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Gi v ing A id Effecti vely
i

Giving Aid Effectively

The Politics of En vironmental Per for ma nce
a nd Selectivit y at Multilater al
Development Ba nks
Mark T. Buntaine

1
1
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the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide.Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

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© Oxford University Press 2016

First Edition published in 2016

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You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Buntaine, Mark T., author.
Title: Giving aid effectively : the politics of environmental performance and selectivity at multilateral
development banks /​Mark T. Buntaine.
Description: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references
and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015034920 | ISBN 978–0–19–046745–6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Economic development projects—​Environmental aspects—​Developing countries. |
Economic assistance—​Environmental aspects—​Developing countries. | Environmental policy—​
Economic aspects—​Developing countries.
Classification: LCC HC59.72.E44 B86 2016 | DDC 332.1/​53—​dc23 LC record available at http://​lccn.
loc.gov/​2015034920

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan, USA
i

Contents

Preface vii

1. The Problem of Performance 1

2. The Politics of Aid Effectiveness 25
3. Addressing the Problem of Performance 46
4. Administrative Procedures: Avoiding Delays with Environmentally
Risky Projects 68
5. Accountability Mechanisms: Civil Society Claims for Environmental
Performance 110
6. Project Evaluations: Learning What Works 142
7. S trategic Planning: Integrating Evaluation into High-​Level
Decision-​Making 182
8. Conclusions and Implications 213

Appendix 1: Data Collection Procedur es 235

Appendix 2: A Br ief History of Eva luation
at the Multilater a l Development Banks 244
Notes 247
R efer ences 257
Index 283

v
 Preface

i
This project began with a rather simple observation: very little evidence was
available to assess whether investments in evaluation and learning make interna-
tional organizations more effective. This book is an attempt to understand how
project evaluation, strategic planning, citizen complaint mechanisms, and adminis-
trative procedures can be used to steer international organizations toward decisions
that more effectively achieve their mandates. I focus specifically on the environmen-
tal performance of the multilateral development banks, since activities related to
preventing environmental harm and promoting good environmental management
have faced intense scrutiny over the past three decades. My purpose is not to retell
a history about performance diverging from mandate; I seek instead to understand
when and why environmental performance can be improved by producing better
information about the outcomes of the development and environmental activities
of the multilateral development banks.
The other purpose of this book is to propose a better way to give development
assistance. Researchers and the development community have converged around
the idea that development assistance is most effective when it is provided to recipi-
ent countries that have the capacity and incentives to use it well. Most scholarly
and practical effort has focused on identifying capacity and aligned incentives at
the level of countries, often through indices of the quality of governance or policy.
The challenge with this approach is that it tends to shift development assistance
toward the middle-​income countries that have the least need for it. I argue that by
vii
viii i Preface

producing better information about the outcomes of development and environ-

mental assistance, organizations that allocate development assistance can be more
focused and move toward the projects that have a successful record and away from
projects that have an unsuccessful record for individual countries. This book dem-
onstrates that a focused approach can work.
I could not have completed this project without the assistance and support of
numerous people. Over the several years that it took to complete this project, our
research team poured through hundreds of thousands of pages of more than 1,000
evaluations and compiled primary documentation for a number of case studies that
appear in this book. More than 50 staff members and managers at the multilateral
development banks provided me interviews. I also received invaluable advice and
support from mentors and colleagues as I pulled together the evidence in this book.
I gratefully acknowledge these various contributions.
I have benefited greatly from the research assistance of Sarah Freitas, Susan
Carter, Selim Selimi, Jacob Wolff, Hannah Freedman, and Varun Kumar. Coding
hundreds of documents that are each hundreds of pages long is an arduous and
unseen task. This book would not have been possible without their diligent work.
I am also grateful to Rahul Madhusudanan, who helped compile the primary docu-
mentation for many of the case studies that appear in this book. His keen eye for
relevant evidence has been a valuable asset.
I benefited from the time of numerous staff members at the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Inter-​A merican Development
Bank, who for reasons of confidentiality must remain anonymous. The interviews
that these staff provided assisted me in understanding the incentives at multilateral
development banks to use information about performance. The interviewees greatly
influenced many of the conclusions reported in this book and I hope will bring to
life many of the findings from the statistical analyses.
Many people have offered guidance and suggestion in the design of this research
and writing this book. Like many books, the seed of this book was a dissertation.
Erika Weinthal was an excellent dissertation supervisor, even when I was not sure
of my direction. She has been a steadfast advocate and has always encouraged me
to think broadly about the implications of this research. Judith Kelley, through
her consistent engagement with the core theoretical issues of this project and her
constructive approach to the research process, has shaped my intellectual journey
in lasting ways. Chris Gelpi and Meg McKean provided important comments
about this research at various points, and this book is surely better for their efforts.
I received other important support for this project while I was completing doctoral
studies at Duke University, including comments from seminar participants and sev-
eral travel and fellowship grants. A National Science Foundation Decision, Risk,
 Preface j ix
and Management Sciences Doctoral Research Grant (#0962436) supported this
work, without which it would have been impossible to collect the evaluation and
interview data that I use as the basis of this book.
I expanded and began refining the dissertation into a book while I was a fac-
ulty member in the Department of Government at the College of William &
Mary. I owe a special debt to Mike Tierney, who has been one of my greatest
advocates as I turned this project into a book. He organized an extremely helpful
book workshop, where I received exhaustive comments from Tamar Gutner, Joe
Jupille, Christopher Kilby, Paula Manna, Amy Oakes, Brad Parks, Sue Peterson,
and Maurits van der Veen. These comments shaped the development of this book
greatly and assisted me in honing the arguments and presentation of evidence.
I also received excellent and helpful comments on the penultimate version of this
book from Sarah Bush and Ron Mitchell. The reviewers for this manuscript took
their jobs very seriously and offered insightful comments that have shaped the final
product, particularly regarding the presentation of qualitative evidence.
Finally, the long road that is a book project would not have been nearly as enjoy-
able without the support of friends and family. I would like to extend a special
thanks to my parents, Robbie and Jim Buntaine, for always supporting my educa-
tion and to my wife, Ryoko Oono, who has endured many years of living separately
and countless late evenings so that I could complete this project. To them, and a
large number of supportive friends, I am forever grateful.
Gi v ing A id Effecti vely
 1
The Problem of Performance
i
Controlling Performance at International
Organizations

International organizations are involved in managing and responding to almost

all problems that cross national borders. They facilitate international bargaining,
coordinate the activities of different countries, provide technical expertise, develop
transboundary programs, and implement international agreements. International
organizations are so important for global governance because they do many of these
tasks better than individual countries acting alone.
Yet relying on international organizations can have a number of downsides. The
management and staff of international organizations might not have the same goals
as their member countries. It can be difficult for member countries to coordinate
the management of international organizations when they want different outcomes.
International organizations are not always accountable to the local people affected
by their activities, since they are not subject to democratic feedback. Like many
large organizations, international organizations can be slow to change and adapt to
new circumstances and demands from their member countries. This book addresses
the challenge of managing international organizations to take advantage of their
useful capabilities while limiting their downsides.
The benefits and challenges of relying on international organizations come
into particular focus for development assistance. Large bodies of research show
that development assistance is not always allocated and managed to achieve the
best results. The empirical focus of this book is the allocation of development and

1
2i Giving Aid Effectively

environmental projects by the multilateral development banks, which for a number

of reasons offer an excellent platform to investigate the more general challenge of
controlling international organizations. More practically, allocation decisions are
also vitally important for international development and environmental manage-
ment. Member countries rely on the multilateral development banks to allocate
development and environmental projects because the development banks concen-
trate expertise, have advantages in managing programs, and help coordinate the
development goals of various countries.
However, the multilateral development banks have been severely criticized,
often by member countries themselves, for failing to meet their mandated envi-
ronmental and social objectives. In response to significant and public failures,
member countries set up or strengthened administrative procedures, complaint
mechanisms, project evaluation, and strategic planning at the multilateral
development banks. Research about international organizations has focused on
blunt tools like restricting discretion (Cortell and Peterson 2006), reforming
international organizations (Nielson and Tierney 2003), and reducing appro-
priations for international organizations (Lavelle 2011). I investigate when and
why finer and more practical control mechanisms have been effective at align-
ing the allocation of aid with results.
The main outcome of interest in this book is whether these control mechanisms
have increased the allocation of projects with a successful record and decreased the
allocation of projects with an unsuccessful record—​a practice called selectivity.
Practically speaking, selectivity is critical for increasing the positive impact of scarce
development and environmental financing. I argue and demonstrate that member
countries can promote selectivity and thereby give aid more effectively when they
generate information about the outcomes of the decisions made by international
organizations and use that information to modify how easy new projects are to
approve. Neither of these two steps alone is sufficient.
Information to promote selectivity can be generated by independent evaluators or
external parties. In turn, this information can be used to modify the incentives of
staff by making it harder to approve projects with a poor record or easier to approve
projects with a good record in a particular country. This can happen either because
information helps staff make decisions about which projects will be difficult to steer
through preparation procedures or because it decreases uncertainty for borrowing
countries about projects that are likely to be successful. In the context of this study,
that means aid can be given more effectively. By linking information about out-
comes with decision-​making processes that include real barriers to approval, mem-
ber countries take advantage of the benefits international organizations offer while
limiting many of the downsides. Before proceeding to my specific argument, it is
 The Problem of Performance j 3
useful to consider the point in history that brought the challenge of controlling the
multilateral development banks to the fore.
The World Bank entered the 1990s at odds with both environmental advocates
and the countries that contributed the bulk of its funds. These tensions went on
display during the planning of a dam project in the Narmada Valley, India. The $3
billion project to build the Sardar Sarovar Dam, partially financed by the World
Bank, was expected to displace up to a quarter million residents and inundate
more than 130,000 hectares of forest that was important for local livelihoods.
Environmental advocacy groups in India argued that beyond these immediate
impacts, millions of poor villagers would be affected by the degradation of forest
and freshwater resources downstream.1 According to advocacy groups, the Indian
government had a poor record compensating the people harmed by large devel-
opment projects. They cited examples of multiyear delays in compensating local
residents for the deadly and widespread toxic releases of the World Bank–​f unded
Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal. In October 1989, the New York Times
reported the reaction of one Narmada Valley resident who would lose land because
of the Sardar Sarovar dam: “They [the Indian government] will never find us land
like this” (Crossette 1989).
These concerns echoed around the world. Environmental groups based in the
United States, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, lobbied the World Bank
to withdraw support for the project (Crossette 1989). Lawmakers in the United
States took note. In October 1989, the US House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research and Environment held a hear-
ing about the Sardar Sarovar dam, during which a range of lawmakers expressed
concerns that the new World Bank president, Barber Conable, was not following
through on earlier commitments to limit environmental harms in World Bank
projects. A number of lawmakers called for greater oversight of the World Bank.
As chairman of the committee James Scheuer commented about the Sardar Sarovar
project specifically, “The American taxpayer and the American Government and
certainly the American Congress does not want to pour money down the drain into
capital-​intensive, labor-​saving projects that are misguided and—​and badly designed
to meet the needs of those [Indian] people” (Sardar Sarovar Dam Project 1989, 4).
Lori Udall of the Environmental Defense Fund testified that “we have seen that the
environmental reforms [at the World Bank] have had few positive tangible results
in ongoing projects in developing countries which we’ve been monitoring” (Sardar
Sarovar Dam Project 1989, 5).
Concerns about the performance of the World Bank—​its achievement of established
policies, mandates, and objectives—​were not exclusive to the United States. Other
donor countries raised concerns that the World Bank was not living up to established
4i Giving Aid Effectively

policies and mandates. In 1990, for example, the United Kingdom led the charge to
eliminate World Bank financing for extractive forestry projects, recognizing that these
projects often failed to live up to established environmental policies (Palmer 1990).
Facing this pressure, the World Bank adopted a moratorium on extractive forestry proj-
ects in September 1990. In early 1991, the World Bank adopted a new forestry policy
that excluded financing for the extraction of timber from primary forests and required
infrastructure projects located in or near primary forests to undergo strict environmen-
tal assessments (Globe and Mail 1991). Reacting to the shortcomings with the Sardar
Sarovar Dam, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency withdrew its own financ-
ing for the project in May 1990, which the Tokyo Shimbun newspaper attributed to “the
carelessness of environmental and cultural impact assessment conducted prior to the
project’s start” (as reported in Pearce 1990). Donor countries united behind the position
that World Bank actions had fallen short of established policies. In other words, the
World Bank had a performance problem.
Calls for improved supervision of the World Bank grew. Buoyed by international
support, residents of the Narmada Valley participated in protests that reached tens
of thousands of people, often clashing with police near construction sites. Protests
became a regular occurrence outside the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Elected
representatives to the US Congress, the most important veto power at the World
Bank, began to talk about withholding funds from the World Bank unless the
World Bank further reformed its environmental and social policies and imple-
mented them diligently. In a March 22, 1990, hearing of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy
was very clear about how badly lawmakers in the United States thought the World
Bank had deviated from expectations:

I’m going to be very reluctant to support any contribution to the World Bank
next year if their environmental image doesn’t improve and if their environ-
mental sensitivity doesn’t dramatically improve. … I hope the World Bank is
listening carefully. If they don’t get their act together on the environment, they
may get other votes in the Senate, but they won’t get my vote for any contribu-
tion whatsoever. (World Bank Fiscal Year 1991 Appropriations 1990)

Activist groups even persuaded the United States to vote against other dam proj-
ects that the World Bank was considering, a major departure from past practice
(Crossette 1992). After sustained pressure from activist groups and US lawmakers,
the World Bank withdrew from the Sardar Sarovar project in 1993.
This is not where the story ends. Member states realized that they needed more
effective ways to supervise the multilateral development banks and manage the
 The Problem of Performance j 5
discretion they granted to them. An independent commission was appointed to
review the Sardar Sarovar project and to generate lessons about improving the per-
formance of the World Bank. The Morse Commission, as it was called in short-
hand, found systematic flaws in planning, design, and implementation of the Sardar
Sarovar project (Morse and Berger 1992). In an effort to have the project approved
quickly, the World Bank had not ensured that displaced people would be properly
compensated or that the environmental consequences of the dam would be properly
managed. As the Morse report noted, “There developed an eagerness on the part
of the Bank and India to get on with the job. Both, it seems, were prepared to ease,
or even disregard, Bank policy and India’s regulations and procedures dealing with
resettlement and environmental protection” (Morse and Berger 1992, ch. 17). The
report highlighted a number of grave risks posed to local people by the project, such
as the spread of malaria by irrigation canals. Such risks were not assessed according
to established environmental policies.
Concerns grew that the World Bank had a more general problem. The Morse
Commission report was part of a growing body of evidence that the World Bank
was not using the authority and discretion it had been granted to design and imple-
ment projects in the interest of donor countries. For example, significant alarm was
raised also about the Polonoroeste road project in Brazil, which caused rapid and
widespread deforestation (Rich 1994). With external concerns growing, World
Bank president Lewis Preston commissioned a systematic, internal review of perfor-
mance across the entire lending portfolio. This portfolio review described a system
of incentives within the World Bank that favored rapid approval of loans over care-
ful appraisal and supervision (Wapenhans 1992). Donor countries, and especially
the United States, began to realize that the World Bank was in need of better over-
sight if it was to simultaneously manage large amounts of development assistance
and protect local people from negative environmental and social consequences of
development projects. As Barney Frank, chairman of the US House Subcommittee
on International Development, Finance, and Trade said during a June 21, 1994,
hearing, “[Reforms] are important if we are to maintain within the country and
the Congress representing the country support for continued appropriations to the
Bank.”2
This episode raises important questions about how the World Bank had come to
be so out of step with its largest and most influential member countries. Although
the United States had instigated changes to environmental policies at the World
Bank beginning in 1987, including the creation of a dedicated environmental office
to implement environmental policies and operating guidelines, the World Bank did
not live up to expectations. Within scholarship on international relations, this type
of problem has become a major concern, prompting a large body of research about
6i Giving Aid Effectively

when and why international organizations act in ways that are misaligned with the
interests of their member countries (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Pollack 1997; Barnett
and Finnemore 1999; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Gutner 2005; Martens 2005;
Weaver 2010; Frey 2006). Such concerns also appear in the popular media, where
international organizations are criticized for being unaccountable to the states that
set them up, especially among the publics of powerful states that have other options
for conducting their foreign relations. For example, criticisms of the “unaccount-
able” United Nations are common in the mass media and think tanks in the United
States.3 If international organizations so commonly and routinely act counter to the
interests of their member countries, then their wide participation in international
affairs is both puzzling and problematic. I argue that member states can and do find
ways to control international organizations without losing the benefits of granting
them resources and decision-​making authority.
States turn to international organizations like the World Bank because of their
organizational, technical, and coordinating advantages. To take advantage of these
capabilities, international organizations must be granted some discretion, which is
the authority to make decisions without explicit approval. If the member states had
to approve every operational, design, and management decision made by the mul-
tilateral development banks, the resulting transactions costs would surely outstrip
any benefits offered by these international organizations. A lack of discretion would
also prevent member states from taking advantage of technical expertise. However,
discretion can lead to problems, as with the Sardar Sarovar project. Management
and staff might use their discretion to make decisions that are not aligned with
achieving the mandates given to them by member countries.
Member countries have attempted to control and manage the discretion they grant
to international organizations. Returning to the aftermath of the Narmada episode,
we find that the threat to withhold funding from the World Bank turned out not
to be a bluff. In 1994, the US Senate voted to withhold replenishment funds from
the arm of the World Bank that lends to the poorest countries, the International
Development Association. Soon, reforms at the World Bank that intended to root
out the projects that had generated so much negative attention were afoot, with a
particular emphasis on preventing projects from harming local people.
New environmental and social safeguard policies were established to prevent proj-
ects from being approved without due consideration of risks for local people. A com-
plaint mechanism was established to receive and process claims from local people
who alleged that they experienced material harm because of World Bank projects.
The evaluation office at the World Bank was reinvigorated, and its staff grew con-
siderably to produce better information about the outcomes of projects. New multi-
year country evaluations were completed to ensure that country assistance strategies
 The Problem of Performance j 7
would be informed by results of previous projects. Little is known about whether
such mechanisms can be used to control international organizations by managing
discretion.
Understanding how international organizations can be controlled to ensure that
they use discretion to achieve goals has many practical applications, most signifi-
cantly for our understanding about the promise and limits of foreign aid. Ensuring
that the multilateral development banks make allocation decisions that are respon-
sive to past performance is critical for development effectiveness. Many policymak-
ers and researchers have been skeptical that development assistance can do much
good, since donor organizations are not often responsive to past performance. At
the project level, international donors have often overlooked the failure of recipients
to meet covenants or conditions, because doing so would imperil the disbursement
of large loans. At the sector level, past staffing decisions can solidify tendencies to
do things in certain ways and at certain levels of effort, regardless of updated infor-
mation about performance. At the country level, donors continue to engage with
recipients that have poor governance and policy performance for political reasons.
In combination, these impediments to more selective allocation raise valid concerns
about the effectiveness of aid.
I investigate whether information about performance can be used to make deci-
sions about the allocation of aid more selective. To complete this investigation,
I created a comprehensive data set of environmental outcomes, both positive and
negative, from thousands of multilateral development bank projects from 1994 to
2009, using every publicly available evaluation document. This data set thus repre-
sents the first attempt to measure an element of performance that is applicable to
projects across disparate sectors of development financing in a consistent way across
organizations and time. This unique data set allows me to move beyond previous
studies that have dealt with the macro-​level causes of reform and policy changes at
international organizations (e.g., Nielson and Tierney 2003) and instead to examine
the effects of control mechanisms. This shift in focus recognizes that not all macro-​
level reforms on paper are implemented well and asks what control mechanisms
make them more successful.
I also spent one month conducting interviews at each of the World Bank,
Asian Development Bank, Inter-​A merican Development Bank, and African
Development Bank. I use these interviews to evaluate the logic of my causal
claims and to extend the results of quantitative models when data are sparse or
suggestive. Together, my analysis of these two streams of data moves the study
of international organizations forward by showing how they can be controlled
for better performance. This research demonstrates more generally how the
allocation of aid can be aligned with results.
8i Giving Aid Effectively

Discretion, the Problem of Control,

and Environmental Outcomes

Discretion is risky, but necessary to take advantage of the benefits that bureaucracies
and international organizations offer. International organizations must have some
discretion; otherwise their ability to use expertise and reduce coordination costs will
be limited. However, when states grant discretion to international organizations,
the possibility arises that the management and staff of international organizations
will choose actions that lead to poor performance. This might come about because
the management and staff of international organizations have uncertainty about
how to achieve mandates or have different interests than member states. Member
states in international organizations have an interest in managing discretion when
it results in agency slack—​the condition when there is a discrepancy between the
collective preferences of member states and the actions of the international organi-
zation. Member states have a number of ways to manage discretion, including ban-
ning certain actions, requiring ex ante procedures before decisions, or evaluating the
performance of international organizations.
Scholars have expressed skepticism that member states can find effective mecha-
nisms of control, even when they are able to deliver collective mandates to inter-
national organizations (Vaubel 2006). Much less attention has focused on the
consequences of control mechanisms, which is unfortunate for understanding how
international organizations might contribute to global governance. States are not
helpless after they grant discretion to international organizations. They can put in
place institutions that generate information about performance and change the
incentives of staff and management on the basis of this information.
Finding the optimal trade-​off between discretion and control when mandates
have been assigned is a complicated endeavor that has the potential to shed light
on many fields of study. For scholars of international relations, the problem of
controlling international organizations has figured prominently in debates about
the merits of multilateralism and the challenges of collective responses to inter-
national problems. To the extent that performance can be optimized by trading
off technical benefits for political control in low-​cost ways, international organiza-
tions might be able to play more important roles in global governance. For scholars
of organizational sociology and management, the challenge of shaping individual
incentives to promote collective goals is a core problem. In the case of multilat-
eral development banks, incentivizing strong preparation and implementation of
projects when individual rewards accrue for getting projects approved is a major
concern. For scholars of program evaluation and information management, the
question about how to produce information that is useful for managers is a critical
 The Problem of Performance j 9
question. Bringing core problems in these different areas of study, I argue that
there are a number of low-​cost ways to increase political control without decreas-
ing the benefits of discretion.
Before proceeding to questions about control mechanisms, it is worth exploring
two particular problems that can arise when discretion is granted. First, the man-
agement or the staff of international organizations may not have strong interests in
implementing directives from member states. This is the problem of divergent pref-
erences, which can range from incentives of individual staff to divert international
resources for private gain, to the incentives that management has to resist costly
reforms and changes to organizational practices. The worst cases of divergent prefer-
ences are easy to observe. For example, in 2005, news broke that the United Nations
office tasked with monitoring the Oil-​for-​Food Program in Iraq had not ensured
that revenues were spent only on humanitarian and development needs, resulting
in billions of dollars of funds that were overpaid or lost (Miller 2005). Staff at the
United Nations were accused of receiving private kickbacks for awarding contracts
to favored vendors, among other crimes.
In other cases, states hand down conflicting or underresourced mandates that
require international organizations to balance competing demands. For exam-
ple, the UN security forces have been severely criticized for standing by dur-
ing the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi people in Rwanda despite their mandate to
secure the peace, inaction that occurred in part because of bureaucratic incen-
tives to resist action and in part because members of the Security Council did
not authorize the forceful actions that were required to prevent the genocide
(Kenna 1999; Carlsson, Han, and Kupolati 1999). At the multilateral develop-
ment banks, member states have prioritized both industrial development and
environmental protection, two mandates that are often at odds with each other
(Gutner 2002). Because of private interests, organizational incentives of manage-
ment, or conflicting mandates, international organizations can fail to meet the
goals set by member states.
Second, international organizations may not effectively collect information about
outcomes or performance, and they may not update their decisions in light of new
information that helps them overcome uncertainty. States often turn to interna-
tional organizations to manage technically complex operations in situations where
expertise is an important asset. It can be difficult for states to understand whether
expertise is being used effectively to achieve goals and to monitor whether decisions
account for new information. For example, the multilateral development banks can
choose an innumerable variety of programs and lending modalities to achieve envi-
ronmental and development goals in borrowing countries. This makes it difficult
to know whether decisions are taking past lessons into account. As former World
10 i Giving Aid Effectively

Bank president Robert McNamara argued, this is one of the central challenges fac-
ing the multilateral development banks:

Certainly the Bank has had its failures … it has learned and is continuing to
learn from its failures. … Taking account of these lessons will, I believe, increase
the Bank’s rate of success for the future. (Grasso, Wasty, and Weaving 2003, ix)

Member states are not helpless in the face of divergent preferences or uncertainty,
however. They can insist on monitoring and evaluation practices that help them
hold international organizations accountable for outcomes and generate informa-
tion that reduces uncertainty about future decisions. Member states can also insist
that the staff and management at international organizations consider, process, and
use new information in decision-​making, through administrative procedures. In
the aftermath of the Narmada project at the World Bank, for example, a number
of policies were put in place to improve oversight and accountability for environ-
mental and social outcomes by generating and processing information about per-
formance. These policies included the adoption of stronger internal processes for
assessing the environmental impacts of projects, the establishment of a permanent
accountability mechanism that civil society groups can use to file complaints about
poor performance, increased staffing and resources for an evaluation department,
and a greater emphasis on strategic planning at the country level.
More generally, information and control mechanisms might help member states
and other stakeholders manage discretion at international organizations. At the
multilateral development banks, the outcome of better control would be more care-
ful selection of projects. Over time, if officials in these international organizations
and their counterparts in borrowing governments were able to more effectively
select projects that are likely to succeed over projects that are likely to fail, the over-
all effectiveness and impact of development finance would increase. This outcome is
called selectivity and will be the primary outcome of focus in this book. Selectivity is
the practice of decreasing investment in the types of projects that have poor records
and increasing investments in the types of projects with good records.
To this point, research has considered the intersection of allocation and effective-
ness at the level of countries and focused mostly on blunt tools of control. Researchers,
practitioners, and borrowing governments have debated whether more funds
should be allocated to the countries that use funds effectively or to the countries
that have the greatest need for development (Dollar and Levin 2006; Nunnenkamp
and Thiele 2006; Easterly 2007; Hout 2007; Feeny and McGillivray 2009; Hoeffler
and Outram 2011). In practice, the proponents of selectivity have won the day and
shifted the allocation of development finance at least formally. Countries that
 The Problem of Performance j 11
have more successful records at implementing aid projects or that are recognized
for better governance receive more aid, especially from multilateral donors, though
there exist significant differences between donors (Dollar and Levin 2006; Clist,
Isopi, and Morrissey 2012). For example, in 1993 the International Development
Association, the arm of the World Bank that provides concessional loans to poor
countries, began factoring the performance ratings of previous projects into the for-
mula that determines allocations to countries (Operations Evaluation Department
2001c). This practice continues to the present day. The US Millennium Challenge
Corporation has eligibility criteria that depend on recipient countries meeting gov-
ernance standards (Chhotray and Hulme 2009). At the heart of these programs is
the notion that aid can have the most impact when it is allocated to the countries
that have shown the ability to use it well.
But this approach has downsides. By allocating aid exclusively or primarily to
countries with good overall records, aid may be diverted from the neediest people
who happen to live in poorly governed countries. Alongside research that investi-
gates whether the allocation of aid is driven by the implementation record or gov-
ernance levels of recipient governments, concerned observers have asked whether
focus on selectivity and other political incentives have diverted aid away from the
neediest recipients. For example, a 2012 report commissioned by the UK House of
Commons on patterns of official development assistance channeled through the
European Commission and noted this concern directly:

It is unacceptable that only 46% of aid disbursed through European institu-

tions goes to low income countries. It devalues the concept of aid. … The UK
must continue to press for funding to be diverted from those higher middle
income countries, who have their own resources to provide for their people, to
give greater help to the poorest people in the world. (2012, para. 45)

Since middle-​income countries also tend to be better governed and have better
records implementing projects, selectivity applied at the country level, taken to its
furthest logical conclusion, would result in aid being diverted in ways that are prob-
lematic to officials in donor countries. This particular report notes that such a situa-
tion would not be providing “value for money” on aid disbursements.
In many cases, international aid donors have sought out other ways to reach the
neediest people who happen to live in poorly governed countries, by channeling aid
differently, limiting their geographic focus, or engaging recipient countries through
pockets of functionality in governments. For example, political scientist Simone
Dietrich (2013) argues that donor agencies can be effective in implementing pro-
grams by finding pockets of functionality within recipient governments or bypassing
12 i Giving Aid Effectively

government agencies and instead partnering with local civic organizations. Matt
Winters (2014) argues that many of the risks associated with the local capture of for-
eign aid for nondevelopment purposes can be averted by clearly specifying outcomes,
responsibilities, and geographic scope during the design of aid projects.
These options offer pathways to selectivity that are not so blunt as increasing or
decreasing aid flows at the level of countries. Yet research about selectivity in the allo-
cation of aid is mostly considered at the country level. This book examines when and
why the multilateral development banks are selective about certain types of environ-
mentally risky and environment-​improving projects within the portfolio of individual
recipient countries. In particular, are countries less likely to receive additional projects
of a certain type when they fail to implement them well, or are they more likely to
receive additional projects of a certain type when they succeed? If member states in the
multilateral development banks are able to prompt this type of selectivity, the alloca-
tion of aid will become more effective over time while avoiding the downsides of selec-
tivity at the level of countries. In addition, this pattern of allocation is precisely what
would be observed if the administrative policies, complaint mechanisms, evaluation
procedures, and planning processes were able to promote more effective management
of the discretion that member states grant to the multilateral development banks.
This book focuses specifically on the ability of the multilateral development
banks to respond to past environmental performance when making decisions about
lending. Performance is understood as the achievement of objectives and adher-
ence to policies set out by member states. The focus on environmental outcomes
is important for theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons. The environmental
components of multilateral development bank lending created the impetus for new
policies and procedures aimed at managing discretion and the allocation of proj-
ects. The environmental aspects of multilateral lending have also generated mixed
and controversial performance records. This mixed record offers an ideal setting to
investigate when and why the changes to allocation practices instigated in the early
1990s have actually prompted selectivity.
The multilateral development banks have been credited with causing alarming
deforestation because of poorly designed road projects, while at the same time
they have helped borrowing countries to adopt national-​level environmental
regulatory frameworks (Rich 1994; Independent Evaluation Group 2008). The
multilateral development banks have funded some of the largest, high-​polluting,
fossil fuel energy projects in the world, while also becoming the largest donor-​
assisted financers of clean-​energy projects globally (Bretton Woods Project 2010;
Independent Evaluation Group 2010a). They have financed large dam projects
that displaced thousands of people and inundated vast tracks of natural areas,
but they have also supported innovative, community-​d riven natural resource
 The Problem of Performance j 13
management projects that successfully addressed the connection between pov-
erty and environmental degradation in rural areas (Khagram 2004; Kumar et al.
2000). Many activists regard the multilateral development banks as harbingers
of environmental destruction, whereas government leaders have turned to them
to manage international financing efforts on climate change, forest conservation,
and pollution prevention.
This mixed performance record has provided the multilateral development banks the
chance to change their practices in response to past outcomes, whether through new
information available from evaluations, citizen complaints, or environmental planning.
Fortunately from a research standpoint, it is possible to observe both the environmen-
tal outcomes of thousands of projects across the multilateral development banks and
the subsequent pattern of allocation. These data allow me to explore when informa-
tion about performance influences decisions about allocation. Many pages have been
written about the mixed environmental records of the multilateral development banks;
I seek to explain when monitoring and evaluation has helped the multilateral develop-
ment banks move beyond their mixed records. It is important to note from the outset
that I am not seeking to directly measure environmental outcomes in a consistent way,
but instead measure whether allocation decisions change in response to information
about environmental performance. Given the wide range of environmental perfor-
mance measures, it is not possible to speak directly to the aggregate quality of environ-
mental management in projects allocated by the multilateral development banks.

Motivating Examples of Opportunities to Respond

to Performance

Consider some of the real opportunities the multilateral development banks had to
respond to performance. In some instances, information from past operations was
available to help select more effective operations in the future. For example, in 1984,
the Asian Development Bank approved the Fisheries Infrastructure Sector Project
in Indonesia (Asian Development Bank 1997a). This project supported increased
fishing effort in underutilized coastal areas and aimed to promote economic devel-
opment in fishing communities. The project produced poor results, especially for
environmental conditions. The independent evaluation completed for this project
described degradation of the environment and fishery:

The landing area has become polluted from uncontrolled discharge of wastes …
contributing to a deterioration in fish quality … the rapid growth in the num-
ber of small boats, many of which use the Project facilities, is contributing to
overfishing in many coastal areas. (Asian Development Bank 1997a, iv)
14 i Giving Aid Effectively

The evaluation concluded that the project was poorly designed and that Indonesia’s
fisheries agency was poorly capable of carrying out similar projects. It recommended
future operations “should incorporate measures to limit fishing effort in coastal
waters or focus on aspects that do not encourage increased fishing,” which would
represent a shift in the portfolio composition (Asian Development Bank 1997a, iv).
That same year, the ADB board approved the Coastal Community Development
and Fisheries Resources Management Project. This new project directly followed the
recommendations of the independent evaluation, having primary goals to “conserve
coastal fisheries resources” and to “rehabilitate the physical fisheries facilities …
to improve environmental and sanitation conditions” (Asian Development
Bank 1997b, ii–​iii). The sequence of events in this case suggests that the Asian
Development Bank responded to Indonesia’s poor performance at mitigating envi-
ronmental damages by redesigning the lending portfolio in that sector. Is this type
of response common and systematic across the multilateral development banks, or
are such instances only incidental? Did the adoption of administrative procedures
that require environmental impact assessments make it easier for member states and
the environmental offices that they created to steer project staff away from high-​risk
projects without eliminating flexibility to take on high-​risk projects where they are
useful and can be implemented well?
Consider alternatively the controversy surrounding the Chad-​Cameroon Oil
Pipeline and the outcry by civil society groups about its negative environmental con-
sequences. Despite being portrayed as a state-​of-​the-​art, environmentally friendly
oil project, the pipeline has left the World Bank embroiled in controversy ever since
it approved financing for the project. In 2001, more than 100 residents across three
areas in Chad filed a formal complaint with the World Bank’s Inspection Panel
alleging that the environmental assessments and management plans for the project
were insufficient to protect them from negative environmental impacts. In particu-
lar, the complaint alleged that the pumping of oil across Chad had the potential
to destroy important medicinal plants, pollute surface waters used by local com-
munities, and negatively impact agricultural production. Similar concerns were
echoed by other environmental groups (e.g., Horta, Nguiffo, and Djiraibe 1999).
These were the kinds of outcomes the member states in the World Bank wanted to
avoid in crafting environmental policies and creating the Inspection Panel to gather
information.
Under great scrutiny, the World Bank Inspection Panel investigated these alle-
gations. The investigation report found that while the implementing department
made a “substantial effort” to mitigate negative environmental impacts, shortcom-
ings were evident in the environmental assessment process, the environmental
management plan, and the implementation arrangements for the environmental
 The Problem of Performance j 15
management plan (Inspection Panel 2002, xii). The Inspection Panel report called
for improved environmental assessments and management plans before the project
proceeded. The World Bank management agreed to prepare a regional development
and environmental assessment plan, convene an expert advisory panel to oversee
compliance with environmental safeguard policies, and collect further baseline data
on the health of local populations to allow for more effective monitoring of envi-
ronmental impacts (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
International Development Association 2002, 17–​19).
This case demonstrated that civil society groups can push the multilateral
development banks for better environmental practices by using their voice and
access to complaint mechanisms. Since civil society groups provide monitor-
ing of environmental outcomes independently, they might provide states with
information that they need to credibly threaten management with decreased
appropriations for acting outside of environmental rules. Can monitoring pro-
vided by civil society groups prompt allocation patterns that are more careful
about these negative outcomes by solving information problems for member
states and their management? Do the multilateral development banks system-
atically respond to complaints about actions that fall outside policies and man-
dates? Does this type of monitoring cause the multilateral development banks
to move away from projects that local people oppose?
The opportunities to manage discretion extend beyond mitigating environmen-
tal damages. Using information from evaluations, staff at multilateral development
banks might identify opportunities where they are most able to meet member state
demands for results with the considerable discretion that they are granted. In 1993,
for example, the World Bank approved the $76 million Environmental Technical
Assistance Project in China. This project was designed to upgrade the institutional
capacity of the State Environmental Protection Agency and the Chinese Academy
of Science, and thereby address China’s rapidly deteriorating environmental condi-
tions. An independent evaluation found the project to be “highly successful” and
noted substantial achievements, including the establishment of national environ-
mental legislation (Independent Evaluation Group 2007). The conclusion of the
evaluation recommended a “continuing role for the Bank in strengthening moni-
toring and enforcement at the provincial level” and identified “a strong desire for a
second technical assistance project targeted to provincial Environmental Protection
Bureaus” (17). Because the project was deemed so successful, all parties showed a
desire to pursue similar projects in the future. According to the World Bank project
database, China borrowed more than $3 billion of environmental financing in the
three years following this evaluation, one of the largest environmental portfolios at
the World Bank.4
16 i Giving Aid Effectively

In this case, the successful implementation of an environment-​improving

project generated information about future programs that could be pursued
with broad support. More broadly, can evaluation enable the multilateral devel-
opment banks to identify opportunities to build an effective record? Can evalu-
ations help the multilateral development banks overcome technical uncertainty
that prevents them from being more effective in the complex and technical deci-
sions about what types of projects to pursue? Is this type of updating limited to
high-​performing countries, or have all countries received more environment-​
improving projects?
Each of the above examples showed a positive response to measured environ-
mental performance, but counterexamples also exist. In 2004, for instance, the
Asian Development Bank evaluation department completed an evaluation of the
Cambodia lending portfolio during the previous decade (Asian Development Bank
2004). This evaluation paid particular attention to environmental management
activities in the Tonle Sap region, which covers 38% of Cambodia’s area and whose
fisheries “provide for up to 80% of the protein intake for Cambodian people, 50%
of whom depend on the lake’s resources, directly or indirectly” (Asian Development
Bank 2004, 17). The country program evaluation chronicled a series of techni-
cal assistance and investment projects that achieved less than satisfactory results,
owing to the fact that the programs did not properly account for Cambodia’s poor
institutional capacity (Asian Development Bank 2004, 16–​18). The evaluation rec-
ommended that future programs should be “modest” in nature. In the years that
followed, however, additional technical assistance projects were approved, even-
tually leading to the $40 million Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder
Development Project in 2009.5
In this case, poor performance at meeting environmental goals did not decrease
investment in future Tonle Sap natural resource management and development
programs. This raises a number of questions about when and why high-​level, the-
matic evaluations can set the stage for strategies that prioritize sectors with strong
records. These high-​level evaluation and strategic planning processes might offer
an opportunity for discretion that does not lead to poor performance because of
miscommunication or lack of information about performance at the multilateral
development banks. But can planning processes promote selectivity in the types of
projects that are chosen?
These examples are only a small subset that illustrate how procedures, policies,
and oversight practices might be used to manage discretion at international organi-
zations and overcome principal-​agent problems without resorting to the blunt tools
that populate so much of the literature on international organizations. Building
a greater appreciation for these kinds of control mechanisms is an important step
Another random document with
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under. The pole appears to end in a fork, and to be attached to the
axle bed.
On the decline of the Roman power, many of the arts of civilisation
which they had been instrumental in forwarding fell into disuse. The
skilled artisans died and left no successors, there being no demand
for them. This will account for no mention being made of carriages or
chariots for some centuries. Of course there were various primitive
contrivances in use to which the name of cart was given, but the
great and wealthy moved about the cities or travelled on horseback,
or if they were incapable of this, they used litters carried by men or
horses. The great bar to the general adoption of wheeled carriages
was undoubtedly the very bad state of the roads.
An evident improvement in construction was made by the Saxons.
In the Cotton Library there is a valuable illuminated manuscript,
supposed to be the work of Elfricus, Abbot of Malmesbury. The
subject is a commentary on the Books of Genesis and Exodus, with
accompanying illustrations. In one of these is represented the first
approach to a slung carriage; and it may be interesting to the lovers
of historical coincidence that it is given in an illustration of the
meeting of Joseph and Jacob, and in that part of the Bible which first
makes mention of vehicular conveyance. The chariot in which
Joseph is seated is a kind of hammock (most probably made of
leather, which was much used by the Anglo-Saxons), suspended by
iron hooks from a framework of wood. It moves upon four wheels,
the construction of which is not clear, owing to the decorative license
taken with them by the artist. The father of Joseph is placed in a cart,
which we doubt not, from its extreme simplicity, is a faithful type of
those of the time. This proves the illuminator to have been true to his
subject and the custom of the period in which he lived, as the chariot
was monopolised by the great men, while the people rode in carts.
With the Normans came the horse litter, a native originally of
Bithynia, and from thence introduced into Rome, where it is still used
by the Pope on state occasions, and also among the mountain
passes of Sicily, as well as in Spain and Portugal. Malmesbury
records that the dead body of Rufus was placed upon a rheda
caballaria, a kind of horse litter. King John, in his last illness, was
conveyed from the Abbey of Swinstead in lectica equestre. These
were for several succeeding reigns the only carriages in use for
persons of distinction. Froissart writes of Isabel, the second wife of
Richard II., as “La june Royne d’Angleterre en une litieré moult riche
qui etoit ordonèe pour elle.” These litters were seldom used except
on state occasions. When Margaret, daughter of Henry II., went into
Scotland, she is described as journeying on a “faire palfrey,” but after
her was conveyed by two footmen “one very riche litere, borne by
two faire coursers vary nobly drest; in which litere the sayd queene
was borne in the intryng of the good towns or otherwise to her good
playsher.”
Carriages proper were first introduced on the continent. Italy,
France, Spain, and Germany contend with each other for the honour
of the first introduction. The earliest record we have is on the
authority of Beckmann, who says that, when at the close of the
thirteenth century Charles of Anjou entered Naples, his queen rode
in a caretta, the outside and inside of which were covered with sky-
blue velvet interspersed with golden lilies.
The English were not long before they adopted this new
innovation. In an early English poem called the “Squyr of Low
Degree,” supposed to be before the time of Chaucer, the father of
the Princess of Hungary thus makes promise:—

“To-morrow ye shall on hunting fare,

And ride my daughter in a chare.
It shall be covered with velvet red,
And cloths of fine gold all about your head,
With damask white and azure blue,
Well diapered with lilies new:
Your pomelles shall be ended with gold,
Your chains enamelled many a fold.”

The pomelles were doubtless the handles to the rods affixed

towards the roof of the “chariette,” and were for the purpose of
holding by when deep ruts or obstacles in the roads caused an
unusual jerk in the vehicle.
 On the continent, there seems to have been a great deal of
opposition to the use of carriages. In 1294, Philip, King of France,
issued an ordinance prohibiting the citizens’ wives the use of cars or
chars; and later on, Pope Pius IV. exhorted his cardinals and bishops
not to ride in coaches, according to the fashion of the time, but to
leave such things to women; and it really was thought infra dig. for a
man to travel other than on horseback. Even his Holiness the Pope
rode upon a grey horse; though to indemnify him for the exertion, his
horse was led, and his stirrup held by kings and emperors.
These exhortations had about the same effect as James I.’s
“Counterblast to Tobacco;” they created an increased demand, and
the people showed their sense in preferring the ease that does no
injury to the self-denial that does no good, in spite of the opposition
of their superiors.
The first coach made in England was for the Earl of Rutland, in
1555, and Walter Rippon was the builder. He afterwards made one
for Queen Mary. Stow’s “Summerie of the English Chronicle” is the
authority upon which this statement is made.
In a postscript to the life of Thomas Parr, written by Taylor, the
Water Poet (and a mortal enemy to land carriages), we find the
following note: “He (Parr) was eighty-one years old before there was
any coach in England (Parr was born in Edward IV.’s reign in 1483);
for the first ever seen here was brought out of the Netherlands by
one William Boonen, a Dutchman, who gave a coach to Queen
Elizabeth, for she had been seven years a queen before she had
any coach; since when they have increased with a mischief, and
ruined all the best housekeeping, to the undoing of the watermen, by
the multitudes of Hackney coaches. But they never swarmed so
much to pester the streets as they do now till the year 1605; and
then was the gunpowder treason hatched, and at that time did the
coaches breed and multiply.” Taylor is to be thanked, not only for his
information, but for his capital though unconscious burlesque upon
those fancied philosophers who talk of cause and effect, where
events, because they happen in sequence, are made to depend one
on the other, when the fact of their being two things apart makes
them independent existences.
 We have not space to dwell upon these old specimens at length.
Queen Elizabeth’s coach is called by an old author “a moving
temple.” It had doors all round, so that when the people desired, and
the virgin queen was agreeable, they might feast their eyes on the
beauty of its trimming or linings.
The following entry in Sir William Dugdale’s diary may be
interesting: “1681. Payd to Mr. Meares, a coachmaker in St. Martin’s
Lane, for a little chariot wch I then sent into the country, £23 13s. 0d.,
and for a cover of canvas £01 00s. 00d.: also for harness for two
horses £04 00s. 00d.”
The opposition on the part of the watermen to the introduction of
coaches assumed rather serious proportions, more especially as the
populace sided with them; to such a height did the antagonism run
that a movement was made to introduce a Bill into Parliament to
prevent the increase of coaches; the apology for its introduction
being, that in war time it would be a matter of great difficulty to mount
the troops if so many horses were monopolised for these coaches.
Luckily, however, it came to nothing, and the antipathy gradually died
out.
Coaches and vehicles of all descriptions now became general,
and in 1635 a patent was granted to Sir Saunders Duncombe for the
introduction of sedans; their purpose being “to interfere with the too
frequent use of coaches, to the hindrance of the carts and carriages
employed in the necessary provision of the city and suburbs.” A
rivalry now sprung up between coach and sedan, and gave rise to a
humorous tract, in which they hold a colloquy as to which should
take precedence, a brewer’s cart being appointed umpire.
The coaches at this period were fearfully and wonderfully made.
There are several examples of them scattered about in the various
museums. The people who used them at this time had no great
ideas of them, for so formidable an affair was the undertaking of a
journey reckoned, that even from Birmingham to London a departure
was the signal for making a will, followed by a solemn farewell of
wife, children, and household!
 Towards the end of the seventeenth century improvements began
to take place. In Wood’s diary mention is made of a machine called
the “Flying Coach,” which performed the journey between Oxford
and London in thirteen hours! This was express rate for that age,
especially as there was some talk of making a law to limit the ground
covered by a coach to thirty miles a day in summer, and twenty-five
miles a day in winter. Oh, those good old times! The outcry lessened,
and the imperfect vehicles and bad roads were left to passengers
unmolested. What the latter were may be imagined from the fact
that, when Charles III. of Spain visited England, and Prince George
of Denmark went out to meet him, both princes were so impeded by
the badness of the roads that their carriages were obliged to be
borne on the shoulders of the peasantry, and they were six hours in
performing the last nine miles of their journey.
In the eighteenth century improvements were made in the
construction of coaches, but they were still heavy lumbering
contrivances, so that little or no progress was made in the rate at
which they travelled. Even so late as 1760 a journey from Edinburgh
to London occupied eighteen days, a part of the roads being only
accessible by pack horses. There is a very good specimen of the
vehicle of the early part of the eighteenth century in the South
Kensington Museum, belonging to the Earl of Darnley’s family, and is
well worthy of study as being one of the lightest examples known of
this period.
In the Museum of South Kensington is also an excellent example
of the fully developed coach of 1790. It is a very massive-looking
affair, and belonged to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland; it looks very
much like a faded edition of the City state coach now, though when
new it doubtless had a very good appearance. It consists of a very
large body, suspended from upright or whip springs by means of
leather braces; the standing pillars slope outwards, making the sides
longer at the roof than at the elbow line. The wheels are of good
height, and the carriage part is very massively constructed, the
upper part being finished off with scroll ironwork, and on this in the
front the coachman’s hammercloth is raised. The panels are painted
with landscapes, &c., by Hamilton, R.A., and no doubt altogether it
cost a deal of money.
Vehicles now began to assume that variety of shape and form of
which we have in our own time so many specimens. There were
Landaus, introduced from a town of that name in Germany; these
were, like the coaches, only made to open in the centre of the roof
just as they do now, but instead of the covering falling into a
horizontal line it only fell back to an angle of 45 degrees, and this
pattern was maintained for a number of years. Landaulets were
chariots made to open. Generally speaking, the difference between a
coach and a chariot was that the former had two seats for the
accommodation of passengers, and the latter but one, and in
appearance was like a coach cut in half. Then came phaetons,
barouches, sociables, curricles, gigs, and whiskies, which, in their
general form and attributes, were similar to the vehicles of the
present day which bear these names. In those days fast driving was
all the “go,” and young men vied with each other in driving the loftiest
and most dangerous gigs and phaetons. Contemporary literature
teemed with romantic tales of spills and hairbreadth ’scapes from
these vehicles, and yet dilated on the fearful pleasure there was in
driving them.
The larger wheeled vehicles were hung upon framed carriages,
with whip springs behind and elbow springs in front, like the
gentlemen’s cabriolets of the present day. When drawn by two
horses they were called curricles, or by one horse, chaises. There
was a little variation in the shape of the body, viz. the full curricle
pattern and the half curricle, with or without a boot, similar to a
Tilbury or a gig body. The wheels were 4 feet 3 inches to 5 feet in
height. Lancewood was then used for shafts.
It is at the beginning of the nineteenth century that real progress is
to be found in coaches and other carriages. In 1804, Mr. Obadiah
Elliott, a coachmaker of Lambeth, patented a plan for hanging
vehicles upon elliptic springs, thus doing away with the heavy perch,
as the longitudinal timber or iron connecting the hind-carriage with
the fore carriage is called. Perches are still used, but are chiefly
confined to coaches proper, or those hung upon C springs. Elliott
also considerably lightened the carriage part of the vehicles he
turned out. This was the first step to a grand revolution in the
manufacture of carriages, which was to affect every variety of
vehicle, great or small. Elliott’s enterprise was rewarded by the gold
medal of the Society of Arts, and by his business becoming a very
prosperous one, for the public were not slow in discovering the
advantages arising from great lightness in vehicles.
A print, published in 1816, shows a landaulet hung on elliptic
springs, four in number, with a square boot framed to the body, and
the driving seat supported on ironwork high above the boot. Behind
there is a footboard supported on the pump-handles. The distance
between the axletrees is very short, only 6 feet 6 inches from centre
to centre. The body is rather small, and the wheels are 3 feet 8
inches and 4 feet 8 inches high respectively, and the bottom of the
body is 3 feet 6 inches above the ground. The span or opening of the
springs is 10 inches.
In 1814 there were 23,400 four-wheeled vehicles paying duty to
Government, 27,300 two-wheeled, and 18,500 tax-carts in Great
Britain, showing a total of 69,200 vehicles. The later returns will
show how much a reduction in the duties and the use of elliptic
springs have promoted the increase of vehicles of all kinds.
A vehicle much in fashion at this period was the curricle, which
had been in use for some time in Italy, where it was suspended from
leather braces. Springs were added by the French, and, on its being
introduced here, the English altered the shape, giving the back a
graceful ogee curve, improved the hood, and added a spring bar
across the horses’ backs. It was a vehicle of easy draught, and could
be driven at great speed. Unfortunately it was rather dangerous if the
horse shied or stumbled, and this tended to reduce the demand for
it, and it was gradually superseded by the cabriolet, though Charles
Dickens used one as soon as he could afford it, and Count D’Orsay
had one made as late as 1836.
The vehicle called the briska, or britchka, was introduced about
1818 from Austria. It was hung both upon C springs and elliptic
springs, and was made in various sizes for different requirements. It
was nearly straight along the bottom. The hind panel was ogee
shaped, and the front terminated in a square boot. There was a
rumble behind, and the back seat was fitted with a hood which could
be raised or lowered at pleasure, and the knees were covered by a
folding knee flap. This was an inconvenient vehicle for our climate,
as only half the number could be sheltered in wet weather that could
be accommodated in dry. It was very fashionable for a time, but died
out about 1840.

Fig. 5.—Stanhope.

The “Stanhope” takes its name from being first built to the order
and under the superintendence of the Hon. Fitzroy Stanhope, by
Tilbury, the builder of the vehicle bearing that name. It was shaped
like the old ribbed gig, but was hung upon four springs, two of which
were bolted between the shaft and axle, and the other two
crossways, parallel to the axle at either end of the body, and
shackled to the side springs. Stanhopes are an easy kind of vehicle,
and do not rock so much as other gigs behind a rough-trotting horse.
At the same time they are rather heavy, owing to the large amount of
iron plating used to strengthen the shafts, &c.
 Fig. 6.—Tilbury.
The “Tilbury” was very much like the Stanhope, but had no boot,
and like it was heavily plated with iron. It was hung by two elbow
springs in front, with leather braces to the shafts or front cross bar,
and behind by two elbow springs passing from beneath the seat to a
cross spring raised to the level of the back rail of the body by three
straight irons from the hind part of the cross bar. Later, two more
springs were added between the axletree and the shafts, by scroll
irons. The Tilbury was a very good-looking and durable vehicle, but
its weight took away the public favour, and it went out of fashion
about 1850. It was, however, adopted with great success by Italy and
other continental countries, where the roads are bad, and solidity of
construction is the first consideration.
Dog-carts and Tandem-carts are too well known to need
description. The former were so called from their being used for the
conveyance of sporting dogs, such as greyhounds or pointers, and
the slats or louvre arrangement of the sides was for the purpose of
admitting air to the animals; though scarcely ever used for this
purpose now, the original plan has been pretty closely adhered to,
except that the boot is considerably reduced and made to harmonise
more with the other parts.
Some of the greatest improvements in the shape and style of
various vehicles were effected by a celebrated maker named
Samuel Hobson, who remodelled and improved pretty nearly every
vehicle which came under his hands. He particularly directed his
attention to the true proportion of parts, and artistic form of carriages.
He lowered the bodies, and lengthened the under or “carriage” part.
The curves and sweeps also received due attention. In fact, he
carefully studied those “trifles” (as Michael Angelo’s friend would
have termed them) on which depended the success of the
production as a work of art. Imitation being the sincerest form of
flattery, the other coachmakers soon showed their sense by copying
his best ideas, though, to give these other coachmakers their due,
they greatly assisted Mr. Hobson with suggestions for improvements,
and as a reward availed themselves of his superior talent for working
on these ideas.
As our interior trade and manufactures increased, the custom
arose of sending commercial travellers throughout England to call
attention to the various goods, and it was found very convenient to
send these travellers in light vehicles which could convey samples of
the various articles. This led to a very great increase in the number
of gigs; and about 1830 one coach factory of London supplied
several hundreds of these vehicles to travellers at annual rentals.
And though on the introduction of the railway system long journeys
by road were unnecessary, these gigs were found of great use in
town and suburban journeys, and in London they may be seen by
hundreds daily, and they are scarcely used by any one else but
commercial travellers. They are too familiar to need detailed
description.
In 1810 a duty was levied by Government upon vehicles for sale. It
was repealed in 1825, but the returns give the number of vehicles
built for private use in 1814 as 3,636, and in 1824 as 5,143, whilst
the number of carriages in use in 1824 had grown to 25,000 four-
wheeled, and 36,000 two-wheeled, besides 15,000 tax-carts; an
increase since 1814 of 20,000 vehicles.
In 1824 there was built for George IV. a low phaeton, called a pony
phaeton, which has since become very common, and has undergone
but very little change from the original. It was a cab shape, half-
caned, with a skeleton bottom side hung upon four elliptical springs,
with crane ironwork back and front. It was drawn by two ponies; the
wheels were only 21 and 33 inches high.
A carriage had been introduced from Germany, called a droitska or
droskey—an open carriage with a hood, on a perch, and suspended
from C springs. The peculiarity was, that the body was hung very
near the perch, so that the seat was only 12 inches above the hind
axletree, and the place for the legs was on either side of the perch.
The chief merits of this vehicle consisted in its lightness as
compared with barouches and briskas, and its shortness.
The cab phaeton was invented by Mr. Davies, of Albany Street,
about 1835; it consisted of a cab body with a hood, hung upon four
elliptic springs, and a low driving seat and dasher, for one horse. It
met with great success and was soon in general use. It was
introduced on the continent, where it became known under the name
of “Milord,” and became the common hack carriage, after which it
went out of fashion with the upper circles. It has, however, been
recently revived under the name of “Victoria.” The Prince of Wales
and Baron Rothschild set the fashion by using Victorias about 1869,
and it really is a very elegant and useful vehicle.
In 1839 the first Brougham was built by Mr. Robinson, of Mount
Street, for Lord Brougham, since when this has become the most
common and the most fashionable vehicle in use. The size of the
first brougham was in its chief dimensions similar to those now
manufactured; it was hung on elliptic springs in front, and five
springs behind. Coachmakers seemed to have lavished the greatest
care and attention on these vehicles, in order to turn out the lightest,
and at the same time the most artistic contrivance, and great
success has attended their efforts.
The foregoing is a brief history of vehicular conveyances from the
earliest times to the present. During the last ten or fifteen years
many further improvements have been added, tending to produce
more perfect vehicles in every respect; but these improvements have
been more in matters of detail than those at the commencement of
the century, and hence are more likely to escape ordinary
observation; but the critical eye will soon discover these changes,
and marvel at the short space of time in which the real work has
been done.
A glance at public carriages may not be out of place. Hackney
coaches were first used in England in 1605. These were similar to
the coaches used by fashionable people, but they did not ply for hire
in the streets, but remained at the hiring yards until they were
wanted. Their number soon increased, owing to there being a
greater number of persons who wished to hire than could afford to
keep a conveyance of their own. In 1635 the number was limited to
fifty, but in spite of the opposition of the King they continued to
increase in number, and in 1640 there were 300 in London. In Paris
they were introduced by Nicholas Sauvage, who lived in a street at
the sign of St. Fiacre, and from this circumstance hackney carriages
are called “fiacres” in France. In 1772 the hire of a fiacre in Paris was
one shilling for the first hour and tenpence for the second. There
were 400 hackney coaches in London in 1662, and the Government
then levied a yearly duty of £5 each upon them. In spite of this their
number had in 1694 increased to 700, a substantial proof of their
usefulness.
In 1703 a stage coach performed the journey from London to
Portsmouth, when the roads were good, in fourteen hours. From this
time there was a gradual increase in the number and destinations of
stage coaches.
In 1755 stage coaches are described as being covered with dull
black leather, studded with broad-headed nails by way of ornament,
and oval windows in the quarters, with the frames painted red. On
the panels the destination of the coach was displayed in bold
characters. The roof rose in a high curve with a rail round it. The
coachman and guard sat in front upon a high narrow boot,
sometimes garnished with a hammercloth ornamented with a deep
fringe. Behind was an immense basket supported by iron bars, in
which passengers were carried at a cheaper rate than in other parts
of the vehicle. The wheels were painted red. The coach was usually
drawn by three horses, on the first of which a postillion rode, dressed
in green and gold, and with a cocked hat. This machine groaned and
creaked as it went along, with every tug the horses gave, though the
ordinary speed was somewhere about four miles an hour.
One hundred years ago news and letters travelled very slowly, the
post-boys to whom the letter bags were intrusted progressing at the
rate of three and a half miles an hour! In 1784 a proposal was laid
before Government by Mr. John Palmer, the originator of mail
coaches, to run quicker vehicles, though at much dearer rates of
postage. This scheme was at first opposed by Parliament, but after a
struggle of some two years, Palmer’s coaches were adopted for the
conveyance of the mails, though the rate at which these travelled
was only six miles an hour for a long time after their introduction.
A great impetus was given to the production of better forms of
stage coaches by gentlemen taking to drive them as an amusement,
and two clubs were soon formed of noblemen and gentlemen who
took an interest in four-in-hand driving and in vehicles in general.
Several clubs of this kind are now flourishing to encourage manly
sport, and with the capacity to promote improvements in the form of
the “drag,” as it is now called.
It is to an architect that we owe the invention of the Hansom cab.
The safety consisted in the arrangement of the framework at the
nearest part to the ground, so as to prevent an upset if the cab tilted
up or down. The inventor was Mr. Hansom, the architect of the
Birmingham Town Hall. Numberless improvements have been made
on this idea, but the leading principles are the same.
In 1829 the first omnibus was started in London by Mr. Shillibeer,
who some time previously had been a coachmaker in Paris. It was
drawn by three horses, and carried twenty-two passengers, all
inside. The fare was a shilling from the “Yorkshire Stingo,” in
Marylebone Road, to the Bank. This vehicle was found too large for
the streets of London, so a smaller one was started, drawn by two
horses and carrying twelve passengers inside. In 1849 an outside
seat was added along the centre of the roof, and by 1857 the
omnibus had become pretty nearly the same form as we now know
it. Our present omnibus is probably the lightest vehicle of its kind for
carrying such a large number of passengers. Its average weight is
about 25 cwt. The London General Omnibus Company have, on an
average, 626 omnibuses running on week-days, and 6,935 horses to
work them. They build their own vehicles, and each runs about sixty
miles a day, at a speed of about six miles an hour, and nearly all are
supplied with brake retarders, worked by the foot, which effect a
great saving in the strain put upon the horses in stopping.
 CHAPTER II.

PREPARATION OF THE DESIGN AND

SETTING OUT THE FULL-SIZED DRAUGHT.
In coach-building, as in building construction, the first thing to be
done is to prepare a design of the vehicle proposed to be built
according to the requirements of the customer. A scale of one inch to
a foot is a very good one for the purpose, though the scale drawings
are more often made to a scale of one and a half or two inches to a
foot. These drawings (or draughts as they are technically termed),
are prepared by specially trained draughtsmen, and it requires no
mean skill to produce, on a small scale, a pictorial representation of
the future vehicle, truly proportioned in all its parts, and a delicacy of
touch in order that the parts may not look coarse. These drawings, if
well made (and they generally are), give a very accurate picture of
the carriage, and a purchaser is generally able from this to say what
peculiar feature he requires, or where he thinks it should be altered;
if he can do this it saves a great deal of trouble in the future, whilst
the coach is being built.
For this work the draughtsman requires a drawing-board and T
square, and two set squares; as he never has to prepare very large
drawings, a board of imperial size will be amply sufficient, and the T
square to have a corresponding length of blade. T squares are made
of a variety of woods, but the most serviceable is one made of
mahogany, with an ebony edge; the most important consideration
being that the edge should be truly “shot” from end to end. The set
squares should either be vulcanite or skeleton mahogany with ebony
edges; the latter are preferable, as they work more cleanly than the
vulcanite, which, unless kept very clean, are apt to make black
smears across the drawing. In order to fasten the paper down to the
drawing board, drawing pins will be required; they are simple pins of
iron or steel, with a large flat brass head; four is the number required
for each sheet of paper, one at each corner. A very much better way
to fix the paper down is to “strain” it to the board. It is done in the
following way:—The sheet of paper to be fastened down is
thoroughly well wetted, by means of a sponge or large flat brush, on
one side (which, it does not matter, but see that your board is
perfectly clean before starting); it should then be left for five or ten
minutes for the water to well soak into the pores of the paper; when
this is done, the paper will be quite limp. Now take a perfectly clean
straight edge, or the back edge of the T square, and turn up one of
the edges of the paper ¼ or ½ an inch against it; along this edge run
a brush charged with glue from the glue pot, or a piece of ordinary
glue dipped into boiling water and rubbed along the edge will do just
as well, and when you think there is enough sticky matter to promote
adhesion between the paper and the board, turn the edge of the
paper back on the board (without removing the straight edge or T
square), and quickly rub it with the tips of the fingers until it goes
down flat all along without any air bubbles: do this to all four edges of
the paper, and place in a perfectly flat position to dry; and if the
operation has been carefully conducted the paper will be beautifully
flat to draw upon, and there can be no fear of its shifting. When the
drawing is finished, all that has to be done is to cut round the edges
of the paper just inside the glued edge, and take it off. A little hot
water will take off the glued strip, and take care to wash all the glue
off at the same time, otherwise a smaller piece of paper might stick
in some important part, and the drawing spoilt in order to detach it.
 Fig. 7.—Coach.
The draughtsman will do well to have a few French curves, for
drawing the “sweeps” or curved lines of the carriage bodies, and
scales of various sizes, which are slips of boxwood or ivory, on which
are marked at the edges various scales, from ¹⁄₁₆th of an inch to a
foot up to 3 inches to a foot; and last, though not by any means
least, a good box of compasses or mathematical instruments. We
shall not discuss the merits of the various kinds of instruments here,
but any one wishing to go into the matter may do so by reading
“Mathematical Instruments” in Weale’s Series. But we should
strongly advise the draughtsman to go to some good maker, as bad
drawing instruments only lead to bad drawing.
The drawing paper used should be of a kind having a slight gloss
on the surface, like “hot-pressed” paper, but without its granular
texture. This kind of paper is usually called a “board,” as Bristol
board, and kept in various sizes, and sold by all colour dealers.
Various names are given to it, but it is all pretty nearly alike.
The paper being fastened, the drawing is commenced by drawing
the ground line a (Fig. 7); from that set off the height that the body is
to be from the ground, indicated by the dotted line b, and draw the
line c, which is the depth of the rocker. This latter is the real bottom
of the vehicle, and from it is measured the height of the seat, about
12 inches, shown by the dotted lines on the body. Then from the seat
measure 42 inches, the length of the roof d. Lay off 23 inches for the
width of the door, and draw e and f. From f measure 28 inches, the
depth of the back quarter g, and from e measure 25 inches, which
will give the front quarter h. Now the curves or sweeps of the body
can be put in by means of French curves. From the hinge pillar
measure 26 inches, shown by dotted line i, and this is the centre of
the hind wheel, which is 4 feet 3 inches high. The spring is 1¼
inches thick, and consists of 5 plates 42 inches long. The opening
between the springs is 12½ inches, the lower one being clipped
beneath the axle. Measure 12½ inches from the underside of the
axle, which will give the underside of the top spring. 1¼ inches must
also be allowed for the back bar j, and the pump-handle k will be ½
an inch thick. Then draw the boot l in such a position that the front
wheels will lock or turn under it freely. This may be found by drawing
a plan of the wheel as shown, and with the centre of the lock bolt
produced to n, strike the lines m, and it will be seen that the wheels
will just clear the body, which is all that is necessary. From this it will
be noticed that the centre on which the fore carriage turns is not in
the same plane as the axle. This is more particularly discussed in the
chapter on wheel-plates. The front wheel is 42 inches high, the
springs the same size as the back springs. The draught may be now
completed from Fig. 7, after having settled on the various heights
and sizes, and can be inked in with Indian ink. The dotted lines,
being merely constructional, are rubbed out when the drawing is
inked in. To complete the drawing, the spokes of the wheels must be
shown. These should be neither too many nor too few, but there is
no rule which regulates their number, except that there should be
two to each felloe. Having inked the parts in and cleaned the pencil
lines off, the drawing is ready to be coloured. The colours applied to
the drawing are the same as will be used for painting the carriage, so
we shall not detail them here.
From this drawing is constructed the full-size draught, which is
prepared before a tool is touched. On the walls of the body-making
shop are large black-boards, 10
or 12 feet square, and on these
the draughts are prepared just
in the same way as described
for the scale drawing, except
that all the heights are marked
up a vertical line which runs
through the centre of the
doorway, and from this the
various widths are also set off.
This and the ground line are the
first two lines drawn, and it is
imperative that they should
make a perfect right angle with
each other, otherwise the
draught will not be true, and the
material worked from it will be
wasted. This full-sized draught
requires the greatest care in
preparation, as all the patterns
to which the materials are cut or Fig. 8.—Brougham with Cant-Board. s,
shaped are taken from it, even Standing pillar (developed). b, Bottom
to the smallest parts. bar. r, Rocker. l, Seat.
The full-size draught also
differs from the scale draught, inasmuch as all the details of the
construction of the vehicle are shown as in the accompanying cut
(Fig. 8), which shows the construction of a small doctor’s brougham,
and Fig. 9, which shows the construction of a landau. This latter is a
representation of the working draught for the vehicle, and, in fact, is
a reduced copy of what would be drawn upon the black-board in the
shop, except that some of the minor details are omitted to avoid
confusion.
Fig. 9.—Landau.