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Textbook Ebook A Short History of Sino Soviet Relations 1917 1991 1St Ed 2020 Edition Zhihua Shen All Chapter PDF
Textbook Ebook A Short History of Sino Soviet Relations 1917 1991 1St Ed 2020 Edition Zhihua Shen All Chapter PDF
A Short History of
Sino-Soviet Relations,
1917–1991
Edited by
Zhihua Shen
China Connections
This series between China’s Social Science Academic Press and Palgrave
Macmillan explores the connections which exist between China and the West,
and those which exist between China’s heritage and its relevance to the key
challenges of our modern world. The books in this series explore China’s his-
torical legacy, and how the changes and challenges faced by China, and the
lessons learned, are central to solving the global issues we face today in fields as
varied as health, education, employment, gender equality, and the environ-
ment. This series makes a case for the importance and forms of connections
between China and the rest of the world, offering a platform for the active
development of research and policy connections which brings together scholars
from across the geographical and topical spectrum to showcase the very best of
Chinese scholarship to the world.
A Short History of
Sino-Soviet Relations,
1917–1991
Translated by Yafeng Xia (Preface, and Parts II and III),
Hongshan Li (Part I), and Xiaohong Liu (Part IV)
Editor
Zhihua Shen
East China Normal University
Shanghai, China
The print edition is not for sale in China Mainland. Customers from China Mainland
please order the print book from: Social Sciences Academic Press. ISBN of the China
Mainland edition: 978-7-5097-8366-5
Published with the financial support of the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and
Social Sciences
China Connections
ISBN 978-981-13-8640-4 ISBN 978-981-13-8641-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8641-1
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore
Pte Ltd.
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189721, Singapore
Preface
v
vi PREFACE
due to the paucity of original documents (the archives in the two countries
were not open to researchers) and the limitations in research methodology
(scholars mainly relied on political science and international relations
approaches), little work of academic value was published during the Cold War.
Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and with the rise of the “New
Cold War History” research approach, during the past decade, several Western
scholars, such as Lorenz Lüthi, Sergey Radchenko, Austin Jersild, and Jeremy
Friedman, among others, have explored the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations
during the Cold War period based on newly released archival sources and have
published works of significant academic value.1
Within China, due to prolonged ideological restrictions coupled with the lack
of access to archival materials, academic research on Sino-Soviet relations remained
a “forbidden area,” and publications on the subject were considered “revisionist
political texts.” This situation gradually began to change in the 1980s, and with
China’s “ideological emancipation” and the declassification of primary archival
sources in both China and the Soviet Union, a new generation of Chinese scholars
began to open a window to the history of Sino-Soviet relations.
All the authors in this volume, myself, together with Li Danhui, Niu Jun,
and Yang Kuisong, were born in the 1950s. We personally experienced and
were deeply affected by the legacy of the “revolutionary era.” For us, our stud-
ies on the history of Sino-Soviet relations are not only an academic activity;
they also represent our responses to the intellectual and political issues of the
time. It is precisely our concern about such “intellectual issues” that differenti-
ates our work from that of Western scholars.
In the mid-1990s, together with Chen Jian, Niu Dayong, Zhang Baijia, and
Zhang Shuguang, we formed close bonds due to our common academic inter-
ests. During the last 20 years, we have worked together to mentor a younger
generation of Cold War historians in China. The four authors in this volume
approach their respective topics with great passion. Li Danhui, Niu Jun, and
Yang Kuisong write about the history of Sino-Soviet relations from the per-
spective of Chinese diplomacy, whereas in Part II, I examine the topic from the
perspective of Soviet diplomacy. Together, we frequently attended conferences,
participated in trips abroad, shared documents, and debated various issues.
This volume represents the fruit of our many years of academic collaboration.
The evolution in the study of Sino-Soviet relations from a “forbidden area”
to producing major works attracting the attention of current Chinese leaders
and resulting in excellent university textbooks is indicative of the great changes
in the understanding of history taking place within mainstream Chinese soci-
ety. Indeed, this book is a reflection of the academic pursuits by Chinese histo-
rians of our generation.
From an academic perspective, our work is characterized by the following:
First, we have made use of declassified and published and unpublished archi-
val sources from Russia, China (including Taiwan), and the United States, as
well as eyewitness accounts and oral history materials (including reports by
three generations of Russian-language interpreters for Mao Zedong). In addi-
PREFACE vii
tion, we have made great efforts to obtain all available Russian historical mate-
rials. During the last 20 years, we have been closely following the progression
of declassification and the availability of Russian archival documents, have
sought both official and private Chinese historical materials, and have used and
promoted the opening of the Chinese archives.
Second, in order to restore the original face of this history, we offer a series
of new perspectives and interpretations of many well-known historical events,
such as the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, the characteristics of
Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s, the Chinese evaluation of the 1956 Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the Sino-
Soviet border negotiations, among others. Although many of our views are still
open to debate, they represent a reflection of our current level of understand-
ing. Every generation writes its own history, and this work exemplifies the inter-
pretations of this history by members of our generation. Nevertheless, as
scholars, we are making great efforts to offer “value-free” judgments.
Third, this book covers 74 years in the history of Sino-Soviet interactions,
that is, from 1917 to 1991. It proceeds chronologically as well as historically.
Such a presentation is relatively rare in the currently available Western-language
sources on this topic. The main story line is the evolution of the changes in
CCP-CPSU relations. Prior to 1949, CCP-CPSU relations and Sino-Soviet
state relations proceeded in tandem but at various times they also intersected.
After the CCP seized national power in China in 1949, the two relationships
merged. Since then, although Sino-Soviet state relations underwent varying
periods of alliance, honeymoon, cooperation, divergence, rupture, and con-
flict, CCP-CPSU party-to-party relations remained dominant. Only when
Sino-Soviet state relations were gradually restored in the 1980s did the two
sides realize that the party should not take the place of the state and Sino-
Soviet state-to-state relations should dominate the bilateral relationship. In
effect, this is a more accurate meaning of Sino-Soviet “normalization.”
This book is structured on the basis of the above perspective: Part I covers
32 years (1917–1948), whereas Parts II, III, and IV cover only 43 years
(1948–1991). This framework better reflects the historical stages, highlighting
the dominant role and then the changing status of CCP-CPSU relations.
Fourth, all the authors in this volume are historians, and they have no for-
mal training in international relations theory. Thus, the focus of this book is on
the historical process. Nevertheless, the history of international relations and
the theory of international relations are closely related. Studies based on the
theory of international relations are premised on historical studies, and likewise
historical studies cannot be divorced from theory. In this regard, this book
attempts to combine both theory and process. For one, we provide a new ana-
lytical framework to understand Sino-Soviet normalization based on three fac-
tors: the historical structure of state-to-state relations, domestic politics, and
China-US-USSR triangular relations. This framework represents a novel and
creative innovation in current scholarship. Additionally, in our attempt to ana-
lyze the fundamental causes for the rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance, we seek
viii PREFACE
Note
1. Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the
Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 (Washington DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford: and Stanford University Press,
2009); Austin Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); and Jeremy Friedman, Shadow
Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2015).
Contents
Preface v
Notes on Contributors xiii
Abbreviations xv
ix
x Contents
21 Embarking on “Normalization”343
Jun Niu
Further Reading387
Index389
Notes on Contributors
xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xv
PART I
On the eve of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao
Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman, identified the major
factors that made it possible for the CCP to take over the national government.
One was the Russian Revolution that “delivered Marxism and Leninism to us.”
The other was the victory of the Russian Revolution that provided an example.
“Take the Russian path, this is the conclusion.”
However, the first Chinese who sought assistance from the Russians was Sun
Yatsen, a “petty bourgeois revolutionary” who was initially overlooked by the
Russian Communists. Moscow began to offer comprehensive guidance and
assistance to the Nationalist (Guomindang) Party led by Sun Yatsen in the
autumn of 1923. Within four or five years, it managed to turn the small orga-
nization that had been operated by Sun for four decades into the most power-
ful political force in China, with a “party army” that was able to unify the
mainland by force.
In sharp contrast, the CCP, established with Soviet help in 1921, had only
several dozen members at the beginning and in its early years was forced to
operate underground. The party followed Moscow’s instructions and allowed
many of its members to join the Nationalist Party. It was able to rapidly grow,
while at the same time it helped the Nationalist Party to expand. However, its
conflicts with the Nationalist Party were inevitable because there was no true
loyalty to the latter. As soon as Sun passed away, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek),
a military man, became the leader of the Nationalist Party. All Communists
were expelled from the Nationalist Party and forced to engage in a Russian-
style “Soviet Revolution” in the countryside.
In 1928, the Nationalist Party managed to consolidate its rule over China.
The Communists, who could only survive and grow in the rural areas far away
from the major cities, found it difficult to effectively challenge the ruling status
of the Nationalists. However, as Mao Zedong recognized in his later years, the
Japanese invasion significantly changed the political order in China. On the
one hand, Moscow immediately readjusted its policy toward China as it too
faced grave challenges from the Japanese. On the other hand, as the “Soviet
2 Uncertain Adversaries, 1917–1948
Revolution” had suffered disastrous defeats, Mao Zedong, a leader who was
goot at military strategy, extremely pragmatic, and known for his independent
thinking, began to rise within the CCP. Thus, the CCP was gradually resur-
rected after the War of Resistance Against Japan began in 1937. Within eight
years, the number of its members and army soldiers grew from about 20,000
to over 1 million, giving it the power to challenge the Nationalist government,
which had lost one-half of China to the Japanese invaders.
The impact of Soviet Russia, later the Soviet Union, on the development of
Chinese politics and history between the 1920s and the 1940s is obvious. Both
the Nationalist and the Communist parties owed much of their success to
Soviet Russia. Their setbacks were also closely tied to the Soviet interventions.
However, the political ecology within China and its complex relations with the
outside world greatly enriched the history of modern China and left countless
stories worth pondering by later generations.
CHAPTER 1
Kuisong Yang
Ever since the Opium War in 1840, China had been forced into the status of a
semi-colony, constantly bullied and oppressed by the foreign powers. To
change this situation, many determined and capable Chinese worked to learn
from the West. However, prior to the Russian October Revolution in 1917,
China became even more vulnerable because of the ongoing contentious wars
among the warlords. When the Chinese again pinned their hopes on the United
States and other countries for just treatment after the victorious ending of
World War I, the unjust decisions made at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
forced many radical intellectuals and young students to look to revolutionary
Russia, which was moving toward socialism. As Soviet rule expanded from
Europe to the Far East, the Russian Bolsheviks, led by V. I. Lenin, based on
their belief in world revolution, began to export the Russian revolutionary
experience to the Far East. On the one hand, the Soviets had to follow the
tradition of the capitalist world when dealing with the Chinese government at
diplomatic venues. On the other hand, they firmly held on to their anti-capital-
ist ideology and worked hard to find allies among the various radical forces in
China. Thus, Soviet Russia not only helped organize the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) but it also chose the Nationalist Party, led by Sun Yatsen, to guide
China on the track of the world revolution.
K. Yang (*)
Contemporary China Study Institute, East China Normal University,
Shanghai, China
e-mail: yks@vip.sina.com
made many young Chinese intellectuals aware that “a massive new world trend
is now beginning to rise in Eastern Europe” and that “a Russian-style revolu-
tion, a socialist revolution, will spread.” Li Dazhao, a professor at Peking
University who had carefully studied the socialist revolutions in Russia and
Europe via Japanese newspapers and magazines, publicly stated that “regarding
the current changes in Russia, we should heartily welcome them as the dawn of
a new civilization … and [we] should not be pessimistic simply because of the
temporary disorder that is now being observed.”
Entering 1919, even the Northern Sea warlords and the Anhui politicians
began to organize research associations on socialism. However, the Chinese
understanding of a socialist revolution, as Qu Qiubai, a prominent leftist writer
said, was not quite clear, just like “observing the morning fog through a screen
window. … The factions and the meaning of socialism are a mess, not quite
clear to the Chinese; just like a dam gate closed for a long time, once it opens
numerous currents rush out, foaming and thundering, yet without any prede-
termined direction.” However, one thing was clear. Regardless of whether
Chinese national feelings would be hurt by the results of the Paris Peace
Conference, the rapid rise of a socialist ideology in China and the impact of
ideas from the Soviet Russian Revolution on Chinese society had become
obvious.
athered in Paris for the Peace Conference, many elites and reporters, with
g
great hopes for “justice over power,” flocked to the city, waiting for the good
news that China would be granted justice by the Paris Peace Conference.
Therefore, the Chinese were greatly shocked when the Paris Peace Conference
ignored the pleas from the Chinese government as well as international law and
allowed Japan to continue its occupation of the Jiaodong Peninsula. Once this
news spread to China, the entire nation became indignant and many young
students poured onto the streets, not only beginning the massive anti-Japanese
May Fourth Movement but also radicalizing many young intellectuals
and students.
After 4 May, people in China began to pay more attention to socialist ideol-
ogy. However, since the Soviet Russian Red Army had not yet arrived in the Far
East region, information about the Russian Revolution came only indirectly
from Japan, Europe, and America. Thus, the minds of radical Chinese intel-
lectuals were filled not with Bolshevism but with anarchism and ideas about
“mutual-assistance,” “pan-labor,” “work-study,” “collaboration,” and “new
villages” were tainted with ideas about anarchism. However, in sharp contrast
to the situation at the turn of the century, almost all people participating in
discussions about the path for a fundamental reform of Chinese society began
to recognize that the laborers were the greatest force in the world and labor
was most sacred and honorable. Many Chinese firmly believed that laborers
were the creators of everything, whereas capitalists, bureaucrats, warlords, and
so forth were nothing but shameful looters. The root cause for social inequality
was “private property and private enterprises,” and the revolutions in Russia,
Austria, Hungary, and Germany were revolutions for the proletariat to com-
pletely eliminate such inequalities. Chinese believed, “for sure, this uprising
will soon spread here.”
Between the summer and autumn of 1919, the Soviet Russian government
established a solid footing in the European part of Russia and began pushing
toward Asia. In order to help the Chinese public understand that Chinese pol-
icy positions were unlike those of the other powers, on 26 August 1919, the
Chinese issued a “Statement from the Soviet Russian Federative Socialist
Republic Government to the Chinese People and the Governments in North
and South China.” The statement declared that the Red Army had marched
east across the Ural Mountains not to bully or enslave other people but to “let
people rid themselves of the shackles of foreign bayonets and foreign money.”
To demonstrate its willingness to help the Chinese, the Soviet Russian govern-
ment also declared that it was “willing to return everything looted from the
Chinese people by the Tsarist government, either alone or in collaboration
with the Japanese and other entente nations.” Upon hearing this diplomatic
statement by the Soviet Russian government, many Chinese civilians sent tele-
grams to the Soviet Russian government to express their gratitude, and their
positive feelings toward the Russian Revolution grew dramatically.
At the time, Soviet Russia was still focusing on Europe. This was based on
the traditional Leninist as well as the Marxist views that a socialist revolution in
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— Sinun sanasi, aasintamma, on tukaatin arvoinen, ja minä
lähetän sen sinulle jo tänään, mutta muissa kohdin sinä kuitenkin
puhut pötyä, pötyä, paljasta pötyä: tiedä, hölmö, että me kaikki täällä
olemme vailla uskoa vain kevytmielisyydestä, sillä meillä ei ole
aikaa: ensiksikin asiat ovat haittaamassa ja toiseksi on Jumala
antanut niukasti aikaa, määrännyt vuorokauteen ainoastaan
neljäkolmatta tuntia, niin että ei jää aikaa kunnollisesti
nukkumiseenkaan, saati sitten katumukseen. Mutta sinä siellä luovuit
uskosta kiduttajien edessä, kun sinulla ei ollut mitään muuta
ajateltavaakaan kuin usko ja kun sinun juuri piti osoittaa uskoasi!
Tämähän, veliseni, on luullakseni tiukka paikka?
8.
Konjakin ääressä
Kiista päättyi, mutta, kumma kyllä, Fjodor Pavlovitš, joka oli ollut
niin iloisella päällä, rypisti äkkiä kulmiaan. Rypisti kulmiaan ja kulautti
kurkkuunsa konjakkia, mutta se ryyppy oli jo aivan liikaa.
— Ei tietenkään kannata.
— Pyh! Tai ehkäpä olet oikeassa. Ah, minä olen aasi, — lausui
äkkiä Fjodor Pavlovitš lyöden kevyesti otsaansa. — No, seisokoon
sitten luostarisi paikoillaan, Aljoška, jos niin on. Mutta me, viisaat
miehet, istumme lämpimässä ja nautimme konjakkia. Tiedätkö, Ivan,
että tämän on varmaankin Jumala itse vartavasten näin järjestänyt?
Ivan, sano: onko Jumala olemassa vai ei? Seis: sano varmasti, puhu
vakavasti! Mitä sinä taas naurat?
— Suuressa määrin.
— No sitten minäkin olen venäläinen mies ja minussa on
venäläinen piirre, ja sinutkin, filosofin, voi saada kiinni omassa
luonteessasi piilevästä samantapaisesta piirteestä. Tahdotko, että
otan kiinni? Lyödään vetoa, että jo huomenna otan kiinni. Mutta
sanohan kumminkin: onko Jumala olemassa vai eikö? Mutta
vakavasti! Minä tarvitsen nyt vakavan vastauksen.
— Jumala on olemassa.
— Ei ole kuolemattomuuttakaan.
— Eikö minkäänlaista?
— Ei minkäänlaista.
— Täydellinen nolla.
— On.
— Rakastan.
— Saattaa olla.
— Todellakin?
— Juuri niin. Mutta minä kunnioitan häntä. Hänessä on jotakin
mefistomaista tai paremmin sanoen jokin määrä Aikamme
sankaria… Arbenin, vai mikä sen nimi oli… se on, näetkö, hän on
hekumoitsija. Hän on siinä määrin lihallinen, että minä pelkäisin
tyttäreni tai vaimoni puolesta, jos tämä menisi hänen luokseen
ripittäytymään. Tiedätkö, kun hän alkaa kertoa… Pari vuotta
takaperin hän kutsui meidät luokseen teetä juomaan ja tarjosipa
likööriäkin (rouvat lähettävät hänelle likööriä), ja kun hän alkoi
kuvailla entisiä aikoja, niin me pitelimme mahojamme… Varsinkin
kun hän kertoi, miten oli parantanut erään hervottoman. »Jos jalkoja
ei kivistäisi, niin minä», sanoi, »tanssisin erään tanssin». Mitäs
semmoisesta arvelet? »Paljon olen, sanoi, elämäni aikana tehnyt
ihmetemppuja.» Kauppias Demidovilta hän pimitti
kuusikymmentätuhatta.
— Kuinka, varastiko?
— Etkä lähde. Sinä tahdot täällä pitää minua silmällä, sitä sinä
tahdot, paha henki, ja siksi et lähdekään?
— No, mitäpä siitä. Uh, päätä kivistää. Korjaa pois konjakki, Ivan,
sanon sen jo kolmannen kerran. — Hän vaipui ajatuksiinsa ja alkoi
äkkiä hymyillä pitkää ja viekasta hymyä: — Älä suutu, Ivan, vanhaan
rahjukseen. Minä tiedän, että sinä et pidä minusta, mutta älä
kuitenkaan suutu. Eipä minussa olekaan mitään rakastamista. Käyt
Tšermašnjassa, minä tulen itse luoksesi, tuon tuomisia, minä neuvon
sinulle siellä erään tyttösen olen jo kauan sitten pannut hänet siellä
merkille. Toistaiseksi hän on vielä paljasjalka. Älä pelkää
paljasjalkaisia, älä halveksi — ne ovat helmiä!…
— Ivan, Ivan! Anna pian hänelle vettä! Hän on aivan kuin äitinsä,
aivan niinkuin äitinsä silloin! Pirskoita suustasi vettä hänen päälleen,
niin minä tein äidille. Äitinsä tähden hän noin, äitinsä tähden… —
mutisi hän Ivanille.
9.
Hekumoitsijat
Dmitri ilmestyi äkkiä taas saliin. Hän oli tietysti huomannut toisen
oven olevan lukossa, ja tuon lukitun sisäänkäytävän avain oli
todellakin Fjodor Pavlovitšin taskussa. Kaikkien huoneitten kaikki
ikkunat olivat myös kiinni, eikä Grušenjka siis ollut voinut mistään
tulla eikä mistään hypätä ulos.
— Aleksei! Sano vain sinä minulle, vain sinua minä uskon: oliko
hän täällä äsken vai eikö? Minä näin hänet itse, kun hän äsken juuri
livahti säleaidan ohi tälle puolelle. Minä huudahdin, hän juoksi pois…
— Mutta minä näin hänet… Siis hän… Otan heti selville, missä
hän on… Hyvästi, Aleksei! Aisopokselle älä nyt hiisku sanaakaan
rahoista, mutta mene heti Katerina Ivanovnan luo ja sano
välttämättömästi: »Käski sanoa terveisiä, käski sanoa terveisiä,
terveisiä! Nimenomaan sanoa terveisiä ja jäähyväiset!» Kerro
hänelle kohtaus.
— Hitto soikoon, jos minä en olisi kiskaissut häntä irti, niin kenties
hän olisi tappanut siihen paikkaan. Paljonko Aisopos tarvitsee? —
kuiskasi Ivan Fjodorovitš Aljošalle.
Aljoša hätkähti.
— Yhäkö te sitä, jotta oliko hän täällä vai eikö? — lausui Aljoša
surullisesti.
— Ei, ei, ei, minä uskon sinua. Mutta asia on tämä: pistäydypä
sinä Grušenjkan luona itse tai koeta jollakin tavoin tavata hänet. Ota
kyselemällä häneltä selvä pian, mahdollisimman pian, arvaa itse
näkemäsi perusteella: kumman puoleen hän tahtoo taipua, minunko
vai hänen? No? Mitä? Voitko sen tehdä vai etkö?