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ELECTRIFICATION
This page intentionally left blank
ELECTRIFICATION
ACCELERATING THE ENERGY
TRANSITION
Edited by

Pami Aalto
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
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 Contents

Contributors ix 3. How to accelerate electrification? The

Preface xi leverage of policies
PAMI AALTO, KIRSI KOTILAINEN, BENJAMIN SOVACOOL,
MERT BILGIN, AND KIM TALUS

I 3.1 Introduction 57
3.2 The interests driving policy-makers 59
Framework for transition to 3.3 How policy-makers can catalyze change: Types of
electrification policy instruments 63
3.4 How do policy-makers formulate policies? 67
1. Introduction: electrification and the energy 3.5 From policies to solutions 71
References 72
transition
€
PAMI AALTO, TERESA HAUKKALA, SARAH KILPELAINEN,
AND MATTI KOJO

1.1 Electrification as the “new oil” 3

1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification? 9 II
1.3 Technological part-solutions 12
1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders? 13 Part-solutions
1.5 Structure of the book 17
References 21 4. How can society accelerate renewable energy
production?
2. Globally and locally applicable technologies
TERESA HAUKKALA, HANNELE HOLTTINEN,
to accelerate electrification JUHA KIVILUOMA, AKIHISA MORI, SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN,
€ €
SARAH KILPELAINEN, KIM TALUS, AND PAMI AALTO
C. JOHANNES MUTH, PAMI AALTO, FANNI MYLLARI,
€
TOPI RONKK € AND PIRKKO HARSIA
O,
4.1 Introduction 79
2.1 Introduction 25 4.2 The problem: Constraints on accelerating wind and
2.2 Wind power 26 solar power generation 80
2.3 Solar energy 29 4.3 Policies 86
2.4 Hydropower 33 4.4 Case study: Policies for accelerating renewable energy
2.5 Marine power 36 in the EU 88
2.6 Bioenergy 37 4.5 Case study: Federal and state-level policies in the
2.7 Geothermal energy 44 USA 93
2.8 Small modular nuclear reactors 47 4.6 Case study: The battle against nuclear power in
2.9 Conclusion 48 Japan 95
Appendix 1: Overview of technology features of low carbon 4.7 Conclusion: Policy mixes for different phases of RES
energy sources 49 integration 97
References 50 References 98

v
vi
5. The role of energy storage and backup
solutions for management of a system with a
high amount of variable renewable power
JUHA KOSKELA, SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN, TAIMI VESTERINEN,
HANNELE HOLTTINEN, JUKKA KONTTINEN,
€
PERTTI JARVENTAUSTA, JUHA KIVILUOMA, PAMI AALTO,
AND KIM TALUS
5.1 Introduction 105
5.2 Energy storage options and features in flexible
systems 107
5.3 Battery storage in the USA 109
5.4 Gas engines and heat storages in future power
systems 112
5.5 The case of household-level batteries 118
5.6 Conclusion 121
References 122
6. Toward smarter and more flexible grids
€
SAMI REPO, HANNELE HOLTTINEN, TOMAS BJORKQVIST,
KIMMO LUMMI, JUSSI VALTA, LASSE PELTONEN, AND
€
PERTTI JARVENTAUSTA
6.1 Introduction 125
6.2 Smart grids in electrical energy system
transformation 127
6.3 Need for flexibility 129
6.4 Case study: Large-scale industrial loads as flexible
resources 132
6.5 Case study: Smart metering 134
6.6 Case study: Power-based grid tariffs 136
6.7 Case study: Energy communities and microgrids 138
6.8 Conclusion and implications 144
References 145
7. Policies for climate-neutral road transport
MATTI KOJO, KALLE ARO, KIRSI KOTILAINEN,
€ AKK
AKIHISA MORI, ANNA PA € ONEN,
€ ANTTI RAUTIAINEN,
JUSSI VALTA, PAMI AALTO, JUKKA KONTTINEN, AND
BENJAMIN SOVACOOL
7.1 Introduction 149
7.2 What do we know? 150
7.3 The problem: Constraints on electrification in road
transport 153
7.4 Policies 155
7.5 Case study: Policies for accelerating the EV sector in
the Nordic countries 157
7.6 Case study: EV policies in China and Japan 161
Contents
7.7 Case study: Emission reduction in the heavy-duty
transport sector by means of biogas 165
7.8 Conclusions: Policy lessons 167
References 170
8. Electrification and energy efficiency in
buildings: Policy implications and interactions
SIRJA-LEENA PENTTINEN, KARI KALLIOHARJU, JAAKKO SORRI,
JUHANI HELJO, AND PIRKKO HARSIA
8.1 Introduction: What does electrification mean in the
context of buildings? 175
8.2 The problem: Policies for electrification and energy
efficiency 177
8.3 Case study: The EU’s “energy efficiency first” principle
in the electrification of buildings 178
8.4 Case study: Implementation of EU legal rules in
Finland 181
8.5 Interlinkages of energy-efficiency policies with the
electrification of buildings 189
8.6 Conclusion 193
References 194
9. From energy consumers to prosumersdhow
do policies influence the transition?
KIRSI KOTILAINEN, JUSSI VALTA, ULLA A. SAARI, MATTI KOJO,
AND ILKKA RUOSTETSAARI
9.1 Introduction 197
9.2 What is energy prosumerism? 198
9.3 The problem: How to engage consumers in the energy
system transition? 200
9.4 Case studies 206
9.5 Conclusions 212
References 213
10. Anticipating future trends in energy
transition: Multilevel dynamics in energy policy
agenda-setting
JARI KAIVO-OJA, JARMO VEHMAS, AND JYRKI LUUKKANEN
10.1 Introduction 217
10.2 The problem: Path dependency in a large technical
system 218
10.3 Trend pyramid framework combined with the
multilevel perspective 220
10.4 The national level: Discursive struggles on energy
policy in Finland 221
 Contents vii
10.5 From national to global level: Big data References 270
analyses 225 Further reading 270
10.6 From micro-level niches to global level: Scientific
debates 240 12. Analyzing electrification scenarios for the
10.7 Conclusions 240 northern European energy system
References 242
ESA PURSIHEIMO AND JUHA KIVILUOMA

III 12.1 Introduction 271

12.2 Scenarios for 2030 273
Combining part-solutions 12.3 A scenario for 2050 277
12.4 Results: the scenario for 2030 278
11. How to combine various solutions in a 12.5 Results: the 2050 case 283
national context? 12.6 Conclusions 286
References 288
€
TOMAS BJORKQVIST, € MAJANNE, AND MATTI VILKKO
YRJO

11.1 Introduction 247 13. Toward a roadmap for electrification

11.2 Case study: The Finnish power system 248 PAMI AALTO, MATTI KOJO, AND AKIHISA MORI
11.3 Scenarios for future electric power system
development in Finland 254 13.1 Introduction 289
11.4 Analysis of scenarios for future electric power system 13.2 Electrification and phases of transition 292
development in Finland 257 13.3 How to move from one phase to another:
11.5 Discussion 265 electrification in practice 298
11.6 Policy recommendations 268 References 299
Appendix 1. Hot water heat storages connected to district
heating networks in use and already decided Index 301
projects 269
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 Contributors
Pami Aalto Faculty of Management and Business/
Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Kalle Aro Faculty of Management and Business/
Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Mert Bilgin Department of Political Science and
International Relations, School of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Medipol University, Istanbul,
Turkey
Tomas Bj€ orkqvist Faculty of Engineering and Natu-
ral Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineer-
ing Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Pirkko Harsia Faculty of Building Services Engi-
neering, Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit,
Tampere University of Applied Sciences, Tampere,
Finland
Teresa Haukkala Aalto University School of Busi-
ness, Espoo, Finland
Juhani Heljo Faculty of Built Environment, Civil
Engineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Hannele Holttinen Recognis Oy, Espoo, Finland
Pertti J€arventausta Faculty of Information Technol-
ogy and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engi-
neering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Jari Kaivo-oja Finland Futures Research Centre,
University of Turku, Tampere, Finland; Kazimiero
Simonaviciaus University, Vilnius, Lithuania
Kari Kallioharju Faculty of Built Environment, Civil
Engineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland; Faculty of Building Services Engineering,
Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit, Tampere
University of Applied Sciences, Tampere, Finland
Sarah Kilpel€ainen Faculty of Management and
Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tam-
pere, Finland
ix
Juha Kiviluoma VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland Ltd., Espoo, Finland
Matti Kojo Faculty of Management and Business/
Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Jukka Konttinen Faculty of Engineering and Natu-
ral Sciences/Materials Science and Environmental
Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Juha Koskela Faculty of Information Technology
and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Kirsi Kotilainen VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland Ltd., Espoo, Finland
Kimmo Lummi Faculty of Information Technology
and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Jyrki Luukkanen Finland Futures Research Centre,
University of Turku, Tampere, Finland
Yrj€
o Majanne Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineering
Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Akihisa Mori Graduate School of Global Environ-
mental Studies, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Kyoto
Prefecture, Japan
C. Johannes Muth Faculty of Management and
Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tam-
pere, Finland
Fanni Myll€ari Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Anna P€ a€
akk€onen Enmac Oy, Tampere, Finland;
Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences/Mate-
rials Science and Environmental Engineering, Tam-
pere University, Tampere, Finland
Lasse Peltonen Faculty of Information Technology
and Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineer-
ing, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
x Contributors
Sirja-Leena Penttinen Faculty of Social Sciences and
Business Studies/Law School, University of Eastern
Finland, Joensuu, Finland
Esa Pursiheimo VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland Ltd, Espoo, Finland
Antti Rautiainen Faculty of Information Technol-
ogy and Communication Sciences/Electrical
Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Sami Repo Faculty of Information Technology and
Communication Sciences/Electrical Engineering,
Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Topi R€onkk€o Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Ilkka Ruostetsaari Faculty of Management and
Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University,
Tampere, Finland
Ulla A. Saari Faculty of Management and Business/
Industrial Engineering and Management, Tampere
University, Tampere, Finland; J€
onk€
oping Interna-
tional Business School, J€ onk€
oping University,
J€
onk€oping, Sweden
Jaakko Sorri Faculty of Built Environment, Civil En-
gineering Unit, Tampere University, Tampere,
Finland
Benjamin Sovacool Center for Energy Technolo-
gies, Department of Business Development and
Technology, Aarhus University, Herning,
Denmark; Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU),
University of Sussex Business School, Falmer, East
Sussex, United Kingdom
Kim Talus Faculty of Social Sciences and Business
Studies/Law School, University of Eastern Finland,
Joensuu, Finland
Jussi Valta Faculty of Management and Business/
Industrial Engineering and Management, Tampere
University, Tampere, Finland
Jarmo Vehmas Finland Futures Research Centre,
University of Turku, Tampere, Finland
Taimi Vesterinen Faculty of Engineering and Natu-
ral Sciences/Materials Science and Environmental
Engineering, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
Matti Vilkko Faculty of Engineering and Natural
Sciences/Automation and Mechanical Engineering
Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
 Preface
This book focuses on a subject that is little dis-
cussed on its own termsdthe electrification of
energy systems and societies. Such a focus dif-
fers from most studies examining the electric en-
ergy system as such or its future development.
Indeed, studies abound in various engineering
disciplines on the evolution of electric energy
systems. Often these studies also mention how
electricity is becoming the main energy carrier,
notably replacing the combustion of fossil fuels
for power and heat. A burgeoning field of
studies also concentrates on how electric energy
systems are developing toward “smart grid”
type “systems of systems,” where the manage-
ment of electricity flows becomes central not
only for the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of power but also for energy use in
transport, buildings, and industry. Such studies
span perspectives from several engineering, in-
formation, and communication sciences with
research on computer science, artificial intelli-
gence, software, as well as studies on innovation
and technology development, for example. The
technical insights of such studies will naturally
be surveyed in this book but chiefly to help us
better understand electrification as a megatrend
that transforms energy systems and societies.
The field of research on electricity markets is
already well established in economics and busi-
ness studies. However, electrification as an over-
all megatrend reshaping the energy markets and
business in several ways has so far received scant
explicit attention. This is surprising, given that
electrification is a logical yet game-changing
xi
outcome of the globally ongoing transition to
new renewable energy sources such as wind
and solar power that produce “only” electricityd
but not heat, unlike fossil fuels, biomass, or
geothermal energy. This switch to renewable en-
ergies is also a pervasive topic in the predomi-
nantly social scientific field of sustainability
transitions, but very rarely do these studies
extend to questions such as what electrification
is ultimately all about, how it might develop,
what such development presupposes, what prob-
lems will likely be encountered on the way, and
what the consequences of all this may be.
In this book, electrification is considered from
the perspective of climate neutrality. Climate
neutrality is a grand policy goal set by human
beingsdan increasing number of societies, com-
panies, and civil society actorsdone that envis-
ages renewable electricity generation with
“electricity-only” resources as the main means
to that end. Because of this essentially societal
aspect of electrification, studies on this subject
should not be limited to the characteristics of
the energy system. Ultimately, research should
reach out to address the implications of electrifi-
cation for society, economy, and politics and
likewise to international relations and what is
often called the geopolitics of energy in a world
where oil or natural gas matter less than they
once did. In other words, electrification becomes
a relevant subject of enquiry in multiple fields
because of the outcome of climate neutrality it
can deliver, although its character as a technical
phenomenon also remains important.
xii
Moreover, the world is anxiously hastening
the efforts for climate neutrality. This means
that most societies will for a long time be seeking
ways to speed up their actions. Accelerated tran-
sition therefore becomes urgent. Hence, the focus
here is on how the adoption of various electrifi-
cation measures could be accelerated by means
of developing and implementing policies and
policy instruments. Approaching electrification
from the perspective of how its introduction
could be accelerated in the interests of achieving
climate neutrality is the new path of research this
book seeks to pioneer.
Naturally there are many important transition
paths toward climate neutrality meriting atten-
tion in parallel with and apart from electrification.
However, hardly any of these offer equal mea-
sures of globally scalable potential. One of them
is the frequently mentioned field of power-to-X
technologies and the associated hydrogen econ-
omy, where gas-based fuels replace fossil fuels
in several energy end-use sectors and open up
promising new value chains. While those pros-
pects are indeed great, we wish to accentuate
that these will mostly likely be outcomes of wide-
spread electrification that first needs to advance.
Large-scale hydrogen economy has to be climate
neutral or sustainable in the wider sense, and it
may best be achieved when based on hydrogen
produced by renewably generated electricity.
This book is intended for several reader
segments. Energy engineers will learn of the
interface between technologies, infrastructures,
society, and policy. With this, this book refers
to societal path-dependencies, lock-ins, vested
interests, and other constraints along the way
to new technologies and infrastructures, elabo-
rating policy instruments to overcome these,
and describing some unsuccessful attempts to
do so. Social scientists and energy lawyers will
learn of the technologies and infrastructures for
electrifying energy systems, their mutual inter-
dependencies, and how they both constrain
and enable societal choices and policy options.
In other words, while readers will undoubtedly
Preface
find some sections of this book familiar terrain,
some other sections should guide them to new
territories. For policy analysts, professionals,
and practitioners, this book is intended to serve
as an accessible handbook on the state-of-the-
art of technologies, infrastructures, and policies,
and no less of their interrelationships, illustrated
by means of several case studies. Overall, the
role of various policy instruments and their use
in suitable combinations is what differentiates
this book from most studies on electric energy
systems and climate-neutral transitions.
The agenda of energy systems transitioning
toward climate neutrality via electrification in
an accelerated manner, and the related policies,
is a very broad field we can probe only selec-
tively. Our case studies mostly concern devel-
oped countries. In many of them, electrification
is progressing satisfactorily. Some references
are made, however, to more challenging cases,
where either material or social structures, or
their combinations, inhibit similar development.
In prospective studies, more attention will be
needed on the world’s numerous emerging and
developing countries. This is especially the
case, given that the patterns of inherited energy
infrastructures and societal constraints are to
some extent case-specific, requiring follow-up
work on a number of cases. The implications of
electrification for development policy and inter-
national relations are another area in need of
further research. Likewise is the wider circle of
policy processes from policy formation and
development to implementation, evaluation,
and follow-up, to which this book can only
make passing reference.
The field opened up for enquiry here is decid-
edly interdisciplinary and should be even more
so in the future. In many of the chapters that
follow, engineers and social scientists represent-
ing a variety of specializations have worked
together, in the capacity of codesign of the
research reported, co-authorship, or interdisci-
plinary commentary and debate. This is not yet
the new normal, but it should indeed become
 Preface
so for many questions on electrification. The
need for more disciplinary studies naturally con-
tinues to exist simultaneously, but such studies
cannot exist alone.
The authors are grateful for several sources of
funding that have enabled the efforts reported
here. The bulk of the work was supported by
the large-scale consortium “Transition to a
Resource Efficient and Climate Neutral Elec-
tricity System” (EL-TRAN, funded by the Stra-
tegic Research Council at the Academy of
Finland, project no. 314319, 2015e21, and led
by Pami Aalto). The partners comprised Tam-
pere University, Tampere University of Applied
Sciences, the University of Eastern Finland, the
University of Turku, and VTT Technical
Research Centre of Finland, with several public,
private, and NGO sector stakeholders playing
key roles as part of the consortium’s interaction
panel. This wide stakeholder involvement was
invaluable for the consortium’s work and helped
to make it more relevant for the ongoing energy
transition. Many colleagues not directly
involved in this book have also greatly sup-
ported the consortium’s work in various capac-
ities and through invaluable cooperation:
Karoliina Auvinen, Marika Hakkarainen,
Mikael Hilden, Kaisa Huhta, Iida Jaakkola,
Jari Ihonen, Johanna Kirkinen, Maria
Kopsakangas-Savolainen, Timo Korpela, Aki
Kortetm€ aki, Heidi Krons-V€ alim€aki, Raimo
Lovio, Anna M. Oksa, Ontrei Reipala, Armi
Temmes, Pasi Toivanen, Sanna Uski, and Seppo
Valkealahti.
We also wish to acknowledge the Business
Finland funded project that has supported our
work on energy use in buildings: the Center for
Electrical Engineering and Energy Efficiency
STEK (co-operation project “Future Energy Solu-
tions for the Urban Environment”). Our work on
producer-consumers (prosumers) has been sup-
ported by two further Business Finlandefunded
projects. The project “Social Energyd Prosumer
Centric Energy Ecosystem” (ProCem,
xiii
coordinated by Tampere University, 2016e18,
with 15 companies involved); this project
comprised an Internet-of-Things (IoT)-based
technology platform for the exploitation of
various distributed energy resources, taking
into account both the electricity market and po-
wer system management perspectives. The proj-
ect “Prosumer Centric Energy
Communitiesdtowards Energy Ecosystem”
(ProCemPlus, 2019e21), with Tampere Univer-
sity, Tampere University of Applied Sciences,
and VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
involved alongside 11 companies. This project
examined the formation of individual energy
communities into broader business-oriented en-
ergy ecosystems through several research
themes and concrete pilot cases related to the
development of energy communities, and ana-
lysed the role of microgrids and energy commu-
nities in the future energy ecosystem.
Several chapters of this book have also
benefited from work within the Business
Finlandefunded consortium “Black Carbon
Footprint” (BCfp, 2019e22, coordinated by Tam-
pere University and Finnish Meteorological
Institute, Topi R€ onkk€o and Hilkka Timonen),
with several universities and companies as part-
ners. The research for Chapter 10 is also linked to
the project “Platforms of Big Data Foresight
(PLATBIDAFO),” which has received funding
from the European Regional Development
Fund (Project No 01.2.2-LMT-K-718-02-0019) un-
der a grant agreement with the Research Council
of Lithuania. For speedy and reliable language
revision work, we would like to warmly
acknowledge Virginia Mattila.
Finally, the authors wish to thank numerous
colleagues and commentators for critical com-
ments and detailed observations in conferences
and seminars, and our significant others for all
their support and tolerance in the fairly chal-
lenging times of lockdown owing to the
COVID-19 pandemic under which this book
was prepared.
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 P A R T I

Framework for transition to

electrification
This page intentionally left blank
 C H A P T E R

1
Introduction: electrification and the
energy transition
Pami Aalto1, Teresa Haukkala2, Sarah Kilpel€ainen1, Matti Kojo1
1
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 2Aalto
University School of Business, Espoo, Finland

1.1 Electrification as the “new oil”
Electricity is frequently referred to as the “new
oil” or the new backbone of energy systems
globally. Electricity powers an increasing number
of activities, making electrification a megatrend
decisively shaping our social and material
environments. While this implies drastic changes
and entails new questions to answer, it will
also help to address some thorny problems we
are facing.
We characterize the megatrend of electrifica-
tion by referring to seven interrelated changes.
The first three relate to the energy system, where
the production, distribution, and consumption
phases are becoming increasingly electrified.
The fourth change pertains to indirect electrifica-
tion, whereby electricity is used to produce for
example synthetic fuels. The last three changes
widen the perspective considerably. At the soci-
etal level, electrification has several highly trans-
formative repercussions. On the wider
international level, electrification has develop-
mental implications while it also shapes our
conceptions of the role of resources in interna-
tional relations. We briefly survey each of these
changes in order to outline the scope of this
book.
1.1.1 What changes will electrification
bring about?
First, in the production phase of the energy
system, the globally ongoing turn to renewable
energy sources acts as a major catalyst of electrifi-
cation. There are sufficient renewable energy
resources to replace our current use of fossil fuels,
since renewables are plentiful in various forms
throughout the planet; likewise a wide range of
technological solutions for their exploitation are
also available (Yahyaoui, 2018a,b). Despite this
great potential, several problems remain to be
solved to actually build and operate energy
systems based entirely on renewable sources.
Many of these problems are tackled in this
book, where we proceed from the observation
that globally the most potent and fastest expand-
ing sectors of renewable energy, wind power, and

Electrification
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-822143-3.00006-8 3 © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
4 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
solar PV power are “electricity-only” resources.
Emerging resources such as tidal and wave
power, alongside traditional hydropower, are
also electricity-only resources. By contrast,
burning fossil fuels releases heat that can be con-
verted into mechanical energy and further into
electricity. At the same time burning creates
emissionsdincluding waste heat from inefficient
conversion processesdand noise from the com-
bustion engines used for instance in the vehicles
that populate our streets and roads.
We will propose several reasons for this turn
to electricity-only renewable resources. Howev-
er, we contend that this transition is particularly
warranted because it can support the ambitious
goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate
policy. In this Agreement, 175 countries agreed
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) into the atmosphere to jointly delimit
long-term global warming to 1.5 C (UN, 2015).
The Agreement expresses a political commit-
ment to pursue climate neutrality, by which the
International Panel on Climate Change refers to
a state of affairs where human actions have
zero effect on climate change. These include
not only CO2 emissions but also emissions of
other GHGs, of which Short-Lived Climate
Pollutants (SLCPs) such as methane, black car-
bon, and ozone are most crucial (UNEP, 2019).
Land-use issues are inseparable from GHG emis-
sions, and refer to the “carbon sink” or the ability
of forests, crops, swamps, seas, and, for example,
wood products to bind CO2 (IPCC, 2018, p. 545).
Yet the transition to electricity-only renew-
ables is hampered by several issues, primarily
that they have to compete with the continuously
expanding supply of fossil fuels. This expansion
results from the production of unconventional
oil and natural gas and the ability of the oil
and natural gas industries to develop better
methods of fully exploiting old, depleting
fields (Covert et al., 2016). Fossil fuel industries
nevertheless face constraints of their own. By
the end of 2020, more than 1200 institutional
investors had announced long-term divestment
plans (withdrawing their investments) from
I. Framework for transition to electrification
fossil fuels. The climate benefits of divestment
are undeniably contested; some think it may
hamper the industry’s conversion into less
climate burdening business. Nevertheless, the
greater problem from the perspective of climate
neutrality is the ever-increasing global energy
demand. This increase is fueled predominantly
by the growing energy needs of developing
(and emerging) countries, which consume
most of the expanding fossil fuels supply while
simultaneously increasing their own renewable
production. In other words, the absolute
volume of fossil fuel consumption may increase
globally, despite divestment, alongside expan-
sion in the absolute volume of renewables and
an increase in their share of the energy mix.
This would mean de facto higher cumulative
GHG emissions. Such scenarios are possible,
for instance, in Southeast Asia, India, and the
Middle East (IEA, 2019a, Annex A). Finally,
when contemplating who should reduce emis-
sions and by how much, a solution fully serving
the principles of distributive justice is elusive.
The developed member countries of the Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) remain responsible for roughly
a half of the historically accumulated CO2 emis-
sions (Kolstad et al., 2014, pp. 217e19; Blanco
et al., 2014, p. 359).
Alongside the transition to electricity-only
renewables, we also need to recognize the other
transition paths to climate neutrality, some of
which are complementary or built on electrifica-
tion while others, at least to some extent, may
compete with widespread electrification. Each
of these paths has its own benefits and associated
problems (see Box 1.1).
The transition path based on electricity-only
renewables offers high climate neutrality gains,
geographically wide applicability, and high
scalability. These features may well make it the
predominant path, but it is not problem-free.
Regarding climate neutrality, the biggest prob-
lem in the production phase is high raw mate-
rials intensity. In life cycle analysis, wind and
solar power face questions of environmental
 1.1 Electrification as the “new oil”
BOX 1.1
Transition paths to climate neutrality
The electrification path is often linked to
several gas-based paths, which can also be
viewed as advanced phases of electrification.
Perhaps the most potent is the energy use of
hydrogen. A high volume of renewably gener-
ated electricity necessitates storing the occasion-
ally generated excess electricity that cannot be
fed into the grid, exported via electricity intercon-
nectors, or instantly consumed. Such excess
electricity can via electrolysis be converted into
a gaseous storable resource by splitting water
molecules into hydrogen and oxygen. The
hydrogen can be reconverted to electricity upon
demand and despatched to the electricity grid,
stored in transportable fuel cells, or distributed
via pipelines for use as fuel, for example, in the
transport or industrial sectors. Alongside such
renewable or “green” hydrogen, nonrenewable
“gray” hydrogen can be produced directly from
fossil fuels and “blue” hydrogen, when carbon
capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technol-
ogies (see below) are added into the system. The
different types of hydrogen have implications
for climate neutrality targets.
Renewably generated electricity can further-
more be used to produce synthetic fuels. Overall,
the paths where electricity is converted to other
energy carriers, either gaseous or liquid formats,
are often called “power-to-X” technologies. All
such technologies offer benefits in terms of
storability while concerns relate to the efficiency
of conversion and identifying the additional
value in relation to the direct use of electricity.
Finally, the gas-based paths include the option
of using organic matter to produce hydrogen or
renewable biogas (which can be upgraded into
biomethane that is compatible with natural gas
infrastructures; see Chapters 2 and 7).
I. Framework for transition to electrification
5
Retrofitting existing fossil fuel power plants
with CCUS technologies is often proposed as a
pragmatic means of reducing emissions without
early phasing out of power plants so incumbent
actors can recover their sunk cost investments.
CCUS would enable the continued use of fossil
fuels without large emissions, for example, in
China, where the fleet of coal plants is relatively
young, or in the USA, where unconventional
natural gas is plentiful, widely exploited, and
relatively inexpensive as long as its environ-
mental implications are not fully appreciated.
In the industrial sector, CCUS can help reduce
emissions, for example, in the heavily emitting
cement and metal industries. In the bioenergy
segment, CCUS could decrease the CO2 emitted
in power, heat, and biofuel applications. In this
context CCUS is often viewed as a means to
achieve “negative emissions” as carbon emitted
in the combustion process is removed from the
atmosphere and new biomass is expected to
replace the utilized biomass, eventually binding
carbon (REN21, 2020, p. 91). However, for both
fossil fuel and biomass-based CCUS applica-
tions, uncertainty persists on the availability of
large-scale carbon storage and demand for its
use on a global scale, likewise on costs and
low policy support, especially with the rapidly
falling costs of wind and solar power (IEA,
2019a). The climate neutrality status of various
CCUS technologies depends on whether the
origin of the carbon is fossil fuel or biomass
based, whether the carbon is stored, for how
long, and whether it is used or not. These differ-
ences also shape the compatibility of CCUS tech-
nologies with emission trading or carbon pricing
schemes.
6 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
sustainability, as do all energy technologies (see
Chapters 2 and 10). Moreover, wind and solar
power are weather-dependent. Fortunately, in
many regions, their use can be combined with
the use of traditional renewable technologies
such as hydropower, or biomass-based or
geothermal facilities producing both power and
heat, improving their attractiveness in environ-
ments requiring space heating. In some regions,
concentrated solar power (CSP) plants can pro-
vide heat, cool, and power, while in others, solar
thermal collectors or small-scale geothermal
systems can supply heat to buildings. Further
transition paths include hydrogen and other
gas-based technologies, synthetic fuels, and car-
bon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS)
technologies (see Box 1.1), as well as traditional
nuclear power alongside small-scale modular
nuclear reactors (SMRs) (see Chapter 2). In fact,
no form of production represents a “silver bul-
let” on its own. Hence electricity-only
renewables alone do not have to completely
solve the climate neutrality challenge and are
likely to be combined with other modes of
production (see Chapters 2, 4, 5, 11, and 12). In
many cases, “sector-coupling” solutions are
applicable whereby electricity is converted to
heat, used directly in the heating of buildings
or in industrial sectors in place of other fuels,
or stored in gaseous or liquid form to be used
later in transport, building or industrial sectors
(Pilpola and Lund, 2018).
Second, in the distribution phase, electrification
reforges the global chains of energy as once they
were knowndbased on unevenly distributed,
point-source fossil fuel resources (van der Ploeg,
2011). The nature of these resources enables
generating high revenue from long chains of
value creation where minerals are extracted
onshore and offshore, transported over long dis-
tances, converted into various fuels, and finally
burned at high temperatures to produce power
and heat. These end products are then distrib-
uted for consumption, with emissions trans-
mitted locally, nationally, and globally. The
I. Framework for transition to electrification
gradual drift away from that world will decrease
the strategic significance of oil and natural gas
resources and their respective infrastructures
including pipelines, tankers, and fuel terminals.
The networks of filling stations will also be un-
der pressure. Yet in the natural gas sector, invest-
ment in transmission and distribution pipelines,
as well as liquefaction and regasification termi-
nals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) are expected
to proliferate until the end of the 2020s in devel-
oping and developed countries alike, and partic-
ularly in the USA. Natural gas infrastructure
may also serve the potential expansion of the
use of biogas, which is largely an unexploited
resource (IEA, 2019a, pp. 583e7; see also Chap-
ters 2 and 7). Weather-dependent resources
may also need access to gas-based infrastructure
if, for example, excess wind power is converted
into hydrogen to be fed into a pipeline network
(see Box 1.1).
At the same time, enormous investment is
expected in electricity gridsdglobally, in the
IEA’s “stated policies” scenario, $354 bln annu-
ally during 2019e30, and $455 bln during
2031e40. In the “sustainable development” sce-
nario, the cumulative needs are even greater
(IEA, 2019a, pp. 748e9). Roughly a quarter of
this investment need would be for Transmission
System Operators (TSOs) to enhance transmis-
sion networks, for example, to connect offshore
wind power parks with large-scale consump-
tion in cities. The remaining three-quarters
would be invested by Distribution System
Operators (DSOs) (Petit, 2019, pp. 116e117).
Such needs may arise because DSOs must rein-
force their grids because of the extra demand for
grid capacity created by the electrification of
heating. Further needs may arise from the inte-
gration into the grid of decentralized electricity
infrastructure such as rooftop solar panels.
Such changes profoundly affect the manage-
ment practices of electric energy grids, as in
developed countries the grids are generally
centralized, one-way systems built to deliver
electricity from large or medium-scale power
 1.1 Electrification as the “new oil”
plants to the points of consumption. By
contrast, in the rural parts of many developing
countries, off-grid alternatives can be poten-
tially highly useful, in the form of small-scale
installations of solar power combined with bat-
tery storage for night-time use, for households,
communities, or farms. Such solutions offer
short-term installation periods and low upfront
costs. This is important, especially when institu-
tional capacity to develop centralized grids is
low, investment capacity of the utility com-
panies low, grid connection relatively expensive
and expected energy demand relatively low,
and where local resources can generate elec-
tricity directly onsite with low upfront cost
(Levin and Thomas, 2016).
Third, in the consumption phase, we witness
further examples of sector coupling in the
form of transitions to electricity in transport,
heating, industry, businesses, and households.
In the transport sector, switching to electric
vehicles (EVs) can replace a large share of oil-
consuming vehicles. In the residential heating
sector, electricity-consuming heat pumps can
replace the burning of oil and natural gas (see
Chapters 7 and 8). In the various industrial
sectors, electrification can replace fossil fuels
in the generation of the heat required in the pro-
duction processes, via technologies such as
infrared heating, ultraviolet curing, microwave
and radio frequency heating, induction heating,
melting or hardening, and electric arc furnaces.
The globally increasing electricity access
enables the use of new electric appliances and
facilitates new use cases such as cooling and
digitalization (IEA, 2017, pp. 234e5; Philibert,
2019, p. 202). This is dependent on the price of
electricity in relation to alternative fuels, in
particular when overall annual subsidies for
fossil fuels amounted globally to over $400 bln
in 2018 (IEA, 2019b). Subsidies for electricity
access would have to be well targeted to
avoid subsidizing better-off large consumers
(IEA, 2019a, p. 471). Sometimes increasingly
weather-dependent production of electricity
I. Framework for transition to electrification
7
fails to meet demand, even when combined
with other generation options, and sometimes
it exceeds the demand, necessitating different
levels of storage of electricity (see Chapter 5).
Fourth, beyond these direct electrification
trends in the energy system as such, in the
various industrial sectors, indirect electrification
can occur. This term refers to processes where
direct electrification is neither possible nor
feasible. This means the use of electricity, by
means of electrolysis, to produce energy carriers
such as chemicals and fuels in gaseous or liquid
form: hydrogen or hydrogen-rich fuels and
chemicals such as ammonia and methanol that
are traditionally produced from fossil fuels. In
this way, it is possible to use energy products
in other economic sectors, store electricity long-
term, or enable long-haul energy transport in
chemical format (Philibert, 2019). For example,
the iron and steel industries, which account for
one-third of global industrial CO2 emissions,
can switch from coal burning to the use of
hydrogen generated from renewably produced
electricity (Karakaya et al., 2018). Hydrogen
produced by electrolysis can also be reacted
with CO2 captured from thermal power genera-
tors, industrial processes such as fuel use or
other chemical processes, or from the atmo-
sphere (direct air capture). This yields electro-
fuels in the form of methane, methanol, or
Fischer-Tropsch (FT) hydrocarbons that can be
refined to make them compatible with existing
fossil fuel infrastructure (Lehtonen et al., 2019).
Such conversion processes imply the use of
CCUS technologies, which have limitations of
their own (see Box 1.1).
Fifth, there are wider, relatively little discussed
social dimensions to electrification. In many “smart
visions” with new electricity generation, distribu-
tion technologies, and related IT infrastructure
(Taşcikaraoglu and Erdinç, 2019), humans are
mostly absent. Sometimes they are somewhat
technocratically referred to as users or consumers.
Such roles do exist, but since human beings are
the performers of the new practices the new
8 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
solutions enable, we should also think of them
as people: citizens or members of the public
with a stake in the changes (cf. Labuissiere
and Nada€i, 2018). In a word, changes in
everyday practices are required if households
are to offer “flexibility services” in the same
way as industries have traditionally done in
some countries. For example, several funda-
mental social dimensions emerge when home
automation technologies use real-time data on
electricity consumption (on the loads caused
by certain appliances), to adjust electricity
consumption in response to the variation in
weather-dependent production or to ameliorate
peak demand situations (Strengers, 2013, pp.
5e9). Such behavioral aspects are not insignifi-
cant since buildings in the residential and
business sectors account for over half of global
electricity demand (Philibert, 2019). Further
electrification is the most important solution
for reducing emissions in this sector, followed
by the use of renewable sources in heating and
improvements in building design and efficiency
standards set for home appliances (Wang et al.,
2018). Yet such electrification requires full
comprehension of the controversies between
these policy domains and the related interest
groups (see Chapters 3 and 8). In summary, to
fully understand residential consumption, the
analysis needs to extend to everyday practices,
life course practices, and societal structures
shaping these (Yamaguchi, 2019).
Sixth, electrification can also advance develop-
ment. Many studies describe rural electrification
projects and programs, and small-scale decen-
tralized off-grid solutions in developing coun-
tries (Kirchhoff et al., 2016; Mandelli et al.,
2016). A typical argument is that developing
countries or some of their more remote regions
can in this way leapfrog the historical patterns
of energy system development in the industrial-
ized countries where economies of scale have
supported the building of fossil fuelebased
centralized systems with high upfront costs
(Levin and Thomas, 2016). If such electrification
projects involve development aid, they risk
I. Framework for transition to electrification
running into familiar problems of producing
ambiguous outcomes and reproducing unequal
power relations (Ahlborg, 2018). Energy justice
issues are pivotal here. In terms of distributive
justice, it matters if everyone within the same
jurisdiction is offered similar access to electricity.
In terms of procedural justice, the concerns
involve transparency and participation in
decision-making over solutions, siting, financing,
and capacity transfer (Delina, 2018, pp. 155e7).
Seventh, electrification ultimately changes the
role of energy resources in international relations
as we know it. Resource conflicts typical for
unevenly distributed point-source fossil fuels,
as seen, for example, in the Middle East and
Africa (Colgan, 2013), should not repeat. Yet
the literature on the “geopolitics of renewables”
addresses new types of interdependencies where
producers of renewable energy technology can
become dependent on trade flows of rare earths
and minerals used as raw material in the produc-
tion of the technology (Scholten and Bosman,
2016). So far, these flows go in particular from
China to companies in the USA, Europe, and
Japan. These flows are combined, for example,
with the expected increase in flows of cross-
border electricity trade, helping to balance
production and consumption across regions
and countries. This is necessary as variable,
weather-dependent production increases. Such
a wider region where production is shared and
traded can also support the technical quality of
electricity by helping to maintain sufficient levels
of inertia in the electric energy grids when they
are chiefly supplied by variable production
(Aalto and Muth, 2019). Together, such trade
flows alter the power relations among major
fossil fuel exporters and their traditional cus-
tomers in North America, Europe, and Asia.
Trade in renewable energy technologies and
equipment may also involve more traditional
protectionism, as seen in the “solar protection-
ism” of the USA, the EU, and India, where they
impose tariffs on Chinese solar PV technologies
as antidumping measures. Overall, however, the
emerging agenda of “geopolitics of renewables”
 1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification?
will for various reasons quite likely differ from
that of the geopolitics of oil (Øverland, 2019).
We summarize the wide agenda of electrifica-
tion as follows:
Electrification is a mega-trend whereby less fuel is
eventually burned to produce energy, with the con-
nectivity of goods, services and people becoming
more reliant on electricity, a larger share of the energy
we use taking the form of electricity, industrial pro-
cesses becoming more dependent on electricity, while
many social and economic activities are also infiltrated
with electricity, which furthermore has implications
for global development in the form of energy access
and to the role of resources in international relations
and perceptions of (energy) justice.
The mega-trend of electrification means that
electricity gradually pervades not only energy sys-
tems, but also our lives as human beings from the
scale of everyday life to the global level. In other
words, electrification is about much more than
the end product of electricity itself. Compared to
fossil fuels or biomass sources, electricity is a
very peculiar type of energy carrier because it
can be both readily used and transported over
long distances, and also converted into mechanical
work with almost 100% efficiency (Goldemberg,
2012, pp. 149e150). Although electricity in this
sense is a very convenient material commodity,
its extensive use entails challenges. To be sensi-
tive to the multifaceted character of electricity,
we treat it as thoroughly material, meaning that
while electricity comprises physical flows, we
are also interested in the actors and networks
that underpin and facilitate these flows and
benefit from them (Spaargaren et al., 2006).
9
Because electricity represents “network energies”
(Tagliapietra, 2017, pp. 18e9), concerning several
flows within “energy ecosystems” (Goldthau
et al., 2018), electrification has far-reaching impli-
cations within energy systems as such and several
repercussions beyond them.
In this book we can address only part of this
wide agenda, and will concentrate mostly on
electrification of the energy system and society
in developed countries. In developing countries,
by contrast, electrification is often inseparable
from issues of energy access, energy justice,
and poverty alleviation, and indeed, from
many other issues on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals agenda of the United Nations
(Delina, 2018; Filho et al., 2020). We will examine
mostly direct electrification within the electric
energy system and its wider social conse-
quences. While our overall focus in this book
will be on various solutions leading to electrifica-
tion, we have a particular interest in how these so-
lutions can be accelerated in order to support the
work on climate neutrality.
1.2 Why and how to accelerate
electrification?
In this book we propose that accelerated elec-
trification is both a possible and desirable policy
goal. First, it is possible in the technical sense.
Some voices in this debate suggest a need
for “bridge fuels” during the transition period
(Delborne et al., 2020).1 Yet several modeling

1
On a global scale, natural gas is the most often mentioned fuel, since it has lower combustion emissions than coal or oil.
However, the final emissions depend on the type of natural gas. In the USA, increasing shale gas production partly replaced
coal-generated electricity and doubled natural gas plant liquids (NGPL) production from the late 2000s to 2016. Yet studies
disagree on whether the emissions from extraction processes from shale, when combined with combustion emissions, cause
greater or less overall GHG emissions (methane) than the use of coal. This controversy originates in the imprecision of
measurements from widely varying drilling conditions, which cannot reliably report the methane leakage nationwide (Smil,
2015, pp. 175e180). Toward the 2020s, biogas and hydrogen-based alternative fuels forcefully entered global policy debates,
used either independently or alongside natural gas (IEA, 2019a, p. 578).

I. Framework for transition to electrification

10 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

studies suggest that this is not necessary for any TABLE 1.1 Climate neutrality targets in selected
technical reasons. By 2050, a world with close to countries.
100% of electricity supplied by renewable Country Target year Target status
resources is technically feasible (e.g., Breyer
et al., 2018). Some modeling studies even claim Suriname Achieved Already carbon negative
that such systems with intermittent resources Bhutan Achieved Already carbon negative
like wind, solar, and hydro would be operable
Norway 2030 Legal obligation
with no load losses across the world (Jacobson
et al., 2018). Several country-specific modeling Uruguay 2030 Policy commitment;
submitted to the UN
studies also support their technical feasibility
(Mathiesen et al., 2015). Finland 2035 Policy commitment
Second, accelerated electrification is possible Austria 2040 Policy commitment
in the political sense. Dozens of countries aim
Iceland 2040 Policy commitment
at an electricity supply based 100% on renewable
resources by 2050 or earlier. Hundreds of com- Sweden 2045 Legal obligation
panies, many of them global leaders, commit to Denmark 2050 Legal obligation
a similar pledge, for example, through the
EU (26 Member 2050 Policy commitment
RE100 initiative. The boldest targets comprise
States)
not only 100% renewably produced electricity,
but renewable sources replacing fossil fuels in Canada 2050 Policy commitment
the overall energy system (see Table 1.1). In Chile 2050 In policy document
Europe, in 2019, the Member States (MS) of the
China 2060 Policy commitment
EU accepted a 100% climate neutrality target
by 2050, with the sole exception of Poland; at Costa Rica 2050 Policy commitment;
submitted to the UN
the same time, many MS will retain nuclear
power as part of their generation portfolio. All Fiji 2050 Policy commitment;
this would nevertheless mean renewables submitted to the UN
becoming globally predominant not only in Japan 2050 Policy commitment
energy production but also in the consumption
Marshall 2050 Policy commitment
sectors of transport, heating, industry, and agri- Islands
culture. In this way, these consumption sectors
New Zealand 2050 Legal obligation
would also become to a large extent electrified.
However, because technical feasibility and po- South Africa 2050 Policy commitment
litical targets do not necessarily translate into South Korea 2050 Policy commitment
transition outcomes (Roberts and Geels, 2019),
Switzerland 2050 Policy commitment
our main question in this book is how can
renewable-based electrification of the overall energy UK 2050 Legal obligation
system be achieved in practice, and how can it be accel-
Based on (Climate Home News, 2020). Which Countries Have a Net Zero
erated? A sobering thought here is how in the Carbon Goal? https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countries-net-
“stated policies” and “sustainable development” zero-climate-goal/. (Accessed 13 November 2020). EU Member States are listed
scenarios of the International Energy Agency separately in case their national target is stricter than that of the whole EU.

(IEA), by 2040, the share of electricity would,

respectively, reach “only” a quarter or less than figure of less than a tenth in the early 1970s and
a third of the final consumption of energy. That 19% in 2018 (IEA, 2017, p. 234; 2019a,b, p. 42).
would nevertheless compare favorably with the Yet a large gap clearly prevails between the

I. Framework for transition to electrification

 1.2 Why and how to accelerate electrification?
profound electrification implied in the above-
mentioned ambitious policy targets and the
scenarios of the IEA. This gap may eventually
be bridged given how the renewable energy
scenarios of the IEA have previously proven far
too cautious. Moreover, the renewable energy
transition, and with it electrification, may follow
the s-shaped curve typical for technology adop-
tion, as seen historically, for example, in how
electricity access and mobile phones reached
nearly everyone in the developed world. Such
an s-curve development would see the creation
of a niche market, followed by widespread
diffusion, and finally saturation of the market
(McMillan, 2018).
Several phases of technology development
may be discerned on the way to widespread
electrification. First, in an early emergence
phase, new technological solutions develop
within a protected niche. Successful technolog-
ical niches can yield improvements in terms
of price or performance. These can emerge as
a result of research, development, and innova-
tion (RDI) activities; demonstration projects;
community-level experiments; pilot areas; and
so on, enabling the nurturing of new technolo-
gies and affording them a space protected
against mainstream market selection until they
are ready to compete (Verbong and Geels,
2007). Second, in the acceleration phase niche
technologies generate knockon effects. These
make the new technology more competitive in
relation to incumbent technologies (Bauknecht
et al., 2020). It is possible to differentiate
between early acceleration or a take-off phase,
whereby actors start clustering in support of
the new technology, sharing a vision of its
future, and a late phase, where it makes a break-
through (Kivimaa et al., 2019). Third, in the
stabilization phase the technology matures,
becomes mainstreamed, and widely adopted.
Here the effects of economies of scale may be
important, comprising falling production costs
and further learning by doing (Harvey et al.,
2018, p. 38). Thereafter the transition becomes
I. Framework for transition to electrification
11
incremental and eventually results in a new
equilibrium (Durrant et al., 2018; Kanger and
Schot, 2019). However, niche acceleration does
not always proceed linearly and may instead
backlash or lock-in as a niche (Kivimaa et al.,
2019); neither are cost reductions automatic,
but require RDI and incremental improvement
(Harvey et al., 2018, p. 38). Patterns of boom
and bust are also possible.
Widespread electrification will not only create
new realities by supporting the evolution of the
niches, but will also abolish many existing
solutions as pointed out by a rich literature on
creative destruction. Some of the incumbent
companies and whole industries may vanish
when new concepts, products, and technologies
emerge (Schumpeter, 2010 [1942]). The change
may be slow or fast, and involves technological
and organizational changes inherent in capital-
ism (Lovio et al., 2011). Creative destruction
may be very necessary for the transition to
accelerate (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016), given the
political urgency of climate neutrality. David
(2018) speaks of exnovation, a process in which
the physical infrastructure of an existing technol-
ogy is deliberately removed from use to avoid
dual infrastructure.
At this point, we can propose that accelerated
electrification is technically possible, politically
increasingly supported, and can be pushed
further by new innovations emerging from the
niches. But because all this will involve creative
destruction, creating losers, it may appear
doubtful whether this mega-trend is desirable.
However, losers can be directly compensated
by means of public policies (see Chapter 3),
and indirectly by virtue of the co-benefits of
accelerated electrification. What might such
co-benefits be? Here it is instructive to look at
the work of the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP) on air quality and climate
change in Asia (UNEP, 2019). For the UNEP,
the co-benefits relate to how measures to reduce
GHG and SLCP emissions bring alongside
climate benefits improved air quality and hence
12 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

health benefits, reduced healthcare costs, better
crop yield, reduced flooding risks as global
warming is combatted, while they also augment
extreme weather patterns associated with
warming (Arif et al., 2014). In other words, the
co-benefits or “win-win” policy approach
promises something for everyone, which may
help to involve more actors. A closely related
policy approach is issue-linkage (Eikeland and
Skjærseth, 2016). These approaches can dramat-
ically improve the desirability of change by
multiplying the options for successful resolu-
tion or new lock-in to renewable resources,
although the risks of hampering or prolonging
decision-making remain (Stevenson, 2018).2
The big question is how to remedy the prob-
lems inherent in accelerated transitions. One
possibility, elaborated in detail by Fouquet
(2010), is that those pushing for the transition
can draw upon the lessons learned from past
energy transitions. Although our focus here is
not on past transitions as such, we will go
through some case studies on experiences during
the 2000 and 2010s. We will address the balance
between technical feasibility, policy instruments
to support change, the innovation and destruc-
tion involved and the prospects for delivering
co-benefits.
At one end, we have to pay attention to the
technological, infrastructural, and further part-
solutions in the production, distribution, and
consumption sectors, and on how to combine
these in the context of a particular electric energy
system. Each electric energy system has its own
key actors such as power producers, TSOs,
DSOs, service providers, and energy consumers.
At the other end, we have to take into account
the wider field of economic, social, and political
stakeholders necessary for the development,
adoption, and implementation of the technolo-
gies (Kilpel€ainen et al., 2019). This means that
in order for a technology to be actually adopted,
we need to consider how it “fits” with society
and its stakeholders to ensure the desirability
of the transition.
This leads to our main argument: since acceler-
ated electrification depends not only on the technolog-
ical and infrastructural part-solutions, but also on
political support and social desirability, it requires
interaction between the key actors of the electric
energy system and the wider field of stakeholders for
actually accepted and functioning solutions to
emerge. Such interaction can be detected on
various levels of analysis ranging from the micro
to the meso and macro-levels. A brief survey of
some established literatures will elucidate this
wide research agenda and help us to develop
an interdisciplinary framework for the study of
accelerated electrification.
1.3 Technological part-solutions
Studies in the natural scientific and engineer-
ing disciplines form the backbone for any analysis
of accelerated electrification, as they explain
the different technological and infrastructural
part-solutions. Here our main message is that,
although absolutely crucial, technologies are
rarely the main problem, even if some major
RDI work and scaling-up is still due for some
individual technologies (see Chapters 2 and 5).

2
In the East Asian case, the familiar pattern features the regional states each bringing their own concerns onto the nego-
tiation table, multiplying both cross-sectoral policy linkages and the number of affected stakeholders. At the same time, the
region’s states delegate insufficient powers to the regional organizations and task forces set up to deal with the policy issues at
stake. This results in real difficulties to adopt any binding decisions for policy change (Aalto, 2014). Similar problems of how
multiple actors weigh different co-benefits and ultimately fail to decide will emerge beyond this East Asian case.

I. Framework for transition to electrification

 1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders?
The main problem is how to combine individual
technologies in the production, distribution, and
consumption phases to develop a climate neutral
system in a particular place that is operable and
meets the needs and interests of its users.
In the various engineering disciplines, one
standard methodological approach is to quantify
and model the individual technological compo-
nents of national energy systems in order to
explore possible transition paths. Most studies
on national electric energy systems feature such
“bottom-up” or “engineering” modeling. These
approaches seek to produce a detailed picture
of the system, its power production units, and
energy conversion technologies delivering
“useful energy,” as well as of the distribution
and consumption sectors. Typically these studies
employ simulation methodologies to yield
optimization results or “best possible results.”
Such results seek to balance quantifiable
outcome variables, for example, the costs and
competitiveness of different technological solu-
tions, with their capacity to meet the expected
demand, cater for the security of supply, and
limit emissions. Macro-economic modeling for
its part focuses on how the aggregate flows of
energy goods from the different production units
are connected to taxation, prices, incomes, and
other interactions among economic actors in
the markets (Rodrigues et al., 2011).
This is all necessary information prior to mak-
ing technology choices or investment decisions,
but does not alone suffice for the purposes of
accelerated transition. That is, these literatures
are not intended to conceptualize the associated
innovation mechanisms, inertia within society,
or how, why, and under what conditions actors
would make the required political decisions
which for their own part crucially frame invest-
ment decisions. The political decisions are of
paramount importance as market logic alone is
unlikely to deliver sufficiently accelerated transi-
tion (see Chapter 3). Moreover, within actual so-
cietal contexts, “second-best” choices are usually
realistic, anticipating the institutional constraints
I. Framework for transition to electrification
13
or possible market failures involved (H€ ubler
et al., 2015). For these reasons, a comprehensive
framework on the acceleration of electrification
needs to extend toward the social and political
disciplines (Cherp et al., 2018), and also to the
humanities (Foulds and Robison, 2018), where
the wider field of stakeholders of the electric en-
ergy system and the leverage of policy are more
deliberately integrated into the analysis.
1.4 How to engage the wider field of
stakeholders?
There is a burgeoning literature on energy
transitions, drawing upon several social-
scientific disciplines, history, and the study of
innovations, concentrating particularly on
technological change within society. It adds a
social dimension to the insights of technolog-
ical, infrastructural, and economics studies.
The “socio-technical” studies do not explicitly
address electrification, but rather diverse topics
within the remit of “sustainability transitions”
or transitions to renewable energy (Hess, 2014;
Kern and Markard, 2016). Yet their merit here
is how they reiterate the significance of the con-
sumption phase of the system and more broadly
the involvement of society in the transition
(Geels, 2002; Kivimaa et al., 2019).
To become desirable and eventually adopted,
new solutions require a societal debate with
positive messages on how these solutions can
become part of everyday life in order to equip
everyone to contribute to the transition. Such a
message stands in contrast to scenarios of
unavoidable climate change disaster where
only large-scale technological measures and
major emission cuts matter. Disseminating a
positive message requires an awareness of
cultural perceptions and knowledge of social
behavior alongside more technical user engage-
ment. For example, in the transport sector, it is
relevant how interest in acquiring a driving li-
cense or ownership of private vehicles may be
14 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
dwindling among young people in some devel-
oped countries, and what kind of consumer
decisions they may make if given access to
information on the GHG footprint of products
and services (see Kanger and Schot, 2019, pp.
63e4). In brief, accelerated electrification entails
treating people not only as economic rationally
behaving consumers, but as active agents of
change in multiple roles (see Chapter 9). Ulti-
mately, the research agenda extends to routines,
social practices, and norms (e.g., Strengers,
2013; Yamaguchi, 2019). However, not all
responsibility for making the choices for climate
neutrality can be delegated to individuals
(Stevenson, 2018).
Here, for analytical purposes, we can discern
three levels of transition: the micro-, meso-, and
macro-levels, as commonly presented in the
context of the so-called multilevel perspective
(Geels, 2002). Since then, several literatures
have further developed this research agenda.
1.4.1 The micro-level
On this level we find that not only is the
energy consumption and future behavior of users
and consumers becoming vital, since an acceler-
ated transition is not possible by concentrating
solely on production side technologies. There is
the activism of consumer-producers (prosumers)
with small-scale production, for example, via
solar PV panels, and resource providers offering,
for example, the batteries of their EVs for
the use of the electric energy network (see
Chapters 7e9). Early adopters of new solutions
are the targets of those who develop new
solutions in the niches of innovation (Schot and
Geels, 2008; Verbong and Geels, 2007). The
strategic niche management studies elucidate
how innovative niche actorsdscientists, agencies,
institutes, companies including start-ups, equip-
ment manufacturers, service providers, consul-
tancies, etc.dcan respond to the global
transition pressures by developing new solutions.
Furthermore, the micro-level includes land and
I. Framework for transition to electrification
property owners, cooperatives, and physical as
well as virtual energy communities, which may
benefit from renewable energy installations on
buildings, farms, and fields (see Chapter 9).
1.4.2 The meso-level
Niche actors seek to challenge and eventually
replace the incumbent actors such as energy
utilities with existing investments in the fossil
fuel or nuclear power sectors (Geels, 2004). The
cluster of incumbent actors, or what the socio-
technical literature calls the socio-technical regime,
consists of (a) networks of actors and social
groups, which in the case of the electric energy
system consist of utility companies providing
power (heat and increasingly in some places
cooling); government ministries in charge of
energy questions, local governments, regulators
and public sector agencies, and large industrial
energy users. The regime also includes (b) the
formal rules such as regulations and standards,
which for their part are interlinked with informal
or normative and cognitive rules such as belief
systems and behavioral norms and practices,
working as a social glue as noted in the institu-
tional literature (Aalto, 2014; Andrews-Speed,
2016). Finally, the regime comprises (c) the tech-
nologies and infrastructures including resources
and the networks of TSOs and DSOs (Verbong
and Geels, 2007). Several types of regime are
discernible in electrification: the energy regime
with its own actors, rules, and technologies; the
transport regime with a view to EVs, a wider
industry regime vis-a-vis the industry’s electrifi-
cation, and the building regime in relation to the
electrification of residential, commercial, and
public sector buildings (Kotilainen et al., 2019;
see Chapters 4e9).
To fully analyze the meso-level, socio-
technical studies frequently draw upon institu-
tional literature, originally developed in the field
of political economy and today widely applied
in several economic organization studies
and policy disciplines. Institutionalism helps to
 1.4 How to engage the wider field of stakeholders?
enhance the conceptualization of the inertia of
regimes, in terms of stabilizing mechanisms
such as path dependence and lock-in (Unruh,
2000; Walker, 2000). Path-dependence implies
how actors are bound to historically institution-
alized paths of conduct since “what happened
at an earlier point in time will affect the possible
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a
later point in time” (Sewell, 1996). In other
words, path-dependencies are large-scale histor-
ical patterns caused by lock-ins in specific
sectors, or technological pathways that become
self-reinforcing. Such lock-ins can be discerned
not only in the sectors of technology and infra-
structure but also in the institutional sectors, as
well as in everyday behavior. The lock-ins limit
the options of actors, institutions, and networks
(Kotilainen et al., 2019). Yet they are rational
and can, for example, provide increasing returns
from the adoption of a certain technology. This
gives incumbent technologies an advantage
over new entrants (Arthur, 1994).
The inertia of path-dependence and lock-in
exist since the incumbent actors and other stake-
holders have vested interests in particular technol-
ogies and solutions. The Nordic countries offer a
useful example of the variety of vested interests.
In Denmark, wind power has developed into a
vested interest, as around half of electricity is
generated from wind, with a flourishing export
industry (Moe, 2015). In Finland, by contrast,
the presence of a large forestry industry has
created a vested interest within society in
biomass solutions. This comprises the use of
biomass for electricity and heat production
from the side-products of the forestry industry,
a biofuel production and export industry and a
strong role for biofuels in national energy strate-
gies (Kilpel€ainen et al., 2021; Toivanen et al.,
2017). Political economy approaches moreover
point at the little examined distributional
conflicts in transitions (Kuzemko et al., 2019;
Moe, 2015). Vested interests do not yield similar
benefits to all groups within society. In the short
run at least, some groups are likely to fare better
economically. Some others lose their immediate
I. Framework for transition to electrification
15
source of revenue in the course of the transition
(Kern and Markard, 2016, pp. 308e9).
We propose that vested interests can be
conceptually separated from generic interests in
almost any society and its diverse groups of
stakeholders in relation to the electric energy
system. Such generic interests imply what the so-
cietal stakeholders expect the electric energy sys-
tem to provide for society. The more the
transition concerns the whole of society, the
more important do such generic interests
become. While climate neutrality is increasingly
becoming the “master interest” driving the
development of energy systems, many other
interests simultaneously underpin this work.
These include interest in resource efficiency
(“to do more with less”); the promotion of RDI
and capacity building; interest in competition
and energy market development, including pri-
ces; and interest in developing energy business,
including its wider socioeconomic effects on
employment and taxation, and finally, security
of supply (see Fig. 1.1 below; Toivanen et al.,
2017; Kilpel€ainen et al., 2019; see Chapter 3).
The precise weight assigned to each interest
varies across countries and time. With this reiter-
ation of the centrality of interests (Hughes and
Lipscy, 2013), institutional approaches help us
to recognize the challenges in the simultaneous
realization of all co-benefits.
Insights from political science and the policy
sciences in general can shed further light not
only on policy formation and implementation
(Hoppe et al., 2016; see Chapter 3) but also on
the roles of political, industrial, and grassroots
coalitions mobilizing in support of transition or
resisting certain technological solutions. In the
USA in particular, financial coalitions may also
play a decisive role vis-a-vis election results
and hence in the prospects for policy change
(Hess, 2014). Moreover, transition policies may
have either positive or negative feedback effects,
also unintended, in terms of new groups
emerging in support of or opposed to change,
affecting the mid- or long-term prospects of tran-
sition (Roberts et al., 2018).
16 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition

Electrifica on

n
The energy system & society tio
t r uc efits
s n
de -be
Interests t ive Co
ea
-vested interests Cr
Path- -generic interests
dependencies -na onal interests
and lock-ins Technological solu ons:
their ’fit’ with the
society & stakeholders;
wider socio-economic,
Consumers developmental and
Service, TSOs, Power & Governmental global implica ons
Prosumers Start-up
consultancy DSOs, heat (& and municipal
Resource companies
& IT microgrid cool) actors incl.
providers RDI actors
companies owners producers regulators

Micro-level (niche) Meso-level (regime) Macro-level

FIGURE 1.1 Electrification: preliminary analytical framework.

1.4.3 The macro-level beyond the immediate reach of the regime

On this highest level of aggregation, we find
the megatrend of electrification influencing
national energy systems and the multiple
actors and stakeholders there. Socio-technical
studies treat this level as the “landscape,” refer-
ring to structures external to the regime. These
comprise developments capable of exerting
pressure on the regime, potentially weakening
its grasp. In turn, the niche actors can exploit
such pressures (Verbong and Geels, 2007).
Overall, it is expected that successful transitions
need to comprise sufficiently coordinated
changes on the micro-, meso-, and macro-
levels alike (Raven et al., 2010). However, how
these levels become precisely aligned to pro-
duce a transition in a given country warrants
more attention (Mori, 2018).
The conceptualization of the macro-level
continues to be debated in the socio-technical
literature, as the landscape can comprise all sorts
of national, transnational, and global structures
(Salonen, 2020). To take but one example, the
emergence of new technologies and their
take-off in a growing number of countries can
represent one such external development that
is not under the control of one single regime.
Yet this all has to start from somewhere. For
example, German actors first adopted wind
power technologies from Denmark in the 1990s
(Cherp et al., 2017, p. 615), and then, with the
support of federal investment, developed and
helped to diffuse these further, facilitating RDI
and cost reduction alongside similar effects
ensuing from RDI in America (Moe, 2015). That
these technologies become globally competitive
opens up new choices for many countries despite
their existing lock-ins in other technologies.
Here the international political economy (IPE)
literature becomes relevant by stressing the
consequences of divergent national interests that
can withhold the prospects of technology
diffusion, or hamper countries in efforts to reach

I. Framework for transition to electrification

 1.5 Structure of the book
agreement on climate and energy policies
(Hughes and Lipscy, 2013). At the same time,
such agreements would be necessary to avoid
the problem of the commons and prevent unfair
competition. For example, national interests
surface when countries are trying to make sense
of how to nationally implement the Paris com-
mitments, prompting them to favor different
combinations of technological part-solutions
in order to create their own transition path-
ways. This interplay between national and
international transactions is also influenced by
the local level, where many energy infrastruc-
ture decisions are actually made. Overall, the
interconnections between different levels neces-
sitate both country-specific analyses and com-
parisons among them (Kern and Markard,
2016; Kuzemko et al., 2019).
The relative dearth of studies on this highest
level of aggregation of energy transitions in
general (Cherp et al., 2018) and electrification
in particular (Aalto and Muth, 2019) shows
how the effects of this level are difficult to grasp
not only for academic transition literatures but
also for the niche and regime actors alike “on
the ground.” We will discuss this problem of
how actors perceive the macro-level, relate to
it, and develop policies promoting accelerated
electrification in Chapter 3.
At this point, we can offer a preliminary sum-
mary of our analytical framework in terms of the
micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Moving on
from the niches of innovation on the micro-
level and the actors found therein, we encounter
the regime-level actors, interest groups, and
incumbent industries, alongside existing path-
dependencies, lock-ins, and interest structures.
On the macro-level we find the megatrend of
electrification. Policies promoting accelerated
electrification are expected to yield notable
climate neutrality benefits nationally and more
widely. At the same time, electrification as a
landscape-level megatrend may also result in
creative destruction on the national (meso) level,
I. Framework for transition to electrification
17
while it can also bring several co-benefits along-
side climate neutrality gains (Fig. 1.1).
1.5 Structure of the book
While the attempted transition is underway
globally, with country-specific variations, and
also some deviant cases, the grand policy ques-
tion is how to accelerate it in order to combat
climate change. This leads to several questions
addressed in the remaining chapters in this book.
Chapter 2 describes various technologies for
climate-neutral or low-carbon energy produc-
tion, and compares their global and local appli-
cability, phase of technology development, and
prospects for accelerated deployment. Attention
is paid to the economic, social, and environ-
mental implications of each technology that
influence these prospects. The chapter highlights
wind and solar resources as being globally the
best scalable renewables. The traditional renew-
ables, namely hydropower and the various
forms of bioenergy, are not as widely applicable
globally, but are set to continue in significant
roles in dozens of countries. Due to the energy
storage and dispatch options they offer, they
can easily be combined with variable output
of wind and solar power. Some countries also
have similar prospects with respect to
geothermal energy. The mainstreaming of other
technologies is expected to take more time. Over-
all, the chapter reiterates how each technology
remains a partial solution in its own right. The
chapter concludes by drawing attention to
possible changes to many of the technologies dis-
cussed and the effects of external events that
may both accelerate or disrupt the ongoing
transformation.
Chapter 3 first situates the climate neutrality
target in the context of further objectives and
interests within society that also shape actors’
expectations vis-a-vis the energy system. In this
way, the chapter builds on the rationalist tenet
18 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
that the study of energy policy formation in tran-
sition processes can usefully proceed bottom-up,
from the interests of the actors, and in this way
probe the fundamental factors driving their
conduct. For example, in addition to climate
neutrality, actors may value security of supply
or affordable energy prices while they may also
prefer the energy sector to serve socioeconomic
needs in terms of, say, providing jobs. The au-
thors argue that policies need to be relevant for
the multiple needs of actors and stakeholders
in order to have realistic prospects of eventually
gaining acceptance and achieving implementa-
tion, delivering targeted outcomes such as
climate neutrality. Second, the chapter surveys
the types of policy instruments available to
policy-makers for catalyzing and accelerating
the transition and then discusses how policy-
makers assess their policy environment and, on
that basis, eventually choose between competing
policy options. Overall, for the transition to suc-
ceed, the set of policy instruments has to be
tailored to the needs of each county and sector
of the electric energy system.
The ways of accelerating the deployment of
wind and solar power, the two most potent
renewable energy resources, are scrutinized in
Chapter 4. As these are relatively mature tech-
nologies, the fundamental issue concerns a suit-
able mix of policy instruments to accelerate
their development in different socio-technical
and institutional contexts. In addition, it is neces-
sary to pay attention to the integration of wind
and solar resources into existing energy systems,
where many other resources and infrastructures
are already operational. The chapter introduces
case studies on the EU context, contrasting these
with the American, Moroccan, and Japanese
cases, to illustrate different policy development
strategies. The authors point out that because
wind and solar power are weather-dependent,
variable output resources, their scaling up
ultimately requires enabling technologies such
as energy storage and various solutions for
more flexible demand. The chapter concludes
I. Framework for transition to electrification
by stressing how a relevant policy mix for main-
streaming renewables typically includes a vari-
ety of policy instruments, including economic
incentives, climate and/or renewable energy tar-
gets, and RDI policies to develop enabling tech-
nologies; policies targeting grid integration of
renewables and local acceptance of renewable
energy installation are also important.
The pivotal role of energy storages and back-
up solutions in systems largely based on variable
power is discussed in Chapter 5. The power sys-
tem must be constantly balanced to avoid severe
blackouts and paralysis of business and society.
Power systems have traditionally used flexibility
provided by generation assets such as fossil fuel
power plants that can adjust production to the
changing demand. As fossil fuel plants are
increasingly replaced with variable output
renewablesdwind and solar powerdenergy
storages and back-up solutions become indis-
pensable to maintain a balance between supply
and demand. The chapter presents several types
of energy storages that help to respond to the
needs of such electrification, ranging from fast
response to long-term, seasonal, and annual
balancing needs. The case studies consider
utility-scale bioenergy and battery solutions, as
well as small-scale battery storage installed in
residential buildings, to improve the cost-
efficiency of solar PV. Battery storages in partic-
ular are found to benefit from several types
of policy instruments to become more widely
deployed, while bioenergy solutions may
require support from policies to adjust their busi-
ness models to the changing energy system and
market.
Chapter 6 probes deeper into the flexibility
solutions required by electrifying energy sys-
tems with a large share of variable power. The
chapter first discusses the concepts of smart
grids and flexibility that become crucial in such
contexts. These concepts are illustrated by means
of case studies on large-scale industrial loads as
flexible resources, smart metering, power-based
grid tariffs, and energy communities and
 1.5 Structure of the book
microgrids, which offer useful insights into the
development of smart grids measures. Smart
grid delivers not only energy, but also services
enabling the efficient and secure operation of
an electricity system, simultaneously presuppos-
ing new business models and the emergence of
new actors. The chapter argues that flexibility
can be improved by means of several technolog-
ical part-solutions commonly related to the
concept of smart grids. Although smart grids
comprise a fairly technical landscape, the transi-
tion toward a flexible and resource-efficient grid,
they entail trade-offs and are therefore also polit-
ical and contested.
Chapter 7 examines how the electrification of
road transport could be accelerated. Transport is
a hard nut to crack as globally this sector ac-
counts for a quarter of CO2 emissions from direct
fuel combustion. Road vehicles account for
nearly three-quarters of these emissions. The
prospects of accelerated electrification are illus-
trated by references to the cases of EV policies
in the Nordic countries, China, and Japan. The
chapter also examines the prospects of bio-
methane as an alternative solution to reduce
GHG emissions in the heavy transport sector,
where electrification is more challenging. The
chapter argues that the electrification of road
transport needs to accelerate rapidly in order to
contribute to the transition toward climate
neutrality. At the same time, fossil fuelebased
transport requires serious destabilization if not
outright creative destruction. The absence of a
“silver bullet” necessitates tailoring a context-
sensitive combination of policy instruments
and part solutions. Four policy lessons are iden-
tified: first, strong institutional signals help to
steer existing operators in the desired direction.
Second, economic instruments will be crucial to
support the transition. It is recommended to
redirect subsidies from fossil fuels to RDI on
clean technology. Third, the need for behavioral
change should not be overlooked. Finally, policy
I. Framework for transition to electrification
19
attention should also be paid to sector coupling
solutions linking EVs with electric energy grids
and the electrification of the building sector.
Chapter 8 argues that the electrification of
buildings is an essential component in climate
neutrality strategies, because residential and
commercial buildings account for a fifth of
global energy consumption. Moreover, the tech-
nical potential for electrification in buildings is
very high. While space and water heating repre-
sent the largest energy end uses in buildings,
energy is also consumed for lighting, air condi-
tioning, and appliances. The authors state that
the challenge of electrification in the building
sector does not relate to technological con-
straints but rather to how the infrastructure
and technology transition costs involved are
managed. Investigating these issues in more
detail in the context of the EU, the chapter con-
tends that many appliances are already highly
energy efficient due to EU-level regulation.
Therefore, optimization within and between
systems is an obvious area in the quest for
energy savings. Policy-makers should also
bear in mind that efficient electrification in the
building sector can serve a range of related
interests, with several co-benefits expected. If
buildings are required to be equipped with
appropriate control and monitoring capabil-
ities, electrified and automated end uses can
be treated as “smart loads” in the electricity
system.
The focus in Chapter 9 shifts from technolo-
gies and infrastructures more markedly to their
users, in particular, prosumers in energy transi-
tion, comparing prosumer-related policies in
five European countries; Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. Small-scale
resources, such as households and apartment
buildings, can have a major role in electrifica-
tion. Smart power grids and affordable renew-
able energy technologies empower consumers
to produce, store, and sell energy, but technical
20 1. Introduction: electrification and the energy transition
readiness alone is not sufficient for a more deci-
sive shift toward prosumerism. An appropriate
policy mix including incentives can remove
behavioral obstacles. Three key proposals are
presented. First, the diffusion of renewable
energy technologies needs to be accelerated.
Second, the prosumer policy mix should foster
flexibility and technology interoperability. For
instance, EVs and home battery storages can
be utilized as flexibility resources during the
peak moments of electricity demand. Third,
prosumers need to be incentivized to use their
resources and to participate actively in energy
markets and flexibility schemes.
The global and regional trends and debates on
energy transition are the subject of Chapter 10.
The authors first examine the discourses framing
the agenda-setting for energy policies in transi-
tions to climate-neutral power systems. They
argue that hegemonic discourse is crucial for
the agenda-setting of energy policy and can
decisively shape the direction of transition. In
other words, technology change also involves a
discursive change that can shed important light
on the contours of technology change. Since
discursive trends decisively frame future energy
transitions, research focusing on such trends can
provide vital information for future policy
planning. Such research can moreover expose
potential discord in the ways in which the trends
may interact in what is essentially a complex
system where multiple industries interact. The
chapter also introduces further theoretical per-
spectives to examine the interaction between
national level debates and global transition,
alongside a big data approach to enable studies
on how, for example, key words such as EVs,
digitalization, and artificial intelligence occur in
transition debates. In this way, the chapter pro-
vides new insights into how various technolo-
gies are debated on these levels and how
socially and political significant framings of the
global technology landscape gradually emerge
from such debates.
I. Framework for transition to electrification
The future development of the energy system
can alternatively be examined with the help of
modeling approaches, illustrating how different
part-solutions can be combined in particular
contexts and how such part-solutions influence
one another. In Chapter 11, the authors pay
attention particularly to the functionality and
operability of the system in conditions of an
increasing share of variable power with expand-
ing wind and solar generation. They propose
that generating a sufficient volume of climate-
neutral and low carbon energy is not the real
problem, but that the challenge relates more to
producing and delivering electricity to meet
demand at a given time and place. The Finnish
electric energy system is used as a case study
to present scenarios on how to ensure a balance
between the production and consumption of
power in a transitioning system, mindful of the
fact that storing electricity in large amounts in-
curs costs. The authors model the main contours
of the system at 2030, expecting many resources
of the present energy system to persist in a future
system as well. However, some further flexibility
will be needed to accommodate the increasing
share of variable power. The chapter suggests
that policies and investment should indeed focus
on such flexibility investments in generation and
consumption.
Chapter 12 for its part models the wider
northern European region where several coun-
tries have announced ambitious targets for
climate neutrality. The case study with three
geographical layers explores how most of the
energy systems, including power, heat, industry,
and transport, could be decarbonized through
electrification. The year 2030 is examined to illus-
trate the short-term policy options and 2050
to scrutinize almost total decarbonization. The
chapter demonstrates how decarbonization
may take place in techno-economic terms and
on this basis prepares the ground for questions
regarding policy targets, policy coordination
between countries, as well as the design of
 References
electricity and energy markets for the attempted
transition to materialize. Key findings concern
the implications for energy prices and the impor-
tance of sector integration as a key element in
both decarbonization and in coping with the
variability inherent in weather-driven power
supply.
The concluding chapter treats electrification
not only as a highly potent pathway to climate
neutrality but also as a source of major changes
to the energy system and the society it serves.
The major changes, disruptions, and creative
destruction that are ahead, will not, however,
take place overnight. The constraints are
numerous, and this change can usefully be
approached from the perspective of three main
phases of electrification which are analytically
separable but in practice may overlap. These
are (1) accelerated deployment of renewable
power; (2) increasing flexibility with storage
and back-up solutions; and (3) sector coupling
linking the power, transport, building, and
industrial sectors together by means of electricity
flows and smart grids to manage these flows.
The main lessons learnt in this book are dis-
cussed for each of the phases regarding how to
accelerate electrification by deploying more
effective policies and, in particular, policy mixes.
The role of command-and-control instruments is
especially emphasized.
The authors conclude by noting the useful-
ness of modeling approaches for considering
alternative transition scenarios, yet call for
simultaneous analysis of the society that is to
transition. Such a combined effort provides a
firm foundation for an effective transition strat-
egy, helping to serve the wide-ranging interests
of society. This anchoring of change in societal
needs cannot be overstated as the electrification
of society as such is not the primary goal of ac-
tors, but rather climate neutrality and the asso-
ciated potential co-benefits that can mitigate the
multiple effects of transition.
I. Framework for transition to electrification
21
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 C H A P T E R

2
Globally and locally applicable
technologies to accelerate electrification
C. Johannes Muth1, Pami Aalto1, Fanni Myll€ari2, Topi Rönkkö2,
Pirkko Harsia3
1
Faculty of Management and Business/Politics Unit, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 2Faculty of
Engineering and Natural Sciences/Physics, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland; 3Faculty of Building
Services Engineering, Built Environment and Bioeconomy Unit, Tampere University of Applied Sciences,
Tampere, Finland

2.1 Introduction it for thousands of years. The first solution was

In this chapter we review different technolo-
gies for climate-neutral energy production. The
review will cover well-established technologies,
those in the acceleration phase, and emerging
“niche” technologies. From a global perspective,
several technologies will be part of future energy
systems, since in most societies no single energy
production technology can alone deliver climate
neutrality. Furthermore, several technologies are
required not only for the production phase but
also for the distribution and consumption phases
of energy systems (see Chapters 4e9). Technolo-
gies only become solutions once taken into use
and accepted by societies and stakeholders (see
Chapter 1).
Our primary focus will be on renewable sour-
ces of energy and related technologies. It is
important to note that renewable energy is not
a recent phenomenon, since humans have used
to burn biomass for heating, cooking, and
light. At the end of the 19th century, the first
electricity-generating wind machines, water tur-
bines, and solar cells powered small utilities and
remote regions. Thereafter, the development of
renewable energy has been tied to the availabil-
ity and prices of fossil fuels. Several factors
paved the way for the dominance of carbon-
based energy: the availability of fossil fuels and
advances in their exploitation, their relatively
easy storability, and multiple uses, alongside
relatively low prices. This “carbon lock-in” refers
to a situation where the diffusion of alternative
energy sources or technologies is high-risk,
slow, and cost-intensive (see Unruh, 2000).
Hence, renewables, excluding hydropower,
long remained niche technologies primarily uti-
lized in off-grid solutions, for example, in the
Arctic, on remote islands, and at offshore loca-
tions. They were initially adopted on a larger

Electrification
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-822143-3.00005-6 25 © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
26 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification
scale in frontrunner countries such as Denmark
and Germany, as well as some US states, after
the 1970s oil crisis (see Chapter 4).
Since the 2000s, increasing awareness of the
climate change effects of fossil fuels, coupled
with the vulnerabilities associated with fossil
fuel imports and a possible “peak oil” situation,
has caused attention to return to renewables. In
2019, the power-producing sector was the pri-
mary source (41%) of energy-related CO2 emis-
sions (IEA, 2020b). Large-scale change in the
power sector is hence crucial for a transition to
climate neutrality, and renewable energy is
well suited for this purpose. Indeed, it is widely
expected that by 2050 renewable energy will
regain its historical primacy. The respective tech-
nological solutions will range from small-scale
residential PV rooftop and micro-hydro systems
to the gigantic Noor Solar Power Plant in
Morocco or the Three-Gorges Dam in China. At
the same time, existing and proposed nuclear po-
wer plants will be important part-solutions in
several countries.
Obviously, external events may decisively
shape the transformation. The lockdown occa-
sioned by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, for
example, reduced global economic activity,
halted some energy projects, and temporarily
decreased energy consumption as well as emis-
sions. This event may afford an opportunity as
did the oil crisis of the 1970s (Aklin and Urpelai-
nen, 2018). For example, 30% of the EU’s
2021e27 recovery package of EUR 1.8 trillion is
earmarked for “green transition.”
With several renewable energy sources and
technologies available, it is important to
acknowledge the global and local variation in
their applicability. Some are more global, some
more local. Nevertheless, in most countries,
either wind or solar PV power technologies, or
their combination, will assume key roles.
Because wind and solar PV power are
“electricity-only” technologies and do not pro-
duce any heat, their increasing adoption will
strengthen the global trend of electrification of
I. Framework for transition to electrification
energy systems and societies. This would mean
extensive sector coupling whereby renewably
produced electricity also becomes the main en-
ergy source in the transport, heat, and industrial
sectors, which so far have proven less amenable
to reform. No single renewable energy technol-
ogy will suffice alone as each energy source
and technology entails both benefits and con-
straints. Thus, to achieve maximum impact,
combining different technologies requires care-
ful examination, taking into account existing en-
ergy systems and society-specific needs.
Our chapter will cover the most promising
renewable energy technologies, namely wind
power, solar power, hydropower, marine power,
several forms of bioenergy, and geothermal
power. We will also discuss small-scale nuclear
reactors (SMRs), which do not represent renew-
able energy technology but which are low-
carbon in terms of power production and as
such offer one possible part-solution in the pur-
suit of climate neutrality. A basic description of
each technology will be complemented by a dis-
cussion on its accelerated deployment with an
eye to meeting the emission reduction targets
of the 2015 Paris Agreement. To this end we
use the Sustainable Development Scenario
(SDS) of the International Energy Agency (IEA)
as a shorthand. Particular emphasis is placed
on how the economic, social, and environmental
implications of each technology shape the pol-
icies needed for their accelerated development
(see Chapter 3).
2.2 Wind power
In 2019, wind power accounted for nearly 6%
of global power generation. Wind power is
becoming more competitive and more widely
adopted than hydropower, with 651 GW in ca-
pacity and commercial wind power plants in at
least 102 countries (REN21, 2020). This accelera-
tion builds on the growing maturation of
onshore wind power technologies. Offshore
 2.2 Wind power
applications are widely expected to mature dur-
ing the 2020s (IEA, 2019, pp. 614e5). Both
onshore and offshore wind power are weather
(and to some extent season)-dependent technolo-
gies. Wind power nowadays offers an inexpen-
sive source of electrical energy in many
locations. However, its variability detracts from
its value for power and energy systems, but
this can be partially compensated by flexible
resources (see Chapters 5e6) including the elec-
trification of the other sectors (see Chapters
11e12). The text below reviews wind power
technology in isolation from these options.
2.2.1 Onshore wind power
In 2019, 95% of globally installed wind power
capacity was onshore. Within that year, around
51 GW of new wind power was deployed. China
accounted for half of this, being the fastest-
growing and largest wind power market and ex-
pected to reach more than 400 GW by 2030, from
229 GW in 2019. Europe is the second-largest,
albeit saturating market (REN21, 2020), with a
high share of wind power already: in some coun-
tries half of power generation and in many, over
20%. Globally, however, onshore wind deploy-
ment was not on track with the IEA’s Sustainable
Development Scenario (SDS), which requires a
tripling of annual wind generation from
1323 TWh in 2018 to 3749 TWh in 2030 (IEA,
2020b). Accelerated deployment is nevertheless
possible, since in many regions the cost-
competitiveness of onshore wind is the best
among the alternatives to fossil fuels. To mea-
sure this, it is commonplace to use the levelized
cost of energy (LCOE) as a proxy, which yielded
an average global cost of 0.053 USD/kWh for
onshore wind in 2019 (see Appendix 1). In gen-
eral, the costs are falling and, in several regions,
much lower.
1
Neodymium (circa 170 kg/MW) and Dysprosium (circa 24 kg/MW) (Zepf, 2020).
I. Framework for transition to electrification
27
A wide selection of large onshore turbine de-
signs is available, suited for different locations,
and ranging from 1.5 MW to over 6 MW capac-
ity. A typical system consists of a tower, rotor
(blades and hub), nacelle covering the gearbox,
electrical generator, and controls. As the gearbox
is the turbine’s most vulnerable part, direct-drive
turbines have been developed with gearless
drive trains, increasing efficiency and reliability,
and reducing costs for maintenance and down-
time. However, such technologies entail higher
investment costs (Klinger and M€ uller, 2017a).
Despite vast potential, several constraints
inhibit the acceleration of onshore wind power.
First, aging and uneconomical old turbines
must be removed and replaced (repowered) by
newer generations (Nelson and Starcher, 2019).
Although this offers efficiency benefits, it neces-
sitates repermitting processes, which in many
instances still need some streamlining. Second,
the new designs (direct-drive system with a per-
manent magnet generator) require less maintai-
nance but large amounts of rare earth elements
(circa 200 kg/MW REE);1 which raises the cost
of the system. Wind turbine systems are in gen-
eral material-intensive, requiring large amounts
of steel and aluminum (towers), concrete (foun-
dations), copper (electronics), fiberglass (blades),
and other materials (Zepf, 2020). The incinera-
tion of fiberglass upon the eventual decommis-
sioning of the turbine produces high emissions,
complicating the recycling of turbines from the
1980 and 1990s (Albers et al., 2009). Third, the
adjustment of subsidy policies and the prolifera-
tion of subsidy-free deployment produces
intense price competition (see Chapter 4), chal-
lenging manufacturers and leading to market
consolidation (REN21, 2020).
Fourth, numerous citizen initiatives oppose
wind turbines due to the impact on people, wild-
life, and land use. Some of this criticism falls into
the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) category, for
28 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification
example, arguments about wind turbines dis-
turbing the landscape, especially near human
settlements. There have also been allegations
about health hazards due to low-frequency noise
from the turbines (Usher, 2019), which, however,
some studies report to be fairly low (see Chapter 4).
Some environmental groups moreover point to
avian mortality caused by wind turbines. Yet
the annual collision rates per turbine vary from
0.01 to 23, of which the highest figure was from
a turbine at a coastal site with a large population
of gulls, terns, and ducks (Drewitt and Langston,
2006). New turbines should therefore not be sited
near birds’ migration pathways or habitat. How-
ever, wind turbines account for the deaths of less
than 600,000 birds per year in the USA, signifi-
cantly lower than for cats (up to 4.7 billion/
year), buildings (365e988 million/year), or fossil
fuel power plants (14 million/year) (Sovacool,
2013). At the same time, some opponents may
simply have a vested interest in their backyard
or in competing technologies.
2.2.2 Offshore wind power
The deployment of offshore wind power only
began during the early 1990s. Despite its vast po-
tential, it is only gradually becoming main-
streamed. In 2019, the total installed capacity
reached 29 GW (þ5.9 GW), with over 6000 tur-
bines connected to grids in 18 countries, most
in the UK, China, and Germany.
While this accounts less than 1% of global
electricity supply (REN21, 2020), the best
offshore wind sites in shallow water (<60 m)
and near the shore (<60 km) could potentially
supply almost 36,000 TWh, which almost equals
the expected global electricity demand in 2040
(IEA, 2019). To meet the IEA’s SDS targets for
2030, annual capacity additions would have to
quadruple from 2019. The maturing of the tech-
nology brings economies of scale, further sup-
ported by standardization and industry
clustering (IEA, 2020b).
I. Framework for transition to electrification
The basic concept of offshore installations is
close to that of onshore turbines, although
some new offshore systems utilize permanent
magnets in place of a gearbox. The more uniform
wind speeds on the sea not only offer greater
wind resources but also cause lower turbulence,
increasing the lifetime of components (Dinh and
McKoegh, 2019). Offshore installations run up to
4500 full load hours per year, more than double
that of onshore turbines (Klinger and M€ uller,
2017b). The higher capacity factor and remote
location allow large turbine sizes, with designs
extending to over 14 MW in capacity with height
and diameter spanning well over 200 m and ex-
pected to increase.
The technical constraints increase with the
water depth. Most of the technology for con-
structing the foundations of offshore turbines
comes from the oil and gas sector. From the
typical foundation of a monopile bottom-fixed
concept (<30 m), the trend is toward deeper wa-
ter offshore wind power plants based on tripods
(<50 m) or jacket structures (<60 m). Floating
designs allow the installation of wind turbine
structures in water depths of several hundred
meters, offering wind exploitation in larger sea
areas (O’Kelly and Arshad, 2016). Such wind po-
wer plants could, in principle, generate over 18
times of global electricity demand, which in
2019 was around 27,000 TWh (IEA, 2020b; BP,
2020).
The main constraints for accelerated deploy-
ment include costs. In 2019, the global average
LCOE of approximately 0.115 USD/kWh for
new installations significantly exceeded that of
other renewable energies (see Appendix 1). The
foundation represents only one driver of the
costs alongside exposure to strong waves and
high wind speeds, which cause increased mate-
rial and maintenance costs. Repair or restoration
work is time-consuming and expensive due to
the remote location (Poudineh et al., 2017).
Offshore wind power plants also require longer
and more expensive connections to onshore
grids. In Germany and the Netherlands auctions
 2.3 Solar energy
have produced projects where the sole subsidy
has consisted of grid connection provided to
the sea. Yet in most regions offshore wind power
is expected to remain costlier than onshore but
coming close to onshore installations with its
less controversial local impacts.
Some environmental and citizen groups have
nevertheless opposed offshore wind power.
Although the noise impact on the coastal popu-
lation is minimal, underwater noise from the
construction and operation of offshore wind tur-
bines can cause behavioral disturbance or even
damage to marine mammals’ hearing (Tougaard
and Mikaelsen, 2018). Offshore wind power
plants near coastlines may moreover give rise
to opposition from the tourism industry.
Accelerated offshore wind deployment ulti-
mately depends on long-term governmental
strategies, including policies to support
technology-specific capacity tenders, and financial
aid and regulatory efforts to support grid develop-
ment (REN21, 2020). For example, the EU has
acknowledged the potential of offshore wind,
and to meet the Paris targets, the Union would
have to install between 230 and 450 GW of capac-
ity by 2050 (European Commission, 2018b). This
would necessitate opening sea areas for wind
exploitation that are currently earmarked for na-
ture conservation, fishing, or military purposes.
2.3 Solar energy
The largest energy source on earth is electro-
magnetic radiation emitted by the sun. The so-
called insolation or irradiance reaches up to
1000 W/m2 depending on several factors such
as time of day, season, location, topography,
and weather (Zekry et al., 2018). The term solar
energy refers to the energy harvested directly
from the sun using photovoltaic (PV) cells, con-
centrators, or other devices to generate electricity
or produce heat. Silicon-based solar PV cells are
a mature, globally applied technology. Applica-
tions range from small residential rooftop sys-
tems to utility-scale power plants. Solar thermal
I. Framework for transition to electrification
29
energy systems such as concentrated solar power
(CSP) plants exist in several countries with inten-
sive radiation and little precipitation. However,
most of the existing applications are solar PV sys-
tems with variable output similar to the case of
wind power. CSP plants, however, can have en-
ergy storage features that increase their value as
a flexible resource for energy systems.
2.3.1 Solar PV power
At the turn of the 2020s, solar PV was the
world’s fastest-growing energy technology in
terms of absolute generation growth (when
considering onshore and offshore wind sepa-
rately). Solar PV is widely expected to become
the main energy source globally by the 2050s.
In 2019, the generation of solar electricity
increased by 22% (þ131 TWh) to 720 TWh, rep-
resenting close to 3% of the global power gener-
ation (REN21, 2020; IEA, 2020b). Together with
biogas, it is the only renewable energy on track
with the IEA’s SDS target requiring average
annual growth of 15% to reach 3268 TWh in
2030 (IEA, 2020b).
From 2000, the global installed solar PV ca-
pacity rose from 1.3 GW to 627 GW in 2019,
boosted by increasing efficiency and the use of
economic instruments such as feed-in tariffs
(REN21, 2020; see also Chapter 4). By 2020, at
least 39 countries had a cumulative capacity of
1 GW or more, with most installations in Asia
and the largest capacity found in China,
205 GW in 2019, followed by the USA (76 GW),
Japan (63 GW), and Germany (49 GW). China
is also a global leader in PV manufacturing
(REN21, 2020). However, its rise has affected
the foreign (economic) trade interests of its com-
petitors. In 2013, the EUdformerly the leader in
this marketdaccused China of illegally subsidiz-
ing its solar PV manufacturers and imposed tar-
iffs on Chinese exports to Europe. In 2018, a
minimum price for solar PV panels was finally
established. Similar disputes occurred between
China and the USA during the 2010s (Hajdukie-
wicz and Pera, 2020).
30 2. Globally and locally applicable technologies to accelerate electrification
Solar cells are based on the photovoltaic effect
which converts electromagnetic radiation (light)
into electric current (power) through the absorp-
tion of photons by a semiconducting material
(e.g., silicon). In other words, solar energy is con-
verted directly into electricity with no emissions
or noise. In 2017, around 95% of all panels pro-
duced used silicon variations (Fraunhofer ISE,
2019), with polycrystalline used in more than
half of these. It is cheaper and causes less silicon
waste than monocrystalline, but its temperature
tolerance and efficiency (11%e16%) are low.
Monocrystallines last for up to 25 years, have
high-efficiency rates (15%e20%), but are expen-
sive (IRENA, 2019a; Pavlovic, 2020). Thin-film
solar cells are the third-most used PV technol-
ogy. They offer a flexible material but have low
efficiency (7%e12%, Fraunhofer ISE, 2019;
IRENA, 2019a). Ongoing RDI work is devel-
oping other primary materials (e.g., organic or
perovskite) and building-integrated photovol-
taics (BIPV) such as flexible panels, transparent
solar cells for windows, and vertically installed
PV panels (IRENA, 2019a). However, energy
analysis should consider that laboratory tests
usually produce better results than actual
installations.
The high learning curve of solar PV and over-
supplies in China have significantly reduced the
cost of solar panels from 300 USD/Watt in the
1950s to 2 USD/Watt in 2010 and 0.36 USD/
Watt in 2019 (Penna, 2020; REN21, 2020). In
addition, operation and maintenance costs are
low. The first unsubsidized solar PV systems
had bid prices below 0.020 USD/kWh (REN21,
2020). The global average LCOE remained
much higher at around 0.068 USD/kWh (see Ap-
pendix 1). The costs depend on the level of solar
radiation, the maturity of the PV market, and the
local policy environment. In many developing
regions, specific financial and institutional con-
straints may include inadequate financing; lack
of available transmission capacity for larger pro-
jects; lack of skilled workforce, information, and
consumer awareness (Pedraza, 2015).
I. Framework for transition to electrification
Solar PV power is also applicable to remote
areas and developing countries with no strong
central grids. Off-grid applications can range
from a single home to a village and on to mega-
watt scale installations. Most off-grid (“behind-
the-meter”) systems can be connected with a
battery or function as a hybrid power system
combined with a fuel generator to ensure con-
stant power supply. With grid connection, they
can sell excess energy (“net-metering”). These
so-called producer-consumers (prosumers) have
significantly driven the market in Europe and
the USA despite the small size of their systems,
often called distributed generation. Commercial-
scale applications can supply electricity to build-
ings or businesses and include both off-grid and
on-grid types. Utility-scale applications feature
grid-connected production with an installed
capacity of at least 1 MW but often reach over
500 MW, combining millions of panels and
stretching over an area of several thousands of
hectares (Usher, 2019). In such systems, solar
power in fact features centralized rather than
distributed generation.
Floating solar photovoltaic (FPV) started as
small-scale pilot projects (20 kW) in 2007, reach-
ing utility scale (150 MW) within a decade. In
2019, 35 countries had such systems with a total
capacity of 2.4 GW, and China dominating the
market (REN21, 2020). FPVs are driven by land
constraints in densely populated areas. Their
benefits include readily accessible cooling,
reduced evaporation of freshwater reservoirs,
and compatibility with existing hydropower
infrastructure. However, they need to be robust
to withstand waves and strong winds. Problems
include limited experience and proper licensing
and permitting (REN21, 2020; IRENA, 2019a).
The environmental constraints of solar PV
relate to land-use requirements unless incorpo-
rated in buildings and to the waste in panel pro-
duction and its energy intensity. Furthermore,
solar panels contain toxic materials (e.g., lead,
cadmium) that may be washed out by rainwater
from panels damaged during natural events
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
going out of the gate. Makes me fairly crazy to wait,
fearful I am missing it in not going. This lottery way of
living is painful on the nerves. There are all kinds of
rumors. Even have the story afloat that now the raid
is over that drove us away from Andersonville, we
are going back there to stay during the war. That
would be a joke. However, I stick to my resolution
that the rebels don’t really know themselves where
we are going. They move us because we are not
safe here. They are bewildered. Believing this am in
a comparatively easy state of mind. Still I worry.
Haven’t said a word in a week about my health. Well,
I am convalescing all the time. Still lame, and always
expect to be; can walk very well though, and feeling
lively for an old man.
Nov. 18.—None being taken away to-day, I believe
on account of not getting transportation. Notice that
rebel troops are passing through on the railroad and
immense activity among them. Am now well satisfied
of the correctness of my views as regards this
movement. Have decided now to stay here until the
last. Am getting ready for action however. Believe we
are going to have a warm time of it in the next few
months. Thank fortune I am as well as I am. Can
stand considerable now. Food given us in smaller
quantities, and hurriedly so too. All appears to be in a
hurry. Cloudy, and rather wet weather, and getting
decidedly cooler. My noble old coverlid is kept rolled
up and ready to accompany me on my travels at any
moment. Have my lame and stiff leg in training. Walk
all over the prison until tired out so as to strengthen
myself. Recruiting officers among us trying to induce
prisoners to enter their army. Say it is no exchange
for during the war, and half a dozen desert and go
with them. Even if we are not exchanged during the
war, don’t think we will remain prisoners long.
Nov. 19.—A car load went at about noon, and are
pretty well thinned out. Over half gone—no one
believes to our lines now; all hands afraid of going to
Charleston. Believe I shall try and escape on the
journey, although in no condition to rough it. Am
going to engineer this thing to suit myself and have a
little fun. Would like to be out from under rebel guard
once more. When I can look around and not see a
prison wall and a gun ready to shoot me, I shall
rejoice. Have edged up to another comrade and we
bunk together. Said comrade is Corporal Smith,
belonging to an Indiana regiment. While he is no
great guns, seems quite a sensible chap and a
decided improvement on many here to mess with.
The nights are cool, and a covering of great benefit.
My being the owner of a good blanket makes me a
very desirable comrade to mess with. Two or three
together can keep much warmer than one alone. It is
said that a number of outsiders have escaped and
taken to the woods. Another load goes to-night or
early in the morning. My turn will come pretty soon.
Nothing new in our situation or the prospects ahead.
Food scarce, but of good quality. More go and I go
to-morrow.
Nov. 20.—None as yet gone to-day and it is
already most night. My turn would not come until to-
morrow, and if none go at all to-day I will probably not
get away until about day after to-morrow. Shan’t flank
out, but await my turn and go where fate decrees.
Had a falling out with my companion Smith, and am
again alone walking about the prison with my coverlid
on my shoulders. Am determined that this covering
protects none but thoroughly good and square
fellows. Later.—Going to be a decidedly cold night,
and have “made up” with two fellows to sleep
together. The going away is the all absorbing topic of
conversation. Received for rations this day a very
good allowance of hard-tack and bacon. This is the
first hard-tack received since the trip to
Andersonville, and is quite a luxury. It is so hard that I
have to tack around and soak mine up before I am
able to eat it. There is a joke to this. Will again go to
bed as I have done the last week, thinking every
night would be the last at Camp Lawton.
 Nov. 21.—Got up bright and early, went to the
creek and had a good wash, came back, after a good
walk over the prison, and ate my two large crackers
and small piece of bacon left over from yesterday,
and again ready for whatever may turn up. Lost my
diminutive cake of soap in the water and must again
take to sand to scrub with, until fortune again favors
me. Men are very restless and reckless, uncertainty
making them so. Try my very best not to have any
words or trouble with them, but occasionally get
drawn into it, as I did this morning. Came out solid
however. Is pretty well understood that I can take
care of myself. Noon.—Five hundred getting ready
to go; my turn comes to-morrow, and then we will see
what we will see. Decided rumors that Sherman has
taken Atlanta and is marching toward Savannah, the
heart of the Confederacy. All in good spirits for the
first time in a week.
 ESCAPE BUT NOT ESCAPE.

MOVED FROM CAMP LAWTON AFTER A SOJOURN OF TWENTY

DAYS—DESTINATION BLACKSHEAR, GA.—JUMP OFF THE
CARS AND OUT FROM REBEL GUARD FOR SIX DAYS—A
HUNGRY TIME BUT A GOOD ONE—CAPTURED AND MAKE THE
ACQUAINTANCE OF TWO OTHER RUNAWAYS WITH WHOM I
CAST MY FORTUNES, ETC., ETC.

Nov. 22.—And now my turn has come, and I get off

with the next load going to-day. My trunk is packed
and baggage duly checked; shall try and get a “lay
over” ticket, and rusticate on the road. Will see the
conductor about it. A nice cool day with sun shining
brightly—a fit one for an adventure and I am just the
boy to have one. Coverlid folded up and thrown
across my shoulder, lower end tied as only a soldier
knows how. My three large books of written matter on
the inside of my thick rebel jacket, and fastened in.
Have a small book which I keep at hand to write in
now. My old hat has been exchanged for a red
zouave cap, and I look like a red headed
woodpecker. Leg behaving beautifully. My latest
comrades are James Ready and Bill Somebody. We
have decided to go and keep together on the cars.
One of them has an apology for a blanket, and the
two acting in conjunction keep all three warm nights.
Later.—On the cars, in vicinity of Savannah en-
route for Blackshear, which is pretty well south and
not far from the Florida line. Are very crowded in a
close box car and fearfully warm. Try to get away to-
night.
In the Woods near Doctortown Station, No.
5, Ga., Nov. 23.—A change has come over the spirit
of my dreams. During the night the cars ran very
slow, and sometimes stopped for hours on side
tracks. A very long, tedious night, and all suffered a
great deal with just about standing room only.
Impossible to get any sleep. Two guards at each side
door, which were open about a foot. Guards were
passably decent, although strict. Managed to get
near the door, and during the night talked
considerable with the two guards on the south side of
the car. At about three o’clock this a. m., and after
going over a long bridge which spanned the
Altamaha River and in sight of Doctortown, I went
through the open door like a flash and rolled down a
high embankment. Almost broke my neck, but not
quite. Guard fired a shot at me, but as the cars were
going, though not very fast, did not hit me. Expected
the cars to stop but they did not, and I had the
inexpressible joy of seeing them move off out of
sight. Then crossed the railroad track going north,
went through a large open field and gained the
woods, and am now sitting on the ground leaning up
against a big pine tree and out from under rebel
guard! The sun is beginning to show itself in the east
and it promises to be a fine day. Hardly know what to
do with myself. If those on the train notified
Doctortown people of my escape they will be after
me. Think it was at so early an hour that they might
have gone right through without telling any one of the
jump off. Am happy and hungry and considerably
bruised and scratched up from the escape. The
happiness of being here, however, overbalances
everything else. If I had George Hendryx with me
now would have a jolly time, and mean to have as it
is. Sun is now up and it is warmer; birds chippering
around, and chipmunks looking at me with curiosity.
Can hear hallooing off a mile or so, which sounds like
farmers calling cattle or hogs or something. All nature
smiles—why should not I?—and I do. Keep my eyes
peeled, however, and look all ways for Sunday. Must
work farther back toward what I take to be a swamp
a mile or so away. Am in a rather low country
although apparently a pretty thickly settled one; most
too thickly populated for me, judging from the signs
of the times. It’s now about dinner time, and I have
traveled two or three miles from the railroad track,
should judge and am in the edge of a swampy forest,
although the piece of ground on which I have made
my bed is dry and nice. Something to eat wouldn’t be
a bad thing. Not over sixty rods from where I lay is a
path evidently travelled more or less by negroes
going from one plantation to another. My hope of
food lays by that road. Am watching for passers by.
Later.—A negro boy too young to trust has gone by
singing and whistling, and carrying a bundle and a tin
pail evidently filled with somebody’s dinner. In as
much as I want to enjoy this out-door Gypsy life, I will
not catch and take the dinner away from him. That
would be the height of foolishness. Will lay for the
next one traveling this way. The next one is a dog
and he comes up and looks at me, gives a bark and
scuds off. Can’t eat a dog. Don’t know how it will be
to-morrow though. Might be well enough for him to
come around later. Well, it is most dark and will get
ready to try and sleep. Have broken off spruce
boughs and made a soft bed. Have heard my father
tell of sleeping on a bed of spruce, and it is healthy.
Will try it. Not a crust to eat since yesterday
forenoon. Am educated to this way of living though,
and have been hungryer. Hope the pesky alligators
will let me alone. If they only knew it, I would make a
poor meal for them. Thus closes my first day of
freedom and it is grand. Only hope they may be
many, although I can hardly hope to escape to our
lines, not being in a condition to travel.
Nov. 24.—Another beautiful morning, a repetition
of yesterday, opens up to me. It is particularly
necessary that I procure sustenance wherewith life is
prolonged, and will change my head-quarters to a
little nearer civilization. Can hear some one chopping
not a mile away. Here goes. Later.—Found an old
negro fixing up a dilapidated post and rail fence.
Approached him and enquired the time of day. (My
own watch having run down.) He didn’t happen to
have his gold watch with him, but reckoned it was
nigh time for the horn. Seemed scared at the
apparition that appeared to him, and no wonder.
Forgave him on the spot. Thought it policy to tell him
all about who and what I was, and did so. Was very
timid and afraid, but finally said he would divide his
dinner as soon as it should be sent to him, and for an
hour I lay off a distance of twenty rods or so, waiting
for that dinner. It finally came, brought by the same
boy I saw go along yesterday. Boy sat down the pail
and the old darkey told him to scamper off home—
which he did. Then we had dinner of rice, cold yams
and fried bacon. It was a glorious repast, and I
succeeded in getting quite well acquainted with him.
We are on the Bowden plantation and he belongs to
a family of that name. Is very fearful of helping me as
his master is a strong Secesh., and he says would
whip him within an inch of his life if it was known.
Promise him not to be seen by any one and he has
promised to get me something more to eat after it
gets dark. Later.—After my noonday meal went
back toward the low ground and waited for my
supper, which came half an hour ago and it is not yet
dark. Had a good supper of boiled seasoned turnips,
corn bread and sour milk, the first milk I have had in
about a year. Begs me to go off in the morning, which
I have promised to do. Says for me to go two or three
miles on to another plantation owned by LeCleye,
where there are good negroes who will feed me.
Thanked the old fellow for his kindness. Says the war
is about over and the Yanks expected to free them all
soon. It’s getting pretty dark now, and I go to bed
filled to overflowing; in fact, most too much so.
Nov. 25.—This morning got up cold and stiff; not
enough covering. Pushed off in the direction pointed
out by the darkey of yesterday. Have come in the
vicinity of negro shanties and laying in wait for some
good benevolent colored brother. Most too many
dogs yelping around to suit a runaway Yankee. Little
nigs and the canines run together. If I can only attract
their attention without scaring them to death, shall be
all right. However, there is plenty of time, and won’t
rush things. Time is not valuable with me. Will go
sure and careful. Don’t appear to be any men folks
around; more or less women of all shades of color.
This is evidently a large plantation; has thirty or forty
negro huts in three or four rows. They are all neat
and clean to outward appearances. In the far
distance and toward what I take to be the main road
is the master’s residence. Can just see a part of it.
Has a cupola on top and is an ancient structure.
Evidently a nice plantation. Lots of cactus grows wild
all over, and is bad to tramp through. There is also
worlds of palm leaves, such as five cent fans are
made of. Hold on there, two or three negro men are
coming from the direction of the big house to the
huts. Don’t look very inviting to trust your welfare
with. Will still wait, McCawber like, for something to
turn up. If they only knew the designs I have on
them, they would turn pale. Shall be ravenous by
night and go for them. I am near a spring of water,
and lay down flat and drink. The “Astor House Mess”
is moving around for a change; hope I won’t make a
mess of it. Lot of goats looking at me now,
wondering, I suppose, what it is. Wonder if they butt?
Shoo! Going to rain, and if so I must sleep in one of
those shanties. Negroes all washing up and getting
ready to eat, with doors open. No, thank you; dined
yesterday. Am reminded of the song: “What shall we
do, when the war breaks the country up, and scatters
us poor darkys all around.” This getting away
business is about the best investment I ever made.
Just the friendliest fellow ever was. More than like a
colored man, and will stick closer than a brother if
they will only let me. Laugh when I think of the old
darky of yesterday’s experience, who liked me first
rate only wanted me to go away. Have an eye on an
isolated hut that looks friendly. Shall approach it at
dark. People at the hut are a woman and two or three
children, and a jolly looking and acting negro man.
Being obliged to lay low in the shade feel the cold, as
it is rather damp and moist. Later.—Am in the hut
and have eaten a good supper. Shall sleep here to-
night. The negro man goes early in the morning,
together with all the male darky population, to work
on fortifications at Fort McAllister. Says the whole
country is wild at the news of approaching Yankee
army. Negro man named “Sam” and woman “Sady.”
Two or three negroes living here in these huts are not
trustworthy, and I must keep very quiet and not be
seen. Children perfectly awe struck at the sight of a
Yankee. Negroes very kind but afraid. Criminal to
assist me. Am five miles from Doctortown. Plenty of
“gubers” and yams. Tell them all about my
imprisonment. Regard the Yankees as their friends.
Half a dozen neighbors come in by invitation, shake
hands with me, scrape the floor with their feet, and
rejoice most to death at the good times coming.
“Bress de Lord,” has been repeated hundreds of
times in the two or three hours I have been here.
Surely I have fallen among friends. All the visitors
donate of their eatables, and although enough is
before me to feed a dozen men, I give it a tussle.
Thus ends the second day of my freedom, and it is
glorious.
Nov. 26.—An hour before daylight “Sam” awoke
me and said I must go with him off a ways to stay
through the day. Got up, and we started. Came about
a mile to a safe hiding place, and here I am. Have
plenty to eat and near good water. Sam will tell
another trusty negro of my whereabouts, who will
look after me, as he has to go away to work. The
negroes are very kind, and I evidently am in good
hands. Many of those who will not fight in the
Confederate army are hid in these woods and
swamps, and there are many small squads looking
them up with dogs and guns to force them into the
rebel ranks. All able-bodied men are conscripted into
the army in the South. It is possible I may be
captured by some of these hunting parties. It is again
most night and have eaten the last of my food. Can
hear the baying of hounds and am skeery. Shall take
in all the food that comes this way in the meantime.
Sam gave me an old jack knife and I shall make a
good bed to sleep on, and I also have an additional
part of a blanket to keep me warm. In fine spirits and
have hopes for the future. Expect an ambassador
from my colored friends a little later. Later.—The
ambassador has come and gone in the shape of a
woman. Brought food; a man told her to tell me to go
off a distance of two miles or so, to the locality
pointed out, before daylight, and wait there until
called upon to-morrow. Rebel guards occupy the
main roads, and very unsafe.
Nov. 27.—Before daylight came where I now am.
Saw alligators—small ones. This out in the woods life
is doing me good. Main road three miles away, but
there are paths running everywhere. Saw a white
man an hour ago. Think he was a skulker hiding to
keep out of the army, but afraid to hail him. Many of
these stay in the woods day-times, and at night go to
their homes, getting food. Am now away quite a
distance from any habitation, and am afraid those
who will look for me cannot find me. Occasionally
hear shots fired; this is a dangerous locality. Have
now been out four days and fared splendidly. Have
hurt one of my ankles getting through the brush; sort
of sprain, and difficult to travel at all. No water near
by and must move as soon as possible. Wild hogs
roam around through the woods, and can run like a
deer. Palm leaves grow in great abundance, and are
handsome to look at. Some of them very large.
Occasionally see lizards and other reptiles, and am
afraid of them. If I was a good traveler I could get
along through the country and possibly to our lines.
Must wander around and do the best I can however.
Am armed with my good stout cane and the knife
given me by the negro; have also some matches, but
dare not make a fire lest it attract attention. Nights
have to get up occasionally and stamp around to get
warm. Clear, cool nights and pleasant. Most too light,
however, for me to travel. The remnants of
yesterday’s food, have just eaten. Will now go off in
an easterly direction in hopes of seeing the
messenger.
Nov. 28.—No one has come to me since day
before yesterday. Watched and moved until most
night of yesterday but could see or hear no one.
Afraid I have lost communication. In the distance can
see a habitation and will mog along that way. Most
noon. Later.—As I was poking along through some
light timber, almost ran into four Confederates with
guns. Lay down close to the ground and they passed
by me not more than twenty rods away. Think they
have heard of my being in the vicinity and looking me
up. This probably accounts for not receiving any
visitor from the negroes. Getting very hungry, and no
water fit to drink. Must get out of this community as
fast as I can. Wish to gracious I had two good legs.
Later.—It is now nearly dark and I have worked my
way as near direct north as I know how. Am at least
four miles from where I lay last night. Have seen
negroes, and white men, but did not approach them.
Am completely tired out and hungry, but on the edge
of a nice little stream of water. The closing of the fifth
day of my escape. Must speak to somebody to-
morrow, or starve to death. Good deal of yelling in
the woods. Am now in the rear of a hovel which is
evidently a negro hut, but off quite a ways from it.
Cleared ground all around the house so I can’t
approach it without being too much in sight. Small
negro boy playing around the house. Too dark to
write more.
Nov. 29.—The sixth day of freedom, and a hungry
one. Still where I wrote last night, and watching the
house. A woman goes out and in but cannot tell
much about her from this distance. No men folks
around. Two or three negro boys playing about. Must
approach the house, but hate to. Noon.—Still right
here. Hold my position. More than hungry. Three
days since I have eaten anything, with the exception
of a small potatoe and piece of bread eaten two days
ago and left from the day before. That length of time
would have been nothing in Andersonville, but now
being in better health demand eatables, and it takes
right hold of this wandering sinner. Shall go to the
house towards night. A solitary woman lives there
with some children. My ankle from the sprain and
yesterday’s walking is swollen and painful. Bathe it in
water, which does it good. Chickens running around.
Have serious meditations of getting hold of one or
two of them after they go to roost, then go farther
back into the wilderness, build a fire with my matches
and cook them. That would be a royal feast. But if
caught at it, it would go harder with me than if caught
legitimately. Presume this is the habitation of some of
the skulkers who return and stay home nights.
Believe that chickens squawk when being taken from
the roost. Will give that up and walk boldly up to the
house.
 RE-CAPTURED.

HOME GUARDS GOBBLE ME UP—WELL TREATED AND WELL

FED—TAKEN TO DOCTORTOWN AND FROM THENCE TO
BLACKSHEAR—THE TWO BUCK BOYS AS RUNAWAYS—RIDE
ON A PASSENGER TRAIN—PROSPECTS AHEAD, ETC.

Doctortown Station, No. 5, Nov. 30.—Ha! Ha!

My boy, you are a prisoner of war again. Once more
with a blasted rebel standing guard over me, and it
all happened in this wise: Just before dark I went up
to that house I spoke of in my writings yesterday.
Walked boldly up and rapped at the door; and what
was my complete astonishment when a white woman
answered my rapping. Asked me what I wanted, and
I told her something to eat. Told me to come in and
set down. She was a dark looking woman and could
easily be mistaken from my hiding place of the day
for a negro. Began asking me questions. Told her I
was a rebel soldier, had been in the hospital sick and
was trying to reach home in the adjoining county.
Was very talkative; told how her husband had been
killed at Atlanta, &c. She would go out and in from a
shanty kitchen in her preparation of my supper. I
looked out through a window and saw a little darky
riding away from the house, a few minutes after I
went inside. Thought I had walked into a trap, and
was very uneasy. Still the woman talked and worked,
and I talked, telling as smoothe lies as I knew how.
For a full hour and a half sat there, and she all the
time getting supper. Made up my mind that I was the
same as captured, and so put on a bold face and
made the best of it. Was very well satisfied with my
escapade anyway, if I could only get a whack at that
supper before the circus commenced. Well, after a
while heard some hounds coming through the woods
and towards the house. Looked at the woman and
her face pleaded guilty, just as if she had done
something very mean. The back door of the house
was open and pretty soon half a dozen large blood
hounds bounded into the room and began snuffing
me over; about this time the woman began to cry.
Told her I understood the whole thing and she need
not make a scene over it. Said she knew I was a
yankee and had sent for some men at Doctortown.
Then five horsemen surrounded the house,
dismounted and four of them came in with guns
cocked prepared for a desperate encounter. I said:
“good evening, gentlemen.” “Good evening,” said the
foremost, “we are looking for a runaway yankee
prowling around here.” “Well,” says I, “you needn’t
look any farther, you have found him.” “Yes, I see,”
was the answer. They all sat down, and just then the
woman said “supper is ready and to draw nigh.”
Drawed as nigh as I could to that supper and
proceeded to take vengeance on the woman. The
fellows proved to be home guards stationed here at
Doctortown. The woman had mounted the negro boy
on a horse just as soon as I made my appearance at
the house and sent for them. They proved to be good
fellows. Talked there at the house a full hour on the
fortunes of war, &c. Told them of my long
imprisonment and escape and all about myself. After
a while we got ready to start for this place. One rebel
rode in front, one on each side and two in the rear of
me. Was informed that if I tried to run they would
shoot me. Told them no danger of my running, as I
could hardly walk. They soon saw that such was the
case after going a little way, and sent back one of the
men to borrow the woman’s horse. Was put on the
animal’s back and we reached Doctortown not far
from midnight. As we were leaving the house the
woman gave me a bundle; said in it was a shirt and
stockings. Told her she had injured me enough and I
would take them. No false delicy will prevent my
taking a shirt. And so my adventure has ended and
have enjoyed it hugely. Had plenty to eat with the
exception of the two days, and at the last had a