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K. E. Løgstrup: Controverting Kierkegaard
Selected Works of K. E. Løgstrup
Series editors: Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern

Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation

The Ethical Demand
Controverting Kierkegaard
Ethical Concepts and Problems
K. E. Løgstrup
Controverting Kierkegaard

Translated by Hans Fink and

Kees Van Kooten Niekerk

Introduced by Bjørn Rabjerg, with notes by

Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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Contents

Translators’ Preface vii

Acknowledgements xv
A Chronology of Løgstrup’s Life and Works xvii
Introduction xix
Bjørn Rabjerg

Controverting Kierkegaard lxiii

German Foreword lxv
Foreword lxvii

Part I: Christianity without the Historical Jesus 1

1. The Christian Message Is Derived from Paradoxicality, and
Jesus’s Proclamation and Works Are Not Integral to Christianity 1
2. The Question of the Occasion for Faith According to Kierkegaard 3
a. Paradoxicality Makes Pressing the Question of the Occasion
for Faith 3
b. The Question of the Occasion for Faith and the Attempt to
Legitimize Faith 3
c. The Answer to the Question of the Occasion for Faith 4
3. The Approximation Problem 9
4. An Alternative to Kierkegaard’s View 11
5. The Paradoxicality 15
6. The Interpretation of the Crucifixion 21
7. Following Christ 23
Part II: The Sacrifice 26
1. Suffering 26
a. Christianity’s Interpretation of Suffering 26
b. The Self-Imposed Martyrdom 30
c. The Alternative to Kierkegaard 31
d. Jaspers’ Non-Christian Version of Kierkegaard’s Specifically
Christian Suffering 32
e. Demand and Salvation 35
2. Christianity and the Naturally Generated and Culturally Formed
Communities 39
a. Self-Denial and Martyrdom 39
b. The Extensive vs Intensive Understanding of Evil 42
c. A-Cosmic Ethics of Love 43
d. Suffering and Misfortune 45
e. The Admission 47
vi 

Part III: The Movement of Infinity 49

1. The Infinite Movement of Resignation 49
2. Taking over Concrete Existence 56
3. The Abstract and Negative Self 60
4. Sartre’s and Kierkegaard’s Portrayal of Demonic
Self-Enclosedness 62
a. Sartre’s Le diable et le bon dieu 62
b. Drama of Ideas and Drama of Characters 64
c. Kierkegaard Illustrated through Sartre, Sartre Interpreted through
Kierkegaard 67
d. The Sovereign Expressions of Life 69
5. The Absolute Good 79
6. Conformity and the Collision between Faith in God and the
Neighbour 83
7. The Sovereign Expressions of Life and the Question of the
Freedom or Bondage of the Will 85
8. Taking over the Situation through the Sovereign Expressions
of Life 89
9. How the Ethical Life of the People Is Lost, Conformism,
and How the Relation of Spirit Is Doubled 92
10. Morality is the Provision of Substitute Motives for
Substitute Actions 96
11. The Levelling Down of Finitude 100
12. Consciousness of Guilt 105
a. Eternity’s Vertical Understanding of Guilt 105
b. Time’s Horizontal Understanding of Guilt 106
13. Action and Attitude of Mind 108
Part IV: Nothingness 117
1. Knowledge as It Is Understood in Transcendental Philosophy,
and Existence 117
2. The Synthesis between Infinity and Finitude, between Eternity
and Temporality 121
3. The Doubling of the Relation of Spirit 124
4. Nothingness and Action 126
5. Knowledge and Reflection 133

Editors’ Notes 137

Select Bibliography 149
Index 153
Translators’ Preface

This translation is based on the edition of Opgør med Kierkegaard published

by Klim, Aarhus, in 2013. Except for the correction of a few typos, the text of
this edition is identical with the original edition published in 1967 by
Gyldendal, Copenhagen. In the Klim edition the original references to
Kierkegaard’s works have been supplemented with references to Søren
Kierkegaards Skrifter [Søren Kierkegaard’s Writings], a critical edition pub-
lished by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen
(Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1997–2013). In our translation, references to
Kierkegaard’s Danish works are to this edition, marked as SKS followed by
the volume’s number and page number(s), for example SKS 4: 258–9. The
German Foreword is a translation of Løgstrup’s foreword to a series of three
books entitled Kontroverse um Kierkegaard und Grundtvig [Controversy
Concerning Kierkegaard and Grundtvig], edited by Götz Harbsmeier and
K. E. Løgstrup. Løgstrup’s foreword was published in the first volume of
this series entitled Das Menschliche und das Christliche [Humanity and
Christianity].
We were able to base our translation of Part I on a draft by Tom Angier,
which has lightened our job considerably. The section that deals with ‘the
sovereign expressions of life’ (Part III, 4 (d) ‘The Sovereign Expressions of
Life’ to 10. ‘Morality is the Provision of Substitute Motives for Substitute
Actions’) had been translated previously by Susan Dew, published in
K. E. Løgstrup, Beyond the Ethical Demand. We have benefited greatly from
this translation. Yet, we have not merely copied it. Whereas Dew’s translation is
free and elegant, we have attempted to keep as close as possible to Løgstrup’s
formulations. The main reason is that Løgstrup practised a kind of phenom-
enology that builds on the specific meaning of words and expressions in
everyday language. This suggests that he chose his formulations with great
precision, at least with regard to central concepts. Therefore, we have tried to be
as consistent as possible in our use of the English words for these concepts. This
has the further advantage that there is a substantial consistency in the transla-
tion of these concepts across the different volumes in the Oxford University
Press series. Our attempt to keep close to Løgstrup’s formulations could easily
have resulted in dubious English, were it not for a meticulous linguistic revision
viii  ’ 

by the editors. We are greatly indebted to them for this. We are also grateful to
Michael Au-Mullaney for his helpful comments on a late draft.
In order to enable our translation to be checked against the original, we have
included page numbers in square brackets from the new critical edition of the
text in Danish: Opgør med Kierkegaard (Aarhus: Klim, 2013). We have
followed the practice of the Oxford University Press edition of The Ethical
Demand with regard to gendered language. That is to say, except when
Løgstrup clearly refers to a man, we have used third-person plural pronouns
to refer to individual human beings.
As Løgstrup points out in his foreword, Opgør med Kierkegaard is an
interpretation and critique of Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity
and offers an alternative understanding. Løgstrup underpins his interpretation
with a large number of quotations from Kierkegaard’s works. We have ren-
dered these quotations on the basis of the standard translation by Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, published in Kierkegaard’s Writings in 26
volumes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979–2009). This trans-
lation is referred to as KW, followed by volume number and page number(s),
for example KW 7: 56–7. References to Kierkegaard’s journals and papers are
to Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, edited and translated by Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 7 volumes (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1967–78), by volume and page number(s) and abbreviated as JP, for
example JP 1: 271–2. In some cases, we have deviated from the translation
given by the Hongs, especially when we judged that their version could
hamper the understanding of Løgstrup’s use of the quotation. Major devi-
ations are explained in a note. We have also changed the quoted texts into
gender neutral language. References to works by Luther in the Introduction
and in the Editors’ Notes are first to D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, 73 vols. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883–2009) abbreviated
as WA, and then to Luther’s Works, American edition, 55 vols. (St Louis and
Philadelphia, PA: Concordia and Fortress Press, 1958–86; new series, vols.
56–75, 2009–) abbreviated as LW, by volume number and then page number.
When Løgstrup quotes from a Danish text of which there is no English
translation, we have just given our own translation. Sometimes he quotes from
French or German sources, but then he always gives his own translation into
Danish. In these cases, we have translated his translation into English, adapted
it to a standard English translation if available, and noted if our translation
departs significantly from it.
We have followed Danish practice in capitalizing only the first letter in titles
of works published in Danish after 1948, but have followed English practice in
  ’  ix

capitalizing all significant words for English titles; and in the Select
Bibliography and the Index we have followed the Danish system of putting
the special characters ‘æ’, ‘ø’, and ‘å’ at the end of the alphabet, so that for
example ‘Luther’ is listed before ‘Løgstrup’.
For some of Løgstrup’s central concepts it has been difficult to find English
terms that precisely capture their meaning. Therefore, it may be useful to say
something about that meaning, as we understand it, and explain why we have
translated as we did.

to believe/faith (at tro and tro): In a religious context, the Danish verb ‘at
tro’ and the corresponding substantive ‘tro’ are the usual translations of
pisteuein and pistis in the Greek New Testament. These concepts com-
bine the epistemic notion of regarding something as true with the notion
of trust in that which is regarded as true (sc. the Gospel and God/Jesus).
In English, the noun pistis is normally translated as ‘faith’. However, in
English ‘faith’ has no corresponding verb. This is why the New Revised
Standard Version of the Bible usually translates pisteuein as ‘to believe’
(e.g. Rom 3:22). It would be natural to follow this translation and render
‘at tro’ as ‘to believe’. The question arises, however, if the specific
meaning of ‘at tro’ does not risk getting lost, because ‘to believe’ is
normally understood in a merely epistemic sense. To avoid this misun-
derstanding an alternative option could be ‘to have faith’. Yet this
translation is not satisfactory, because it misses the idea of the verb ‘at
tro’ as an act, not as something you have. This is important for the way it
is understood in both Kierkegaard and Løgstrup. To maintain its char-
acter as an act we have decided to take over common theological usage
and translate the verb ‘at tro’, when used in a clearly religious context, as
‘to believe’. Finally, we have translated ‘den troende’ (the believing
person) as ‘the believer’ when we judged that the emphasis lay on the
epistemic notion, and as ‘the faithful’ when we judged that the emphasis
lay on the notion of trust.
bourgeois/bourgeois life (spidsborger/spidsborgerlighed): The Danish terms
(sometimes translated as philistine/philistinism) are clearly pejorative
and express contempt for the narrowness of mind taken to be charac-
teristic of citizens who are preoccupied with their own self-righteous
conception of what is right and wrong. Spidsborgerlighed can thus be
found in all social classes.
compassion (barmhjertighed): Løgstrup’s use of this word is closely con-
nected to the biblical story of The Good Samaritan, in Danish: Den
x  ’ 

barmhjertige samaritaner (Luke 10:37). ‘Barmhjertighed’ is the Danish

translation of Greek eleos which Luther translated as ‘Barmherzigkeit’,
and which traditionally in English has been translated as ‘mercy’.
However, the problem with ‘mercy’ is that it is primarily shown when
sparing someone from punishment; but this does not correspond with
Løgstrup’s understanding of the Samaritan story, which instead involves
the desire to relieve other people’s suffering and acting accordingly. For
this reason, ‘compassion’ is arguably a more suitable translation than
‘mercy’, although previously in Løgstrup literature and translations,
‘mercy’ has been used as the preferred translation, for example when
translating the sovereign expression of life ‘barmhjertighed’.
A worry could be that ‘compassion’ sounds too passive and thus, unlike
mercy, is more of a merely emotional state; but it is of crucial importance
to both the Samaritan story and to Løgstrup’s use of ‘barmhjertighed’
that action is also involved: ‘Go, and do likewise’, as Jesus replies. In this
respect, Løgstrup draws a distinction between ‘medlidenhed’, which is
merely passive (and so more like ‘sympathy’ or ‘fellow-feeling’), and
‘barmhjertighed’, which involves action. However, in English ‘compas-
sion’ also usually involves acting, so a person who merely felt compassion
but did not act would arguably not count as compassionate. Therefore,
Løgstrup’s important distinction is captured by the use of ‘compassion’
rather than ‘mercy’, ‘pity’, or ‘sympathy’, and so is adopted here.
controversion (opgør): As Bjørn Rabjerg says in his Introduction, the word
opgør has a very dramatic meaning involving a showdown or face-off, but
it also means something quite undramatic—or at least not terribly
exciting—as a term from accounting, where it means to settle an account
or a balance sheet. To have an opgør involves engaging in a controversy
with someone, where the matter dealt with is to be properly settled; it
involves a confrontation and is intended to ‘set the record straight’, so to
speak, so the expression ‘to settle a score’ comes close. For this reason,
Showdown with Kierkegaard, or Settling the Score with Kierkegaard would
have been more exciting options when translating the title, as would
probably Controversy with Kierkegaard. However, we have chosen to
stick with Controverting Kierkegaard, mainly because it is accurate, mean-
ing that it involves an ongoing dispute with someone where one engages
in a controversy, but also because this translation has been used in the past
and is thus now standard throughout the Anglophone Løgstrup literature.
definitive (definitiv): With this word Løgstrup designates one of the main
characteristics of the sovereign expression of life. On the one hand he
  ’  xi

explains this term in contrast to an indeterminate (‘ubestemt’) kind of

spontaneity, so it refers to a determinate content. Yet it is no accident
that he uses the word ‘definitiv’ and not the word ‘bestemt’ (‘determin-
ate’ or ‘definite’), because ‘definitiv’ designates also that the sovereign
expressions of life impose a claim on us that we act in a specific way (see
72–3/99–100). Therefore, we have translated ‘definitiv’ in this context
with the English counterpart ‘definitive’, referring to both the definite
character of the sovereign expressions of life and the unconditionality of
their claim.
demand (fordring): This is one of the most central concepts for Løgstrup as
can be seen from his use of it in the title of his main work Den etiske
fordring. The Danish term involves someone being asked, required,
demanded, claimed, or called to do something. Kierkegaard speaks of
the ‘infinite demand’ (den uendelige fordring) and also of ‘love’s demand’
(kjerlighedens fordring) (see e.g. SKS 9: 189/KW 16: 189, where the
Hongs have ‘love’s requirement’). Løgstrup employs the term to cover
the idea that something is being demanded of you without this being a
command given by someone in particular. His use of the word implies
that the reason to act is taking care of the other rather than the authority of
a commander. In the KW translation, ‘fordring’ is rendered as ‘require-
ment’, which might obscure the connection between Kierkegaard and
Løgstrup at this point. In his treatment of the sovereign expressions of
life, Løgstrup speaks of a ‘krav’ involved in them (72–3/99–100). ‘Krav’
could well be translated as ‘demand’, but we have translated it as ‘claim’ to
maintain the verbal distinction Løgstrup makes between the ethical
demand and the ‘demand’ involved in the sovereign expressions of life.
expression of life (livsytring): This word can also be translated as ‘mani-
festation of life’ or ‘life manifestation’ (e.g. in Metaphysics II, part V).
Løgstrup’s use of it has its background in Danish versions of German
Lebensphilosophie. This type of philosophy stresses the non- or pre-
rational aspects of human existence and is characterized by Herbert
Schnädelbach as follows: ‘Life, in the sense of that which is always
there to sustain and embrace spirit, culture, and also the individual
consciousness, is the fundamental notion of life-philosophy in all its
different aspects.’¹ In his doctoral dissertation, Løgstrup adopts this idea
and adapts it theologically by stating that life, as God has created it, is the

¹ Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933, translated by Eric Matthews

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 142.
xii  ’ 

pre-condition for culture. In this connection he designates culture’s

different areas, including knowing, as ‘Livs-Ytringer’.² Here ‘livsytring’
is used in the wide sense of encompassing all culture insofar as it is the
product of pre-cultural life. However, Løgstrup continues by focusing on
the ethical content of pre-cultural life, which is revealed in Jesus’s
spontaneous acts of love.³ It is this aspect of life which later determines
his conception of the ‘suveræne/spontane livsytringer’. These are spon-
taneous other-regarding impulses or ways of conduct such as trust,
sincerity, and compassion. Because ‘expression’ seems to capture the
spontaneous and dynamic nature of these phenomena best, we have
translated ‘livsytring’ as ‘expression of life’, thereby also following what
seems to have become the standard translation in Anglophone discus-
sions of Løgstrup’s ethics.
immediate (umiddelbar): Løgstrup can use this word in the common sense
of ‘direct’ or ‘without intermediary’, but often it refers for him more
specifically to the property of being self-forgetfully engaged in the task at
hand or the relationship with other people. In this sense ‘umiddelbar’ is a
key term for Løgstrup as it is for Kierkegaard, and therefore we have
translated it as ‘immediate’ as is normal in the Kierkegaard literature. In
Løgstrup’s view the sovereign expressions of life belong to the sphere of
immediacy. Hence, he can use ‘umiddelbar’ in connection with them
too, and then the term is used in a sense close to that of ‘spontaneous’.
knowing/knowledge (erkendelse): The Danish term can mean both the
knowledge one possesses and the process of coming to know. In this
respect it is like the English ‘cognition’; but this word is more technical
sounding than ‘erkendelse’ is in Danish. We have therefore translated it
by either ‘knowledge’ or ‘knowing’, depending on context.
Schwärmerei (sværmeri): Luther used this German term as a derogatory
characterization of those evangelical movements that aimed at establish-
ing God’s Kingdom on earth. In a Lutheran context, this term is often
translated as ‘enthusiasm’ or sometimes as ‘fanaticism’, but neither term
is ideal in English, so we have decided to use the German word, which is
also used in English and appears in the Oxford English Dictionary,
where ‘Schwärmerei’ is defined as follows: ‘Religious zeal, fanaticism,
extravagant enthusiasm for a cause or a person.’ In the present work

² K. E. Løgstrup, Den erkendelsesteoretiske Konflikt, §22. For full bibliographic details, see the
Select Bibliography.
³ K. E. Løgstrup, Den erkendelsesteoretiske Konflikt, §24.
  ’  xiii

Løgstrup uses the term as the designation of an over-enthusiastic ideal-

ism that aims at establishing God’s Kingdom on earth, which he, like
Luther, regards as unrealistic, because it does not take account of the
wickedness and limitations of human nature. The corresponding adjec-
tive is ‘schwärmerisch’, and a ‘Schwärmer’ is a person who cherishes
such idealism.
taking over (overtagelse): By the expression ‘at overtage sig selv’ (to take
over oneself ) Kierkegaard means relating consciously to and accepting
one’s concrete, real self and its history, including its unfavourable
aspects, in order to lead a responsible life on these conditions. In Part
III, Chapter 8 Løgstrup uses this expression polemically against
Kierkegaard, when he writes: ‘the task is not to take over existence and
its conditions with the abstract and negative self, but to take over the
interpersonal situation with the sovereign expressions of life’ (89/119).
That is to say, one should not relate reflectively to oneself but, turned
outwards towards others, one’s acts should be guided by the sovereign
expressions of life. In order to maintain the verbal similarity with
Kierkegaard’s expression, we have translated ‘overtagelse/at overtage’
in this context as ‘taking over/to take over’ respectively.
the universal (det almene): The Danish term can mean the universal, the
general, the ordinary, the public and what is common for all. In
Kierkegaard, the term is used in accordance with the Hegelian under-
standing of ethics as the objective spirit as realized in concrete institu-
tions like marriage and the state. Kierkegaard can thus speak about being
married as ‘realisere det almene’ in the sense of realizing that which
applies to everyone. We have chosen to use ‘the universal’ throughout,
because this seems the best way to retain this Kierkegaardian conception.
Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to the following for their helpful comments on previous
versions of this translation: Alexander Altonji, Tom Angier, Michael Au-
Mullaney, David Bugge, Svein Aage Christoffersen, and Bo Kristian Holm.
We are also grateful to Simon Thornton for editorial assistance.
A Chronology of Løgstrup’s Life and Works

1905 (2 September) Born in Copenhagen, Denmark

1923–30 Studies theology at the University of Copenhagen while also fol-
lowing lectures on philosophy, in particular Frithiof Brandt’s series
of lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
1930–35 Research visits at various universities, mainly in Germany, but also
in France, Switzerland, and Austria
1932 Awarded the gold medal for his prize essay (similar to a PhD
dissertation) on Max Scheler’s phenomenological approach to
ethics: En fremstilling og vurdering af Max Scheler’s: ‘Der
Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik’ [An
Exposition and Evaluation of Max Scheler’s: ‘Formalism in Ethics
and Material Ethics of Value’] (published 2016)
1935 Marriage to Rosemarie Pauly (1914–2005); they had five children
1936–43 Returns to Denmark. Lutheran pastor on Funen. Becomes part of
the Tidehverv movement
1943 Defends his higher doctoral dissertation Den erkendelsesteoretiske
Konflikt mellem den transcendentalfilosofiske Idealisme og Teologien
[The Epistemological Conflict between Transcendental Idealism
and Theology], which was published in 1942 (new Danish critical
edition published 2011). Becomes professor of ethics and philoso-
phy of religion at Aarhus University, Denmark
1944 Goes underground for the remainder of World War II due to his
involvement in the resistance movement
1948 Earliest signs of disagreement with Tidehverv
1950 Gives a series of lectures on Kierkegaard and Heidegger at the Freie
Universität Berlin, published the same year as Kierkegaards und
Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung
[Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its
Relation to Proclamation] (Danish publication 2013)
1952 Kants filosofi I [Kant’s Philosophy I] (reprinted in 1970 as Part 1 of
Kants kritik af erkendelsen og refleksionen [Kant’s Critique of
Knowledge and Reflection])
xviii    ø ’    

1956 Den etiske fordring [The Ethical Demand]

1961 Breaks with Tidehverv (final break in 1964) Kunst og etik [Art and
Ethics] Becomes a member of the Danish Academy
1965 Kants æstetik [Kant’s Aesthetics]
1968 Opgør med Kierkegaard [Controverting Kierkegaard]
1970 Kants kritik af erkendelsen og refleksionen [Kant’s Critique of
Knowledge and Reflection]
1971 Etiske begreber og problemer [Ethical Concepts and Problems] pub-
lished as a contribution to an anthology on ethics and Christian
faith (published as a book in 1996)
1972 Norm og spontaneitet [Norm and Spontaneity]
1974 Awarded the Amalienborg Prize. This prize was inaugurated in
1972, and is awarded by the Queen of Denmark to an outstanding
Danish scholar or writer
1976 Vidde og prægnans [Breadth and Concision], the first volume of the
Metafysik [Metaphysics] I–IV series
1978 Metafysik IV: Skabelse og tilintetgørelse [Creation and Annihilation]
1981 Dies on 20 November in his home in Hyllested, north-east of
Aarhus
1982 System og symbol [System and Symbol]
1983 Metafysik II: Kunst og erkendelse [Art and Knowledge]
1984 Metafysik III: Ophav og omgivelse [Source and Surrounding]
1984 Det uomtvistelige [What Is Incontrovertible]
1987 Solidaritet og kærlighed og andre essays [Solidarity and Love and
Other Essays]
1988 Udfordringer [Challenges]
1992 Kære Hal—Kære Koste [Dear Hal—Dear Koste] (letter correspond-
ence, reprinted and expanded in 2010 in Venskab og strid
[Friendship and Strife])
1995 Prædikener fra Sandager-Holevad [Sermons from Sandager-
Holevad]
1996 Martin Heidegger
1999 Prædikenen og dens Tekst [The Sermon and Its Text]
2010 Venskab og strid [Friendship and Strife] (letter correspondence)
 Introduction
Bjørn Rabjerg

1. Controverting Kierkegaard
The Danish title of the present book, Opgør med Kierkegaard, is difficult to translate
into English. The word opgør has a very dramatic meaning involving a showdown or
face-off, but it also means something quite undramatic—or at least not terribly
exciting—as a term from accounting, where it means to settle an account or a
balance sheet. To have an opgør involves engaging in a controversy with someone,
where the matter dealt with is to be properly settled; it involves a confrontation and
is intended to ‘set the record straight’, so to speak, so the expression ‘to settle a score’
comes close. For this reason, Showdown with Kierkegaard, or Settling the Score with
Kierkegaard would have been more exciting options when translating the title, as
would probably Controversy with Kierkegaard. However, we have chosen to stick
with Controverting Kierkegaard, mainly because it is accurate, meaning that it
involves an ongoing dispute with someone where one engages in a controversy,
but also because this translation has been used in the past and is thus now standard
throughout the Anglophone Løgstrup literature.
Controverting Kierkegaard (published in very late 1967 and for that reason
usually dated 1968)¹ is Løgstrup’s second main work after The Ethical
Demand.² Almost simultaneously (in 1968), it was published in German as
Auseinandersetzung mit Kierkegaard,³ the second volume of a series of three
books (1966, 1968, and 1972) under the joint title Kontroverse um Kierkegaard

¹ The book came out just before Christmas in 1967, but for technical reasons books published
this late in the year were recorded as published in the following year. Therefore, Opgør med
Kierkegaard is officially a 1968 release and is generally referred to as such.
² Knud Ejler Løgstrup was born in Copenhagen in 1905 and died in 1981 in his home outside
Aarhus, where he had spent most of his life as Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion. For
further biographical details, please consult the chronology of Løgstrup’s life on pp. xvii–xviii. It
may also be useful to read the section ‘The Ethical Demand in Context’ from the ‘Introduction’ to
Løgstrup’s The Ethical Demand, pp. xx–xxv.
³ In his ‘Afterword’ to the Danish 2013 edition of Opgør med Kierkegaard, Svein Aage Christoffersen
gives a detailed account of the differences between the Danish and the German editions. Most notable
are the additions to the German edition of (1) a chapter on Rudolf Bultmann’s view on the historical
xx 

und Grundtvig [Controversy Concerning Kierkegaard and Grundtvig].⁴ It is a

theological work in a much more obvious way than The Ethical Demand,
which becomes clear already in the first sentence where Løgstrup emphasizes
that what he is interested in is ‘the general tendency and implications of his
[Kierkegaard’s, BR] understanding of Christianity’ (lxvii/9).⁵ This impression
is only strengthened in Part I, which deals with Løgstrup’s view on the role of
‘the historical Jesus’, which is tied to his concept of revelation. However, in Part
III, Løgstrup introduces the key concept of the sovereign expressions of life (and
their contrary term, our circling thoughts and emotions), which—although they
do play an important theological role—can be taken as philosophical terms and
thus do not have to rely on Løgstrup’s theological position. Moreover, as it turns
out, Løgstrup’s thoughts concerning the historical Jesus are not without philo-
sophical importance either, because they show how Løgstrup can make the
transition from theology (revelation) to philosophy (reason) without ending up
in ‘obscurantism’, as he calls it in The Ethical Demand.⁶ It is thus worth pointing
out that although Løgstrup’s thoughts in the following have interesting philo-
sophical perspectives, his controversy targets Kierkegaard’s theology, and as
such it does not involve the more philosophical aspects of Kierkegaard (e.g. his
critique of Hegel). However, Løgstrup does also engage with contemporary non-
religious existentialism through discussions with Sartre and Jaspers, and when
taking this together with the fact that his engagement with Kierkegaard is firmly
tied to contemporary Kierkegaardianism, it shows that Løgstrup’s engagement
with Kierkegaard in the book is first and foremost aimed at the contemporary
intellectual debates rather than at Kierkegaard himself.

Jesus followed by a discussion on this; (2) texts from the ‘Polemical Epilogue’ of The Ethical
Demand that had been omitted in the German 1958 translation; and (3) a new epilogue, ‘Epilog
über die Existenztheologie’ [‘Epilogue on Existence Theology’], relating the book more explicitly
to contemporary theological Existentialism; cf. Svein Aage Christoffersen, ‘Efterskrift’
[‘Afterword’]. When not given in the text, full bibliographical details are given in the ‘Select
Bibliography’. Any abbreviations that are used are explained in the Translators’ Preface.
⁴ Løgstrup wrote a short ‘Vorwort’ [‘Foreword’] to the German edition, explaining the context
to the non-Danish reader (Kontroverse um Kierkegaard und Grundtvig, Volume I: Das
Menschliche und das Christliche [The Human and the Christian], Götz Harbsmeier and Knud
Ejler Løgstrup (eds.) (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1966), pp. 10–11). The German foreword
has been included in this translation because Løgstrup here clarifies how the book is not just a
critique of Kierkegaard, but also of contemporary Existentialism, and how he sees an alliance
between nihilistic tendencies in Positivism and Kierkegaardian Existentialism. The three German
volumes frame the Danish theologian N. F. S. Grundtvig as an important voice against these
tendencies (for more on Grundtvig, see §2.1).
⁵ Unattributed references in the text are to the present book, followed by a reference to the
Danish edition. Other references to books by Løgstrup are given first to English translations
where available, and then to the Danish originals.
⁶ The Ethical Demand, p. 4/Den etiske fordring, p. 10.
  xxi

We will take a closer look at the main ideas of the book below (§3), but as
its background and context are both complex and important we will turn to
this first.

2. Background and Context

Controverting Kierkegaard is the climax of a dispute between Løgstrup and
contemporary Kierkegaardianism, which had begun already twenty years
before its publication; but the relationship between Løgstrup and Kierkegaard
was not always one of conflict. When Løgstrup began his studies in Theology at
the University of Copenhagen in 1923, Kierkegaard had only just very recently
become the centre of attention. In fact, it was a publication the year before,
namely the second edition of Karl Barth’s The Epistle to the Romans in 1922,
which brought Kierkegaard to the theological and philosophical centre stage
(even in his native country Denmark), and therefore Barth and Kierkegaard
were main topics when Løgstrup entered the university.
Two people were particularly significant to the reception of Kierkegaard in
the 1920s in Copenhagen, who also came to be highly influential on Løgstrup.
Among the professors, the newly appointed (1921) Professor of Systematic
Theology, Eduard Geismar (1871–1939), had read Kierkegaard as early as the
late 1880s, and he had spent two years abroad primarily in Germany in
1897–99, where he became acquainted with Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926) and
his idealistic philosophy, studying with him in Jena for a year.⁷ In 1922, the
year following his appointment, Geismar travelled to Germany with the main
purpose of establishing contact with those German theologians who were
taking an interest in Kierkegaard, visiting Karl Barth in Göttingen and
Friedrich Gogarten in Munich, both of whom were at the heart of what
became known as dialectical theology and of the journal Zwischen den
Zeiten [Between the Times]. Geismar soon picked up on the thoughts in
Barth’s anti-idealistic theology, and from the beginning of his university
career, he encouraged his students to read both Barth and Kierkegaard. His
first substantial work on Kierkegaard came in 1923, Det etiske Stadium hos
Søren Kierkegaard [The Ethical Stage in Søren Kierkegaard], and in 1926–28

⁷ Put very briefly, idealism in general was conceived of as a humanism centred on the idea that
human beings should and could live up to the moral ideals, and Christian idealism saw faith as a
crucial tool in this cultivation of the individual person’s moral character. Eucken was a prime
proponent and received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1908 for his contributions within
idealistic philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie).
xxii 

came his six-volume monograph, Søren Kierkegaard, Livsudvikling og

Forfattervirksomhed [Søren Kierkegaard: His Personal Development and His
Work as an Author]. Geismar found himself in a difficult position of tension
between an Eucken-inspired idealism and Barth’s anti-idealism. His
Kierkegaard studies can be characterized as an attempt to mediate between
the two by focusing on Works of Love and the edifying discourses rather than
on the late works of Kierkegaard, which he found to be too hostile towards life
in finitude, or the human as he calls it.⁸
The other important figure was a student at The Faculty of Theology.
Kristoffer Olesen Larsen (1899–1964) had read Kierkegaard since he was a
teenager, and in 1923 he handed in a prize dissertation manuscript
under the title Søren Kierkegaards Lære om Paradoxet og denne Læres etiske
Konsekvenser med særligt Hensyn til Forholdet til Hegel [Søren Kierkegaard’s
Teaching on the Paradox and the Ethical Consequences of This Teaching with
Special Reference to the Relationship to Hegel], for which he was awarded the
gold medal.⁹ In his prize dissertation, Olesen Larsen’s Kierkegaard reading is
clearly influenced by Geismar, but only a few years later, beginning in 1926 when
Geismar’s first volume on Kierkegaard appeared, Olesen Larsen started to voice
a severe criticism of Geismar’s more idealistic interpretation of Kierkegaard.
Olesen Larsen’s critique of Geismar was part of a wider Danish theological
youth uprising against idealism, and piety in general, which came to be known
under the name of the journal at its centre, Tidehverv [Turn of the Times]—
clearly inspired by German dialectical theology and Zwischen den Zeiten.
Where Geismar had sought to connect Kierkegaard with a version of idealism,
Olesen Larsen and the Tidehverv movement based their theology on a dis-
tinctly anti-idealistic reading of Kierkegaard, with the young Karl Barth as an
important source of inspiration.¹⁰ As it turned out, Olesen Larsen’s critique of
Geismar (which, given the tone set by the Tidehverv members, often took the
form of downright ridicule) was to triumph to such an extent that Olesen

⁸ For more information on Geismar, see Jens Holger Schjørring, ‘Barth—Geismar—

Tidehverv’, Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, 39 (1976), pp. 73–105; and ‘Geismar og Brunner’
[‘Geismar and Brunner’], Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, 39 (1976), pp. 166–95.
⁹ The prize dissertation was a call for students to write a dissertation on a specific topic and
with a set title over a period of fourteen months. After submitting the anonymized manuscript, a
committee assessed it, and the winner received the gold medal. Løgstrup won a similar prize in
1932, as discussed below.
¹⁰ ‘The young Karl Barth’ refers to Barth’s writings from the first half of the 1920s. Later on, in
the late 1920s and early 1930s, major differences between Barth and Tidehverv became obvious.
This led to a harsh critique by Tidehverv of Barth’s new and more dogmatic path when Barth
visited Denmark in 1933, but also to an important alliance between Tidehverv and Rudolf
Bultmann, who attended many of Tidehverv’s summer meetings.
  xxiii

Larsen became widely perceived as the leading Kierkegaard scholar in

Denmark in the 1930s through to the 1960s, and as such Geismar came out
on the losing side. In fact, it could be argued that Olesen Larsen succeeded in
an almost total assassination of Geismar’s character and of Geismar as an
intellectual, leaving him more or less ousted after his death in 1939 and largely
forgotten even today.¹¹ Therefore, Kierkegaard’s importance and impact on
Danish intellectual life through most of Løgstrup’s life was intimately con-
nected to Tidehverv and Olesen Larsen. For this reason, Olesen Larsen’s
Kierkegaard-inspired theology plays a major role in Løgstrup’s controversy
or showdown with Kierkegaard and thus requires a closer inspection.¹²

2.1 Tidehverv: Luther, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Danish Protestantism

To start out by putting it briefly, Olesen Larsen’s reading of Kierkegaard has
what Kierkegaard called the infinite qualitative difference between the human
being and God as its foundation.¹³ In his Epistle to the Romans, Barth had
stated that this motif was the systematic foundation of his dialectical the-
ology,¹⁴ but to Olesen Larsen it was clear that Barth did not in fact remain
committed to the absoluteness and radicality of the opposition between God’s
infinity and human finitude. Therefore, Olesen Larsen’s main project was to
reaffirm the absolute difference, seeing the word of God as a radical contra-
diction of everything human and finite.¹⁵

¹¹ However, one of Løgstrup’s main objections, namely that Kierkegaard’s view of

Christianity is hostile towards life in finitude (the purely human), probably originates in
Geismar’s Kierkegaard reading and can thus be said to have lived on.
¹² Here we also need to mention the influence coming from Løgstrup’s colleague and
Kierkegaard expert Johannes Sløk (1916–2001). Much like Olesen Larsen, Sløk read Kierkegaard
as a theological existentialist. However, Løgstrup preferred to avoid public discussions with Sløk,
and so Olesen Larsen plays a much more visible role in Løgstrup’s work, although Sløk’s reading of
Kierkegaard certainly plays a role in the background. For more on Løgstrup’s disagreement with
Sløk, see Christoffersen, ‘Efterskrift’ [‘Afterword’], pp. 183–4 and 187–92.
¹³ Cf. Practice in Christianity, SKS 12: 132/KW 20: 128.
¹⁴ Cf. Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief, 2nd edition (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1922), p. xiii; and
The Epistle to the Romans, translated by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1968), p. 10.
¹⁵ There are clear parallels to Bultmann, which help explain why Bultmann visited Tidehverv’s
summer meetings and was a popular speaker. However, Olesen Larsen and Tidehverv should not be
seen as mere Bultmann disciples, as many of the central points in Tidehverv’s theology developed
before they engaged with Bultmann and thus developed independently and with important
differences. In a letter to Gogarten dating from 4 November 1928, Bultmann praises Olesen
Larsen emphatically as a theologian and Kierkegaard scholar, referring to him as an ‘überragende
Gestalt’ [‘outstanding figure’] (Hermann Götz Göckeritz, Rudolf Bultmann—Friedrich Gogarten,
Briefwechsel [Correspondence] 1921–1967 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), p. 144).
xxiv 

As already stated, theology in Denmark prior to the founding of Tidehverv in

1926 was at its core idealistic, the dominant theological current being Liberal
Theology (or Liberal Protestantism), which put an emphasis on personal con-
version and commitment to Christian faith and moral improvement, seeing
Jesus as a moral ideal and faith as founded in a personal relationship with
Jesus.¹⁶ As such, Liberal Theology in Denmark was based on an optimistic view
on the possibilities for improvement of each person’s moral character and for
culture (a term used to focus on human-made society such as political institu-
tions and social life) to develop and grow (moral and cultural perfectionism).
Another important Christian current in Denmark at the time was the Danish
Christian Student Federation (Danmarks kristelige studenterforbund), which was
connected to the YMCA and inspired by John Mott’s (1865–1955) World’s
Student Christian Federation. Along with a third important current, the Danish
Inner Mission, it was more conservative and sceptical in its view of culture than
Liberal Theology, but common to all three was their focus on piety and morality
as deeply rooted in Christian faith. Finally, Grundtvigianism, based on the
theology of N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783–1872), was a fourth major influence.
One of Grundtvig’s main points was to focus on human life here and now
and see Christianity in the light of this, and thus not as mainly concerning
transcendence and a hereafter. This view is encapsulated in his dictum: ‘Human
first, and Christian thereafter’ (‘menneske først og kristen så’).¹⁷
Even though these currents within contemporary Christianity took them-
selves to be Lutheran, Tidehverv saw its attack on them as a return to a more
fundamental Lutheranism. Central to the attack is the aforementioned
Kierkegaardian notion of the infinite qualitative difference between God and
the human, which had at least three important consequences:
Firstly, to Olesen Larsen (and Tidehverv) the infinite qualitative difference
was understood as a direct rejection of idealism (perfectionism) of all kinds,
because it precisely emphasized the total impossibility for any human striving
in trying to connect with or come closer to God. If the difference is infinite, no
finite human striving or attempt at establishing a connection could succeed. In
Lutheran terms, God is Majesty while we humans are sinners and we are
therefore unable to rise above our nature and station. In fact, to Tidehverv, the

¹⁶ The term ‘liberal’ refers to the liberal stance taken towards many of Christianity’s dogmas,
such as the virgin birth of Jesus, where liberal theology focused on ethics and the inner religious
feeling instead.
¹⁷ N. F. S. Grundtvig, ‘Menneske først og Christen saa’, translated in his Selected Writings:
N. F. S. Grundtvig, edited by Johannes Knudsen, Enok Mortensen, and Ernest D. Nielsen
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 140–1.
  xxv

very striving to rise above sin—that is, the striving for moral improvement and
the ambition to grow through faith, which was so prevalent in idealistic
theology—was understood as sin in its clearest form. As N. O. Jensen
(Luther expert and one of the main voices in early Tidehverv) expressed it:
‘[our attempts to improve ourselves, BR] only entangle us even more deeply in
sin. For indeed, real sin is the unwillingness to settle for being mere sinners
before God’.¹⁸ This theological move was perceived of as a radicalization of the
concept of sin. Where sin had previously been seen as gradual by the pious and
moralistic Christians, something you could be entangled in to various degrees
depending on your moral character and your degree of faith, it was now
understood radically as the fundamental category of human existence. Here
Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity—especially the concepts of neighbour love,
morality, and pity—was an important inspiration for Tidehverv, and in this
light they saw radical sin as radical egotism, where this egotism is something
we are powerless to escape from, and where every attempt to escape from it is
always already egotistically motivated. If I want to be good, then it is always
already something I want; and the concern with what I want and who I want to
be is always already a self-centred and self-concerned enterprise and thus
deeply entangled in self-centred motivation. We find this very clearly formu-
lated by Løgstrup in one of his early articles from 1936, ‘Enhver moralsk
Tanke er en Bagtanke’ [‘Every Moral Motivation Is an Ulterior Motivation’]:

Christian Ethics is purportedly a so-called ethics of attitude [sindelagsetik, BR].

[ . . . ] But in the name of morality to take an interest in one’s attitude of mind brings
about a self-centredness, a pharisaism, which totally corrupts the attitude.¹⁹

Therefore, Løgstrup can conclude, ‘pharisaism is the transcendental condition

of any ethics of attitude’, and so—if ethics involves being judged by our
attitude, will, and intentions—human beings are powerless to do the good.²⁰

¹⁸ N. O. Jensen ‘Retfærdiggørelse og helliggørelse hos Luther’ [‘Justification and Sanctification

in Luther’], Tidehverv 8 (1936), pp. 127–36; reprinted in Luthers Gudstro [Luther’s Faith in God]
(Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1959), p. 93 (my translation).
¹⁹ ‘Enhver moralsk Tanke er en Bagtanke’, p. 431 (my translation). ‘Sindelagsetik’ is difficult
to translate to English. It is the same word as the German ‘Gesinnungsethik’, which refers to the
attitude of mind and thus the intentions of an agent in a moral situation, and so whether they
have a good (i.e. a morally praiseworthy) will. However, Løgstrup’s objection (along with
Tidehverv) is that the will is never good, because to (will to) take an interest in the moral
praiseworthiness of one’s will or attitude of mind is by definition tantamount to being self-
interested. However, importantly, later on when Løgstrup introduces the sovereign expressions
of life, he provides a way of freeing the will to actually will the good of the other person.
²⁰ ‘Enhver moralsk Tanke er en Bagtanke’, p. 432 (my translation).
xxvi 

Secondly, the infinite qualitative difference and the radical conception of sin
imply that also on an epistemic level we are completely cut off from God. Just
as we cannot do what is good, we are unable to know what is true (i.e. to have
knowledge about the highest truth, knowledge of God and God’s being).
Reason, as Luther (in)famously put it, is the Devil’s whore,²¹ and thus is
entirely unfit for relating to God. Knowledge and reason only concern our
relative world of finite truths and ends, such as calculating your wage increase,
planning how to escape back home from your in-laws in time for Champions
League football, or predicting that three tablespoons of salt in a Yorkshire
pudding would ruin it. Therefore, the human relation to God, that is, to
absolute truths and ends, takes place in a completely different category,
namely in faith. For this reason, revelation became the crucial category in
Tidehverv’s Lutheran theology, because revelation is God’s word and message
to us, to which we can only respond in faith (or lack of faith), as opposed to
everything we ourselves can say to each other, and where we can respond
through our own words and reasoning. The Christian proclamation²² is God’s
Word to us revealed through Christ, and only in our hearing this message,
only in our being addressed by God through his Word, do we ‘meet’ God.
Here, Tidehverv’s roots in the writings of the young Karl Barth are plain to see:
God is the wholly other and thus completely different from everything else.
Therefore, his word sounds not from anything relatable in our finite world, but
it resonates to us perpendicularly or directly from above (senkrecht von oben),
from God’s radical transcendence. God’s word is alien to anything in this world,
because this world is infinitely different from God and thus marked by God’s
absolute absence. Indeed, the absolute nothingness of this world is a central
theme in Olesen Larsen’s theological existentialism—and (as we shall see) a
central theme in Løgstrup’s confrontation with both him and Kierkegaard.
Thirdly, when all human striving for moral improvement through piety is
both impossible (due to the infinite qualitative difference) and condemned
because it is self-centred (the radical conception of sin), the task for us as human
beings is to live our life in finitude faithful to the Earth (‘være jorden tro’),

²¹ WA 18: 164/LW 40: 174.

²² Which in all its vagueness (precisely what is included in ‘the Proclamation’?) became a
standard phrase in both Tidehverv and for Løgstrup, cf. as examples Løgstrup’s ‘Introduction’ in
The Ethical Demand and his lectures on Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and
its Relation to Proclamation. The Danish word for ‘proclamation’ (forkyndelse) also means the
act of preaching, that is, to proclaim the word of God. For a discussion on proclamation in
Løgstrup, see Bennett, Faulkner, and Stern, ‘Indirect Communication, Authority, and
Proclamation as a Normative Power: Løgstrup’s Critique of Kierkegaard’.
  xxvii

which was one of the classical Tidehverv slogans.²³ Put in Lutheran terms, we
must live our lives where we are and as we are, without striving beyond
the earthly realm, but live our life in our calling and station (‘livet i kald og
stand’), here and now. Again, the inspiration from Nietzsche is clear, for
example from his critique in Thus Spoke Zarathustra of the ‘Backworldsmen’
or the ‘Hinterworldly’ (‘die Hinterweltler’), namely those who cast their fancy on
a world beyond this world.²⁴ Another inspiration is Kierkegaard’s final text from
Either/Or: ‘Ultimatum’, the Pastor’s sermon on ‘The Upbuilding That Lies in the
Thought That in Relation to God We Are Always in the Wrong’. The upbuild-
ing element consists precisely in that when we realize that we are never right, but
always fail entirely in the (loving and forgiving) eye of God, we are set free from
our striving and our worry about God’s disapproving eye, and thus set free to
live ‘just as humans’, as Olesen Larsen puts it again and again in his writings.
Therefore, according to Olesen Larsen, Christianity means to love the world:
‘We love the world because it is earthly, nothing but earthly, and human
existence because it is human, nothing but human, and if we are to love
human ideals they must be anything but divine.’²⁵ Humanly speaking, the
world is a joy to live in, but Christianly speaking it is mere nothingness: ‘And
yet we understand that for God, this world is nothing but dust and ashes, and
the human being is a sinner through and through.’²⁶
But if this is the truth about the Christian message and our existence, that
we cannot do the good and cannot improve, why then bother at all about
whether we are doing the right thing or not? If God is dead then everything is
permitted, as is famously said, but does Tidehverv’s theology not in fact lead to
exactly the same conclusion: if God exists (in this way) is everything then
permitted? Luther’s response would come in the shape of his doctrine con-
cerning the uses of the law.²⁷ The Lutheran idea is that the law is God’s law, a

²³ Inspired by Nietzsche: ‘I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not
believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they
know it or not’ (Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, Kritische Studienausgabe, Volume
4 (München: De Gruyter 1999), p. 15/Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Adrian Del Caro
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 6).
²⁴ Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, pp. 35–8/20–2.
²⁵ Kristoffer Olesen Larsen, 1927, ‘Et Stykke Krigspsykose’ [‘A Fragment of War Psychosis’],
Tidehverv, 1 (1927), pp. 129–36; reprinted in Kristoffer Olesen Larsen, At være mennske:
Udvalgte Arbejeder I, edited by Johannes Horstmann and V. Olesen Larsen (Copenhagen: Gad
Forlag, 1967), p. 38 (my translation).
²⁶ Kristoffer Olesen Larsen, 1927, ‘Et Stykke Krigspsykose’ [‘A Fragment of War Psychosis’],
p. 38 (my translation).
²⁷ As we shall see in Part II of Controverting Kierkegaard, Løgstrup makes the claim that in
fact Tidehverv (and Kierkegaard) are unable to respond to the problem of passivity. The problem
is that they do not follow Luther in juxtaposing the two uses of the law, because they and
Kierkegaard end up subordinating the first use to the second use: cf. 44–5/64–5.
xxviii 

natural ethical law (lex naturalis) which we know because it is written in our
hearts and is thus available to us through reason and conscience.²⁸ Thus, we
know what is right and wrong, meaning that we know what we ought to do
even though we are unable to comply due to our selfishness. We are required
to love our neighbour, but our inability to actually love them does not set us
free from all ethical requirements, but rather it places us under the demand
that we should act as if we actually loved them.²⁹ This is why Luther distin-
guishes between two uses of the law:³⁰ The first use of the law (usus civilis),
also called the political use of the law, is when the law is used as a cultural
codification which regulates society through either fear of punishment or the
benefit of rewards so that citizens act according to the law (this involves both
the actual judicial laws of the legal system and social norms where perpetrators
are socially ostracized, while those who live up to the standards are praised).
Here, our actions are central, and the law is thus used to contain sin and to
keep the wickedness at bay, so as to protect the neighbour. However, to act
according to the law does not amount to fulfilling the law, because the real
function of the law is spiritual, which is the second use of the law (usus
theologicus). The spiritual use is focused on our spirit or attitude of mind
(German: Gesinnung, Danish: sindelag), because what the law really demands
is unselfish love for the neighbour. However, this is an impossibility, because
while we may act as if we loved, the law cannot make us love the neighbour,³¹ and
thus the law in its second use (also called its convicting use) confronts us with our
own inadequacy, our sin, and serves as a guide, chastening our self-indulgence
and directing us towards Christ and the Gospel.³² So, we are unable to fulfil the
spirit of the law (second use), but the laws, norms, and regulations of society can
make us perform the actions required by the letter of the law (first use).
Thus, these three aspects of the infinite qualitative difference (namely the
impossibility of both moral improvement and knowledge of God, and the need

²⁸ This is, of course, something Luther bases on Paul, cf. Rom 2:15: ‘They show that what the
law requires is written on their hearts, to which their own conscience also bears witness; and their
conflicting thoughts will accuse or perhaps excuse them’ (New Revised Standard Version).
²⁹ Cf. Løgstrup’s position on ethics in The Ethical Demand, where the demand is a demand to
love the neighbour, but as such also in a radical sense an unfulfillable demand, because the demand
for love precisely shows that love is absent, which is why we ultimately, and in a radical way, fall short
of what is demanded. Here we clearly see the influence from Tidehverv on Løgstrup’s position.
³⁰ Cf. WA 40.I: 479–80/LW 26: 308–9.
³¹ Again, we see how this lies in the background of Løgstrup’s work, cf. The Ethical Demand,
pp. 124–6/Den etiske fordring, pp. 164–7, where the presence of the demand precisely shows us
the absence of love, and where also the demand as a demand cannot bring love about, and we
must therefore act merely as if we loved. Or, as Løgstrup puts it in Controverting Kierkegaard:
‘Morality is the Provision of Substitute Motives for Substitute Actions’ (96/127).
³² Yet again Luther relies on Paul, cf. Gal. 3:24: ‘Therefore the law was our disciplinarian until
Christ came, so that we might be justified by faith’ (New Revised Standard Version).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
„Nu is ’t raadsel opgelost,” roept de heer, die tot geluk van de jongens een
goedmoedig mensch blijkt te zijn en zich bijtijds z’n eigen jongenstijd herinnert.

„Dáár zit de geheimzinnige macht,” lacht hij. „Kom er eens uit bengel, of wil je
liever wachten op een volgend slachtoffer?”

De dame, nog bleek van schrik, is ’t maar half eens met haar echtvriend en kan
zich niet voorstellen dat hij het geval zoo van den komieken kant beschouwt.

„Zulke kwajongens,” zegt ze boos.

„Past u maar op, mijnheer,” roept Ambro overmoedig. „Tusschen alle boomen
in den laan hangt zoo’n draadje.”

En de heer en dame gaan voor alle zekerheid naar de overzijde van de straat,
waar ze in de duisternis vreemde geluiden uit de portieken der huizen hooren
opklinken.

„Als je een beetje bang van aard bent, zou je gauw aan spoken gaan gelooven
en de kluts kwijt raken,” zei de heer lachend.

Dan vervolgt het tweetal zijn weg.

„Ik ga d’r uit,” roept Ambro. „Die man nam ’t zoo koeltjes op, de aardigheid is er
nu vanaf. Ze moeten razen en tieren, dan is ’t echt.”

En rrrtts! daar staat hij weer op den beganen grond. [46]

Wim volgt zijn voorbeeld en klautert ook naar beneden. De jongens zijn weer
bij elkaar.

„Wat gaan we nu doen?” vroeg Paul.

„Nu gaan we jou naar bed brengen en dan stoppen we je fijn onder de wol
enne … dan krijg je een fopspeentje in je mondje,” plaagde Ambro.

Paul durfde Ambro niet aan, anders had hij ’m wel op z’n gezicht geslagen,
maar hij kende de kracht van Ambro’s knuisten.
[Inhoud]
 NETTE MANIEREN … EN ONNETTE JONGENS.

’t Is hartje winter; de tijd van schaatsenrijden, op de prik zitten en

sneeuwballen gooien. Zalige, heerlijke wintertijd!

Voor eenigen der jongens is echter een pretje begonnen, dat ze minder
aangenaam stemt, ze vinden het een zuren appel, waar je maar doorheen
moet bijten.

De ouders van Ambro en Karel hebben n.l. besloten, teneinde hun jongens
wat nettere manieren te laten leeren, ze op dansles te doen bij juffrouw
Hesterman.

Deze juffrouw nu, was een toonbeeld van netheid, wat ook geen wonder
was, want ’t goede mensch deed immers zaken in „nette manieren”.

Ik vrees, dat de jongens van haar artikel niets willen weten.

We zullen zien!

De jongens sputterden vreeselijk tegen het plan van hun ouders en Ambro
beweerde, dat ie, als [47]’t er op aankwam, nog liever naar school ging.

En zoo zien we dan op een kouden winteravond, waarop de sneeuw ’n paar

voet hoog ligt, Karel, met zijn dansschoenen in een wit-flanellen zakje
gepakt, onder den arm, zich door de donkere straten naar de dansles
begeven.

Achter hem loopt een klein heertje, dat plotseling naast hem komt loopen en
met een eenigszins vreemde stem vraagt of hij zich hier in de Tuinderstraat
bevindt.

„Neen, Mijnheer,” zegt Karel, die ’t gezicht van ’t heertje in ’t donker niet
goed kan onderscheiden.

„Dan moet U eerst rechtuit en dan bij den hoek rechts afslaan.”
„Dank u wel,” zegt het heertje op denzelfden krakenden toon en blijft naast
hem voortloopen.

„’t Is koud vanavond,” zegt hij dan en al pratend loopen ze samen voort in de
richting van de dansles.

Bij een lantaarn gekomen, kijkt Karel eens even naar het gezicht van zijn
begeleider, geeft dan een schreeuw van verbazing en barst in een
schaterlach uit, als hij in het heertje Ambro herkent.

„Wel verdraaid!” giert Karel, „Ambro in een lange, met een kaasbol op z’n
hersens!”

„Hoe is ie?” vraagt Ambro, terwijl hij zich trotsch als een pauw opricht en
zich van alle kanten door Karel laat bewonderen. Ambro ziet er potsierlijk uit
en ’t is hem aan te zien, dat broek noch hoedje hem toebehooren. [48]

De broek is hem een eind te groot, zoodat de stof bij de pijpen als een
harmonika op z’n schoenen ineen valt; daarentegen is het hoedje hem veel
te klein en balanceert heel mal op z’n ronden kaaskop.

Maar de twee jongens vinden ’t prachtig en zien die kleine gebreken wel
over ’t hoofd.

Als Karel eindelijk uitgekeken is vraagt hij: „Hoe kom je er aan?”

„Van me neef geleend,” zegt Ambro blij. „Thuis weten ze er niets van, ik ben
me stiekum even bij hem gaan verkleeden en na de dansles ga ik het goed
weer verwisselen.”

„’n Reuze-bak,” zegt Karel en samen verkneuteren ze zich in de pret.

Onder al dit praten en lachen zijn ze eindelijk genaderd aan ’t huis van
juffrouw Hesterman.

Ze schellen vrij onzacht aan en worden open gedaan door een kittig
dienstmeisje, met tullen muts met lange banden.
Direct trekt Ambro aan de uitdagende lange slierten en roept:
„Tingelingeling, wie is daar?”

Het meisje is woedend en zegt smalend: „Dat draagt een lange broek!!”

Ambro schaamt zich wel een beetje over het feit dat zijn gedrag niet in
overeenstemming is met de lengte van z’n broekspijpen en loopt haastig
door.

Het meisje wijst ze daarop de kleedkamer en verdwijnt.

„Wij zijn de eersten,” zegt Karel. [49]

Een tweede meisje verschijnt en wijst hun de plaats waar hun schoenen
bewaard moeten worden.

De jongens ontdoen zich van hun schoenen.

Dan komen vier nieuwe gezichten binnen, alle jongens van ongeveer
denzelfden leeftijd als Ambro en Karel.

„Goeden avond, heeren,” zegt Ambro. „Moeten jullie ook springen leeren?”
De jongens, weinig toeschietelijk, brommen iets terug, waarop Karel
minachtend zegt:

„Kunnen jullie niet antwoorden? Wat een kevers.”

Op hetzelfde oogenblik vliegt er een laars naar hem toe, die een groote
moddervlek nalaat op de muurvlakte van z’n hoogen witten boord.

„Dàt laat je je niet doen,” zegt Ambro woedend. „Geef pit, Boekie, knok ’m
op z’n kanes!”

Rang, pats!

Eenige welgeraakte meppen volgen en dan werpt Karel zich op den langen
roodharigen slungel die z’n boord, z’n glorie zoo gemeen bedierf. [50]

„Ik zàl je! rooje vuurtoren!” schreeuwt Karel woedend.

De vechtersbazen maken een helsch kabaal.

Ambro meent de zaak te kunnen redden door het electrisch licht uit te
draaien. Maar in ’t donker wordt de strijd voortgezet en timmert Karel met
een spiksplinternieuwe dansschoen op z’n beleediger los.

Plotseling gaat de deur open en hoort men angstige vrouwenstemmen

vragen wat er toch gebeurt en waarom het licht uit is.

Dan wordt het licht opgedraaid en staat juffrouw Hesterman midden in de

kamer.

Het is een lange dame, met een scherp vogelgezicht. Ze is heel deftig
gekleed, in een ruischende zijden japon, die haar eenigszins wesp-achtige
gestalte nauw omsluit.

„Wat is dat hier voor een kabaal,” zegt ze boos.

„Ze maken kennis met mekaar, juffrouw,” lacht Ambro.

„Schandelijk, schandelijk,” zegt de juffrouw verontwaardigd.

„’t Wordt tijd dat jullie nette manieren leert, men zou bijna zeggen, dat jullie
uit een achterbuurtje kwaamt.”

„Kalm maar, juffrouw,” sust Ambro.

„’t Is al gedaan.”

De beide ruziemakers laten elkaar los en zien er, nu fel beschenen door ’t
electrisch licht, zeer onbetamelijk en gehavend uit. [51]

„De rooie vuurtoren” vertoont een blauw oog, zoodat met de kleur van zijn
haar zijn gelaat wel een veelkleurig schilderspalet gelijkt.

De met zooveel zorg gefabriceerde scheiding in Karel’s haardos is

verdwenen en z’n bol toont veel overeenkomst met een stoffer.

De mooie boord is in zwijm gevallen en het keurige, lichte dasje bengelt als
een touwtje op zijn rug.

„Jullie ziet er fraai uit,” zegt de juffrouw boos. „Als er ooit weer zoo’n
schandaal in mijn huis mocht plaats hebben, dan zet ik de belhamels die het
veroorzaken voor goed het huis uit.”

„Je hoort ’t,” zegt Ambro met een veelbeteekenend, kwasi-ernstig gezicht.

De vechtersbazen doen angstige pogingen om hun toilet weer eenigszins in

orde te brengen.

„Nu voortmaken, jongeheertjes, de les gaat beginnen,” zegt de juffrouw en

verlaat de kamer.

„Tòch lag je onder,” zegt Karel sarrend tegen den langen slungel.

„Nou niet weer beginnen,” komt Ambro tusschenbeide.

Dan gaan ze allen te zamen, achter de juffrouw aan naar de danszaal.

Ambro, die geen rekening houdt met den gladden parket-vloer der danszaal,
glijdt uit en komt vrij onzacht op z’n zitvlak terecht.
„Bèns!” gilt hij door de zaal. „’t Lijkt waarachies wel ijs.”

„Ik heb spijkers onder m’n schoenen,” zegt Karel heel kalm. „Ik kan niet
vallen.” [52]

Juffrouw Hesterman, die dit hoort, komt hard aangehold, in grooten angst
voor haar mooien vloer.

Doch dan ziet ze dat de bengel dansschoenen aan heeft, en boos over z’n
plagerij, dreigt ze hem met een spitsen vinger.

Aan den wand der zaal staan aan één kant lange banken met fluweelen
zittingen, aan den anderen kant vele stoeltjes op een rij.

Op de banken zitten ongeveer veertien meisjes, ook van den leeftijd der
jongens, in aardige, witte jurkjes gekleed, breede witte linten in het haar,
kousen en schoentjes in dezelfde kleur.

„Net een rij opgeprikte kapellen,” smaalt Ambro.

De jongens moeten op de stoelen plaats nemen.

Eensklaps roept Karel hardop: „Kijk es, Ambro, de zittingen van die stoelen
kan je omkeeren.”

Met draait hij de houten zitting om en komt een mooie, rood-satijnen zitting
boven.

„Veel zachter,” zegt Karel en wil er op gaan zitten.

Maar de juffrouw, die het alweer zag, komt naar hem toe en zegt nijdig:

„Wil je dit wel eens laten! Die zittingen mogen jullie niet gebruiken, die
worden alleen gebruikt als er feestjes zijn.

„En nu wil ik verder geen last van jullie hebben, denk erom.”

Juist als de juffrouw de les wil beginnen, wordt er op de deur geklopt en op

haar „binnen” betreden twee jongens de zaal.
Ze zijn van een heel ander slag dan de andere jongens en zullen zeker ’t
hart van de juffrouw [53]stelen, want ’t zijn toonbeelden van netheid.

„’t Is vast een tweeling,” zegt Ambro. „Ze lijken precies op elkaar.”

En dan tot de jongens: „Zeg, jij moet een rood strikje aandoen, en jij een
blauw, anders kunnen we jullie niet uit elkaar houden.”

Het keurig-nette tweetal zegt boe noch ba, ze kijken alleen met verachtelijk
opgetrokken neusjes naar den kleinen man in den langen pantalon die zoo
staat op te scheppen.

BERG en DAL DAL en BERG

Dit zwijgen prikkelt Ambro.

„Wacht even,” zegt hij. „Jullie zijn tòch te onderscheiden, jij hebt een puist op
je neus en jij een pitje in je kin! Jongens, gezicht op Berg en Dal!!” en
schaterend wendt Ambro zich af van de twee parkietjes. [54]

Juffrouw Hesterman gaat midden in de zaal staan, klopt met haar spitse
vingertoppen tegen elkaar en commandeert:

„Stilte, meisjes en jongens.”

„’t Spul gaat beginnen,” roept Karel.

De juffrouw stampvoet van woede: „Stilte heb ik gezegd! Heb je ’t verstaan?”

En dan gaat ze kalm verder:

„Nu komen de jongenheertjes op een rij voor me staan. Luister nu goed naar
wat ik je zeg en doe precies na wat ik je voor doe.”

Ambro trekt tot groot vermaak van de jongens net zoo’n pruimenmondje als
de juffrouw en zet z’n lichaam precies in de houding van de gecorsetteerde
dame.

„Ik zal beginnen jullie de buiging te leeren.”

Tegelijkertijd neemt ze, om goed te laten zien hoe ze de voeten moeten

zetten, met twee nuffige vingers aan weerskanten een tip van haar toch al
niet langen rok op, plaatst haar hooggehakte schoentjes naast elkaar en
verzoekt ze hetzelfde te doen. [55]

Ambro, ondeugend als hij steeds is, trekt ook vol gratie z’n beide
broekspijpen een eind omhoog.

Nijdig zegt de juffrouw: „Dàt hoeft niet, mijnheertje Verbrugge, en u moet me

nu niet meer lastig vallen, want ik wensch u niet nogmaals te verbieden, u
staat hier niet als clown.”

„Zij wel,” fluistert Ambro in Karel’s oor.

De heele rij jongens staat nu volmaakt naar den zin van juffrouw Hesterman.
 „Heel goed is ’t zoo,” zegt ze
voldaan.

„Wanneer we nu het lichaam

doorbuigen, blijven de armen
ongedwongen omlaag
hangen, zoo ook de handen.
Kijk, flauw gebogen.”

Bij de heeren-buiging blijkt het

corset van de juffrouw haar
parten te spelen en ze blijft
halverwege steken.

De heele rij buigt nu. Maar ’t

lijkt meer op jongens die
haasje-over gaan springen,
uitgezonderd natuurlijk Berg
en Dal, die voor buigen in de
wieg zijn gelegd.

„Héél goed, jongenheertjes

Otto en Eugène,” zegt ze
waardeerend. „Jullie hebt me
volmaakt begrepen.”

„Ik krijg pijn in m’n rug,” zegt

Ambro, die nog altijd gebukt
staat.

Nu worden ze een voor een

onder handen genomen en na
korten tijd buigen ze allen als
volleerde saletjonkers.

„Nu gaan de jongenheertjes weer zitten en komen een voor een ’n buiging
voor mij maken. En ik zeg jullie eens en voor altijd, dat ’t mijn wensch is, dat
jullie bij komen en gaan steeds op die [56]manier je compliment voor me
komt maken.”

„Wat een flauwe kul,” fluistert Karel met een scheefgetrokken mond Ambro
in.

Na deze proeve van wellevendheid komen de meisjes aan de beurt.

Ze zijn veel gemakkelijker te regeeren dan de jongens … tenminste … op de

dansles.

Op één wenk van de juffrouw kwamen alle witte kappelletjes van de bank
gevlogen.

„Groot ballet bij Carré,” spot Ambro.

De jongens moeten nu wachten tot de veel moeilijker dames-buiging is

geleerd. En als dat afgeloopen is, is ook de eerste dansles voorbij.

„De volgende week verwacht ik jullie op hetzelfde uur, en ik hoop, dat de

verschillende jongenheertjes zich dan wat fatsoenlijker zullen gedragen, de
eerste indruk was verre van beschaafd. Jullie kunt gaan.”

„Berg en Dal” stappen te zamen naar de juffrouw en maken voorbeeldig de

pas-geleerde buiging.

Vijf andere jongens doen het hen zeer onbeholpen na.

Ambro is al bij de deur, als hij door de juffrouw teruggeroepen wordt. Ze wijst
hem erop, dat hij haar nog niet gegroet heeft.

Hij kijkt even om het hoekje van de deur en terwijl hij haar amicaal toewuift,
roept hij: „Dag juffrouw, houdt u maar haaks.” En weg is de bengel.

Het schoenen-verwisselen geschiedt deze keer zonder hindernissen.

Kareltje en de Vuurtoren [57]hebben blijkbaar vrede gesloten, want ze zitten
broederlijk naast elkaar te babbelen.
„Berg en Dal” zijn nog niet in de kleedkamer verschenen, zij hebben
toestemming van de juffrouw gekregen zich te verkleeden in een kamertje
aan den anderen kant der danszaal.

Eindelijk zijn de meesten klaar en ze moeten zich door een haag van
dienstboden werken die allen in den corridor staan om hun respectievelijke
jongejuffrouwen af te halen.

Buiten ligt als een wit tapijt, de verschgevallen sneeuw.

„Dat belooft wat,” zegt Ambro, vergetend dat hij een hard hoedje op heeft.

„Zeg dàt wel,” antwoordt Karel en tegelijkertijd vliegt Ambro’s kaashoed door
een welgemikten bal van Karel door de lucht.

„Had ik nou dat lamme ding maar niet op,” zucht Ambro.

„Ik breng ’m vast niet heel thuis en dan zal je me neefie hooren.”

„Stil, jong, de deur gaat open,” zegt Karel zacht.

Ingepakt als twee bakerkinderen verschijnen Berg en Dal op de stoep.

„Pats! Midden in hun facie,” roept Ambro.

De twee slachtoffers loopen in vollen draf langs de huizen der stille straat
voort.

Nadat Ambro en Karel al wat uit de deur kwam bekogeld hadden, namen ze
afscheid van elkaar en ging elk zijns weegs.

Ambro versnelt zijn pas, want hij bedenkt met [58]schrik, dat hij z’n huiswerk
nog moet maken en ook nog het geleende goed terug moet brengen.

Daar passeert hij de brug bij de Westersingel. Een plotselinge rukwind … en

z’n hoed ligt in ’t water.

„Die is naar de maan,” mompelt hij in zichzelf.

Beteuterd kijkt hij ’t hoedje na, dat vol loopt en zinkt.

„Niets aan te doen,” bedenkt hij. „Daar gaat voor een paar maanden m’n
weekgeld aan,” en bedroefd vervolgt hij zijn weg, nog uitgelachen door een
paar straatbengels die hem naroepen:

„Hij komt weer boven!”

Zoo eindigde Ambro’s eerste dansles.

[Inhoud]
 WIE EEN KUIL GRAAFT VOOR EEN ANDER …

De jongens zaten allen bij elkaar in het hol. Het was winter en het hol was niet
zoo dicht begroeid als anders, doch door al het gewir-war van takken waren
ze toch moeilijk te ontdekken.

„Wat zijn we hier in langen tijd niet geweest,” zei Ambro.

„Als ze ons maar niet door de takken heen zien,” zei Puckie Voortman, die na
een lange ongesteldheid zich weer bij de roovers had aangesloten.

„Wat is de grond hier vochtig,” vond Piet Kaan.

„Nou ja, ’t is geen zomer,” zei Ambro.

„Waarom was jij vanmorgen niet op school?” vroeg Wim aan Ambro. [59]

„Ik heb zitten teekenen langs den Overschieschen Weg. Den molen heb ik
gemaakt.”

„’t Zal wat moois zijn,” spotte Wim.

„Nou, hier heb ik ’m,” zei Ambro.

De jongens verdrongen zich om Ambro, teneinde de teekening goed te

kunnen zien.

„Verduiveld, dat ’s aardig,” zei Puckie bewonderend.

De andere jongens waren ook vol lof en Piet Kaan voorspelde, dat Ambro nog
eens een beroemd schilder zou worden.

Ambro lachte. „Kan je denken!” zei hij.

„Ik word koekebakker, kan je fijn taartjes voor noppes eten.”

„Meen je het heusch?” vroeg Paul ongeloovig.

„Neen hoor,” zei Ambro en dan liet hij er ernstig op volgen:

„Ik zou ’t liefst clown in een circus worden.”

„Valt geen spat mee te verdienen,” meende Chris.

„Met het schilderen zeker wel,” spotte Ambro.

„En een clown gaat twintig jaar voor z’n tijd dood.”

„Dat lieg je! August de Domme werd zeventig.”

„Dat zegt niks,” hield Chris vol. „Als ie kruidenier was geweest, zou ie de
honderd gehaald hebben.”

„Clown of detective zou ik willen worden,” zei Ambro peinzend.

„Geen klein verschil,” meent Karel. „Ik wil officier worden.”

„Ajakkes!” zegt Paultje. „Dat doe je nou ook om het mooie pakje.” [60]

En dan laat hij er waanwijs op volgen:

„Mijn oom is ook officier en die zegt, dat ie er al spijt van had, een jaar nadat
hij ’t geworden was. Hij is in Indië geweest, zie je, en daar maken ze een boel
mee.”

„Je lijkt wel een oud mannetje, Paul,” lachte Karel. „Ik vind ’t toch wàt een fijn
leven. Vol avonturen is het en iederen dag wat anders.”

„Dat zeg je nu, als jongen, maar oom zegt, dat je daar naderhand heel anders
over denkt, vooral, als je een oorlog hebt meegemaakt.”

„Ik heb al lang genoeg van jullie gezwam,” viel Ambro de twee praters wat ruw
in de rede.

„Ik ga bootje varen bij de ronde bank.”

Dat vonden alle jongens best, ze hadden ’t meer gedaan en ’t gaf altijd
reuzen-pret. Ze gingen een zeil-wedstrijd houden. Daartoe maakte ieder z’n
eigen bootje.
De romp van het schip bestond uit een stuk boomschors, het zeil met den
mast werd voorgesteld door een eendenveertje.

„Effe kijke of er niemand aankomt,” en ze gluurden voorzichtig door de takken.

„Ja warempel, daar heb je Willem van de beeren.”

Willem reed voorbij met een wagen vol bloederig vleesch waarmee hij z’n
pleegkinderen ging voeren.

„Kom maar, jongens,” zei Ambro. „Het terrein is nu veilig.”

En achter elkaar slopen de jongens het boschje uit.

De groote bank was dichtbij en stond vlak bij den grooten vijver. [61]

„De wind is gunstig,” zei Ambro, die z’n nat gemaakte vinger omhoog stak. Nu
haalden ze hun zakmessen te voorschijn en begonnen kerven te maken in de
mooie, dikke platanen. Heele stukken schors haalden zij er op die manier af.

In het gras vonden ze bij hoopjes de eendenveertjes liggen. Het voornaamste

was nu, om de juiste grootte te vinden van schors en veertjes, alsook de
plaats waar het veertje op het schip bevestigd moest worden.

„Zijn jullie klaar?” vroeg Ambro.

Allen waren gereed en zes bootjes werden gelijktijdig te water gelaten en

kregen nog een laatste duwtje van den maker. Dan was ’t een feest voor de
jongens om te kijken wat er ging gebeuren met hun vaartuigjes.

„Wie zou ’t eerst aan den overkant zijn?”

„Ik zie ’t al,” zei Ambro. „Die van Karel gaat ’t hardst. Net als de vorige keer.
Hij is de beste bootenmaker van ons allen.”

’t Scheepje van Paul draaide als razend in ’t rond.

„Jij hebt je mast verkeerd gezet.”

De wind was de bootjes inderdaad gunstig. Langzaam dobberden ze al verder

en verder van den kant en met kleine rukjes staken ze ’t breede water over.
Vol spanning keken de jongens naar de liliput-vloot.

„Ik ben jullie al drie meter voor,” riep Karel, die trotsch was op z’n schuitje.

„De mijne doet niets dan draaien,” klaagde Paul. [62]

„Jij kan beter een malle-molen maken dan een schip,” plaagde Chris hem.

Midden op den vijver aangekomen, kreeg de vloot het hard te verduren en

twee bootjes werden door een rukwind omver geworpen en vergingen met
man en muis.

Een ander bootje werd aangevallen door een eendje, dat nog nooit in z’n
leven zoo’n vreemdsoortig ding in zijn gebied zag ronddrijven.

De mast werd weggepikt en ’t afgetuigde schip nu door den stroom

meegevoerd.

„Ik ben er bijna,” riep Karel en liep naar den overkant van den vijver.

Daar aangekomen haalde hij zegevierend zijn scheepje naar binnen.

„Lang leve „de Karel Boekers”,” riepen de jongens. „De snelste zeiler van het
land, hiep hôj!”

Plotseling roept Karel: „Jongens, daar komt de lange Loese, hij is vast weer
op vangst uit.”

In vollen draf rende hij terug naar zijn makkers aan den overkant, die op ’t
hooren van dien naam hun spel in den steek lieten en gingen beraadslagen
wat ze zouden doen, nu hun aardsvijand, de Lange Loese, in aantocht was.

Die „Lange Loese” was veel grooter en sterker dan een van hen allen en zijn
grootste amusement bestond in plagen van kleinere jongens, ze gevangen te
nemen en als slaven uit den ouden tijd te behandelen.

Zijn koninklijk verblijf (want hij voelde zich heelemaal vorst) was gelegen in het
beneden rotshol, [63]dat voor jong en oud toegankelijk was en waaraan de
sombere legende verbonden was, dat daar eens een oude water-Chinees den
hongerdood gestorven was.
„Hij heeft er nog drie bij zich,” riep Ambro, die achter een boom het naderend
onheil bespiedde.

„We kunnen ze met ons zessen toch niet aan,” zei Paul.

„Hij zit alweer in de piepzak,” plaagde Karel.

„Net doen of we ze niet zien, dan zullen ze ons misschien niets doen,” stelde
Paul voor.

„Ik zal mijn leven duur verkoopen,” zei Ambro op gezwollen toon. „Niet dan
over mijn lijk komen ze ’t rotshol binnen.”

Van beenen maken, was geen kwestie, want de „stelten” van de lange Loese
deden de jongens denken aan de zevenmijlslaarzen van den reus.

Enkele kleinere jongens hadden den wedloop wel eens gewaagd, maar in
minder dan geen tijd hadden zij den ijzeren greep in hun nekvel gevoeld, om
daarna als gevangen slaaf meegevoerd te worden naar lange Loese’s paleis.

„Had ik nou me boksbeugel maar bij me,” zuchtte Ambro. „Maar die heeft
vader me gisteren afgepakt. Daar is-t-ie, jongens, gewoon doorloopen, niet
naar ’m kijken.”

De lange Loese was zich volkomen bewust van den grooten indruk die hij op
de kleinere jongens maakte.

Nu kreeg hij ze in de gaten, en een kwaadaardige grijns kwam om z’n

wreeden mond. [64]

„Bereidt u voor op den dood,” schreeuwde hij den jongens toe. „Uw laatste uur
heeft geslagen.”

Kleine Paul verstopte zich achter Ambro, die, nu er niets meer te redden viel,
besloot zich dapper te verdedigen.

„Van jou ben ik niet bang, lange lijs,” riep hij overmoedig.

Op hetzelfde oogenblik werd hij bij den kraag gepakt, Paul incluis, terwijl de
drie helpers van lange Loese de andere jongens overmeesterden.