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THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Cultural Diplomacy
in Europe
Between the Domestic and the International

Edited by
Caterina Carta
Richard Higgott
The European Union in International Affairs

Series Editors
Sebastian Oberthür
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Brussels, Belgium

Knud Erik Jørgensen

Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

Philomena B. Murray
University of Melbourne
Parkville, VIC, Australia

Sandra Lavenex
University of Geneva
Geneva, Switzerland
This Book Series aims to be a central resource for the growing commu-
nity of scholars and policy-makers who engage with the evolving interface
between the EU and international affairs. It provides in-depth, cutting
edge and original contributions of world-class research on the EU in inter-
national affairs by highlighting new developments, insights, challenges and
opportunities. It encompasses analyses of the EU’s international role, as
mediated by its own member states, in international institutions and in
its strategic bilateral and regional partnerships. Books in the Series exam-
ine evolving EU internal policies that have external implications and the
ways in which these are both driven by, and feed back into, international
developments. Grounded in Political Science, International Relations,
International Political Economy, Law, Sociology and History, the Series
reflects a commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship. We welcome book
proposals relating to the changing role of the EU in international affairs
across policies and the Union’s relations with different parts of the world,
as well as relations with states and multilateral institutions. We are inter-
ested in research on values and norms, interests and global governance
and welcome both theory-informed studies and studies comparing the
EU with other major global actors. To submit a proposal, please contact
Commissioning Editor Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@palgrave.com.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14438
 Caterina Carta · Richard Higgott
Editors

Cultural Diplomacy
in Europe
Between the Domestic and the International
Editors
Caterina Carta Richard Higgott
Department of Political Science Institute for European Studies (IES)
Université Laval Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)
Québec, Canada Brussels, Belgium

The European Union in International Affairs

ISBN 978-3-030-21543-9 ISBN 978-3-030-21544-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21544-6

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To the memory of Simon Duke, a gentle giant of a man
 Preface and Acknowledgements

Over the last few years, especially since 2014, institutional actors and
agents have begun to pay considerable attention on the potential for
international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy to play a role in
the enhancement of Europe’s external relations. This has been an arti-
cle of faith for High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini
during her tenure of office as the High Representative for External
Relations. Ironically, indeed tragically, this widening interest has
occurred at the very time when the ability to project culture and cul-
tural relations across borders has become increasingly difficult. The rise
of identitarian politics, populism and nationalism have had a discernable
“closing” effect on today’s international relations with attendant conse-
quences for both the theory and practice of cultural diplomacy; that is,
both how we explain it and how we practice it.
At the very time that these changes were happening the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research programme put out a call for research con-
sortiums to undertake work on Europe’s cultural and science diplomacy.
The editors of this volume were members of the successful consortium that
secured the funds to undertake this research. The consortium, European
Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID)
engaged in a sustained programme of research across the domains of cul-
ture, science and innovation diplomacy during the period 2016–2019.1

1Its substantial and interesting product can be seen at https://www.el-csid.eu.

vii
viii    Preface and Acknowledgements

This edited volume is but one product of the EL-CSID project. The
majority of the contributors to this volume of essays were engaged in the
activities of the consortium; hence our ability in them to secure a reason-
ably “joined up” view of contemporary European international cultural
relations and cultural diplomacy. Those authors that were not from the
consortium were mostly drawn from the artistic and cultural community.
They have added invaluable hands on practitioner insights to our work
and we thank them.
The literature on European international cultural relations, especially
literature that attempts to combine leading edge conceptual analysis
with contemporary empirical narrative, is not large. Indeed we believe
this volume to be one of, if not the first of its kind. It is thus a volume
we offer in the hope that it will appeal to a wide audience ranging from
scholars interested in diplomacy, and indeed international relations more
generally at one end of the spectrum through officials and policy makers
in the corridors of power in Brussels, and the Foreign offices and cul-
tural agencies of the member states of the EU through to practition-
ers in the cultural community and the cultural industries. In addition
to our practitioners, we would like to thank also our colleagues in the
EL-CSID consortium for their support during the project; especially Luk
VanLangenhove, Elke Boers and Léonie Maes.
The research for this volume was produced with funding support
from the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant
agreement number 693799.
The research in this volume reflects the views of the authors’ only.
The Research Executive Agency of the European Commission is not
responsible for any views that may be made of the information contained
in the volume.

Brussels, Belgium Caterina Carta

March 2019 Richard Higgott
 Contents

1 Introduction: Cultural Diplomacy in Europe:

Between the Domestic and International 1
Caterina Carta

Part I Setting up the Institutional Machinery:

Tuning the Different Voices of European
Cultural Diplomacy

2 EU Cultural Diplomacy: A Contextual Analysis

of Constraints and Opportunities 19
Richard Higgott

3 A Vision of Europe Through Culture: A Critical

Assessment of Cultural Policy in the EU’s External
Relations 41
Stuart MacDonald and Erik Vlaeminck

4 National Ways to Cultural Diplomacy in Europe:

The Case for Institutional Comparison 63
Caterina Carta and Ángel Badillo

ix
x    Contents

5 Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Relations:

A Northern Current in Troubled Waters? 89
Riccardo Trobbiani and Lina Kirjazovaite

6 Towards a Sustainable Approach to EU Education

Diplomacy? The Case of Capacity-Building
in the Eastern Neighbourhood 113
Silviu Piros and Joachim Koops

Part II The Role of Intra-European Cultural Diplomacy

in the Age of Populisms

7 The Influence of Populism and Nationalism

on European International Cultural Relations
and Cultural Diplomacy 141
Richard Higgott and Virginia Proud

8 A Nationalist Agenda in an EU Context: Implications

for Contemporary Culture in Central Europe 167
Virginia Proud

9 ‘Reaching Across the Fault Lines?’: The Role

of Cultural Diplomacy in Post-Brexit Europe 191
Caterina Carta and Eleonora Belfiore

Part III Perspectives on the Future

10 Navigating Uncertainty: The Future

of EU International Cultural Relations 217
Riccardo Trobbiani and Andrea Pavón-Guinea

11 Conclusion: On the Strategic Deployment

of Culture in Europe and Beyond 239
Caterina Carta and Richard Higgott

Index 263
 Notes on Contributors

Ángel Badillo is Senior Analyst on Culture and Language at the Elcano

Royal Institute and Professor at the Department of Sociology and
Communication and at the Iberoamerican institute at the University of
Salamanca.
Eleonora Belfiore is Professor of Communication and Media Studies at
Loughborough University, UK.
Caterina Carta is Associate Professor of International Relations at
Université Laval, Quebec City, Canada. She holds a Canada Research
Chair in Public Diplomacy.
Richard Higgott is Emeritus Professor of International Political
Economy at the University of Warwick and Research Professor at the
IES and Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy Vesalius College, VUB,
Brussels.
Lina Kirjazovaite is Members and Programmes Manager at the EU
National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) network.
Joachim Koops is Scientific Director of the Institute of Security and
Global Affairs (ISGA) at Leiden University. Previously he was Dean
of Vesalius College and director of the think tank Global Governance
Institute.
Stuart MacDonald (SYM Consulting) is a specialist consultant in
international cultural relations. He founded the Centre for Cultural

xi
xii    Notes on Contributors

Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He is a Fellow of the Royal

Society of Arts in London and is currently advising Universities in
Germany and the UK on their EU strategies.
Andrea Pavón-Guinea is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of
Public Communication at the University of Navarra. Her research
focuses on the theory and practice of European public diplomacy.
Silviu Piros is a doctoral researcher at the Institute for European
Studies (IES) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Fellow at the
Global Governance Institute (GGI), in Brussels.
Virginia Proud, L.L.B., M.B.A. is Research Officer at the Vrije
Universiteit Brussel.
Riccardo Trobbiani (UNU-CRIS) is Academic Assistant at the College
of Europe and Project Researcher at the United Nations University
Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS).
Erik Vlaeminck is a Ph.D. student at the University of Edinburgh. He
holds a M.A. in Slavonic and Eastern European Studies from KU Leuven
and a M.A. in Russian and Eurasian Studies from Leiden University.
 List of Figures

Chapter 2
Fig. 1 EU cultural agents and actors 28

Chapter 5
Fig. 1 Policy dialogues and frameworks for Euro-Mediterranean
cultural cooperation 96

Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Populist network activity in Europe 157

xiii
 List of Tables

Chapter 10
Table 1 SWOT of culture in EU external relations 229

Chapter 11
Table 1 Countries’ specific focus and suggested fields
of intervention 247

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Cultural Diplomacy

in Europe: Between the Domestic
and International

Caterina Carta

1  Introduction: Culture, Strategy and Resilience

The 2016 Global Strategy (GS) produced by the new High
Representative Federica Mogherini represented a very much needed plat-
form to rethink the role of an increasingly weakened Europe in volatile
international context. In that, despite their consistency and continu-
ity, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy
represent two different trajectories for the European Union (EU): one
ascending and one descending. In 2003, the EU was still in an expansive
stage. Ten years later, both the EU and the entire continent were turned
upside-down by a series of crises, e.g. the Libyan and Syrian civil wars,
the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee crisis, BREXIT and the rise of populism
and anti-EU parties (Caporaso 2018). The difficulty to deal with exter-
nal crises was further accompanied by a record low support for European
integration even in traditionally pro-European countries. Beyond

C. Carta (*)
Department of Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
e-mail: Caterina.carta@pol.ulaval.ca

© The Author(s) 2020 1

C. Carta and R. Higgott (eds.), Cultural Diplomacy in
Europe, The European Union in International Affairs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21544-6_1
2 C. CARTA

Europe, a less amicable U.S. administration and a less predictable inter-

national context made European strategic thinking even more compel-
ling and needed (Biscop 2016; Higgott and Van Langenhove 2016).
This context underscored a loss of international reputation for the
EU, and a sense of ‘European fatigue’ (Barroso 2012) has ever since
underpinned the EU public rhetoric (Cross 2016). For one thing, insti-
tutional discourses have progressively moved from a ‘normative power’
to a ‘principled pragmatism’ rhetoric, which seeks to ground the EU’s
‘idealistic aspirations’ into ‘the realistic assessment of the strategic envi-
ronment’ (GS 2016: 16). For another, this rhetoric reaffirmed the EU’s
intention to play ‘a very strong regional and global role’ (Mogherini
2016).
Not surprisingly, EU institutional discourses have thus progressively
conceded the existence of a ‘far from academic’ existential crisis (Duke
2014). The Global Strategy referred to threatening ‘times of existential
crisis, within and beyond’ the EU (2016: 5). Van Rompuy acknowledged
the existence of an ‘existential test’ while receiving the Nobel Prize in
2012. Junker alluded to it in his ‘State of the Union’ address in 2016.
Verhofstadt reiterated the theme of a ‘crossroad in 2017’ that encom-
passes the ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ populated by Trump, Putin and radi-
cal Islam.
More and more, the EU strategic thinkers acknowledged that the EU
needs to focus realistically on its objectives and doing so by reflecting
about what kind of actor it wishes and can be, both abroad and at home.
By analogy with Richard Haass’ book Foreign Policy begins at home
(2013), the Global Strategy states that ‘global strategy begins at home’
(2016: 18) and underscored the importance of unifying the domestic
and international parts of the external action equation (EEAS 2017).
Indeed, the relationship between political cohesion and foreign pol-
icy cuts both ways. Just as ‘domestic’ political cohesion is indispensable
to have an effective foreign policy, greater cooperation in foreign pol-
icy matters can act as a ‘domestic’ confidence building measure. In this
context, the concept of resilience—that is, ‘the ability of an individual, a
household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to with-
stand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without
compromising long-term development prospects’ (Council 2013: 1)—
acquired increasing popularity among practitioners and policy pundits in
Europe (Council 2013; Pawlak 2016; Cross and La Porte 2017) as a key
component of the EU domestic/international strategy.
 1 INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE … 3

Current EU references to culture are hence to be situated in the

broader discourse on how to overcome the EU’s ‘existential crisis’
(Barroso 2012) and further located in the attempt to foster domestic and
international societal resilience. Culture is thus imbricated in a bundle of
domestic/international priorities. With its ductile, omnipresent nature,
‘culture’ relates to the economic activities of the European cultural and
creative sector (Commission 2016); development (Council 2017); and
‘non-material development and economy’ (European Parliament 2011).
Culture in International Relations (CiIR) is seen as a key vector for
‘addressing major global challenges’ (GS 2016: 2) and as a reservoir of
‘immaterial’ antibodies that allow the EU ‘to live up to its values inter-
nally and externally’ (GS 2016: 1).
Hence, the relevance of ‘culture’ as a vector of international politi-
cal strategy draws on three interrelated considerations. First, as with
its crucial role in the process of meaning-making (McNamara 2015:
27), ‘culture’ encompasses both domestic and international arenas and
goals. Second, if compared to public diplomacy, CiIR offers a platform
for ‘long-term’ political projection and programming (Nye 2009), and
allows broader relationships which go beyond the realm of so-called
‘high politics’, typically associated with narrow conceptions of security.
CiIR thus offers the EU the possibility of going beyond the ‘speaking
with one voice’ mantra and to ‘engage with its own diversity’ (Macaj
and Nicolaïdis 2014). Finally, linking foreign policy objectives to culture
offers the possibility to capitalise on a far less controversial—e.g. seem-
ingly depoliticised—symbolical repertoire. Hence, with the ‘normative
pedigree’ of the EU is under strain, ‘culture’ offers a defused way to
rebuild its soft power repertoire.
However, strategising CiIR comes with challenges. The EU is a mul-
tilayered political system that presents significant coherence-related chal-
lenges. The way in which its member states (MSs) organise their cultural
policies, both domestically and internationally, has a bearing upon the
making of a common EU strategy. Different ‘national ways to CD’ high-
light the existence of different practices of ‘doings and sayings things’
(Schatzki 2012: 20; Pouliot 2016; Adler-Nissen 2016), stemming from
various material and immaterial cultural heritages, resources, institutional
philosophies, structures and strategic conceptions (Lamo de Espinosa
and Badillo Matos 2017).
The European Commission’s 2007 Agenda for culture in a glo-
balising world and the Joint Communication ‘Towards an EU Strategy
4 C. CARTA

for International Cultural Relations’ bear witness of these reflections.

Critically, the documents connected culture and international cultural
relations to the concept of strategy, a role further reiterated in both
the 2016 European Global Strategy and the 2017 Conclusions on a EU
strategic approach to international cultural relations. But what does it
mean to approach international cultural relations strategically? And how
strategic effectively is the EU in developing its own strategic approach
International Cultural Relations?
The EU’s increasing resort to culture for both internal (i.e. fostering
European cohesion and advancing integration) and external (i.e. mit-
igating the demise of other soft power components) purposes calls for
an analysis of the strategic role of culture for the EU, especially as it
relates to the realm of external action. This book constitutes a step in this
regard. It provides a conceptual discussion on CiIR and examines how
this concept relates to that of Cultural Diplomacy (CD), International
Cultural Relations (ICR) and Cultural Strategy (CS). It then discusses
its role and relationship with both the GS and the current EU’s attempts
to foster the EU’s political and societal resilience. This book proposes a
way of conceptualising ‘culture’ as an object of strategy based on a four-
edged act of programming which includes: (a) the definition of the field
(encompassing both culture and cultural diplomacy); (b) the setting up
of a network connecting different societal and institutional actors (which
proceeds from an act of mapping of both institutional and cultural actors
and resources); (c) the prioritisation of global actions (along geographi-
cal and/or thematic lines); and (d) the establishment of a wide semantic
field around which different narratives can be inlayed.

2  Mobilising Culture in International Relations: Four

Strategic Dimensions and Associated Puzzles
All contributors in this volume acknowledge that the deployment of
cultural symbols, messages and resources requires a strategy, e.g. a blue-
print for mapping, selecting, ranking, mobilising, framing and deploying
different (human, immaterial and material) resources in the pursuit of
stated goals.
In the first place, mobilising CiIR relies on the definition of cul-
ture for external purposes, which in turn requires both a definition of
what culture and its field of action are supposed to be. Culture is one
 1 INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE … 5

of the most difficult concepts of the English language (Williams 1983).

‘Culture’ is not a unified system of meaning (O’Sullivan et al. 1994: 68);
it does not offer a framework providing ultimate values that shape or ori-
ent behavior, but rather ‘a repertoire or “toolkit” of habits, skills, and
styles’ (Swidler 1986: 273). The architrave of things such as ‘national
cultures’ or ‘national identities’ is abstract and impersonal, apt to be
adapted, imitated and learnt over time and space (Andersen 1983: 155–
158). Drawing on such a minimalistic script, these social constructions
are discursive representations or habiti, in Bourdieu’s terms (1992), that
are constantly adapting to a dynamic context, and to the perception of
what is constructed as different. Inherently diverse, culture does not
offer any univocal policy script. Engaging in diplomatic activities through
the evocation of culture thus implies the representation of a ‘collective
cultural agency’, one that is staged through processes of selective elabo-
ration of common stories. ‘CiIR’, thus, suggests a process of fabrication.
The slippery nature of ‘culture’ also comes with policy challenges. As
both the concept of ‘art’ and ‘creativity’ are virtually borderless, the deci-
sion of what to include and how to prioritise the policy domain is highly
relevant since it draws on material and immaterial heritage and strives to
allocate scarce resources.
In the second place, as with the cultural multilayered policy frame-
work, CiIR needs to rely on a solid institutional framework and to mobi-
lise and coordinate a high number of public and private institutional and
societal actors who intervene in cultural practices to various extents and
by virtue of different provisions both within and without the borders of
the state. To do so, it has to activate an organisational field, i.e. a ‘het-
erogeneous set of functionally interconnected organisations’ (Knoke
2001: as quoted in Brown 2012: 7) to coordinate different administra-
tive actors and establish a societal network (Zaharna 2007; Slaughter
2009; Lord 2010). From the institutional point of view, different admin-
istrative traditions (Painter and Peters 2010) provide an organisational
and cognitive framework around which states design, steer and conduct
their CD activities (Katzenstein 1996: 23). Intra- and inter-organisa-
tional differences at the national level reflect different beliefs about the
nature of the government, administrative structures which deal with cul-
tural policies and ‘objectives regarding the whole area of culture and the
art’ (Cummings and Katz 1987: 4). In turn, this organisational and cog-
nitive framework informs the way of organising relations with a pleth-
ora of public and private actors that perform both cultural and cultural
6 C. CARTA

diplomatic activities, within and without states’ borders. To simplify

these differences, we can place the states’ strategic traditions along a con-
tinuum indicating whether they tend to adopt (a) a top–down approach
(centralised, leading from above) to CD; or (b) a bottom–up (decentral-
ised, leading from behind) approach. At the one end of the spectrum,
top–down approaches centralise CD activities around the MFA or the
Ministry of culture and reflect a more hands-on intervention of the cen-
tral government in cultural diplomatic activities. At the opposite end of
the spectrum, bottom-up approaches mostly rely on quasi-independent
agencies (e.g. Cultural Institutes, CIs) and steer CD indirectly, through
both their ability to establish funding and audit schemes, performance
indicators and negotiate strategic guidelines. While these mechanisms
allow the government some oversight over activities of the CIs, the ‘arm
length’ of societal and organisational actors tends to be less intrusive.
Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) can gener-
ally be conceived as the driving force of CD strategies. However, CD
functions are ‘spread across multiple organisations’ (Brown 2012: 7).
Beyond the MFA, CD avails of the collaboration with other branches of
the executive—e.g. the Ministries of Education and/or Culture, Cultural
Heritage, Economic Development and Innovation—let alone a pleth-
ora of public actors below the central level, like federate states, regions,
provinces or cities, universities, theaters, etc. Critically, finding ‘cultural
ambassadors’ in the creative sector requires an act of mapping and selec-
tion of private actors that are potentially eligible for sponsorship. By lev-
eraging their control over central funds and taxation revenues, and their
ability to act as gatekeepers of CD activities, states strive to sway different
public and private actors into their discursive orbit ‘to whatever extent’
they can (Fox 1999: 2–3).
Indeed, CD aims to ‘steer’, ‘shape’ and ‘channel’ cultural products
and relations that grow organically within society (Lenczowski 2011:
162). In this regard, CD is not to be confused with a closely related con-
cept, that of ‘International Cultural Relations’ (ICR). The definitions
of ICR and CD substantiate both the inherent co-presence of sponta-
neous and institutionally led cultural practices and the need to con-
ceptually distinguish them. ICR alludes to ‘relations between national
cultures… lodged in any society’ that ‘cross borders’ (Arndt 2005).
In turn, CD has been alternatively regarded as ‘the linchpin of public
diplomacy’ (Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy 2005), that
 1 INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE … 7

draws on ideas, arts and creativity to ‘win “foreigners” voluntary alle-

giance’ (Schneider 2006: 3), either by fostering ‘mutual understanding’
(Cummings 2003: 1); or manipulating ‘cultural materials and person-
nel for propaganda purposes’ (Barghoorn 1960: 10). Hence, while ICR
occurs spontaneously and disorderly, CD provides ICR with an overarch-
ing framework.
In the third place, not dissimilarly from any external and foreign pol-
icy activity, CD entails the definition of areas of geographical/thematic
priorities and rests on the ability to make sense of the partners’ organ-
isational culture and structures and the composition of their private
cultural sector. In terms of thematic priorities, the attempt is made to
operationally bridge domestic and international EU cultural initiatives,
even though in terms of access and strategic designs this is not always
the case (Lisack 2014). In terms of prioritising global partners, both the
preparative actions and the ensuing country reports reflected a mix of
regional and global ambitions. On the one hand, priority was given to
Southern and Eastern neighbouring countries. On the other hand, the
EU designed specific strategies targeting its so-called Strategic Partners
(Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa,
South Korea and the USA).
Lastly, instead of directly shaping CD messages, a CS strives to artic-
ulate an overarching discursive framework that seeks to give meaning
to the different actors, activities and messages that compose a given
‘national culture’. To this end, institutional attempts to strategically
deploy CiIR messages are to be conceived as flexible discursive themes,
which allow various symbols, messages, scripts and actors to move freely
within a pre-established semantic template. Indeed, international actors
articulate an overarching discursive framework that seeks to give meaning
to the different actors, activities and messages that make up a country’s
culture. In other term, states try to strategically develop core cultural
narratives, as instruments ‘to extend their influence’ (Miskimmon et al.
2013: 2). Micromanagement is to be avoided. A CS works better with-
out formal or specific instructions (e.g. the diplomats coordinate, but
do not impose either the contents or modes of representation, Fisher
2007). Hence, ‘the measure of power is connectedness’ (Slaughter
2009), that is, the ability to draw on ‘values webs’ in which ‘suppliers
become partners and, instead of just supplying products, actually collab-
orate in their design’ (Slaughter 2009).
8 C. CARTA

Hence, much like Public Diplomacy, CiIR activities reveal that states
and other entities strive to acquire ‘influence through impression man-
agement’ ‘as an integral part of the policy planning’ (Mor 2006: 157).
This reflection underscores the importance of strategic communication
in the making of international public relations and public diplomacy (Van
Dike and Vercic 2009). The term strategic communication refers to a
method ‘that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies pol-
icy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks”, develops
themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic
and tactical dynamics, and monitors success’ (US Office of the Under
Secretary of Defence 2004: 2). International strategic communication
constitutes an all-encompassing approach—ranging from public diplo-
macy to public affairs, from international broadcasting to military infor-
mation operation—that strives to achieve long-term stated goals through
the planned used of three factors: the message, the media channels and
the audience(s) (Bockstette 2008).
In this framework, culture is a ‘good’ that carries ‘values’ (Hillman-
Chartrand 1992: 135): it draws on a diversified and dynamic societal
source, allows to communicate with a wide audience and potentially
serves and enhances various goals in parallel. CiIR can be strategi-
cally used to maximise an entity’s international influence, by means
of ‘enlarg[ing] the circle of those able to serve as influential interpret-
ers between this and other nations’ (State Department, Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs 1973, quoted in Scott-Smith 2008:
173). They can serve an economic rationale, i.e. by promoting activi-
ties that generate economic returns to one’s constituency (Grant and
Wood 2004). Moreover, they underpin cultural cooperation, build trust
(Higgott 2017) and promote intercultural understanding (Luke and
Morag 2013). The co-presence of different goals bears no contradiction:
‘culture’ is a polysemous concept which offers an extremely fluid seman-
tic repertoire serving a variety of purposes. While CiIR does pursue a
variety of goals, the relations between CiIR and foreign policy objec-
tives is rarely manifest. Self-projection or ‘the desire to create a good
impression’ (Demos 2013: 13) avails of a far wider symbolic toolkit and
transcends immediate goals (Nye 2009). CiIR is thus an instrument of
foreign policy, but its goals, messengers, semantic repertoire and scope of
action is wider and more diffuse.
 1 INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE … 9

3  The Contributions to This Volume

The atypical status of the EU adds an additional layer of challenges to
a coherent international cultural strategy (Helly 2017; Isar 2015). The
EU needs to coordinate the activities of its sovereign MSs in an area that
intercepts two core symbolic fields (e.g. foreign policy and culture). For
one thing, ‘culture’ as an object of policy intercepts the work of different
Directorates Generals (DGs) within the Commission and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) and is discussed in various Council con-
figuration. ‘Speaking culture strategically’ requires not just the ability of
establishing virtuous networks of public and private actors, but also the
ability of bridging policy areas that straddle the domestic/international
distinction. For another, European attempts to ‘speaking culture strate-
gically’ reflect different national understandings of how ‘strategy’ applies
to external goals, which in turn translates into different organisational
philosophies and ways of setting up, managing and relating to cultural
networks.
Hence, while the EU offers its MSs the possibility of drawing on extra
funds, visibility and resources, it also comes with an extra layer of insti-
tutional complexity. The difficulties of defining the borders and rules of
the organisational field are amplified by both the inherent plurality of
national institutional stakeholders and the segmentation of arts, heritages
and the creative sectors across the MSs. In this framework, at most, the
EU ‘contributes, encourages and, “if necessary” supports and supplements’
cooperation between the MSs in areas of ‘dissemination of the culture
and history of the European people’; ‘cultural heritage of European sig-
nificance’; ‘non-commercial cultural exchanges’; and ‘artistic and literary
creation’ (art. 167 TFEU). ‘Speaking culture’ thus requires the ability to
unite a fragmented and decentralised policy-making environment and to
bridge policy areas that straddle the domestic/international distinction.
The contributions to this volume acknowledge both these challenges
and the crucial role of ‘culture’ to foster both the EU’s and its partners’
political and societal resilience. They further acknowledge that culture
as an object of strategy entails a four-edged act of programming which
includes: (a) the definition of the field (encompassing both culture and
cultural diplomacy); (b) the setting up of a network connecting different
societal and institutional actors (which proceeds from an act of mapping
of both institutional and cultural actors and resources); (c) the prioriti-
sation of global actions (along geographical and/or thematic lines); and
10 C. CARTA

(d) the establishment of a wide semantic field around which different

narratives can be inlayed.
Accordingly, the book is composed of two parts. Part I—Setting Up
the Institutional Machinery: Tuning the Different Voices of European
Cultural Diplomacy—explores the institutional and organisational
designs that underpin the current attempt to develop a strategy to mobi-
lise CiIR. It glances over the mechanisms of cooperation, the strategies
adopted to mobilise the cultural network and offers case studies of the
EU’s action on the ground.
In his contribution, Richard Higgott delves into the global and insti-
tutional constraints on the European strategic approach to ICR in the
wake of the 2016 Joint Communication and the 2017 adoption of a
strategy for ICR. He examines opportunities, but more pertinently the
constraints on the development of a European strategy for ICR and CD.
It identifies three types of constraints—structural (politico-economic
context), ideational (defining the appropriate normative agenda for
ICR-CD) and agential (the role of people and institutional agents).
Stuart MacDonald and Erik Vlaeminck look specifically at the
symbolic and discursive dimension of the current attempts to develop
a strategy for ICR. Their contribution focuses on two key aspects of a
successful strategy: the definition of the field, and the need for a shared
discursive framework within which the many policies, cultural and other
actors involved can generate a shared sense of purpose and shape strat-
egies. They notice that the terminology used in key documents often
reflect the need to produce texts which can be agreed upon, rather than
systematic terminology which is subject-field driven. This inhibits the
development of strategies as important sites for ‘narrating the EU into
existence as an actor’.
The contribution of Caterina Carta and Ángel Badillo offers a plat-
form for analysing the cultural diplomatic models in Europe in a compar-
ative perspective. It focuses specifically on the French, German, Spanish
and UK models, as indicative of larger trends in Europe. Their chapter,
hence, looks at cultural policy and diplomacy from a state’s perspective
and discusses the criticalities that such differences impose over the mak-
ing of a coherent EU’s cultural strategic approach.
Riccardo Trobbiani and Lina Kirjazovaite seek to provide an analy-
sis for the practices of intercultural cooperation developed in the frame-
work of the EU relations with the Middle East and North Africa. They
notice that, in the absence of a single institutional framework, the EU
 1 INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE … 11

and its MSs have put in place initiatives for cultural cooperation with
the MENA based on ‘variable geometries’—creating various fora, pro-
grammes, platforms and networks managed by different actors.
Joachim Koops and Silviu Piros glance into Education Diplomacy.
Although education diplomacy is often not referred to as a direct com-
ponent of CD, their effects are mutually reinforcing. Their chapter takes
steps from the consideration that the 2016 Global Strategy acknowl-
edges the role of education in building societal resilience, both in the
near-abroad and beyond. They hence zoom into the case of the Eastern
Partnership (EaP), which provides a framework for supporting reform
and modernisation of higher education through EU-Easter Partnership
institutional cooperation. The chapter thus explores the role and rele-
vance of institutional reform and capacity building in the field of higher
education, as enablers of EU education diplomacy and long-term tools
to strengthen societal resilience. In particular, it analyses the role of
TEMPUS in the EaP countries of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.
Part II—The Role of Intra-European Cultural Diplomacy in the
Age of Populisms—glances into current attempts to deploy culture as a
tool to increase European societal resilience and as an antidote to current
populist challenges.
Richard Higgott explores the nature of ‘the populist beast’ and the
extent to which it has infiltrated the European political and policy pro-
cess. He pays particular attention to the role of emerging communica-
tion technologies and practices as a key enabler of the what he calls the
Populist Nationalist Zeitgeist (PNZ). His chapter investigates trends and
practices of populist movements. It focuses specifically on the cultural
dynamics of foreign policy and the degree to which actors (from both
government and civil society) can develop strategies of cultural resilience
against the populist nationalist urge.
Virginia Proud delves into the rhetoric and actions of nationalist par-
ties in Hungary and Poland. She highlights the way ‘culture’ is used stra-
tegically to fuel a climate of suspicion of the ‘Other’, specifically against
refugees and migrants. However, she also shows how independent voices
in the arts and culture communities are currently reaching out for inter-
national collaboration as a means of survival, and to EU and interna-
tional networks as a source of resilience.
Caterina Carta and Elenora Belfiore explore both the potentials and
limits of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy as policy-instruments in
the post-Brexit relationships between the United Kingdom (UK) and the
12 C. CARTA

EU (EU). Their contribution provides a general mapping of the reac-

tions of the cultural policy and diplomacy world to the Brexit, by spe-
cifically looking into both strategic assessments and specific initiatives
promoted to mend the rip between the UK and the EU, both at the
political and at the societal level.
Part III—Perspectives on the Future assesses the challenges associated
to the EU’s current attempt to develop its strategic approach to ICR.
The contribution of Riccardo Trobbiani and Andrea Pavón-Guinea
draw on recent developments to perform a Strengths-Weaknesses-
Opportunities-Threat (SWOT) Analysis of the EU’s strategic approach.
They identify several factors that could potentially impact over the future
of EU ICR. These range from the rise of populist and nationalist forces
both within and outside Europe to the challenges this rise imposes to
intercultural trust and tolerance at the global level. The chapter argues
that, notwithstanding the uncertainty and volatility that characterise the
current international scenario, investing in stronger EU cooperation in
ICR remains a priority for EU leadership. Drawing on the distinction
between CD and ICR, they suggest that an EU strategic approach to
ICR rooted in development policy and intercultural dialogue bears the
promise to facilitate cooperation among EU institutions, MSs and their
cultural institutes, as well as broader cultural networks based on innova-
tive models.
Finally, the conclusions critically address the question on how ‘stra-
tegic’ and integrated is the EU in the making of its approach to ICR,
by drawing on the conceptual and empirical findings highlighted by the
contributions to this book. They recap and critically discuss the main
findings of the various contributions and advance policy recommenda-
tions in the four elements of CS that the book has identified.

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the western part) of the plain of Esdraelon is meant; compare 1
Chronicles x. 7, note.

²³And the archers shot at king Josiah; and the

king said to his servants, Have me away; for I
am sore wounded.
23. the archers shot] Compare the death of Ahab, xviii. 33. 1
Esdras i. 29, “the princes came down against king Josias,” is an
inferior reading due probably to a misreading of the Hebrew.

for I am sore wounded] The very words ascribed to Ahab (xviii.

33), and further the verb rendered I am wounded is used only in
these two passages: a singularly strong witness to the view that the
present story has been influenced by that of Ahab’s death.

²⁴So his servants took him out of the chariot,

and put him in the second chariot that he had,
and brought him to Jerusalem; and he died,
and was buried in the sepulchres of his
fathers. And all Judah and Jerusalem
mourned for Josiah.
24. the second chariot] War chariots were small, with (apparently)
only standing room for their occupants; see the illustrations of
Egyptian and Assyrian chariots given in the Encyclopedia Biblia i.
724‒730. This “second chariot” was probably of a larger kind,
suitable for travelling.

25 (= 1 Esdras i. 32; not in 2 Kings).

The Lamentations for Josiah.

²⁵And Jeremiah lamented for Josiah: and all

the singing men and singing women spake of
 Josiah in their lamentations, unto this day; and
they made them an ordinance in Israel: and,
behold, they are written in the lamentations.
25. lamented] i.e. “composed (or uttered) an elegy.” The Hebrew
word (ķōnēn) suggests formal composition, and the actual words of
lamentation are often given, as in 2 Samuel i. 17 ff., iii. 33, 34;
Ezekiel xxvii. 33, xxxii. 2, 16. The elegy in question is not preserved
in the book of Jeremiah or elsewhere. Doubtless the Chronicler or
his source had real grounds for his statement about the popular
Songs of Lament for Josiah, and we may suppose that one of these,
rightly or wrongly, was ascribed to Jeremiah.

an ordinance] compare 2 Samuel i. 18.

in the lamentations] In some lost work, not in our canonical book

of the Lamentations, for the contents of the canonical book lend no
support whatever to the view that it is referred to here (see further
Encyclopedia Britannica¹¹, s.v. Lamentations, p. 128).

26, 27 (= 1 Esdras i. 33; 2 Kings xxiii. 25, 28).

The Epilogue to Josiah’s Reign.

²⁶Now the rest of the acts of Josiah, and his

good deeds, according to that which is written
in the law of the Lord, ²⁷and his acts, first and
last, behold, they are written in the book of the
kings of Israel and Judah.
26. according to that which is written] Compare the strong terms
used in 2 Kings xxiii. 25, “like unto him was there no king before him,
that turned to the Lord with all his heart ... according to all the law of
Moses; neither after him arose there any like him.”
 Chapter XXXVI.
1‒4 (= 1 Esdras i. 34‒38; 2 Kings xxiii. 30b‒34).
The Reign of Jehoahaz.

¹Then the people of the land took Jehoahaz

the son of Josiah, and made him king in his
father’s stead in Jerusalem.
1. the people of the land took] Compare xxvi. 1, xxxiii. 25.

Jehoahaz] Called “Shallum” in 1 Chronicles iii. 15; Jeremiah xxii.

11. He was younger than Jehoiakim; verse 5.

²Joahaz was twenty and three years old when

he began to reign; and he reigned three
months in Jerusalem.
2. in Jerusalem] His mother’s name is here omitted; compare
xxxiii. 1, 21, xxxiv. 1. According to 2 Kings xxiii. 32 (compare Ezekiel
xix. 3, 4) Jehoahaz “did evil.”

³And the king of Egypt deposed him at

Jerusalem, and amerced the land in an
hundred talents of silver and a talent of gold.
3. deposed him at Jerusalem] The clause answers to 2 Kings
xxiii. 33, “put him in bands at Riblah in the land of Hamath, that he
might not reign in Jerusalem.” Perhaps we should read the same
words in Chronicles The Hebrew words for “deposed” and “put in
bands” are liable to be easily confused.

amerced] Authorized Version condemned. For “amerce” in the

sense of “fine,” compare Deuteronomy xxii. 19; and for “condemn” in
the same sense see Amos ii. 8 (Authorized Version, “fined” Revised
Version).

an hundred talents of silver and a talent of gold] The land was

poorer than in the days when Sennacherib had imposed a fine on
Hezekiah of “three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold”
(2 Kings xviii. 14).

⁴And the king of Egypt made Eliakim his

brother king over Judah and Jerusalem, and
changed his name to Jehoiakim. And Neco
took Joahaz his brother, and carried him to
Egypt.
4. changed his name to Jehoiakim] This name is compounded
with the Divine name Jehovah. Probably Neco made the new king
swear fealty by Jehovah, and then declared his official name to be
Jehoiakim, in order that he and his people might have something to
remind them of the oath he had taken. (Eliakim = “God establishes”;
Jehoiakim = “Jehovah establishes.”) The rendering of this verse in 1
i. 38 is due to misreadings of the Hebrew.

took Joahaz ... to Egypt] He died in Egypt; 2 Kings xxiii. 34;

Jeremiah xxii. 12.

5‒8 (= 1 Esdras i. 39‒42; 2 Kings xxiii. 36‒xxiv. 6).

The Reign of Jehoiakim.

⁵Jehoiakim was twenty and five years old

when he began to reign; and he reigned
 eleven years in Jerusalem: and he did that
which was evil in the sight of the Lord his
God.
5. and he reigned eleven years] So also in Kings. The statement,
however, is lacking in 1 Esdras i. 39, so that it is a highly probable
inference that the text of Chronicles has here been harmonised with
Kings; compare verse 15, and Introduction § 3, p. xxii.

in Jerusalem] The Chronicler omits his mother’s name (compare

verse 2, note) and also the statement that he raised the indemnity
imposed by Neco by means of a poll-tax (2 Kings xxiii. 35).

he did that which was evil] Compare 2 Kings xxiii. 37; Jeremiah
xxii. 13‒18, xxvi. 20‒23, xxxvi. 1‒32.

⁶Against him came up Nebuchadnezzar king

of Babylon, and bound him in fetters, to carry
him to Babylon.
6. Nebuchadnezzar] The correct form of his name is
“Nebuchadrezzar” (so generally in Jeremiah and Ezekiel); in the
inscriptions Nabu-kudurri-uṣur. The name is Assyrian and means “O
Nebo, defend the crown” (or “the boundary”), Nebo being a god who
was regarded as the son of Marduk, the chief god of Babylon
(compare Isaiah xlvi. 1). Nebuchadrezzar reigned from 604‒561
b.c., and was succeeded by Evil-Merodach (Amil-Marduk). The only
purely historical inscription relating to his reign deals with a
campaign in Egypt in 568 b.c.; compare Jeremiah xliii. 11.

came up] It seems probable that Nebuchadrezzar did not in

person come up against Jerusalem at the end of Jehoiakim’s reign,
nor in person carry off any of the sacred vessels; it is likely moreover
that Jehoiakim was not carried to Babylon. The result of Jehoiakim’s
rebellion against Nebuchadrezzar was according to 2 Kings simply
that “bands” of Chaldeans and their allies invaded Judah. Probably
Jehoiakim’s life and reign came to an end (how we do not know;
compare Jeremiah xxii. 18, 19) during this petty warfare, and then
three months later, the main Chaldean army under Nebuchadrezzar
having arrived, Jerusalem was taken, and Jehoiakim’s son and
successor Jehoiachin was carried off with the golden vessels of the
house of the Lord to Babylon. The Chronicler seems to foreshorten
the history at this point.

⁷Nebuchadnezzar also carried of the vessels

of the house of the Lord to Babylon, and put
them in his temple ¹ at Babylon.
¹ Or, palace.

7. of the vessels] There is no mention in 2 Kings of the removal of

sacred vessels during Jehoiakim’s reign. Some were carried off
under Jehoiachin, the rest under Zedekiah; 2 Kings xxiv. 13, xxv. 13‒
17. Compare last note.

in his temple] So LXX.; 1 Esdras i. 39 [41]; Daniel i. 2. Note the

margin, “in his palace.” The Hebrew word (heykāl) is a loan-word;
the original (ikallu) is the ordinary word in Assyrio-Babylonian for
“palace.”

⁸Now the rest of the acts of Jehoiakim, and his

abominations which he did, and that which
was found in ¹ him, behold, they are written in
the book of the kings of Israel and Judah: and
Jehoiachin ² his son reigned in his stead.
¹ Or, against.

² In 1 Chronicles iii. 16, Jeconiah. In Jeremiah xxii. 24, Coniah.

 8. that which was found in him] i.e. his sin (in this context);
compare 1 Kings xiv. 13.

of Israel and Judah] The LXX. (but not 1 Esdras) adds here “And
Jehoiakim slept with his fathers, and was buried in the garden of
Uzza with his fathers.”

9, 10 (= 1 Esdras i. 43‒45; compare 2 Kings xxiv. 8‒17).

The Reign of Jehoiachin.

The account given in 2 Kings contains much that is not given in

Chronicles and, in particular, many details of the first captivity of
Judah.

⁹Jehoiachin was eight ¹ years old when he

began to reign; and he reigned three months
and ten days in Jerusalem: and he did that
which was evil in the sight of the Lord.
¹ In 2 Kings xxiv. 8, eighteen.

9. Jehoiachin] Called “Jeconiah,” 1 Chronicles iii. 16, where see

note.

eight years] So LXX. (B) of Chronicles and Esdras (B); but the
number is probably corrupt for eighteen, so LXX. (A) of Chronicles
and Esdras (A) and Hebrew and LXX. of 2 Kings xxiv. 8. It is
possible that the words “and ten days” in the latter part of the verse
are a misplaced fragment of an original ben shĕmōneh ‘esreh
shānāh, i.e. “eighteen years old.”

in Jerusalem] The Chronicler here omits the king’s mother’s

name (compare verse 2, note), though she was a person of some
influence; compare 2 Kings xxiv. 12; Jeremiah xxii. 24‒26; and
perhaps Jeremiah xiii. 18 (Revised Version).
 he did that which was evil] Compare Jeremiah xxii. 24; Ezekiel
xix. 5‒9.

¹⁰And at the return of the year king

Nebuchadnezzar sent, and brought him to
Babylon, with the goodly vessels of the house
of the Lord, and made Zedekiah his brother
king over Judah and Jerusalem.
10. at the return of the year] Compare 2 Samuel xi. 1 = 1
Chronicles xx. 1, “at the return of the year, at the time when kings go
out to battle.” This would be in the spring.

brought him to Babylon] Not the king only, but also certain
leading men and craftsmen and smiths (in number 3023) went into
captivity—so Jeremiah lii. 28; compare Jeremiah xxiv. 1, and 2 Kings
xxiv. 14 (where the size of the deportation is magnified into “all
Jerusalem save the poorest of the land—even ten thousand
captives”).

Zedekiah] A covenant-name like “Jehoiakim”—(verse 4, note); it

seems to mean “Righteousness of Jehovah”; compare the significant
title in Jeremiah xxiii. 6, “The Lord is our Righteousness.”
Zedekiah’s original name was “Mattaniah” (i.e. “gift of Jehovah”); 2
Kings xxiv. 17.

his brother] In 2 Kings (more accurately) “his father’s brother”;

compare 1 Chronicles iii. 15, 16, notes.

11‒19 (= 1 Esdras i. 46‒56; compare 2 Kings xxiv. 18‒xxv. 21;

Jeremiah xxxvii. 1‒xxxix. 8, lii. 1‒27).
Reign of Zedekiah. Destruction of Jerusalem.

¹¹Zedekiah was twenty and one years old

when he began to reign; and he reigned
 eleven years in Jerusalem:
11. in Jerusalem] The Chronicler omits, as usual, his mother’s
name. She was “Hamutal, the daughter of Jeremiah of Libnah” (2
Kings xxiv. 18), and was mother of Jehoahaz also (2 Kings xxiii. 31).
Jehoiakim was by a different mother (2 Kings xxiii. verse 36).

¹²and he did that which was evil in the sight of

the Lord his God; he humbled not himself
before Jeremiah the prophet speaking from
the mouth of the Lord.
12. humbled not himself] Jeremiah consistently advised Zedekiah
to submit to the Chaldeans; but the king partly through fear of his
princes, partly through illusive hopes, could never bring himself to do
so; compare Jeremiah xxi. 1‒7, xxxiv. 8‒22, xxxvii. 1‒10, 17, xxxviii.
17‒23.

¹³And he also rebelled against king

Nebuchadnezzar, who had made him swear
by God: but he stiffened his neck, and
hardened ¹ his heart from turning unto the
Lord, the God of Israel.
¹ Hebrew strengthened.

13. who had made him swear by God] Compare Ezekiel xvii. 11‒
19.

¹⁴Moreover all the chiefs of the priests, and the

people, trespassed very greatly after all the
abominations of the heathen; and they
 polluted the house of the Lord which he had
hallowed in Jerusalem.
14. polluted the house] Jeremiah vii. 9‒11, xxiii. 11‒14; Ezekiel
viii. 5‒16.

¹⁵And the Lord, the God of their fathers, sent

to them by his messengers, rising up early
and sending; because he had compassion on
his people, and on his dwelling place:
15. rising up early and sending] The words are absent from 1
Esdras i. 50, and are perhaps a late addition to Chronicles derived
from Jeremiah; compare Jeremiah xxvi. 5. See note on verse 5
above.

¹⁶but they mocked the messengers of God,

and despised his words, and scoffed at his
prophets, until the wrath of the Lord arose
against his people, till there was no remedy ¹.
¹ Hebrew healing.

16. mocked the messengers] Jeremiah was imprisoned, beaten,

and threatened with death, Urijah (Jeremiah xxvi. 20‒23) was put to
death. Of the fate of Habakkuk (who probably lived during the
Chaldean period, Habakkuk i. 6) nothing is known.

¹⁷Therefore he brought upon them the king of

the Chaldeans, who slew their young men with
the sword in the house of their sanctuary, and
had no compassion upon young man or
 maiden, old man or ancient: he gave them all
into his hand.
17. Chaldeans] Their name in Hebrew is Casdim and in Assyrio-
Babylonian Caldu (the change of “s” for “l” before a dental is not
uncommon in the latter language). They were a people originally
living south of Babylon on the sea, but Nabopolassar, father of
Nebuchadrezzar, conquered Babylon and established a Chaldeo-
Babylonian Empire.

in the house of their sanctuary] Compare Ezekiel’s vision of the

slaughter; Ezekiel ix. 1‒11.

¹⁸And all the vessels of the house of God,

great and small, and the treasures of the
house of the Lord, and the treasures of the
king, and of his princes; all these he brought
to Babylon.
18. all the vessels] i.e. all the vessels which remained after the
previous spoliation (verse 10). They were perhaps chiefly of brass;
compare 2 Kings xxv. 13‒15.

¹⁹And they burnt the house of God, and brake

down the wall of Jerusalem, and burnt all the
palaces thereof with fire, and destroyed all the
goodly vessels thereof.
19. brake down the wall] The Hebrew verb here used (nittēç)
implies a more thorough breaking down than the pāraṣ of xxv. 23
(see note), xxvi. 6.

20, 21 (= 1 Esdras i. 57, 58).

The Captivity.
 ²⁰And them that had escaped from the sword
carried he away to Babylon; and they were
servants to him and his sons until the reign of
the kingdom of Persia:
20. to him and his sons] Compare Jeremiah xxvii. 7. There were
three kings of Babylon after Nebuchadrezzar before Cyrus
established Persian rule, viz. Evil-Merodach (Amil-Marduk) (2 Kings
xxv. 27), Neriglissar (Nergalšar-uṣur), and Nabonidus (Nabu-na’id).
The last two kings were usurpers. Neriglissar was (it seems) son-in-
law to Nebuchadrezzar (Hommel, Babylonia in Hastings’ Dictionary
of the Bible, 1. 229a, or Sayce in Encyclopedia Britannica¹¹, iii. pp.
105, 106). Whether Nabonidus was connected with the royal house
is not known.

²¹to fulfil the word of the Lord by the mouth of

Jeremiah, until the land had enjoyed her
sabbaths: for as long as she lay desolate she
kept sabbath, to fulfil threescore and ten
years.
21. by the mouth of Jeremiah] Compare Jeremiah xxv. 11, xxix.
10.

her sabbaths] i.e. years, occurring every seventh year, when the
land was to be allowed a respite from cultivation; compare Leviticus
xxv. 1‒7, xxvi. 34, 35.

threescore and ten years] i.e. two whole generations. It is

probable that the Chronicler intended to suggest that the Sabbatical
years had been neglected throughout the period (about 490 = 70 × 7
years) during which the kingdom lasted; but, if so, he treats the point
somewhat loosely, not troubling about the objection that the reigns of
the several God-fearing kings (David, Solomon, Jehoshaphat) would
need to be subtracted from this total, and that actually the number of
violated Sabbatical years would fall considerably below 70.

22, 23 (= Ezra i. 1‒3a] 1 Esdras ii. 1‒5a).

Cyrus Decrees the Rebuilding of the Temple.

These verses are obviously inappropriate as the conclusion of

Chronicles, and their proper place is as the opening words of the
book of Ezra, where also they are given. Their exposition properly
belongs to the commentaries on Ezra or Esdras, to which
accordingly the reader must be referred for fuller notes. These
verses were retained here when the separation of Ezra‒Nehemiah
from Chronicles was made (see Introduction, § 2), either through
mere accident, or perhaps to indicate that Chronicles had originally
formed one work with Ezra and Nehemiah, but most probably in
order to avoid a depressing termination to the book. This last point
carries no small weight in view of the fact that in the Hebrew Bible
Chronicles is the last book. It is interesting to note that to avoid
closing the book of Isaiah with the terrible verse (lxvi. 24) which is
actually its conclusion, it was customary to repeat after verse 24
some hopeful words taken from verse 23. Compare also the last
verses of 2 Kings.

²²Now in the first year of Cyrus ¹ king of

Persia, that the word of the Lord by the
mouth of Jeremiah might be accomplished,
the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of
Persia, that he made a proclamation
throughout all his kingdom, and put it also in
writing, saying,
¹ Hebrew Coresh.

22. Cyrus king of Persia] Cyrus, the Persian, was at first king of a
small state in Elam, to the east of Babylonia. In 549 b.c. he
conquered the king of the Medes, and so became founder of the
Medo-Persian Empire. In 546 b.c. he overthrew the famous
Croesus, king of Lydia, and advancing against Babylon entered it
after a short and easy campaign in 538 b.c.—a career of meteoric
brilliance. By his “first year” is meant 537 b.c., his first year as ruler
of the Babylonian Empire.

stirred up the spirit] Compare 1 Chronicles v. 26; Haggai i. 14.

made a proclamation] compare xxx. 5. The phrase is

characteristic of the Chronicler.

²³Thus saith Cyrus king of Persia, All the

kingdoms of the earth hath the Lord, the God
of heaven, given me; and he hath charged me
to build him an house in Jerusalem, which is in
Judah. Whosoever there is among you of all
his people, the Lord his God be with him, and
let him go up.
23. All the kingdoms of the earth] The king of Babylon bore the
title of “king of the four quarters of the world.” Cyrus succeeded to
this title on his conquest of Babylon.

let him go up] i.e. to Jerusalem; compare Ezra i. 3. Since

Chronicles is the last book according to the order of the Hebrew
Canon, these encouraging words conclude the Hebrew Bible.
 INDEX
Abiathar,
39 f., 102, 120, 142, 167
Abib,
339
Abijah,
218 ff.
Abimelech (Ahimelech),
102, 120, 142
addīrīm,
273
Adullam, the cave of,
81, 88, 211
Adversary, the, see Satan
Ahab,
240 ff.
Ahaz,
292 ff.
Ahaziah (Jehoahaz),
263 ff., 284
Akaba, the Gulf of,
202
Alamoth, set to,
104
Alexander the Great,
xv, xix, xlix, 4
Algum trees,
174, 204
Aliens in Israel,
98, 120, 134, 173, 176, 312
Altar of incense, the,
139, 162, 185, 289
Altar-pillars,
83, 224, 313
Amaziah,
279 ff.
Ambushment,
223, 254
Amen,
111, 115
Amerce,
346
Ammon, Ammonites,
121, 125 f., 249, 291 f.
Amon, King of Judah,
329
Anachronisms,
164 f., 261
Anathoth,
84
Angel,
130 f.
Antonia, the Tower of,
163
Apes,
206
Arabians,
1, 238, 287;
invasion by, 226, 262 f.
Aram (= Syria),
9, 17, 119, 122
Aramaic,
9, 321
Ariel,
83
Ark, the,
94 ff., 101 ff., 186 ff., 339
Armourbearer,
74
Asa,
223 ff.
Asaph,
42 ff., 103, 107, 112, 145, 188
Ascent of the sepulchres, the,
324
Ashdod,
287
Asherim (Ashērah, Ashērim, Ashēroth),
224, 231, 237, 247, 277, 313, 320, 325 f., 331
Ashtaroth (Ashtoreth),
49, 75
Asshur-bani-pal,
6, 317, 327
Assyria, Assyrians,
8 f., 297 ff., 316 ff., 327
Assyrian monuments,
122, 206, 317, 320, 327
Athaliah,
266 ff.
Attent (= attentive),
194
Augury,
325
‘azārāh,
184, 250 f.
Azariah, another name for Uzziah,
23, 285
Azariah the prophet,
li, 228 ff.

Baal (Baalim), use and disuse of the title,

22, 31, 59, 63, 180, 236, 275;
the house of, 272;
altars of, 325, 331
Babylon,
327;
kings of, 351
Bädeker, Palestine, referred to,
32, 34, 47, 50, 57, 96, 99, 119 f., 150, 199, 211, 231 ff.,
250, 264, 266, 287, 291, 297 f., 318, 320, 323
Balsam trees,
100
bāmōth,
231, 320
bānāh,
211
Barnes, W. E., referred to,
lx;
(in Expositor), 78, 81;
(in Expository Times), 118;
(on Kings), 172, 185, 240, 285, 293, 322;
(in Journal of Theological Studies), 180
Bashan,
35
Bath (a measure for liquids),
175, 182
Bearers,
173, 176
Beauty of holiness,
110, 254
Beer-sheba to Dan,
128, 308
bĕgādim,
335
Belial, sons of,
219
Ben-hadad,
233
Benzinger, I., referred to,
xxxiii, 238, 307
Beracah, valley of,
255
Beth-Dagon,
75
Beth-el,
57, 222
Beth-horon,
 49, 199
Beth-shean (Beth-shan),
58, 75
Beth-shemesh,
47, 283, 298
Bezalel,
17, 170
bīrāh, bīrāniyyōth,
163, 238
Bliss, Dr, Excavations at Jerusalem,
318 f.
Boaz,
180
Book of the law, see Law
Brasen altar, the,
180 f., 196, 201
Brasen sea, the, see Sea
Brass,
118
Brook of Egypt,
196
Brother (= fellow-tribesman),
88
Burning for the dead,
235, 263
Burning of the dead,
76
Burnt offerings,
106, 141, 195, 306, 313