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Ethics
Discovering Right and Wrong
EIGHTH EDITION
LOUIS P. POJMAN
Late of the United States Military Academy, West Point
JAMES FIESER
University of Tennessee, Martin
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About the Authors
Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005) was professor of philosophy, emeritus at the

United States Military Academy and a life member of Clare Hall, Cambridge
University. He received an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary/
Columbia University and a D.Phil. from Oxford University. He wrote in the areas
of philosophy of religion, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy and is the
author or editor of more than 30 books and 100 articles. Among these are Ethics:
Discovering Right and Wrong (8/e 2017), Environmental Ethics (7/e 2017), Who Are
We? (2005), and Global Political Philosophy (2003).
James Fieser is professor of philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Martin.
He received his B.A. from Berea College, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy
from Purdue University. He is author, coauthor, or editor of 10 text books,
including Socrates to Sartre and Beyond (9/e 2011), Ethical Theory: Classical and Con-
temporary Readings (6/e 2010), A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (2003), and
Moral Philosophy Through the Ages (2001). He has edited and annotated the ten-
volume Early Responses to Hume (2/e 2005) and the five-volume Scottish Common
Sense Philosophy (2000). He is founder and general editor of the Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy Web site (www.iep.utm.edu).
iii
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Contents
PREFACE v iii
1 What Is Ethics? 1
Ethics and Its Subdivisions 1
Morality as Compared with Other Normative Subjects 3
Traits of Moral Principles 6
Domains of Ethical Assessment 7
Conclusion 10
For Further Reflection 11
2 Ethical Relativism 13
Subjective Ethical Relativism 15
Conventional Ethical Relativism 17
Criticisms of Conventional Ethical Relativism 20
Conclusion 25
3 Moral Objectivism 28
Aquinas’s Objectivism and Absolutism 30
Moderate Objectivism 36
Ethical Situationalism 40
Conclusion 41
iv
CONTENTS v
4 Value and the Quest for the Good 44

Types of Values 45
Foundational Nature of Values 50
The Good Life 55
Conclusion 58
5 Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral 61

Why Does Society Need Moral Rules? 63
Why Should I Be Moral? 67
Morality, Self-Interest, and Game Theory 69
The Motive to Always Be Moral 72
Conclusion 75
6 Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism 77

Psychological Egoism 78
Ethical Egoism 82
Arguments Against Ethical Egoism 87
Conclusion 91
7 Utilitarianism 93
Classic Utilitarianism 95
Act- and Rule-Utilitarianism 98
Criticism of Utilitarianism 101
Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means 106
Conclusion 110
8 Kant and Deontological Theories 113

Kant’s Influences 114
The Categorical Imperative 117
Counterexamples to the Principle of the Law of Nature 123
Other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative 125
The Problem of Exceptionless Rules 129
Conclusion: A Reconciliation Project 132
vi CONTENTS
9 Virtue Theory 135

The Nature of Virtue Ethics 136
Criticisms of Action-Based Ethics 140
Connections Between Virtue-Based and Action-Based
Ethics 146
Conclusion 153
10 Biology and Ethics 155

Moral Behavior in Animals 156
Morality and Human Evolution 161
What Is Left for Traditional Morality? 167
Conclusion 172
11 Gender and Ethics 175

Classic Views 177
Female Care Ethics 181
Four Options Regarding Gender and Ethics 186
Conclusion 190
12 Religion and Ethics 194

Does Morality Depend on Religion? 195
Is Religion Irrelevant or Even Contrary to Morality? 200
Does Religion Enhance the Moral Life? 205
Conclusion 210
13 The Fact–Value Problem 212

Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically Stated 213
Ayer and Emotivism 216
Hare and Prescriptivism 220
Naturalism and the Fact–Value Problem 227
Conclusion 230
14 Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism 232

Mackie’s Moral Skepticism 234
Harman’s Moral Nihilism 238
CONTENTS vii
A Defense of Moral Realism 242

Conclusion 245
APPENDIX 247
GLOSSARY 251
INDEX 255
For more information on an alternate version of this book which contains classic
and contemporary philosophical reading selections in the back of the book, please
contact your Cengage Learning representative.
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Preface
I n 1977, Australian philosopher John L. Mackie published his famous book Ethics:
Inventing Right and Wrong, in which he argues that the moral values we hold are
inventions of society: “we have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral
stands to take.” The title of the present book Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, is
both an acknowledgement of the importance of Mackie’s view and a response to it.
Morality is not purely an invention, as Mackie suggests, but it also involves a
discovery. We may compare morality to the development of the wheel. Both are
creations based on discoverable features. The wheel was invented to facilitate the
transportation of objects with minimal friction. The construction of a wheel
adheres to the laws of physics to bring about efficient motion. Not just anything
could function as a good wheel. A rectangular or triangular wheel would be
inefficient, as would one made out of sand or bird feathers or heavy stones. Ana-
logously, morality has been constructed to serve human needs and desires, for
example, the need to survive and the desires to prosper and be happy. The
ideal morality should serve as the blueprint for individual happiness and social
harmony. Human beings have used their best minds over millennia to discover
those principles that best serve to promote individual and social well-being. Just
as the construction of the wheel is dependent on the laws of physics, so the con-
struction of morality has been dependent on human nature, on discoverable fea-
tures of our being. It is in this spirit of moral discovery that Ethics: Discovering
Right and Wrong surveys the main theories of moral philosophy today.
The philosophical community experienced a great loss in 2005 with the
death of Louis Pojman, the original author of this book, who succumbed to his
battle with cancer. His voluminous writings—over 30 books and 100 articles—
have been uniformly praised for their high level of scholarship and insight, and
countless philosophy students and teachers have benefited from them (see www.
louispojman.com for biographical and bibliographical details).
Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong was first published in 1990 and quickly
established itself as an authoritative, yet reader-friendly, introduction to ethics.
viii
PREFACE ix
In an earlier preface, Louis expresses his enthusiasm for his subject and his com-
mitment to his reader:
I have written this book in the spirit of a quest for truth and under-
standing, hoping to excite you about the value of ethics. It is a subject
that I love, for it is about how we are to live, about the best kind of life.
I hope that you will come to share my enthusiasm for the subject and
develop your own ideas in the process.
Over the years, new editions of this book have appeared in response to the con-
tinually evolving needs of college instructors and students. Throughout these
changes, however, the book has focused on the central issues of ethical theory,
which in this edition include chapters on the following 14 subjects, beginning
with the more theoretical issues of (1) what ethics is most generally, (2) ethical
relativism, (3) moral objectivism, (4) moral value, (5) social contract theory and
the motive to be moral, and (6) egoism and altruism. The book next focuses on
the influential normative theories of (7) utilitarianism, (8) Kantianism and deon-
tology, and (9) virtue theory. Building on these concepts, the last portion of
the book explores the more contemporary theoretical debates surrounding
(10) biology and ethics, (11) gender and ethics, (12) religion and ethics,
(13) the fact–value problem, and (14) moral realism and skepticism.
This newly revised eighth edition attempts to reflect the spirit of change that
governed previous editions. As with most textbook revisions, the inclusion of
new material in this edition required the deletion of a comparable amount of
previously existing material. Many of the changes in this edition were suggested
by previous book users, both faculty and students, for which I am very grateful.
The most noticeable change is a new chapter on biology and ethics. Many minor
changes have been made throughout for clarification and ease of reading.
MINDTAP
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The preface to the fifth edition of this book lists the following acknowledge-
ments, which I present here verbatim:
Michael Beaty, Sterling Harwood, Stephen Kershnar, Bill Lawhead,
Michael Levin, Robert Louden, Laura Purdy, Roger Rigterink, Bruce
x PREFACE
Russell, Walter Schaller, Bob Westmoreland, and Mark Discher were

very helpful in offering trenchant criticisms on several chapters of this
book. The students in my ethical theory classes at the University of
Mississippi and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for the past
20 years have served as a challenging sounding board for many of my
arguments. Ronald F. Duska, Rosemont College; Stephen Griffith,
Lycoming College; Arthur Kuflik, University of Vermont; James
Lindemann Nelson, Michigan State University; Peter List, Oregon
State University; Ann A. Pang-White, University of Scranton; Fred
Schueler, University of New Mexico; Nancy A. Stanlick, University
of Central Florida; R. Duane Thompson, Indiana Wesleyan University;
Peter Vallentyne, Virginia Commonwealth University; and David A.
White, Marquette University reviewed the manuscript for an earlier
edition and provided guidance in revising this latest edition.
I thank Debra Matteson, Liz Fraser, and the rest of the talented editorial staff at
Cengage for their expertise and good nature throughout the production of this
new edition. Thanks also to the dozens of ethics instructors who completed an
online survey about the text and made valuable suggestions for improvement.
Finally, I thank Louis’s wife, Trudy Pojman, for her gracious encouragement
with this project.
James Fieser
August 1, 2015
1
What Is Ethics?
S ome years ago, the nation was stunned by a report from New York City.
A young woman, Kitty Genovese, was brutally stabbed in her own neighbor-
hood late at night during three separate attacks while 38 respectable, law-abiding
citizens watched or listened. During the 35-minute struggle, her assailant beat her,
stabbed her, left her, and then returned to attack her two more times until she died.
No one lifted a phone to call the police; no one shouted at the criminal, let alone
went to Genovese’s aid. Finally, a 70-year-old woman called the police. It took
them just two minutes to arrive, but by that time Genovese was already dead.
Only one other woman came out to testify before the ambulance showed up
an hour later. Then residents from the whole neighborhood poured out of their
apartments. When asked why they hadn’t done anything, they gave answers
ranging from “I don’t know” and “I was tired” to “Frankly, we were afraid.”1
This tragic event raises many questions about our moral responsibility to
others. What should these respectable citizens have done? Are such acts of omis-
sion morally blameworthy? Is the Genovese murder an atypical situation, or does
it represent a disturbing trend? This story also raises important questions about
the general notion of morality. What is the nature of morality, and why do we
need it? What is the Good, and how will we know it? Is it in our interest to be
moral? What is the relationship between morality and religion? What is the rela-
tionship between morality and law? What is the relationship between morality
and etiquette? These are some of the questions that we explore in this book.
ETHICS AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS
Ethics is that branch of philosophy that deals with how we ought to live, with the
idea of the Good, and with concepts such as “right” and “wrong.” But what is
1
2 CHAPTER 1
philosophy? It is an enterprise that begins with wonder at the marvels and mysteries
of the world; that pursues a rational investigation of those marvels and mysteries,
seeking wisdom and truth; and that results in a life lived in passionate moral and
intellectual integrity. Taking as its motto Socrates’ famous statement “The unex-
amined life is not worth living,” philosophy leaves no aspect of life untouched by
its inquiry. It aims at a clear, critical, comprehensive conception of reality.
The main characteristic of philosophy is rational argument. Philosophers clarify
concepts and analyze and test propositions and beliefs, but their major task is to con-
struct and analyze arguments. Philosophical reasoning is closely allied with scientific
reasoning, in that both build hypotheses and look for evidence to test those hypoth-
eses with the hope of coming closer to the truth. However, scientific experiments
take place in laboratories and have testing procedures to record objective or empiri-
cally verifiable results. The laboratory of the philosopher is the domain of ideas.
It takes place in the mind, where imaginative thought experiments occur. It takes
place in the study room, where ideas are written down and examined. It also takes
place wherever conversation or debate about the perennial questions arises, where
thesis and counterexample and counterthesis are considered.
A word must be said about the specific terms moral and ethical and the asso-
ciated notions of morals and ethics. Often these terms are used interchangeably—as
will be the case in this book. Both terms derive their meaning from the idea of
“custom”—that is, normal behavior. Specifically, “moral” comes from the Latin
word mores and “ethical” from the Greek ethos.
The study of ethics within philosophy contains its own subdivisions, and
dividing up the territory of ethics is tricky. The key divisions are (1) descriptive
morality, (2) moral philosophy (ethical theory), and (3) applied ethics. First,
descriptive morality refers to actual beliefs, customs, principles, and practices
of people and cultures. Sociologists in particular pay special attention to the con-
crete moral practices of social groups around the world, and they view them as
cultural “facts,” much like facts about what people in those countries eat or how
they dress. Second, moral philosophy—also called ethical theory—refers to
the systematic effort to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles
and theories. It analyzes key ethical concepts such as “right,” “wrong,” and
“permissible.” It explores possible sources of moral obligation such as God,
human reason, or the desire to be happy. It seeks to establish principles of right
behavior that may serve as action guides for individuals and groups. Third,
applied ethics deals with controversial moral problems such as abortion, pre-
marital sex, capital punishment, euthanasia, and civil disobedience.
The larger study of ethics, then, draws on all three of these subdivisions,
connecting them in important ways. For example, moral philosophy is very
much interrelated with applied ethics, and here will be a difference in the quality
of debates about abortion and other such issues when those discussions are
informed by ethical theories. More light and less heat will be the likely outcome.
With the onset of multiculturalism and the deep differences in worldviews
around the globe today, the need to use reason, rather than violence, to settle
our disputes and resolve conflicts of interest has become obvious. Ethical aware-
ness is the necessary condition for human survival and flourishing.
WHAT IS ETHICS? 3
The study of ethics is not only of instrumental value but also valuable in its
own right. It is satisfying to have knowledge of important matters for its own
sake, and it is important to understand the nature and scope of moral theory
for its own sake. We are rational beings who cannot help but want to understand
the nature of the good life and all that it implies. The study of ethics is some-
times a bit off-putting because so many differing theories often appear to contra-
dict each other and thus produce confusion rather than guidance. But an
appreciation of the complexity of ethics is valuable in counteracting our natural
tendency toward inflexibility and tribalism where we stubbornly adhere to the
values of our specific peer groups.
MORALITY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER

NORMATIVE SUBJECTS
Moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve

not what is but what ought to be. How should I live my life? What is the right
thing to do in this situation? Is premarital sex morally permissible? Ought a
woman ever to have an abortion? Morality has a distinct action-guiding, or nor-
mative, aspect, which it shares with other practices such as religion, law, and eti-
quette. Let’s see how morality differs from each of these.
Religion
Consider first the relation between morality and religion. Moral behavior, as
defined by a given religion, is usually believed to be essential to that religion’s
practice. But neither the practices nor principles of morality should be identified
with religion. The practice of morality need not be motivated by religious con-
siderations, and moral principles need not be grounded in revelation or divine
authority—as religious teachings invariably are. The most important characteristic
of ethics is its grounding in reason and human experience.
To use a spatial metaphor, secular ethics is horizontal, lacking a vertical or higher
dimension; as such it does not receive its authority from “on high.” But religious
ethics, being grounded in revelation or divine authority, has that vertical dimension
although religious ethics generally uses reason to supplement or complement revela-
tion. These two differing orientations often generate different moral principles and
standards of evaluation, but they need not do so. Some versions of religious ethics,
which posit God’s revelation of the moral law in nature or conscience, hold that rea-
son can discover what is right or wrong even apart from divine revelation.
Law
Consider next the close relationship between morality and law. Many laws are
instituted in order to promote well-being, resolve conflicts of interest, and pro-
mote social harmony, just as morality does. However, ethics may judge that
4 CHAPTER 1
some laws are immoral without denying that they have legal authority. For
example, laws may permit slavery, spousal abuse, racial discrimination, or sexual
discrimination, but these are immoral practices.
In a PBS television series, Ethics in America, a trial lawyer was asked what he
would do if he discovered that his client had committed a murder some years
earlier for which another man had been wrongly convicted and would soon be
executed.2 The lawyer said that he had a legal obligation to keep this informa-
tion confidential and that, if he divulged it, he would be disbarred. It is arguable
that he has a moral obligation that overrides his legal obligation and demands
that he act to save the innocent man from execution.
Furthermore, some aspects of morality are not covered by law. For example,
although it is generally agreed that lying is usually immoral, there is no general
law against it—except under such special conditions as committing perjury or
falsifying income tax returns. Sometimes college newspapers publish advertise-
ments by vendors who offer “research assistance,” despite knowing in advance
that these vendors will aid and abet plagiarism. Publishing such ads is legal, but
its moral correctness is doubtful.
Similarly, the 38 people who watched the attacks on Kitty Genovese and
did nothing to intervene broke no New York law, but they were very likely
morally responsible for their inaction. In our legal tradition, there is no general
duty to rescue a person in need. In 1908, the dean of Harvard Law School pro-
posed that a person should be required to “save another from impending death
or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or no inconvenience to
himself.” The proposal was defeated, and one of its opponents posed the ques-
tion of whether a rich person, to whom $20 meant very little, be legally obliged
to save the life of a hungry child in a foreign land? Currently, only Vermont and
Minnesota have “Good Samaritan” laws, requiring that one come to the aid of a
person in grave physical harm but only to the extent that the aid “can be ren-
dered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others.”
There is another major difference between law and morality. In 1351, King
Edward of England instituted a law against treason that made it a crime merely
to think homicidal thoughts about the king. But, alas, the law could not be
enforced, for no tribunal can search the heart and discover the intentions of the
mind. It is true that intention, such as malice aforethought, plays a role in deter-
mining the legal character of an act once the act has been committed. But, pre-
emptive punishment for people who are presumed to have bad intentions is
illegal. If malicious intentions by themselves were illegal, wouldn’t we all deserve
imprisonment? Even if one could detect others’ intentions, when should the
punishment be administered? As soon as the offender has the intention? How
do we know that the offender won’t change his or her mind?
Although it is impractical to have laws against bad intentions, these inten-
tions are still morally wrong. Suppose I buy a gun with the intention of killing
Uncle Charlie to inherit his wealth, but I never get a chance to fire it (for exam-
ple, suppose Uncle Charlie moves to Australia). Although I have not committed
a crime, I have committed a moral wrong.
WHAT IS ETHICS? 5
Etiquette
Lastly, consider the relation between morality and etiquette. Etiquette concerns
form and style rather than the essence of social existence; it determines what is
polite behavior rather than what is right behavior in a deeper sense. It represents
society’s decision as to how we are to dress, greet one another, eat, celebrate
festivals, dispose of the dead, express gratitude and appreciation, and, in general,
carry out social transactions. Whether people greet each other with a handshake,
a bow, a hug, or a kiss on the cheek depends on their social system. Russians
wear their wedding rings on the third finger of their right hands, whereas Amer-
icans wear them on their left hands. The English hold their forks in their left
hands, whereas people in other countries are more likely to hold them in their
right hands. People in India typically eat without a fork at all, using the fingers of
their right hands to deliver food from their plate to their mouth. In and of them-
selves, none of these rituals has any moral superiority. Polite manners grace our
social existence, but they are not what social existence is about. They help social
transactions to flow smoothly but are not the substance of those transactions.
At the same time, it can be immoral to disregard or defy etiquette. Whether
to shake hands when greeting a person for the first time or put one’s hands
together in front as one bows, as people in India do, is a matter of cultural deci-
sion. But, once the custom is adopted, the practice takes on the importance of a
moral rule, subsumed under the wider principle of showing respect to people.
Similarly, there is no moral necessity to wear clothes, but we have adopted
the custom partly to keep warm in colder climates and partly to be modest.
Accordingly, there may be nothing wrong with nudists who decide to live
together in nudist colonies. However, for people to go nude outside of nudist
colonies—say, in classrooms, stores, and along the road—may well be so offen-
sive that it is morally insensitive. There was a scandal on the beaches of South
India where American tourists swam in bikinis, shocking the more modest
Indians. There was nothing immoral in itself about wearing bikinis, but given
the cultural context, the Americans willfully violated etiquette and were guilty
of moral impropriety.
Although Americans pride themselves on tolerance, pluralism, and awareness
of other cultures, custom and etiquette can be—even among people from similar
backgrounds—a bone of contention. A Unitarian minister tells of an experience
early in his marriage. He and his wife were hosting their first Thanksgiving meal.
He had been used to small celebrations with his immediate family, whereas his
wife had been used to grand celebrations. He writes, “I had been asked to carve,
something I had never done before, but I was willing. I put on an apron, entered
the kitchen, and attacked the bird with as much artistry as I could muster. And
what reward did I get? [My wife] burst into tears. In her family the turkey is
brought to the table, laid before the [father], grace is said, and then he carves!
‘So I fail patriarchy,’ I hollered later. ‘What do you expect?’ ”3
Law, etiquette, and religion are all important institutions, but each has lim-
itations. A limitation of religious commands is that they rest on authority, and we
may lack certainty or agreement about the authority’s credentials or how the
6 CHAPTER 1
authority would rule in ambiguous or new cases. Because religion is founded not
on reason but on revelation, you cannot use reason to convince someone from
another religion that your view is the right one. A limitation of law is that you
can’t have a law against every social problem, nor can you enforce every desir-
able rule. A limitation of etiquette is that it doesn’t get to the heart of what is
vitally important for personal and social existence. Whether or not one eats with
one’s fingers pales in significance with the importance of being honest, trustwor-
thy, or just. Etiquette is a cultural invention, but morality is more like a
discovery.
In summary, morality differs from law and etiquette by going deeper into
the essence of our social existence. It differs from religion by seeking reasons,
rather than authority, to justify its principles. The central purpose of moral phi-
losophy is to secure valid principles of conduct and values that can guide human
actions and produce good character. As such, it is the most important activity we
know, for it concerns how we are to live.
TRAITS OF MORAL PRINCIPLES
A central feature of morality is the moral principle. We have already noted that
moral principles are guides for action, but we must say more about the traits of
such principles. Although there is no universal agreement on the characteristics a
moral principle must have, there is a wide consensus about five features: (1) pre-
scriptivity, (2) universalizability, (3) overridingness, (4) publicity, and (5) practica-
bility. Several of these will be examined in chapters throughout this book, but
let’s briefly consider them here.
First is prescriptivity, which is the commanding aspect of morality. Moral
principles are generally put forth as commands or imperatives, such as “Do not
kill,” “Do no unnecessary harm,” and “Love your neighbor.” They are intended
for use: to advise people and influence action. Prescriptivity shares this trait with
all normative discourse and is used to appraise behavior, assign praise and blame,
and produce feelings of satisfaction or guilt.
Second is universalizability. Moral principles must apply to all people who
are in a relevantly similar situation. If I judge that an act is right for a certain
person, then that act is right for any other relevantly similar person. This trait is
exemplified in the Golden Rule, “Do to others what you would want them to
do to you.” We also see it in the formal principle of justice: It cannot be right for
you to treat me in a manner in which it would be wrong for me to treat you,
merely on the ground that we are two different individuals.4
Universalizability applies to all evaluative judgments. If I say that X is a good
thing, then I am logically committed to judge that anything relevantly similar to
X is a good thing. This trait is an extension of the principle of consistency: we
ought to be consistent about our value judgments, including one’s moral judg-
ments. Take any act that you are contemplating doing and ask, “Could I will
that everyone act according to this principle?”
WHAT IS ETHICS? 7
Third is overridingness. Moral principles have predominant authority and

override other kinds of principles. They are not the only principles, but they take
precedence over other considerations, including aesthetic, prudential, and legal
ones. The artist Paul Gauguin may have been aesthetically justified in abandon-
ing his family to devote his life to painting beautiful Pacific Island pictures, but
morally he probably was not justified, and so he probably should not have done
it. It may be prudent to lie to save my reputation, but it probably is morally
wrong to do so. When the law becomes egregiously immoral, it may be my
moral duty to exercise civil disobedience. There is a general moral duty to
obey the law because the law serves an overall moral purpose, and this overall
purpose may give us moral reasons to obey laws that may not be moral or ideal.
There may come a time, however, when the injustice of a bad law is intolerable
and hence calls for illegal but moral defiance. A good example would be laws in
the South prior to the Civil War requiring citizens to return runaway slaves to
their owners.
Fourth is publicity. Moral principles must be made public in order to guide
our actions. Publicity is necessary because we use principles to prescribe behav-
ior, give advice, and assign praise and blame. It would be self-defeating to keep
them a secret.
Fifth is practicability. A moral principle must have practicability, which
means that it must be workable and its rules must not lay a heavy burden on us
when we follow them. The philosopher John Rawls speaks of the “strains of
commitment” that overly idealistic principles may cause in average moral
agents.5 It might be desirable for morality to require more selfless behavior
from us, but the result of such principles could be moral despair, deep or
undue moral guilt, and ineffective action. Accordingly, most ethical systems
take human limitations into consideration.
Although moral philosophers disagree somewhat about these five traits, the
above discussion offers at least an idea of the general features of moral principles.
DOMAINS OF ETHICAL ASSESSMENT
At this point, it might seem that ethics concerns itself entirely with rules of con-
duct that are based solely on evaluating acts. However, it is more complicated
than that. Most ethical analysis falls into one or more of the following domains:
(1) action, (2) consequences, (3) character traits, and (4) motive. Again, all these
domains will be examined in detail in later chapters, but an overview here will
be helpful.
Let’s examine these domains using an altered version of the Kitty Genovese
story. Suppose a man attacks a woman in front of her apartment and is about to
kill her. A responsible neighbor hears the struggle, calls the police, and shouts
from the window, “Hey you, get out of here!” Startled by the neighbor’s repri-
mand, the attacker lets go of the woman and runs down the street where he is
caught by the police.
8 CHAPTER 1
Action
One way of ethically assessing this situation is to examine the actions of both the
attacker and the good neighbor: The attacker’s actions were wrong whereas the
neighbor’s actions were right. The term right has two meanings. Sometimes, it
means “obligatory” (as in “the right act”), but it also can mean “permissible”
(as in “a right act” or “It’s all right to do that”). Usually, philosophers define
right as permissible, including in that category what is obligatory:
1. A right act is an act that is permissible for you to do. It may be either
(a) obligatory or (b) optional.
a. An obligatory act is one that morality requires you to do; it is not
permissible for you to refrain from doing it.
b. An optional act is one that is neither obligatory nor wrong to do. It is
not your duty to do it, nor is it your duty not to do it. Neither doing it
nor not doing it would be wrong.
2. A wrong act is one you have an obligation, or a duty, to refrain from doing: It
is an act you ought not to do; it is not permissible to do it.
In our example, the attacker’s assault on the woman was clearly a wrong
action (prohibited); by contrast, the neighbor’s act of calling the police was
clearly a right action—and an obligatory one at that.
But, some acts do not seem either obligatory or wrong. Whether you take a
course in art history or English literature or whether you write a letter with a
pencil or pen seems morally neutral. Either is permissible. Whether you listen
to rock music or classical music is not usually considered morally significant. Lis-
tening to both is allowed, and neither is obligatory. Whether you marry or
remain single is an important decision about how to live your life. The decision
you reach, however, is usually considered morally neutral or optional. Under
most circumstances, to marry (or not to marry) is considered neither obligatory
nor wrong but permissible.
Within the range of permissible acts is the notion of supererogatory acts,
or highly altruistic acts. These acts are neither required nor obligatory, but they
exceed what morality requires, going “beyond the call of duty.” For example,
suppose the responsible neighbor ran outside to actually confront the attacker
rather than simply shout at him from the window. Thus, the neighbor would
assume an extra risk that would not be morally required. Similarly, while you
may be obligated to give a donation to help people in dire need, you would
not be obligated to sell your car, let alone become impoverished yourself, to
help them. The complete scheme of acts, then, is this:
1. Right act (permissible)
a. Obligatory act
b. Optional act
(1) Neutral act
(2) Supererogatory act
2. Wrong act (not permissible)
WHAT IS ETHICS? 9
One important kind of ethical theory that emphasizes the nature of the act is
called deontological (from the Greek word deon, meaning “duty”). These theories
hold that something is inherently right or good about such acts as truth telling and
promise keeping and inherently wrong or bad about such acts as lying and promise
breaking. Classical deontological ethical principles include the Ten Command-
ments and the Golden Rule. The leading proponent of deontological ethics in
recent centuries is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who defended a principle of
moral duty that he calls the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law.”
Examples for Kant are “Never break your promise” and “Never commit suicide.”
What all of these deontological theories and principles have in common is the view
that we have an inherent duty to perform right actions and avoid bad actions.
Consequences
Another way of ethically assessing situations is to examine the consequences of an
action: If the consequences are on balance positive, then the action is right; if
negative, then wrong. In our example, take the consequences of the attacker’s
actions. At minimum he physically harms the woman and psychologically trau-
matizes both her and her neighbors; if he succeeds in killing her, then he emo-
tionally devastates her family and friends, perhaps for life. And what does he gain
from this? Just a temporary experience of sadistic pleasure. On balance, his action
has overwhelmingly negative consequences and thus is wrong. Examine next the
consequences of the responsible neighbor who calls the police and shouts down
from the window “Hey you, get out of here!” This scares off the attacker, thus
limiting the harm of his assault. What does the neighbor lose by doing this? Just a
temporary experience of fear, which the neighbor might have experienced any-
way. On balance, then, the neighbor’s action has overwhelmingly positive con-
sequences, which makes it the right thing to do.
Ethical theories that focus primarily on consequences in determining moral
rightness and wrongness are sometimes called teleological ethics (from the
Greek telos, meaning “goal directed”). The most famous of these theories is utili-
tarianism, set forth by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873), which requires us to do what is likeliest to have the best consequences. In
Mill’s words, “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness;
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”
Character Traits
Whereas some ethical theories emphasize the nature of actions in themselves and
some emphasize principles involving the consequences of actions, other theories
emphasize a person’s character trait, or virtue. In our example, the attacker has an
especially bad character trait—namely, malevolence—which taints his entire out-
look on life and predisposes him to act in harmful ways. The attacker is a bad
person principally for having this bad character trait of malevolence. The respon-
sible neighbor, on the other hand, has a good character trait, which directs his
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Thou Dorothea remembered that perhaps Dolly did not
render herself attractive to Edred.
"I have seen her look lovely—as you say."
Dorothea gave him an eager glance, trying to read further.

Did he really feel no more than he showed? At the same
moment Mervyn and Dolly swept past again, nearer and
more slowly than before. Dolly lifted her blue eyes, and
gazed full at Dorothea, with a heart-sick reproachful gaze.
Dorothea was startled, even confounded, by it. The look
was such as she might have received from one whom she
had deeply injured. But how could she have injured Dolly?
Was she not studiously keeping aloof from Mervyn, for
Dolly's sake, forbearing to give him a needless smile?
Edred seemed not to have noticed the little interlude. He

went on without a break: "If one wanted mere prettiness,
and nothing more—"
"Oh!" cried Dorothea indignantly. "You don't mean Dolly!

You are not speaking of Dolly!"
Edred made no answer. Dorothea was hurrying forward,

under the strength of her own feelings.
"You have known her so many years, and I only two days,—
but to think of accusing Dolly of mere prettiness! You can't
know Dolly really. You can't have seen her in her home,
with her father and mother and her sisters. And I fancied
that you—"
Dorothea paused, and Edred's usually impassive face was

aglow. "Thanks," he said abruptly. "Yes, I—I think I do know
her. Forget what I said just now," and his voice showed
agitation. "Forget everything, except that she—that no one
in the world can ever be to me what Dolly is."
"I thought so," murmured Dorothea. "But why—?"
"Why do I not seek her? What is the use? Cannot you see
for yourself. Have I a grain of hope to work upon?"
Dorothea could not say that he had. She could only say,—"If
I were a man, I would not give in so easily."
"If you were a man, I suppose you would do as a man

does," he observed drily. "I don't know what has made me
say so much to you, Miss Tracy. Pray consider it to be
strictly in confidence—and pray forget the whole."
"I shall not forget; and I shall not repeat it," said Dorothea.
"But I still think that if I were you, I would try to win her."
Both Dorothea and Edred were too deeply interested in their

subject to pay much attention to what went on around.
Edred's eyes were bent downward, and Dorothea's were
occupied in studying him. They were skating round a tiny
islet which lay at one end of the pond, carelessly keeping to
the left of the narrow ice-belt, and calmly oblivious of the
fact that other people might choose to round the islet from
the opposite direction.
"Hallo!" A warning shout from Mervyn recalled their

wandering minds to the present. But the shout came too
late. Mervyn and Dolly, skimming lightly one way, met
Edred and Dorothea in full career. The four went down
together, and Dolly was underneath.
The two young men were up instantly; and almost before

Dorothea knew what had happened, she found herself again
on her feet, helped up by Mervyn's strong hands. Dolly
alone lay white and still on the hard ice.
"You are not hurt? You are sure you are not hurt?" Mervyn
was saying anxiously to Dorothea, while Edred was
endeavouring to lift Dolly. "You are quite sure?"
A keen throb of joy passed through Dorothea. She could not

but see that Mervyn's first thought was of her; his chief
solicitude was for her. Then she thrust the joy fiercely aside.
"O no, no; not in the least. But Dolly,—poor Dolly! Don't
think of me! Only think of Dolly," she implored.
CHAPTER XX
CUTTING THE KNOT
NEARLY ten days had gone by, and nothing would induce
Colonel Tracy to prolong his stay at the Woodlands. He
enjoyed being there immensely, he avowed; and the old
reconciled comrades were well-nigh inseparable.
Nevertheless, the Colonel confessed to Dorothea a private
craving for his town-life, his quiet room, his solitary candle
and musty books. He "wasn't made to live in a crowd," he
said. Dorothea could not echo his sentiments, but she
acquiesced.
Edred had prolonged his stay at the Park, and Mervyn was
there still, instead of taking flight with his usual speed. Both
brothers now, however, talked of leaving: Edred at the same
time as the Tracys—Mervyn a day or two later.
For more than a week, ever since the skating, Dolly had
been upstairs, invisible. Her poor little bruised face was at
first in no state to be seen: and also, she had been too
unwell to leave her room. The shock of her fall had perhaps
only given a finishing stroke to long previous strain. From
one cause or another, she was thoroughly weak and low,
disposed to tears on the slightest pretext, and unable to
rally.
Dorothea had had no easy part to play. She found herself

very much in request with both brothers: with Mervyn
plainly for her own sake; with Edred as plainly for Dolly's
sake. Edred liked to get Dorothea alone, and to hear her
talk about Dolly; only nobody except Dorothea was aware of
this explanation. She was very willing to talk to him of
Dolly, and she was very anxious to do her duty to Dolly in
keeping Mervyn at arm's length. But the latter task was by
no means easy; partly because she was doing violence to
her own inclinations—partly because Mervyn was of a
nature not to be easily checked.
Matters had developed fast in these few days. When

Dorothea first came to Craye, she liked Mervyn, and she
knew that she could like him very much more. The potential
had now become the positive. Dorothea not only liked him
very much more, but she felt that for her, he stood alone as
the man who was unlike all other men. This means
something far beyond mere liking; yet for Dolly's sake
Dorothea strove hard to hide what she felt, to treat him as
a mere acquaintance.
Perhaps she was less successful in veiling her true feelings

than she imagined. Perhaps Mervyn had a keener insight
into woman's nature than Edred. The more Dorothea
endeavoured to hold aloof, the more persistently he came
after her. Both young men were constantly in and out of the
house all through that week, and both appeared to come
mainly for the purpose of talking to Dorothea. There was no
appearance of jealousy between them; perhaps because the
sunny-tempered Mervyn was not given to jealousy, perhaps
because Edred felt too secure. So, at least, people
conjectured. It might easily be thought by a looker-on that
she gave encouragement to Edred. She was more at her
ease with him than with Mervyn.
And poor little Dolly all this while was hors de combat,
unable to fight her own battle. It did seem hard to the elder
sisters; both of whom had now a pretty clear understanding
of the state of Dolly's mind, and neither of whom supposed
Dorothea to be fighting Dolly's battle for her—only through
ignorance fighting it wrongly. Isabel and Margot had seen
with pleasure Mervyn's evident fancy for Dorothea; and
they would have been equally pleased to see the "fancy"
returned. Attentions from Edred were another matter, and
that his attentions should be apparently well received, while
those of Mervyn were more or less rebuffed, exercised the
sisters greatly.
"I think it is too bad—quite too bad!—and I wish they had

never come to Woodlands at all," Isabel declared hotly.
Margot could have echoed the wish. "But that is hardly fair,"
she said. "Edred might never have cared for Dolly in any
case,—and I am sure Dorothea does not know how things
are."
"Then she ought to know! People ought to use their eyes,"

said unreasonable Isabel.
"Some people haven't the gift," remarked Margot, thinking

how slow Isabel herself had been.
"Why shouldn't one give her a hint, Margot? I'll do it."
Margot shook her head. She had a great dread of interfering

in such matters. Simple blundering Isabel, who had done
damage before by her outspokenness, pondered the matter
for a whole half-hour, and came to the conclusion that this
was a case for open speech. People like Isabel who meddle
in everything, do harm nine times out of ten; but the tenth
time they occasionally manage to set wrong right, thereby
gaining encouragement to proceed in the same course. The
nine times are forgotten—the one is remembered.
Twice a day Dorothea was allowed to see Dolly for a chat.

She would gladly have stayed longer than the stipulated
fifteen or twenty minutes; but no encouragement to do so
was given. Dorothea was keenly aware that, Dolly did not
care to have her. A barrier seemed to divide them; and not
all Dorothea's efforts could do away with it. "And yet we
ought to be friends," she said often to herself.
Mervyn and Edred had each promised separately to look in

late that last afternoon—Mervyn to say good-bye to the
Tracys, Edred to say good-bye to the Erskines. "About tea-
time," both had said; and there was some idea of Dolly
coming down for the first time; but though perhaps well
enough, she seemed to shrink from the exertion.
The matter was still undecided at four o'clock. "Will she

come!" Dorothea asked eagerly, meeting Isabel on the
stairs. Isabel gazed absently, with wrinkled brow, and asked
"Who?"
"I mean Dolly. Margot said she might be able. Wouldn't it do

her good?—to be downstairs, I mean."
Isabel was too much absorbed with one idea to have room
in her mind for any other train of thought. "Yes,—no,—I am
not sure. Dolly isn't sure yet, I believe," she said vaguely,
moving towards the nearest open door on the next landing,
with the air of one expecting to be followed. "I have been
thinking that I—I—there is something I should rather like to
ask you."
Dorothea walked after her into the bedroom, and waited.
Isabel carefully closed the door, and then fidgeted to the

fireplace.
"Dolly seems so depressed just now, doesn't she! Has she

not seemed so to you?"
"Yes; I wish she did not. But perhaps in a few days she will
be better."
"She is getting over the fall. It is not only that now: at

least, I believe not. I am speaking privately—I mean I
shouldn't like what I say repeated to anybody—but—but—"
blundered Isabel, "you see, we seem to know you pretty
well now. And you have seen a great deal of the
Claughtons."
"Yes, a good deal." Dorothea could not restrain a slight
blush.
"And I thought I would just ask—I thought I could just put a

little question. I should like so much to know whether it has
struck you—whether you have an impression that either of
them cares at all for Dolly,—cares very particularly, I
mean."
Dorothea was silent. If she had had merely an "impression,"

she could have told it at once; but how could she betray
Edred's confidence to Isabel?
"You see I am asking for Dolly's sake. One can't help

noticing,—and I dare say you have noticed that she does
seem to—well, to have a particular liking for one of them—
more than just friendship."
Dorothea said "Yes" again.
"I was sure you couldn't help seeing. At one time we really
thought something was coming of it,—but lately I have felt
doubtful. He doesn't seem to take the same pains,—and I
do believe that is why poor little Dolly is so down-hearted.
Of course, one can't do anything: and, as Margot says,
things must be left to take their own course. Still, I thought
I might just ask you, as a friend, whether you have noticed
—"
Dorothea liked to be treated as a friend, and she had

noticed a great deal; but she was puzzled what response to
make.
"I can't imagine for my part what has made him so stiff and
cold," said Isabel, knitting her brows. "Of course, he never
is very lively—still, he used not to be like this. Margot says
—but I don't believe—"
Dorothea broke into the confused sentences.
"Mr. Mervyn Claughton stiff and cold!"
"Mervyn! I'm speaking of Edred, of course. You haven't

supposed that I meant Mervyn all the while!"
Dorothea stood mute; her eyes unwontedly bright.
"You didn't think Dolly cared for Mervyn!" exclaimed Isabel.

"You couldn't—possibly!"
"I suppose it was stupid of me, but I really did!"
Isabel stood looking with puzzled eyes. "I don't know what I
have said to make you so happy," she said.
"Don't ask me anything, please," begged Dorothea in

answer. "Don't say any more. Only let me see Dolly for a
few minutes,—and if I can persuade her to go into the study
for an hour, don't put any difficulties in the way. I have my
reasons: and I must not explain."
"Dolly to go into the study!"
"Yes. It will be all right, only please just let it be so. I want
to see Dolly alone. I will not repeat a word that you have
said."
Two minutes later, Dorothea, vividly conscious that Isabel

had cut a Gordian knot, was kneeling beside Dolly's couch.
"Dolly, I have something to propose," she said softly. "Dolly,

listen to me. Margot thought you were too tired to come
down among us all to-day. But I want you not to mind being
tired. I want you to manage just to get to the study sofa for
an hour."
"What for?" asked Dolly languidly.
"Because—" and she lowered her voice,—"Mr. Edred

Claughton will be so disappointed if he cannot see you once
more before he goes."
If Dorothea had any doubts remaining, the glow which leapt

to Dolly's white face was enough to do away with them.
"He and I feel so guilty about this week," Dorothea went on.
"It was all our fault,—your being laid up, I mean. If we had
not both been so stupidly full of what we were talking
about, we should have had our wits about us, and there
need have been no collision."
"It can't be helped."
"I almost think you would forgive us both, if you knew what
it was that interested us so much. Guess! What do you
think it could be?"
"I don't know."
"It was—Dolly, of course. What else could be so

engrossing?"
Dolly's cheeks became brighter still.
"I don't think I ought to say much more. I would not say so
much to any one except you. But—I do know that he is
longing to see you before he goes; and I thought—if you
could get down to the study, that might be the best way.
And, Dolly—" very softly—"darling, don't be too cold. He has
been so hopeless,—and I don't think he has much pluck."
Dolly said not a word in answer. She only put both arms
round Dorothea, and held her fast, as if thus cementing the
friendship which was to have been, but which hardly yet
had begun to be between them.
Five o'clock drew near, and Dolly was in the study. Dorothea
wondered how affairs would fit in. Would Edred be too shy
to use his opportunity? And would Mervyn appear at all?
Her thoughts were in a whirl, but by no means on her own
account only. The last few days had been an education in
unselfishness.
Both Colonels were absent on a long ramble, and Mrs.

Erskine had not appeared from her afternoon repose, when
the two Claughtons marched in together. Isabel fled at the
sound of the front door opening; Margot alone remaining
with Dorothea. The latter could not guess whether this were
a condition of things purposely arranged. She only knew
that it was unusual. Her own face, commonly pale, had
perhaps never been brighter or prettier than now when for
the first time she could venture to meet Mervyn with an
unchecked smile of welcome. She did not seem excited, but
there was a glow in her cheeks, and the placid eyes shone
softly through their glasses.
"Dolly is in the study," Margot remarked, as Edred glanced

round.
Margot had evidently no intention of saying more. She

seated herself, and began to talk to Mervyn, while Edred
showed not the least disposition to act on his own behalf. In
another moment, he too would have subsided into a chair,
but Dorothea stood up, and came close to him.
"Dolly is in the study," she repeated in an undertone, not

meant for the other two. "You told me yesterday that you
wanted to see her."
"Well, yes," assented Edred.

"She is there on the sofa; why not go to her—now?"
"At once!" Edred seemed reluctant. "What is the use?" he

asked despondingly.
"The use! Make it of use. O go, do go!"
The voice, though low, was energetic enough to reach

Margot and Mervyn. Edred actually obeyed without another
word; and as the door closed behind him, Dorothea turned
to meet two smiling faces.
"Never was better advice given," uttered Mervyn. "I have a

mind to follow it myself. Margot—be kind! All the world will
buzz about our ears directly. Don't you think you ought, as
a duty, to keep watch outside the study-door? Just for five
minutes!"
"That would be a double kindness, I suppose! Well—just for

five minutes!" and Margot too left the room.
Dorothea, occupied still with Dolly, did not see through this
move, till she found herself alone with Mervyn, felt her
hands imprisoned in his, and heard him say—
"We have only five minutes! Not a moment to lose!

Dorothea—if anybody in the world understands me, it is
yourself. Do you know me well enough—to—"
Then she knew what was coming, and she did not shrink
from it. Thanks to Isabel's cutting of the tangled knot, she
had no hesitation as to what answer she might or would
give.
Within the specified five minutes, Dorothea had become the

affianced wife of Mervyn; and within half-an-hour, Dolly was
the affianced wife of the less expeditious Edred.
"Nothing could have been better managed. It really is
delightful all round," declared Isabel to Margot, dallying in
her room late that night. "I always knew the Claughtons
would be charmed. Emmeline is hard to please, but she
really does take to Dorothea. And as for Colonel Tracy, I
believe he wants nothing more than to get her off his
hands."
"Now, Issy!"
"You know what I mean. He is an odd man, and he can't

help it, I suppose. But I am sure Dolly and Dorothea look
the picture of happiness. I believe Dorothea will be the
making of Mervyn. He is a nice fellow, though Emmeline
underrates him to such an extent. I wonder what Edred's
friend Mrs. Effingham will say?"
"She has not much to do with the matter. I often wonder

she has not taken more trouble about Dorothea."
"Oh, well—people in London have no time, and she is

always in a bustle. But isn't this a curious finale to the long
quarrel,—that the two babies, Christened together, and then
never meeting till they are nearly twenty, should marry
brothers, and become almost sisters! Now, Margot, I know I
often seem to you a great deal too outspoken, and perhaps
I am. But just this once, don't you think I was right?"
"Just this once, Issy, I haven't a word to say," Margot

answered.
THE END
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Textbook Ebook Ethics Discovering Right and Wrong 8Th Edition Louis P Pojman All Chapter PDF

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Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong

8th Edition Louis P. Pojman

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About the Authors

Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005) was professor of philosophy, emeritus at the

4 Value and the Quest for the Good 44

5 Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral 61

6 Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism 77

8 Kant and Deontological Theories 113

9 Virtue Theory 135

10 Biology and Ethics 155

11 Gender and Ethics 175

12 Religion and Ethics 194

13 The Fact–Value Problem 212

14 Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism 232

A Defense of Moral Realism 242

Russell, Walter Schaller, Bob Westmoreland, and Mark Discher were

ETHICS AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS

MORALITY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER

Moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve

TRAITS OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

Third is overridingness. Moral principles have predominant authority and

DOMAINS OF ETHICAL ASSESSMENT

"I have seen her look lovely—as you say."

Dorothea gave him an eager glance, trying to read further.

Edred seemed not to have noticed the little interlude. He

"Oh!" cried Dorothea indignantly. "You don't mean Dolly!

Edred made no answer. Dorothea was hurrying forward,

Dorothea paused, and Edred's usually impassive face was

"If you were a man, I suppose you would do as a man

Both Dorothea and Edred were too deeply interested in their

"Hallo!" A warning shout from Mervyn recalled their

The two young men were up instantly; and almost before

A keen throb of joy passed through Dorothea. She could not

Dorothea had had no easy part to play. She found herself

Matters had developed fast in these few days. When

Perhaps she was less successful in veiling her true feelings

"I think it is too bad—quite too bad!—and I wish they had

"Then she ought to know! People ought to use their eyes,"

"Some people haven't the gift," remarked Margot, thinking

"Why shouldn't one give her a hint, Margot? I'll do it."

Margot shook her head. She had a great dread of interfering

Twice a day Dorothea was allowed to see Dolly for a chat.

Mervyn and Edred had each promised separately to look in

The matter was still undecided at four o'clock. "Will she

"I mean Dolly. Margot said she might be able. Wouldn't it do

Dorothea walked after her into the bedroom, and waited.

Isabel carefully closed the door, and then fidgeted to the

"Dolly seems so depressed just now, doesn't she! Has she

"She is getting over the fall. It is not only that now: at

"And I thought I would just ask—I thought I could just put a

Dorothea was silent. If she had had merely an "impression,"

"You see I am asking for Dolly's sake. One can't help

Dorothea said "Yes" again.

Dorothea liked to be treated as a friend, and she had

"Mr. Mervyn Claughton stiff and cold!"

"Mervyn! I'm speaking of Edred, of course. You haven't

Dorothea stood mute; her eyes unwontedly bright.

"You didn't think Dolly cared for Mervyn!" exclaimed Isabel.