Euroscepticism and the Future of

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Vries
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Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration
Euroscepticism and the
Future of European
Integration

Catherine E. De Vries

1
3
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For Hector,
who made me see the European project through different eyes
Preface

This book provides a new chapter in a classic conversation. It examines the

role of public opinion in the European integration process. Almost half a
century ago, the European Union started to commission, fund, and undertake
one of most intense and long running programmes of cross-national survey
research anywhere in the world through the Eurobarometer.1 Since then
academics, policy makers, and pundits have started to chart the policy prefer-
ences of European publics. Although the locus of attention has shifted
recently from understanding support to scepticism, the core question at the
heart of societal and scholarly debates has largely remained the same: what
explains variation in attitudes towards European integration? This book sug-
gests that the widespread fascination with explanation has partly been at the
expense of our understanding of the exact nature of public opinion and the
role it plays in the European integration process. By redirecting our focus, this
book provides a much-needed account of the conceptualization, causes, and
consequences of public opinion in the European Union.
The idea for this book was the result of two dinner conversations. The first
took place in September 2014. At that time, the Eurozone crisis had taken its
grip on the European continent, and my husband and I had many conversa-
tions about the effects of the crisis and the reforms needed to safeguard the
future of the European project. In one of these, I mentioned the ‘stark rise in
unemployment’ that my home country the Netherlands had experienced
since 2012 and how it may have contributed to the electoral gains of Euro-
sceptic parties. My husband, a Spanish political economist, was clearly
annoyed by my choice of words. He suggested that I might think about the
Dutch experience in a broader perspective, and pointed towards the dire
situation in Spain. He tried to make me understand what ‘real unemployment
and deep structural problems in the labour market’ look like. This exchange of
perspectives over the dinner table made me realize that my views about the

1
The Eurobarometer has conducted biannual surveys in all the EU member states (as well as
some candidate countries) since 1973. While its purpose is to chart the policy preferences of
European publics and provide input for EU policy making, the Eurobarometer surveys have
provided an invaluable resource for academic research in Europe. For more information see
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.
Preface

European project, the single currency, and the possibility for reform were
tainted by ‘my’ national perspective.
The second conversation took place at the annual meeting of the European
Political Science Association in Vienna in June 2015. On the last evening of
the conference, I had dinner with colleagues. One of these was my friend and
co-author, Elias Dinas, who is Greek. During dinner, Elias was eagerly trying to
get ahold of his mother in Greece. Earlier that day the Greek government had
restricted the amounts of money people were allowed to withdraw from their
bank accounts. His mother urgently needed cash for groceries and was not
able to get hold of her money. Our dinner conversation about the situation in
Greece and the role the European Union played in it, against the backdrop of
people going about their normal lives on a Saturday night in Vienna, made
me realize again that the way each of us sees the European project and
evaluates it is deeply influenced by ‘our’ national viewpoints. These two
dinner conversations and many other exchanges since then led me to the
insight that underpins this book and the theory of European public opinion it
presents: people’s evaluations of and experiences with the European project are
fundamentally framed by the national circumstances in which they find themselves.
Although the idea that national conditions matter for public opinion about
European integration has been addressed in the literature before, most notably
in the important contributions of Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and Robert
Rohrschneider (2002), we currently lack an understanding of the exact way in
which they do and how they relate to behaviour in elections and referendums.
This book presents a benchmark theory of public opinion towards European
integration. It provides both a comprehensive country and individual level
mechanism of how national and European evaluations are linked and interact
to produce certain kinds of behavioural consequences. The contribution of this
book is not only to provide an insight into how public opinion, and especially
Euroscepticism, is structured, how it comes about, how it changed in the midst
of the Eurozone crisis, and how it is linked to national conditions, but also
what possible consequences it has for the future of the European project.
The writing of this book has been an extremely rewarding experience that
would not have been possible without the help of others. Some people advised
me over a cup of coffee, while others attended various talks or workshops
where ideas were presented, and others again took valuable time out of their
busy schedules to read entire drafts of the manuscript. A very special thank
you goes to the Bertelsmann Foundation and in particular Isabell Hoffmann.
A large part of the data collection would not have been possible without the
generous support of the Bertelsmann Foundation. I am grateful for their
continued dedication to understanding the contours of public opinion in
Europe. Especially my close cooperation with Isabell has been crucially
important for my thinking. I wish to thank her for all her advice and her

viii
 Preface

ways of challenging me to always think about the bigger picture and the
political ramifications of my findings.
Second, I would like to express my gratitude to several wonderful colleagues
who have helped sharpen my thinking. There are many, but I especially wish
to thank Elias Dinas, David Doyle, Aina Gallego, Tim Haughton, Armèn
Hakhverdian, Stephanie Hofmann, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Spyros Kosmidis,
Gary Marks, Robert Rohrschneider, Christina Schneider, Marco Steenbergen,
and Mariken Van der Velden for their extremely helpful comments on various
ideas and drafts. A special thank you also goes to Kalypso Nicolaïdis and the
staff at the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oxford for
organizing a book workshop in February 2017. At this workshop some of my
former Oxford colleagues and students took the time to engage with my ideas.
I especially want to thank Kalypso and Alexander Kuo for their extremely
insightful and constructive comments and thorough reading of the book. In
addition, I wish to acknowledge two very bright students in International
Relations at Oxford, Kira Huju and Christine Gallagher, who provided very
helpful comments. I also wish to thank Dominic Byatt, my editor at Oxford
University Press, for his continued support. His advice on how to write a book
about a target that is continuously changing was extremely valuable.
Finally, I wish to thank four people in particular who stood by me in the
process of writing this book. The first is my longstanding friend and co-author
Sara Hobolt. Your clarity of thought and dedication to understanding the deep
problems the European Union faces at the present time amazes me every time
we meet. This book has benefited from all our exchanges and your thoughtful
insights. Our academic and personal friendship means so very much to me.
The second is my ‘Doktor-Mutter’ and co-author Liesbet Hooghe. Without
your valuable advice, critique, and support this manuscript would never have
been published. You are an inspiration to me to this day. I also wish to
wholeheartedly thank my husband and co-author, Héctor Solaz. I am eternally
grateful for all the long walks and talks during which you supported me when
I felt stuck, and clarified the core argument I wanted to make to myself. Thank
you for every minute. Without your love and support this book would have
never seen the light of day. Finally, I want to thank my little daughter Mila.
You move so gracefully between three European cultures and languages. Your
life truly represents what European connectedness is made of. I hope for you
and for your future life companions that Europe finds a way to champion its
accomplishments and cherish its differences as strengths rather than as
weaknesses.
Braiswick
May 2017

ix
Contents

List of Figures xv
List of Tables xix

Part I. Public Opinion and European Integration

Introduction: Losing Hearts and Minds? Taking Stock
of EU Public Opinion 3
0.1 Key Questions 4
0.2 What Lies Ahead 7

1. What Is the Matter with Europe? The Puzzles of

Euroscepticism 13
1.1 The Puzzling Rise of Euroscepticism 14
1.2 Benchmarks as a Crucial Piece of the Puzzle 23
1.3 Relationship to Existing Approaches 26

Part II. The Nature of Support and Scepticism

2. In or Out? A Benchmark Theory of Support and
Scepticism 33
2.1 The Nature of Support and Scepticism 35
2.2 A Benchmark Theory of Support and Scepticism 36
2.3 The Importance of Regime and Policy Evaluations 42
2.4 Measuring People’s Regime and Policy Evaluations 45
2.5 Summary 55

3. Kicking Up a Fuss? From Permissive to Responsive

Support and Scepticism 56
3.1 Public Responsiveness to Real-World Conditions 59
3.2 A Survey Experiment on Public Responsiveness 66
3.3 The Role of Political Sophistication 70
3.4 Summary 72
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 15/11/2017, SPi

Contents

Part III. A Typology of Support and Scepticism

4. A Divided Public? Types of Support and Scepticism 77
4.1 Four Types of Support and Scepticism 78
4.2 Country Level Variation 83
4.3 Individual Level Variation 93
4.4 The Importance of Proximate Responsibility Attribution 95
4.5 Summary 101

5. Common People? Who Are Supporters and

Sceptics and What Do They Want? 103
5.1 The Demographic Profile of Supporters and Sceptics 105
5.2 The Issue Priorities of Supporters and Sceptics 116
5.3 The Issue Positions of Supporters and Sceptics 121
5.4 Summary and Implications 126

Part IV. The Consequences of Support and Scepticism

6. Going Hard or Soft? Party Choice among Supporters
and Sceptics 129
6.1 The Importance of Supply and Demand 131
6.2 Support for Eurosceptic Parties 139
6.3 Do Issue Positions Matter? 146
6.4 Summary and Implications 150

7. Brexit and Beyond: Leave and Remain Preferences

among Supporters and Sceptics 153
7.1 The Brexit Vote 156
7.2 Remain and Leave Support in the EU 161
7.3 The Importance of Issue Priorities and Positions 163
7.4 Remain and Leave Support Post-Brexit 171
7.5 Summary and Implications 176

Part V. Public Opinion and The Future of European Integration

8. Change or Die? EU Reform Preferences among Supporters
and Sceptics 183
8.1 Measuring the Reform Preferences of Supporters
and Sceptics 186
8.2 Support for EU Reform Proposals 189
8.3 Eurozone Reform Preferences 196
8.4 Summary and Implications 202

xii
 Contents

9. Conclusion: A Divided Public, a Divided Union:

Where Do We Go from Here? 204
9.1 The Main Contributions of the Book 205
9.2 A Divided Public: So What? 209
9.3 Can the Grand Theories of European Integration
Provide Insights? 211
9.4 Can Supranational Reform Solutions Help? 214
9.5 Flexible Integration as a Way Forward 217

Appendix 223
Bibliography 227
Index 243

xiii
List of Figures

0.1. A typology of support and scepticism 9

1.1. Hard Eurosceptic party support in the 2014 European Parliamentary
elections 15
1.2. A comparison of Sunderland and Bournemouth 18
1.3. The relationship between feelings of exclusive national identity
and hard Eurosceptic party support in the 2014 European
Parliamentary elections 20
1.4. Trends in feelings of exclusive national identity and extreme right
vote shares in the Netherlands 22
1.5. Leave and Eurosceptic party support in Great Britain and Spain 24
1.6. Approval of policies and regime at the EU Level in Great Britain
and Spain 25
1.7. Approval of policies and regime at the national and EU level in
Great Britain and Spain 26
2.1. Defining EU support 38
2.2. Defining EU scepticism 39
2.3. EU regime and policy differential across time 50
2.4. EU regime and policy differential across time and space 51
2.5. EU regime and policy differential by unemployment 52
2.6. EU regime and policy differential by quality of government 52
2.7. Changes in EU regime and policy differentials between 2004 and
2014 across space 53
2.8. Changes in national and European regime evaluations between
2004 and 2014 across space 54
2.9. Changes in national and European policy evaluations between
2004 and 2014 across space 55
4.1. Four types of support and scepticism 78
4.2. Plotting countries in an EU differential space in 2014 81
4.3. Types of support and scepticism in 2014 82
4.4. Types of support and scepticism across countries in 2014 83
List of Figures

4.5. Distribution of types by economic conditions in 2014 85

4.6. Distribution of types by quality of government in 2014 87
4.7. Change in types 2008–2014 89
4.8. Change in types 2008–2014 across countries 90
4.9. Change in types by national conditions 2008–2014 91
4.10. Types in 2008 and 2014 92
4.11. The effect of economic and political system satisfaction on
support and scepticism 94
4.12. Expectations of democracy by national conditions 98
4.13. Responsibility judgements by national conditions 99
5.1. Unemployment among the four types 106
5.2. Financial worry among the four types 107
5.3. Social positioning among the four types 108
5.4. Skill levels among the four types 109
5.5. Gender gap among the four types 110
5.6. Age gap among the four types 111
5.7. Education level among the four types 112
5.8. Policy responsibility among the four types 115
5.9. Issue priorities among the four types 116
5.10. Issue priorities of loyal supporters by national conditions 118
5.11. Issue priorities of policy sceptics by national conditions 119
5.12. Issue priorities of regime sceptics by national conditions 119
5.13. Issue priorities of exit sceptics by national conditions 120
5.14. Predicting issue positions by the four types 122
5.15. Predicting policy positions by the four types and national conditions 123
5.16. National and European attachment among the four types 125
5.17. Predicting national attachment by the four types 125
6.1. Conditions for second order and EU issue voting 132
6.2. Eurosceptic members of the 2014 European Parliament 133
6.3. Issue priorities among the four types 137
6.4. Issue priorities across member states 138
6.5. Support for Eurosceptic parties among the four types 141
6.6. Hard versus soft Eurosceptic party support among the four types 142
6.7. Left versus right Eurosceptic party support among the four types 143
6.8. Left Eurosceptic party support by unemployment and immigration
as priority 144

xvi
 List of Figures

6.9. Right Eurosceptic party support by unemployment and immigration

as priority 145
6.10. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on migration 147
6.11. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on national control 148
6.12. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on redistribution 149
6.13. Change in Eurosceptic party support by views on state intervention
in the economy 150
7.1. Remain support among the four types, British respondents only 157
7.2. Remain support among the four types by issue priority, British
respondents only 158
7.3. Predicting remain support among the four types, British
respondents only 160
7.4. Remain support among the four types 162
7.5. Remain support among the four types across countries 163
7.6. Remain support among the four types by issue priority 164
7.7. Remain support among the four types by views on foreigners 165
7.8. Remain support among the four types by views on globalization 166
7.9. Predicting remain support 167
7.10. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-foreigner
sentiment 169
7.11. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-globalization
stance 170
7.12. Predicting remain support among the four types by anti-elitist stance 171
7.13. Difference in remain support among the four types, April–August 2016 172
7.14. Change in remain support among the four types, April–August 2016 173
7.15. Remain support among the four types in April–August 2016 in
five countries 174
7.16. Change in remain support among the four types, April–August
2016 in five countries 174
7.17. Remain support among the four types by Brexit expectation 175
8.1. Support for EU reform in 28 member states 190
8.2. Support for EU reform in 28 member states by national conditions 191
8.3. Support for EU reform among loyal supporters in 28 member states 193
8.4. Support for EU reform among policy sceptics in 28 member states 194
8.5. Support for EU reform among regime sceptics in 28 member states 195
8.6. Support for EU reform among exit sceptics in 28 member states 195
8.7. Support for economic reform among the four types 196

xvii
List of Figures

8.8. Support for economic reform among the four types by national
conditions 197
8.9. Expectations about future of Eurozone among the four types 198
8.10. Expectations about future of Eurozone among the four types by
national conditions 199
8.11. Support for Eurozone budget and finance minister among the
four types 200
8.12. Support for Eurozone budget and finance minister among the
four types by national conditions 200
8.13. Support for EU response to member state in financial difficulty
among the four types 201
8.14. Support for EU response to member state in financial difficulty
among the four types by national conditions 202
9.1. Summary of the differences between the four types 208

xviii
List of Tables

2.1. Cross-validation of EU differential measures 49

3.1. Four types of events 60
3.2. Selection of events 62
3.3. Effect of event type on the EU regime differential 63
3.4. Effect of national corruption vignette 68
3.5. Effect on EU policy differential 69
3.6. Effect of political sophistication 71
3.7. Difference in treatment effect by political sophistication 72
4.1. Testing the proximate responsibility attribution assumption 100
5.1. Changes in predicted support and scepticism based on
socio-demographic variables 113
6.1. Hard and soft Eurosceptic parties included in the 2014 EES 134
8.1. Example of a choice in the conjoint experiment 188
8.2. Attributes of different dimensions 188
A.1. Balance statistics 223
A.2. Results of placebo tests 224
A.3. Results of small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption 225
Part I
Public Opinion and European
Integration
Introduction
Losing Hearts and Minds? Taking Stock
of EU Public Opinion

Obsessed with the idea of instant and total integration, we failed to notice that
ordinary people, the citizens of Europe do not share our Euro-enthusiasm. Disil-
lusioned with the great visions of the future, they demand that we cope with the
present reality better than we have been doing until now.
Donald Tusk, 30 May 2016, Brussels

The European Union (EU)1 is currently facing one of the rockiest periods in its
sixty years existence. Not often in its history has the country bloc looked so
economically fragile, so insecure about how to protect its borders, so divided
over how to tackle the crisis of legitimacy facing its institutions, and so under
assault by Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs. While government leaders aim
to find unity, intergovernmental conferences in recent years have been beset
by deep divisions over how to bring the Eurozone and refugee crises to an end.
The dream of Europe’s founding father Jean Monnet to build a Union of men
rather than states seems almost out of reach. These latest developments have
left a mark on public opinion. Eurosceptic sentiment is on the rise. It is no
longer a phenomenon tied to small segments of society, extremist political
parties or to specific economic cycles. The outcome of the Brexit referendum
in Great Britain2 provided a first glimpse of what may lie ahead when Euro-
sceptic sentiment hardens. In June 2016, against the recommendation of
most political and economic experts, the British people voted to leave the EU.

1
The European Union (EU) has changed its name several times during its existence. In this
book, I will use the words ‘EU’, ‘Europe’, and ‘Union’ interchangeably.
2
In this book, I will use the term Great Britain rather than the United Kingdom. This is because
some of the public opinion data sources that I use do not always include Northern Ireland. In order
to be consistent, I rely on data from Great Britain only.
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

The result sent a shock wave through the political establishment in London,
Brussels, and beyond. Was the result based on British exceptionalism, or
indicative of a larger process of a revolt against Brussels? The British public
has always displayed a stronger pull towards Euroscepticism compared to
public opinion on the continent. Yet, recent election contests demonstrated
a steady rise of Eurosceptic sentiment throughout many parts of the Union. In
fact, Eurosceptic parties have seized their largest ever vote shares in the 2014
European Parliament elections.
These election and referendum outcomes have to be seen against the back-
drop of the economic and political challenges that the EU has faced in the
previous decade or so. The Eurozone and refugee crises have proved to be real
stress tests for Europe. While economic recovery may be on its way, at least in
some member states, what many citizens have learnt from these recent tribu-
lations is not to blindly trust politicians and technocrats who blithely promise
that more Europe will automatically deliver economic prosperity and geopol-
itical stability. For a long time public opinion was viewed as largely irrelevant
for an understanding of the course of European integration. This viewpoint is
perhaps best reflected in the writing of Ernst Haas. In his seminal volume The
Uniting of Europe, Haas (1968: 17) wrote: ‘It is as impracticable as it is unneces-
sary to have recourse to general public opinion surveys. . . . It suffices to single
out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study the
reactions to integration and assess changes in attitude on their part.’ The days
of a permissive consensus in which elites could pursue further integrative
steps with little to no regard for public opinion are gone (Hooghe and Marks
2009; Risse 2015). Leaders in Brussels and throughout Europe’s capitals are
confronted with a new and challenging political reality. At a time when
Europe faces some of its biggest economic, political, and social challenges
since the Second World War, the integration project itself has become highly
contested among the public. As a result, the EU finds itself faced with an
existential challenge: the unprecedented development in supranational governance
in recent years has led to greater public contestation, yet at the same time the Union is
more reliant on public support for its continued legitimacy than ever before.

0.1 Key Questions

The days of the permissive consensus are over, but the question is: what has
come in its place? Pundits, journalists, and politicians suggest that we are
currently dealing with a rise in Euroscepticism. Feelings of discontent and
anger over Brussels’ divided response to economic downturn and refugee
flows seem to have plummeted public support for the European project to
an all-time low. This sentiment is illustrated by the former President of the

4
 Introduction

European Council Herman Van Rompuy (2010: 10) who in his speech on
9 November 2010 in Berlin commemorating the Kristallnacht warned: ‘We
have together to fight the danger of a new Euroscepticism. This is no longer
the monopoly of a few countries. In every member state, there are people who
believe their country can survive alone in the globalised world. It is more than
an illusion: it is a lie.’ Prominent scholars of European integration, like Liesbet
Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009), suggest that the permissive consensus may
not necessarily have been replaced by all-out Euroscepticism, but rather that
we are witnessing a constraining dissensus. This is partly because the deepening
and widening of European integration has put questions of identity at the
forefront of political debates (e.g. McLaren 2002, 2005; Kuhn 2015; Risse
2015). As a result, public opinion is deeply divided over the European project.
Due to the fact that these identity-based concerns are increasingly mobilized
by political parties in electoral and referendum contests, public preferences
today constrain jurisdictional choices in Europe.
These accounts of the nature of public opinion towards the EU are compel-
ling in many ways, but also raise key questions. What exactly do we mean by
Euroscepticism? Has it become a widespread phenomenon cutting across
national and social lines? Is Euroscepticism primarily linked to people’s feel-
ings of national identity, or is it rooted in socio-economic insecurity, or
perhaps in both? Is Euroscepticism the driver of recent Eurosceptic party
success, or do national conditions and evaluations play a more important
role? And finally, when does Eurosceptic public opinion have the ability to
constrain the preferences of national and European elites who shape jurisdic-
tional choices in Europe? These are the key questions this book addresses. It
suggests that in order to fully grasp public opinion and understand its causes
and consequences for the integration process, we need to take a step back and
revisit the precise nature of popular sentiment towards the EU. In the chapters
that follow, I present a benchmark theory of EU public opinion. This theory
suggests that the way people view the EU is intrinsically linked to the national
conditions in which they find themselves as well as their comparison of these
conditions to those at the EU level. It is not only a result of a comparison of
objective conditions, but also of people’s subjective perceptions of these
conditions. EU public opinion resembles a kaleidoscope mirroring people’s experi-
ences with and evaluations of starkly different national political and economic
contexts that together make up the Union.
This book maintains that public opinion cannot be simply characterized as
Eurosceptic or not, but rather consists of different types. This is important
because: (a) the different types of sceptics display distinctive sets of issue
positions, priorities, and reform preferences; (b) only certain types of scepti-
cism have the ability to threaten the EU’s existence because they are linked to
preferences for secession and support for hard Eurosceptic parties; and (c) the

5
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

existence of different types makes a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing

Euroscepticism unlikely to be successful. This book suggests that Euroscepti-
cism is such a diverse phenomenon partly because the Eurozone crisis has
exacerbated structural imbalances within the EU and consequently made
experiences with the Union more distinct than ever before. As the economic
and political conditions within member states started to diverge further and
further during the crisis, people’s comparisons of national and European
conditions also moved further apart. While the EU aims to be united in diversity,
this book suggests that in terms of Euroscepticism the EU is divided in its diversity.3
The fact that people’s benchmarks started to diverge more strongly as the
Eurozone crisis unfolded is crucially important for our understanding of
Euroscepticism. It helps us to grasp why support for the EU remains relatively
high in bailout-battered member states that have experienced some of the
worst effects of the crisis, such as Ireland or Spain for example, while Euro-
scepticism is steadily on the rise in countries that have benefited to an enor-
mous extent from the Single Market and/or Euro, and weathered the crisis
relatively well, such as Germany, Great Britain, or the Netherlands. The
benchmark theory suggests that different kinds of Euroscepticism develop
primarily within those contexts where people perceive that they have an
exit option to EU membership. When national conditions are good, in eco-
nomic and political terms, or at least when people perceive them as such,
Euroscepticism is most likely to develop. When national conditions are bad,
however, EU support is the most likely outcome as no viable alternative to
membership is present. This pattern exists because people assign responsibil-
ity for economic and political performance not primarily to EU actors, but first
and foremost to their national governments. This means that when national
economic and political conditions are good, people attribute them to the
actions of their national government and Euroscepticism is likely to increase.
However, when conditions are bad, they are perceived to be a consequence of
low quality leadership at home, and this is likely to increase support for the
EU. Using the same theoretical framework, this book also helps to clarify
patterns within countries. It suggests that Euroscepticism is not only the
prerogative of those who are left behind by integration, or globalization
more generally, but is also found among those who are relatively well off.
What unites these different groups is the benchmark they employ. Euroscep-
tics believe that their country can survive, or will even thrive, outside of the
EU. Euroscepticism is not necessarily a reflection of the extent to which they
themselves stand to gain or lose from integration.

3
I wish to thank Tim Haughton for suggesting this formulation.

6
 Introduction

The deeply divided nature of public opinion that this book uncovers
has important consequences for the future of the European project. It puts
European and political elites in a very difficult position. Public opinion is more
responsive to real-world conditions today than in the past and this means that
citizens demand solutions to the current European crises. Yet, the deep divi-
sions within the public represent something of a policy conundrum. There is a
growing rift between different types of sceptics within and across countries in
terms of their policy demands. Some sceptics, especially within the North
Western region, demand less intra-EU migration, while others, most notably
in Southern and Central and Eastern European member states, wish to see
more economic investment and employment programmes. It appears difficult
to come up with policy proposals that could satisfy both these constituencies
simultaneously, especially in the short run. Combatting unemployment and
sluggish growth in the Union to revive struggling member states, especially in
the South, would necessitate the introduction of some sort of monetary
transfer or debt reduction that may require a further allocation of policy
competences to the EU level (Stiglitz 2016). This is something that some
sceptics do not wish to see. Moreover, the restriction of immigration to please
some of the sceptics would violate one of the core principles of integration,
namely the free movement of people. This in turn is not popular among other
segments of the population. Although it might be possible to strike a balance
between these different demands by introducing some sort of transfer mech-
anism or debt reduction that would allow poorer economies to grow and thus
depress the demand for migration in the future, the fruits of such reforms
would most likely only come to bear in the medium or long run. Given the
importance of EU matters in domestic elections and for the re-election of
national governments (De Vries 2007, 2010; Schneider 2013), current incum-
bents will most likely focus on their short-term political survival rather
than medium- to long-term policy solutions. The way for the EU to deal
with these different constituencies, this book suggests, is to fully embrace
the diversity within its borders and provide more differentiated and flexible
policy solutions.

0.2 What Lies Ahead

This book revisits core questions about the nature of public opinion and
its role in the integration process. Not surprisingly there is a burgeoning
literature on public attitudes towards European integration (for an overview
see Hobolt and De Vries 2016a). Early studies focused on EU support (see
for example Inglehart 1970; Gabel 1998), whereas over the last decade or
so scholarly attention has shifted to the study of opposition, namely

7
Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

Euroscepticism (see Spiering and Harmsen 2004; Hooghe 2007). Although

the literature has made great strides in attempting to explain which factors
determine whether people hold positive or negative attitudes towards the EU,
the precise conceptualization and measurement of support and scepticism has
received much less scholarly attention. This book aims to remedy this by devel-
oping a benchmark theory of public opinion towards the EU. This theoretical
approach builds on recent insights from behavioural economics and social
psychology. By analysing existing survey data, complementing and cross-
validating it with newly collected survey data as well as combining it with
novel experimental data, the book provides a systematic account of (a) how
people’s EU attitudes are structured, (b) how they vary across time and space, (c)
how they have very different behavioural implications, and (d) how they might
constrain the room to manoeuvre of European and national elites. It does so by
taking a Europe-wide approach. This allows for a thorough understanding of the
continuity and change in public sentiment towards Europe. That said, at times,
the book draws on specific country examples to clarify the bigger picture.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the recent surge in Euro-
scepticism. Chapter 1 suggests that recent trends in public opinion are
difficult to reconcile with existing explanations of EU support and scepticism,
most notably the utilitarian and identity explanations. The chapter outlines
how the benchmark theory developed in this book can help us to understand
these recent trends. It also highlights how the theory builds on, yet clearly
deviates from, existing work highlighting the importance of national condi-
tions for EU public opinion.
Part II provides a fine-grained conceptualization of EU public opinion.
Chapter 2 introduces the benchmark theory of EU scepticism and support.
The chapter suggests that the nature of public opinion towards European
integration is both multidimensional and multilevel in nature. The core
insight underlying the benchmark theory is intuitive and simple: public opin-
ion towards Europe is based on a comparison between the benefits of the status quo of
membership and those associated with an alternative state, namely one’s country
being outside the EU. This comparison is coined the EU differential. When
people compare the benefits, they evaluate both the outcomes (policy evalu-
ations) and the system that produces them (regime evaluations). Not only
does this chapter present a fine-grained conceptualization of what it means to
be an EU supporter or sceptic, it also develops a careful empirical measurement
strategy and cross-validates the measurement with a variety of existing and
newly developed data sources.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that European public opinion is responsive to
changes in real-world conditions and moves in predictable ways. The analysis
combines natural experimental and survey experimental data to show that EU
support and scepticism react to both national and European events. This

8
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Satu sydämestä
ja auringosta
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Satu sydämestä ja auringosta

Author: Elina Vaara

Release date: October 27, 2023 [eBook #71967]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Porvoo: WSOY, 1925

Credits: Tuula Temonen

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SATU

SYDÄMESTÄ JA AURINGOSTA ***
SATU SYDÄMESTÄ JA AURINGOSTA

Kirj.

Elina Vaara

Porvoossa, Werner Söderström Oy, 1925.

SISÄLLYS:
SATU SYDÄMESTÄ JA AURINGOSTA

Kaukaiset metsät.
Satu sydämestä ja auringosta.
Mennyt suvi.
Lumikkosydän.
Järvellä.
Hiiden hovi.
Syysromanssi.
Saaren soittaja.

VILLIVIINI
 Karnevaalihuume.
Käsky — kielto..
Kuolleet.
Judithin tuska.
Villiviini.

HILJAISIA AKORDEJA

Puutumus.
Hiljainen huone.
Akordi.
Hiljaisimmat.
Hartaus.
Keväthämärä.

LAULU KAUKAISESTA RAKKAUDESTA

Blayn prinssi.
Trubaduurilaulu.
Aavelinna.
Suleika.
Yö keitaalla.
Oi Sulamith, on päivät hämärtyneet.
Netkron sadusta.

PUISTOKUJA

Kevät.
Kultaiset pallot.
Kellastuneesta vihkosta.
Katkenneiden pilarien kaupunki.
Tähtisumua.
Uneksijat.
Puistokuja.
SATU SYDÄMESTÄ JA AURINGOSTA.

KAUKAISET METSÄT.

Keskiyöllä ikävään ma havaan, sateen lauluun ikkunani

avaan. Sydän valittaa. Siellä sananjalat viherjäiset, sinikellot,
punakämmekkäiset vavisten nyt vartoo kuolemaa.

Siellä syksy mustan tulvan lailla hautaa metsät, joissa

huolta vailla häipyi suven kuut. Haavanlehdet maahan
varisevat, raskasmielisinä huokailevat tuuleen tummat,
rakkaat havupuut.

Kuule, sadeyö, kun kuiskaan sulle: katoovaisuudesta voitko

mulle laulun virittää, jok' on sinipunainen ja musta, jok' on
täynnä murheen huumausta — laulun, jonka voi vain
nyyhkyttää!

SATU SYDÄMESTÄ JA AURINGOSTA.

Oli kerran kuninkaantalo, missä yö oli päivinkin. Ei tulvinut
koskaan valo sen synkkiin saleihin. Ah, tummat uutimet häilyi
siell' edessä ikkunain; mut auringonikävä säilyi yhä sielussa
prinsessain.

Pian hämyyn hautakuorin kaks heistä kaipaus vei, mut

prinsessa hennoin ja nuorin hän kuolla tahtonut ei. Miten
verhojen takaa ehtoin surunsairain kuuntelikaan hän huminaa
syreenilehtoin, jotka varisti kukkasiaan!

Kuu venheellään kun sousi yli torninhuippujen, kuva

nuorukaisen nousi hänen uniinsa ihmeellinen. Sen
silkinkuivaa tukkaa ois nauraen hyväillyt ja tuhannen
syreeninkukkaa hänen tielleen kylvänyt…

Ja prinsessa pimeän linnan ei enää viipyä voi: unen kutsu

pohjalla rinnan kuin kiihkeä viulu soi. Hän pakeni linnasta
salaa kuin pääsky, pesästään joka paisuvin siivin halaa sini-
ilmaan värisevään.

Näyn ihanan eessä aivan sydän nuori hurmaantui: laill'

yrtteihin peittyvän laivan maa säteiden virrassa ui. Utupilvissä
taivahalla lepäs aurinko hehkuen kuin valkeiden vuorten alla
ois järvi kultainen.

Ja kun nukahti matkalainen puun himmeän varjoihin, niin

untensa nuorukainen hänet herätti suudelmin. Käden
prinsessan käteen hän liitti, vei kauas maailmaan, ja hymyä
auringon riitti, he kunne kulkivatkaan.

Moni kaupunki kaunis, suuri ilon, loistonsa tarjolle toi. Oli

puutarhat kukassa juuri ja suihkulähteet soi! Mut prinsessa
 päivien mennen pian tunsi sydämessään, ett' uupuu valohon
ennen kuin yöhön pimeään.

Yhä prinsessa kulkee, kulkee all' ihanan auringon… Mut

illoin, kun silmät hän sulkee, sydän luotaan kaukana on. Nyt
raukein siivin se halaa taa tummain uudinten, ja se pimeään
linnahan palaa kuin pesäänsä pääskynen.

MENNYT SUVI.

Kuin käsi lämmin, suven muisto mun sydäntäni hyväilee,

vaikk' auringoton on jo puisto ja kaikki ilo pakenee, pois ilo
pakenee.

Ma lehtimetsäin huminahan taas haaveissani unohdun ja

heinään silkinruskeahan, mi peitti kukkulani mun, ah,
kukkulani mun.

Ja kaislarannat, vedet tummat on laulelmiksi muuttuneet:

ne on niin kaukaiset ja kummat kuin paimenhuilun säveleet,
kuin huilun säveleet.

En konsaan lämpöä ma vailla nyt lähde syksyn kylmyyteen,

kun vaeltaa sain päivän mailla ja nähdä onnen sydämeen, ah,
onnen sydämeen.

LUMIKKO-SYDÄN.
 Sun nuoruutesi kuninkaallinen on kristalliseen arkkuun
suljettuna, ja parvi kääpiöiden itkee, palvoo sua vuorten yössä
vahakynttilöin.

Kuu läpikuultavalle haudalles

niin säälivänä kylvää säteitänsä,
ja huhuilussa juron huuhkajankin
on outo, murheellinen vienous.

Kentiesi löytää lumon-alaisen

hän, jonka kyyneleet on kyllin kuumat
ja kyllin hartaat vangin lunnahiksi:
tuo tulimieli poika kuninkaan.

Mut ehkä valitsee hän toisen tien puutarhojen ja linnain

houkuttaissa. Ja silloin arkussas, oi sydän, sydän, sa
iankaikkisesti maata saat.

JÄRVELLÄ.

Oi järvi, laineitten koti ja kalain kimmelsuomuisten, ma

kuuntelen läikyntääsi ja laulua hyräilen.

On järven pohjalla linna,

niin kaunis simpukkalinna, ai!
Sen ammoin mahtava Ahti
on rakentanut kai.
 Mut Ahdin maineikas suku
— kuin moni ylhäinen suku muu,
joka liian on vanha ja hieno —
jo sammuu, rappeutuu.

Vain pieni, kalpea prinssi

nyt linnanpuistossa leikkiä lyö,
rapukarjoja paimentaapi
ja itkee, kun tummuu yö.

Oi järvi, laineitten koti ja kalain kimmelsuomuisten, ma

kuuntelen läikyntääsi ja laulua hyräilen.

HIIDEN HOVI.

Vuorivirta kuohuu alla ikkunain, lyövät tornin seinään laineet

loiskahtain takana tunturin viiden. Nuku, nuori kukka ripsin
kasteisin! Sull' on kultasänky silkkiuutimin linnassa mahtavan
hiiden.

Peikko lemmenkade nukkua ei voi; kiilusilmin väijyy,

niinkuin vartioi saituri timanttijyvää. Ryöstö-impi huokaa
taljavuoteellaan, unohtaa ei saata edes unissaan
onnettomuuttansa syvää.

Vuorivirta kuohuu alla ikkunain, lyövät tornin seinään laineet

loiskahtain takana tunturin viiden. Nuku, nuori kukka. ripsin
kasteisin! Sull' on kultasänky silkkiuutimin linnassa mahtavan
hiiden.
SYYSROMANSSI.

Sinimustia astereita syksyn tummuvat päivät on. Sinimustia

astereita kasvoi puistossa kartanon.

Pieni kreivitär unelmoiden

niitä poimi, ne murheen toi.
Alla vanhojen vaahteroiden
vielä nyyhkytys illoin soi.

Pieni kreivitär kuninkaalle

antoi lempensä ainoan.
Vieras juhlittu kaukomaalle
läks, ei kuulunut palaavan.

Läpi sydämes kävi miekka,

pieni kreivitär, tiennyt et:
luvuttomat kuin rannan hiekka
kuninkaiden on rakkaudet!

Sinimustia astereita syksyn tummuvat päivät on. Sinimustia

astereita kasvoi puistossa kartanon.

SAAREN SOITTAJA.

Kun vetten sini vaaleana väikkyi,

kun kukat pihlajan ja syreenin
tän saaren hautas lumeen tuoksuvaiseen,
ma tänne silloin matkasin.
 Nyt täällä viipynyt oon liian kauan.
Mun viuluni on mykäks vaiennut.
Siks poveen pusertunut tuska, hurma
on järkeni mun sokaissut.

Kuin syksyn liekehtivä koivu tuolla

veen miilunmustaan syliin kumartuu,
niin hullu rakkaus ja synkkä murhe
mun sydämessäin sekaantuu.

Ja halveksivat katseet kylätieltä

mua peikkoin lailla seuraa uniin yön.
Mut vannon, että kerran vielä soitan
tai viulun sirpaleiksi lyön!

———

Nyt kielet viritän, nyt kostan teille. Ja tää on kosto halvan

soittajan: te mielet ynseät, kuin lapset pahat ma teidät
soinnuin taivutan.

Ma sallin tähtein sataa ylitsenne

kuin sädehtiväin tuliperhosten.
Ma kutsun ihastuksen huulillenne
ja sytän kaipuin sydämen.

Sa tyttö kaunis, kylmyytesi hautaan

ma sävelien villiruusuihin!
Jääkirkkaat silmäs pysähtyvät minuun
ja hämärtyvät kyynelin.
 Mun viuluni, ah, itkee, nauraa, kuohuu,
kun outo, kuuma onni siinä soi.
— Mut riemusta käy raskahaksi pääni.
En viipyä ma enää voi.

Ma syöksyn venhevalkamahan: vihdoin

pois olen vapaa täältä lähtemään.
Jää hyvästi, oi haavojeni saari!
Nyt viime kerran sinut nään.
VILLIVIINI.

KARNEVAALIHUUME.

On murhetta maailma täynnä, tie musta ja kuolleet puut. Minä

sentään nauraen kuljen, minä niinkuin ihmiset muut. Ja
hehkuvat keltaiset lyhdyt.

Mut sydämeni ei naura,

sitä turhaan pyytelen.
Tänä yönä mun kuolema saartaa,
vaikk' elää himoitsen.
Ja hehkuvat keltaiset lyhdyt.

Oi, ruusuja, okaita halaan,

en rauhaa hautausmaan!
Sydän mulla on ihanan nuori,
kun toipuu se tuskastaan.
Ja hehkuvat keltaiset lyhdyt.

Minä lingota liekkejä tahdon

ja häätää kuoleman pois.
Minä tahdon riemuita, laulaa,
 kuin onnekas rintani ois.
Ja hehkuvat keltaiset lyhdyt.

On maailma murhetta täynnä, tie musta ja kuolleet puut.

Minä sentään nauraen kuljen kuin ihmisnaamiot muut. Ja
hehkuvat keltaiset lyhdyt.

KÄSKY — KIELTO.

— Tuskan, tuskan hinnalla on riemus ostetut.

Kyyneleitä, verta oon ma niistä maksanut.
Siispä syöksy nautintoon, sen mehu kuuma juo!
— Ah, en voi, en voi, en voi! on turha käsky tuo.

— Sydän, sydän, heikkousko siitä estää sun?

— En ma pelkää muuta kuin ett' ilo tahraa mun.
Kyyneleet ja veri ovat kiirastulenain:
Jos ma tulta pakenen, oon maata, maata Vain!

KUOLLEET.

Onnelliset, onnelliset kuolleet, jotka alla mätäneväin lehtein

itse verkkaan maaksi lahoatte! Leponne on niinkuin musta
rauha saderaskaan, marraskuisen illan.

Onnelliset, onnelliset kuolleet!

Tärisytä intohimo ykskään
 untanne ei majesteetillista,
piikit elon orjantappuroiden
enää otsaanne ei viillä veriin.

Onnelliset, onnelliset kuolleet! Keihäänhaava syvä

kyljessänne voideltu on unhon narduksella, kädet kuumat,
lävistämät naulain, kiedotut on unhon käärinliinaan.

Onnelliset, onnelliset kuolleet, jotka alla mätäneväin lehtein

itse verkkaan maaksi lahoatte! Tuhatkerroin autuaammat
sentään ootte, jollei ylösnousemuksen valo koskaan kohtaa
silmiänne.

JUDITHIN TUSKA.

Olen kamppaillut kuoleman painin kera tuskan enkelin. Ma

syömeni rinnasta revin ja maahan tallasin. Ah, silmin
mustenevin sun povees painoin tikarin ja pakenin yön
pimeihin niin kauas kuin ma jaksoin voimin murtuvin.

Nyt ammottava, avoin verihaava mun rintani on. Miks

lähteelle laahautuisin? Ma tunnen kohtalon: vaikk' aalloissa
Jordanin uisin, ois janoni lieska sammumaton, ah,
sammumaton kuin auringon, joka sadevedestä kuiviks juo ojat
aavikon!

Käy raju tuskannyyhke kuin puistatus ruumiissain. Maan

tomussa ma ryömin nyt rukoillen rakkauttain. Ah, kasvoin
kyynelten syömin sun eessäs, armas, haavoissain ma
 polvillain nyt makaan vain ja kuolen, nimes kuumeisilla
huulillain.

VILLIVIINI.

Ruskeata, purppuraa, hiilen hehku kaiken yllä! Huumaukses

tunnen kyllä, sydämen se sairaaks saa.

Joka syksy köynnöstyt

sydämeni ympärille
tummin liekkein, tuhlaat sille
hiuduttavat hyväilyt.

Ruskeata, purppuraa, hiilen hehku kaiken yllä! Kerran tules,

tiedän kyllä, tuhkaksi mun kuluttaa.
HILJAISIA AKORDEJA

PUUTUMUS.

Valkea pumpuliköynnös välissä ikkunaruutuin.

Kaksi kättä pöydän verkaa vasten puutuin.

Harmaita sauhulintuja suhisee vaiheilla taivaan.

Kaksi valjua kättä, vihityt huoleen ja vaivaan.

Mustaa liejua kadulla vettä valuvalla.

Ihmisen kädet vihreän varjostimen alla.

HILJAINEN HUONE.

Valko-ompeleiset uutimet unteloina nuokkuu renkaissaan.

Vihreätä, hämynpehmeätä iltalamppu heittää valoaan.

Kuva kehyksessään hymyilee.

Hellät, uskolliset silmät nään.