A Second Chance for Europe Economic

Political and Legal Perspectives of the

European Union 1st Edition Jo Ritzen
(Eds.)
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/a-second-chance-for-europe-economic-political-and-l
egal-perspectives-of-the-european-union-1st-edition-jo-ritzen-eds/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The political economy of European banking union 1st

Edition Howarth

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-political-economy-of-
european-banking-union-1st-edition-howarth/

Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in

Europe Legal and Economic Perspectives 1st Edition Kai
Hüschelrath

https://textbookfull.com/product/public-and-private-enforcement-
of-competition-law-in-europe-legal-and-economic-perspectives-1st-
edition-kai-huschelrath/

The Pursuit of Stability of the Euro Area as a Whole

The Reform of the European Economic Union and
Perspectives of Fiscal Integration Luca Lionello

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-pursuit-of-stability-of-the-
euro-area-as-a-whole-the-reform-of-the-european-economic-union-
and-perspectives-of-fiscal-integration-luca-lionello/

Protection of Health and Safety at the Workplace A

Comparative Legal Study of the European Union and China
Kai Liu

https://textbookfull.com/product/protection-of-health-and-safety-
at-the-workplace-a-comparative-legal-study-of-the-european-union-
and-china-kai-liu/
Political Communication and European Parliamentary
Elections in Times of Crisis: Perspectives from Central
and South-Eastern Europe 1st Edition Ruxandra Boicu

https://textbookfull.com/product/political-communication-and-
european-parliamentary-elections-in-times-of-crisis-perspectives-
from-central-and-south-eastern-europe-1st-edition-ruxandra-boicu/

Global Technology and Legal Theory Transnational

Constitutionalism Google and the European Union 1st
Edition Guilherme Cintra Guimarães

https://textbookfull.com/product/global-technology-and-legal-
theory-transnational-constitutionalism-google-and-the-european-
union-1st-edition-guilherme-cintra-guimaraes/

Citizens’ Support for the European Union: Empirical

Analyses of Political Attitudes and Electoral Behavior
During the EU Crisis Simon Bauer

https://textbookfull.com/product/citizens-support-for-the-
european-union-empirical-analyses-of-political-attitudes-and-
electoral-behavior-during-the-eu-crisis-simon-bauer/

Animals In Brazil Economic Legal and Ethical

Perspectives Carlos Naconecy

https://textbookfull.com/product/animals-in-brazil-economic-
legal-and-ethical-perspectives-carlos-naconecy/

After the Financial Crisis: Shifting Legal, Economic

and Political Paradigms 1st Edition Pablo Iglesias-
Rodriguez

https://textbookfull.com/product/after-the-financial-crisis-
shifting-legal-economic-and-political-paradigms-1st-edition-
pablo-iglesias-rodriguez/
Jo Ritzen
Editor

A Second Chance
for Europe
Economic, Political and Legal Perspectives
of the European Union
A Second Chance for Europe
Jo Ritzen
Editor

A Second Chance for

Europe
Economic, Political and Legal
Perspectives of the European Union
Editor
Jo Ritzen
UNU-Merit/ Graduate School of Governance
Maastricht University
Maastricht, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-319-57722-7 ISBN 978-3-319-57723-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57723-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017941006

# Springer International Publishing AG 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of
the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt
from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with
regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface

This book was inspired by the “Vibrant Europe Forum 2012”, where a group of
radicals began calling for a better political, social and even psychological environ-
ment for all Europeans. We wanted the EU to help ensure a brighter future for all:
young and old, rich and poor. Back then, it seemed more than possible. Put simply,
the future was bright.
Five years on and the climate has changed dramatically. The clouds are packed
and a storm is brewing. There has been a clear rise in anti-EU sentiment,
culminating in “Brexit” in 2016, and more trials are on the horizon. Meanwhile,
IS/Daesh atrocities on the European mainland demonstrated a deep hatred for “our”
lifestyle and values.
A massive flow of refugees challenged the security of our external borders, as
well as the openness of our internal frontiers. Outside the EU, Putin conquered the
Crimea, Erdogan had a putsch within a putsch and the Syrian war continued
unabated, while IS/Daesh killed wantonly just 250 km from our southern borders.
And the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency created a new awareness:
that Europe’s security guarantee may not be cast iron and may not last forever.
This book started by looking for new ideas to make Europe an even better place
to live, via better coordination and cooperation. Since then, it has morphed into an
urgent call to action: to stave off a potential catastrophe. It was written for all those
concerned about the future, including the future of their children and grandchildren,
in a Europe committed to the values of human dignity and equal rights for all, along
with security and well-being. We target an audience of well-educated ordinary
citizens—certainly not just European specialists. These specialists are cited to
achieve the necessary depth, but we generally avoid technical language and
legalese.
This book is dedicated to my grandchildren: to Hannah, Yco, Marijn, Arne, Jelle,
Robin, Jara, Torben and Meri. They are the future incarnate, a generation that
should enjoy the same benefits that I have enjoyed throughout a long and fruitful
life. Benefits large and small, both everyday and extraordinary, tangible and
intangible, are only possible thanks to strong European partnerships.
We consider expert evidence on the EU, in terms of where it stands and how it
may evolve in many important areas like education, employment, finance, migra-
tion, sustainability and trust in EU decision-making. We also look at the “bigger

v
vi Preface

picture”: how European cooperation can improve our lives and those of future
generations, and how this cooperation can be moulded and set into EU structures.
In the process it has been a privilege to work with several eminent scholars.
I wrote chapters “Halting Support for the EU” and “A Vibrant European Model”
with Klaus F. Zimmermann, a man who stands tall in labour market research and
has a keen eye for evidence-based policy. Martin Kahanec, co-author of chapters
“EU Mobility” and “A Sustainable Immigration Policy for the EU”, has built an
impressive career and reputation in migration research and is equally dedicated to
evidence-based policymaking. Annemarie Neeleman and Pedro Teixeira are also
researchers on evidence-based policymaking in (higher) education. Last but not
least, Howard Hudson was instrumental in getting the text into presentable English.
This book is the fruit of many eminent people, both young and old, from various
walks of life. Yet, its tone is very much drawn from a university setting. This is
undeniable. Nonetheless, many politicians were involved in discussing ideas. The
business community was also included in the forums and activities. The authors
were the “scribes”, who alone are responsible for this book.
Two organisations were home to the scribes: Maastricht University in the deep
south of the Netherlands and the Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) in Bonn,
Germany. They deserve all possible gratitude for their roles in fostering this book.
Additionally, the Rockefeller Bellagio Center in Italy provided a temporary sanc-
tuary—a stay that gave a substantial push to the project, after the Vaeshartelt
Declaration, signed on 23 March 2012 at the above-mentioned Vibrant Europe
Forum. The extremely able Secretary-General of this forum was Arian Meyer,
without whom it would never have gotten off the ground.
In July 2013, the IZA hosted a second workshop in Bonn, calling for “A European
Labor Market with Full Employment, More Income Security and Less Income
Inequality in 2020”. The participants and contributors to that workshop have very
much left their mark on this book. Many discussions have followed with leaders from
the business community, the political arena and academia since that event.
Early readings of this book have shown substantial agreement on the analysis.
Based on this reading, now is the time to forge a new strategy for Europe, with one
clear aim: to shore up the EU. Only the EU, taking the right path, can ensure a
brighter political, social and psychological environment for all Europeans: young
and old, rich and poor.

Bunde, the Netherlands Jo Ritzen

12 March 2017
Contents

European Citizens at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Jo Ritzen
Halting Support for the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Jo Ritzen and Klaus F. Zimmermann
A Vibrant European Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Jo Ritzen and Klaus F. Zimmermann
In Europe We Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Jo Ritzen
EU Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Jo Ritzen and Martin Kahanec
A Sustainable Immigration Policy for the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Jo Ritzen and Martin Kahanec
A Sustainable Eurozone with Exit Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Jo Ritzen
European Identity and the Learning Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Jo Ritzen, Annemarie Neeleman, and Pedro Teixeira
Forward to a Second Chance for Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Jo Ritzen

vii
European Citizens at Risk

Jo Ritzen

Abstract
Turmoil is sweeping across the European Union (EU). The political elite are
feeling the pressure—but what of the man and woman in the street? Do they
want the EU to collapse? And if that happens, will Europe really be better off?
The EU is crumbling partly because of declining growth in security and
welfare resulting from the Great Recession of the period 2007–2014, partly
because of the havoc in employment due to mechanization and robotisation,
partly because of an inadequate structure. This happens at a time when
Europeans should expect “secular stagnation”, i.e. lower economic growth
than they are used to in the recent past (e.g. the period 1980s–2008).
Border regions have most to fear from a crumbling EU, because a
re-instatement of impediments on cross-border traffic would worsen their loca-
tional attractiveness. New impediments that might result from a crumbling of the
EU would have serious negative effects first and foremost for the border regions.
The halting support for the EU stands in stark contrast to the potential benefits
to be gained from reinforcing European cooperation, as other major powers seek
to improve their political and economic positions. This is likely to weaken the
standing of individual European countries; yet, under the right leadership, a
strong and cohesive EU can still stand tall in the world: with and for its members.
The leadership of the EU is well aware of the dangers of declining EU
cohesion, but seems unable to act. Reinforcement of EU cohesion ought to
address the challenges posed towards that cohesion in the EU. We focus here
on the challenges to EU economic organisation, to political and democratic

J. Ritzen (*)
Kloosterweg 54, 6241 GB Bunde, The Netherlands
e-mail: j.ritzen@maastrichtuniversity.nl

# Springer International Publishing AG 2017 1

J. Ritzen (ed.), A Second Chance for Europe, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57723-4_1
2 J. Ritzen

organisation, to demographic organisation from the migration perspective, to

monetary organisation (it’s the Euro, stupid) and the organisation of communi-
cation (the language Babylon of the EU).

Contents
1 European Citizens at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 A Future with Less Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Europe of the (Border) Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 A Vibrant Europe Is Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 The Five Presidents Are Stuck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Challenge and Response: A Guide Through the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1 European Citizens at Risk

To put it simply, the man and woman in the street are in jeopardy. There are serious
problems within and between EU member states, threatening the very fabric, the
united front—the cohesion—of the EU as a whole. This puts citizens at risk because
they have so much to gain from cohesion, while other world powers simply jostle
for power and influence, as they have done for centuries. Ultimately, this may
diminish or cancel out the economic, political and democratic achievements of
Europe.
The internal challenges to cohesion among European countries we focus here on
are:

– The inadequacy of the European model to deal with the fallout from
globalisation;
– The side-stepping from essential democratic values in some EU countries;
– Migration both within the EU and from outside the EU with insufficient
integration;
– The unsustainability of the monetary union (the Euro) in which 19 of the
28 member states participate;
– The European language Babylon, whereby the average European of one country
is barely able to communicate with another foreign national.

Each and every one of these challenges could be a reason for a spiral downward
in trust of citizens, both in the politics of their own country, but also of the EU. The
challenges are confusing, leading to uncertainty, frustration and anger. Citizens feel
in 2017 far more insecure about their international environment than in 2007. They
look for clarification of their confusion, for the release of their anger, for the
illumination of their uncertainty and for more security towards more national
decision-making, more inward-turning and less cooperation between European
countries. Perhaps that is the logical response. However, the lessons of history
European Citizens at Risk 3

tell us that this is not a viable road for betterment. Rather it will lead to
“Verelendung”1, to strife and injustice. United we stand, divided we fall.
Solutions for problems within and between countries have always only been
achieved through cooperation. Our pitch, then, is that European citizens need more
and not less cooperation between European countries. Not in the naı̈ve ways of the
past, but in a European partnership with rights and duties and without the frills of an
empire ruled by and profiting a new aristocracy. With strict borders around
European countries that want to work together, which are jointly applied and
protected, to provide security for the welfare and values of the citizens of the
countries. It may mean cooperation among fewer countries, but it may also be
expanded to new countries that want to commit themselves to common standards.
Cooperation within the EU was so successful until 2008. But it is now in danger,
as we will further explore in this book. Most of the challenges mentioned above are
the result of the construction of the EU—its basic architecture. This is based on
solidarity and the willingness of EU countries to follow the common good, the
common values and the common aims with little or no restraint on nation-centric
behaviour (or moral hazard). This has often led countries to pursue their self-
interest even if it would be harmful to the common good. The framework of the
EU needs improvement, needs maturity, needs a second chance.
More and more citizens are turning their backs on Europe. They see the EU as
the problem rather than the solution that it was meant to be (and indeed, should be).
In surveys and polls they express their desire to leave the EU. The years from 2008
to 2016 will go down in history as a period of rapidly rising crisis for the union, with
the UK’s “Brexit” marking a dramatic turning point. We were accustomed to an
ever-expanding EU. Then in 2016 one of the larger countries and in many respects
one of the leaders in economic, political and cultural thinking, the UK, decided to
break away.
There are some reasons to compare the confusion, anger and uncertainty in the
European air in early 2017 with the fogs that drifted over the European continent in
the late 1920s, following the previous great crisis (even though historical
comparisons always have severe limitations). For example: there are no
“brownshirts” or stormtroopers marching through European streets. The optimists
among us might say that what we are experiencing in 2016 and 2017 is more likely
to be a temporary change in the political climate, in many respects comparable to
that in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Koenis 2015). Back then, in the 1960s and
1970s, it was marked by the critical attitude of young, leftist groups towards the
elite (which did not feel the need to be accountable). In 2016 and 2017 it is marked
by the anger of the “white male” against (once again) the new, but this time

1
Literally: immiseration. The term, advanced by Karl Marx, refers to the alienation of the workers
to society as a result of reduced wage growth relative to total value creation in the economy and the
increasing inequality in wealth towards a small group of super-capitalists.
4 J. Ritzen

meritocratic elite2. No matter how accountable or meritorious the elite may be, it is
no longer trusted to pursue the common good.
Here we choose the side of the optimist: there is no reason for panic and our
democracy in most of the EU countries is not in great danger. At the same time most
optimists prefer to follow a no-regret scenario, seeking policies that contribute to
peace and prosperity even in the bleakest of times. The alternative is to allow the
“Verelendung“ to run its course—thus allow for chaos and the chance of the EU
falling apart in strife about bills to be settled and claims to be resolved3, hopefully
settled amiably, or in courts, rather than in economic or even worse, military strife.
Koopmans and Statham (2010) showed that part of the confusion, anger and
uncertainty of citizens has to do with the feeling that they have lost control of
national decision-making and even more so in the EU. They ask: “can democratic
politics perform effectively under conditions of globalisation (on the European or
on the country level)”. Their analysis goes to the heart of the matter: cooperation in
the EU suffers from the same constraints as cooperation on the national level. The
ultimate chance for the EU to survive and become stronger is to organise the EU as
reinforcing member states in such a way as to prevent the alienation of its citizens.
This is the EU of the citizens and of the countries, where the EU assists countries in
their aspirations.
This is a greater challenge than ever before, as freedom of information has to
some extent been perverted through social media—perverted in the spread of
widely-believed “alternative versions of the truth”. This “post-truth” agenda
represents little more than lies and disinformation, in that many citizens are no
longer able to distinguish fact from fantasy on some issues. Some politicians lean
on perversions of the truth to denounce, deny or ignore facts—and they not only get
away with it but seem to gain political support in the process. Some groups in
society entertain very different versions of major historical events than the main-
stream (like 9/11) propagated by informal media or social media. The power of
traditional media as a referee on fact and fiction has decreased.
Our societies at the national level (and united in the European Union) have
pursued a course of what could be called “technocratic” globalisation: ensuring we
retain competitive power in a world in which other nations have emerged as
competitors. These emerging economies made economic and societal progress
possible through low wages, initially through imitation and gradually through
innovation. Low-wage competition was one of the driving forces for automation

2
A Dutch Survey of late 2016 however contradicts the “angry (old) white (lowly educated) male”
explanation showing that 25% of young voters support Wilders (and only 8% of pensioners).
Males and females support Wilders equally and his support is also drawn from the well-educated
(I&O Research 2016). 12% of persons with a migrant background voted for Wilders in the 2012
election.
3
The implementation of Brexit will unveil part of this dreadful scenario. EU officials have said that
an exit will cost the UK some €12 billion to carry over UK membership (for example, agreements
for transfers to poorer countries and costs of UK civil servants in Brussels). Countries receiving
EU support will continue to claim, even if the UK is no longer contributing.
European Citizens at Risk 5

and robotisation, engineered by the fast increase in computer technology. European

countries wanted to retain or improve their position in world competitiveness as a
means to improve incomes, healthcare and education for their citizens. The EU
pronounced in 2000—fully supported by its member states—that the EU would
become the most competitive region in the world by 2010 (the Lisbon Declaration).
This goal was set within a year of the (virtual) launch of the Euro, even though the
Lisbon Declaration had nothing directly to do with the Euro introduction. However
the coincidence shows the spirit of the EU at the turn of the century: full of
optimism. The EU started on a honeymoon in 2000 with the Maastricht Treaty in
full swing, the accession of new member states soon to follow and the Euro as the
new gold.
There are many reasons why the optimism of that time turned sour, turning the
honeymoon into a grinding routine of internal tension. Yet these reasons can be
reduced to one main background: the inability of countries to adjust to the demands
of globalisation in a way in which many citizens felt comfortable. The main
reason—in our view—is not the financial and economic crisis itself. Rather EU
countries had to adjust (in many cases too) quickly to the “demands” of
globalisation, by changing social security systems to provide for more “trampo-
line” and less “hammock”, by changing labour regulations to provide for more
flexibility (and creating less certainty in the process) and by changing health
provision to contain the rising costs.
The north, west and east of Europe adjusted but left behind a disgruntled
population with one group, larger than ever, feeling alienated. Disgruntlement
often turned into opposition against immigration, even against the wretched asylum
seekers, saved from drowning in the Mediterranean. Opponents of immigration
feared that new arrivals might “take their jobs”, threaten their welfare systems, or
even impose foreign values on their Europe.
A deep human tragedy in the north and west of Europe has been the aggressive
and sometimes violent opposition to the lifestyle and values of Europe by a handful
of immigrants and their children, often influenced by religious and political forces
from their countries of origin. One cannot but regretfully acknowledge that in
particular IS/Daesh has been highly successful in driving a wedge between a
substantial part of (Western) European societies and part of the population with a
migrant background. Worse: this is a spiral downward as it has clearly increased
prejudice and stereotyping against EU citizens with a migration background, thus
widening the gap and potentially driving more of the population with a migrant
background towards the security of their “original” political and religious identities.
Disgruntlement perhaps never was and certainly is not the sole “privilege” of
older, lesser-educated white males. No longer just the low educated are driven out
of manufacturing or mining jobs. Also the middle educated involved in routine
work, for example in the banking sector are losing their jobs because of adjustment
to new technologies (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). This disgruntlement in turn
puts serious strain on the political system. Politicians have become insecure. The
sure road towards more long-run welfare through fast adjustment is no longer felt to
be a feasible option. It is now a matter of looking for short-run solutions that
6 J. Ritzen

hopefully do not deviate too much from the long term. Across the political spec-
trum, politicians give the EU a cold shoulder, as Europeanisation is in many ways
akin to globalisation. A further general transfer of sovereignty is no longer a
possibility. A plea for a United States of Europe—however posed—as a solution
to contemporary problems is perhaps more harmful than helpful to finding solutions
for the problems, as it simply does not address the problems of Northern and
Western European countries with the EU. Nor would it work for the Eastern
European EU countries with their recent experience with democracy.
The European South took a different turn at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. The political systems of for example Italy made “adjustment” very diffi-
cult, in terms of labour regulation, social security and governance (including
pension regulation). At the same time the generous flow of surplus Euros from
the north (earned by balance of payments surpluses) continued to fuel the welfare of
the people. The need for “adjustment” appeared superfluous. Yet, when the crisis
hit, southern countries were exposed to (government) deficit levels far above the
level at which interest payments can be easily integrated in the government budget.
They then had to go through the hardship of considerable austerity, creating even
more disgruntlement and even sometimes despair, giving rise to strong “anti-
movements”. “Anti” stands then for: anti-establishment, anti-political-elite and
anti-EU cooperation.
Some countries in Eastern Europe, notably Hungary and Poland, began to
“backslide” on the traditional forces for democracy and human rights as defined
early on by De Tocqueville: the independence of the justice system and freedom of
the press. These countries made substantial progress in building up democratic
institutions as part of the EU accession process. There always was a concern that
after accession they might revert on their earlier commitments and now this appears
to have been the case. The four Central and Eastern European countries united in
the “Visegrad Group” (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) also
take a very different attitude towards asylum and immigration than Western,
Northern and Southern Europe—basically, refusing point-blank to accept asylum
seekers (Visegrad Group 2016).
Such is the snapshot of 2017: many countries within the EU are internally deeply
divided. The divisions between groups of EU countries are equally deeply rooted.
The expectations of many Europeans on life, work, welfare, health provisions and
perhaps on education are not met. There is a growing uncertainty about the future
income position (Ritzen et al. 2016). There is less hope that people or their children
will find themselves in a similar or better position in the future in terms of work.
Across the Atlantic, PEW research found that “pessimism” in the US doubled
between 2000 and 20104. For Europe we find similar figures.

4
Answers to the question: “How do you view your life and that of your family over the next
40 years: optimistic or pessimistic?” In 2010 the share that answered “pessimistic” amounted to
31%, increasing from 15% in 1999 (see: Ritzen and Zimmermann 2017).
European Citizens at Risk 7

Increasing pessimism is understandable, because of the cutbacks as a result of

the economic crisis and even before that, because of the increasing flexibility on the
labour market, because migrants speak different languages around them making
them uneasy, because the shop around the corner disappeared, because you nowa-
days have to pay for everything that used to be free, like the doctor, trash collection,
you name it, while rents skyrocket.
These are national issues, linked to globalisation and its “discontents” (Stiglitz
2002). Globalisation, thanks to its high annual increases in trade, helped to pay for
welfare, but also required change and flexibility, leading to large-scale lay-offs.
These issues play out everywhere more or less in the same way, with huge tensions
surrounding cutbacks (in particular in pensions and health provisions) and with
tremendous conflicts around the flexibilisation of the labour market (see the strikes
in Belgium, France and Italy).
So how could national issues become the problem of Europe? How could the EU
become the new bogeyman in the wake of the financial crisis? Two major reasons
emerge:

– The EU’s status as the embodiment, even epitome, of globalisation;

– The EU’s complex architecture, rendering it a lame duck in the crisis.

The EU member states put the EU in the driver’s seat for global competitiveness,
even before the introduction of the Euro. The introduction of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) in 1998 seemingly further shifted responsibility for sound
economic behaviour and competitiveness away from the individual countries to
the EU. Sound economic behaviour by countries was no longer deemed necessary.
It was now an integral part of EU membership. Politicians across Europe have long
used the EU as a scapegoat for the necessary budget cuts in times of adversity.
These were needed as “sound economic behaviour”, meaning that taxes and
government expenditures have to balance over the longer run.
There is a parallel between the SGP and the “Washington Consensus”: rules for
sound economic behaviour in developing countries as a prerequisite for receiving
soft loans from the IMF and the World Bank (Williamson 1993)5. There is a
substantial difference as well: the SGP was self-imposed by EU countries, while
the Washington Consensus was developed by international aid agencies.
The EU became even more the enemy during the crisis in countries that had to
seek refuge under the umbrella of special funding (because they were broke and
unable to borrow any more money at reasonable interest rates). The EU became the
lender very much like the World Bank and the IMF for developing countries, stating
that money would only be lent on certain conditions.
It appears that “globalisation” in the style of 1990 to 2010, in terms of develop-
ment, is reaching its limits and that globalisation needs to be reinvented in such a

5
Stiglitz (2002) and Williamson (1993) warn that countries should include the distributional
consequences of policies aimed at maintaining or achieving fiscal balance.
8 J. Ritzen

way that it can be combined with social cohesion in countries and broader regions,
like in Europe. US President Trump has indicated that he will pursue new directions
of “controlled globalisation”. This is in line with the analysis of Stiglitz (2002) and
Summers (2016). In the words of the latter: “Technocratic internationalisation has
to be replaced by responsible nationalism, in order to avoid disquieting referendums
and populism. The willingness of the population to be convinced by geopolitical
reasoning appears to be exhausted”. To continue along the lines of Stiglitz (2002):
“Can the proponents of the post-second world war globalization prove their superi-
ority?” His context is the US which by 2017 has been conquered by the Trumpian
revolution, with its strange mix of economic policies of de-globalisation
(or “controlled globalisation”) and billionaire capitalism; but the reasoning applies
equally to the EU member states and the EU as a whole.
In today’s globalised world, individual EU member states best chance to com-
pete is to join a “globalisation pack”. Here Giddens (2014) makes a strong case for
Europe as a “community of fate”: The EU as a whole however has a chance to
choose its own way of controlled globalisation (of course without resorting to
Trumpian billionaire capitalism). Such a line of thinking is a major turnabout in
transatlantic political-economic philosophies. Nevertheless, it is important for the
nation states of the EU to think hard in this respect and to find common ground, so
that the EU can continue to provide the best circumstances for its population,
beyond the claim of competitiveness. Is there a “European model” for production
and distribution that can provide more social cohesion? It must be underlined that
such a model is only feasible on the European scale. Individual countries have no
chance of opting out of the globalisation rat race as they would become less
attractive locations for individuals and for businesses. But jointly we can.
Part of this approach is to ensure that societal changes are the result of a due
democratic process, even if this delays “adjustment”. The feeling among citizens of
having major changes pushed onto them without due process is perhaps one of the
reasons for the increasing gap between politics and the “people”6. This is perhaps
what Summers (2016) calls “responsible nationalism”.
Another part could be the reinforcement of the position of citizens and the state
versus the economic short-term self-interests of the world of capital. It is not only in
the financial world that there are substantial complaints about the short-termism of
shareholders. This also holds true for major industries. It is a recurrent theme of the
Davos World Economic Forum of CEOs of publicly held companies. No single
European country can create incentives for long-termism on its own: it needs to be
done on a European scale. An EU model creating more coherence between capital,
long-run welfare and work may help to sustain popular support for the EU (and
increase trust in national politics).
Reducing short-termism bears some relation with an improvement of the posi-
tion of “labour” versus the position of “capital” in firms. There is also some relation

6
Katz (2002) sees the increase in Euroscepticism as the result of the lack of due process in
Europeanisation over the last 20 years.
European Citizens at Risk 9

with the inequality of capital. Capital is in some countries increasingly concentrated

in the hands of a limited number of people giving them substantial power to
influence political decisions. The increase in the inequality of capital and the
political and economic power associated with capital should clearly be a matter
of concern for social cohesion in the long run, as for example argued by Piketty
(2015)7.
If European cooperation is to have a second chance, then it is imperative to think
about and agree on the main lines of European-style globalisation, to provide
comfort to most citizens.

2 A Future with Less Growth

How can cooperation between European countries in the EU improve the lives of
European citizens? That is our central question. As of 2017, the EU is not in the best
shape and may fall apart. To what extent will this hurt European citizens? The
answer needs to be framed in the political, military and economic context of Europe
in the second decade of the twenty-first century. First, the political and military
context requires more, not less, cooperation. The threat of Russia to Eastern
European countries, the Turkish oppression of minorities and abandonment of
basic democratic institutions, the war in Syria and tensions across the Arab
world, the violent antagonism of IS/Daesh to Western values and the Western
way of living: these are all part of the political and military context that calls for
more cooperation. At the same time the economic context may limit the “room for
manoeuvre” for politicians to engage in the kind of cooperation that requires
substantial change in societies. We argue that relatively new economic
circumstances may limit the chances of gaining democratic support for drastic
policy changes.
There is a substantial likelihood of less economic growth in the near future in EU
countries, compared to what countries have been used to in the period preceding
the economic crisis (everything else remaining equal), while purchasing power is
likely to grow even less due to measures to prevent further damage to the climate.
These measures will drive prices upwards.
There is likely to be a period of what economists call “secular growth” over the
next decades (Pagano and Sbracia 2014). Figure 1 shows the rolling 10-year
moving average growth rate for leading economies in real terms. In 2014, real
GDP growth (10-year moving averages) in the EU was below 2% (and negative in
Italy). Looking back, this 10-year moving average of growth reached its zenith in
Japan around 1972 and for the US, Germany, Italy and the UK some 8 years later
(around 1980). By 1980 OECD economies were hit by a second oil shock. They

7
Often the US is depicted as the country with the highest concentration of capital (45% for the top
1%). However some EU countries are not much different (e.g. Germany with 42% of capital
concentrated in the top 1%).
10 J. Ritzen

Fig. 1 Real GDP annual France Germany

growth rate (based on a Italy Japan
10-year moving average). United Kingdom United States
Source: Penn World Tables,
version 9 (2016) 10

-2

never recovered sufficiently to claw their way back to the levels seen between 1972
and 1980 and so fell back to much lower levels of economic growth. However, there
was resurgence in economic growth (albeit on a lower level) in the high time of the
EU: between 2000 and 2008. This demonstrates the trend towards lower levels of
economic growth in the developed world. Low economic growth rates are likely to
stay with us for the foreseeable future, according to von Weizsäcker (2014),
Summers (2016), Gordon (2016) and many other economists who have focused
on long-run growth.
The demographic transition (with high birth rates in the period of 1945–1975,
followed by about 20% lower birth rates thereafter) has influenced economic
growth negatively over the transition period, lasting to around 2040, if birth rates
remain unchanged (Van Imhoff 1982). Cervellati et al. (2017) analysed economic
and population growth data for the last 150 years, concluding that long-run demo-
graphic dynamics have potentially major implications for the prospects of human
and physical capital accumulation, the evolution of productivity and the question of
secular stagnation.
The core of the economic debate is about the real interest-rate, consistent with
full employment. Has this indeed fallen to zero or negative levels? (Bernanke
2015). At a broader level, the debate is concerned with the question whether the
recently experienced delayed recovery reflects a “one-off crisis related to a drop in
potential output, a phenomenon of delayed recovery from cyclical fluctuations, a
prolonged drop in GDP below its long-run potential, or a reduction in long-run
growth potential” (Teulings and Baldwin 2014).
The term “secular stagnation” was coined by Alvin Hansen (1938). He argued
that economic growth would slow when the population stops growing and while
technological progress increases only modestly. From this perspective, firms are
European Citizens at Risk 11

unlikely to see much reason to invest in new capital goods, while the ageing
population will continue to save—thus both investments and consumption stagnate.
This would increase unemployment for many years. He wrote this after the Great
Depression and just before the Second World War, with a very different population
development than expected, i.e. the baby boom of 1945–1975.
Many economists like Summers (2016) believe that the present situation satisfies
the Hansen analysis, in particular if trade drops at the same time (Freund 2016). She
explains how “the new reality that trade and economic growth are no longer as
connected as they used to be” may be caused by secular growth, as trade “is caught
in the tempest because trade relies heavily on investment”.
She argues: “New liberalization initiatives, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are especially timely. These
mega-regional deals will create new business opportunities, lifting private invest-
ment. As trade expands, investment opportunities are likely to propagate around the
region. While the trade slowdown is largely a symptom of secular stagnation, trade
liberalization is part of the solution”. However, it is unlikely that the “controlled
globalisation” spirit pervading the OECD countries will lend its hand for this course
for the US. At the same time, the EU may in fact step into the space left by the US in
the Pacific Region and perhaps even in Latin America if the US relinquishes
NAFTA.
Not only can more trade perhaps offset the lowering of economic growth due to
the demographic transition. There are also opportunities in public investments, for
example in energy conservation or public infrastructure (OECD 2015) or in “per-
manent” education (as van Imhoff 1982, argues). Yet, in a balanced budget model
they can easily lead to less disposable income per person.
The bottom line is that there is not a certainty of lower levels of economic
growth. There are still many options to be explored. However, a prudent strategy
takes lower levels of growth as the point of departure.
Lower growth is anyway expected to be accompanied by a lower increase in
purchasing power as the price of energy will need to increase in order to meet the
climate goals of the Paris Agreement, signed in April 2016 by practically all major
nations. These goals are self-protecting against a worldwide increase in temperature
due to the CO2 emissions of the use of fossil fuel. Fossil fuel is a cheap source of
energy if one neglects the external effects on the world climate. If these external
effects were included, however, the price would far exceed that of renewable
energy (Stern 2006).
In summary: there is a substantial probability that the highly needed reforms to
recreate a vibrant European society will have to take place while the traditional
lubricating oil for reform of economic growth and more disposable income per
capita is much less than we were accustomed to in the past (pre-crisis) decades.
12 J. Ritzen

3 Europe of the (Border) Regions

The EU is an agreement between nations, between countries. At the same time the
EU’s border regions with some 25% of inhabitants (i.e. living within 25 km of a
border) stood most to gain from open borders within the EU and from convergence
in legislation in the EU. The main proponents of European cooperation, the
architects of the EU’s previous incarnations, came from border regions. This is
no coincidence. Border regions have suffered tremendously from 1960 to the
present day thanks to legislative developments in nation states. Every new law in
a country was a new brick on top of the virtual wall of the border, making cross-
border work or life more difficult. Physical border lines have disappeared in the
EU. Yet they are highly visible as there is little economic activity some five km
before and after the border. The differences in the legislation between countries in
taxation, in labour regulations, in welfare have reduced cross-border work. The EU
has instituted the Interreg Programmes8 for cooperation between adjoining border
regions. This has been helpful, but cannot counterbalance the negative effects of
differences in legislation.
Guerot (2016) calls for a rethink of Europe from the regional perspective. “The
national states pervert the European idea and play against each other”. More room
for regions, in particular the border regions, would help to make the second chance
for Europe a success.

4 A Vibrant Europe Is Possible

The Vibrant Europe Declaration was signed by 25 European leaders9 from politics
(including Frans Timmermans, in 2017 Vice President of the European Commis-
sion), the business community and academia (among them the renowned Harvard
economist and President of the College de France: Philippe Aghion). The declara-
tion expresses both the prospects of joint action, but also a requirement: if European
countries want to stand strong on the international platform, they have to work
together to contribute to the welfare of their citizens. It reads as follows:

What we should aim for is a vibrant Europe for all Europe’s citizens, which helps deliver
safer, stronger communities, nurture every individual talent and holds out a realistic hope of
betterment for themselves and their children. We want a Europe that aims for higher and
sustainable growth, with outcomes that promote full employment and reduced wage
inequality. Crucial to achieve this are trade agreements in which sustainability is rewarded,
a migration policy which is a win-win for both the receiving country and the migrant and a
decisive pooling of responsibility, which Europe’s nations must accept, for their external
relations with the rest of the world. The European Union should provide a vibrant frame-
work for the development of our economies and societies. To do this the EU must work
closely with regional and national governments, in the spirit of mutual reinforcement,

8
See for example: ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/EN/policy/.../interreg25years
9
http://vef.merit.unu.edu/docs/vef_declaration.pdf
European Citizens at Risk 13

where trust is restored as the leading organizing principle, accountabilities are clear and
transparent and executive decision-making is devolved to the maximum possible extent.
Vibrant must be the catchword for this new dynamic Europe, where creativity and entre-
preneurship can blossom, new products and services originate and it is good to live because
a strong sense of community offers fellowship and security. Europe has been a tremendous
asset for its citizens. In the post WW II decades, European integration facilitated unprece-
dented economic growth and strong convergence between poorer and richer member states.
But for the past decade and more, Europe has found it difficult to cope with the realities of a
fast changing world where the new emerging economies of other continents have substan-
tially reduced worldwide income inequality but at the same time added to Europeans’ sense
of insecurity. At the same time the relative power of even the largest EU member states has
dramatically diminished. In the old world of the G7, more than half the members were EU
member states. Today, in the G20, which has now become the major forum for world
economic debates, only one fifth of the members are European. With Europe only
amounting to some 8% of the world population, individual European countries will have
less and less leverage on the world stage. Europe as a whole faces the choice of either
hanging together to remain influential and relevant, or succumbing one by one to the whims
and demands of other world powers. A Europe that successfully hangs together could mean
so much more in the hearts and minds of its citizens. It could navigate a careful course
between the strong desire for both individual freedom and community belonging, within a
European tradition of openness, which is part of Europe’s best traditions. To believe in a
vibrant EU that is more influential in shaping globalisation to our citizens’ benefit does not
mean that decision-making and responsibility needs to be pushed upwards to the anonymity
of some higher level of governance: communities can and should be strengthened. With the
aim of contributing to convergence within and between EU member states in living
conditions, they should be financially empowered by higher levels of governance to take
control of their future. Each community should take responsibility for its own “social
contract”: its own particular balance between rights and responsibilities within the welfare
state, as well as taking decisions on where public intervention is needed, or private
endeavour should be relied upon, on issues such as housing and schooling. The financial
resources for sustaining this social contract will be derived from enhanced sustainable
growth across the whole EU, achieved by the encouragement of creativity and entre-
preneurship in an overall setting of full employment, yet leaning strongly against increased
“wage inequality”. The vision brings six different strands of thinking, each of which present
their own dilemmas and choices:

– A vibrant, dynamic Europe, which appeals as a place to thrive for intelligent, creative
minds and hands.
– A Europe, which offers hope of improvement and the prospect of real social mobility for
all citizens, while being mindful of the inherent dangers implied in the present trend
towards greater inequality in income and wealth.
– A Europe, which acts as a responsible steward to future generations and follows a
no-regret course in tackling climate change and preserving the natural environment.
– An open Europe for all those who want to contribute to the common European cause in a
genuine spirit of tolerance, social trust and community cohesion, at all times respecting
individual freedom of choice as a fundamental European value.
– A secure Europe, which continues to live in peace by furthering its internal economic
and social cohesion and by intense cooperation with neighboring countries on its
borders in a meaningful partnership of respect, recognition and compromise.
– A European Union whose institutions regain the trust and respect of the ordinary
European citizen. So that Europe is more than the sum of the EU member states. We
realize that most of us come from countries in one specific part of Europe and look
forward to a discussion with colleagues from other parts of Europe with the openness to
come to a joint position which also encompasses their views.
14 J. Ritzen

5 The Five Presidents Are Stuck

There is broad recognition at all levels that the EU faces serious, even existential
challenges. This is not only about the EU as an institution but the cooperation it
brings for the citizens. How can it get unstuck? The EU leadership is like a deer
peering into the bright lights of an approaching car. In public appearances they
show full awareness of the predicament but blame the nations and their leadership.
There are few, if any initiatives from official parties to address the challenges
ahead.
Back in 2015, the leadership of the EU (the Five Presidents, namely of the
Council, Commission, Parliament, Eurogroup and Central Bank) published a strat-
egy to address the challenges (EC 2015). This strategy deals with the principal steps
to be taken for “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”. This
happened at a time when the cracks in the EU architecture were already visible.
The EU High Command seeks to achieve a “fair” Economic and Monetary Union
for Convergence, Prosperity and Social Cohesion by means of a “Financial Union”
and a “Fiscal Union” “with an Integrated Framework for Sound and Integrated
Fiscal Policies”, while strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and
institutions. The Five Presidents’ Report reads like a pre-Maastricht Treaty story
in the spirit of an ever-enlarging, ever-deepening EU—and is completely oblivious
to the turbulence both inside and outside the EU.
The strategy of the five presidents barely acknowledges the growing unrest in the
populations of the member states, most notably on national policies and the role of
the EU as an added-value umbrella. To illustrate: the report assumes that competi-
tiveness between EU member states will “soon” converge, so that new steps can be
taken for deepening cooperation. The report pays no attention to the inherent
dissidence of Hungary and Poland to essential EU values, such as upholding
press freedom and having an independent judiciary. These are countries that receive
substantial transfers from the EU (some €70 billion for Poland and €20 billion for
Hungary during the 5-year budget period of 2013–2018. Are such contributions
from richer EU countries to dissident countries really sustainable? The report is also
oblivious to the questions of migration and integration in EU countries. Of course,
the report could not anticipate Brexit, but might have paid attention to the what-if
question (also to illustrate to the Brits what their vote implied).
There is no word in the Five Presidents’ Report about a couple of “running
sores”: first, the European Parliament circus travelling from Strasbourg to Brussels
and back every month; then, the Babylon of 24 official languages requiring almost
50% of the EU civil service for translation.
Perhaps the Five Presidents are not to blame for this deficit in thinking about the
challenges and how to meet them. The Five Presidents are the hostages of the
Council, the Heads of State of individual countries. They constrain the debate,
demanding a narrow focus on “today’s issues” and on practical solutions of
problems as they emerge (the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, IS/Daesh, cyber
security, etc.). Any communique given at the end of a Council Meeting in recent
years betrays the short-term thinking of most council members. Take for example
European Citizens at Risk 15

the Bratislava Summit of 27 member states in September 2016, which had been
devoted to diagnose together the present state of the European Union and discuss
the common future, after Brexit. There is not a single concrete policy or strategy to
be found on how to deal with the major challenges. The Council simply agreed to
the principle of . . . “business as usual”(European Council 2016).
Yet, perhaps the preceding does injustice to the Work Programme of the
European Commission (October 2016). Here’s another perspective: “The White
Paper on the Future of Europe (non-legislative; Q1/2017) setting out steps on how
to reform an EU of 27 Member States 60 years after the Treaties of Rome will also
include the future of the EMU to prepare stage 2 of EMU deepening in the new
political and democratic (including a stability oriented review of the Stability and
Growth Pact and the follow up to Article 16 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the EMU, incorporating the substance of this treaty into the EU
legal framework). The initiative will also include a review of the European System
of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of
oversight at both macro- and micro-prudential levels.”
This work programme does recognise the need for reform, as indeed, business as
usual is not a realistic option (as we discuss later). The subtitle of the work
programme is aptly: “No time for business as usual”. This book is meant to
illustrate the manifold challenges for business as usual, while offering solutions
to the challenges. We believe that the challenges are real. They are serious and of
such a magnitude that it is unlikely that the EU and Euro, in their current forms, will
still exist some 10–15 years from now. Of course, one can differ on the solutions we
offer. But the book then urges the reader to suggest alternatives—to prevent a
chaotic falling apart and to ensure that the aims of European cooperation for the
welfare of its citizens are still served.

6 Challenge and Response: A Guide Through the Book

What do we want with Europe? What arrangements between our European states
and us, you and me, the citizens, would make us feel better off, now and in the
future? This is the tough question that we try to answer in this book. It is a tough
question at the best of times, but even more so at the present moment of uncertainty
and vulnerability for the European project. Uncertainty on the future of the EU has
been mounting in the past decade. The financial and economic crisis has thoroughly
shaken the belief of many that they are better off in a European setting than in a
purely national one. The vulnerability lies in the dissent with the EU and its
institutions shared by political parties of both the (far-)left and (far-)right often
embracing each other in their antagonism towards Europe. In many EU countries
the political parties who are against EU membership have reached a support of
around 30% of the voters.
Brexit has shaken the belief of many in a “deepening” of the EU: of more
transfer of sovereignty. Pro-Europeans have always pleaded for more say on the
European level about major economic, social and security policies. This was seen as
16 J. Ritzen

a natural course of events, as inevitable. Brexit refuted that notion, in line with
earlier no’s in EU countries on referendums supporting this direction. Brexit was a
decisive moment in the history of the EU requiring a thorough reflection on the
alternatives before us. The call for a deeper and bigger Europe is now far from self-
evident. The EU may see a future of less in some respects and smaller in others,
while at the same time deepening in those areas that require a European approach.
The changing face of the population of European countries due to immigration is
splitting the population into staunch pro- and anti-immigration supporters with
hardly a compromise in view. The refugee crisis of 2014 and 2015 has led to
clashes in some European countries and to a stark “no to refugees” in others. IS/
Daesh-inspired or -led terrorism—especially when carried out by European youth
with a migrant background—has shaken Europeans to the core. These brutal attacks
on European security and lifestyle have led European leaders to war rhetoric. This is
not helpful when shaping a discourse on immigrant integration in the EU.
“Safer and better off” would be a more inspiring tagline than “ever closer
union”—at least from the perspective of, the citizens of European countries, if we
are expected to cooperate in this structure called “Europe”. Cooperation means give
and take. It means that decisions affecting our daily lives could be made far away
from us. If we feel that the costs of faraway decisions are too high compared to what
we expect to gain from them, then we better stick with what we have. Often the
costs are now and the benefits tomorrow. The structure called “Europe” needs to
build and maintain trust—trust that it will deliver benefits in the not-too-distant
future when you and I pay a price right now. Yet, trust comes on foot and gallops
away by horse. The economic and refugee crises have gravely shaken the trust in
the EU among many citizens. Regaining that trust will require a long-term effort.
You and I both know that we, the citizens of EU member states, are all different
in terms of age, upbringing, outlook on life and positions in society. The coopera-
tion we want to engage in should make us better off. It cannot be that everyone is
always better off in exactly the same degree at any given time, but cooperation
requires that costs and benefits are fairly born.
Trust and fairness are the two pillars of cooperation—and both rely on the
maximum participation of citizens in the decision-making process. This process
also allows for the rejection of further European cooperation, as has repeatedly
happened in referendums, where citizens do not trust that they will be better off or
outright reject the infringement on national identity. By restoring trust and fairness
there is a chance that voters can be won back towards a future of hope and
expectation away from the populist parties, which cling to a past that never existed.
The structure we call “Europe” is the EU in its present composition of 28 member
states (and of course, after Brexit, of 27 member states). There are many challenges
now coming from various directions. The first and most daunting challenge is to
win back the capacity to act, to increase the room for manoeuvre in the highly
complex EU of the 28 member states, with popular support expressed in elections
and referendums. The EU’s poor response to the economic crisis, to the refugee
crisis and to Daesh terrorism was not because of too much, but rather too little
Europe. There was no single authority that could act fast. Decisions had to be
European Citizens at Risk 17

reached by the EU Council with 28 members, each looking after their own short-run
benefit. They took too long to be effective and were inadequate because they
represented the lowest common denominator.
This books hopes to contribute to a vibrant Europe by analysing the challenges
and proposing solutions. Chapter “Halting Support for the EU” delves into the
causes of the halting support for the EU, often named “Euroscepticism”. It is
written by Klaus F. Zimmermann together with the main author. It is based on
earlier publications on this topic. The future of an EU that can provide for long-run
peace and prosperity is in danger due to the waning support for the EU, as expressed
in surveys, polls, voting in elections or in referendums. If this trend persists, the
stark reality is that the EU is unlikely to survive the next 10–15 years in its present
form. Euroscepticism appears to have increased substantially in the period
2006–2011 covering in part the economic crisis. Those are EU citizens who believe
that the EU was not good for them or for their country. Some may be considered
“losers of globalisation”. These people have found themselves in a position with
less certainty about the future of themselves or their children and are disappointed
in their expectations about the life they thought they would lead. A statistical
analysis of Euroscepticism data highlights the importance of uncertainty on one’s
future as a potential source of resistance to the EU.
After 2011, Euroscepticism measured in this way (“the EU is not good for my
country”) remained fairly stable. Yet Euroscepticism has become visible in increas-
ing support for anti-EU parties and in referendums on Europe; most notably with
Brexit. We argue that there is a need to realign the direct democracy of referendums
with the indirect one of parliamentary representation for the EU to serve its purpose
as an “instrument” of peace, security and welfare.
The bottom line is that Euroscepticism acts as a major centrifugal force.
Euroscepticism is likely to increase in the years ahead and, without further action,
may give rise to more exits.
Reducing Euroscepticism can only be achieved if the citizens of EU member
states feel that European cooperation brings a positive outlook on the future—for
themselves and their children and grandchildren. This requires a fair sharing of the
burdens and benefits, costs and rewards of globalisation; a fair chance of gaining
employment and a good education for children; fair access to healthcare and social
benefits, as well as an increased feeling of security. Traditionally measures of
income distribution, like the Gini coefficient or the percentage of income earned
by the top 10% income earners have been used to gauge fairness. However, it
appears that these measurements may not be the right way to assess “fairness” as
felt by substantial segments of the population, as we see in chapter “Halting Support
for the EU”.
It is likely that majority support for more (but a different) Europe is still feasible
when addressing some of the sources of discontent. At the same time we believe that
all analyses show that the future EU will continue to be one with substantial
Euroscepticism and outright anti-Europeanism, even of all potential sources of
discontent are addressed.
18 J. Ritzen

The resolution we propose between pro- and anti-European attitudes is that of a

socio-economic model that may provide for more optimism among European
citizens. In such a model a more substantial part of society than at present should
be able to see the benefits to our societies of Europeanisation, as a benevolent
branch of globalisation.
Chapter “A Vibrant European Model” addresses the way such a socio-economic
model of the EU can deal with economic growth and fairness (written together with
Klaus F. Zimmermann). It presents a possible scenario (a “vibrant EU”) for an EU
that may bring more certainty and some hope to large groups in the population
(in particular in the south of Europe, but also to some extent in the north) by
combining economic growth with more innovation, more sustainability and less
income inequality. This is an attempt to regain support for the EU of a more
substantial part of the population (where “the EU” stands for a continued
European cooperation, but also more trust in national governments).
Fixing the Eurozone’s financial framework, as well as the banking sector
(as discussed in chapter “A Sustainable Eurozone with Exit Options”), is critical
in order to reach a level of economic activity that can reduce European unemploy-
ment to an acceptable level by 2030. But it is not enough. The growth prospects of
the EU as a whole still leave the unemployment rate at some 6.5% by 2030, with
substantially higher youth unemployment, even if one believes that labour produc-
tivity will continue to rise at pre-crisis levels. The latter is debatable, as many
economists believe that we are in a period of secular stagnation, implying that
desire and drive to invest is waning (see before: Sect. 2). Meanwhile, by 2030,
youth unemployment would still be above 20% in some of the EU member states in
the periphery.
The “muddling through” scenario (continuing as we did in the recent past) would
mean that wage-, income- and capital- (wealth) inequality continue to increase
(as in the past decades) and that there would be little or no room for more vigorous
greening efforts as promised in the Paris Agreement. “Muddling through” puts
Europe behind other nations in terms of world relevance, making it more difficult to
participate in and influence others during global negotiations on human rights,
peace, environmental issues and trade.
The “muddling through” scenario is cast in terms of innovation, employment
protection legislation (EPL), taxation, social security and greening in the period
2014–2030. In contrast, a “vibrant” scenario contains major reforms for the driving
factors of innovation (including higher education and public research), combined
with substantial changes in employment protection legislation and taxation/social
security, as well as in CO2 worldwide emission regulation. In this way, the vibrant
scenario creates a solid foundation for full employment, less income and wealth
inequality, more growth and higher sustainability.
Vibrancy in the EU is hard to imagine without adjustments in the welfare state’s
organisation. In particular, employment protection legislation in most EU countries
needs to be reconsidered. Temporary jobs have been a saviour of employment, but
they do not provide enough opportunities for training. EU countries should allow
for more training possibilities for temporary contracts and at the same time
European Citizens at Risk 19

stimulate mobility for permanent contracts. In the trade-off with competitiveness,

Europe should not lower social standards or work quality, but instead aim to
generate a full employment perspective with increased labour mobility. It is
important to focus on the reduction of income and wealth inequality within EU
countries as part of the vibrant scenario.
The European socio-economic model, that we propose, has at its core—perhaps
paradoxically—an increased pace of economic innovation. Innovation is the source
of continued prosperity. However, innovation is also associated with “creative
destruction” and job-losses. Hence we propose to imbed a heightened level of
innovation within measures to ensure full employment, worker participation in
firm decision-making and levelling off the offensive pay inequalities in the upper
part of the private sector of non-entrepreneurial incomes earned. In such a way the
conflict between innovation and increased hope for a better future for all can
possibly be resolved.
A second element of the European socio-economic model is that the cooperation
between EU countries is a means to reach sustainability in the use of natural
resources and in CO2 emissions that threaten the climate. More efforts for
sustainability should be coordinated in an international context, as the Paris Agree-
ment has provided. Imports of goods and services of countries that do not follow
“Paris” should be subjected to import taxes in order to create a level playing field.
The innovation efforts should be in part directed at ecological sustainability.
Coordination and cooperation on the scale of Europe is essential to increase
sustainability. At the same time it is necessary to safeguard our competitive
position. This could be achieved by ensuring at the World Trade Organization
that imported products should exhibit the same standards for sustainability as goods
and services produced in the EU (or that the difference is translated into an import
sustainability levy, which makes up the difference in costs of sustainable produc-
tion in the EU with those outside the EU).
Chapter “In Europe We Trust” turns from the socio-economic model for the EU
in chapter “A Vibrant European Model” to the “governance model”. The promise of
“Europe” shaped in the form of the EU was: welfare and happiness will increase as
a result of “being part” of the EU. Increased economic cooperation would go hand-
in-hand with improved “governance” (for example, better “rule of law”, more
control of corruption).
However, one can observe that progress in the quality of governance in the EU
Member States in the past decades has been uneven. Some old members, like Italy
and Greece, slid down on the control of corruption and some new members, like
Hungary and Poland, slid back on the rule of law scale. Meanwhile progress in other
countries was halting.
We consider this to be a serious threat to EU cohesion. Citizens in wealthier
countries may question the sizeable transfer of euros to countries that do not meet
the agreed principles on rule of law and press freedom. The EU provided carrots to
ensure progress in terms of the rule of law and other means of improving gover-
nance. This progress would translate into the investment climate as well as in
happiness in the EU countries.
20 J. Ritzen

The present institutional structure of the EU has failed to bring about an upward
spiral in governance throughout the EU member states. We propose changes in this
structure that may contribute to bending potential downward developments and
explore the possibilities of new instruments to engender faster convergence in
governance within the EU, like a strengthening of the European Court of Human
Rights, tracking funds at national level, creating an EU Prosecutor’s Office and the
possibility of class actions if a case is lost at the European Court.
Essential to this approach is that some sovereignty be relinquished both in the
richer as well as in the poorer countries to achieve this. We realise that the present
political climate is not inclined to give more power to the EU. However, you really
cannot have you cake and eat it: improved governance cannot be achieved without
extended EU powers (beyond the “nuclear” Article 7 procedure, as a “stick”).
Without improved governance, the EU is bound to have less chance for economic
convergence.
Chapter “EU Mobility”, written together with Martin Kahanec, focuses on
demography and mobility in the EU. Demographics differ substantially between
EU countries. Yet, the impact of the demographic transition is likely to be much
less harmful to the welfare system than expected for the EU as a whole; this is due
to behavioural effects such as greater labour supply with higher wages due to
increased worker shortages.
EU mobility is a cornerstone of the economic union (the free movement of
goods, services and people, without borders or thresholds). The free movement of
people and of workers within the EU has overwhelmingly benefited the citizens of
the EU member states both in the countries of work and in the countries of origin.
Earlier apprehensions on crowding out of less-educated workers in the countries of
destination and on welfare migration turned out by and large to be refuted. At the
same time EU policies still need completion, to deal with special cases of crowding
out in subsectors and to deal with fraud. Integration of mobile EU workers is
difficult because of linguistic and cultural barriers. This should also be a concern
for EU policy. EU countries should be guided by the EU to cut red tape and
synchronise administration. Welfare migration would be counteracted by making
welfare only available after a certain fixed period (half a year, for example).
The integration of EU mobile citizens is clearly a concern in areas with high
concentrations of migrants (mostly big cities). A sustainable EU policy on intra-EU
mobility would pay more attention to integration in destination countries, with the
carrot of extra funding for migrants to take part in practical language lessons,
incentivised by requirements to do so (in the form of work permits).
EU demographics should lead EU member countries to jointly devise an immi-
gration policy based on labour market needs, in particular the need for more well-
trained workers from outside the EU, as is argued by Martin Kahanec and the editor
in chapter “A Sustainable Immigration Policy for the EU”. A sustainable EU
immigration policy aims at contributing to a vibrant European society, through
selective immigration from outside the EU, through more attention for integration
of immigrants and rooting out discrimination, through asylum policy from centres
close to areas of conflict and through additional attention for education and training
in areas where many refugees have settled. We make a difference between the
European Citizens at Risk 21

largest source of immigration (“regular”) and asylum (which is often—by the

public at large—considered the main source, but has in practice been much smaller
than regular immigration).
Immigration from outside the EU is contested, mostly because of sluggish
integration of some of the largest groups of immigrants and considerable tensions
in values between some parts of the immigrant population and the native popula-
tion. Values are measured in terms of adherence to the basic constitutions of the EU
countries, which all recognise equal rights of all citizens. Many people with an
immigration background state that they follow the values of their religion even if
this contrasts with those of the constitution. These contrasts have pervaded from
first but also to second and next generations.
We propose a win-win policy for immigration, which may be a small bridge
between those who are in favour and those who are against immigration. Policy is
then more selective immigration, based on the employability potential of the
immigrant, combined with a greater focus on integration and strict measures to
fight discrimination.
On economic grounds there is little defence for the immigration of unskilled or
low-skilled people. The labour market in the EU post-robotisation era demands
high skilled, entrepreneurial, world-wise people who can easily communicate in
some of the major European languages. The majority of the unskilled or lower
skilled immigrants are likely to end up in strong competition with local lower
trained labour, pitting them against the most disadvantaged groups, even though
their incomes may be much higher than in the country of origin. Many migrants to
the EU feel cheated in their expectations, as they clearly express in terms of (un)
happiness.
In many EU member states the demographic transition—negative or zero popu-
lation growth, the ageing of society—is often cited as an economic reason for
opening up to (young) migrants, even if they are low skilled and do not speak the
language. However, this economic reasoning is clearly not convincing. There may
be humanitarian reasons for allowing immigration of low skilled workers who do
not speak the language, but then the question arises whether there alternatives to
immigration as a support for the humanitarian concern.
The focus on well-trained immigrant youngsters from outside the EU builds on
the Blue Card scheme introduced in 2009. This was meant to allow skilled third-
country workers to work in any participating EU country. The scheme has so far
proved quite unsuccessful, as too many more attractive alternatives existed for
entering the EU. We propose to support this line by generous admission of
youngsters for study in the EU, which has been a clear win-win for both receiving
countries and countries of origin.
Raising the requirements for immigration also puts—in our approach—respon-
sibility on EU countries to contribute to education in countries of origin, especially
for those who seek to join someone in an EU country. University-to-university
collaboration between EU universities and those in countries of origin should be
enhanced. This serves a multitude of purposes, among them the education of
youngsters to be welcomed in EU countries as migrants. This could be a benefit
22 J. Ritzen

both to the sending as to the receiving country (in view of potential “circular”
migration).
We also acknowledge the need for a robust policy framework that will be able to
cope with asylum and abrupt large-scale waves of refugees wanting to enter the EU,
resulting from conflicts, natural catastrophes, or other violent events. We propose
screening schemes for regional refugee camps to determine migrants’ status,
channelling them either as economic immigrants—selected on their employabil-
ity—or through a humanitarian scheme, complying with the EU’s multilateral and
bilateral commitments. Such a humanitarian scheme must—in our view—be
embedded in education-cooperation policies, to provide better opportunities to
qualify for admission and greater support for refugees.
A sustainable policy for refugees and asylum would also include a more active
involvement of the EU in camps across the borders of conflict areas. Refugees and
asylum seekers are only selected from the camps outside the EU. The EU ensures
not only the set-up of application centres, but also education institutions helping
refugees and asylum seekers to qualify for admission.
In any case, the EU has to come to an agreement on immigration from outside
the EU through regular means. Someone who has been accepted in one country can
freely move to another country. Asylum is definitely an EU issue to prevent asylum
shopping, but also to assure the border countries of the EU that the costs of asylum
are shouldered by all EU member states.
Chapter “A Sustainable Eurozone with Exit Options” is concerned with the
Euro. The Euro helped to provide relatively high economic growth in the
pre-crisis period 2000–2008. Unemployment was reduced to unprecedentedly low
levels. But the Euro also contributed to the depth of the crisis, as high growth was
accompanied by substantial divergence in competitiveness between the north and
south of Europe. During the crisis the debt of many southern countries increased to
the levels that are difficult to service with interest payments under normal
circumstances. This “debt overhang” also drags economic growth down.
It is now no longer self-evident that the common currency, the Euro, is here to
stay with the present member countries. There is widespread agreement among the
specialists that saving the Euro would require substantial changes, in particular to
deal with the excessive public debt of a number of Euro countries. This requires a
considerable contribution from the Euro countries that have emerged strongly from
the economic and financial crisis. We propose to recreate convergence in economic
growth between Southern and Northern countries with an “Euro New Deal” that
involves a substantial reduction of the debt of Southern countries, in exchange for
an automatic exit from the Eurozone in case of non-compliance with earlier agreed
terms. The exit option from the Euro-zone should be clarified, both for a voluntary
as for a forced exit. What does it entail in terms of the public debt held in the
country which exits (in terms of Euro’s)?
The current EU treaty is not fit for purpose to achieve such major reforms. The
road map of the Five EU Presidents presented in 2015 is far from sufficient to
reduce the risks of the Euro-zone falling apart by Brexit-type developments (which
might also imply voluntary exits from the Euro-zone) or by new banking crises
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Tarvittiin harvinaista rohkeutta vapaaehtoisesti lyöttäytyä
mustatukkaisen miehen seuraan tällä hetkellä. Useimmat naiset
olisivat viivytelleet ja keksineet jonkin syyn jättääkseen vaikean
hetken toiseen tilaisuuteen. Mutta Josephine teki päätöksensä
silmänräpäyksessä. Huulet varmasti yhteenpuristuneina, silmät
loistaen päättäväisyyttä ja leuka kulmikkaana, joka saattoi tehdä niin
peloittavan vaikutuksen, ilmestyi hän oveen suoraryhtisenä ja
uhmaavana.

Brannon näki hänet ensin, sillä Betty katsoi muualle. Josephine oli
odottanut, että hän olisi huudahtanut voimakkaasti tai ainakin
näyttänyt joitakin merkkejä hämmästyksestä tai levottomuudesta.

Mutta mitään sellaista ei näkynyt. Ulkonaisesti ei Brannonissa

voinut huomata mitään mielenliikutusta. Ei ainoakaan lihas
värähtänyt eikä väri hänen kasvoillaan vähintäkään vaihtunut. Ja
hänen silmissään, jotka jo ensi tapaamisessa olivat olleet niin lujat,
oli nyt niin syvä katse, ettei Josephine ensinkään pystynyt sitä
käsittämään.

Yhdestä seikasta pääsi hän kuitenkin heti selville, katsoessaan

Brannonia, nimittäin siitä, ettei tämä aikonut tuntea häntä tai ettei
hän ainakaan ilmaisisi tuttavuuttaan Bettylle.

Betty, joka tunsi Brannonin paremmin kuin tämä aavistikaan, oli

huomannut muutoksen hänen olennossaan. Hän oli koko ajan
pitänyt häntä silmällä ja hän oli heti käsittänyt sen, mikä
Josephinestä näytti niin arvoitukselliselta. Hän tiesi että jokin huvitti
Brannonia.

Hän kääntyi ja näki Josephinen, huomasi hänen kalpeutensa ja

leukansa kulmikkuuden. Hän huomasi myös sotaisan ilmeen
Josephinen silmissä.

Mutta hän salasi huomionsa hymyyn ja kumarrukseen.

"Jo", sanoi hän, "tahdon esittää sinut Mr Neal Brannonille, meidän

karjatalomme esimiehelle."

"Minä tapasin Mr Brannonin muutama päivä sitten", sanoi

Josephine varmalla äänellä. "Ja ellen erehdy, kertoi hän juuri siitä
sinulle. Estin hirttämisaikeen, joka ei olisi ollut lainmukainen,
ainakaan minun mielipiteeni mukaan."

"Jo! Ethän tarkoittane — — —."

"Aivan varmasti", keskeytti Josephine hänet töykeästi. "Minä olen

se tyttö, joka puolustaa erästä aatetta — nimittäin aatetta ottaa sen
mitä kukin haluaa." Hän katsoi suoraan Brannonia silmiin.

"Siunatkoon" huudahti Betty, "mitä ihmettä, en osannut

ajatellakaan —
—" Hän vaikeni ja katsoi vuoroon Brannoniin ja vuoroon
Josephineen.

Brannonin silmissä näki hän huumorin välähtävän, kun taas

Josephinen silmissä näkyi raivon selvät merkit. Silmänräpäyksessä
asettui hän vieraansa puolelle.

"Brannon", sanoi hän vakavana, "ole hyvä ja toimita asia, josta

äsken oli kysymys!"

Brannon kumarsi, hyppäsi takaisin satulaan ja ratsasti pois. Hän

oli jo karja-aitauksen luona kun Betty kääntyi ystävänsä puoleen.
 "Kerro minulle siitä, Jo", kehoitteli hän ystävällisesti.

"Niin", sanoi hän sitten, kun Josephine oli kertonut tarinansa, "sen
täytyi tietenkin tuntua sinusta julmalta ja raakamaiselta, enkä
ymmärrä muuta kuin että olit vallan oikeassa ryhtyessäsi estämään
sitä. Luultavasti olisin tehnyt samalla tavalla, jos olisin sattunut
olemaan paikalla. Mutta Brannon sanoi sinulle totuuden. Laki lakina
on näillä seuduilla vain pilaa. Laista ei täällä kannata puhuakaan.
Sitä laiminlyödään aina kun se vain ei ole vahingoksi. Mies, joka
varastaa hevosen, tietää varsin hyvin, mikä kohtalo häntä odottaa,
jos hän joutuu kiinni. Hän kärsii tavan vakiinnuttaman rangaistuksen.
Se ei ole murha tavallisessa merkityksessä, koska sen täkäläinen
lakikirja sallii. Brannon ei katsonut asiaa samoilla silmillä kuin sinä,
vaikkakin hän epäilemättä aavisti mitä tunteita se sinussa herätti. Ja
mahdollisesti hän lisäksi ärsytti sinua nauramalla sinulle
hiljaisuudessa, kuten hänen tapansa on. Brannon on todellinen mies,
Jo."

Hän tuuppasi Josephineä vakuuttavasti kylkeen ja taputti häntä

sitten punoittavalle poskelle.

"Älä rohkenekaan olla pahoillasi siitä", varoitti hän. "Olen iloinen,

että asia sai sellaisen käänteen. En ollut käskenyt Brannonia
hirttämään Artwellia, vaikkakin tiesin, että Brannon varmasti aikoi
saada hänet käsiinsä. Ja jos ensinkään tunsin mitään
mielenliikutusta Artwellin kohtaloon nähden, niin oli se tylsää
alistumista niihin tapoihin, joilla tällä seudulla sellaiset asiat
suoritetaan. Mutta minä olen oikein iloinen. Jo, todellakin iloinen
siitä, että pelastit Artwellin. Pääasia on, että hän on paikkakunnalta
hävinnyt, sillä sitä me toivoimme. En usko, että hän enää on
vaivaava meitä. Lyön vaikka vetoa, että Brannon on samaa mieltä.
Istu nyt kiikkutuoliin, kunnes olen hakenut hevoset tänne. Emme
anna sellaisten pikkuasioitten turmella ratsastusretkeämme."

Myöhemmin, istuessaan Chesterfieldin vakavassa, luotettavassa

satulassa, Bettyn saattamana, joka taas ratsasti virmalla raudikolla,
tunsi Josephine olevansa suuresti hämmästynyt ystävänsä
hellävaraisesta Brannonin arvostelusta.

Bettyn mielipiteet tuntuivat hänestä sangen venyviltä, varsinkin

siinä, että hän saattoi arvostella suosiollisesti Satan Lattimeria aivan
samoilla perusteilla kuin Brannoniakin.

Molemmat, oli hän sanonut, olivat todellisia miehiä. Ja samassa

hengen vedossa oli hän maalannut kuvan, joka oli mitä elävin
vastalause sanomalleen, varsinkin mitä Lattimeriin tuli.

"Raakalainen" oli yksi niistä maininnoista, jotka hän oli

kankaalleen kiinnittänyt kuvatessaan hänen luonnettaan. "Hän on
paholainen", oli hän lisännyt siihen. Ja sitten seurasi "Hän on kaunis,
pelottavan, synkän kaunis… häikäilemätön, hymyilevä piru… olisi
voinut olla merirosvo."

Ja sitten "Hän on mies, Jo, joka tuuma hänessä on miestä … hän

pystyy hallitsemaan. He ovat kaikki todellisia miehiä" (täten oli hän
vetänyt Whitmanin ja Brannonin samaan joukkoon), "komeita miehiä,
voimaa ja tarmoa uhkuvia, tulta ja terästä. Minä pidän heistä,
Lattimeristäkin, vaikka hän ei epäröisi ryöstää ja viedä naista
vuoristoon."

Josephine ei oikein tiennyt ymmärsikö hän lopultakaan Bettyä

ensinkään. Täytyikö hänen otaksua, että Bettyn ihanteet olivat täysin
ristiriidassa koko sivistyneen maailman omaksumien ihanteitten
kanssa, ihanteitten, jotka aika oli osoittanut kestäviksi ja jotka johtivat
koko inhimillisen elämän kulkua. Vai pitikö hänen uskoa, että Betty,
huolimatta luettelemistaan Lattimerin vähemmän ihailtavista
luonteen puolista, oli havainnut hänessä ominaisuuksia, jotka
oikeuttivat hänet vaatimaan itselleen "todellisen miehen" nimen.

Entä Brannon sitten? Bettyn mukaan oli hänkin "todellinen mies."

Oliko hän samanlainen kuin Lattimer? Ja oliko Betty jättänyt
mainitsematta hänen miellyttäviä tapojaan vain sen vuoksi, että hän
oli hänen isänsä karjatalon esimies?

Vai oliko ehkä Brannon toisenlainen? Josephine ei sitä uskonut.

Hän oli vakuutettu siitä, että Brannonin pelottavan tyynen, teräksen
kaltaisen ulkokuoren alla piilotteli monenlaisia hurjia ja paheellisia
mielitekoja, jotka vain odottivat aikaansa päästäkseen puhkeamaan
ilmi.

Senkö vuoksi Josephine oli niin utelias noihin miehiin nähden,

senkövuoksi hänen mielensä tällä hetkellä valtasi halu jäädä Bettyn
karjataloon, nähdäkseen kuinka Brannon paljastaisi itsensä ja
näyttäytyisi siksi villi-ihmiseksi, jollaiseksi hän tiesi hänet?

"Betty", sanoi hän hetken kuluttua, tämän vaiettua ja kun hevoset

astuivat käyden korkeassa sacaton ruohossa laajan alanteen
pohjassa, "kuinka vanha Brannon on?"

"Kaksikymmentä seitsemän vuotta", vastasi Betty. Pitkien

silmäripsiensä alta katsoi hän Josephineen ja hänen huulensa
puristuivat omituisesti, aivan kuin hän olisi koettanut tukahuttaa
jotakin levotonta ajatusta.
 "Hän näyttää vanhemmalta", huomautti Josephine hetken vaitiolon
perästä.

"Niinkö luulet?" kysyi Betty tyynenä, heittäen nopean silmäyksen

ystäväänsä.

"Luulen, että ilma ja aurinko ovat saaneet hänet niin ruskeaksi ja

raa'an näköiseksi ja kova elämä kait on tehnyt hänen silmänsä niin
järkkymättömän lujiksi. Minä vihaan häntä, Betty."

"Ohhoh" vastasi Betty ylimalkaisesti.

Josephine ei huomannut ivallista hymyä hänen huulillaan.

Viides luku.

Josephine oli Whitmanin mökistä tuonut vaikutelman, joka kiusasi

häntä öin ja päivin seuraavan kahden viikon ajan — sen nimittäin,
että seudun karuus vain lisäsi Mrs Whitmanin hentoutta.

Mrs Whitman oli Ben Whitmanin äiti, yhden niistä kolmesta, joita
Betty oli ylistänyt ensimmäisinä päivinä hänen tulonsa jälkeen
Lawsonin karjatalolle. Hän oli hento, murhemielinen nainen, joka
kantoi sairautensa stoalaisella tyyneydellä. Kahteen vuoteen hän ei
ollut astunut jalallaan Whitmanin karjatalon seinien sisäpuolelta ja
hänen tervetulon toivotuksensa Josephinelle oli ollut liikuttavan
sydämellinen, samoin kuin hänen pyyntönsäkin, että hän uudistaisi
käyntinsä "hyvin pian."
 Josephine oli luvannut tulla, mutta käynti oli lykkääntynyt yhä kun
Betty Lawsonilla oli paljon työtä, liian paljon joutaakseen
"vetelehtimään", kuten hän suoraan oli Josephinelle sanonut ja
Josephine ei taas halunnut lähteä yksin matkaan.

Sillä Josephinen sydämeen oli hiipinyt uusi seudun kammo. Hän

pelkäsi sitä julmaa voimaa, joka näytti ympäröivän hänet kaikkialla
hänen liikkuessaan ja joka tuntui painostavan häntä jonkunlaisena
oman heikkouden ja arvottomuuden tuntona.

Varsin omituista oli, että kun hän yritti selitellä tuota tunnetta ei hän
tiennyt mistä aloittaa. Sillä hän tunsi, että kaikki minkä hän näki,
kiusasi häntä julmalla raa’alla voimallaan. Karja, jonka hän näki, oli
suurta, jäntevälihaksista, hurjasilmäistä ja ärtyisää, ja saattoi juosta
yhtä kovaa kuin hevonen. Hevoset olivat sitkeitä, pörrökarvaisia,
pahasisuisia petoja, jotka näkyivät iankaikkisesti vastustavan kaikkia
hillitsemisyrityksiä. Miehet, joita hän oli nähnyt, olivat hiljaisia, tuiman
näköisiä, itsetyytyväisiä, ja näyttivät täysin vastaavan seudun
karuutta. Ahavoittuneine kasvoineen ja rauhallisine, vakaville
silmineen näyttivät he pronssipatsailta joltakin esihistorialliselta
ajalta. Ja joka miehellä oli kuolettava ase vyöllään eikä hän epäillyt
että he joka hetki olivat valmiit sitä käyttämään.

Myrkyttävä elämä, joka täten oli joutunut Josephinen huomion

esineeksi, oli täyttänyt hänet sellaisella kauhulla, ettei hän tohtinut
tehdä kävelymatkojakaan mihinkään. Iljettäviä eläimiä, jotka
matelivat, vääntelehtivät ja hyppelivät, oli tämäntästä sattunut hänen
tielleen aivan odottamatta.

Matkallaan Whitmanin karjatalolle oli Betty näyttänyt hänelle

muutamia seudun piileskeleviä asukkaita. Timanttiselkäinen
kalkkarokäärme oli kiertynyt kokoon mesquitopensaan varjoon,
skorpiooni taas erään kallion suojaan ja sarviniekka kilpikonna,
harmaana, jäykkänä, kauhistuttavana oli silmiään räpäyttämättä
katsellut hevosia, häpeämättömästi ja vihamielisesti.

Josephineä puistatti hänen seisoessaan tänä aamuna karjatalon

alemmalla kuistilla, katsellen tomupilveä, joka tasaisesti kulki
laakson suuntaa pohjoiseen. Pilven edessä kulkivat Lawsonin
vankkurit ja niissä istui Betty Lawson ja eräs lehmäpaimen.

Betty oli matkalla Willetiin hankkimaan erilaisia tarveaineita.

Josephine oli kieltäytynyt lähtemästä matkaan sen vaivaloisuuden

vuoksi. Sillä hänestä tuntui kuumuus, tomu, ja itse matkustaminen
niin alkuperäisellä ajoneuvolla perin vastenmieliseltä. Ja Willet oli
hänestä tuntunut mahdottomalta heti ensi silmäyksellä, hänen
astuessaan junasta sen rappeutuneelle asemalle.

Mutta Bettyn lähdettyä vallitsi koko karjatalolla raskas

yksinäisyyden tunne ja Josephine katui jo ettei ollut lähtenyt
ystävänsä mukaan. Hän katseli vankkurien etenemistä katumuksen
sekainen pelko mielessään ja mitä kauemmaksi ne häipyivät, sitä
selvemmin hän tunsi, että hänen olisi pitänyt seurata Bettyä. Bettyn
turvallinen läsnäolo oli aina vaikuttanut sen, että nuo uhkaavat ja
lymyilevät vaarat näyttivät pienemmiltä ja epäoleellisilta ja Bettyn
lähdettyä näytti vaaran lähestyminen olevan käännetyssä suhteessa
hänen matkansa etenemiseen.

Mutta Josephine ei ollut mikään pelkuri, vaikkakin hymy, jonka hän

tarjosi ympäristölleen, oli hieman kankea ja iloton. Pelkäämänsä
vaarat mahtoivat sittenkin olla suuresti liioiteltuja, koskapa Bettykin
niistä oli läpäissyt.
 Hän hymyili jo iloisemmin. Talosta saattoi hän kuulla Chongin,
kiinalaisen palvelijan kalistelevan kattiloitaan ja pannujaan. Ääni
rohkaisi häntä, se käänsi hänen ajatuksensa pois satujen
maailmasta ja kuvitelluista vaaroista. Chong oli ainoa ihminen, joka
Bettyn vanhempien lähdettyä Itään oli elänyt hänen kanssaan
karjatalon päärakennuksessa muutamia viikkoja ennen Josephinen
tuloa. Ja ilmeisesti ei Bettyllä ollut aseita.

Mutta sittenkin tunsi Josephine omituista rauhattomuutta, joka oli

melkein enteellistä. Hän oli peloittavan yksin, omituisen alakuloinen.
Ja kuitenkin tiesi hän että Chong varmasti oli talossa ja että Brannon
oli pienessä tupasessa — esimiehen tuvassa — joka oli noin sadan
jalan päässä olevalla tasaisella paikalla, suoraan länteen siitä, missä
hän seisoi, ja selvästi näkyvissä.

Brannon asui yksin esimiehen tuvassa — Betty oli sen kertonut

Josephinelle — ja oli nyt siellä, sillä noin viisi minuuttia sitten oli hän
akkunasta nähnyt hänen menevän sinne.

Ja hän oli varma siitä, ettei Brannon ollut mennyt ulos, sillä — hän
myönsi sen punastuen — hän oli pitänyt silmällä ovea.

Hän tiesi, että miesten asumukset olivat tyhjät, sillä

aamiaispöydässä oli Betty kertonut, että koko miehistö oli päivän
nousussa lähtenyt muutamaksi päiväksi arolle, etelään, etsiäkseen
vasikoita ja muuta karjaa, joka mahdollisesti oli merkitsemättä.

Betty ei ollut maininnut mitään siitä, että Brannon jäisi taloon.

Josephine selitti asian siten, että jokin tehtävä oli viivyttänyt hänen
lähtöään. Hän ihmetteli, tiesiköhän Betty, ettei Brannon ollut lähtenyt
muitten miesten mukana.
 Näissä mietteissään osui hänen katseensa miesten asumuksiin.
Niitä oli kaksi, rakennettuina vierekkäin noin viidenkymmenen jalan
päässä matalasta joesta, jonka karja-aitaus sulki osaksi sisäänsä.
Matala, säännötön rakennus, jota käytettiin keittiönä ja
ruokailuhuoneena, oli aivan asumusten ääressä. Kaikki kolme
rakennusta olivat vajaan kahden sadan jalan päässä
päärakennuksesta.

Kaksi kertaa oli hän jo aikaisemmin katsellut asuntorakennuksiin

päin eikä ollut huomannut siellä mitään liikettä. Mutta nyt
katsoessaan sinne, näki hän miehen tulevan nurkan takaa, katsovan
hetkisen häneen ja sitten istuutuvan mukavasti asumusten
seinustalla olevalle penkille.

Mies oli ilmeisesti ontunut aivan kuin hänen jalkansa tai reitensä
olisi ollut loukkaantunut. Ilman ihmeellinen kuulakkuus vaikutti, että
hänen kasvonsa selvästi näkyivät päärakennukseen saakka ja
Josephine tunsi hänet samaksi tummaksi mieheksi, joka oli
kuiskannut hänelle tuona päivänä radan varrella, samaksi mieheksi,
joka oli auttanut häntä Les Artwellin vapauttamisessa.

Kuudes luku.

Vasta tuon tumman miehen nähtyään Josephine totesi, että

ainakin osa siitä epämääräisestä pelosta, joka häntä oli: kiusannut
Bettyn lähdettyä, oli johtanut siitä tietoisuudesta, ettei Brannon ollut
mennyt muitten miesten mukana arolle. Mutta nyt hän tiesi, että
hänen vaistomaisesti tuntemansa epäluottamus Brannonia kohtaan
ja mahdollisesti hänen vihansa häntä kohtaan oli aiheuttanut sen
alakuloisuuden, joka hänet oli vallannut. Muulla tavalla hän ei voinut
selittää sitä helpotuksen tunnetta, jota hän tunsi huomattuaan ettei
Brannon ollut ainoa mies karjatalolla.

Hän ei vähääkään luottanut Bettyn jotenkin liioiteltuihin Brannonin

ylistyksiin. Hänen ei ollut koskaan ollut tapana hyväksyä ketään
tuttavakseen tai ystäväkseen niin horjuvilla perusteilla eikä hänellä
ollut aikomus tehdä sitä nytkään. Hän tahtoi itse valita ystävänsä
omien arvosteluperusteittensa mukaan.

Tosin hänellä oli ennakkoluulonsa, se täytyi ottaa huomioon, mutta

hän oli vakuutettu siitä, että huolimatta siitä epäedullisesta kuvasta,
jonka hän Brannonista oli rautatien vierellä saanut, hän ei sittenkään
olisi hänestä pitänyt. Hän oli varma siitä, ettei hän koskaan pitäisi
hänestä eikä luottaisi häneen, sillä hän ei pitänyt miehistä, joilla oli
levottomuutta herättävä tapa nähdä toisen läpi.

Alusta alkaen olivat Brannonin silmät loukanneet häntä. Ne olivat

niin lujat ja teräksiset, niin ärsyttävän rauhalliset, niin selvästi
ilkamoivat sinensä syvyydessä, että ne olivat hänessä nostattaneet
voimakkaan vastustushalun. Hän oli varma siitä, että niihin kätkeytyi
samoja villejä ja häikäilemättömiä mielitekoja, joita Betty oli
hiljaisuudessa hänellekin omistanut, verratessaan häntä Satan
Lattimeriin — seuraavassa henkäyksessä selittäessään, ettei
Lattimer häikäilisi "ryöstää naista vuoristoon."

Tumma mies oli tehnyt häneen edullisemman vaikutuksen. Ennen

kaikkea tuntui mies inhimillisemmältä. Siellä, rautatien varrella oli
hän kuiskatessaan Josephinelle osoittautunut intohimoiseksi, mikä
kuitenkin oli anteeksi annettavaa, sillä olihan Brannonilla aikomus
hirttää viaton mies. Sitäpaitsi oli Brannon hänelle vastenmielinen ja
se seikka näytti olevan omiaan liittämään hänet Josephineen.
 Joka tapauksessa, jos hänen kerran oli luotettava aina-
uskottavaan vaistoonsa, niin täytyi turvautua tummaan mieheen? Ei
hän suinkaan aikonut heittäytyä varsin ystävälliseksi tummaa
miestäkään kohtaan, mutta häntä vaivasi eräänlainen uteliaisuus,
joka vaati tyydytystä. Ja niin hän arvelematta antautui mielijohteensa
valtaan, astui kuistilta alas ja lähti käymään väenasuntoa kohti.

Tumma mies nousi seisomaan hänen lähestyessään. Hänen

liikkeensä olivat kömpelöt, mutta Josephinen mielestä hän toimitti
kumarruksensa melkoisella soreudella, varsinkin huomioonottamalla
hänen kipeän jalkansa, joka oli paksussa siteessä ja joka ilmeisesti
kieltäytyi kannattamasta hänen ruumiinpainoaan.

Hänen silmissään oli myös kunnioittava sävy ja hänen äänensä oli

imartelevan nöyrä ja ystävällinen.

"Tekö se olettekin, ma'am", sanoi hän. "Minä luulin, että olitte

mennyt
Betty Lawsonin kanssa."

"Ettekö siis nähnyt minun seisovan kuistilla?" kysyi Josephine, sillä

hän oli varma siitä, että mies oli nähnyt hänet.

"Vasta minuutti sitten", hymyili hän. "Tottahan toki. Mutta siihen

saakka luulin, että olitte mennyt Bettyn kanssa. En nähnyt hänen
lähtevän, vaikka tiesinkin, että hänen piti matkustaa. Olen oleskellut
väen asunnossa hoitamassa jalkaani."

"Miten se loukkaantui?"

"Nyrjähti hevosta lassotessani tänä aamuna. En luule, että se on

poikki — vääntyi vain pahasti, jotenka en voinut seurata muita
miehiä. Pahaksi onneksi."

"Oletteko kuullut mitään Artwellista?" kysyi Josephine varovasti.

Mies nauroi leveästi. "Jo vain, Less on turvassa. Hän pyysi minua
kiittämään teitä. Te teitte hänelle hyvän työn, ma'am. Artwell ei ole
koskaan varastanut hevosta keneltäkään!" Hän katsoi Josephilleen
tuikeasti, kysyvästi. "Ettehän ole kertonut Brannonille, että minä
katkaisin Artwellin siteet?"

"Enhän toki"! selitti Josephine.

"Se on oikein", sanoi mies, silmät loistaen tyytyväisyyttä. "Jos

Brannon saisi tietää sen, niin tekisi hän elämäni vähemmän
miellyttäväksi."

"En kerro sitä hänelle koskaan."

"Aa, ette pidä hänestä?" sanoi mies hieman intohimoisesti. "Niin,

on paljon ihmisiä, jotka eivät pidä hänestä. Hän on hieman liian
pirteä."

Josephine ei halunnut jatkaa keskustelua Brannonista. Hän puhui

karja-aitauksesta, hevosista, seudusta ja siitä pelon tunteesta, jonka
niiden näkeminen hänelle aiheutti.

Mies katseli häntä uteliaasti ja ilmeisesti hieman hämmästyneenä,

vaikka selvästi huvitettuna siitä että Josephine sanoi pelkäävänsä
ympäristönsä valtavuutta ja voimaa.

"Älkää jutelko minulle sellaisia", nauroi mies. "Se on minulle jotakin

aivan uutta. En ole koskaan kuullut, että joku pelkäisi vuoria,
syvänteitä, puita ja tasankoja tai muuta sellaista. Eikös siellä idän
puolella sellaisia näe?"

Luonnollisesti Josephine tästä huomasi, että häneltä puuttui

mielikuvitusta. Hän tunsi pientä pettymystä, mutta hän lohdutti
itseään sillä, että oli kuullut ihmisten kummastelevan suuria
kaupunkeja, vaikka hän itse oli niin tottunut niitten ihmeisiin, etteivät
ne enää herättäneet hänessä mitään ihmetystä.

"Lähetän Chongin hoitamaan jalkaanne", sanoi hän ja kääntyi

lähteäkseen.

"Joutavia, sitä ette tee", sanoi hän nopeasti. "Siitä ei maksa vaivaa
olla levoton."

"Denver on loukkaantunut pahemminkin, miss Hamilton" kuului

hidas, hieman pilkallinen ääni lähinnä päärakennusta olevan nurkan
takaa.

Josephine kääntyi ympäri ja näki jäykistyen Brannonin.

Hän seisoi väen asunnon nurkalla hajasäärin, käsivarret ristissä

rinnalla ja oikean käden sormet hypistelivät leukaa.

Josephine oli nähnyt hänet samassa asennossa sinä päivänä kun

hän pelasti Artwellin, juuri ennen kuin hän oli huomannut tämän
paon, seisoessaan miehineen odottamassa junan lähtöä. Asento oli
luonteenomainen hänen tyyneen ilkamoivaan ja itsetietoiseen
suhtautumiseensa nähden, kanssaihmisiinsä.

Hän oli ilmeisesti kuunnellut heidän keskusteluaan. Ah, kuinka

Josephine vihasi häntä!
 "Luonnollisesti te ette välitä Mr Denverin jalasta vähääkään!" sanoi
hän, silmät säihkyen halveksuntaa. "Mies, joka kuuntelee salaa, on
liian itsekäs tehdäkseen mitään onnettomien hyväksi."

"Mr Denver ei ole onneton, Miss Hamilton", sanoi Brannon,

korostaen leveästi "mister" sanaa. "Hieman pahoinvoipa ehkä. Sattui
nyrjäyttämään jalkansa, juuri nyt kun olisi pitänyt olla auttamassa
poikia raskaassa ja likaisessa työssä merkittäessä karjaa avonaisella
arolla."

"Näyttää siltä, kuin Mr Denver ei olisi ainoa mies, joka pakoilee

raskasta, likaista työtä", sanoi Josephine kerkeästi.

"Niinhän se on. Voihan olla, että jäin pitämään Denverille seuraa

hänen yksinäisyydessään."

Josephinen pilkka ei ilmeisestikään tehonnut Brannoniin. Ja jos

hän tunsikin sen, niin oli se liian syvällä näyttäytyäkseen. Hänen
silmäyksensä Denveriin oli oudon tyhjä, ikäänkuin lyhytnäköisen. Oli
aivan kuin ei hän olisi miestä nähnytkään.

Denverin huomasi Josephine istuvan jännittyneenä, joka lihas

värähtelevänä. Hänen huulensa olivat nyrpällään ja hänen tummat
silmänsä olivat kivenkovat ja raivosta kiiluvat.

Mutta se oli raivoa, jota Denver koetti voimainsa takaa tukahuttaa.

Josephinesta näytti kuin mies olisi tiennyt, että hänen täytyi hillitä
sitä, sillä hän pelkäsi näyttää sitä.

Myöskin huomasi Josephine, että Brannon salassa nautti Denverin

ponnistuksesta hillitä itsensä. Hän oli myös epämääräisesti tietoinen
siitä, että hänen silmiensä edessä oli käynnissä jonkinlainen taistelu,
jotakin salassa olevaa, joka suoritettiin alkuperäisten, hirvittävien
voimien kesken.

Samoin kuin tuona Artwellin vapauttamispäivänä, näytti Brannon

nytkin olevan hallitseva voima. Hän oli yhtä varma kyvystään
käskeä, yhtä varma hallitsemaan joka tilannetta, mikä hänen
kohdalleen sattui. Josephine tunsi taas tuon raudankovan
taipumattomuuden, ja kammottava tyyneys, jonka alle hän sen kätki,
ärsytti häntä kuten aikaisemminkin. Hän päätti pistää Brannonia niin
syvälle, että tämän täytyi paljastaa itsensä jollakin tavalla.

"Tietääkö Betty Lawson, että te laiminlyötte velvollisuutenne?"

kysyi hän.

"En tiedä mitä Betty ajattelee tällä haavaa", vastasi Brannon.

"Oh, minä otaksun, että tämä on eräs tapa huomauttaa minulle,

että se mitä te teette, ei ole minun asiani?"

"Käskikö Betty sanomaan, että minun on tehtävä teille tiliä

töistäni?" kysyi Brannon, katse tiukkana, kohdatessaan Josephinen.

Josephine naurahti pilkallisesti, turhaan yrittäen vaimentaa

raivoaan, joka hänen suonissaan kihisi. Hän tiesi hävinneensä.
Jollakin tavalla hän sai sen kummallisen vaikutelman, että hänen
sanansa muistuttivat rakeitten rapinaa peltikattoa vasten. Ne saivat
aikaan aika rätinän, mutta niillä ei ollut mitään näkyvää vaikutusta
metalliin.

Mutta hänen onnistui näyttää vihansa silmillään ja se tuotti hänelle

jonkinverran lohdutusta. Ja hän oli varma siitä, että hänen
käytöksensä osoittama halveksuminen, kun hän kääntyi ja lähti
hänen luotaan, täytyi saada miehen huomaamaan, kuinka
vähäpätöinen atoomi hän sittenkin oli tytön mielestä.

Tämä usko pysyi lujana siksi, kunnes hän pääsi kuistille ja sieltä
katsoi taakseen.

Brannon seisoi häneen päin; hän oli ilmeisesti seurannut häntä

katseellaan. Josephine saattoi selvästi nähdä hänen kasvonsa ja
näki, että hän hymyili.

Josephine meni taloon, oleskeluhuoneeseen, ja pysähtyi siihen.

Hänen kasvonsa punoittivat raivosta, jonka hän tiesi johtuvan siitä,
että hän oli Brannonissa tavannut miehen jonka tahto oli lujempi kuin
hänen omansa.

Seitsemäs luku.

Josephine vietti lopun päivää suuressa seurusteluhuoneessa,

miettien yhteenottoaan Brannonin kanssa. Hän oli liian vihainen
voidakseen lukea hyllyllä olevia kirjoja, joitten kannet viekoittelevina
paistoivat hänen silmiinsä. Hän oli liian ärtynyt voidakseen neuloa tai
uudistaa toisen hattunsa, jonka hän oli tuonut mukanaan ja joka
pienillä laitteilla olisi tullut entistä viehättävämmäksi. Sellaiset pienet
ilot ja tehtävät näyttivät aivan vähäpätöisiltä aamun tapahtumiin
verrattuina. Elämä, suuri, elävä ja alkuperäinen elämä oli
mieltäkiinnittävämpi.

Hänen kasvonsa hehkuivat vielä kun hän, syötyään päivällisensä,

vinosilmäisen Chongin tarjoillessa, palasi seurusteluhuoneeseen ja
seisoi hetkisen lännenpuoleisen akkunan ääressä katsellen ulos.

Denveriä ja Brannonia ei näkynyt missään.

Josephine valitsi itselleen kirjan ja meni kuistille, jossa hän istuutui

keinutuoliin ja koetti lukea, saadakseen Brannonin ajatuksistaan.

Kirja oli ikävä, mielenkiinnoton. Hän paiskasi sen kiinni että

paukahti. Hänen otsansa oli sileä ja huulet luonnollisessa
asennossaan kun hän istui katsellen pohjoista lakeutta, joka kohosi
hänen katseensa suuntaan ja jolla loisti vihreitä täpliä, harmaitten ja
tasaisten saviläikkien vastakohtana.

Hän aikoi voittaa Brannonin. Hän tahtoi näyttää hänelle, ettei

häntä peloittanut hänen mestaroiva itsetietoisuutensa, hänen harkittu
välinpitämättömyytensä toisten toivomuksista ja haluista, hänen
mielettömät koskemattoman valtiutensa vaatimukset eikä hänen
naurettava itseluottamuksensa. Hän aikoi opettaa hänelle, että hän
ei voinut —.

Siinä hänen ajatuksensa menettivät yhtenäisyytensä.

Vihreänruskea aro muuttui sekavaksi, hämäräksi järveksi. Josephine
itki.

Hieman myöhemmin hän hautoi silmiään märällä pyyheliinalla ja

puri huultaan suutuksissaan, vaikka hänen yhä
suonenvedontapaisesti nytkähtelevät olkapäänsä selvästi todistivat
hänen mielenliikutuksensa ankaruutta.

Hänen vihansa Brannonia kohtaan oli tullut katkeraksi, hurjaksi ja

sen voima aiheutti hänelle kostonhimoista iloa, sillä itkunsa aikana
oli hän kerran ollut myöntämäisillään, että hän tunsi itsensä niin
viheliäiseksi siitä syystä, että hän piti Brannonista, huolimatta
välinpitämättömyydestään häntä kohtaan.

Iltapäivä oli lopussa, kun hän nousi ja meni sisään.

Chong oli illallisen valmistuspuuhissa ja hymyili hänelle

kohteliaasti kun hän astui keittiöön.

"Tuntu ikevelle!" mongersi hän. "Missy Lawson pite suuri ääni."

Josephinellä oli ikävä, paljon ikävämpi, kuin hän tahtoi

myöntääkään.
Hän meni huoneeseensa, ja kun hän palasi oli Chong jo kattanut
pöydän.

Kun hän oli lopettanut ateriansa, oli maailma pimennyt ja kuistilta

katsoen näytti suunnaton alanko kääriytyneen synkkiin varjoihin.

Hämärä jatkui viimeiseen saakka. Vaipuvan auringon viimeisetkin

säteet katosivat korkeilta vuoren huipuilta taivaanrannalla ja silloin
vaipui alanko äkkiä tumman verhon taakse ja Josephine saattoi vain
hämärästi erottaa esimiehen ja väen asunnon ääriviivat.

Hän meni seurusteluhuoneeseen ja sytytti lampun.

Puolta tuntia myöhemmin, kun ei hän kuullut mitään ääntä

keittiöstä ja otaksuen, että Chong oli mennyt levolle, nousi hän ja
meni ovelle mielessään pelonsekainen aavistus, että joku hiiviskeli
talon ympärille. Hän aikoi sulkea oven ja tarttui jo ripaan, kun hän
kuuli kumeaa, raskasta töminää.

Kahden vaiheilla, valmiina pakenemaan, jäi hän kuuntelemaan.

Ääni tuli lähemmäksi, selvemmäksi. Hevonen — täyttä neliä.
 Hän veti helpotuksen huokauksen, huomattuaan, että hänen
hermonsa olivat vain olleet liian jännittyneinä. Lähestyvä hevonen
ehkä merkitsi vain sitä, että jokin talon miehistä oli ratsastanut kotiin,
tuodakseen jonkin tiedon Brannonille, joka oli jäänyt kotiin "Denverin
seuraksi."

Hänen huulensa vetäytyivät pilkalliseen hymyyn sitä ajatellessaan,

mutta se katosi taas kun hän kuuli kavion kapseen aivan kuistin
nurkalla ja äänen, joka kantautui hänen korviinsa pimeyden
tyhjyydestä.

"Halloo! Onko joku pojista siellä?"

"Mitä — ei — on. Nimittäin Denver ja Brannon."

"Hyvä"! Ääni kuulosti tyytyväiseltä ja kaikui korkeana ja syvän

miehekkäänä. Josephinen silmät olivat jo tottuneet pimeyteen ja hän
saattoi erottaa hevosen ja miehen hämärät ääriviivat.

"Se vapauttaa minut enemmästä", kuului ääni taas. "Minulla on

omat asiani toimitettavana ja minulla on helvetinmoinen kiire. Kävin
Laskarissa. Palatessani poikkesin Ben Whitmanin luona. Hänen
äitinsä on sairas, lienee saanut jonkin kohtauksen tai muuta
semmoista, Ben pyysi minua ratsastamaan Willetiin hakemaan
lääkäriä. Sanoin meneväni sinne, ellei täällä olisi ketään, jonka voisi
lähettää. Siinä kaikki. Luulenpa, että olen toimittanut asiani."

"Odottakaa!"

Äkillisen kiihtymyksensä vallassa oli Josephine astunut kuistille ja

oli jo puolitiessä miehen luo lausuessaan komentavan sanansa.

"Puhukaa nopeasti!" huusi mies kärsimättömänä.