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Process Control Instrumentation Technology Johnson
Technology
Curtis D. Johnson
Eighth Edition
8e
ISBN 978-1-29202-601-5
9 781292 026015
Technology
Curtis D. Johnson
Eighth Edition
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P E A R S O N C U S T O M L I B R A R Y
Table of Contents
1. Introduction to Process Control

Curtis D. Johnson 1
2. Analog Signal Conditioning
Curtis D. Johnson 55
3. Digital Signal Conditioning
4. Thermal Sensors
5. Mechanical Sensors
6. Optical Sensors
7. Final Control
8. Discrete-State Process Control
9. Controller Principles
10. Analog Controllers
11. Computer-Based Control
12. Control-Loop Characteristics
Appendix: Units
I
Appendix: P&ID Symbols
Appendix: Derivations
Appendix: Internet Resources
References
Glossary
Index 675
II
Introduction to
Process Control
INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES
This chapter presents an introduction to process-control concepts and the elements of a
process-control system. After you read this chapter and work through the example prob-
lems and chapter problems you will be able to:
■ Draw a block diagram of a simple process-control loop and identify each element.
■ List three typical controlled variables and one controlling variable.
■ Describe three criteria to evaluate the performance of a process-control loop.
■ Explain the difference between analog and digital control systems.
■ Define supervisory control.
■ Explain the concept behind process-control networks.
■ Define accuracy, hysteresis, and sensitivity.
■ List the SI units for length, time, mass, and electric current.
■ Recognize the common P&ID symbols.
■ Draw a typical first-order time response curve.
■ Determine the average and standard deviation of a set of data samples.
1 INTRODUCTION
Human progress from a primitive state to our present complex, technological world has been
marked by learning new and improved methods to control the environment. Simply stated, the
term control means methods to force parameters in the environment to have specific values.
This can be as simple as making the temperature in a room stay at 21°C or as complex as man-
ufacturing an integrated circuit or guiding a spacecraft to Jupiter. In general, all the elements
necessary to accomplish the control objective are described by the term control system.
The purpose of this book is to examine the elements and methods of control system op-
eration used in industry to control industrial processes (hence the term process control). This
From Chapte5r 51 of Process Control Instrumentation Technology, Eighth Edition. Curtis D. Johnson. Copyright © 2006
by Pearson Education, Inc. Published by Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
1
INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS CONTROL
chapter will present an overall view of process-control technology and its elements, including
important definitions.
2 CONTROL SYSTEMS
The basic strategy by which a control system operates is logical and natural. In fact, the
same strategy is employed in living organisms to maintain temperature, fluid flow rate, and
a host of other biological functions. This is natural process control.
The technology of artificial control was first developed using a human as an integral
part of the control action. When we learned how to use machines, electronics, and comput-
ers to replace the human function, the term automatic control came into use.
2.1 Process-Control Principles

In process control, the basic objective is to regulate the value of some quantity. To regulate
means to maintain that quantity at some desired value regardless of external influences. The
desired value is called the reference value or setpoint.
In this section, a specific system will be used to introduce terms and concepts em-
ployed to describe process control.
The Process Figure 1 shows the process to be used for this discussion. Liquid
is flowing into a tank at some rate, Qin, and out of the tank at some rate, Qout. The liquid in
the tank has some height or level, h. It is known that the output flow rate varies as the square
root of the height, Qout = K 2h, so the higher the level, the faster the liquid flows out. If the
output flow rate is not exactly equal to the input flow rate, the level will drop, if Qout 7 Qin,
or rise, if Qout 6 Qin.
FIGURE 1
The objective is to regulate the level of liquid in the tank, h, to the value H.
2
TR
This process has a property called self-regulation. This means that for some input flow
rate, the liquid height will rise until it reaches a height for which the output flow rate matches
the input flow rate. A self-regulating system does not provide regulation of a variable to any
particular reference value. In this example, the liquid level will adopt some value for which
input and output flow rates are the same, and there it will stay. But if the input flow rate
changed, then the level would change also, so it is not regulated to a reference value.
EXAMPLE The tank in Figure 1 has a relationship between flow and level given by Qout = K2h
1 where h is in feet and K = 1.156 (gal兾min)兾ft1兾2. Suppose the input flow rate is 2 gal/min.
At what value of h will the level stabilize from self-regulation?
Solution
The level will stabilize from self-regulation when Qout = Qin. Thus, we solve for h,
h = a b = a b = 3 ft
Qout 2 2 gal兾min 2
K 1兾2
1.156 (gal兾min)兾ft
Suppose we want to maintain the level at some particular value, H, in Figure 1, re-
gardless of the input flow rate. Then something more than self-regulation is needed.
Human-Aided Control Figure 2 shows a modification of the tank system to al-

low artificial regulation of the level by a human. To regulate the level so that it maintains the value
H, it will be necessary to employ a sensor to measure the level. This has been provided via a
“sight tube,” S, as shown in Figure 2. The actual liquid level or height is called the controlled variable.
In addition, a valve has been added so that the output flow rate can be changed by the
human. The output flow rate is called themanipulated variableor controlling variable.
FIGURE 2
A human can regulate the level using a sight tube, S, to compare the level, h, to the
objective, H, and adjust a valve to change the level.
3
FIGURE 3
An automatic level-control system replaces the human with a controller and uses a sensor
to measure the level.
Now the height can be regulated apart from the input flow rate using the following
strategy: The human measures the height in the sight tube and compares the value to the
setpoint. If the measured value is larger, the human opens the valve a little to let the flow
out increase, and thus the level lowers toward the setpoint. If the measured value is smaller
than the setpoint, the human closes the valve a little to decrease the flow out and allow the
level to rise toward the setpoint.
By a succession of incremental opening and closing of the valve, the human can bring
the level to the setpoint value, H, and maintain it there by continuous monitoring of the sight
tube and adjustment of the valve. The height is regulated.
Automatic Control To provide automatic control, the system is modified as

shown in Figure 3 so that machines, electronics, or computers replace the operations of the human.
An instrument called a sensor is added that is able to measure the value of the level and con-
vert it into a proportional signal, s. This signal is provided as input to a machine, electronic circuit,
or computer called the controller. The controller performs the function of the human in eval-
uating the measurement and providing an output signal, u, to change the valve setting via an
actuator connected to the valve by a mechanical linkage.
When automatic control is applied to systems like the one in Figure 3, which are
designed to regulate the value of some variable to a setpoint, it is called process control.
2.2 Servomechanisms
Another commonly used type of control system, which has a slightly different objective
from process control, is called a servomechanism. In this case, the objective is to force some
parameter to vary in a specific manner. This may be called a tracking control system. In-
4
FIGURE 4
Servomechanism-type control systems are used to move a robot arm from point A to
point B in a controlled fashion.
stead of regulating a variable value to a setpoint, the servomechanism forces the controlled
variable value to follow variation of the reference value.
For example, in an industrial robot arm like the one shown in Figure 4, servomech-
anisms force the robot arm to follow a path from point A to point B. This is done by con-
trolling the speed of motors driving the arm and the angles of the arm parts.
The strategy for servomechanisms is similar to that for process-control systems, but
the dynamic differences between regulation and tracking result in differences in design and
operation of the control system. This book is directed toward process-control technology.
2.3 Discrete-State Control Systems

This is a type of control system concerned with controlling a sequence of events rather than
regulation or variation of individual variables. For example, the manufacture of paint might
involve the regulation of many variables, such as mixing temperature, flow rate of liquids
into mixing tanks, speed of mixing, and so on. Each of these might be expected to be reg-
ulated by process-control loops. But there is also a sequence of events that must occur in
the overall process of manufacturing the paint. This sequence is described in terms of events
that are timed to be started and stopped on a specified schedule. Referring to the paint ex-
ample, the mixture needs to be heated with a regulated temperature for a certain length of
time and then perhaps pumped into a different tank and stirred for another period.
The starting and stopping of events is a discrete-based system because the event is ei-
ther true or false, (i.e., started or stopped, open or closed, on or off). This type of control
system can also be made automatic and is perfectly suited to computer-based controllers.
5
These discrete-state control systems are often implemented using specialized computer-
based equipment called programmable logic controllers (PLCs).
3 PROCESS-CONTROL BLOCK DIAGRAM

To provide a practical, working description of process control, it is useful to describe the
elements and operations involved in more generic terms. Such a description should be in-
dependent of a particular application (such as the example presented in the previous sec-
tion) and thus be applicable to all control situations. A model may be constructed using
blocks to represent each distinctive element. The characteristics of control operation then
may be developed from a consideration of the properties and interfacing of these elements.
Numerous models have been employed in the history of process-control description; we
will use one that seems most appropriate for a description of modern and developing tech-
nology of process control.
3.1 Identification of Elements

The elements of a process-control system are defined in terms of separate functional parts
of the system. The following paragraphs define the basic elements of a process-control sys-
tem and relate them to the example presented in Section 2.
Process In the previous example, the flow of liquid in and out of the tank, the tank
itself, and the liquid all constitute a process to be placed under control with respect to the
fluid level. In general, a process can consist of a complex assembly of phenomena that re-
late to some manufacturing sequence. Many variables may be involved in such a process,
and it may be desirable to control all these variables at the same time. There are single-
variable processes, in which only one variable is to be controlled, as well as multivariable
processes, in which many variables, perhaps interrelated, may require regulation. The
process is often also called the plant.
Measurement Clearly, to effect control of a variable in a process, we must have

information about the variable itself. Such information is found by measuring the variable.
In general, a measurement refers to the conversion of the variable into some corresponding
analog of the variable, such as a pneumatic pressure, an electrical voltage or current, or a
digitally encoded signal. A sensor is a device that performs the initial measurement and en-
ergy conversion of a variable into analogous digital, electrical, or pneumatic information.
Further transformation or signal conditioning may be required to complete the measure-
ment function. The result of the measurement is a representation of the variable value in
some form required by the other elements in the process-control operation.
In the system shown in Figure 3, the controlled variable is the level of liquid in the
tank. The measurement is performed by some sensor, which provides a signal, s, to the con-
troller. In the case of Figure 2, the sensor is the sight tube showing the level to the human
operator as an actual level in the tank.
6
The sensor is also called a transducer. However, the word sensor is preferred for the
initial measurement device because “transducer” represents a device that converts any sig-
nal from one form to another. Thus, for example, a device that converts a voltage into a pro-
portional current would be a transducer. In other words, all sensors are transducers, but not
all transducers are sensors.
Error Detector In Figure 2, the human looked at the difference between the actual level, h,
and the setpoint level, H, and deduced an error. This error has both a magnitude and polarity.
For the automatic control system in Figure 3, this same kind of error determination must be
made before any control action can be taken by the controller. Although the error detector
is often a physical part of the controller device, it is important to keep a clear distinction between
the two.
Controller The next step in the process-control sequence is to examine the error and
determine what action, if any, should be taken. This part of the control system has many
names, such as compensator or filter, but controller is the most common. The evaluation may
be performed by an operator (as in the previous example), by electronic signal processing, by
pneumatic signal processing, or by a computer. In modern control systems, the operations of
the controller are typically performed by microprocessor-based computers. The controller re-
quires an input of both a measured indication of the controlled variable and a representation
of the reference value of the variable, expressed in the same terms as the measured value. The
reference value of the variable, you will recall, is referred to as the setpoint. Evaluation con-
sists of determining the action required to drive the controlled variable to the setpoint value.
Control Element The final element in the process-control operation is the device
that exerts a direct influence on the process; that is, it provides those required changes in
the controlled variable to bring it to the setpoint. This element accepts an input from the
controller, which is then transformed into some proportional operation performed on the
process. In our previous example, the control element is the valve that adjusts the outflow
of fluid from the tank. This element is also referred to as the final control element.
Often an intermediate operation is required between the controller output and the fi-
nal control element. This operation is referred to as an actuator because it uses the con-
troller signal to actuate the final control element. The actuator translates the small energy
signal of the controller into a larger energy action on the process.
3.2 Block Diagram

Figure 5 shows a general block diagram constructed from the elements defined previously.
The controlled variable in the process is denoted by c in this diagram, and the measured rep-
resentation of the controlled variable is labeled b. The controlled variable setpoint is labeled r,
for reference. The controller uses the error input to determine an appropriate output signal,
p, which is provided as input to the control element. The control element operates on the
process by changing the value of the controlling process variable, u.
The error detector is a subtracting-summing point that outputs an error signal,
e = r - b, to the controller for comparison and action.
7
FIGURE 5
This block diagram of a control loop defines all the basic elements and signals involved.
Figure 6 shows how a physical control system is represented as a block diagram.

The physical system for control of flow through a pipe is shown in Figure 6. Variation of
flow through an obstruction (the orifice plate) produces a pressure-difference variation
across the obstruction. This variation is converted to the standard signal range of 3 to
15 psi. The P/I converter changes the pressure to a 4- to 20-mA electric current, which is
sent to the controller. The controller outputs a 4- to 20-mA control signal to signify the cor-
rect valve setting to provide the correct flow. This current is converted to a 3- to 15-psi pres-
sure signal by the I/P converter and applied to a pneumatic actuator. The actuator then
adjusts the valve setting.
Figure 6 shows how all the control system operations are condensed to the stan-
dard block diagram operations of measurement, error detection, controller, and final con-
trol element.
The purpose of a block diagram approach is to allow the process-control system to be
analyzed as the interaction of smaller and simpler subsystems. If the characteristics of each
element of the system can be determined, then the characteristics of the assembled system
can be established by an analytical marriage of these subsystems. The historical develop-
ment of the system approach in technology was dictated by this practical aspect: first, to
specify the characteristics desired of a total system, and then, to delegate the development
of subsystems that provide the overall criteria.
It becomes evident that the specification of a process-control system to regulate a
variable, c, within specified limits and with specified time responses, determines the char-
acteristics the measurement system must possess. This same set of system specifications is
reflected in the design of the controller and control element.
From this concept, we conclude that the analysis of a process-control system re-
quires an understanding of the overall system behavior and the reflection of this behav-
ior in the properties of the system elements. Most people find that an understanding of
8
FIGURE 6
The physical diagram of a control loop and its corresponding block diagram look similar.
Note the use of current- and pressure-transmission signals.
the parts leads to a better understanding of the whole. We will proceed with this as-
sumption as a guiding concept.
The Loop Notice in Figure 5 that the signal flow forms a complete circuit from
process through measurement, error detector, controller, and final control element. This is
called a loop, and in general we speak of a process-control loop. In most cases, it is called
a feedback loop, because we determine an error and feed back a correction to the process.
9
4 CONTROL SYSTEM EVALUATION

A process-control system is used to regulate the value of some process variable. When such
a system is in use, it is natural to ask, How well is it working? This is not an easy question
to answer, because it is possible to adjust a control system to provide different kinds of re-
sponse to errors. This section discusses some methods for evaluating how well the system
is working.
The variable used to measure the performance of the control system is the error,
e(t), which is the difference between the constant setpoint or reference value, r, and the con-
trolled variable, c(t).
e(t) = r - c(t) (1)
Since the value of the controlled variable may vary in time, so may the error. (Note that in
a servomechanism, the value of r may be forced to vary in time also.)
Control System Objective In principle, the objective of a control system is to

make the error in Equation (1) exactly zero, but the control system responds only to errors (i.e.,
when an error occurs, the control system takes action to drive it to zero). Conversely, if the
error were zero and stayed zero, the control system would not be doing anything and would
not be needed in the first place. Therefore, this objective can never be perfectly achieved,
and there will always be some error. The question of evaluation becomes one of how large
the error is and how it varies in time.
A practical statement of control system objective is best represented by three
requirements:
1. The system should be stable.
2. The system should provide the best possible steady-state regulation.
3. The system should provide the best possible transient regulation.
4.1 Stability
The purpose of the control system is to regulate the value of some variable. This requires
that action be taken on the process itself in response to a measurement of the variable. If
this is not done correctly, the control system can cause the process to become unstable.
In fact, the more tightly we try to control the variable, the greater the possibility of
instability.
Figure 7 shows that, prior to turning on a control system, the controlled variable drifts
in a random fashion and is not regulated. After the control system is turned on, the variable
is forced to adopt the setpoint value, and all is well for awhile. Notice that some time later, however,
the variable begins to exhibit growing oscillations of value—that is, an instability. This occurs
even though the control system is still connected and operational; in fact, it occurs because
the system is connected and operational.
The first objective, then, simply means that the control system must be designed and
adjusted so that the system is stable. Typically, as the control system is adjusted to give bet-
ter control, the likelihood of instability also increases.
10
FIGURE 7
A control system can actually cause a system
to become unstable.
4.2 Steady-State Regulation

The objective of the best possible steady-state regulation simply means that the steady-
state error should be a minimum. Generally, when a control system is specified, there
will be some allowable deviation, ¢c, about the setpoint. This means that variations of
the variable within this band are expected and acceptable. External influences that tend
to cause drifts of the value beyond the allowable deviation are corrected by the control
system.
For example, a process-control technologist might be asked to design and imple-
ment a control system to regulate temperature at 150°C within 2°C. This means the set-
point is to be 150°C, but the temperature may be allowed to vary within the range of 148°
to 152°C.
4.3 Transient Regulation

What happens to the value of the controlled variable when some sudden transient event oc-
curs that would otherwise cause a large variation? For example, the setpoint could change.
Suppose the setpoint in the aforementioned temperature case were suddenly changed to
160°C. Transient regulation specifies how the control system reacts to bring the tempera-
ture to this new setpoint.
Another type of transient influence is a sudden change of some other process vari-
able. The controlled variable depends on other process variables. If one of them suddenly
changes value, the controlled variable may be driven to change also, so the control system
acts to minimize the effect. This is called transient response.
4.4 Evaluation Criteria

The question of how well the control system is working is thus answered by (1) ensuring
stability, (2) evaluating steady-state response, and (3) evaluating the response to setpoint
changes and transient effects. There are many criteria for gauging the response. In general,
the term tuning is used to indicate how a process-control loop is adjusted to provide the best control.
11
FIGURE 8
One of the measures of control system
performance is how the system responds to
changes of setpoint or a transient disturbance.
Damped Response One type of criterion requires that the controlled variable ex
hibit a response such as that shown in Figure 8 for excitations of both setpoint changes and
transient effects. Note that the error is of only one polarity (i.e., it never oscillates about the set-
point). For this case, measures of quality are the duration, tD, of the excursion and, for the tran-
sient, the maximum error, emax , for a given input. The duration is usually defined as the time
taken for the controlled variable to go from 10% of the change to 90% of the change follow-
ing a setpoint change. In the case of a transient, the duration is often defined as the time from
the start of the disturbance until the controlled variable is again within 4% of the reference.
Different tuning will provide different values of emax and tD for the same excitation.
It is up to the process designers to decide whether the best control is larger duration with
smaller peak error, or vice versa, or something in between.
Cyclic Response Another type of criterion applies to those cases in which the re-
sponse to a setpoint change or transient is as shown in Figure 9. Note that the controlled vari-
able oscillates about the setpoint. In this case, the parameters of interest are the maximum error,
12
FIGURE 9
In cyclic or underdamped response, the variable
will exhibit oscillations about the reference
value.
emax , and the duration, tD, also called the settling time. The duration is measured from the time
when the allowable error is first exceeded to the time when it falls within the allowable error
and stays.
The nature of the response is modified by adjusting the control loop parameters,
which is called tuning. There may be large maximum error but short duration or long dura-
tion with small maximum error, and everything in between.
A number of standard cyclic tuning criteria are used. Two common types are mini-
mum area and quarter amplitude. In minimum area, the tuning is adjusted until the net area
under the error-time curve is a minimum, for the same degree of excitation (setpoint change or transient).
Figure 10 shows the area as a shaded part of the curve. Analytically, this is given by
A = μ 冟 e(t) 冟 dt = minimum (2)
The quarter-amplitude criterion, shown in Figure 10, specifies that the ampli
tude of each peak of the cyclic response be a quarter of the preceding peak. Thus,
a2 = a1兾4, a3 = a2兾4, and so on.
13
FIGURE 10
Two criteria for judging the quality of control-
system response are the minimum area and
quarter amplitude.
5 ANALOG AND DIGITAL PROCESSING

In the past, the functions of the controller in a control system were performed by sophisti-
cated electronic circuits. Data were represented by the magnitude of voltages and currents
in such systems. This is referred to as analog processing. Most modern control systems now
employ digital computers to perform controller operations. In computers, data are repre-
sented as binary numbers consisting of a specific number of bits. This is referred to as
digital processing. The paragraphs that follow contrast the analog and digital approaches to
control system operation.
5.1 Data Representation

The representation of data refers to how the magnitude of some physical variable is repre-
sented in the control loop. For example, if a sensor outputs a voltage whose magnitude
varies with temperature, then the voltage represents the temperature. Analog and digital
systems represent data in very different fashions.
Analog Data An analog representation of data means that there is a smooth and
continuous variation between a representation of a variable value and the value itself.
Figure 11 shows an analog relationship between some variable, c, and its representation,
b. Notice that, for every value of c within the range covered, there is a unique value of b. If
c changes by some small amount, c, then b will change by a proportional amount, b.
The relationship in Figure 11a is called nonlinear because the same c does not re-
sult in the same b, as shown. This is described in more detail later in this chapter.
14
FIGURE 11
Graph (a) shows how output variable b
changes as an analog of variable c. Graph
(b) shows how a digital output variable, n,
would change with variable c.
Digital Data Digital data means that numbers are represented in terms of binary
digits, also called bits, which take on values of one (1) or zero (0). When data are repre-
sented digitally, some range of analog numbers is encoded by a fixed number of binary dig-
its. The consequence is a loss of information because a fixed number of binary digits has a
limited resolution. For example, Table 1 shows how voltage from 0 to 15 volts could be
encoded by four binary digits. A change of one volt produces a change of the least signifi-
cant bit (LSB). You can see that, if the voltage changed by less than one volt, the digital rep-
resentation would not change. So the representation cannot distinguish between 4.25 V and
4.75 V because both would be represented by 01002.
Table 1 also shows the hexadecimal (hex) representation of binary numbers in the dig-
ital representation. Often we use the hex representation when presenting digital data because
it is a more compact and human-friendly way of writing numbers.
The consequence of digital representation of data is that the smooth and continuous re-
lation between the representation and the variable data value is lost. Instead, the digital repre-
sentation can take on only discrete values. This can be seen in Figure 11, where a variable,
c, is represented by a digital quantity, n. Notice that variations of c, such as c, may not result
in any change in n. The variable must change by more than some minimum amount, depend-
ing on where in the curve the change occurs, before a change in representation is assured.
Data Conversions Special devices are employed to convert analog voltages into
a digital representation. These are called analog-to-digital converters (ADCs). In a control
system, the sensor often produces an analog output such as a voltage. Then an ADC is used
15
TABLE 1
Decimal-binary-hex encoding
Voltage Binary Hex
0 0000 0h
1 0001 1h
2 0010 2h
3 0011 3h
4 0100 4h
5 0101 5h
6 0110 6h
7 0111 7h
8 1000 8h
9 1001 9h
10 1010 Ah
11 1011 Bh
12 1100 Ch
13 1101 Dh
14 1110 Eh
15 1111 Fh
FIGURE 12
An ADC converts analog data, such as
voltage, into a digital representation, in
this case 4 bits.
to convert that voltage into a digital representation for input to the computer. Figure 12
shows how an ADC might be used to convert voltage into a 4-bit digital signal as illustrated
in Table 1.
Digital-to-analog converters (DACs) convert a digital signal into an analog voltage.
These devices are used to convert the control output of the computer into a form suitable
for the final control element.
5.2 ON/OFF Control

One of the most elementary types of digital processing has been in use for many years, long
before the advent of computers, in fact. This is called ON/OFF control because the final
control element has only two states, on and off. Thus, the controller output need have only
these two states as well. It can be said that the controller output is a digital representation
of a single binary digit, 0 or 1.
Figure 13 shows a diagram of an elementary ON/OFF control system whose ob-
jective is to maintain the temperature in a system at some reference value, Tref . A sensor
16
FIGURE 13
This ON/OFF control system can either heat or cool or do neither. No variation of the de-
gree of heating or cooling is possible.
converts temperature values into a resistance in an analog fashion; that is, R varies
smoothly and continuously with T. Signal conditioning converts the variable R into an
analog voltage, V. Thus, V is an analog of T as well. The differential amplifier multiplies
the difference between V and a reference voltage, Vref , by a gain K to produce an error
voltage, Ve.
Ve = K(Vref - V)
Vref is simply defined as the voltage from the converter that would be produced by Tref.
At this point, the system becomes digital, because the relays will either be open
or closed so that the heater or cooler will either be on or off. The diodes direct the cur-
rent to the appropriate relay to produce heating or cooling, based on polarity. This sys-
tem also exhibits a deadband and a hysteresis, since there is a difference between a relay
“pull-in” voltage and the “release” voltage. A deadband is a range, of temperature in
this case, wherein no action will occur. Hysteresis means that the behavior of the sys-
tem is different at the same value of temperature, depending on whether the tempera-
ture is increasing or decreasing.
Our home and auto heaters and air conditioners, home water heaters, and a host of
other basic control systems work according to the same ON/OFF mode.
17
FIGURE 14
An analog control system such as this allows continuous variation of some parameter,
such as heat input, as a function of error.
5.3 Analog Control

True analog control exists when all variables in the system are analog representations of an-
other variable. Figure 14 shows a process in which a heater is used to control temperature
in an oven. In this case, however, the heater output, Q, is an analog of the excitation volt-
age, VQ, and thus heat can be varied continuously. Notice that every signal is an analog: VT
is an analog of T; the error E is an analog of the difference between the reference, Vref , and
the temperature voltage, VT. The reference voltage is simply the voltage that would result
from measurement of the specified reference temperature, Tref .
5.4 Digital Control

True digital control involves the use of a computer in modern applications, although in the past,
digital logic circuits were also used. There are two approaches to using computers for control.
Supervisory Control When computers were first considered for applications in

control systems, they did not have a good reliability; they suffered frequent failures and
breakdown. The necessity for continuous operation of control systems precluded the use of
computers to perform the actual control operations. Supervisory control emerged as an in-
termediate step wherein the computer was used to monitor the operation of analog control
loops and to determine appropriate setpoints. A single computer could monitor many con-
trol loops and use appropriate software to optimize the setpoints for the best overall plant
operation. If the computer failed, the analog loops kept the process running using the last
setpoints until the computer came back on-line.
Figure 15 shows how a supervisory computer would be connected to the analog
heater control system of Figure 14. Notice how the ADC and DAC provide interface be-
tween the analog signals and the computer.
18
FIGURE 15
In supervisory control, the computer monitors measurements and updates setpoints, but
the loops are still analog in nature.
Direct Digital Control (DDC) As computers have become more reliable and
miniaturized, they have taken over the controller function. Thus, the analog processing loop
is discarded. Figure 16 shows how, in a full computer control system, the operations of
the controller have been replaced by software in the computer. The ADC and DAC provide
interface with the process measurement and control action. The computer inputs a digital
representation of the temperature, NT, as an analog-to-digital conversion of the voltage, VT.
Error detection and controller action are determined by software. The computer then pro-
vides output directly to the heater via digital representation, NQ, which is converted to the
excitation voltage, VQ, by the DAC.
Smart Sensor Along with the dramatic advances in computer technology has
come an equally dramatic advance in the applications of computers to control systems. One
of the most remarkable developments has been the integration of a microprocessor-based
controller computer directly into the sensor assembly. Using modern integrated circuit tech-
nology, the sensor, signal conditioning, ADC, and computer controller are all contained
within the sensor housing. In one form, the unit also contains a DAC with a 4- to 20-mA
output to be fed to the final control element. The setpoint is programmed by connecting an-
other computer to the unit using a serial interface line.
The most current technology, however, is to interface these smart sensors to a local
area network, or field bus, to be described next, which allows the sensor to be connected to
other computers and to the final control element over a common digital serial line.
19
FIGURE 16
This direct digital control system lets the computer perform the error detection and
controller functions.
Networked Control Systems When a plant uses DDC, it becomes possible to

place the computer-based controller directly at the site of the plant where the control is
needed. This is done by using smart sensors or by placing the computer controller in her-
metically sealed instrument cases around the plant. In order to have coordinated control of
the whole plant, all these DDC units are placed on a local area network (LAN). The LAN
commonly provides communication as a serial stream of digital data over a variety of car-
riers such as wires and fiber optics. The LAN also connects to computers exercising mas-
ter control of plant operations, fiscal computers for accounting and production control, and
engineering computers for monitoring and modifying plant operations as needed. In con-
trol systems, these LANs are referred to as a field bus.
Figure 17 shows how the LAN or field bus connects the computers in a plant together.
Each of the process-control computers operates one or more DDC loops like the one shown
in Figure 16. Bus users can monitor the operations of any of the plant process-control loops,
and those with authorization can modify control characteristics such as setpoints and gains.
Management Engineering Financial
LAN
Process-control
computers
Plant
FIGURE 17
Local area networks (LANs) play an important role in modern process-control plants.
20
Special process-control bus standards have been developed for how data and informa-
tion are represented and transmitted in these networks. The two most commonly implemented
standards are the Foundation Fieldbus and the Profibus (Process Field Bus). The idea behind
these standards is to have universal agreement among process equipment manufacturers on
how data are represented on the bus line and how data are transmitted and received. This is
an extension of the “plug and play” concept used for computer hardware. With standardiza-
tion, successful interconnection and interfacing of equipment from a variety of manufactur-
ers into a control loop is assured. Fieldbus (primarily in the United States) and Profibus
(primarily in Europe) are vying to become the universal standard.
5.5 Programmable Logic Controllers

Many manufacturing operations are ON/OFF in nature; that is, a conveyor or heater is ei-
ther on or off, a valve is either open or closed, and so on. In the past, these types of discrete
control functions were often provided by a system of electrical relays wired according to a
complex diagram into what was called a relay logic controller.
In recent years, computers have also taken over the operation of such relay logic con-
trollers, known as programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Even though originally de-
signed to control discrete-state (ON/OFF) systems, they are now also used to implement
DDC.
Figure 18 shows how the problem of Figure 13 would be implemented using a
PLC. Note that thermal-limit switches are used instead of a sensor to indicate when the
FIGURE 18
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is an outgrowth of ON/OFF-type control environ-
ments. In this case the heater and cooler are either ON or OFF.
21
temperature has risen above or fallen below the limit temperatures. These are simply
switches designed to open (or close) when the temperature reaches certain preset limits.
6 UNITS, STANDARDS, AND DEFINITIONS

As in any other technological discipline, the field of process control has many sets of units,
standards, and definitions to describe its characteristics. Some of these are a result of his-
torical use, some are for convenience, and some are just confusing. As the discipline grew,
there were efforts to standardize terms so that professional workers in process control could
effectively communicate among themselves and with specialists in other disciplines. In this
section, we summarize the present state of affairs relative to the common units, standards,
and definitions.
6.1 Units
To ensure precise technical communication among individuals employed in technological
disciplines, it is essential to use a well-defined set of units of measurement. The metric sys-
tem of units provides such communication and has been adopted by most technical disci-
plines. In process control, a particular set of metric units is used (which was developed by
an international conference) called the International System (SI, Système International
D’Unités).
In the United States, the English system of units is still in common use, although use
of SI units is gradually occurring more often. It is important for the process-control spe-
cialist to know English units and to be able to perform conversions with the SI system.
International System of Units The international system of units is maintained

by an international agreement for worldwide standardization. The system is based on seven
well-defined base units and two supplementary, dimensionless units. Everything else falls
into the category of defined units, which are defined in terms of the seven base and two sup-
plementary units.
Quantity Unit Symbol
BASE
Length Meter m
Mass Kilogram kg
Time Second s
Electric current Ampere A
Temperature Kelvin K
Amount of substance Mole mol
Luminous intensity Candela cd
SUPPLEMENTARY
Plane angle Radian rad
Solid angle Steradian sr
22
All other SI units can be derived from these nine units, although in many cases a special
name is assigned to the derived quantity. Thus, a force is measured by the newton (N),
where 1 N = 1 kgm兾s2; energy is measured by the joule (J) or watt-second (Ws), given
by 1 J = 1 kgm2兾s2; and so on, as shown in Appendix: Units.
Other Units Although the SI system is used in this text, other units remain in com-
mon use in some technical areas. The reader, therefore, should be able to identify and trans-
late between the SI system and other systems. The centimeter-gram-second system (CGS)
and the English system are also given in Appendix: Units. The following examples illustrate some
typical translations of units.
EXAMPLE Express a pressure of p = 2.1 * 103 dyne兾cm2 in pascals. 1 Pa = 1 N兾m2.

2
Solution
From Appendix: Units, we find 102 cm = 1 m and 105 dyne = 1 newton; thus,
b a 5 b
cm 2
p = (2.1 * 103 dyne兾cm2) a 102
1N
m 10 dyne
p = 210 N兾m2 = 210 pascals (Pa)
EXAMPLE Find the number of feet in 5.7 m.

3
Solution
Reference to the table of conversions in Appendix: Units shows that 1 m = 39.37 in.; therefore,
(5.7 m) a 39.37 ba b = 18.7 ft

in. 1 ft
m 12 in.
EXAMPLE Express 6.00 ft in meters.

4
Solution
Using 39.37 in./m and 12 in./ft,
(6.00 ft) (12 in.兾ft) a b = 1.83 m

1m
39.37 in.
EXAMPLE Find the mass in kilograms of a 2-lb object.

5
Solution
The conversion factor between mass in kilograms and pounds is found from Appendix: Units
to be 0.454 kg/lb. Therefore, we have
m = (2 lb)(0.454 kg兾lb)
m = 0.908 kg
23
Metric Prefixes With the wide variation of variable magnitudes that occurs in in-
dustry, there is a need to abbreviate very large and small numbers. Scientific notation allows
the expression of such numbers through powers of 10. A set of standard metric prefixes has
been adopted by the SI to express these powers of 10, which are employed to simplify the
expression of very large or very small numbers.
EXAMPLE Express 0.0000215 s and 3,781,000,000 W using decimal prefixes.

6
Solution
We first express the quantities in scientific notation and then find the appropriate decimal
prefix from Appendix: Units.
0.0000215 s = 21.5 * 10-6s = 21.5 s
and
3, 781, 000, 000 W = 3.781 * 109 W = 3.781 GW
6.2 Analog Data Representation

For measurement systems or control systems, part of the specification is the range of the
variables involved. Thus, if a system is to measure temperature, there will be a range of tem-
perature specified, for example, 20° to 120°C. Similarly, if the controller is to output a sig-
nal to a continuous valve, this signal will be designed to cover the range from fully closed
to fully open, with all the various valve settings in between.
Two analog standards are in common use as a means of representing the range of vari-
ables in control systems. For electrical systems, we use a range of electric current carried
in wires, and for pneumatic systems we use a range of gas pressure carried in pipes. These
signals are used primarily to transmit variable information over some distance, such as to
and from the control room and the plant. Figure 19 shows a diagram of a process-control
FIGURE 19
Electric current and pneumatic pressures are the most common means of information
transmission in the industrial environment.
24
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so as to embrace the whole scheme of the universe, I should no
longer perceive the contents of that universe as dispersed through
space, because I should no longer have as my special standpoint a
here to which other existence would be there.
My special standpoint in space may thus be said to be
phenomenal of my special and peculiar interests in life, the special
logical standpoint from which my experience reflects the ultimate
structure of the Absolute. And so, generally, though the conclusion
can for various reasons not be pressed in respect of every detail of
spatial appearance, the spatial grouping of intelligent purposive
beings is phenomenal of their inner logical affinity of interest and
purpose. Groups of such beings, closely associated together in
space, are commonly also associated in their peculiar interests, their
special purposes, their characteristic attitude towards the universe.
The local contiguity of the members of the group is but an “outward
and visible sign” of an “inward and spiritual” community of social
aspiration. This is, of course, only approximately the case; the less
the extent to which any section of mankind have succeeded in
actively controlling the physical order for the realisation of their own
purposes, the more nearly is it the truth that spatial remoteness and
inner dissimilarity of social purposes coincide. In proportion as man’s
conquest over his non-human environment becomes complete, he
devises for himself means to retain the inner unity of social aims and
interests in spite of spatial separation. But this only shows once
more how completely the spatial order is a mere imperfect
appearance which only confusedly adumbrates the nature of the
higher Reality behind it. Thus we may say that the “abolition of
distance” effected by science and civilisation is, as it were, a
practical vindication of our metaphysical doctrine of the comparative
unreality of space.
Similarly with time, though the temporal series may, in a sense, be
said to be less of an unreality than the spatial. For it does not seem
possible to show that spatial appearance is an inevitable form of
finite experience. We can at least conceive of a finite experience
composed entirely of successive arrangements of secondary
qualities, such as sounds or smells, and the accompanying feeling-
tones, though we have no positive ground for affirming the existence
of such a type of experience. But the temporal form seems
inseparable from finite intelligence. For the limitation of my existence
to a certain portion of time is clearly simply the abstract and external
aspect of the fact that my interests and purposes, so far as I can
apprehend the meaning of my own life, occupy just this special place
in the logical development of the larger whole of social life and
purpose of which my own life is a member. So the position of a
particular purposive act in the temporal series of acts which I call the
history of my own life, is the outward indication of the logical place
filled by this particular act in the connected scheme of interests
which form my life on its inner side. But it is an inevitable
consequence of the want of complete internal harmony we call
finitude, that the aims and interests of the finite subject cannot be in
the same degree present to its apprehension all at once and
together. In being aware of its own internal purpose or meaning, it
must, because it is finite and therefore not ultimately a completely
harmonious systematic whole, be aware of that purpose as only
partially fulfilled. And in this sense of one’s own purposes as only
partially fulfilled, we have the foundation of the time-experience, with
its contrast between the “now” of fulfilment and the “no longer” and
“not yet” of dissatisfied aspiration.
For this reason, dissatisfaction, unfulfilled craving, and the time-
experience seem to be bound up together, and time to be merely the
abstract expression of the yearning of the finite individual for a
systematic realisation of its own purpose which lies for ever beyond
its reach as finite. If this is so, only the absolute and infinite individual
whose experience is throughout that of perfectly harmonious
systematic realisation of meaning, can be outside the time-process;
to it, “vanished and present are the same,” because its whole nature
is once for all perfectly expressed in the detail of existence. But the
finite, just because its very nature as finite is to aspire to a perfection
which is out of reach, must have its experience marked with the
distinction of now from by and by, of desire from performance. In this
temporal character of all finite experience we may perhaps
afterwards discern the ultimate ground of morality, as we can already
discern in the unresting struggle of the finite to overcome its finitude,
practical evidence that time is not a form which adequately
expresses the nature of Reality, and must therefore be imperfect
appearance.[154]
Thus we seem finally to have reached the conclusion that time and
space are the imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical
relations between the purposes of finite individuals standing in social
relations to each other; the inner purposive life of each of these
individuals being itself in its turn, as we have previously seen, the
imperfect expression, from a special logical “point of view,” of the
structure and life of the ultimate infinite individual. For the infinite
individual itself the whole of the purposes and interests of the finite
individuals must form a single harmonious system. This system
cannot itself be in the spatial and temporal form; space and time
must thus in some way cease to exist, as space and time, for the
absolute experience. They must, in that experience, be taken up,
rearranged, and transcended, so as to lose their character of an
endless chain of relations between other relations.
Precisely how this is effected, we, from our finite standpoint,
cannot presume to say. It is natural to draw illustrations from the
“specious present” of perception, in which we appear to have a
succession that is also simultaneous; or again, from the timeless and
purely logical character science seeks to ascribe to its “laws of
nature.” But in the “specious present” we seem obliged to attend to
one aspect, succession or simultaneity, to the exclusion of the other;
probably we never succeed in equally fixing both aspects at once. It
thus presents us rather with the problem than with its solution. And
again, after our discussion of the meaning of law, we cannot affirm
that Nature is, for the absolute experience, a system of general laws.
Hence it seems well not to take these illustrations for more than they
are actually worth as indications of the merely phenomenal character
of time. Metaphysics, like the old scholastic theology, needs
sometimes to be reminded that God’s thoughts are not as ours, and
His ways, in a very real sense when Philosophy has done its best,
still past finding out.[155]
Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chaps. 4

(Space and Time), 18 (Temporal and Spatial Appearance); L.
Couturat, L’Infini Mathématique, pt. 2, bk. iv. chap. 4 (against the
Kantian antinomies); H. Poincaré, La Science et L’Hypothèse, pp.
68-109; H. Lotze, Metaphysic, bk. ii. chaps. 1-3; W. Ostwald,
Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, lects. 5, 8; J. Royce, The World
and the Individual, Second Series, lect. 3; B. Russell, Foundations of
Geometry: Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relative (Mind,
July 1901), Principles of Mathematics, pt. 6, vol. i.; H. Spencer, First
Principles, pt. 2, chap. 3.
141. The student who desires to think out the problems for himself
would probably do well to take the discussions of Locke (Essay, bk.
ii. chaps. 13-15) and Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. 2)
rather than that of Kant as his starting-point, as they are less vitiated
by psychological superstitions. In recent metaphysical work the
chapters on the subject in Mr. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality will
probably be found most useful. Much may be learned from Mr.
Russell’s work, Foundations of Geometry, with which should,
however, be compared the largely discrepant results of his later
article, “Is Position in Space and Time Relative or Absolute?” (Mind,
July 1901).
142. We are not called upon to enter into such specially
psychological questions as, e.g., whether both directions, past and
future, can be detected within the “specious present” of direct
perception, or whether the specious present only contains the
elements “now” and “no longer,” the “not yet” being a subsequent
intellectual construction, as is held, e.g., by Mr. Bradley and Mr.
Shadworth Hodgson.
143. We may indeed go still further, and say that every unique
moment or experience has its own unique spatial and temporal
system. The method by which I weave the perceived space-time
systems of different experiences within my own mental life into a
single conceptual system, is in principle the same by which the
spaces and times of myself and other men are made into one
system for the purpose of practical intercourse.
144. For an account of the psychological processes involved in all
this, see, e.g., Stout, Manual of Psychology,3 bk. iii. pt. 2, chaps. 3-5;
bk. iv. chap. 6.
145. Thus Dedekind (Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? p. xii.)
maintains that none of the constructions of Euclid involve the
continuity of space.
146. Of course, a physical vacuum is not the same thing as empty
space. For the purposes of any special science a vacuum means a
space not occupied by contents of the special kind in which that
special science is interested. Thus, in the ordinary parlance of
Physics, a vacuum means simply a space in which there is no mass.
Whether it is desirable, for the purposes of physical science, to
assume the existence of vacuum, is altogether a question for
Physics itself, and to decide it in the affirmative is not to maintain the
existence of that unmeaning abstraction, absolutely empty space. In
any case, it may be observed that the widespread notion that motion
is only possible in a physical vacuum is a mistake, motion being
perfectly possible in a fluid plenum.
147. It must be carefully noted that distance as thus defined is not
properly a quantitative relation, and involves no notion of magnitude,
but only of relative place in a series. It should also be observed that
in assuming the existence of such a unique relation between every
pair of points, it is tacitly taken for granted that the number of
dimensions of the spatial order is finite. In a space of an infinite
number of dimensions, such unique relation would be impossible.
(See Russell, Foundations of Geometry, p. 161 ff.) Our justification
for making this assumption, as also for taking time to be of one
dimension only, seems to be that it is indispensable for all those
practical purposes which depend on our ability to create a science of
Geometry, and that we have no positive ground for assuming the
opposite. Thus ultimately the assumption appears to be of the nature
of a postulate.
148. The ablest detailed account of the relativity of spatial position
readily accessible to the English reader, will be found in Mr. Russell’s
Foundations of Geometry, chaps. iiiA, iv. Mr. Russell has since, in
Mind for July 1901, attempted to prove the opposite view, that
positions in space and time are inherently distinct, but without
discussing his own previous arguments for relativity. Into the purely
mathematical part of Mr. Russell’s later contentions I am not
competent to enter. I may, however, suggest that the question of
Metaphysics cannot be decided merely by urging, as Mr. Russell
does, that fewer assumptions are required to construct a geometry
on the hypothesis of absolute than on that of relative position. The
superior convenience of an assumption for certain special purposes
is no proof of its ultimate intelligibility. And when Mr. Russell goes on
to admit that points in space are indistinguishable for us, he seems
to me to give up his case. For is not this to admit that, after all, the
space with which we deal in our geometrical science is relative from
beginning to end? How differences of quality of which we, by
hypothesis, can know nothing, can help or hinder our scientific
constructions, it is indeed hard to see.
149. This may be brought home even to those who, like myself,
are not mathematicians, by the perusal of such a work as
Lobatchevsky’s Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Parallel-Linien,
where a consistent geometry of triangles is constructed in entire
independence of the postulate of parallelism. Of course, in the end it
must be a mere question of nomenclature whether a form of serial
order independent of these quasi-empirical restrictions is to be called
“space” or not.
150. It must be carefully remembered that the essential defect of
the indefinite regress is not its interminableness, but its monotony.
We ourselves held that Reality is an individual composed of lesser
individuals which repeat the structure of the whole, and that the
number of these individuals need not be finite. But, in our view, the
higher the order of individuality the more self-explanatory was its
structure, whereas in the indefinite regress an incomprehensible
construction is endlessly repeated in the same form.
151. Normally, that is; for brevity’s sake I omit to note the possible
case of a coherent dream-life continued from night to night. In
principle there would be a difference between the case of the space
and time of such a dream-life and those of our waking hours.
152. So the events of my dreams, though not occupying any place
in the temporal series of the events of waking life, are so far logically
connected with that series as both sets of events stand in relation to
certain identical elements of psychical temperament and disposition.
Another interesting case is that of so-called “dual personality.” The
experience of both the two alternating personalities can be arranged
in a single temporal series only because of the way in which both
sets are inwoven with the systematic interests of other men, whose
personality does not alternate, or alternates with a different rhythm. If
all mankind were subject to simultaneous alternations of personality,
the construction of a single time-series for all our experiences would
be impossible. In this discussion I have throughout followed the full
and thorough treatment of the problem by Mr. Bradley, Appearance
and Reality, chap. 18.
153. Otherwise, conceptual space and time are, as we have seen,
derivatives of the number-series, and we have already learned that
the number-series leads to the problem of summing an endless
series, and is therefore not an adequate way of representing ultimate
Reality. (Bk. II. chap. 4, § 10). Another form of the same difficulty
would be that conceptual space and time are applications of the
numerical series,—but application to what? To a material which is
already spatial and temporal. All these puzzles are only different
ways of expressing the essential relativity of space and time. But see
the anti-Kantian view in, e.g., Couturat, L’Infini Mathématique, pt. 2.
154. Compare Prof. Royce’s remarks, The World and the
Individual, Second Series, lect. 3, “The Temporal and the Eternal,” p.
134. I should certainly have had to acknowledge considerable
obligation to Prof. Royce’s discussion had not the present chapter
been written before I had an opportunity of studying it.
155. Against the plausible attempt to solve the problem by simply
thinking of the whole physical order as forming a “specious present”
to the Absolute Experience, we may urge that the “specious present”
itself regularly consists for us of a multiplicity of detail, which we
apprehend as simultaneous without insight into its inner unity as the
embodiment of coherent system. Hence the direct insight of the
Absolute Experience into its own internal meaning or structure
cannot be adequately thought of as mere simultaneous awareness
of the detail of existence. So long as a succession is merely
apprehended as simultaneous, its meaning is not yet grasped.
CHAPTER V
SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION

§ 1. The concept of evolution an attempt to interpret natural processes in terms of
individual growth. § 2. Evolution means change culminating in an end which is
the result of the process and is qualitatively new. The concept is thus
teleological. § 3. Evolution, being teleological, is essentially either progress or
degeneration. If it is more than illusion, there must be real ends in the physical
order. And ends can only be real as subjective interests of sentient beings
which are actualised by the process of change. § 4. Thus all evolution must
take place within an individual subject. § 5. Further, the subject of evolution
must be a finite individual. All attempts to make “evolution” a property of the
whole of Reality lead to the infinite regress. § 6. The distinction between
progressive evolution and degeneration has an “objective” basis in the
metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of individuality. §
7. In the evolutionary process, old individuals disappear and fresh ones
originate. Hence evolution is incompatible with the view that Reality consists
of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals.
§ 1. We saw, in the first chapter of the present Book, that evolution

or orderly development is a fundamental characteristic of the
processes which compose the physical order as apprehended by the
various empirical sciences. For the purposes of Mechanics and
Mechanical Physics, indeed, we have no need to look upon Nature
as the scene of development; for these sciences it is enough to
conceive of it as a vast complex of changes of configuration and
transformations of energy, connected by regular uniformities of
sequence. As soon, however, as we come to regard Nature from the
standpoint of those sciences which explicitly recognise differences of
quality, as well as differences in position and quantity, among the
objects with which they deal, this narrowly mechanistic conception of
natural processes becomes inadequate. With the notion of physical
processes as productive of changes of quality we are inevitably led
to think of the physical order as a world in which the qualitatively new
is derived from, or developed out of, the previously familiar by fixed
lines of deviation and under determinate conditions.
Naturally enough, it is from the biological sciences, in which the
study of organic growth plays so prominent a part, that the impulse
to conceive of physical change as development originally comes. As
long ago as the fourth century B.C., Aristotle had taken the concept of
growth or development as the foundation of the most influential
scheme of metaphysical construction yet produced in the whole
history of speculation. In Aristotle’s view, however, the process of
development was regarded as strictly confined within the limits of the
individual life. The individual organism, beginning its existence as an
undeveloped germ or potentiality, gradually unfolds itself in a series
of successive stages of growth, which culminates at the period of
complete maturity. But the individual germ itself is a product or
secretion derived from a pre-existing mature individual of the same
type as that into which this germ will ultimately grow. The number of
distinct typical processes of growth is thus strictly determined, and
each such process implies the previous existence of its completed
result. In other words, the boundaries between species are fixed and
ultimate; there can be no beginning in time of the existence of a new
species, and therefore no origination of new species by development
from other types. As Aristotle epigrammatically puts it, “It takes a
man to beget a man.”
A further point of weakness in the Aristotelian theory is the
absence of any definite account of the machinery by which the
process of growth is effected. We learn, indeed, that the latent
capacity of the organic germ to develop according to a certain
specific type is stimulated into activity by influences contained in the
environment, but the precise nature of this process of stimulation
was necessarily left in obscurity, in consequence of the imperfect
knowledge possessed by Aristotle of the minute character of natural
processes in general.
In the evolutionary theories of modern biology, it is precisely the
problems of the origination of new species, and of the special
character of the relations between the species and its environment
by which this process is conditioned, that have attracted almost
exclusive attention. And, with the steadily increasing success of
evolutionary hypotheses in dealing with biological problems, there
has naturally arisen a tendency to extend the application of the
general concept of evolution far beyond the sphere in which it first
originated. We have now not only more or less well-accredited
hypotheses of the production by evolution of our chemical elements,
but even ambitious philosophical constructions which treat the
concept of evolution as the one and only key to all the problems of
existence. In the presence of these far-reaching applications of
evolutionary ideas, it becomes all the more necessary to bear in
mind, in our estimate of the worth of the evolution concept, that its
logical character remains unaltered by the extension of its sphere of
applicability; it is still, in spite of all minor modifications, essentially
an attempt to interpret natural processes in general in terms of
individual growth.
We are not, of course, in the present chapter in any way
concerned with the details of any one particular theory as to the
special conditions which determine the course of organic or other
evolution. What those conditions in any special case are, is a
question, in the first instance, for that particular branch of empirical
science which deals with the description of the particular aspect of
the processes of the physical order under investigation. And though
it would be a proper question for a complete Philosophy of Nature
how the details of a well-established scientific theory must be
interpreted so as to harmonise with the general metaphysical
implications of the physical order, it is for many reasons premature to
raise such a question in the present state of our actual knowledge of
the details of evolutionary processes. All that can be done here is to
ask what in general are the logical implications involved in thinking of
a process as an evolution at all, and how those implications are
related to our general interpretation of the physical order.
§ 2. Evolution obviously involves the two concepts, already
criticised at length, of change and the dependence of the order and
direction of change upon determinate conditions. But an evolutionary
process is never a mere orderly sequence of changes. For instance,
the changes of configuration and exchanges of energy which take
place when work is done in a material system, conceived as
composed of moving masses without any element of secondary
quality, are not properly to be called a process of evolution. They are
not an evolution or development, because, so long as we keep to the
strictly kinetic view of natural processes as consisting solely in the
varying configuration of systems of mass-particles, the end of the
process is qualitatively undistinguishable from its beginning; nothing
qualitatively new has emerged as its result. Or rather, to speak with
more accuracy, the process has really no end and no unity of its
own. It is only by an entirely arbitrary limitation of view, due to purely
subjective interests of our own, that we isolate just this collection of
mass-particles from the larger aggregate of such particles which
form the physical order as regarded from the strictly kinetic
standpoint, and call it one system; and again, it is with equal
arbitrariness that we determine the point of time beyond which we
shall cease to follow the system’s changes of configuration. In the
indefinitely prolonged series of successive configurations there is no
stage which can properly be called final. Hence from the rigidly
mechanistic point of view of Kinetics and Kinematics there are no
evolutions or developments in the universe, there is only continuous
change.
Development or evolution, then, definitely implies the culmination
of a process of change in the establishment of a state of things
which is relatively new, and implies, further, that the relatively new
state of things may truly be regarded as the end or completion of this
special process of change. Thus the fundamental peculiarity of all
evolutionary ideas is that they are essentially teleological; the
changes which are evolutions are all changes thought of as
throughout relative to an end or result. Except in so far as a process
of change is thus essentially relative to the result in which it
culminates, there is no sense in calling it a development. We may
see this even by considering the way in which the concepts of
evolution and development are used in the various departments of
Physics. We sometimes speak of a chemical process as marked by
the “evolution” of heat, or again we say that, if the second law of
Thermo-dynamics is rigidly and universally true, the physical
universe must be in a process of evolution towards a stage in which
none of its energy will be available for work. But we can only attach a
meaning to such language so long as we allow ourselves to retain
the common-sense point of view according to which there are real
qualitative differences between what abstract Mechanics treats as
equivalent forms of “energy.”
We can speak of the evolution of heat, just because we,
consciously or unconsciously, think of heat as being really, what it is
for our senses, something qualitatively new and distinct from the
other kinds of energy which are converted into it by the chemical
process. So we can intelligibly talk of the gradual conversion of one
form of energy into another as an evolution only so long as we
regard the various forms of energy as qualitatively different, and are
therefore entitled to look upon the complete conversion of the one
into another as the qualitatively new result of a process which is
therefore terminated by its complete establishment. From the
standpoint of the physical theories which regard the distinction
between the forms of energy as only “subjective,” there would be no
sense in regarding that particular stage in the course of events at
which one form of energy disappeared as the end or result of a
process which terminates in it, and thus such terms as evolution and
development would lose their meaning. Only the establishment of
the qualitatively new can form a real end or result, and so afford a
logical basis for the recognition of the changes in the physical order
as distinct processes of development.
§ 3. This essentially teleological character of development is
emphasised in the language of the biological sciences by the
constant use of the concepts of progress and degeneration. For
biology an evolution is essentially a process either in the progressive
or in the regressive direction. Every evolution is an advance to a
“higher” or a decline to a “lower” state of development. Now progress
and regress are only possible where the process of change is
regarded as throughout relative to the end to be attained by the
process. Exactly how we conceive this end, which serves us as a
standard for distinguishing progress from degeneration, is a
secondary question; the point of fundamental importance is that,
except in reference to such an end, there can be no distinction at all
between progressive and retrogressive change. Thus, unless there
are really ends in the physical order which determine the processes
of change that culminate in their actual establishment, evolution
cannot be real. If the ends, by the establishment of which we
estimate progress in development, are merely arbitrary standards of
our own to which nothing in external reality corresponds, then the
physical order must really be a mere succession of changes which
are in no true sense developments, and the whole concept of nature
as marked by development will be a mere human delusion. And, on
the contrary, if there is any truth in the great scientific conceptions of
evolution, there must be real ends in the physical order.
Now, there is only one intelligible way in which we can think of a
process of change as really relative to an end. The resultant state
which we call the end of the process, as being the final stage which
completes this special process, and enables us to mark off all that
succeeds it as belonging to a fresh process of development, must
also be its end in the sense of being the conscious attainment of an
interest or purpose underlying the whole process. It is only in so far
as any state of things is, for some sentient being, the realisation of a
subjective interest previously manifested in an earlier stage of
experience, that that state of things forms the real culmination of a
process which is distinguished from all other processes, and
stamped with an individuality of its own, by the fact that it does
culminate in precisely this result. The conceptions of end or result
and of subjective interest are logically inseparable. Hence we seem
forced to infer that, since evolution is an unmeaning word, unless
there are genuine, and not merely arbitrarily assigned, ends
underlying the processes of physical nature, the concept of evolution
as characteristic of the physical order involves the metaphysical
interpretation of that order as consisting of the teleological acts of
sentient beings, which we had previously accepted on more general
grounds. It would be useless to attempt an escape from this
conclusion by drawing a distinction between two meanings of
“end”—“a last state” and “the achievement of a purpose.” For the
whole point of the preceding argument was that nothing can be an
“end” in the former sense without also being an end in the latter.
Unless processes have ends which are their subjective fulfilment, it
is only by an arbitrary convention of our own that we assign to them
ends which are their last states. And if it is only an arbitrary
convention that physical processes have ends in this sense,
evolution itself is just such a convention and nothing more.[156]
§ 4. What is in principle the same argument may be put in another
form, and the equivalence of the two forms is itself very suggestive
from the metaphysical point of view. Evolution or development, like
all change, implies the presence throughout successive stages in a
process of something which is permanent and unchanging. But it
implies something more definite still. Whatever develops must
therefore have a permanent individual character of its own of which
the successive stages in the development process are the gradual
unfolding. Unless the earlier and the later stages in a connected
series of changes belong alike to the gradual unfolding, under the
influence of surroundings, of a single individual nature, there is no
meaning in speaking of them as belonging to a process of
development. Only the individual can develop, if we are to attribute
precise meaning to our words. We speak of the evolution of a society
or a species, but if our words are not to be empty we must mean by
such phrases one of two things. Either we must mean that the
species and the society which develop are themselves individuals of
a higher order, no less real than the members which compose them,
or our language must be merely a way of saying that the life of each
member of the social or biological group exhibits development.
When we reflect on what is really involved in our ordinary loose
expressions about the “inheritance” of this or the other physical or
social trait, we shall see that the former alternative is far less
removed from ordinary ways of thought than might at first seem to be
the case. If any kind of reality corresponds to our current metaphor
of the “inheritance” of qualities, the groups within which such
“inheritance” takes place must be something much more than mere
aggregates of mutually exclusive individuals. A group within which
qualities can be thus inherited must, as a whole, possess a marked
individual nature of its own. Now we have already seen that all
individuality is in the end teleological. A group of processes forms an
individual life in the degree to which it is the expression of a unique
and coherent interest or aim, and no further. Hence, once more, only
what is truly individual can develop or evolve. And we readily see
that it is precisely in so far as a set of processes form the expression
of individual interest, that the demarcation of the group as a
connected whole from all previous and subsequent processes
possesses more than a conventional significance. Hence only
processes which are the expression of individual interest possess
“ends” or “last states,” and thus the two forms of our argument are in
principle identical. Once more, then, the significance of evolutionary
ideas, if they are to be more than a purely conventional scheme
devised for the furtherance of our own practical purposes, and as an
artificial aid to classification, is bound up with the doctrine that the
events of the physical order are really the expression of the
subjective interests of sentient subjects of experience.[157]
§ 5. To proceed to a further point of the utmost importance. Not
only does evolution imply the presence of individuality in the subject
of the evolutionary process; it implies its possession of finite
individuality. An infinite individual cannot have development or
evolution ascribed to it without contradiction. Hence the Absolute,
the Universe, or whatever other name we prefer to give to the infinite
individual whole of existence, cannot develop, cannot progress,
cannot degenerate. This conclusion might be derived at once from
reflecting upon the single consideration that temporal succession is
involved in all evolution, whether progressive or retrogressive. For
temporal succession is, as we have seen, an inseparable
consequence of finite individuality. But it will be as well to reach our
result in a different way, by considering certain further implications of
the concept of evolution which are manifestly only present in the
case of finite individuality.
In every process of development or evolution there are involved a
pair of interrelated factors, the individual nature which develops, and
the environment which contains the conditions under which and the
stimuli in response to which it develops. The undeveloped germ is as
yet a mere possibility, something which will yet exhibit qualities not
as yet possessed by it. In its undeveloped state, what it possesses is
not the qualities characteristic of its later stages, but only
“tendencies” or “dispositions” to manifest those qualities, provided
that the environment provides the suitable stimulus. Hence, if either
of the two interrelated factors of development, the individual or the
environment, is missing, there can be no evolution. Now, the infinite
individual whole of existence has no environment outside itself to
supply conditions of development and incentives to change. Or, what
is the same thing, since the “possible” means simply that which will
follow if certain conditions are realised, there is no region of
unrealised possibility outside the realised existence of the infinite
whole. Hence in the infinite whole there can be no development: it
cannot progressively adapt itself to new conditions of existence; it
must once and for all be in its reality all that it is in “idea.” The infinite
whole therefore evolves neither forward nor backward.
This impossibility of ascribing development to the whole of Reality
is strikingly illustrated by a consideration of the impasse into which
we are led when we try in practice to think of the whole universe as
in process of evolution. So long as you are still in the presence of the
fundamental distinction between the developing subject and its
environment, you are logically driven, if everything is to be taken as
a product of evolution, to supplement every evolutionary theory by a
fresh evolutionary problem. To account for this special evolution
(e.g., the evolution of the vertebrata) you have to assume an
environment with determinate qualities of its own, influencing the
evolution in question in a determinate way in consequence of these
qualities. But if everything has been evolved, you have again to ask
by what process of evolution this special environment came to be
what it is. To solve this problem you have once more to postulate a
second “environment” determining, by interaction, the course of the
evolution of the former. And thus you are thrown back upon the
indefinite regress.
Unless, indeed, you are prepared boldly to assert that, as all
determinate character is the product of evolution, the universe as a
whole must have evolved out of nothing. (You would not escape this
dilemma by an appeal to the very ancient notion of a “cycle” or
“periodic rhythm” of evolution, in virtue of which the product of a
process of evolution serves in its turn as the environment for the
reiterated evolution of its own antecedent conditions, A thus passing
by evolution into B and B back again into A. For you would at least
have to accept this tendency to periodic rhythm itself as an ultimate
property of all existence, not itself resulting by evolution from
something else.) The dilemma thus created by the attempt to apply
the concept of evolution to the whole of Reality, is sufficient to show
that evolution itself is only thinkable as a characteristic of processes
which fall within the nature of a system which, as a whole, does not
evolve.
We may restate the same contention in the following form:—All
development means advance towards an end. But only that which is
as yet in imperfect possession of its end can advance towards it. For
that which already is all that it has it in its nature to be there can be
no advance, and hence no progressive development. Neither can
such a complete individual degenerate. For even in degenerating,
that which degenerates is gradually realising some feature of its own
nature which was previously only an unrealised potentiality. Thus
even degeneration implies the realisation of an end or interest, and
is itself a kind of advance[.] As the biologists tell us, the atrophy of an
organ, which we call degeneration, is itself a step in the progressive
adaptation of the organisation to new conditions of life, and, as the
moralists remind us, in the ethical sphere a “fall” is, in its way, an
upward step. Hence what cannot rise higher in the scale of existence
also cannot sink lower.
§ 6. Evolution is thus an inseparable characteristic of the life of
finite individuals, and of finite individuals only. And this consideration
gives us the clue to the metaphysical interpretation of the distinction,
so significant for all evolutionary theory, between the progressive
and retrogressive directions of the evolution process. To a large
extent it is, of course, a matter of convention what we shall regard as
progress and what as degeneration. So long as we are specially
interested in the attainment of any end or culminating result, we call
the line of development which leads up to that result progressive,
and the line which leads to its subsequent destruction degeneration.
And thus the same development may be viewed as progress or as
degeneration, according to the special character of the interests with
which we study it. Thus, for instance, the successive modifications of
the vertebrate structure which have resulted in the production of the
human skeleton are naturally thought of as progressive, because our
special interest in human intelligent life and character leads us to
regard the human type as superior to its predecessors in the line of
development. At the same time, many of these modifications consist
in the gradual loss of characteristics previously evolved, and are
therefore degenerative from the point of view of the anatomical
student, who is specially interested in the production of organs of
increasing complexity of structure, and therefore takes the
complexity of those structures as his standard in distinguishing
progress from retrogression.
But the distinction is not a purely conventional one. As we have
seen, degrees of individuality are also degrees of reality; what is
more completely individual is also a completer representative of the
ultimate structure of the infinite individual whole, and therefore more
completely real. Hence we may say that advance in individuality is
really, and not in a merely conventional sense, progress in
development; loss of individuality is real degeneration. Thus we get
at least the possibility of a true “objective” basis for distinction
between the directions of evolutionary progress. But we must
remember that it is only where we are able to know something of the
actual interests of finite experiencing beings that we have safe
grounds for judging whether those interests receive more adequate
embodiment in consequence of the changes of structure and habit
produced by evolution or not. Hence, while our insight into the inner
lives of ourselves and our animal congeners theoretically warrants
us in pronouncing the various developments in human social life to
be genuinely progressive or retrogressive, and again in regarding the
series of organic types which leads directly up to man as a true
“ascent,” our ignorance of the special character of the individual
experiences of which the inorganic physical order at large is the
phenomenal manifestation, makes it impossible for us to determine
whether an “evolution” outside these limits is really progressive or
not. We have to treat “cosmic evolution” in general, outside the
special line of animal development which leads up to man, as
indifferently a “progress” or a “degeneration” according to our own
arbitrary point of view, not because it is not “objectively” definitely the
one or the other, but because our insight is not sufficient to discern
which it is.
§ 7. One more point may be noted, which is of some importance in
view of certain metaphysical problems connected with the nature of
finite individuality. If evolution is more than an illusion, it seems
necessary to hold that it is a process in the course of which finite
individuals may disappear and new finite individuals originate. This
point is metaphysically significant, because it means that the fact of
evolution is irreconcilable with any of the philosophical theories of
ancient and modern times, which regard Reality as composed of a
plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals or
“personalities.”[158] If these philosophical theories are sound, the
course of the world’s history must be made up of the successive
transformations of finite individuals, who somehow remain
unaffected and unaltered in their character by the various external
disguises they assume. The individuals of such a philosophy would,
in fact, be as little modified by these changes as the actors on a
stage by their changes of costume, or the souls of the
“transmigration” hypothesis by the bodies into which they
successively enter. And thus development would not be even a
relatively genuine feature of the life of finite individuals; it would be a
mere illusion, inevitable indeed in the present condition of our
acquaintance with the detailed contents of existence, but
corresponding to no actual fact of inner experience.
On the other hand, if evolution is not a pure illusion, these
metaphysical constructions cannot be valid. For the whole essence
of the modern doctrine of evolution is contained in the principle that
radical differences in kind result from the accumulation of successive
modifications of individual structure, and once established continue
to be perpetuated as differences in kind. Now, such differences in
kind can only be interpreted metaphysically as radical differences in
the determining aims and interests of the experiencing subjects
constituting the physical order, and we have already seen that it is
precisely the character of these dominant unique interests which
forms the individuality of the individual. Thus the metaphysical
interpretation of the evolution process seems inevitably to resolve it
into a process of the development of fresh and disappearance of old
individual interests, and thus into a process of the origination and
disappearance of finite individuals within the one infinite individual
whole.
A conclusion of the same sort would be suggested by
consideration of those facts of our own individual development from
which the wider evolutionary theories have, in the last resort,
borrowed their ideas and their terminology. The mental growth of the

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Process Control Instrumentation

Technology 8th Edition Curtis D.

Visit us on the World Wide Web at: www.pearsoned.co.uk

© Pearson Education Limited 2014

ISBN 10: 1-292-02601-4

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

1. Introduction to Process Control

2.1 Process-Control Principles

Human-Aided Control Figure 2 shows a modification of the tank system to al-

Automatic Control To provide automatic control, the system is modified as

2.3 Discrete-State Control Systems

3 PROCESS-CONTROL BLOCK DIAGRAM

3.1 Identification of Elements

Measurement Clearly, to effect control of a variable in a process, we must have

3.2 Block Diagram

Figure 6 shows how a physical control system is represented as a block diagram.

4 CONTROL SYSTEM EVALUATION

Control System Objective In principle, the objective of a control system is to

4.2 Steady-State Regulation

4.3 Transient Regulation

4.4 Evaluation Criteria

A = μ 冟 e(t) 冟 dt = minimum (2)

5 ANALOG AND DIGITAL PROCESSING

5.1 Data Representation

5.2 ON/OFF Control

5.3 Analog Control

5.4 Digital Control

Supervisory Control When computers were first considered for applications in

Networked Control Systems When a plant uses DDC, it becomes possible to

Management Engineering Financial

5.5 Programmable Logic Controllers

6 UNITS, STANDARDS, AND DEFINITIONS

International System of Units The international system of units is maintained

Quantity Unit Symbol

EXAMPLE Express a pressure of p = 2.1 * 103 dyne兾cm2 in pascals. 1 Pa = 1 N兾m2.

EXAMPLE Find the number of feet in 5.7 m.

(5.7 m) a 39.37 ba b = 18.7 ft

EXAMPLE Express 6.00 ft in meters.

(6.00 ft) (12 in.兾ft) a b = 1.83 m

EXAMPLE Find the mass in kilograms of a 2-lb object.

EXAMPLE Express 0.0000215 s and 3,781,000,000 W using decimal prefixes.

6.2 Analog Data Representation

Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chaps. 4

SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION

§ 1. We saw, in the first chapter of the present Book, that evolution

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