Euroscepticism and the Future of

European Integration De Vries

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Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration
Euroscepticism and the
Future of European
Integration

Catherine E. De Vries

1
3
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For Hector,
who made me see the European project through different eyes
Preface

This book provides a new chapter in a classic conversation. It examines the

role of public opinion in the European integration process. Almost half a
century ago, the European Union started to commission, fund, and undertake
one of most intense and long running programmes of cross-national survey
research anywhere in the world through the Eurobarometer.1 Since then
academics, policy makers, and pundits have started to chart the policy prefer-
ences of European publics. Although the locus of attention has shifted
recently from understanding support to scepticism, the core question at the
heart of societal and scholarly debates has largely remained the same: what
explains variation in attitudes towards European integration? This book sug-
gests that the widespread fascination with explanation has partly been at the
expense of our understanding of the exact nature of public opinion and the
role it plays in the European integration process. By redirecting our focus, this
book provides a much-needed account of the conceptualization, causes, and
consequences of public opinion in the European Union.
The idea for this book was the result of two dinner conversations. The first
took place in September 2014. At that time, the Eurozone crisis had taken its
grip on the European continent, and my husband and I had many conversa-
tions about the effects of the crisis and the reforms needed to safeguard the
future of the European project. In one of these, I mentioned the ‘stark rise in
unemployment’ that my home country the Netherlands had experienced
since 2012 and how it may have contributed to the electoral gains of Euro-
sceptic parties. My husband, a Spanish political economist, was clearly
annoyed by my choice of words. He suggested that I might think about the
Dutch experience in a broader perspective, and pointed towards the dire
situation in Spain. He tried to make me understand what ‘real unemployment
and deep structural problems in the labour market’ look like. This exchange of
perspectives over the dinner table made me realize that my views about the

1
The Eurobarometer has conducted biannual surveys in all the EU member states (as well as
some candidate countries) since 1973. While its purpose is to chart the policy preferences of
European publics and provide input for EU policy making, the Eurobarometer surveys have
provided an invaluable resource for academic research in Europe. For more information see
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.
Preface

European project, the single currency, and the possibility for reform were
tainted by ‘my’ national perspective.
The second conversation took place at the annual meeting of the European
Political Science Association in Vienna in June 2015. On the last evening of
the conference, I had dinner with colleagues. One of these was my friend and
co-author, Elias Dinas, who is Greek. During dinner, Elias was eagerly trying to
get ahold of his mother in Greece. Earlier that day the Greek government had
restricted the amounts of money people were allowed to withdraw from their
bank accounts. His mother urgently needed cash for groceries and was not
able to get hold of her money. Our dinner conversation about the situation in
Greece and the role the European Union played in it, against the backdrop of
people going about their normal lives on a Saturday night in Vienna, made
me realize again that the way each of us sees the European project and
evaluates it is deeply influenced by ‘our’ national viewpoints. These two
dinner conversations and many other exchanges since then led me to the
insight that underpins this book and the theory of European public opinion it
presents: people’s evaluations of and experiences with the European project are
fundamentally framed by the national circumstances in which they find themselves.
Although the idea that national conditions matter for public opinion about
European integration has been addressed in the literature before, most notably
in the important contributions of Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and Robert
Rohrschneider (2002), we currently lack an understanding of the exact way in
which they do and how they relate to behaviour in elections and referendums.
This book presents a benchmark theory of public opinion towards European
integration. It provides both a comprehensive country and individual level
mechanism of how national and European evaluations are linked and interact
to produce certain kinds of behavioural consequences. The contribution of this
book is not only to provide an insight into how public opinion, and especially
Euroscepticism, is structured, how it comes about, how it changed in the midst
of the Eurozone crisis, and how it is linked to national conditions, but also
what possible consequences it has for the future of the European project.
The writing of this book has been an extremely rewarding experience that
would not have been possible without the help of others. Some people advised
me over a cup of coffee, while others attended various talks or workshops
where ideas were presented, and others again took valuable time out of their
busy schedules to read entire drafts of the manuscript. A very special thank
you goes to the Bertelsmann Foundation and in particular Isabell Hoffmann.
A large part of the data collection would not have been possible without the
generous support of the Bertelsmann Foundation. I am grateful for their
continued dedication to understanding the contours of public opinion in
Europe. Especially my close cooperation with Isabell has been crucially
important for my thinking. I wish to thank her for all her advice and her

viii
 Preface

ways of challenging me to always think about the bigger picture and the
political ramifications of my findings.
Second, I would like to express my gratitude to several wonderful colleagues
who have helped sharpen my thinking. There are many, but I especially wish
to thank Elias Dinas, David Doyle, Aina Gallego, Tim Haughton, Armèn
Hakhverdian, Stephanie Hofmann, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Spyros Kosmidis,
Gary Marks, Robert Rohrschneider, Christina Schneider, Marco Steenbergen,
and Mariken Van der Velden for their extremely helpful comments on various
ideas and drafts. A special thank you also goes to Kalypso Nicolaïdis and the
staff at the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oxford for
organizing a book workshop in February 2017. At this workshop some of my
former Oxford colleagues and students took the time to engage with my ideas.
I especially want to thank Kalypso and Alexander Kuo for their extremely
insightful and constructive comments and thorough reading of the book. In
addition, I wish to acknowledge two very bright students in International
Relations at Oxford, Kira Huju and Christine Gallagher, who provided very
helpful comments. I also wish to thank Dominic Byatt, my editor at Oxford
University Press, for his continued support. His advice on how to write a book
about a target that is continuously changing was extremely valuable.
Finally, I wish to thank four people in particular who stood by me in the
process of writing this book. The first is my longstanding friend and co-author
Sara Hobolt. Your clarity of thought and dedication to understanding the deep
problems the European Union faces at the present time amazes me every time
we meet. This book has benefited from all our exchanges and your thoughtful
insights. Our academic and personal friendship means so very much to me.
The second is my ‘Doktor-Mutter’ and co-author Liesbet Hooghe. Without
your valuable advice, critique, and support this manuscript would never have
been published. You are an inspiration to me to this day. I also wish to
wholeheartedly thank my husband and co-author, Héctor Solaz. I am eternally
grateful for all the long walks and talks during which you supported me when
I felt stuck, and clarified the core argument I wanted to make to myself. Thank
you for every minute. Without your love and support this book would have
never seen the light of day. Finally, I want to thank my little daughter Mila.
You move so gracefully between three European cultures and languages. Your
life truly represents what European connectedness is made of. I hope for you
and for your future life companions that Europe finds a way to champion its
accomplishments and cherish its differences as strengths rather than as
weaknesses.
Braiswick
May 2017

ix
Contents

List of Figures xv
List of Tables xix

Part I. Public Opinion and European Integration

Introduction: Losing Hearts and Minds? Taking Stock
of EU Public Opinion 3
0.1 Key Questions 4
0.2 What Lies Ahead 7

1. What Is the Matter with Europe? The Puzzles of

Euroscepticism 13
1.1 The Puzzling Rise of Euroscepticism 14
1.2 Benchmarks as a Crucial Piece of the Puzzle 23
1.3 Relationship to Existing Approaches 26

Part II. The Nature of Support and Scepticism

2. In or Out? A Benchmark Theory of Support and
Scepticism 33
2.1 The Nature of Support and Scepticism 35
2.2 A Benchmark Theory of Support and Scepticism 36
2.3 The Importance of Regime and Policy Evaluations 42
2.4 Measuring People’s Regime and Policy Evaluations 45
2.5 Summary 55

3. Kicking Up a Fuss? From Permissive to Responsive

Support and Scepticism 56
3.1 Public Responsiveness to Real-World Conditions 59
3.2 A Survey Experiment on Public Responsiveness 66
3.3 The Role of Political Sophistication 70
3.4 Summary 72
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/11/2017, SPi

Contents

Part III. A Typology of Support and Scepticism

4. A Divided Public? Types of Support and Scepticism 77
4.1 Four Types of Support and Scepticism 78
4.2 Country Level Variation 83
4.3 Individual Level Variation 93
4.4 The Importance of Proximate Responsibility Attribution 95
4.5 Summary 101

5. Common People? Who Are Supporters and

Sceptics and What Do They Want? 103
5.1 The Demographic Profile of Supporters and Sceptics 105
5.2 The Issue Priorities of Supporters and Sceptics 116
5.3 The Issue Positions of Supporters and Sceptics 121
5.4 Summary and Implications 126

Part IV. The Consequences of Support and Scepticism

6. Going Hard or Soft? Party Choice among Supporters
and Sceptics 129
6.1 The Importance of Supply and Demand 131
6.2 Support for Eurosceptic Parties 139
6.3 Do Issue Positions Matter? 146
6.4 Summary and Implications 150

7. Brexit and Beyond: Leave and Remain Preferences

among Supporters and Sceptics 153
7.1 The Brexit Vote 156
7.2 Remain and Leave Support in the EU 161
7.3 The Importance of Issue Priorities and Positions 163
7.4 Remain and Leave Support Post-Brexit 171
7.5 Summary and Implications 176

Part V. Public Opinion and The Future of European Integration

8. Change or Die? EU Reform Preferences among Supporters
and Sceptics 183
8.1 Measuring the Reform Preferences of Supporters
and Sceptics 186
8.2 Support for EU Reform Proposals 189
8.3 Eurozone Reform Preferences 196
8.4 Summary and Implications 202

xii
 Contents

9. Conclusion: A Divided Public, a Divided Union:

Where Do We Go from Here? 204
9.1 The Main Contributions of the Book 205
9.2 A Divided Public: So What? 209
9.3 Can the Grand Theories of European Integration
Provide Insights? 211
9.4 Can Supranational Reform Solutions Help? 214
9.5 Flexible Integration as a Way Forward 217

Appendix 223
Bibliography 227
Index 243

xiii
List of Figures

0.1. A typology of support and scepticism 9

1.1. Hard Eurosceptic party support in the 2014 European Parliamentary
elections 15
1.2. A comparison of Sunderland and Bournemouth 18
1.3. The relationship between feelings of exclusive national identity
and hard Eurosceptic party support in the 2014 European
Parliamentary elections 20
1.4. Trends in feelings of exclusive national identity and extreme right
vote shares in the Netherlands 22
1.5. Leave and Eurosceptic party support in Great Britain and Spain 24
1.6. Approval of policies and regime at the EU Level in Great Britain
and Spain 25
1.7. Approval of policies and regime at the national and EU level in
Great Britain and Spain 26
2.1. Defining EU support 38
2.2. Defining EU scepticism 39
2.3. EU regime and policy differential across time 50
2.4. EU regime and policy differential across time and space 51
2.5. EU regime and policy differential by unemployment 52
2.6. EU regime and policy differential by quality of government 52
2.7. Changes in EU regime and policy differentials between 2004 and
2014 across space 53
2.8. Changes in national and European regime evaluations between
2004 and 2014 across space 54
2.9. Changes in national and European policy evaluations between
2004 and 2014 across space 55
4.1. Four types of support and scepticism 78
4.2. Plotting countries in an EU differential space in 2014 81
4.3. Types of support and scepticism in 2014 82
4.4. Types of support and scepticism across countries in 2014 83
List of Figures

4.5. Distribution of types by economic conditions in 2014 85

4.6. Distribution of types by quality of government in 2014 87
4.7. Change in types 2008–2014 89
4.8. Change in types 2008–2014 across countries 90
4.9. Change in types by national conditions 2008–2014 91
4.10. Types in 2008 and 2014 92
4.11. The effect of economic and political system satisfaction on
support and scepticism 94
4.12. Expectations of democracy by national conditions 98
4.13. Responsibility judgements by national conditions 99
5.1. Unemployment among the four types 106
5.2. Financial worry among the four types 107
5.3. Social positioning among the four types 108
5.4. Skill levels among the four types 109
5.5. Gender gap among the four types 110
5.6. Age gap among the four types 111
5.7. Education level among the four types 112
5.8. Policy responsibility among the four types 115
5.9. Issue priorities among the four types 116
5.10. Issue priorities of loyal supporters by national conditions 118
5.11. Issue priorities of policy sceptics by national conditions 119
5.12. Issue priorities of regime sceptics by national conditions 119
5.13. Issue priorities of exit sceptics by national conditions 120
5.14. Predicting issue positions by the four types 122
5.15. Predicting policy positions by the four types and national conditions 123
5.16. National and European attachment among the four types 125
5.17. Predicting national attachment by the four types 125
6.1. Conditions for second order and EU issue voting 132
6.2. Eurosceptic members of the 2014 European Parliament 133
6.3. Issue priorities among the four types 137
6.4. Issue priorities across member states 138
6.5. Support for Eurosceptic parties among the four types 141
6.6. Hard versus soft Eurosceptic party support among the four types 142
6.7. Left versus right Eurosceptic party support among the four types 143
6.8. Left Eurosceptic party support by unemployment and immigration
as priority 144

xvi
 List of Figures

6.9. Right Eurosceptic party support by unemployment and immigration

as priority 145
6.10. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on migration 147
6.11. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on national control 148
6.12. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on redistribution 149
6.13. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on state intervention
in the economy 150
7.1. Remain support among the four types, British respondents only 157
7.2. Remain support among the four types by issue priority, British
respondents only 158
7.3. Predicting remain support among the four types, British
respondents only 160
7.4. Remain support among the four types 162
7.5. Remain support among the four types across countries 163
7.6. Remain support among the four types by issue priority 164
7.7. Remain support among the four types by views on foreigners 165
7.8. Remain support among the four types by views on globalization 166
7.9. Predicting remain support 167
7.10. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-foreigner
sentiment 169
7.11. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-globalization
stance 170
7.12. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-elitist stance 171
7.13. Difference in remain support among the four types, April–August 2016 172
7.14. Change in remain support among the four types, April–August 2016 173
7.15. Remain support among the four types in April–August 2016 in
five countries 174
7.16. Change in remain support among the four types, April–August
2016 in five countries 174
7.17. Remain support among the four types by Brexit expectation 175
8.1. Support for EU reform in 28 member states 190
8.2. Support for EU reform in 28 member states by national conditions 191
8.3. Support for EU reform among loyal supporters in 28 member states 193
8.4. Support for EU reform among policy sceptics in 28 member states 194
8.5. Support for EU reform among regime sceptics in 28 member states 195
8.6. Support for EU reform among exit sceptics in 28 member states 195
8.7. Support for economic reform among the four types 196

xvii
List of Figures

8.8. Support for economic reform among the four types by national
conditions 197
8.9. Expectations about future of Eurozone among the four types 198
8.10. Expectations about future of Eurozone among the four types by
national conditions 199
8.11. Support for Eurozone budget and finance minister among the
four types 200
8.12. Support for Eurozone budget and finance minister among the
four types by national conditions 200
8.13. Support for EU response to member state in financial difficulty
among the four types 201
8.14. Support for EU response to member state in financial difficulty
among the four types by national conditions 202
9.1. Summary of the differences between the four types 208

xviii
List of Tables

2.1. Cross-validation of EU differential measures 49

3.1. Four types of events 60
3.2. Selection of events 62
3.3. Effect of event type on the EU regime differential 63
3.4. Effect of national corruption vignette 68
3.5. Effect on EU policy differential 69
3.6. Effect of political sophistication 71
3.7. Difference in treatment effect by political sophistication 72
4.1. Testing the proximate responsibility attribution assumption 100
5.1. Changes in predicted support and scepticism based on
socio-demographic variables 113
6.1. Hard and soft Eurosceptic parties included in the 2014 EES 134
8.1. Example of a choice in the conjoint experiment 188
8.2. Attributes of different dimensions 188
A.1. Balance statistics 223
A.2. Results of placebo tests 224
A.3. Results of small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption 225
Part I
Public Opinion and European
Integration
Introduction
Losing Hearts and Minds? Taking Stock
of EU Public Opinion

Obsessed with the idea of instant and total integration, we failed to notice that
ordinary people, the citizens of Europe do not share our Euro-enthusiasm. Disil-
lusioned with the great visions of the future, they demand that we cope with the
present reality better than we have been doing until now.
Donald Tusk, 30 May 2016, Brussels

The European Union (EU)1 is currently facing one of the rockiest periods in its
sixty years existence. Not often in its history has the country bloc looked so
economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided
over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under
assault by Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs. While government leaders aim
to find unity, intergovernmental conferences in recent years have been beset
by deep divisions over how to bring the Eurozone and refugee crises to an end.
The dream of Europe’s founding father Jean Monnet to build a Union of men
rather than states seems almost out of reach. These latest developments have
left a mark on public opinion. Eurosceptic sentiment is on the rise. It is no
longer a phenomenon tied to small segments of society, extremist political
parties or to specific economic cycles. The outcome of the Brexit referendum
in Great Britain2 provided a first glimpse of what may lie ahead when Euro-
sceptic sentiment hardens. In June 2016, against the recommendation of
most political and economic experts, the British people voted to leave the EU.

1
The European Union (EU) has changed its name several times during its existence. In this
book, I will use the words ‘EU’, ‘Europe’, and ‘Union’ interchangeably.
2
In this book, I will use the term Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom. This is because
some of the public opinion data sources that I use do not always include Northern Ireland. In order
to be consistent, I rely on data from Great Britain only.
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

The result sent a shock wave through the political establishment in London,
Brussels, and beyond. Was the result based on British exceptionalism, or
indicative of a larger process of a revolt against Brussels? The British public
has always displayed a stronger pull towards Euroscepticism compared to
public opinion on the continent. Yet, recent election contests demonstrated
a steady rise of Eurosceptic sentiment throughout many parts of the Union. In
fact, Eurosceptic parties have seized their largest ever vote shares in the 2014
European Parliament elections.
These election and referendum outcomes have to be seen against the back-
drop of the economic and political challenges that the EU has faced in the
previous decade or so. The Eurozone and refugee crises have proved to be real
stress tests for Europe. While economic recovery may be on its way, at least in
some member states, what many citizens have learnt from these recent tribu-
lations is not to blindly trust politicians and technocrats who blithely promise
that more Europe will automatically deliver economic prosperity and geopol-
itical stability. For a long time public opinion was viewed as largely irrelevant
for an understanding of the course of European integration. This viewpoint is
perhaps best reflected in the writing of Ernst Haas. In his seminal volume The
Uniting of Europe, Haas (1968: 17) wrote: ‘It is as impracticable as it is unneces-
sary to have recourse to general public opinion surveys. . . . It suffices to single
out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study the
reactions to integration and assess changes in attitude on their part.’ The days
of a permissive consensus in which elites could pursue further integrative
steps with little to no regard for public opinion are gone (Hooghe and Marks
2009; Risse 2015). Leaders in Brussels and throughout Europe’s capitals are
confronted with a new and challenging political reality. At a time when
Europe faces some of its biggest economic, political, and social challenges
since the Second World War, the integration project itself has become highly
contested among the public. As a result, the EU finds itself faced with an
existential challenge: the unprecedented development in supranational governance
in recent years has led to greater public contestation, yet at the same time the Union is
more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before.

0.1 Key Questions

The days of the permissive consensus are over, but the question is: what has
come in its place? Pundits, journalists, and politicians suggest that we are
currently dealing with a rise in Euroscepticism. Feelings of discontent and
anger over Brussels’ divided response to economic downturn and refugee
flows seem to have plummeted public support for the European project to
an all-time low. This sentiment is illustrated by the former President of the

4
 Introduction

European Council Herman Van Rompuy (2010: 10) who in his speech on
9 November 2010 in Berlin commemorating the Kristallnacht warned: ‘We
have together to fight the danger of a new Euroscepticism. This is no longer
the monopoly of a few countries. In every member state, there are people who
believe their country can survive alone in the globalised world. It is more than
an illusion: it is a lie.’ Prominent scholars of European integration, like Liesbet
Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009), suggest that the permissive consensus may
not necessarily have been replaced by all-out Euroscepticism, but rather that
we are witnessing a constraining dissensus. This is partly because the deepening
and widening of European integration has put questions of identity at the
forefront of political debates (e.g. McLaren 2002, 2005; Kuhn 2015; Risse
2015). As a result, public opinion is deeply divided over the European project.
Due to the fact that these identity-based concerns are increasingly mobilized
by political parties in electoral and referendum contests, public preferences
today constrain jurisdictional choices in Europe.
These accounts of the nature of public opinion towards the EU are compel-
ling in many ways, but also raise key questions. What exactly do we mean by
Euroscepticism? Has it become a widespread phenomenon cutting across
national and social lines? Is Euroscepticism primarily linked to people’s feel-
ings of national identity, or is it rooted in socio-economic insecurity, or
perhaps in both? Is Euroscepticism the driver of recent Eurosceptic party
success, or do national conditions and evaluations play a more important
role? And finally, when does Eurosceptic public opinion have the ability to
constrain the preferences of national and European elites who shape jurisdic-
tional choices in Europe? These are the key questions this book addresses. It
suggests that in order to fully grasp public opinion and understand its causes
and consequences for the integration process, we need to take a step back and
revisit the precise nature of popular sentiment towards the EU. In the chapters
that follow, I present a benchmark theory of EU public opinion. This theory
suggests that the way people view the EU is intrinsically linked to the national
conditions in which they find themselves as well as their comparison of these
conditions to those at the EU level. It is not only a result of a comparison of
objective conditions, but also of people’s subjective perceptions of these
conditions. EU public opinion resembles a kaleidoscope mirroring people’s experi-
ences with and evaluations of starkly different national political and economic
contexts that together make up the Union.
This book maintains that public opinion cannot be simply characterized as
Eurosceptic or not, but rather consists of different types. This is important
because: (a) the different types of sceptics display distinctive sets of issue
positions, priorities, and reform preferences; (b) only certain types of scepti-
cism have the ability to threaten the EU’s existence because they are linked to
preferences for secession and support for hard Eurosceptic parties; and (c) the

5
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

existence of different types makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing

Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful. This book suggests that Euroscepti-
cism is such a diverse phenomenon partly because the Eurozone crisis has
exacerbated structural imbalances within the EU and consequently made
experiences with the Union more distinct than ever before. As the economic
and political conditions within member states started to diverge further and
further during the crisis, people’s comparisons of national and European
conditions also moved further apart. While the EU aims to be united in diversity,
this book suggests that in terms of Euroscepticism the EU is divided in its diversity.3
The fact that people’s benchmarks started to diverge more strongly as the
Eurozone crisis unfolded is crucially important for our understanding of
Euroscepticism. It helps us to grasp why support for the EU remains relatively
high in bailout-battered member states that have experienced some of the
worst effects of the crisis, such as Ireland or Spain for example, while Euro-
scepticism is steadily on the rise in countries that have benefited to an enor-
mous extent from the Single Market and/or Euro, and weathered the crisis
relatively well, such as Germany, Great Britain, or the Netherlands. The
benchmark theory suggests that different kinds of Euroscepticism develop
primarily within those contexts where people perceive that they have an
exit option to EU membership. When national conditions are good, in eco-
nomic and political terms, or at least when people perceive them as such,
Euroscepticism is most likely to develop. When national conditions are bad,
however, EU support is the most likely outcome as no viable alternative to
membership is present. This pattern exists because people assign responsibil-
ity for economic and political performance not primarily to EU actors, but first
and foremost to their national governments. This means that when national
economic and political conditions are good, people attribute them to the
actions of their national government and Euroscepticism is likely to increase.
However, when conditions are bad, they are perceived to be a consequence of
low quality leadership at home, and this is likely to increase support for the
EU. Using the same theoretical framework, this book also helps to clarify
patterns within countries. It suggests that Euroscepticism is not only the
prerogative of those who are left behind by integration, or globalization
more generally, but is also found among those who are relatively well off.
What unites these different groups is the benchmark they employ. Euroscep-
tics believe that their country can survive, or will even thrive, outside of the
EU. Euroscepticism is not necessarily a reflection of the extent to which they
themselves stand to gain or lose from integration.

3
I wish to thank Tim Haughton for suggesting this formulation.

6
 Introduction

The deeply divided nature of public opinion that this book uncovers
has important consequences for the future of the European project. It puts
European and political elites in a very difficult position. Public opinion is more
responsive to real-world conditions today than in the past and this means that
citizens demand solutions to the current European crises. Yet, the deep divi-
sions within the public represent something of a policy conundrum. There is a
growing rift between different types of sceptics within and across countries in
terms of their policy demands. Some sceptics, especially within the North
Western region, demand less intra-EU migration, while others, most notably
in Southern and Central and Eastern European member states, wish to see
more economic investment and employment programmes. It appears difficult
to come up with policy proposals that could satisfy both these constituencies
simultaneously, especially in the short run. Combatting unemployment and
sluggish growth in the Union to revive struggling member states, especially in
the South, would necessitate the introduction of some sort of monetary
transfer or debt reduction that may require a further allocation of policy
competences to the EU level (Stiglitz 2016). This is something that some
sceptics do not wish to see. Moreover, the restriction of immigration to please
some of the sceptics would violate one of the core principles of integration,
namely the free movement of people. This in turn is not popular among other
segments of the population. Although it might be possible to strike a balance
between these different demands by introducing some sort of transfer mech-
anism or debt reduction that would allow poorer economies to grow and thus
depress the demand for migration in the future, the fruits of such reforms
would most likely only come to bear in the medium or long run. Given the
importance of EU matters in domestic elections and for the re-election of
national governments (De Vries 2007, 2010; Schneider 2013), current incum-
bents will most likely focus on their short-term political survival rather
than medium- to long-term policy solutions. The way for the EU to deal
with these different constituencies, this book suggests, is to fully embrace
the diversity within its borders and provide more differentiated and flexible
policy solutions.

0.2 What Lies Ahead

This book revisits core questions about the nature of public opinion and
its role in the integration process. Not surprisingly there is a burgeoning
literature on public attitudes towards European integration (for an overview
see Hobolt and De Vries 2016a). Early studies focused on EU support (see
for example Inglehart 1970; Gabel 1998), whereas over the last decade or
so scholarly attention has shifted to the study of opposition, namely

7
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

Euroscepticism (see Spiering and Harmsen 2004; Hooghe 2007). Although

the literature has made great strides in attempting to explain which factors
determine whether people hold positive or negative attitudes towards the EU,
the precise conceptualization and measurement of support and scepticism has
received much less scholarly attention. This book aims to remedy this by devel-
oping a benchmark theory of public opinion towards the EU. This theoretical
approach builds on recent insights from behavioural economics and social
psychology. By analysing existing survey data, complementing and cross-
validating it with newly collected survey data as well as combining it with
novel experimental data, the book provides a systematic account of (a) how
people’s EU attitudes are structured, (b) how they vary across time and space, (c)
how they have very different behavioural implications, and (d) how they might
constrain the room to manoeuvre of European and national elites. It does so by
taking a Europe-wide approach. This allows for a thorough understanding of the
continuity and change in public sentiment towards Europe. That said, at times,
the book draws on specific country examples to clarify the bigger picture.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the recent surge in Euro-
scepticism. Chapter 1 suggests that recent trends in public opinion are
difficult to reconcile with existing explanations of EU support and scepticism,
most notably the utilitarian and identity explanations. The chapter outlines
how the benchmark theory developed in this book can help us to understand
these recent trends. It also highlights how the theory builds on, yet clearly
deviates from, existing work highlighting the importance of national condi-
tions for EU public opinion.
Part II provides a fine-grained conceptualization of EU public opinion.
Chapter 2 introduces the benchmark theory of EU scepticism and support.
The chapter suggests that the nature of public opinion towards European
integration is both multidimensional and multilevel in nature. The core
insight underlying the benchmark theory is intuitive and simple: public opin-
ion towards Europe is based on a comparison between the benefits of the status quo of
membership and those associated with an alternative state, namely one’s country
being outside the EU. This comparison is coined the EU differential. When
people compare the benefits, they evaluate both the outcomes (policy evalu-
ations) and the system that produces them (regime evaluations). Not only
does this chapter present a fine-grained conceptualization of what it means to
be an EU supporter or sceptic, it also develops a careful empirical measurement
strategy and cross-validates the measurement with a variety of existing and
newly developed data sources.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that European public opinion is responsive to
changes in real-world conditions and moves in predictable ways. The analysis
combines natural experimental and survey experimental data to show that EU
support and scepticism react to both national and European events. This

8
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
road a brisk fusillade was heard towards Tsikalaria, and as I
was about to return to Halepa a young Turk was seen at a
distance running towards us with a letter in his hand. It was
a message sent by the Albanian corporal stationed at
Tsikalaria asking for assistance. This messenger had hardly
arrived when a gendarme was seen coming down in great haste.
He said that the fight between Christians and Mussulmans
having become general, and there being only another gendarme
with the corporal, armed assistance was immediately required.
I took both these messengers and conveyed them to the gate of
the town, from whence I drove to Halepa to acquaint the Vali
with what was taking place. It was getting dark when I met on
the road his Excellency accompanied by the Italian Consul
going on foot to Canea, having found no available carriage,
and I drove back with them. The position was rather
perplexing. There was no available gendarmerie, and no
soldiers could be sent out, as they would have been fired upon
by the Christians. …

"Early on the day following, that is, on the 4th instant, the
Governor-General visited the village of Tsikalaria and the
villages westward of it in order to ascertain the truth with
regard to the numerous reports which were in circulation since
the preceding evening. It would seem that on hearing of his
son having been killed on the Canea-Suda road, the father of
the wounded Mussulman opened fire on the Christians. Other
Christians maintain that this wounded Mussulman, after having
shot at the Christian on the road, hastened to Tsikalaria, and
together with his father, began firing on the Christians. In a
very short time all the Christians rushed towards the heights,
and the Mussulmans towards the plain. During this evolution a
Christian was killed, it is said, by the father of the wounded
Mussulman, who had been arrested and is in prison. The same
night the women and children took refuge in the villages on
the mountains, while a contingent of 150 armed Christians came
down from Campos and Keramia in order to assist the male
population of Tsikalaria to defend their property. On the
 other hand, armed Mussulmans flocked from all parts of the
plain to defend their co-religionists. The Mussulmans at
Perivolia, where they are of nearly equal numerical force,
tried to surround the Christians in order to keep them as
hostages for the safety of their co-religionists in other
villages where the Christians are more numerous. In so doing
they shot down a Christian, on whom they also inflicted
numerous knife stabs, finally cutting his throat. This was
followed by an emigration to, and armed assistance from, the
mountain villages as at Tsikalaria. "In the village of
Varipetro the Mayor, assisted by the corporal of gendarmerie,
a Mussulman Albanian, was doing his utmost to prevent a
conflict between its Christian and Mussulman inhabitants, when
a Christian from Lakkos, whose brother had been murdered two
years ago by a native Mussulman, stealing behind the corporal,
shot him dead. The Christians of Varipetro, with whom the
corporal was popular, having tried to arrest his murderer, the
Lakkiotes, who had come there in order to defend their
co-religionists, turned their arms against them, and prevented
them from carrying out their intention. In consequence of this
murder all the Christians of Varipetro emigrated to the
mountains, and all the Mussulmans to the town of Canea. Nearly
1,000 Christians from the plains of Cydonia and Kissamo came
to defend the inhabitants of Galata and Darazzo, and for a
time blockaded the Turks in the village of Kirtomado, Aghia, &c.
{544}
But the inhabitants of Galata, who are all Christians, have so
much confidence in the Mussulman Albanian Lieutenant called
Islam, who is stationed in their village, that they begged
their co-religionists to withdraw, which they did. …

"As is always the case, each party claims to have been

attacked by the other party, and the truth is not likely to be
ever discovered. Be this as it may, both Christians and
Mussulmans remain under the unshaken conviction that they are
wronged by the other party; this increases the animosity of
one sect against the other, and each member of the two races
will act on this conviction. This is the inevitable
consequence of the absolute want of confidence between the two
elements, and there is not the least hope that this feeling
will disappear, nor even slightly decrease, so long as they
are left to themselves. In the present instance it may be that
the Mussulmans, or some of them, may have considered
themselves bound to retaliate for recent murders committed on
their co-religionists by Christians. … The Christians are
convinced, and all their proceedings are marked by that
conviction, that all the incidents which trouble the public
peace are devices of the native Mussulmans to prevent the
execution of the promised reforms. I do not deny that the
attitude of the authorities at Constantinople may have such an
effect on the low class of Cretan Mussulmans; but it is far
from being so with the educated class who are as, if not more,
anxious than the Christians that the intended reforms should
be carried out without delay. In fact, they know that they
have nothing to hope from Constantinople, and that the only
protection of the minority to which they belong lies in the
promised reforms. On the other hand, I have observed with the
greatest pleasure that the Christians laid down their arms at
the first recommendation of the Consuls to do so, which proves
a sincere desire on their part to live in peace. When the
Christians were taking up arms in former times they used to
remain for weeks, even for months, on the mountains in spite
of the entreaties of the Consuls. Therefore, the Christians
and the Mussulmans are respectively well disposed, but there
is such an insuperable distrust on both sides, that they can
never come to a mutual understanding. Whether the incidents
which cause disturbances or disorders on the island are the
work of the Turks or of the Christians or of both is quite
immaterial to me. The important fact to be taken into
consideration is that an exchange of a few shots between one
or two Christians and as many Mussulmans is sufficient to
cause several districts, four in the present instance (Canea,
Apokorona, Sphakia, and Kissamo), to take up arms, and also
that there can be no doubt that such scenes will be repeated
on every recurrence of such incidents."

To the same effect, Captain Custance, of the British ship

Barfleur, reported on the 15th to Admiral Hopkins: "The
general situation, as I understand it, is, that the Cretan
Christian leaders, urged on by certain interested people at
Athens, have been preparing for some time to make an attempt
to drive the Turkish authorities out of the island in the
spring, if a favourable opportunity offers. The Mussulmans
would not be sorry to see the last of the Turkish Government
if they could only be sure that their lives and property would
be safe under the new regime, which, owing to the bitter
hatred existing between the Christians and Mussulmans, cannot
be expected. The two parties are face to face, armed to the
teeth, with long-standing feuds and wrongs, and with no force
between them capable of maintaining order."

On the 27th of January the Consul-General reported by telegram

to Lord Salisbury: "An outburst of terror, such as has not yet
occurred in Candia, has been caused by the commencement of a
fresh immigration of Mussulmans into the town, and by the
murder, within a week, of two men of that faith, and a few
minor outrages." The next day he reported: "Telegraphic news
from Candia, dated to-day, reports murder of a Mussulman, and
wounding of two others, and murder of seven Christians; murder
of further Mussulmans is rumoured. The Mussulman Military
Commissioner, and the Austrian Military Attache, now in
Candia, report that they met about 1,000 armed Mussulmans
moving inland, and numbers of Mussulman families moving
towards the town." Again, on the 2d of February: "Murder of
four Mussulmans last night, following on wounding of Christian
by Mussulman on the 31st January near Canea. Panic ensued in
Canea and Suda Bay this morning. Shops all closed. Shots fired
in town and Halepa, which resulted in death of two Mussulmans.
Four mixed villages, one large Christian village, and several
farms in environs are in flames." On the 4th, Colonel
Chermside, of the gendarmerie commission, sent the following
 statement to Lord Salisbury: "The most that we have been able
to attempt to-night is to get a cordon to separate Christian
and Moslem quarters. Patrolling was tried, but the fire from
the Christians was too heavy to maintain it. Several Turkish
soldiers have been killed and wounded."

Great Britain,
Parliamentary Publications
(Papers by Command:
Turkey, Number 10, 1897, pages 15-45).

TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (February-March).

Greek interference in Crete.
Greek forces in the island.
Demands for annexation of Crete to Greece.
Action of the Powers in the "Concert of Europe."
Pacific blockade of Crete.

Early in February, the difficulties of the attempt which the

leading European powers, acting in what was known as "the
Concert of Europe," were making to settle affairs in Crete by
reforming its Turkish government, were complicated by
interference from Greece. The Greeks, in ardent sympathy with
their Cretan kinsmen, were eager to take up the cause of the
Christian inhabitants of the island, and their government was
driven into independent action to that end, hoping that
Christian sentiment in Europe would constrain the Powers to
give it a free hand. A Greek squadron was sent to Crete, to
bring away fugitives—women and children especially—and to
prevent the landing of Turkish reinforcements. This was
quickly followed by an expedition of 2,000 men, Colonel Vassos
in command. An instant stimulation of the insurrection
occurred, and declarations demanding the annexation of Crete
to the kingdom of Greece began to appear; while the Greek
government represented in a note to the Powers that no
possible solution of the Cretan problem could be found without
concession to that demand. The Greek troops, considerably
 increased in number, were landed on the island, joining the
insurgent Cretans, and beginning operations against the Turks.

{545}

On the 13th of February the admirals commanding the foreign

naval forces at Canea joined in sending a warning to the Greek
commodore, requiring him to "desist from all hostile acts and
to conform with international law." On the 15th a mixed force
of British, French, Russian, Italian and Austrian marines was
landed for the protection of the town. On the same day, from
Colombari, Colonel Vassos, the Greek commander, issued a
proclamation, saying: "In the name of His Majesty, George I.,
King of the Greeks, I occupy the Island of Crete, and proclaim
this to its inhabitants without distinction of sex or
nationality. I promise in the name of His Majesty that I will
protect the honour, life and property, and will respect the
religious convictions, of its inhabitants, bringing them peace
and equality rights." On the 17th, the Turkish forces at Canea
were attacked by the Greeks and insurgents, and the attack was
renewed on the 21st; whereupon, after warnings from the
foreign admirals in the harbor, the Russian, German, Austrian
and British ships opened fire on the attacking troops. In the
meantime, considerable bodies of Mohammedans were being
besieged by superior forces at other points in the island,
with great danger of massacre if overcome.

On the 2d of March, the representatives of Great Britain,

Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, at
Constantinople, arrived at an agreement of action, and jointly
addressed notes to the governments of Turkey and Greece. To the
Porte they wrote: "The Great Powers, animated by the desire to
assure the maintenance of peace and to see the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire respected, have sought for the means of
ending the disorders that have led to their armed intervention
in Crete, as well as of putting an end to the presence of the
Greek forces in the island. They have recognized that in
consequence of the delay in applying them, the reforms
contemplated in the Arrangement of August 25, 1896, no longer
correspond to the requirements of the present situation, and
they have agreed upon the following points:

1. Crete can in no case be annexed to Greece in the present

circumstances.

2. The island will be endowed by the Powers with an autonomous

administration ('régime').

In notifying these decisions to the Sublime Porte by order of

their Governments, the Representatives of the Great Powers at
Constantinople think it their duty to communicate the
resolution which has been taken by their Governments to
address to Greece a summons to withdraw her troops and naval
forces from Crete."

To the Greek government the same announcement was made, that

"Crete can in no case, in the present circumstances, be
annexed to Greece," and the communication was more explicit in
the further statements, as follows:

"In view of the delays caused by Turkey in the application of

the reforms agreed upon in concert with the Powers, and which
now make it impossible to adapt those reforms to a changed
condition of affairs, the Powers are resolved, while
maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to endow
Crete with an absolutely effective autonomous administration
(régime), intended to secure to it a separate government,
under the high suzerainty of the Sultan. The Cabinets are
convinced that these views can only be realized by the
withdrawal of the Greek ships and troops now in the waters and
on the territory of the island which is occupied by the
Powers. We accordingly confidently expect this decision from
the wisdom of His Majesty's Government, which cannot wish to
persist in a course opposed to the decision of the Powers, who
are determined to carry out an early pacification, which is as
necessary for Crete as it is for the maintenance of general
peace. I will not, however, conceal from your Excellency that
I am instructed to warn you that, in case of a refusal of the
Royal Government, the Great Powers have arrived at the
irrevocable decision not to shrink from any measure of
compulsion if, on the expiration of six days, the recall of
the Greek ships and troops from Crete has not been effected."

The Turkish government replied on the 6th: "The Sublime Porte

has had the honour to receive the note which the Ambassadors
of the Great Powers were good enough to address to it on the
2nd of March relative to Crete. The Imperial Government takes
note with satisfaction of the assurances which the Great
Powers are good enough to give it as to their desire to
respect the integrity of the Empire and of the decision which
they have taken to obtain the withdrawal of the Greek ships of
war and troops from Crete. Relying upon their friendly
sentiments, and upon their firm resolve not to impair the
Sultan's rights of sovereignty, the Sublime Porte, which is
itself desirous of assuring the maintenance of peace, accepts
the principle of an autonomy to be accorded to Crete, while
reserving to itself liberty to discuss with the Ambassadors
the form and the details of the administration ('régime') with
which the island is to be endowed."

Two days later, the Greek government replied at greater

length, imploring the Great Powers "not to insist upon the
system of autonomy decided on, but to give back to Crete what
it already possessed at the time of the liberation of the
other provinces which form the Hellenic kingdom, and to
restore it to Greece, to which it already belonged in the time
of the Presidency of Capodistria," and appealing against the
demand for the withdrawal of the Greek military forces from
the island. "Since, in our opinion," wrote M. Skouses, the
Greek minister, "the new autonomous administration ('régime')
condition could not fulfil the noble object of the Powers, it
 is clear what would be the condition of the unfortunate island
from now until the establishment of that administration, if
the Great Powers decided to persist in their resolve.

"In this connection, and in the name of humanity, as also in

the interest of the pacification of the island—a pacification
which is the sole object of the solicitude of the Great
Powers—we do not hesitate to appeal to them in regard to the
other measure, relative to the withdrawal of our military
forces. … The presence in the island of the Greek army is …
demanded by the dictates of humanity, and is necessary in the
interest of the definitive restoration of order. It is, above
all, our duty not to leave the Cretan people at the mercy of
Mussulman fanaticism, and of the Turkish army, which has
always intentionally, and by connivance, been a party to the
acts of aggression of the populace against the Christians.

{546}

"Above all, if our troops in the island, who are worthy of the
full confidence of the Great Powers, were intrusted with the
mandate of pacifying the country, their wishes and intentions
would at once be completely satisfied. It would then be
possible, after order had been restored, to obtain a free
expression of the wishes of the Cretan people, with a view to
decide their lot. Not only are the horrors which during
several decades have occurred periodically in Crete, not
committed without profoundly agitating the Hellenic people,
but they also interrupt the social activity, and seriously
disturb the economy and finances of the State. Even if it were
possible for us to forget for a moment that we are
co-religionists of the Cretan people, that we are of the same
race, and allied by blood, we cannot conceal from the Great
Powers that the Hellenic State is unable to resist such shocks
any longer. We therefore appeal to the generous sentiments
which animate the Great Powers, and beg them to allow the
Cretan people to declare how it desires to be governed."
 Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications
(Papers by Command: Turkey, Numbers 4 and 5, 1897).

The position taken by the Greek government in this reply was

firmly maintained. Its troops were not withdrawn from Crete,
and the Powers of "the Concert," thus practically defied, had
difficulty in agreeing upon the next steps they would take.
France, England, and Italy would not consent to strong
measures of coercion proposed by Russia, Germany and Austria,
and the decision reached finally was to establish what is
known as a "pacific blockade" of the Cretan coast, to begin on
the 21st of March. This was announced on the 18th by the
admirals commanding on that coast, who gave notice: "The
blockade will be general for all vessels flying the Greek
flag. Vessels of the Six Powers or of neutral Powers will be
allowed to enter the ports in the occupation of the Powers and
land their merchandise there, but only if it is not intended
for the Greek troops or for the interior of the island. The
ships of the international fleets may visit these vessels."
The Greek government was notified to recall its men-of-war
still in Cretan waters, with the warning that "they will be
retained there by force if they have not left by 8 A. M. on
the 21st March."

On the day previous to this announcement of blockade the same

admirals had published a proclamation as follows:

"The undersigned, Commanders-in-chief of the naval forces of

Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and
Russia, in Cretan waters, acting under instructions from their
respective Governments, solemnly proclaim and announce to the
people of the island that the Great Powers have arrived at the
irrevocable decision to secure the complete autonomy of Crete,
under the suzerainty of the Sultan. It is well understood that
the Cretans are to be free from all control on the part of the
Sublime Porte as regards their internal affairs. The principal
aim of the Powers being to provide a remedy for the evils
which have afflicted the country, and to prevent their
recurrence, they are drawing up in concert a scheme of
measures intended to regulate the working of the autonomous
régime, to restore peace, to assure to everyone, without
distinction of race or religion, liberty and security of
property, and to facilitate, by the resumption of agricultural
work and trade, the progressive development of the resources
of the country. Such is the aim of the Powers. They wish this
to be understood by all. A new era is commencing for Crete;
let all lay down their arms. The Powers desire peace and
order. They will, if it be required, have the necessary
authority to make their decisions respected. They count on the
co-operation of all the inhabitants of the island, Christian
and Mussulman, to assist them in accomplishing a work which
promises to secure concord and prosperity to the Cretans."

To the promise of an autonomous government for Crete the

insurgent Christians appear to have given no heed; but a great
number of the Mohammedan inhabitants of the island united in
sending telegrams to the British minister at Constantinople,
which were all of the tenor of the following: "Your Excellency
knows that the Christians of Crete, forming the numerical
majority of the population, but incapable of properly
administering the former privileges they enjoyed, have now
again been emboldened to massacre, destroy, and ruin, in the
same way that in the past they have always made ill-use of
their liberties in the country by the treacherous destruction
and ruin of their Moslem fellow-countrymen. Therefore, if the
people are left irresponsible for the government of the
country, which is the very breath of human life, it will
facilitate the completion of their bloodthirsty designs, and
hasten the ruin of the Mussulmans. We are quite sure that this
state of things will not recommend itself to the sympathy of
the Great Powers, the propagators of civilization.

"We therefore beg, in the name of the Mussulman population,

 that the internal affairs of the Christian inhabitants of
Crete who have not yet reached even the first step on the path
of civilization, and are led away by the seditious designs of
Greece, may not be removed from the direction of the Sublime
Porte; if this be impossible, we beg that the internal affairs
of the island may be placed under the continual control of the
Great Powers in conjunction with the Porte; and we finally beg
that the necessary measures may be taken for the protection of
the life, honour, and property, as well as the rights of the
20,000 Mussulman inhabitants now living in Turkey, whose
interest in property is greater in value than that of the
Christians, and who are occupied with commerce and other
pursuits, besides those who live In the island, who, if
necessary, are prepared to undergo a census, and who exceed
100,000."

The situation of the Moslem population of the island was

represented a little later by Colonel Chermside, in a despatch
to Lord Salisbury, as follows:

"Over 49,000 Moslems are assembled in Candia and within cordon

area, comprising 25 square miles, viz., about two-thirds of
Moslem population of Crete. Of these, 29,000 are refugees from
central and eastern districts of island. Doles of flour are
issued to 39,000 persons; issue up to date 18 lb. per head; no
other food issued. The mass of the people have no buying power
and no work, but since arrival of British troops, armed
individuals are rare in streets; distress is supported with
great fortitude, in spite of insufficient food and ravages of
small-pox. Population hopes for future foreign protection
against Christian compatriots. "

Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Turkey, Number 10, 1897, pages 153-178.

{547}
TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (March-September).
War with Greece.
Success of the Turkish arms.
Peace sought by the Greek Government.

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Great Powers, the Greeks

were rashly bent upon war with the Turks, and, when balked in
Crete, began hostile demonstrations along the Turkish frontier
in their own peninsula. The events that followed have been
thus described by an eye-witness, who wrote immediately
afterwards: "When I arrived in Athens," says this writer,
"early last March [1897], although the Cretan insurrection was
being openly supported by Greek arms, war had not been
declared against Turkey. It was what I think was once
described in Parliament as 'a condition of war,' but not war.
… King George and his advisers rashly decided to attempt to
hasten matters in their own fashion. Agitation was begun
without and within the Turkish frontier, and the Ethuike
Hetairia manufactured alarms and disturbances in Macedonia and
Epirus. Attempts were made in other directions, but though
money and emissaries were sent, nothing came of it. Meanwhile
the mobilisation of the Greek army was begun, and later on
reserves were called out. Knowing a good deal about the
relative condition of preparedness for war of both Turkey and
Greece, I spoke without reserve on the subject to the King
and, later on, to the Princes. I told them nearly every
military intelligence department in Europe knew that Turkey
had been getting her troops ready for a year past to deal with
insurrection or invasion along the Macedonian frontier. Within
the Salonica military district she had nearly 100,000 men under
arms, all well trained and passably equipped. Besides infantry
she had nearly 10,000 cavalry, and within a month could place
a further force of 70,000 infantry in the field. Against these
the Greeks could not bring more than 60,000 regulars. There no
doubt might be mustered twice that number of men, but they
would be untrained irregulars and volunteers who would take a
month at least before they could be of much use, and Turkey
would have her bands of irregulars out also to offset their
value. It was notorious besides that the Greek army was
indifferently organised, that it had no transport, no
commissariat department, no medical department, and was
without anything like a sufficiency of trained officers. …

"Prepared or not, the Greeks clamoured for war, never doubting

latterly but that they would win. They protested that the
Hellenes were aroused and would fight and die, if need be, to
the last man. Greece would not waive an iota of her demands.
We were told that the Greeks scattered throughout the Turkish
Empire would spring to arms and paralyze the enemy's hands.
There were to be fearful outbreaks in Macedonia, Epirus, and
Albania, and tumults and burnings in all the chief cities
under Turkish rule where Greeks dwelt—Smyrna, Constantinople,
Salonica, and so on. I was informed that insurrectionary bands
were being got ready to invade Macedonia and Epirus, and I was
introduced to several of the leaders of these new expeditions.
… I saw many of these Greek filibusters at Kalabaka and other
places. By order from Athens the local commandants supplied
them with stores, transport, and trenching tools, and sent
guides to direct them, so that they should slip across into
Macedonia at the most suitable points for conducting their
operations. …

"The Greeks had a fairly long innings carrying on the war

within Turkish territory, whilst disingenuously disclaiming
responsibility for the acts of their own levies. Finally, in
April, the Sultan declared war and set his forces in motion.
Prior to that date the Greeks had moved up the whole of their
available strength close to the Thessalian frontier. The army
numbered nearer fifty than sixty thousand, of all ranks. …
Before war was declared the Crown Prince Constantine arrived
in Larissa, and took over the command of the Greek army in
Thessaly. … He had no military experience; and, as events
disclosed, was neither of a martial disposition nor of a firm
temperament. He showed subsequently that he felt keenly his
false position, and he tried to excuse the awful failures made
in the conduct of the campaign of panic and flight. …

"Independence Day having passed without a general invasion of

Macedonia by the Greeks, it is likely that the Turks had
thought the danger over, when suddenly firing began in a night
along the frontier from Nezeros to Ravenni. For a day or two the
Greeks carried all before them, capturing many block-houses
and taking a number of prisoners. They succeeded in
penetrating Turkish territory in some places for two or three
miles. … The Turks were in immediate danger of being
outflanked in one part of the field of operations, and
separated from their main force at Elassona. It was midday,
the 19th of April, when at a critical moment for the safety of
a portion of Edhem's forces an order arrived from the Crown
Prince to cease firing and retire the whole Greek army back
upon their own side of the frontier. … After an interval of
three hours, during which there was little or no firing, a
message arrived from headquarters that a blunder had been made
and the army was to readvance and engage the enemy. It was a
lost opportunity, for the Turks followed up the Greeks and
reoccupied the lines from which they had been driven. … The
cost of the blunder was a serious one to the Greeks, for in a
futile attempt, on the following day, to retake Gresovala,
General Mavromichali lost 2,000 men. …

"On the 21st of April, without any of the pictorial display or

reputed hand-to-hand fighting, some 40,000 Turks, not less,
accompanied by three cavalry regiments and half a score of
batteries, quietly streamed down the zigzag paved way in the
steep Melouna pass into Thessaly. They occupied the village of
Legaria and positions among the lowest foot hills at the
outlet of the pass. The Greeks were not able to embarrass them
as they deployed, although an attempt was made to find the
range with artillery. … For two days there was a fierce
artillery duel, interspersed occasionally with sharp rifle
fire as the infantry became engaged on the right and left of
 the line. … All had ended in favour of the Greeks when the sun
set on the 22nd April, and the battle of Mati was over. … It
was the same night that the Crown Prince ordered the army to
retreat upon Larissa, twenty-five miles distant by road. About
8 P. M. the men were roused from their first sleep and
commanded to fall in. They did so very orderly and quietly,
thinking it was intended to deliver a surprise attack upon the
Turks.
{548}
The whole army was on the march, and had got five or six miles
from the battle-field, or close to Turnavos, when the
unaccountable mad panic seized them. Some say it originated
one way, some another. … The army broke into pieces and became
a furious rabble, which fled by road and fields south as hard
as most could run. Arms and ammunition and baggage were cast
aside wholesale. The Greek officers, as a rule, behaved worse
than the men, for they led the fleeing mob, and many of them
never stopped until they reached Pharsala or Vola. … The
whilom Greek army was a mob convinced that the Turkish cavalry
was upon their heels, though it never was near them. It gave
them the strength of despair, and so they covered afoot fifty
to sixty miles within twenty-four hours. The inhabitants of
Larissa and all the surrounding country, terrified at the
sudden calamity, were left by the military and civic
authorities, without hint or warning, to shift for themselves.
… The women and children of Larissa had to carry what they
wished to save upon their own backs. Thousands of these
helpless creatures, together with sick and wounded soldiers,
were left around the railway station, whilst officers rode off
upon the early or later special trains, to fly, as some of
them did, as far as Athens. The troops had gone hours before I
left Larissa, and even then there were no signs of the enemy
to be seen."

Bennet Burleigh,
The Greek War, as I saw it
(Fortnightly Review, July, 1897).
"Not until several hours after the departure of the last
Greek, did a few Turkish cavalrymen cautiously enter the town
[Larissa], some distance ahead of the Turkish army. … It was
the design of the Greeks to save Volo, a wealthy town, and the
haven of refuge of many of the peasants. Accordingly, a line
was formed from two miles beyond Pharsala to the pass which
was the doorway to Volo. About three miles from this pass was
the village of Velestino; and on the hills back of it were the
headquarters of Colonel Smollenske, commander of this, the
right wing of the Greek army. The Greek fleet, with decks
cleared for action, was in the Bay of Volo; having gone there
after the defeat of Mati, hoping that, in case the army
failed, its heavy guns would protect the town. After four
days, the Turks, having digested their victory with cigarettes
and coffee, were ready to renew fighting. Meanwhile, the Greeks
had put themselves in a sort of order. Evidently, the first
intention of the Turks was to force their way through
Smollenske's line and on to Volo. Accordingly, they attempted
to storm Smollenske's rifle-pits; but they were driven back
for the first time, and with the greatest loss that any such
movement had yet encountered in the campaign. … The Turks,
after a slight resistance, withdrew from the villages in front
of Velestino, which they had taken, and were soon moving over
to the left. Their plan of cutting the Greek line in two was
executed with energy. On the morning of May 7, Edhem Pasha
sent his fearless infantry, under heavy fire, up the hollows
between the mountain-ridges which ran at right angles to the
Turkish line across the plain. They intrepidly scaled the
ridges, and forced the Greeks from the position. Smollenske's
force was flanked and separated from the Crown Prince's force:
and he retreated in an orderly manner to Almyro. The Crown
Prince's force had been flanked on its left; at the same time
it was being flanked on its right by the force that had
flanked Smollenske. The Crown Prince, therefore, withdrew to
the heights of Domoko.
"So apparent was now the hopelessness of the Greek cause that
even the new ministry, which had been buoyed up into almost an
aggressive spirit by the 'victory' of Velestino, begged for
the intervention of the Powers. It was granted in the form of
a demand on the Sultan for an armistice. As there are six
Powers, each having a formal foreign office, this took some
time. The Sultan, as usual, was more deliberate than the six
tormentors, whom he in return tormented. Being truly Greek,
the Greek Cabinet seemed to believe that articles of peace
would be signed the moment the necessity of peace appealed to
the ministerial mind. … Two days after Pharsala, the Turkish
army appeared on the plain some ten miles from Domoko. There
it rested quietly for more than a week, leisurely celebrating
the important feast of Bairam. This confirmed the belief of
the Greek generals that the war was at an end. The morning of
May 17 found the Crown Prince's force more than ever convinced
of an armistice, and quite unprepared for an attack. At nine
o'clock the whole Turkish army began to advance upon the
astounded Greeks—most astounded of them all were the Crown
Prince and General Macris—in such a manner as to leave no
doubt as to its intention.

"The battle of Domoko which followed was the most sanguinary

of the campaign. … For three hours, that is, until
sundown,—the attack having begun at four o'clock,—the Greeks
steadily returned the hot fire of the Turks, who soon ceased
to advance, and doggedly hung on to the ground that they had
gained. … During this attack in front the Turks were making a
more important movement, strategically, on the right. … With
amazing intrepidity, during the hot action on the centre, the
Turks had fought their way over the mountains at the Greeks'
far right. Some reserves were sent around at sunset—but too
late. The Turkish left wing was already even with the town of
Domoko. Military experts maintain that the Crown Prince, by
readjusting his forces over night, could have given the
phlegmatic enemy a surprise in the morning, and held him in
check for several days. The retreat over the pass to Lamia
 began at ten o'clock in the evening; and the next morning the
battalions covering the retreat were under heavy fire. The
Greeks' next stand was to be at Thermopylæ. Should the Turks
advance spiritedly, Smollenske's army would be cut off from
that of the Crown Prince, and forced to surrender. But the
Sultan, being somewhat appeased by more blood-letting, now
bowed before a letter from him whom the Greeks called 'a vile
enemy,'—the Czar,—who, for this act, saw his influence at
Constantinople supplanted by that of Germany, though the fear
of Russia was undiminished. At last the armistice came,—none
too soon for the demoralized army of Greece. The war had
lasted just thirty-one days."

F. Palmer,
How the Greeks were defeated
(Forum, November, 1897).

{549}

The preliminary treaty of peace, signed September 18, required

Greece to pay to Turkey a war indemnity of nearly eighteen
millions of dollars, arrangements for securing the payment of
which were to be controlled by an international commission
composed of one representative of each of the mediating
Powers. The same Powers were likewise to settle with Turkey a
rectification of the Greek frontier. Greece, in fact, was
helplessly in their hands.

TURKEY: A. D. 1897-1899.
Prolonged anarchy in Crete.
The inharmonious "Concert of Europe."
Final departure of Turkish troops and
officials from the island.
Organization of government under Prince George of Greece.

"The autonomous regime promised to this unfortunate island—the

Cuba of Europe—is still [at the end of 1897] apparently far
from realization. In the meantime a most distressing
condition; amounting to practical anarchy, prevails everywhere
except at some ports where the international gendarmerie
maintain a fair semblance of order. So completely have the
houses and property of the Mahometan population been destroyed
by the insurgents that the coming of winter has brought no
prospect to the former but one of desolation and famine.
Considerable pillaging of Christian houses by Mahometan
refugees was also reported from Candia, Kydonia, and other
points. In Candia the Turkish gendarmerie—recruited from the
worst class of Bashi-Bazouks—have proved worse than useless
for keeping order; they connive with the marauders and share
in the pillage. The British occupation is said to be only
nominal. …

"A strange satire upon the concert of Europe and the pretenses
of Western civilization was the circular letter addressed by
the Sultan to the powers, about mid-October, urging upon them
'in firm language' the necessity of promptness in restoring
tranquillity to the disordered island, and warning them of the
dangers of procrastination in this matter. … To accomplish the
pacification of Crete, the Sultan, in the letter referred to,
suggested that the entire population, Christian and Mahometan,
should be disarmed; that the disarmament should be carried out
by Ottoman troops; that the international troops should
co-operate in the work if the powers so desired; that the
entire force should be commanded by a European general in the
Turkish service; that an Ottoman garrison should be
permanently maintained; that the governor should be a
Christian and an Ottoman subject; and that a corps of
gendarmerie should be formed. … Toward the end of October it
was announced that the powers had finally chosen for the post
of governor-general of Crete Colonel Charles Schaeffer, a
native of the grand duchy of Luxemburg, and a man of extended
experience in the Turkish and Egyptian services, … related to
several of the principal houses of the aristocracy at St.
Petersburg, as well as to some of the most influential