it costs men a great deal of trouble to prepare corn
and flax.”
“True; and now you have hit upon the right reason. If corn and flax
grew of themselves on land which belonged to nobody, would you
pay for them, or just gather them without paying?”
“I should be very silly to pay when I might have them without.”
“So I think: but would corn and flax be less valuable then than
now, when we have to pay very dear for them?”
“The corn would be just as good to eat, and the flax to make linen
of: but they would not to change away.”
“No more than the air, which is very useful in breathing, or water
which we could not do without, and which yet would be a very poor
thing to carry to market. Now, would you call water a valuable thing
or not, Julien?”
“No, not at all, because it will buy nothing——O yes, but it is
though; because we could not do without it.—Mamma, is water
valuable or not?”
“Very valuable in use, but not usually in exchange. When things
are valuable in exchange, it is either because they cost labour before
they could be used, or because they are very scarce.”
“So,” observed Charles, “if a mine should ever be dug so deep that
the air is not fresh at the bottom where the miners work, the owner of
the mine would be very glad to buy air of any one who could convey
it down by a machine. Such an one would be wise to charge so
much a gallon for the fresh air he supplied, to pay for the labour and
expense of his machine, and for the trouble of working it.”
Marguerite then mentioned that she once staid in a small country
town during a drought. There was no reservoir of water, and all the
pumps and cisterns were dry. The poor people went out by night into
the neighbouring country, and watched the springs; and any one who
was fortunate enough to obtain a gallon of fresh water was well paid
for it. The price rose every day, till at last one woman gave a calf for
a pailfull of water, hoping to save her cow, it being certain that both
must die without this supply.
“And did she save her cow?”
“Yes. While the woman was anxiously sitting up in bed, planning
what she should change away next, she fancied there was a
different feel in the air; and on looking out of the window, she found
the sky covered with black clouds; and before morning, the trade in
water was over. There was nobody to give a doit for a cistern-full.”
“It was just so with me,” observed Charles, “when I was besieged
in the cellar. I was parched with thirst, and would have given a pipe
of my best wine to any one who would have let me down a quart of
water through the trap-door. Three hours after, I myself threw
hundreds of gallons on the fire at the guard houses, when the order
was given to take them down in an orderly way; and I did not
consider such use of the water any waste. So much for the value
which is given by scarcity.”
“But, papa, though things are more valuable to people when there
is a scarcity of them, the people are less rich than they were before.
That seems to me very odd.”
“Because you have been accustomed to consider value and
wealth as the same things, which they are not. Our wealth consists
in whatever is valuable in use as well as in exchange. Owing to the
storm of last year, I have less wealth in my possession now than I
had then, though what I have may, perhaps, exchange for more
wealth still. I have as much furniture, and as many clothes and
luxuries, and as much money; but I have fewer growing vines, and
much less wine. If I were to use up my own grapes and wine instead
of selling them, they would last a much shorter time than my stock of
the former year would have lasted. So I have less wealth in
possession. But the value of wine has risen so high, in consequence
of scarcity, that I can get as much now of other things in exchange
for a pint, as I could, fourteen months ago, in exchange for a gallon.”
“But that is partly because the wine is older. Mr. Steele is very
particular about the wine being old, and he pays you much more, he
told me, the longer it has been kept.”
“And it is very fair he should, for reasons which you can hardly
understand yet.”
“Try him,” said Marguerite.
“It is impossible, my dear. I refer to the charges I am at for the rent
of my cellar, the wear of my casks, and the loss of interest upon the
capital locked up in the wine. All this must be paid out of the
improvement in the quality of the article; and all this, Julien must wait
a few years to understand.
“Now tell me, my boy, whether you think it a good thing or not that
there should be a scarcity of wine?”
“Why, papa, as we do not want to drink all you have ourselves,
and as people will give you as much for it as they would for twice as
much, I do not think it signifies to you; but it must be a bad thing for
the people of Paris that there is so little wine to be had. At least you
said so about the bread.”
“But if my wine should be as dear next year, and I should have no
more losses from storms, and no more expense than in common
years, in growing my wine, would the high price be a good thing for
me or not?”
“It would be good for you, and bad for your customers; only I think
they would not give you so much for your wine. They would
remember that there had been no more storms, and they would find
people that had cheaper wine to sell, and then they would leave off
buying of you.”
“And they would be very right, if there was anybody to sell
cheaper; as there would be, if labourers had less wages, and so
made it less expensive to grow and prepare wine. But if some way
was found of making more wine than ever, in a cheaper way than
ever, who would be the better for that?”
“The people that buy of you, because I suppose you would let
them have it cheaper.”
“And papa too,” said Marguerite, “for many people would buy wine
who cannot afford it now.”
“Therefore,” concluded Charles, “a high exchangeable value is not
at all a good thing for everybody, though it may be for a time to some
few. And a low exchangeable value is a very good thing to
everybody, if it arises from the only cause which can render it
permanent,—a diminution of the cost of production.”
“But if this happened with every article,” pursued Marguerite,
“there would be an end of the cheapness, though not of the plenty.
As many of one thing would exchange for a certain number of other
things as before.”
“True; but less labour would purchase them all; and this is the
grand consideration. As less labour will now purchase a deal table
than was once necessary to procure a rough hewn log in its place,
less labour still may hereafter buy a mahogany one; and this is a
desirable thing for the purchasers of tables, and no less for the
makers, who will then sell a hundred times the number they can
dispose of now.”
Chapter VI.
NEW DEVICES.
The Parisians soon after showed that they knew little of the
resources on which the supply of the wants of the state should
depend, by having recourse to a measure which, however popular,
was one of great folly;—folly to be exceeded only by an act of the
populace which took place nearly at the same time.
The coffers of the government had long been empty. Loans of
almost every kind, and under every species of pretence, had been
raised upon the suffering nation, some of which proved failures in
their primary object, while others, however great the proceeds in
amount, seemed to be exhausted with somewhat the same speed as
water that is poured into a sieve. Never money went away so fast
before; and whilst the government was dismayed at its magic
property of disappearance, the people grew more and more angry at
what they thought the extravagance of their rulers. Neither of them
took into the account the scarcity of most of the necessaries of life,
and both regarded money as having the same value as ever,—as
being, in itself, the thing required to supply the necessities of the
state. To both it was equally inconceivable why, if so much had
defrayed such and such expenses in former years, double the sum
would go no way at all at present. The ministers and the court could
only tremble at the necessity of owning the truth, while the people
raged, and could be appeased only by court largesses for the relief
of the starving: which largesses went as little way when they had
changed hands as before. Neither party suspected that money,
although scarce, had become very cheap through the still greater
scarcity of other things; and in the absence of this necessary
knowledge, everybody was eager about gold and silver.
The National Assembly had tried all means, first by themselves,
and then with the assistance of Necker, to raise a supply, without
which the affairs of the state could not, they believed, proceed; and
all in vain. Then Necker had leave given him to pursue his own
methods; and, popular as he was, no one had a doubt that he would
succeed. But he failed, though he issued the most tempting
proposals; offered the highest interest that ever was heard of, even
in such an emergency; and exerted his utmost personal influence in
favour of the loan. The subscription was not half filled: the reason of
which was that many had no money, having spent it all in buying
necessaries; and as many in France as had taken their money
(much of it had gone into other countries) expected to want it
themselves for the same purposes, or had not confidence enough in
the stability of the government to take it for a creditor. So the king’s
horses went on to eat borrowed hay or to want it; and the king’s
servants to clamour for their wages; and the king’s tradesmen to
decline orders on one pretence or another; and the police threatened
to leave the home minister to keep order by himself; and state
couriers went unwillingly forth on their journies; and business lagged
in every department of the administration.
At this moment, it entered some wise head that, if people would
not lend money, they might lend or give something else; not corn or
hay, or any of the necessaries of life; for every one knew there was
still less of these things than of money; but gold and silver in any
form. It would have been hard to say what lasting good this could do
amidst the impossibility of procuring the necessaries of which gold
and silver are only the representatives: but no matter for that.
Nobody was asked to explain the affair, and apparently none
troubled themselves to think about it; so delighted were all with the
new notion of giving away trinkets to save the state. The idea of a
patriotic contribution was charming,—a contribution in which almost
everybody could join; women and children, and persons of many
degrees below the class of capitalists. The court joined: the
gentlemen sacrificing nearly half their watches and seals, and the
ladies adopting simplicity as a fashion, and sending away the
jewellery they could not wear as Arcadian shepherdesses and
Sicilian nymphs. The Assembly followed, every member thereof
stooping down at the same moment to strip his shoes of their
buckles, so that their act of patriotic devotion made really a very fine
show. This gave the signal to the whole country, and all France was
forthwith unbuckled in respect of the feet. She became also
quakerlike as to the hands, for not a maiden but took out her lover’s
hair from his parting gift, and flung the ring into the lap of the nation;
not a wife that did not part with the token of her wifehood in the
cause. Pecks of gold rings, bushels of silver buckles, with huge store
of other baubles, were at once in the possession of the state; and
the people no longer doubted that all would henceforth be well.
And what was really the event?—The gold answered the same
purpose as it does when a basin full of it coined stands on the
banker’s counter during a run. It satisfied the ignorant that all must
be safe where there is so much wealth actually before one’s eyes. It
hushed the clamours of the people for a little while; and made the
servants of the government willing to go on somewhat longer upon
credit; so that more industry and briskness prevailed for a time, at
the risk of ultimate disappointment, and an aggravation of popular
fury,—now diverted but not dispersed. A mob went about to levy
these voluntary offerings, an act ludicrously inconsistent with their
next proceeding; if, indeed, any of the events of this extraordinary
time could be regarded as ludicrous.
They called at Charles’s house among others, whence, as it
happened, no such offerings had yet gone forth. Charles had
resisted Pauline’s wish to lend the queen her thimble, and Julien’s
offer to pay his first tax with the silver-tipped riding-whip grandpapa
had given him. Neither would he allow Marguerite’s few ornaments,
all keepsakes, to be thrown away in any such manner. He would give
the coat off his back to the state, he said, when it could do any
service; but the proposed gifts could only help to make jewellery a
drug, without supplying one more person with bread, or lessening by
so much as one scruple the burdens of the state. He was disposed
to be vexed when he came home one day, and found a short
allowance of spoons at the dinner-table, the clock on the mantel-
piece gone, and his wife as destitute of external ornament as any
Arcadian shepherdess at Versailles. He laughed, however, at his
wife’s apologies for having made a voluntary offering against her
own will as well as his, and hoped that she would be as little the
worse as the state would be the better for the sacrifice. Goldsmiths
and jewellers of enterprise and capital would profit by the fancy, he
observed, if nobody else did; and the many losers might find some
comfort in sympathy with the very few winners.
The people, meanwhile, were bitterly complaining of famine, and
the more gold was carried to the treasury, the more bread was
bought up before the eyes of those who were deprived of it from its
increased price. It mattered not that some was given away in charity
by the king, and more, to suit his own purposes, by the duke of
Orleans; the people were rendered unable to purchase it, and
furnished with the plea of want, wherewith to make the streets of
Paris echo. It would have been better to have let the exchange of
wedding rings for bread be made without the interposition of the king
or his ministers, even without taking into consideration the events
which followed. A report was soon industriously spread that the
bread furnished by court charity was of a bad quality. It was believed,
like everything that was then said against the court; and the
consequence was that an anomalous and melancholy sight was
seen by as many as walked in the city. Clamorous, starving crowds
besieged the bakers’ shops, and carried off all the bread from their
ovens, all the flour from their bins; while the discontented among the
mob politicians of the Orleans faction were on the way to snatch the
food from the mouths of the hungry and throw it into the river, and to
cut the sacks, and mix the flour with the puddles of the streets. Want
and waste, faction and delusion were here seen in their direct
extremes.
At this time, Charles and Marguerite did not allow their children to
go out under any guardianship but that of their father, as it was
impossible to foresee what might happen in the streets before they
could get home again. They were as safe as any could be at such a
time;—safer than the few who ventured abroad in carriages at the
risk of insult wherever they turned; safer than the sordidly fed and
clad, who were seized upon by the agents of faction to augment their
mobs, and be made the instruments of violence under the penalty of
suffering it themselves. The parents and children were also safer
together than separate; as a domestic party, abroad to take the air,
presented as unsuspicious a group, and one as likely to pass
unnoticed, as could well be imagined. Yet they had their occasional
alarms; and when there was no cause to fear for themselves, were
too often grieved and shocked at what they beheld inflicted on
others.
“O papa!” cried Julien, one day, as they were walking; “what are
they doing at Maigrot’s shop? I do believe the crowd is coming there
next.”
Maigrot was a baker, well known to Charles’s family, and much
beloved by the children, on account of the little hot cakes which
seemed to be always ready to pop out of the oven and into their
mouths, when they went with the servant to deliver orders or pay
bills.
Instead of his usual smiling face, Maigrot was now seen in a state
of desperate anxiety, as well as could be judged from the glimpse of
him at his door, trying first to slip out, and then to force his way
between the two men who were evidently placed at the entrance as
guards till the mob should come up. Foiled in his attempt, Maigrot
disappeared, and Charles thought that it might depend on whether
there was a way of exit at the back of the house, whether his head
would presently be carried on a pike, between two loaves of his own
bread, or whether he would be kneading and baking in peace ten
years hence. There seemed to be just time to run and give a word of
advice to whomsoever might be waiting in the shop, and Charles ran
forward to do so. He was prevented entering; but seeing Maigrot’s
wife sinking and trembling behind the counter, and looking absolutely
incapable of any resolution whatever, he called out to her to assist in
emptying the flour bins and distributing the bread, and to fear
nothing, and all would be well. The woman tossed off a glass of
water which stood beside her, and rallied for the effort. In such effort
lay the only resource of sufferers under violence in those days; for
the magistracy were unable to afford assistance; or, if able, were not
to be depended on. The shop was presently emptied and gutted, and
its stock carried away, without, however, being in this instance
preceded by the horrible display of a human head. Maigrot had
escaped and actually joined in with the mob in time to see his own
flour cast into the Seine. Nobody thought more of the baker, and he
took advantage of this disregard to learn a great deal of his own
doings which he did not know before. He now overheard that his
flour was mixed with hurtful ingredients by order of his customer, the
king; that an inferior kind was sold at high prices as the best; and
that there were stores of meal concealed somewhere about his
premises, to victual the soldiers who were to be brought to rule the
city, and give the king his own way. All this was news to Maigrot, who
was compelled to listen to these falsehoods in silence: more
fortunate than many who had lost their lives as well as their good
name under similar charges. A defender sprang up, however, when
he least expected it.
Charles and his little son could not help following to look on, when
the mob proceeded with the flour down to the river. They stood on
the outskirts of the crowd, watching sack after sack as, with hoarse
shouts, it was heaved into the water so as to make the heaviest
splash possible. A new amusement presently occurred to some of
the leaders; that of testing the political opinions of the passers by by
the judgment they should pronounce on the quality of the flour.
Those who declared it good must, of course, be parasites of the
court; those who made mouths at it were the friends of the people;
and the moment this point was settled, every gazer from a distance
was hauled to the water’s edge to undergo the test; every
approaching carriage was waylaid and stopped, and its inmates
brought on the shoulders of the mob. Of course, all gave judgment
on the same side;—a thing likely to happen without much
dishonesty, when the raw flour was crammed into the mouth by foul
and sometimes bloody hands. It would have been difficult to
pronounce it very good under such circumstances of administration.
Among the most piteous looking of those under test was the
marquis de Thou, who was taken from a non-descript sort of
carriage, on his way, as he vowed, to the duke of Orleans, but
certainly attended by more than one servant of the royal household.
While prosecuting his explanations with gesture and grimace,
uplifted as he was above the crowd, he looked so like a monkey
riding a bear that a universal shout of mockery arose. He was
lowered for a moment, out of sight; and the laugh rose louder than
ever when he reappeared, held at arms’ length by a hundred hands,
powdered all over like a miller. His position made the judgment he
had to give all the more difficult, for it enabled him to perceive the
royal servants watching him on one side, the duke of Orleans and
some of his fiercest followers on another, and the pitiless mob
around.
“Ah! it is very, very good food for the poor, without doubt,” he
declared, while in full view of the court party, and with his mouth
stuffed with a compound which had just been taken from a puddle
underfoot. “Very fine nourishment for a good king to buy dear, and
give away to a hungry people.—Ah! no more,—no more, I pray you! I
shall presently dine, and it is enough. I cannot praise it more than I
have done.—Ah! but” (seeing the duke frowning) “I do not say but it
may be a little sour,—and somewhat bitter,—yes, O yes, and gritty,—
and, O do not murder me, and I will also say hurtful.—And
poisonous? Yes, no doubt it is poisonous,—clearly poisonous.—But,
how bountiful of the king to think of how the poor should be fed!”
The marquis might think himself fortunate in getting off with a
ducking in the yeasty flood, into which he was let down astride on a
flour sack. While sneaking away through the crowd, after shaking his
dripping queue, and drawing a long breath, he encountered Charles,
whom he immediately recognised, and with inconsiderate
selfishness, exposed to the notice of the crowd by his appeal.
“Ah, my friend, here is a condition I am in! For our old friendship’s
sake,—for the sake of our vicinity in Guienne, aid me!”
“Do not answer him. Take no notice,” whispered Maigrot from
behind; “’tis as much as your life is worth.”
But Charles could not be inhuman. He gave the old man his arm to
conduct him to the carriage which he intended to order to his own
house. Before he had well turned his back, however, a piercing
shriek from Julien made him look round. The mob were about to
carry the boy towards the sacks.
“Do not be alarmed, my dear,” said he. “Taste the flour, and say
whether you think it good; and I will come to you in a moment to do
the same.”
Julien shrieked no more, but he looked ruefully in his father’s face,
when Charles returned. As soon as he had gulped down his share
and could speak, he said he had never tasted raw flour before, but it
was not so good as the hot cakes that were made of it sometimes.—
The boy escaped with being only laughed at.—His father’s turn
came next.
Charles stipulated, when laid hold of, to be allowed to feed
himself, and refused laughingly to taste what came out of the puddle
till his neighbours should have separated the mud from the flour.
With a very oracular look, he then proceeded from sack to sack,
tasting and pronouncing, apparently unmoved by the speculations he
heard going on all round him as to whether he was a royalist from
about the court, or a spy from Versailles, or only an ignorant stranger
from the provinces. When he had apparently made up his mind, he
began a sort of conversation with those nearest to him, which he
exalted by degrees into a speech.
“When I,” he observed, “I, the very first, opened a prisoner’s cell in
the Bastille——”
He was interrupted by loud cheers from all who heard; and this
drew the attention of more.
“——I found,” continued Charles, “a mess of wholesome food in
that horrible place. Every other kind of poison was there,—the
poison of damps and a close atmosphere; the poison of inactivity
which brings on disease and death; the poison of cruelty by which all
the kindly feelings are turned into bitterness in the soul of the
oppressed; and the poison of hopelessness, by which the currents of
life are chilled, and the heart of the captive is sunk within him till he
dies. All these poisons we found in every cell; but to all their inmates
was denied that quicker poison which would have been welcome to
end their woes. Some, we know, have lived thirty-five years under
this slow death, while a very small mixture of drugs with their bread
would have released them in fewer hours. That this quicker method
was ever used, we have no proof; that it was not used in the case of
those whom we released, we know, not by their state of health alone;
for that, alas! was not to be boasted of;—but by the experience of
some of us. When we were heated with toil and choked with dust, we
drank the draughts which the prisoners left untasted in their cells.
When a way was made among the ruins, women came to see what a
work their husbands had achieved; and when their children craved
food, rather than return home before all was finished, they gave their
little ones the bread which the captives had loathed. Many thus ate
and drank; and I appeal to you whether any evil came of that day;
whether the sleep of the next night was not sound as became the
rest which succeeds to an heroic effort. No one was poisoned with
the food then provided by the government; and yet that horrible
dungeon was the place, if there be any, for poison to do its work.
And if not attempted there, will it be here? Here, where there are a
million of eyes on the watch to detect treasons against the people?
Here, where there are hundreds of thousands of defenders of the
public safety? No, fellow citizens: this is not the kind of treason which
is meditated against us. There are none that dare practise so directly
on your lives. But there is a treason no less fatal, though more
disguised, which is even at this moment in operation against you.
You ask me two questions;—whether this food is of a bad quality;
and whether you are not half-starved; and both these evils you
ascribe to your rulers.—To the first I answer, that this food is, to the
best of my judgment, good; and, whether good or bad, that the
government has nothing to do with it, since it forms no part of the
stores that the king has bought up for distribution. It is flour of the
same harvest, the same field, the same mill, the same bin, that I and
mine have been supplied from; and it has nourished me well for the
work I have had to do; for letting in the light of day upon the foulest
dungeon that ever deformed the earth,—for watching over those who
have been released from it,—for attending to the proceedings of the
Assembly,—for meditating by night and consulting by day how the
rights of the people may best be attained and secured. Keep the
same food to strengthen you for the same purposes. Do not forget
your other complaint;—that you are starving: and remember that
however much this may be owing to the misrule and courtly
extravagance you denounce, the grievance will not be removed by
your feeding the fishes with that which your children are craving. I
spoke of another kind of treason than that which you suspect, and I
see about me too many tokens of its existence;—the treason which
would not poison but starve you.
“Of the motives of this treason I have nothing to say, for I am
wholly ignorant of them. I only insist that there can be no truly
patriotic aim under the project of depriving you of the food which is at
best but scantily supplied. Do you find in the most plentiful seasons
that we have corn enough to make sport with in the river? Are your
houses even then so filled with grain that, after feeding your children
and domestic animals, you have enough left for the eels of the
Seine? Is it to give you this over-supply that the peasantry of the
provinces live under roofs of rushes, and couch upon beds of straw?
Tell me,—is there in the happiest of times such a superfluity that no
Frenchman has a want or wish for more?”
Furious cries of denial rose from all sides, joined with curses upon
the government which year by year, by its extravagance, snatched
the hard-earned bread from the labourer’s hands.
“This is all true,” replied Charles, “and is in course of being
reformed: but when did even a tyrannical government inflict upon
you such evils as you are this day inflicting upon yourselves? When
has it robbed the shops of one of the most useful class of men
among you, and carried away boat-loads of the food for which
thousands are pining, and destroyed your means of life before your
eyes? A worse enemy than even a weak king and a licentious court
is making sport of your miseries, and overwhelming you with such as
cannot be repaired. Yes! let it not hurt your pride to hear of woes that
cannot be repaired; for even the power of the sovereign people is not
unlimited, great as you have proved it to be. You have abolished
servile parliaments, and obtained a virtuous assembly of
representatives. You have swept away the stronghold of oppression,
and can tread with free steps the turf from which its very foundations
have been extracted. You have rejected a constitution which was an
insufficient warrant for your liberties, and are in the way to obtain
universal assent to that noble Declaration of Rights which shall
become the social contract of every civilized nation.—All these
things, and others which would have been called impossibilities ten
years ago, you have achieved. But there are impossibilities
remaining which more truly deserve the name. You cannot prevent
multitudes dying when famine is in the land; you cannot call up a
new harvest before the seed has sprouted; you cannot insist upon
supplies from other lands which are already drained. You can waste
your resources, but you cannot recall them. With however much
pride or levity you may at this hour fling away the staff of your life,
you cannot retard the day when you will sink for want of it,—when
you will kneel in the mud by the brink of this very current, and crave
the waters to give up what you have buried in them, or to drown your
miseries with your life.—Will you suffer yourselves thus to be made
sport of? Will you permit yourselves to be goaded into madness, in
order that you may be ready for madmen’s deeds? Will you throw
away what is in your own hands, that others may reduce you to
crave the small pittance which will remain in theirs? Those who have
incited you to the deeds of this day take very good care that all our
granaries shall not be emptied. They reserve a few, that you may at
length,—when all their schemes are ripe,—be their tools through
your literal dependence on them for bread.—Disappoint this plot as
far as you can. It is now too late to keep plenty in your own hands;
but baffle the approaches of famine to the last moment; for with
hunger comes slavery; or, if you will not have slavery, death; and in
either case, your country must surrender your services at the very
moment when she wants them most.—Where is the patriotism of
bringing things to this pass?—Where also is the justice of
condemning unheard so useful a class of men as those from whom
you have taken their property without accusation, and, in many
cases, their lives, on nothing better than suspicion of their having
communicated with the court?—We must respect rights, as well as
frame a Declaration of them. We must cherish the innocent and
useful of society, if we wish to restrain those who are neither the one
nor the other. Let there be a contrast between the oppressors and
the friends of the people. Let tyrants tremble, while industrious
citizens dwell in peace.”
It was now easy to wind up the discourse to the point
contemplated. Charles proposed that Maigrot should be permitted,
under proper guardianship, to bake a provision of loaves out of this
very flour; and if they proved good, that all that remained of his
property should be restored to him. The crowd rather relished the
idea of waiting the operation, in full prospect of a batch of hot rolls
gratis as the result, and the proposal was received with
acclamations.—Charles immediately singled out Maigrot, as he
stood on the outskirts of the mob, requested him to lead the way
homewards, put a loaf into each arm of his little son, swung a sack of
flour on his own shoulders, and headed the most singular of all the
extraordinary processions which attracted the gaze of Paris in those
times.
The duke of Orleans made no opposition. He saw that the game
was up for this day, and departed in an opposite direction, having no
particular wish to hear the verdict which he knew would be passed
upon the bread, or to witness the exultation of the baker.—Before
night, Maigrot not only felt his head safe upon his shoulders, but was
the most eminent baker in Paris; and, if he had but had any flour
remaining, might have boasted such a business as he had till now
never thought of aspiring to.
Chapter VII.
MOB SOVEREIGNTY.
The endeavours of individuals like Charles to make the people wise

were of little avail, however successful at the moment, in opposition
to influences of a different character which were perpetually at work
upon the mob of Paris. The obstinacy of the king in refusing to sign
the declaration of rights, the imbecility of the ministry, the arts and
clamours of the leaders of different parties, and, above all, the
destitution of which they took advantage, overcame all principles of
subordination, all sentiments of loyalty, and filled the people with a
rage which rendered them as blind to their own interests as unjust
towards those of the ranks above them. Riot and waste spread and
grew from day to day, and the wise saw no more prospect of relief
than the foolish of danger.
The king had been told, on the day the Bastille was taken, that his
capital was in a state of revolution; but, nearly three months
afterwards, he was still wondering what the event might mean;
talking over with the queen the kindnesses he had always intended
showing to his people, and assuring the people’s parliament that the
best thing he could do for them was to preserve his dignity and
prerogative. He could still at Versailles ride abroad unmolested in the
mornings, feast his body-guard in the middle of the day, and look on
while the ladies of the court were dancing in the evening, and sleep
the whole night without hearing the drums and larums which kept all
Paris awake; and could not therefore believe that all would not come
right, when the people should have been persuaded of the atrocious
unreasonableness of the Declaration they wanted him to sign. When
he heard that they drowned their flour in hatred of him, he did all he
could think of in ordering that more should be given them; and when
the queen discovered that which every one would have kept from
her,—that she was hated,—she curled her proud lip, and reared her
graceful head, and thought that the citizens must be ignorant indeed
if they fancied they could understand her springs of action, or
believed that they could intimidate her. With the dauphin at her knee,
she expatiated to the ladies of her court on the misfortune of kings
and queens having any connexion at all with the people beneath
them, whom it was at all times difficult to manage, and who might, as
now, cause serious trouble, and interfere materially with the peace of
royalty. She had at that moment little idea how the peace of royalty
was to be invaded this very day.
A murmur of horror and looks of dismay penetrated even into the
presence of her majesty, when tidings arrived of the approach of an
army of women from Paris.
“Of women!” cried the gouvernante of the dauphin. “Is it because
they can crave bread with a shriller wail?”
“Of women!” exclaimed the lady Alice de Thou. “They come to
plead for the rights of their children. I remember when they brought
the little ones in their arms after the storm, and we gave them all we
had.”
“Of women!” said the queen, thoughtfully. Then, with fire in her
eyes, she continued, looking steadfastly on the trembling
chamberlain who brought the news, “Since they are women, it is my
head they want. Is it not so? Speak. Are they not come for me?”
As soon as the chamberlain could speak, he muttered that he
feared they were indeed not women, but ruffians in disguise.
“Aye, just so,” observed the queen. “Their womanhood is
emblematical; and the hint of their purpose is not lost upon me. I
hope they are indeed men, and can handle arms. I would take my
death more willingly, being shot at as a mark, than being torn to
pieces by the foul hands of the rabble. A death-blow from afar rather
than a touch from any one of them!”
All present, except the chamberlain, were loud in their
protestations against the possibility of any such danger. It was
inconceivable; it was barbarous; it was horrific; it was a thing
unheard of; in short, it was absolutely inconceivable. The
chamberlain mournfully admitted that the whole was indeed
inconceivable to all who had not witnessed the procession, like a
troop of furies from the regions below, taking their way through every
savage district on the earth, and swelling their ranks with all that
could be gathered up of hideous and corrupt. That her majesty’s
sacred person should fall into such hands——
All now began to urge flight, and the queen was for a moment
disposed to listen; but finding that the king was out shooting, had
been sent for, and was expected every instant, she resolved to wait
his arrival, and then it was too late. The poissardes, real and
pretended, had by that time rushed into the place, filled the streets,
stopped up the avenue, and taken up a position of control in the
Chamber of Assembly. The king reached the palace through a back
entrance, in safety, but it was in vain to think of leaving it again.
A hasty council was summoned, consisting of the royal family, and
a few confidential servants, whose attachment to the persons of
majesty might set against the enervating terror which had seized
upon the ministers, and prevented their exerting any influence over
these new and appalling circumstances. Within the circle, rapid
consultation went on in low voices, while some kept watch at the
doors. When discussing the necessity of signing the declaration of
rights,—which was one of the demands of the mob without,—the
queen’s manner and tone were perceived suddenly to change, and
she appeared to make light of the danger under which even her spirit
had quailed but just before.
“Be careful;” she whispered to the person next her. “There is a
creature of the duke of Orleans in the room. I wonder how he got in.”
The lady Alice, who was watching her, followed the glance of her
eye, and saw that it rested on one whom she little expected to see.
“Madam!” she exclaimed, “it is my father!”
“Yes, my child; come to share your loyalty, now that the women
below have made him afraid. If the palace is stormed, he must find a
refuge once more under the Orleans provision-carts, which are, I
suppose, in waiting, as usual. We must give him no news to carry;
and Alice, as soon as he is gone, I must have your head-dress to
wear, as the best protection while your father points the way to us. I
would not, however, be so cruel, my child, as to deck you with mine.
You would lose your pretty head in a trice, and then the marquis

African Psychology The Emergence of A Tradition Augustine Nwoye Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

African Psychology The Emergence of A Tradition Augustine Nwoye Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

African psychology: the emergence of a

tradition Augustine Nwoye

Subject: Social Psychology

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers

the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education

by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University

Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the

prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted

by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction

rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Title: African psychology : the emergence of a tradition / Augustine Nwoye.

Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2022. |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identi ers: LCCN 2021050785 (print) | LCCN 2021050786 (ebook) |

ISBN 9780197630174 (digital-online)

Subjects: LCSH: Psychology—Africa—History.

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050785

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050786

Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

aspects of continental African psychology understood as a postcolonial aca-

addresses several fundamental questions (Nwoye, 2015a): (1) What foun-

efforts that scholars of continental African psychology are making to free

Chapter 8 introduces the notion that, as understood in mainstream

The Notion of Africentric Paradigm

much-​awaited globalectic framework of inclusion and African presence in

is that when Professor Gikandi declared Achebe the “inventor” of African

to forge a totally similar psychology. In particular, although I recognize the

Subject: Social Psychology

Biko, S. (1978). I Write What I Like. London: Bowerdean Press.

Mbiti, J. S. (1969). African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann.

Universiti Sains Malaysia (Malaysia), and the University of KwaZulu-​Natal

One of the most unprecedented developments in the history of the scientific

The endeavours of individuals like Charles to make the people wise

You might also like

much-awaited globalectic framework of inclusion and African presence in

Universiti Sains Malaysia (Malaysia), and the University of KwaZulu-Natal