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Ethics
Discovering Right and Wrong
EIGHTH EDITION
LOUIS P. POJMAN
Late of the United States Military Academy, West Point
JAMES FIESER
University of Tennessee, Martin
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About the Authors
Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005) was professor of philosophy, emeritus at the

United States Military Academy and a life member of Clare Hall, Cambridge
University. He received an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary/
Columbia University and a D.Phil. from Oxford University. He wrote in the areas
of philosophy of religion, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy and is the
author or editor of more than 30 books and 100 articles. Among these are Ethics:
Discovering Right and Wrong (8/e 2017), Environmental Ethics (7/e 2017), Who Are
We? (2005), and Global Political Philosophy (2003).
James Fieser is professor of philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Martin.
He received his B.A. from Berea College, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy
from Purdue University. He is author, coauthor, or editor of 10 text books,
including Socrates to Sartre and Beyond (9/e 2011), Ethical Theory: Classical and Con-
temporary Readings (6/e 2010), A Historical Introduction to Philosophy (2003), and
Moral Philosophy Through the Ages (2001). He has edited and annotated the ten-
volume Early Responses to Hume (2/e 2005) and the five-volume Scottish Common
Sense Philosophy (2000). He is founder and general editor of the Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy Web site (www.iep.utm.edu).
iii
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Contents
PREFACE v iii
1 What Is Ethics? 1
Ethics and Its Subdivisions 1
Morality as Compared with Other Normative Subjects 3
Traits of Moral Principles 6
Domains of Ethical Assessment 7
Conclusion 10
For Further Reflection 11
2 Ethical Relativism 13
Subjective Ethical Relativism 15
Conventional Ethical Relativism 17
Criticisms of Conventional Ethical Relativism 20
Conclusion 25
3 Moral Objectivism 28
Aquinas’s Objectivism and Absolutism 30
Moderate Objectivism 36
Ethical Situationalism 40
Conclusion 41
iv
CONTENTS v
4 Value and the Quest for the Good 44

Types of Values 45
Foundational Nature of Values 50
The Good Life 55
Conclusion 58
5 Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral 61

Why Does Society Need Moral Rules? 63
Why Should I Be Moral? 67
Morality, Self-Interest, and Game Theory 69
The Motive to Always Be Moral 72
Conclusion 75
6 Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism 77

Psychological Egoism 78
Ethical Egoism 82
Arguments Against Ethical Egoism 87
Conclusion 91
7 Utilitarianism 93
Classic Utilitarianism 95
Act- and Rule-Utilitarianism 98
Criticism of Utilitarianism 101
Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means 106
Conclusion 110
8 Kant and Deontological Theories 113

Kant’s Influences 114
The Categorical Imperative 117
Counterexamples to the Principle of the Law of Nature 123
Other Formulations of the Categorical Imperative 125
The Problem of Exceptionless Rules 129
Conclusion: A Reconciliation Project 132
vi CONTENTS
9 Virtue Theory 135

The Nature of Virtue Ethics 136
Criticisms of Action-Based Ethics 140
Connections Between Virtue-Based and Action-Based
Ethics 146
Conclusion 153
10 Biology and Ethics 155

Moral Behavior in Animals 156
Morality and Human Evolution 161
What Is Left for Traditional Morality? 167
Conclusion 172
11 Gender and Ethics 175

Classic Views 177
Female Care Ethics 181
Four Options Regarding Gender and Ethics 186
Conclusion 190
12 Religion and Ethics 194

Does Morality Depend on Religion? 195
Is Religion Irrelevant or Even Contrary to Morality? 200
Does Religion Enhance the Moral Life? 205
Conclusion 210
13 The Fact–Value Problem 212

Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically Stated 213
Ayer and Emotivism 216
Hare and Prescriptivism 220
Naturalism and the Fact–Value Problem 227
Conclusion 230
14 Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism 232

Mackie’s Moral Skepticism 234
Harman’s Moral Nihilism 238
CONTENTS vii
A Defense of Moral Realism 242

Conclusion 245
APPENDIX 247
GLOSSARY 251
INDEX 255
For more information on an alternate version of this book which contains classic
and contemporary philosophical reading selections in the back of the book, please
contact your Cengage Learning representative.
✵
Preface
I n 1977, Australian philosopher John L. Mackie published his famous book Ethics:
Inventing Right and Wrong, in which he argues that the moral values we hold are
inventions of society: “we have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral
stands to take.” The title of the present book Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, is
both an acknowledgement of the importance of Mackie’s view and a response to it.
Morality is not purely an invention, as Mackie suggests, but it also involves a
discovery. We may compare morality to the development of the wheel. Both are
creations based on discoverable features. The wheel was invented to facilitate the
transportation of objects with minimal friction. The construction of a wheel
adheres to the laws of physics to bring about efficient motion. Not just anything
could function as a good wheel. A rectangular or triangular wheel would be
inefficient, as would one made out of sand or bird feathers or heavy stones. Ana-
logously, morality has been constructed to serve human needs and desires, for
example, the need to survive and the desires to prosper and be happy. The
ideal morality should serve as the blueprint for individual happiness and social
harmony. Human beings have used their best minds over millennia to discover
those principles that best serve to promote individual and social well-being. Just
as the construction of the wheel is dependent on the laws of physics, so the con-
struction of morality has been dependent on human nature, on discoverable fea-
tures of our being. It is in this spirit of moral discovery that Ethics: Discovering
Right and Wrong surveys the main theories of moral philosophy today.
The philosophical community experienced a great loss in 2005 with the
death of Louis Pojman, the original author of this book, who succumbed to his
battle with cancer. His voluminous writings—over 30 books and 100 articles—
have been uniformly praised for their high level of scholarship and insight, and
countless philosophy students and teachers have benefited from them (see www.
louispojman.com for biographical and bibliographical details).
Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong was first published in 1990 and quickly
established itself as an authoritative, yet reader-friendly, introduction to ethics.
viii
PREFACE ix
In an earlier preface, Louis expresses his enthusiasm for his subject and his com-
mitment to his reader:
I have written this book in the spirit of a quest for truth and under-
standing, hoping to excite you about the value of ethics. It is a subject
that I love, for it is about how we are to live, about the best kind of life.
I hope that you will come to share my enthusiasm for the subject and
develop your own ideas in the process.
Over the years, new editions of this book have appeared in response to the con-
tinually evolving needs of college instructors and students. Throughout these
changes, however, the book has focused on the central issues of ethical theory,
which in this edition include chapters on the following 14 subjects, beginning
with the more theoretical issues of (1) what ethics is most generally, (2) ethical
relativism, (3) moral objectivism, (4) moral value, (5) social contract theory and
the motive to be moral, and (6) egoism and altruism. The book next focuses on
the influential normative theories of (7) utilitarianism, (8) Kantianism and deon-
tology, and (9) virtue theory. Building on these concepts, the last portion of
the book explores the more contemporary theoretical debates surrounding
(10) biology and ethics, (11) gender and ethics, (12) religion and ethics,
(13) the fact–value problem, and (14) moral realism and skepticism.
This newly revised eighth edition attempts to reflect the spirit of change that
governed previous editions. As with most textbook revisions, the inclusion of
new material in this edition required the deletion of a comparable amount of
previously existing material. Many of the changes in this edition were suggested
by previous book users, both faculty and students, for which I am very grateful.
The most noticeable change is a new chapter on biology and ethics. Many minor
changes have been made throughout for clarification and ease of reading.
MINDTAP
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The preface to the fifth edition of this book lists the following acknowledge-
ments, which I present here verbatim:
Michael Beaty, Sterling Harwood, Stephen Kershnar, Bill Lawhead,
Michael Levin, Robert Louden, Laura Purdy, Roger Rigterink, Bruce
x PREFACE
Russell, Walter Schaller, Bob Westmoreland, and Mark Discher were

very helpful in offering trenchant criticisms on several chapters of this
book. The students in my ethical theory classes at the University of
Mississippi and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point for the past
20 years have served as a challenging sounding board for many of my
arguments. Ronald F. Duska, Rosemont College; Stephen Griffith,
Lycoming College; Arthur Kuflik, University of Vermont; James
Lindemann Nelson, Michigan State University; Peter List, Oregon
State University; Ann A. Pang-White, University of Scranton; Fred
Schueler, University of New Mexico; Nancy A. Stanlick, University
of Central Florida; R. Duane Thompson, Indiana Wesleyan University;
Peter Vallentyne, Virginia Commonwealth University; and David A.
White, Marquette University reviewed the manuscript for an earlier
edition and provided guidance in revising this latest edition.
I thank Debra Matteson, Liz Fraser, and the rest of the talented editorial staff at
Cengage for their expertise and good nature throughout the production of this
new edition. Thanks also to the dozens of ethics instructors who completed an
online survey about the text and made valuable suggestions for improvement.
Finally, I thank Louis’s wife, Trudy Pojman, for her gracious encouragement
with this project.
James Fieser
August 1, 2015
1
What Is Ethics?
S ome years ago, the nation was stunned by a report from New York City.
A young woman, Kitty Genovese, was brutally stabbed in her own neighbor-
hood late at night during three separate attacks while 38 respectable, law-abiding
citizens watched or listened. During the 35-minute struggle, her assailant beat her,
stabbed her, left her, and then returned to attack her two more times until she died.
No one lifted a phone to call the police; no one shouted at the criminal, let alone
went to Genovese’s aid. Finally, a 70-year-old woman called the police. It took
them just two minutes to arrive, but by that time Genovese was already dead.
Only one other woman came out to testify before the ambulance showed up
an hour later. Then residents from the whole neighborhood poured out of their
apartments. When asked why they hadn’t done anything, they gave answers
ranging from “I don’t know” and “I was tired” to “Frankly, we were afraid.”1
This tragic event raises many questions about our moral responsibility to
others. What should these respectable citizens have done? Are such acts of omis-
sion morally blameworthy? Is the Genovese murder an atypical situation, or does
it represent a disturbing trend? This story also raises important questions about
the general notion of morality. What is the nature of morality, and why do we
need it? What is the Good, and how will we know it? Is it in our interest to be
moral? What is the relationship between morality and religion? What is the rela-
tionship between morality and law? What is the relationship between morality
and etiquette? These are some of the questions that we explore in this book.
ETHICS AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS
Ethics is that branch of philosophy that deals with how we ought to live, with the
idea of the Good, and with concepts such as “right” and “wrong.” But what is
1
2 CHAPTER 1
philosophy? It is an enterprise that begins with wonder at the marvels and mysteries
of the world; that pursues a rational investigation of those marvels and mysteries,
seeking wisdom and truth; and that results in a life lived in passionate moral and
intellectual integrity. Taking as its motto Socrates’ famous statement “The unex-
amined life is not worth living,” philosophy leaves no aspect of life untouched by
its inquiry. It aims at a clear, critical, comprehensive conception of reality.
The main characteristic of philosophy is rational argument. Philosophers clarify
concepts and analyze and test propositions and beliefs, but their major task is to con-
struct and analyze arguments. Philosophical reasoning is closely allied with scientific
reasoning, in that both build hypotheses and look for evidence to test those hypoth-
eses with the hope of coming closer to the truth. However, scientific experiments
take place in laboratories and have testing procedures to record objective or empiri-
cally verifiable results. The laboratory of the philosopher is the domain of ideas.
It takes place in the mind, where imaginative thought experiments occur. It takes
place in the study room, where ideas are written down and examined. It also takes
place wherever conversation or debate about the perennial questions arises, where
thesis and counterexample and counterthesis are considered.
A word must be said about the specific terms moral and ethical and the asso-
ciated notions of morals and ethics. Often these terms are used interchangeably—as
will be the case in this book. Both terms derive their meaning from the idea of
“custom”—that is, normal behavior. Specifically, “moral” comes from the Latin
word mores and “ethical” from the Greek ethos.
The study of ethics within philosophy contains its own subdivisions, and
dividing up the territory of ethics is tricky. The key divisions are (1) descriptive
morality, (2) moral philosophy (ethical theory), and (3) applied ethics. First,
descriptive morality refers to actual beliefs, customs, principles, and practices
of people and cultures. Sociologists in particular pay special attention to the con-
crete moral practices of social groups around the world, and they view them as
cultural “facts,” much like facts about what people in those countries eat or how
they dress. Second, moral philosophy—also called ethical theory—refers to
the systematic effort to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles
and theories. It analyzes key ethical concepts such as “right,” “wrong,” and
“permissible.” It explores possible sources of moral obligation such as God,
human reason, or the desire to be happy. It seeks to establish principles of right
behavior that may serve as action guides for individuals and groups. Third,
applied ethics deals with controversial moral problems such as abortion, pre-
marital sex, capital punishment, euthanasia, and civil disobedience.
The larger study of ethics, then, draws on all three of these subdivisions,
connecting them in important ways. For example, moral philosophy is very
much interrelated with applied ethics, and here will be a difference in the quality
of debates about abortion and other such issues when those discussions are
informed by ethical theories. More light and less heat will be the likely outcome.
With the onset of multiculturalism and the deep differences in worldviews
around the globe today, the need to use reason, rather than violence, to settle
our disputes and resolve conflicts of interest has become obvious. Ethical aware-
ness is the necessary condition for human survival and flourishing.
WHAT IS ETHICS? 3
The study of ethics is not only of instrumental value but also valuable in its
own right. It is satisfying to have knowledge of important matters for its own
sake, and it is important to understand the nature and scope of moral theory
for its own sake. We are rational beings who cannot help but want to understand
the nature of the good life and all that it implies. The study of ethics is some-
times a bit off-putting because so many differing theories often appear to contra-
dict each other and thus produce confusion rather than guidance. But an
appreciation of the complexity of ethics is valuable in counteracting our natural
tendency toward inflexibility and tribalism where we stubbornly adhere to the
values of our specific peer groups.
MORALITY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER

NORMATIVE SUBJECTS
Moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve

not what is but what ought to be. How should I live my life? What is the right
thing to do in this situation? Is premarital sex morally permissible? Ought a
woman ever to have an abortion? Morality has a distinct action-guiding, or nor-
mative, aspect, which it shares with other practices such as religion, law, and eti-
quette. Let’s see how morality differs from each of these.
Religion
Consider first the relation between morality and religion. Moral behavior, as
defined by a given religion, is usually believed to be essential to that religion’s
practice. But neither the practices nor principles of morality should be identified
with religion. The practice of morality need not be motivated by religious con-
siderations, and moral principles need not be grounded in revelation or divine
authority—as religious teachings invariably are. The most important characteristic
of ethics is its grounding in reason and human experience.
To use a spatial metaphor, secular ethics is horizontal, lacking a vertical or higher
dimension; as such it does not receive its authority from “on high.” But religious
ethics, being grounded in revelation or divine authority, has that vertical dimension
although religious ethics generally uses reason to supplement or complement revela-
tion. These two differing orientations often generate different moral principles and
standards of evaluation, but they need not do so. Some versions of religious ethics,
which posit God’s revelation of the moral law in nature or conscience, hold that rea-
son can discover what is right or wrong even apart from divine revelation.
Law
Consider next the close relationship between morality and law. Many laws are
instituted in order to promote well-being, resolve conflicts of interest, and pro-
mote social harmony, just as morality does. However, ethics may judge that
4 CHAPTER 1
some laws are immoral without denying that they have legal authority. For
example, laws may permit slavery, spousal abuse, racial discrimination, or sexual
discrimination, but these are immoral practices.
In a PBS television series, Ethics in America, a trial lawyer was asked what he
would do if he discovered that his client had committed a murder some years
earlier for which another man had been wrongly convicted and would soon be
executed.2 The lawyer said that he had a legal obligation to keep this informa-
tion confidential and that, if he divulged it, he would be disbarred. It is arguable
that he has a moral obligation that overrides his legal obligation and demands
that he act to save the innocent man from execution.
Furthermore, some aspects of morality are not covered by law. For example,
although it is generally agreed that lying is usually immoral, there is no general
law against it—except under such special conditions as committing perjury or
falsifying income tax returns. Sometimes college newspapers publish advertise-
ments by vendors who offer “research assistance,” despite knowing in advance
that these vendors will aid and abet plagiarism. Publishing such ads is legal, but
its moral correctness is doubtful.
Similarly, the 38 people who watched the attacks on Kitty Genovese and
did nothing to intervene broke no New York law, but they were very likely
morally responsible for their inaction. In our legal tradition, there is no general
duty to rescue a person in need. In 1908, the dean of Harvard Law School pro-
posed that a person should be required to “save another from impending death
or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or no inconvenience to
himself.” The proposal was defeated, and one of its opponents posed the ques-
tion of whether a rich person, to whom $20 meant very little, be legally obliged
to save the life of a hungry child in a foreign land? Currently, only Vermont and
Minnesota have “Good Samaritan” laws, requiring that one come to the aid of a
person in grave physical harm but only to the extent that the aid “can be ren-
dered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others.”
There is another major difference between law and morality. In 1351, King
Edward of England instituted a law against treason that made it a crime merely
to think homicidal thoughts about the king. But, alas, the law could not be
enforced, for no tribunal can search the heart and discover the intentions of the
mind. It is true that intention, such as malice aforethought, plays a role in deter-
mining the legal character of an act once the act has been committed. But, pre-
emptive punishment for people who are presumed to have bad intentions is
illegal. If malicious intentions by themselves were illegal, wouldn’t we all deserve
imprisonment? Even if one could detect others’ intentions, when should the
punishment be administered? As soon as the offender has the intention? How
do we know that the offender won’t change his or her mind?
Although it is impractical to have laws against bad intentions, these inten-
tions are still morally wrong. Suppose I buy a gun with the intention of killing
Uncle Charlie to inherit his wealth, but I never get a chance to fire it (for exam-
ple, suppose Uncle Charlie moves to Australia). Although I have not committed
a crime, I have committed a moral wrong.
WHAT IS ETHICS? 5
Etiquette
Lastly, consider the relation between morality and etiquette. Etiquette concerns
form and style rather than the essence of social existence; it determines what is
polite behavior rather than what is right behavior in a deeper sense. It represents
society’s decision as to how we are to dress, greet one another, eat, celebrate
festivals, dispose of the dead, express gratitude and appreciation, and, in general,
carry out social transactions. Whether people greet each other with a handshake,
a bow, a hug, or a kiss on the cheek depends on their social system. Russians
wear their wedding rings on the third finger of their right hands, whereas Amer-
icans wear them on their left hands. The English hold their forks in their left
hands, whereas people in other countries are more likely to hold them in their
right hands. People in India typically eat without a fork at all, using the fingers of
their right hands to deliver food from their plate to their mouth. In and of them-
selves, none of these rituals has any moral superiority. Polite manners grace our
social existence, but they are not what social existence is about. They help social
transactions to flow smoothly but are not the substance of those transactions.
At the same time, it can be immoral to disregard or defy etiquette. Whether
to shake hands when greeting a person for the first time or put one’s hands
together in front as one bows, as people in India do, is a matter of cultural deci-
sion. But, once the custom is adopted, the practice takes on the importance of a
moral rule, subsumed under the wider principle of showing respect to people.
Similarly, there is no moral necessity to wear clothes, but we have adopted
the custom partly to keep warm in colder climates and partly to be modest.
Accordingly, there may be nothing wrong with nudists who decide to live
together in nudist colonies. However, for people to go nude outside of nudist
colonies—say, in classrooms, stores, and along the road—may well be so offen-
sive that it is morally insensitive. There was a scandal on the beaches of South
India where American tourists swam in bikinis, shocking the more modest
Indians. There was nothing immoral in itself about wearing bikinis, but given
the cultural context, the Americans willfully violated etiquette and were guilty
of moral impropriety.
Although Americans pride themselves on tolerance, pluralism, and awareness
of other cultures, custom and etiquette can be—even among people from similar
backgrounds—a bone of contention. A Unitarian minister tells of an experience
early in his marriage. He and his wife were hosting their first Thanksgiving meal.
He had been used to small celebrations with his immediate family, whereas his
wife had been used to grand celebrations. He writes, “I had been asked to carve,
something I had never done before, but I was willing. I put on an apron, entered
the kitchen, and attacked the bird with as much artistry as I could muster. And
what reward did I get? [My wife] burst into tears. In her family the turkey is
brought to the table, laid before the [father], grace is said, and then he carves!
‘So I fail patriarchy,’ I hollered later. ‘What do you expect?’ ”3
Law, etiquette, and religion are all important institutions, but each has lim-
itations. A limitation of religious commands is that they rest on authority, and we
may lack certainty or agreement about the authority’s credentials or how the
6 CHAPTER 1
authority would rule in ambiguous or new cases. Because religion is founded not
on reason but on revelation, you cannot use reason to convince someone from
another religion that your view is the right one. A limitation of law is that you
can’t have a law against every social problem, nor can you enforce every desir-
able rule. A limitation of etiquette is that it doesn’t get to the heart of what is
vitally important for personal and social existence. Whether or not one eats with
one’s fingers pales in significance with the importance of being honest, trustwor-
thy, or just. Etiquette is a cultural invention, but morality is more like a
discovery.
In summary, morality differs from law and etiquette by going deeper into
the essence of our social existence. It differs from religion by seeking reasons,
rather than authority, to justify its principles. The central purpose of moral phi-
losophy is to secure valid principles of conduct and values that can guide human
actions and produce good character. As such, it is the most important activity we
know, for it concerns how we are to live.
TRAITS OF MORAL PRINCIPLES
A central feature of morality is the moral principle. We have already noted that
moral principles are guides for action, but we must say more about the traits of
such principles. Although there is no universal agreement on the characteristics a
moral principle must have, there is a wide consensus about five features: (1) pre-
scriptivity, (2) universalizability, (3) overridingness, (4) publicity, and (5) practica-
bility. Several of these will be examined in chapters throughout this book, but
let’s briefly consider them here.
First is prescriptivity, which is the commanding aspect of morality. Moral
principles are generally put forth as commands or imperatives, such as “Do not
kill,” “Do no unnecessary harm,” and “Love your neighbor.” They are intended
for use: to advise people and influence action. Prescriptivity shares this trait with
all normative discourse and is used to appraise behavior, assign praise and blame,
and produce feelings of satisfaction or guilt.
Second is universalizability. Moral principles must apply to all people who
are in a relevantly similar situation. If I judge that an act is right for a certain
person, then that act is right for any other relevantly similar person. This trait is
exemplified in the Golden Rule, “Do to others what you would want them to
do to you.” We also see it in the formal principle of justice: It cannot be right for
you to treat me in a manner in which it would be wrong for me to treat you,
merely on the ground that we are two different individuals.4
Universalizability applies to all evaluative judgments. If I say that X is a good
thing, then I am logically committed to judge that anything relevantly similar to
X is a good thing. This trait is an extension of the principle of consistency: we
ought to be consistent about our value judgments, including one’s moral judg-
ments. Take any act that you are contemplating doing and ask, “Could I will
that everyone act according to this principle?”
WHAT IS ETHICS? 7
Third is overridingness. Moral principles have predominant authority and

override other kinds of principles. They are not the only principles, but they take
precedence over other considerations, including aesthetic, prudential, and legal
ones. The artist Paul Gauguin may have been aesthetically justified in abandon-
ing his family to devote his life to painting beautiful Pacific Island pictures, but
morally he probably was not justified, and so he probably should not have done
it. It may be prudent to lie to save my reputation, but it probably is morally
wrong to do so. When the law becomes egregiously immoral, it may be my
moral duty to exercise civil disobedience. There is a general moral duty to
obey the law because the law serves an overall moral purpose, and this overall
purpose may give us moral reasons to obey laws that may not be moral or ideal.
There may come a time, however, when the injustice of a bad law is intolerable
and hence calls for illegal but moral defiance. A good example would be laws in
the South prior to the Civil War requiring citizens to return runaway slaves to
their owners.
Fourth is publicity. Moral principles must be made public in order to guide
our actions. Publicity is necessary because we use principles to prescribe behav-
ior, give advice, and assign praise and blame. It would be self-defeating to keep
them a secret.
Fifth is practicability. A moral principle must have practicability, which
means that it must be workable and its rules must not lay a heavy burden on us
when we follow them. The philosopher John Rawls speaks of the “strains of
commitment” that overly idealistic principles may cause in average moral
agents.5 It might be desirable for morality to require more selfless behavior
from us, but the result of such principles could be moral despair, deep or
undue moral guilt, and ineffective action. Accordingly, most ethical systems
take human limitations into consideration.
Although moral philosophers disagree somewhat about these five traits, the
above discussion offers at least an idea of the general features of moral principles.
DOMAINS OF ETHICAL ASSESSMENT
At this point, it might seem that ethics concerns itself entirely with rules of con-
duct that are based solely on evaluating acts. However, it is more complicated
than that. Most ethical analysis falls into one or more of the following domains:
(1) action, (2) consequences, (3) character traits, and (4) motive. Again, all these
domains will be examined in detail in later chapters, but an overview here will
be helpful.
Let’s examine these domains using an altered version of the Kitty Genovese
story. Suppose a man attacks a woman in front of her apartment and is about to
kill her. A responsible neighbor hears the struggle, calls the police, and shouts
from the window, “Hey you, get out of here!” Startled by the neighbor’s repri-
mand, the attacker lets go of the woman and runs down the street where he is
caught by the police.
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So teen mekaar aangedruk, soos reisigers deur ’n onweer
bedreig, smaak hulle nog die geluk van hul laaste samesyn, tot die
droewige afskeidsure aanbreek.
Jan en Paula slaap nog toe mevrou Kibert stilletjies uitgaan om by
haar God die hoogste krag te gaan soek wat sy netnou nodig sal kry.
So sit sy dan in die kerk. Sy het meer behoefte aan moed as aan
kalmte. Voor die uur van smarte slaan, soek sy krag en geduld by
Hom Wat alle menslike ellende gedra het sonder kla.
Mevrou Kibert sit ’n bietjie apart in ’n donker hoekie, verlore in
haar eie oordenkinge. In gedagte gaan sy die laaste jare van haar
lewe weer oor, en vind soveel om die Heer voor te dank. Het Hy haar
nie die seën geskenk waar sy so lank met besorgdheid om gesmeek
het nie—die geluk van haar dogter? Paula, haar eie Paulatjie—sy
het haar wel nie die liefste van al haar kinders nie, maar sy is die
sagste, en was haar steun in die beproewinge van haar oudag; hoe
dikwels het sy nie die Here Se seën op haar afgesmeek nie, want op
Paula veral het die verdriet van die famielie neergekom! En om haar
dogter nou die afgebede seën te skenk, verskeur die Heer die hart
van die moeder. Maar dewyl die Heer dit nou vir so’n prys wil doen,
hoe sou sy so laf kan wees om te murmureer teen Sy wil en
weldaad, hoe kan sy dit regkry om die eensaamheid te verwens wat
sy vanaand sal ingaan soos in ’n vroegtydige dood? En sy sê in haar
gebed:
—Nee, nee, ek sal myself nie beklaag nie; ons is tog maar te gou
om soiets te doen tot verontskuldiging van ons swakheid. My God, U
ondersteun my in my behoefte. Vanaand wil ek sterk wees. Hulle sal
my nie sien ween nie. Ek sou tog nie met hulle kan saamgaan nie. U
het my gewaarsku dat my kragte uitgeput is; en dan, my werk is
gedaan. My kinders sal dit voortsit beter as ek kan. Ek dank U dat U
my, in U goedheid, nog die geluk van my dogter laat sien het. Ek dra
haar op aan U beskerming gedurende die lang seereis, en ook haar
man, wat ook my kind geword het . . . . Ek dra ook aan U hoede op,
my God, ’n ander lewentjie wat nog in duisternis en onsekerheid
verkeer, die lewentjie van ’n klein wesentjie wat nog moet kom, wat
my oë nooit sal sien nie, wat my hande nie sal verwelkom in die
wêreld nie. Gee daaraan ook gesondheid, verstand, wilskrag, en
onderwerping aan U heilige wil. Gee hom ’n lang lewe, opdat hy U
lank en goed kan dien. Laat hom volhardend en sterk wees in wat
goed is; laat hom nie bang wees om te lag nòg om te ween nie; laat
hom werklustig wees; en laat hom word vir sy moeder wat sy vir my
gewees het . . . .
As mevrou Kibert haar hoof ophef van haar hande, waarop sy
vooroor geleun het, sien sy dat die priester klaar is om die diens te
sluit. Sy verwyt haar dat sy nie na die preek of gesang geluister het
nie. Maar sy vind dat sy in haar gebed die kalmte en vrede gevind
het wat sy kom soek het.
Die mense staan op van hul sitplekke en verlaat langsaam die
kerk. Mevrou Kibert stap ook uit op die sneeu, in die triestige
winterdag, wat haar sal sien terugkom van die stasie . . . . alleen.
As sy terugkom op Maupas, en deur die gang stap, wat vol kiste
en koffers is, vind sy haar ou meid Marie besig met die ete klaar te
maak.
Meneer het uitgegaan, sê sy, om ’n rytuig te bespreek.
—Sonder te eet? vra mevrou Kibert—sorgsaam soos altyd.
—Hy wou nie.
—En mevrou?
—Watter mevrou? Ag ja, juffrou Paula. Ek kan tog nie gewend
word om haar mevrou te noem nie . . . . is dit nie snaaks nie? . . . .
die juffrou is in haar kamer . . . . As ’n mens oud word, dan vergeet jy
ook alles, en ek is niks meer werd nie.
—Dit kan ook nie anders nie, Marie: ons is altwee oud.
Maar albei vergeet wat hulle te doen het en dink aan die vertrek
wat op hande is; die ou bediende haal haar bril af en stryk haar hand
oor haar oë.
Met haar bewende hande wil mevrou Kibert nog vir die laaste keer
haar dogter haar sjokolade klaarmaak soos sy daarvan hou. Dan
gaan sy luister aan die kamerdeur, en hoor Paula sug. Sy klop, stap
saggies binne, en vind Paula in trane.
—Ma, ag ma, moet ek regtig weggaan! Ek het geen moed meer
nie.
Mevrou Kibert sit die koppie neer, en lê haar gerimpelde hand op
die voorhoof van haar dogter:
—My liefste, ek wou jou vanmôre nog bedien, en ek het van
hierdie broodjies laat kom, wat jy so graag eet.
Sy buig vooroor, en terwyl sy Paula kus, sê sy saggies:
—Hou moed, Paula, God wil dit so! Die liefde van jou man gee my
die versekering dat jy gelukkig sal wees. En moenie oor my ongerus
wees nie.
Maar die trane hou maar aan. Jan kom binne, en sien die twee in
mekaar se arms. Hy dink dat dit Paula is wat moeite doet om haar
ma te troos.
—Ons kom weer, ma, sê hy. Ek beloof u, ons kom weer. Ander
jaar kom Etienne en sy vrou kuier, en dan kom ons die jaar daarna.
Maar as die ou vrou opkyk, merk hy met verbasing dat sy nie
ween nie, en dat dit sy is wat moet troos.
—Waar sal ek in dié twee jaar wees? dink sy. En kalm en ernstig
antwoord sy:
—Jan, jy moet jou vrou tog baie liefhê. As julle vèrweg is, dan sal
dié gedagte my krag gee. God is goed en Hy waak oor ons. Die
skeiding sal die band tussen ons hegter maak. Ons gedagtes en ons
harte bly één. As daar sekerheid van liefde is, dan beteken afstand
tog maar min.
Met dié plegtigheid, wat sy waarskynlik nie opsetlik aan haar
woorde gee nie, gaan die ou moeder aan:
—Bemin mekaar trou. Moenie jul liefde maak tot ’n vervelende en
verswakkende tederheid nie. Put daaruit, en uit jul wedersydse
vertroue, die wilskrag en die volharding vir jul lewe. Kyk vooruit. As
julle agteruitkyk na ons dode, na my, moenie dat dit julle ontmoedig
nie, maar laat dit strek tot beter begrip van jul jonkheid en van al wat
God daarvan verwag.
Jan en sy vrou het haar hande geneem en haar spraakloos
aangehoor.
—Ja, sê sy nog daarby, asof sy in die toekoms sien, kyk vooruit,
na jul planne, na jul toekomstige kroos. Gee aan jul seuns en
dogters dapper harte, en laat hulle ook voor hulle uitkyk, met oë wat
uit jul eie verlede krag sal put om te sien.
Hulle ween albei, terwyl die ou moeder doodkalm bly. En sy
besluit:
—Ek seën julle. Vir jou, Paula, om jou vrome waaksaamheid oor
my, en om jou sorg vir jou broers. En vir jou, Jan, om jou vriendskap
vir Marcel, en om al die geluk wat ek in daardie twee oë lees, al is
hulle vol trane . . . .
Mevrou Kibert gaan met hulle saam tot by die stasie. Hulle
ontmoet daar bowendien nog ’n paar vriende wat die jong
vertrekkende paar kom groet. Jan se oom is siekerig, maar hy het
die bediende gestuur met ’n ruiker blomme. Alida staan opsy—bleek
en skraal, hoewel sy ’n dik pelskleed aan het: sy wag op ’n geskikte
oomblik om Paula te groet. Paula sien haar staan, en gaan na haar
toe; ’n oomblik aarsel die twee, en dan is hulle in mekaar se arms.
Paula sien hoe haar ou skoolmaat lyk, en vra saggies:
—Nog altyd so verdrietig?
—Altyd nog. Maar jy Paula?
Terwyl hul saam na die kant van mevrou Kibert stap, vra Paula
snel aan haar:
—Alida, bewys my tog ’n vriendskap: gaan tog af en toe na ma
toe, hou ’n oog op haar, en skryf my hoe dit met haar gesondheid
gaan.
—Ek beloof jou dit.
Alida bly alleen staan, en bewoë stap Paula terug na haar ma en
Jan. Soos altyd as die oomblik van afskeid kom, is die laaste woord
van die ou vrou ’n gebed:
—Dat God julle beskerm!
Maar as die trein wat hulle wegneem, verdwyn het, raak sy haar
voorhoof aan en voel dat dit yskoud is, en sy dink:
—Dit was hoog tyd. My moed was op.
Sy is verplig om op die bank te gaan sit, in die derdeklas
wagkamer. Die reisigers wat kom en gaan, is besig met hul
reiskaartjies en hul koffers en sien nie eens die ou vrou in haar
rouklere wat daar alleen sit en huil nie.
Sy het weer geword ’n arme, swakke, lydende sterfling. Maar sy
het darem die krag besit om tot die laaste oomblik haar wanhoop
verborge te hou vir haar kinders.
In die trein druk Jan sy wenende vroutjie aan sy bors. Sy leun haar
hoof teen die hart waaraan sy haar heeltemal oorgegee het, en laat
aan haar trane ’n vrye loop. Hy begryp dat hy maar stil moet bly. Hy
streel net saggies haar wang met sy hand, en nou en dan buig hy
vooroor om ’n eerbiedige kus te druk op die oë waarvan hy die trane
nie kan stuit nie. Sy lig nou haar hoof op, en Jan verseker haar:
—Ons kom eendag terug, Paula.
Sy skud haar hoof, twyfelagtig, of wil nog nie vertroos word nie.
—Jy is my alles, Jan, fluister sy; en dan begin sy weer te ween.
Hy begin nou oor haar ma te praat:
—Paula, wat ’n voorbeeld gee sy ons van moed en selfopoffering.
Dat ons dit tog nooit vergeet nie! En as ons dit haar miskien moet
nadoen, dat ons dan steeds aan haar terugdink. O, dat dié wat uit
jou gebore word, soos sy mag wees! Dat hy ’n ferm en dapper hart
mag besit! Dat hy sy bestemming aanvaar sonder sy hande slap te
laat hang, opdat hy, deur nie bang te wees vir die lewe nie, die dood
ook nie vrees nie: dis net onvrugbare siele wat terneergeslae word
deur die gedagte aan die dood. Dat God ons kind beskerm, en ook
haar vir wie ons daar agterlaat met verskeurde hart.
—Ja, antwoord sy nou, dis ook my gebed. Dis God wat aan ma
die tevredenheid en berusting gegee het wat sy op my wou oorbring.
Haar jong lewe het menige uur van smart en rou geken. Maar sy
dink dat hierdie nog die swaarste is. Sy dink dis die dood wat sy
voel. Maar dis die lewe—die lewe in sy verhewenste roering—wat sy
voel in die diepste van haar siel. En dis dié hoogste lewe wat haar
liefde louter, en dié heilige vlam van moederlike opoffering waarvan
sy die krag meer en meer sal ondervind. Eendag sal sy verstaan dat
die edelste, innigste, volste lewe bestaan in algehele oorgawe van
eie hart, en in selfopoffering.
Die trein stoom verby die eikebos van Maupas; en Jan en Paula
kyk nog ’n keer uit oor die welbekende ou landskap. Die takke van
die bome dra sneeuvlokkies, soos klein wit blaartjies wat die
ondergaande son tempteer; en die ryp op die wingerdstokke blink in
die aandstrale soos skitterende kantwerk.
Dáar, en nêrens anders, het sy haar lewe deurgebring totnogtoe,
dáar het sy kennis gemaak met die lewe, met die dood, met die
liefde. En sy dink aan ’n jong, trotse dingetjie wat ’n hoë borsie opsit
omdat sy haar ma oppas.
—Soen my, sê sy aan haar man.
Hy omarm haar, en voldoen aan haar wens. En dié kus verwek ’n
heilige ontroering in hul wese, want hulle voel daarin nie alleen ’n
tere vereniging van hul liggame en siele nie, maar ook haar lange,
vrome toewyding aan haar moeder; hulle voel ook die geheimsinnige
vooruitsig op die betekenis van hul vereniging vir hul ras en nasie; dit
vermeerder hul lewenshoeveelheid en deel aan hul liefde iets
onsterfliks mee . . . .
X.
KALME BERUSTING.
Met moeite staan mevrou Kibert op van die bank waar sy gaan sit
het om te huil. Sy sien al die vreemde mense heen en weer
verbystap, en wil haar droefheid vir hul oë verberg. Sy dink by
haarself:
—Hier kan ek tog nie veel langer bly nie.
Sy staan eindelik op, en moet aan die muur vashou om te bly
staan. Sy vra haarself of sy wel ooit nog krag genoeg het om die
huis te bereik. Sy voel nou eers haar swakheid en ouderdom soos ’n
sware drag op haar skouers. Sy dink terug aan die dag toe sy
aangesukkel het in die eindeloos-lange laning van Chenée. Aan die
deur van die stasie, dink sy met swarigheid aan die lang ent pad
huis-toe. Gewend om nooit koste vir haarself te maak nie, dink sy
daar nie eens aan om een van die huurrytuie te neem wat daar
staan nie.
Stadigies begin sy aan te stap, leunend op haar sambreel, voetjie
vir voetjie, om nie te gly op die sneeu nie. Die moeite wat sy haar
moet gee, trek haar aandag van haar droefheid af. Maar elke keer as
sy ’n oomblik stilstaan, fluister sy die naam van Paula—Paula, wat
haar nooit meer tot steun sal wees nie. In gedagte volg sy haar twee
geliefde reisigers, wat haar geluk wegdra.
—Hulle is nou al dáar of dáar . . . .
As sy oor die bruggie gaan van die troebele, wild-tuimelende
spruitjie, bly sy ’n oomblik staan en leun teen die brugreling om
asem te kry. Daar hoor sy ’n sagte stem roep:
—Mevrou, wil u my toelaat om met u mee te gaan?
Dis Alida, wat gesien het hoe die ou vrou aarselend en sukkelend
die pad van die stasie ingeslaan het, huis-toe; sy het nie geweet of
sy die ou vrou moet help nie—volgens haar belofte aan Paula—dan
of sy haar maar ongesteurd moet laat in haar diepe smart. Maar nou
sy sien dat mevrou Kibert nie meer kan nie, kom sy nader.
Mevrou Kibert is so gedaan, dat sy somaar die arm neem van die
jongvrou. Sy stap bedruk en spraakloos aan. Alida is by-die-hand
genoeg om haar op ’n mooi manier te troos deur haar te vertel hoe
bly haar kinders sal wees as hulle mekaar daar in Asië ontmoet. Aan
die deur bedank Paula haar moeder haar hartlik vir haar moeite.
—Maar ek sal u ook nog die trap ophelp, sê mevrou Marthenay.
—Dis baie goed van jou, dankie.
En as hulle bo kom, sê mevrou Kibert:
—Bly nog ’n oomblik om uit te rus. Ek het swaar op jou arm
geleun, die hele pad.
Daar lê iets smekends in haar gedoofde oë, wat die treurige
verlatenheid van haar huis aanskou. Dit maak Alida verdrietig, en sy
antwoord dat sy ’n bietjie sal sit.
Sy volg die ou vrou in haar slaapkamer, wat oordag ook as
voorkamertjie dien—’n skerm is voor die bed geplaas.
Ou Marie, nog bedroef oor die vertrek van die juffrou, bring ’n
telegram binne:
—Hier is ’n telegram, sê sy; en stuurs kyk sy die deftige mevrou
Marthenay aan.
Met moeite, want sy beef, maak mevrou Kibert die telegram oop.
Die rooi papiertjie, wat die dood kan inhou, maak sy nooit meer oop
sonder angs nie. Maar haar gelaat helder meteens op. Solank as sy
lees, kyk Alida onwillekeurig rond na die armlike meubels—byna
kloosterlik eenvoudig. En daar val haar oog op ’n vergrote portret
van Marcel. Sy gaan nader om te kyk. Die portret was geneem na sy
terugkoms van die woestyn, as kommandant; hy het die strenge kyk
van ongenaakbaarheid in sy oë. En duidelik sien sy weer die dag
terug toe hy met haar gepraat het in die bos van Chenée.
Mevrou Kibert lig haar hoof op van die telegram en sien hoe Alida
daar voor die portret staan. Sy het nou spyt dat sy haar daar in die
kamer gebring het. Maar as sy omdraai en na die ou vrou terugkom,
bars Alida meteens in trane uit.
—Wat makeer?
—Mevrou, o mevrou!
En die jongvrou snik haar geheim uit voor die moeder van Marcel.
—Ek het hom liefgehad. As u kon weet hoe lief ek hom gehad het!
Met groot medelyde kyk mevrou Kibert die jongvrou aan, wat haar
seun moeg gemaak het vir sy lewe. Paula het haar vertel dat Marcel,
op die oomblik toe hy gesneuwel het, in die binnesak van sy baadjie
die portret gehad het van ’n blonde meisiekind. ’n Meisiekind, ja, dit
is sy, ’n swak kind, wat die uitverkorene was van die manhaftige siel!
—Arme kind, sê sy, terwyl sy met haar hand die wang streel van
Alida, wat uitgeput op ’n stoel neergesak het.
Die ellende wat die ou vrou nou te vertroos het, laat haar haar eie
smart vergeet, en oombliklik het sy haar teenwoordigheid van gees
en haar moed terug.
—Alida, my kind, bedaar!
Maar mevrou Marthenay snik aaneen. Eindelik bring sy die
woorde uit, wat al eenkeer oor haar lippe gekom het, en wat ’n
samevatting is van haar hele ongelukkige bestaan.
—Waarom is ek nie sy weduwee nie? Dan sou ek minder
ongelukkig gewees het as nou.
Mevrou Kibert sê saggies:
—Maar jy wou nie sy vrou word nie.
—O, ja, ek wou wél, want ek het hom liefgehad; maar my ouers
was teë daarop.
Sy beskuldig haar ma nie alleen nie.
Maar die ou vrou skud haar kop, en naderbykomend, sê sy nog
sagter, terwyl sy altyd nog Alida haar wang streel:
—Arme kind! Jy het nie geweet wat dit beteken om lief te hê nie.
Alida wil teëpraat, maar die ou vrou gaan aan:
—Nee, jy het nie geweet wat liefde is nie. As ’n mens jou hart
weggee, dan is dit vir altyd. En liefde skenk krag, geduld en
lydsaamheid. Jou ma het jou geluk gesoek—maar op háar manier.
Sy het gedink dat sy goed doen deur jou af te keer van my seun.
Beskuldig haar nie: beskuldig net jouself. Ongetwyfeld sou mevrou
Delourens toegegee het as jou liefde onherroeplik gebly het. Want
sy het jou liefgehad en sy sou geleer het om in te sien dat die
voorwerp van jou liefde haar goedkeuring werd was. Nee, jy wou nie
die vrou word van Marcel nie.
Arme kind, sê sy, terwyl sy met haar hand die wang streel van
Alida, wat uitgeput op ’n stoel neergesak het.
Alida snik wanhopend:

—Ek het hom nog lief.
Buite haarself van verdriet, hou sy nog vas aan haar nuttelose
liefde.
Op ferme toon gaan mevrou Kibert voort:
—Jy was bang vir die lewe. Jou ouers was bang vir die lewe vir
jou. Die lewe, Alida, is nie die tydverdryf en ydele gedoente van die
wêreld nie. Om te lewe is om te voel dat jy ’n siel besit, en dat jy dit
heeltemal besit. Dis om lief te hê, lief te hê met al jou kragte, vir
altyd, tot aan die end, tot aan selfopoffering. Daar moet geen vrees
bestaan vir moeite, nòg vir groot vreugde, nòg vir groot verdriet: dis
alles net openbaringe van ons menslike natuur. Uit die dae wat
verbygaan, moet ’n mens die goeie opvang, wat nooit verbygaan nie.
’n Meisie wat gaan trou, neem aan om deelgenoot te word van
arbeid en van gevare, en nie om groter gemak te soek of
beuselagtige genot nie. In haar toewyding self sal sy groter behae
skep. Dit weet jy nie.
Alida luister nou aandagtig, en sy dink by haarself:
—Dit het niemand my nog ooit gesê nie.
Mevrou Kibert gaan aan:
—Op hierdie oomblik selfs, dat my hart verbryseld is, kan ek nie
anders nie as God dank vir sy oorvloedige weldade. Jy verbaas jou
daaroor, my kind, dat ek jou, op so’n dag as hierdie, nog van my
geluk vertel. En tog is dit waar: ek is gelukkig. As God my sou vra
om weer met my lewe te begin, ek sou weer begin. En nogtans het
ek gesigte wat my die liefste was, koud en beweegloos gesien; en ek
het die dood geken in sy wreedste gedaante vir ’n moeder: as hy
haar kind wegneem wat vèrweg is van haar. Maar in my man, in my
seuns en dogters, het my hele hart geleef, en het ek alles gesmaak
wat die goddelike goedheid ’n mens kan gee. My lewe was vol
omdat ek verbind was aan hul lewe. Myself het ek nooit beween nie.
En nou voel ek ook nie eensaam nie. My dode hou my geselskap, en
dié wat leef, verlaat my nie. Kyk, hierdie telegram het ek netnou van
Etienne gekry. Hy weet dat Paula vandag van my weggaan; en uit
naam van almal spreek hy my moed in. Ek het dit nodig gehad.
—Mevrou! sê Alida, en soen haar hand.
—Ja, my kind, ek het my lewe liefgehad, ek het die lewe liefgehad.
En ek kan sterwe, selfs in eensaamheid, selfs as vreemde hande my
oë sal moet toedruk: God het my ’n skone deel toegemeet. En die
dood sal my volgsaam en tevrede aantref as hy kom.
Daar skitter ’n vreemde verrukking in haar helder oë. Alida is nou
kalm en kyk haar aan vol eerbiedige bewondering.
—Praat nog so met my, smeek sy as mevrou Kibert ophou.
Die ou vrou kyk haar lank en teer aan. Dan streel sy weer haar
wang, en sê:
—My kind, jy moet my iets belowe.
—O mevrou, alles wat u wil.
—Moenie meer aan Marcel dink nie. Jy het nie reg daartoe nie.
Neem jou teenswoordige lewe op, in sy geheel en sonder wroeging,
God wil sien dat jy moed genoeg toon om vroeëre bande los te
maak. Dit was verkeerd van jou om jou man sy betrekking te laat
neerlê. Werk is die adel van ons dae. Spoor hom aan om iets te
soek waarmee hy hom kan besig hou, opdat jou fout weer
goedgemaak word.
—Hy het my verlaat, mevrou.
—Niksdoen was miskien oorsaak daarvan. Probeer om hom dit te
vergewe. Gaan met jou hart te rade. Laat hy self sy landerye
bestuur, laat hy deelneem aan gemeentebelange—so is daar nog
veel waarvan ek nie weet nie. En dan sal jy sien dat alles beter sal
gaan. Jy kan nog gelukkig word. Jou dogter sal jou daarin te hulp
kom. Is ’n vrou wat ’n kind het, ooit te bekla? Kweek deug aan in die
jong lewe, en bevalligheid en standvastigheid. Jy moet haar liefhê,
nie in jou belang nie, maar vir haar welsyn. En die vrede van die
Heer sal op jou neerdaal.
—Ag, sê Alida, ontroerd, as u wil toestem om my af en toe hier by
u te ontvang, en so met my te praat, dan sal ek seker weer nuwe
moed skep.
Sy dink daar nie aan dat haar teenwoordigheid ’n pynlike
nagedagtenis oproep by mevrou Kibert nie. Die ou vrou aarsel nie
langer as ’n enkele sekonde nie: is dit nie God wat haar vra om
hierdie arme swak skepsel ook nog te help nie?
—Kom so dikwels as jy nodig het, is haar eenvoudige antwoord.
As mevrou Marthenay weg is, neem sy die portret van Marcel en
sit dit agter die skerm, naas haar bed, terwyl sy dink:
—Hier is hy nader by my, en kan Alida hom nie meer sien nie. As
sy haar hele plig dapper wil volbring, dan is dit nodig dat sy sy beeld
nie meer sien nie.
Dan kniel sy, en bid:
—Vader, U Wat my sterkte is, help my. Ek het nou aan U afgegee
alles wat ek liefhet. Ek het nou niks meer om U te gee nie as my
smart. Neem dit van my aan. En beskerm almal wat ek liefhet, die
dode wat in U vrede rus en die lewende wat hul plig doen as mense .
...
As sy opstaan om ou Marie te help tafel dek, dan is daar ’n glans
van heilige vrede op haar gelaat—die vrede van dié wat die dood
sonder vrees tegemoet gaan nadat hulle die lewe aanvaar het
sonder swakheid.
EINDE.
[1] Die naam Kibert uit te spreek op ooreenkomstige manier as

die naam Joubert.
[2] Die naam Berlier op ooreenkomstige manier uit te spreek as
die naam Villier.
[3] Dis daar so die gebruik dat die moeder dit doen.
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About the Authors

Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005) was professor of philosophy, emeritus at the

4 Value and the Quest for the Good 44

5 Social Contract Theory and the Motive to Be Moral 61

6 Egoism, Self-Interest, and Altruism 77

8 Kant and Deontological Theories 113

9 Virtue Theory 135

10 Biology and Ethics 155

11 Gender and Ethics 175

12 Religion and Ethics 194

13 The Fact–Value Problem 212

14 Moral Realism and the Challenge of Skepticism 232

A Defense of Moral Realism 242

Russell, Walter Schaller, Bob Westmoreland, and Mark Discher were

ETHICS AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS

MORALITY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER

Moral principles concern standards of behavior; roughly speaking, they involve

TRAITS OF MORAL PRINCIPLES

Third is overridingness. Moral principles have predominant authority and

DOMAINS OF ETHICAL ASSESSMENT

Alida snik wanhopend:

[1] Die naam Kibert uit te spreek op ooreenkomstige manier as

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