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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN EDUC ATION

Sye Foong Yee

A Phenomenological
Inquiry into Science
Teachers’ Case
Method Learning

123
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Sye Foong Yee

A Phenomenological Inquiry
into Science Teachers’ Case
Method Learning

123
Sye Foong Yee
Institute of Teacher Education Malaysia
Technical Education Campus
Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia

and

The University of Western Australia

Perth, WA, Australia

ISSN 2211-1921 ISSN 2211-193X (electronic)

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Foreword

I first came to know Yee when she requested I host her for the Australian
Endeavour Research Fellowship 2016. We finally met in person when she arrived
for a 4-month stint at The University of Western Australia. I know she shivered in
the cold winter months of Perth (it was cold for her coming from warm, sunny
Malaysia) during that time she did her research on the Case Method for teacher
education that has become the subject of this book A Phenomenological Inquiry
into Science Teachers’ Case Method Learning.
The book opens with Chap. 1 that gives an overview of Edmund Husserl’s
(1859–1938) transcendental phenomenology that takes the reader into the realm of
consciousness, epochè, eidos, noema, noesis, eidetic seeing, eidetic reduction and
other wonders of the world of the phenomenological attitude. This leads to Chap. 2
on teacher professional development and the various ways in which teachers learn
and change. The Case Method and the use of case studies as a viable form of
teacher education or teacher professional development are then discussed.
I am delighted to be writing the Foreword for a book that illustrates the practical
dimensions of using case studies to teach, specifically for science teacher profes-
sional development. I worked together with Yee on the teaching case The
Not-so-simple Simple Electric Circuit that is one of the teaching cases in the
Science Education Casebook that we produced as part of the Endeavour project.
The workshop employing this teaching case was conducted in the Graduate School
of Education for a number of Australian school teachers. This is an application
of the Case Method in science teacher professional development.
It is interesting that the data obtained from interviews with the teachers in the
workshop has been analysed phenomenologically and presented as a phenomeno-
logical inquiry into Case Method learning in Chap. 3. This chapter serves as an
example of how to conduct and report phenomenological research. Of interest is the
meaning of the Case Method learning from the teachers’ perspectives. This is
portrayed in the textural descriptions. The structure of the learning or how learning
occurred through the use of the Case Method is explained in the structural
descriptions. And finally, of course, there is the essence of the Case Method
experience. This research exemplifies the use of phenomenology in extricating the

v
vi Foreword

intricacies of the learning that took place when the Case Method was used. The
findings serve to augment the extant literature on using the Case Method in teacher
education. This is presented in Chap. 4 of the book. The underlying significance of
this research is its illustration of the methodology of phenomenology in research on
learning experiences.
The appeal of using phenomenology in investigating learning is explicated in
Chap. 5. Phenomenology as a means to elucidate the consciousness of learning in
terms of its meanings, structures and essences is clarified in this chapter. There is
also a section on the role of the researcher in adopting this methodology. After the
initial fascination of the phenomenological terms, the reader will come to under-
stand the value of phenomenology in educational research and hopefully, adopt
phenomenology for their research.
I extend my congratulations to Yee on this fine book. I am honoured to rec-
ommend this book to readers as both an example of the Case Method in teacher
education and an example of the phenomenological approach to study learning.

Perth, Australia Vaille Dawson

Professor of Science Education
Graduate School of Education
The University of Western Australia
Preface

I found it very challenging in the dual task of illustrating how the Case Method
could be used in science teacher professional development and how phenomenol-
ogy could be used to uncover the complexities and delicate nuances of learning
from the Case Method experience. The result is this book A Phenomenological
Inquiry into Science Teachers’ Case Method Learning.
The motivation to write this book is grounded in my genuine belief that the Case
Method is a viable approach for educating teachers in the realistic everyday con-
texts of teaching. Instinctively, I knew that the learning through the Case Method
experience would be complex and the best way to capture in its pristine essences
would be through phenomenology. In doing so, I realized that the phenomeno-
logical method could be applied to study any learning experience to yield knowl-
edge of the learner’s transcendent consciousness of the learning experience. In
writing this book, inadvertently I found myself understanding the structures of my
own consciousness and its transcendence when it comes to learning to write this
book. This knowledge will serve me well in my teaching and research. It is my
fervent hope that readers will also acquire this invaluable knowledge in addition to
using the Case Method as part of their teaching repertoire and phenomenology as a
research methodology to understand learning.
The successful completion of this Endeavour research project required a lot of
support and guidance that I was extremely fortunate to have received from the
people who were always there for me. I take this opportunity to extend my sincere
and deepest gratitude. I respectfully thank my host supervisor, Prof. Vaille Dawson,
Deputy Dean Faculty of Education University of Western Australia for her honest
and practical comments that guided me throughout this research. May we remain
friends always even though this will be my first and last winter? I express my
profound gratitude to Prof. Helen Wildy, Dean Faculty of Education University of
Western Australia for the wonderful and memorable experience of doing research in
a prestigious institution. I also thank Katherine Carson for her patience and warm
friendship. I remember laughing happily at the jokes we made about your former
‘patients’ during lunchtime. I would also like to thank my co-researchers who
willingly and without reserve shared their experience of the Case Method with me,

vii
viii Preface

without which this project would not have been possible. Many thanks too for the
lecturers and staff at the Education Faculty who were ever willing to help me and
make me feel at home.
Lastly, my gratitude to the Australian Endeavour Scholarships and Fellowships
2016 for giving me a meaningful and fruitful 4 months in the beautiful city of Perth
that inspired me and reawakened my passion for research amidst the scenic river
and deep blue skies.
This work was supported by the Australian Endeavour Research Fellowship
2016 at The University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia.

Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia Sye Foong Yee

Contents

1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Phenomena as Mental Objects of Consciousness . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Experience and a Priori Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.3 Science of Matters of Fact and Eidetic Science . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.4 Immanence, Transcendence and Essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Consciousness and Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Intersubjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 The Natural Attitude and the Cogito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.4 The Phenomenological Reduction and the Epochè
(or ἐpovή) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.5 Noema and Noesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.6 The Eidetic Reduction or Imaginative Variation . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Application of Husserl’s Phenomenological Method . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.1 Phenomenological Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Phenomenology in Human Science Research . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Phenomenology of Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Teacher Professional Development and the Case Method . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1 Teacher Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Teacher Professional Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Enhancing Teacher Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 The Case Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Historical Insights for Teacher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.2 The Case Method for Teacher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.3 An Application of the Case Method in Science Teacher
Professional Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37

ix
x Contents

3 Investigating Case Method Learning Phenomenologically . . . . . . . . . 45

3.1 Outline of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.1 Objective and Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.2 The Interview Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.1.3 Research Subjects or Co-researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.4 Research Ethics and Rigour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1.5 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1.6 Data Organization, Analysis and Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Presentation of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.1 Case Method Experience of Co-researchers . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.2 Composite Textural Description of the Case Method
Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 73
3.2.3 Composite Structural Description of Case Method
Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 77
3.2.4 The Essence of the Case Method Experience . . . . . . ..... 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 81
4 Understanding Case Method Learning Through
Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1 Rationale for the Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 Implications of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Outcomes of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5 Transcendental Phenomenology for Research on Learning . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Phenomenology and the Experience of Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 The Consciousness of Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.1 The Meaning of the Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2.2 The Structure of the Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.3 The Essence of the Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Intersubjectivity and the Role of the Researcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Appendix A: The Teaching Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Appendix B: Structure of the Teaching Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix C: The Teaching Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Appendix D: The Case Leading Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Appendix E: Interview Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Chapter 1
The Framework of Transcendental
Phenomenology

A phenomenon is a thing that manifests itself. In modern philosophical use, phe-

nomenon is understood as ‘what is experienced’ by an individual who is able to feel,
perceive, or experience subjectively. Literally, phenomenology is the study of phe-
nomena. Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that investigates and describes
phenomena as they are consciously experienced. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938)
sought to discover the ultimate foundation of our beliefs of the world and our existence
through an understanding of the framework of our own consciousness. He believed
that it lay in the nature of the experiencing subject and her consciousness. Husserl’s
phenomenology is Pure or Transcendental Phenomenology that aims to describe the
structures of pure consciousness of the Pure Ego or subject. The central task is to
obtain a clear and undistorted description of the ways things appear in our intentional
consciousness. The essence or what is essential to the phenomenon can be appre-
hended through insight or eidetic intuition in the form of powerful feelings or vivid
images. With its beginnings as a philosophy, phenomenology evolved to become a
research methodology. The focus of a phenomenological inquiry into lived experi-
ences in human science research and professional practice illustrates the potential of
the method of phenomenology to investigate various human experiences especially
the experience of learning.

1.1 Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was a German philosopher considered the princi-

pal founder of twentieth-century Phenomenology in his own right. Phenomenology
refers to a philosophical method and school of philosophy founded by Husserl. His
influence extended to amongst others, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, and contemporary philosophy.

© The Author(s) 2019 1

S. F. Yee, A Phenomenological Inquiry into Science Teachers’ Case Method Learning,
SpringerBriefs in Education, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2679-0_1
2 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

1.1.1 Phenomena as Mental Objects of Consciousness

The term phenomenon comes from the Greek word phainein meaning ‘to show
itself’ or ‘to appear’. In philosophy, phenomenology is the science of phenomena or
appearances of objects (or things) in human consciousness. The roots of the discipline
of phenomenology stretch back through the centuries. Nevertheless, Husserl’s phe-
nomenology blossomed through the changing understanding of phenomena. From
the strict empiricist perspective, what ‘appears’ to us are sensory data (such as seeing
red, hearing a musical note, and other sensations from our sense organs) or quali-
ties of things (such as the beautiful colours of flowers, the resonant chords from
the piano, and so on). From the strict rationalist perspective, what ‘appears’ to us
are distinct ideas in our minds. Fusing these two perspectives, phenomena became
things-as-they-appear to our minds or mental objects. With the emergence of psychol-
ogy in the late nineteenth century, Franz Brentano in his 1874 book Psychology from
an Empirical Standpoint, distinguished psychical or mental phenomena as acts of
consciousness of internal perception and physical phenomena as objects of external
perception.
An act of consciousness is intentional as we deliberately direct our awareness
towards some physical or mental object or our awareness is about some object. For
example, in perceiving (a conscious act), something is perceived (a physical object
such as a table or a mental object such as a personal problem). Every mental phe-
nomenon, as an act of consciousness, has an object. Different acts of consciousness
relate to their objects in different ways. For example, perceiving a personal prob-
lem is different from evaluating a personal problem. Our conscious relatedness to
objects takes different modes (such as perceiving, evaluating, loving, remembering,
and so on). These modes are how we intend or decide it to be. We decide whether
we want to perceive, evaluate, love or remember the problem. The different modes
are also related. For example, the evaluation of the personal problem depends on the
perception of the problem of which the evaluation is about. Brentano’s demarcation
of mental phenomena and the manner in which consciousness directs to an object
greatly influenced Husserl’s philosophy.
Bernard Bolzano’s ideas in his 1937 book Theory of Science also influenced
Husserl. Bolzano distinguished between subjective and objective ideas or represen-
tations. Subjective ideas or representations occur in the mind at a particular time. The
study of psychology deals with subjective ideas. Bolzano refers to objective ideas or
representations as propositions. The study of logic deals with objective ideas, such
as propositions, that constitute objective theories in the physical sciences.
In Husserl’s phenomenology, ‘object’ refers to the thing to which a person has
directed (or intended) her awareness (or consciousness). An object is the thing of her
conscious attention. An object is a thing that she is conscious of. It could also refer
to the thing captured by the conscious person as having a mutual relationship with
the thing that she is being conscious of. Objects could be physical and material or
otherwise. It could also be the components of extension of materiality. It could be
the human body, a tool, an artwork, cultural practices, institutions, or any sense (or
1.1 Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy 3

meaning). However, this object is neither a reification of what is in consciousness

nor the mental processes that represent this object.
The object has reality in consciousness but ‘this reality is reality for me only as
long as I believe I can confirm it’ (Husserl, 1975). The object has meaning to the
person in her own particular way. The meaning is ideal and not spatiotemporal. For
example, a person claims that she saw a snake. She describes vividly how the long
green snake frightened her. Then she realized it wasn’t a snake but a rubber tube. She
nonchalantly corrected her earlier description by changing ‘snake’ to ‘rubber tube’.
Objectivation is the conversion of an abstraction into an object. To objectify an
object in the aforementioned sense, the person presents it or expresses it such that
it makes sense to her. She applies a priori thinking to obtain an intelligible notion
of the object. The object is made objective or has been objectivated. It is now the
thought-of object. Objectivity refers to the various conceivable objectivations of the
object. This objectivity of the object belongs to what is presented to consciousness or
appears in consciousness of an object. What ‘appears’ is potentially there from any
perspective for anyone and everyone. What appears is subjective and intersubjective.
A re-conceived notion of phenomenon is the ‘objective intentional contents of
subjective acts of consciousness’ (Smith, 2013). This paved the way for Husserl’s
phenomenology that deals with consciousness, intentionality, intersubjectivity, and
its correlated mental processes. Extending on Brentano’s ‘object’ of the intentional
act of consciousness, Husserl delineated the ‘content’ (or rather intentional content)
of the subjective experience of the intentional act of consciousness. For example,
the intentional act of remembering the moon that I saw last night. The intentional
object is the moon I saw last night; it is how I remembered it. The intentional content
is the remembered as such. It is the mode or how the object is judged, thought
about, perceived, imagined, believed and remembered, etc. For example, the moon
was full, bright, romantic, and so on; how I presented the moon to myself. It is the
information that I take to characterize the moon so that I succeed in directing my
thoughts towards the moon I saw last night rather than the moon I saw the night
before or something else. The intentional content is the ‘meaning’ of the moon taken
in my particular way. The meaning is not spatiotemporal but ideal to me. Thus,
the intentional content transcends the conscious act of remembering that has this
intentional content.
An intentional act identifies clearly and definitely an object; the intentional object.
It is possible that this intentional object does not exist in the ordinary sense of ‘exist’
because it is possible to be conscious of and experience meaningfully objects that
do not exist. The intentional content is the ideal ‘meaning’ of the intentional object
taken from a subjective perspective. The self-presentation of the intentional object
in a certain way (rather than another way) is not necessarily through linguistics.
Indeed, the use of language can be analysed for meaning of underlying states in
the intentional act. The intentional act, intentional object and intentional content are
correlated.
Subsequently, Husserl further refined the notion of intentional conscious acts
as having act-quality, act-matter, and act-character that are mutually dependent
constituents of a particular object of consciousness. The act-quality is the type of
4 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

intentional act. For example, judging, thinking, perceiving, imagining, believing,

remembering, desiring and so on. Each act-quality (or type of intentional act) deals
with different content or matter that is referred to as the act-matter (or intentional con-
tent). For example, the mode or how the object is judged, thought about, perceived,
imagined, believed, remembered, etc.
An act-quality can be non-positing or positing. Mere thinking or reflecting on a
possibility is a non-positing act. Judging or asserting the existence of something is a
positing act. Whether the intention of the act is fulfilled or unfulfilled has to do with
the subject synthesizing or presenting the act-matter as evidence to her. The fulfilled
act is superior to the unfulfilled act because it leads more directly to the object. The
characteristic differentiating mark of fulfilment is the act-character.

1.1.2 Experience and a Priori Knowledge

Husserl’s writings capture his progressive conceptualization and refinement of

Transcendental Phenomenology. The complexity of his writings does not yield its
meanings readily thereby rendering various readings and understandings of his work.
Logical Investigations, published in two volumes in 1900 and 1901, respectively, was
a critique against psychologism. The psychologistic view is that the laws of logic are
natural laws to be studied empirically in the discipline of psychology. This reduces
the laws of logic to be empirically discoverable and contingent instead of validated
a priori and necessarily true. Philosophy would then be based on empirical findings
without prior intellectual clarification of meaning. Husserl was vehemently against
this. His stance was that we experience the world we live in and we are conscious of it.
This consciousness and its intentionality in relation to other consciousness reach out
to make sense or meaning of the specific beings or experiences. Husserl argued for a
‘transcendental path’ in considering ‘consciousness, the lifeworld, and the meaning
of intersubjective being’ (Owen, 2003).
In Phenomenology, the term ‘lifeworld’ refers to the world as directly and subjec-
tively experienced in everyday life. This world includes experiences that are social,
perceptual, individual, practical, etc. Husserl persistently questioned the foundations
of knowledge about the world. He strongly believed that we start ‘… with the human
lifeworld around us, and with man himself as essentially related to this surrounding
world, and exploring … [the] never-discovered a priori of any such surrounding world
…’ (Husserl, 1977a, §59, p. 138/165). He sought a framework for our consideration
about our consciousness of the world. The method and analytic perspective for this
consideration is expounded in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to
a Phenomenological Philosophy published as three ‘books’; in 1913 (First Book)
and 1952 (Second Book and Third Book posthumously). Husserl asserts that an
understanding of the consciousness of the experiencing human subject holds the key.
Consequently, first-person consciousness is logically and epistemologically prior to
other forms of knowledge and inquiry. He sought a systematic description and anal-
ysis of the intentionality of first-person consciousness. He declared phenomenology
1.1 Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy 5

as the science of the essence (Husserl, 1982, p. xx/4). He envisioned phenomenology

as ultimately playing a crucial role in the larger philosophical enterprise.
Cognition is the mental process of obtaining knowledge or understanding through
thinking and experiencing with our senses. Husserl sought to discover the essential
foundation of our beliefs of the world and our existence through an understanding of
the framework of our own consciousness. He believed that it lay in the nature of the
experiencing subject and her consciousness. The central task is to obtain a clear and
undistorted descriptions of the ways things (or objects) appear. The objects in our
natural waking life present themselves as existing to us or ‘become themselves-given
as existing’ (Husserl, 1982, §2, p. 5/7). The object ‘given’ means the object as it is.
When we are conscious of an object and before any thinking about it, that object in
our consciousness bears the ‘givenness’ as ‘there’ or ‘on hand’. This givenness is
given ‘originarily’ or offered itself first to us, precisely as it is given. Phenomenology
focuses on the phenomenon as it is given to us in our consciousness of it (that is,
given ‘originarily’), and before we reflect on it, think about it, conceptualize and
categorize it, or explain it.
An object is various mental formations that belong together. In objectivating,
an object is explicated and clarified. Significations or meanings result from this
objectivating. Any object can be logically determined through our thinking as we
explicate it or relate it to other objects. Through thinking as such, objectivities of a
higher level are constituted. For example, the conditions or qualities of the object
itself, the objects determined by these conditions or qualities, and the relationships
between objects are objectivities of increasingly higher levels. If the thinking is
predicative, there will be a step-by-step build-up of expressions and declaratory
‘signification-formations’ that reflect and correspond to the syntactical objectivities
that are derived using syntactical forms. The syntactical categories of these syntactical
forms can function as substrates that underlie the formation of new categories that
in turn function as substrates (or ground) of other categorical formations. Husserl’s
phenomenology provides the ground for theory in the empirical sciences. It is ‘a
theoretical framework that grounds and co-ordinates theory-production for empirical
practice’ (Owen, 2015).
For Husserl, philosophy should be non-empirical and a priori with rational con-
sideration in advancing it. He envisioned a ‘wider sphere of an objective theory of
knowledge’ in Logical Investigations. He sought to propose a pure a priori logic as the
foundational framework for all the sciences. To do so, the investigation of the inten-
tional structure of meaning, language, and knowledge is called for. Husserl’s phe-
nomenological theory of intentionality and phenomenological theory of knowledge in
Logical Investigations laid the theoretical foundations of Husserl’s phenomenology.

1.1.3 Science of Matters of Fact and Eidetic Science

The general idea of the world around us or Nature is the spatiotemporal universe or
everything ‘worldy’. However, not everything in the world is worldly. The world is
6 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

the ‘sum-total of objects of possible experience and experiential cognition’ (Husserl,

1982, §1, p. 6/8). For Husserl, the idea of real spatiotemporal objectivity is insufficient
because not all grounds or predicates ascribed to spatiotemporal realities belong to
the essence of the object.
The laws of Nature express only de facto rules, that is, rules that are ‘in fact’ or
‘in effect’. In other words, ‘if such and such real circumstances exist in fact then
such and such definite consequences must exist in fact’. Underlying Natural Science
is the idea of the essence of nature. This essence is the intrinsic and indispensable
quality of nature that determines its character. Without it, nature would not be what
it is. Husserl (1989, §1, p. 4) points out that ‘all predicates we ascribe to objects
under the headings of pleasantness, beauty, utility, practical suitability, or perfection
remain completely out of consideration’. Thus, he argues that the concept of real
spatiotemporal objectivity is insufficient. To give the sciences an adequate episte-
mological foundation was to span his entire career with the beginning arguments
in Logical Investigations and Ideas and further refinement in Cartesian Meditations
published in 1931. It plays a prominent role and dominates one of his works, The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology published in 1936.
Husserl (1982, §2, p. 7/9) declares that the objectivism of Natural Science, as we
know it, is vague about the lifeworld even though Natural Science originates from
subjective perceptions of the lifeworld. Husserl opines that the origin of Natural
Science and Philosophy lies in the structures and interests of our experiential life.
Husserl questioned the foundations of Natural Science (or Science of Matters of
Fact) and scientific inquiry alleging that the framework of science itself and the
psychological assumptions of the scientist compromised it. The scientist ‘wears the
blinders of habit … all he sees is nature’ (Husserl, 1989, §49e, p. 193/183). The
focus is on inanimate being (or the objective observations of the scientist) without
attending to the intentionality of consciousness of the animate being (or the subjective
scientist) (Husserl, 1999, p. 15/17). The scientist observes and experiments. She
ascertains factual existence according to experience. Experiencing is the grounding
act. She does not proceed further to understand her own cognizing being. For Science
of Matters of Fact, objects are ‘outside’ of consciousness whilst knowledge of objects
is ‘inside’ consciousness. This is because intentionality of consciousness is not taken
into consideration.
The ultimate grounding act in the Eidetic Sciences is not experience but ‘the
seeing of essences’. The focus of phenomenology is the cognizing being. It is about
how we come to know or become aware of being. It is our consciousness of our
own being. Our consciousness to be loved or to love someone (or something) is an
example of our consciousness of our own being. Likewise, our consciousness to be
learning or to learn something) is an example of our consciousness of our own being.
Eidetic axioms are the ‘predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes’ that are seized
upon in immediate insight as in the seeing of essences. They have eidetic validity
from proceeding in an exclusively eidetic way involving mediate grounding that is
eidetically necessary and clearly established and indisputable (Husserl, 1982, §7,
p. 16/17). Phenomenology, as an Eidetic Science, attends to how objects appear. It
then becomes possible to judge the legitimacy of claims to know or understand.
1.1 Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy 7

1.1.4 Immanence, Transcendence and Essence

Phenomenologists analyse the consciousness of an experience from the noetic (spe-

cific being or intentionality) and noematic (sense or meaning) perspective. Husserl
believed that such an analysis unlocks the possibility of taking an ‘absolute or fun-
damental process’ from which other processes could be derived (Owen, 2003). As
Husserl (1999) states, ‘I want to bring within my purview the essence of the possibil-
ity of this contact [between knowledge and its object], to bring it to givenness in an act
of seeing’ (p. 63/6) in order to arrive at ‘an understanding of how the transcendental
real object can be encountered within the act of knowing’ (p. 69/13).
Of concern in Phenomenology is not how experience arises but what ‘resides’ in
experience or the contents of the experience. It is believed that what resides or is
immanent in experience cannot be infringed by any theoretical assumption or empir-
ical psychology. It is ‘completely hidden and inexpressible’ and involves a ‘newly
revealed intentional background of constitutive achievements’ (Husserl, 1970b, §59,
p. 210/214). However, conditions for the possibility of experience signify what is
immanent in the essence of experience. In a phenomenological analysis of experi-
ence, the essence of the experience that is investigated is the same as the possibility
of experience. Hence, the essence is a condition of the possibility of experience
(Husserl, 1977b, §40, p. 118–9/141). Phenomenology makes a ‘transcendental’ turn
away from merely attending to an object to considering the conditions of the object’s
possibility (Kant, 1993; Gardner, 1993).
For Husserl (1982), the ‘task’ was to study the ‘… specific eidetic processes per-
taining to reason in mediate groundings, validating of every kind and form and in
all positional spheres; to trace back to their phenomenological origins the different
‘principles’ of such validating …’ (§141, p. 340/295). Our consciousness or aware-
ness of an experience reaches out to the lifeworld intentionally (or voluntarily in a
certain manner) in terms of specific being (or to be) with the purpose to make sense
(or meaning) of it. For example, a person is sad and conscious of it. She tries to make
sense of being sad. She reasons that it is because time is passing and she has not
achieved her goals. Her thoughts then turn to the reasons she has been unsuccessful
thus far. And so the thinking and reflecting continues.
The focus of phenomenology is on our intentionality (and associated mental pro-
cesses) and the objects of this intentionality as they appear in our consciousness.
Our consciousness through its various intentionalities, make sense of the lifeworld
that we experience. Objects appear in our consciousness or awareness together with
their specific senses or meanings. This objectivity appears within ‘immanent tran-
scendence’ (Husserl, 1977a, §47, p. 103/134). The objects that appear have ideal
referents and meanings ‘outside’ the flow of the stream of consciousness of the
experience (or transcendent to it) but they reside (or is immanent) in the experience.
The essence of the experience is the specific objectivity that makes the experience
what it is and not any other experience, that is, a condition for the experience to be
possible.
8 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

Experience is consciousness of an object. It is an intuitive consciousness that

‘makes this object given’. The object is presented or given ‘originally’ in the con-
sciousness of seizing upon this object. In making sense of the object, the person
‘objectivates’ or thinks predicatively. However, this objectivation is inadequate not
only in clearness or distinctness but also in its characteristic presentation that is
never ‘all-sided’ but ‘one-sided’ or perhaps ‘many-sided’ in a sequence. This holds
for physical things as well as ‘all the essential components of extension or of mate-
riality … for all realities without exception’ (Husserl, 1982, §3, p. 9/10).
Nevertheless, the experiencing or intuiting of the object can transform or change
into eidetic seeing. When this occurs, what is seen is the essence or eidos. The essence
of something individual is the ‘what’ of the something that makes it what it is. The
essence is also an object but distinct from the aforementioned object. The datum of
‘experiencing intuition’ is an individual object whereas the datum of eidetic intuition
is the essence. Seeing an essence is intuition or more accurately eidetic intuition. In
eidetic intuition, idiosyncrasies of the person are ignored. The focus is on features
essential to it as a person. Thus, the focus is really on features that are essentially
or necessarily shared by any other person. The features of the consciousness of the
person and her intentionalities that make the experience possible, that is essential or
necessary conditions of the experience, are the essence or eidos.

1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology

Some main ideas of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology are discussed and

clarified as it pertains to the phenomenological inquiry into the consciousness of
learning that is the purpose of this book. The terms used in this section must be
understood precisely and exclusively in the sense that Husserl’s exposition prescribes
for them. The terms must not be construed as might be suggested by terminological
habits of the reader or historical use of the term.

1.2.1 Consciousness and Intentionality

Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology was conceptualized as a study of the intrin-

sic structures of our consciousness. In Husserl’s words, ‘I am conscious of a world
endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in
time. I am conscious of it. … intuitively I find it immediately [as factually existing],
that I experience it ...’ (Husserl, 1982, §27, p. 51/48). The being of consciousness in
the world or to be conscious in the world is ‘first become acquainted with the world
in the full sense of the world-for-all, that is, the world of culture …’ (Husserl, 1970b,
§55, p. 187/191). This is the being of consciousness or to be conscious.
Consciousness is our awareness of the world that exists as it is for us. It is the
totality of our thinking and all our mental processes as we experience, ‘objecti-
1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology 9

vate’ and intend to in our consciousness. Any consciousness is a consciousness of

something. Consciousness is intentional and directed towards objects. As discussed
in Sect. 1.1.1, ‘object’ refers to the thing to which we have directed (or intended) our
awareness (or consciousness). An object is the thing of our conscious attention. An
object is a thing we are thinking of. It always contains a content that is intentional.
Intentionality is an act of consciousness. Intentionality is the notion that con-
sciousness or awareness is directed at something or some object. Whether the object
actually exists or not makes no difference from the perspective of phenomenology.
Interestingly, it is possible that the intentional object does not exist in the ordinary
sense of ‘exist’. Nonetheless, the correlation of intentional object, intentional act,
and intentional content is still sensible. In other words, it is possible to experience
meaningfully about objects that do not exist. The object may have indeterminate
actuality or reality. An object can emerge in our consciousness in an empty manner.
Our thinking or flux of numerous and varied mental processes moves to fill it by
looking again and again at it. The object or thing is then thought of in a fulfilled man-
ner; the ‘seeing’ brings a sense of completion or wholeness of perception (Husserl,
1982, §30, p. 57/53). Whether the intention of the act is fulfilled or unfulfilled has
to do with the subject synthesizing or presenting to herself (or self-presentation) of
the act-matter as evidence. This is the act-quality.
Transcendental phenomenology studies the intrinsic structures of consciousness
through the contents of experience that is transcendent to the structures of conscious-
ness. Intentionality is explained in terms of the contents of experience rather than the
object of the experience. Intentionality is analysed in terms of three ideas: intentional
act, intentional object and intentional content or matter. These ideas are distinct but
correlated and mutually dependent in the structure of consciousness and experienc-
ing. Analyses of intentionality can reveal the structures of consciousness through the
transcendence of consciousness to what it is conscious of.

1.2.2 Intersubjectivity

The person thinks of the object and its correlates that are apprehended in the thinking.
Objectifying the object to makes sense of it, the person renders the object objective.
Not withstanding the thinking of the person which is indeed subjective, the objectiv-
ities of the object are thus indeed subjective too. Each person is related to her world
and likewise all other persons too. Nonetheless, it is the same world. Objects of
consciousness that are common to different persons are intended to differently with
different clarity, manner of apprehension and so on. There is the notion of mutual
objectivity, objective knowledge, and understanding occurring through empathy. The
complex overlapping senses of other persons is shared at a fundamental level. This
further brings forth the notion of intersubjectivity between persons; for example,
the intersubjectivity between the researcher and the researched. Husserl (1977a)
explains it as ‘we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the
10 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

sense ‘other ego’ becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious experi-
ence of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as if there in its own
manner’ (§43, p. 90/122).
Husserl believed that each person can experience and know the other in the sense
of empathy and co-presence, but not exactly as one experiences and knows oneself.
When two people present themselves to each other, there is an exchange of percep-
tions, feelings, ideas, and judgments. Intersubjectivity is the process of many people
coming to know a common phenomenon, each through his or her subjective expe-
rience. Empathy leads to ‘the constitution the intersubjective objectivity’ (Husserl,
1989, §47, p. 178/169). This refers to the interrelationship of one person’s conscious-
ness with another person, in terms of the necessary and universal functions of the
shared experiential world that is created from the individual lifeworlds.
The conscious life of the researched is surely based on the knowledge of the
researcher’s own lived experiences and is thus correlated intentionally during the
research process. Schutz (1967) states, ‘My lived experiences of you are consti-
tuted in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity with your lived experiences, to which
they are intentionally related.’ Intersubjectivity involves the self-insights and sub-
jective perceptions of the object concerned from the researcher’s perspective. Other
insights and perceptions become present to the researcher to the extent that they
enter the researcher’s consciousness, are co-present to the researcher, and become
essential to the researcher’s intentional experience (Faber, 1943). A return to the
‘self’ of the researcher and using a self-reflective process enables the researcher to
increasingly relate to the experience being investigated. Intersubjective validity is the
continuing alteration of validity that occurs when people articulate and describe their
experiences.

1.2.3 The Natural Attitude and the Cogito

Husserl asks us to begin as human beings living naturally in the world. We are
conscious of a world spread out in space that we know intuitively as factually existing
because we can experience it. In his words, things are ‘simply there for me, whether
or not I am heedful of them’ (Husserl, 1982, §27, p. 51/48). It is not necessary that
these things be found in the immediate field of perception. We can let our attention
wander away to all things that we know is in our surroundings or ‘co-present’. There
is also a consciousness of ‘knowing of them’ that does not involve thinking but can
change into ‘a clear intuiting or a perceiving in the sense of a seizing upon’ (§27,
p. 52/49) when we turn our attention to it.
What we now perceive and what is co-present is surrounded by an ‘obscurely
intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality’ that stretches into the unlimited. It is
as if our field of perception is surrounded by a ‘halo’. Husserl graphically describes
how this horizon can be ‘penetrated’ if we turn our attention to it by sending ‘rays
of the illuminative regard of attention into this horizon’. What is indeterminate or
obscure at first then becomes alive, hauling out a chain of quasi-memories that are
1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology 11

linked together. The ‘sphere of determinateness becomes wider and wider, perhaps so
wide that connection is made with the field of actual perception’ (§27, p. 52/49). This
is us as conscious beings, aware of ourselves and our surrounding world, thinking
and experiencing.
In our waking consciousness, we are in this manner at all times. The world is there
for us not only as a world of mere things with ‘material determinations’ or features
but also value characteristics. It is a ‘theorizing consciousness’ (Husserl, 1982, §28,
p. 53/50) in different forms (such as conceptualization, explication, comparison,
inference, and so on) and at different levels. It also includes emotional states (such as
liking, hoping, desiring, and so on) and social acts (such as smiling, helping, and so
on). The consciousness of all these as immediately present in an individual’s natural
surrounding world is described by the Cartesian expression, cogito. Using Husserl’s
terminology, the person is in the natural attitude.

1.2.4 The Phenomenological Reduction and the Epochè

(or ™πoχή)

Husserl believed that the naturalist–realist context of the spatiotemporal or material

world is so influential that ‘reductions’, namely the phenomenological reduction and
the eidetic reduction, were required to prevent the ‘misinterpretations’ that he asserted
occurred in the Natural Sciences. Phenomenological reduction and its execution
through epochè are explained here and eidetic reduction is explained in Sect. 1.2.6.
Husserl (1982, §31, p. 57/53) describes a ‘givenness’ belonging to the natural
attitude. We simply take it for granted that our surrounding world exists. We ourselves
and our experiences are parts of that world and interact with the other parts. In our
natural waking life, whenever we perceive a thing and before any thinking about
it, that thing in our consciousness bears the ‘givenness’ as ‘there’ or ‘on hand’. We
‘continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality’ to which we as human beings
belong and are related to it. Put simply, we generally focus our attention on objects
and events in the world whose existence we take for granted rather than the structure
of our experience itself. This is the ‘general positing which characterizes the natural
attitude’ (Husserl, 1982, §30, p. 57/53).
Whilst we do not give up this general positing or assumed belief, Husserl asks us to
undergo a ‘modification’ in a phenomenological investigation. While the positing in
itself remains what it is, we ‘put it out of action’, we ‘exclude it’, or ‘we make no use
of it’ (Husserl, 1982, §31, p. 59/54). We parenthesize or bracket it. He points out that
this is not an attempt to doubt or negate universally as René Descartes (1596–1650)
attempted. Rather, it is a certain refraining from beliefs. In Husserl’s words, ‘We put
out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude
(1982, §32, p. 61/56)’. Everything that positing encompasses with respect to being
or to be, that is, the whole natural world that is there and on hand, is parenthesized.
The physical, the psychophysical, all individual objectivities, all kinds of cultural
12 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

formations, all forms of aesthetic and practical values are excluded. However, the
world still remains there in our consciousness as an actuality; it is not negated and
its existence is not doubted.
This is the Phenomenological Reduction that is achieved through the bracketing or
epochè. Exercising it shuts us off from any belief and judgment about spatiotemporal
factual being. The world as matter of fact is excluded but not the world of essences
and individual ‘being’ or existence. Through the engagement of the epochè, Husserl
made the transcendental turn without any ontological commitment about the reality
and nature of the individual.
The epochè helps turn our attention away from the natural world and things that
we ordinarily take for granted. It makes explicit our awareness of us as conscious
beings thinking and experiencing. It also suspends or sets aside all empirical and
psychological theories of natural science. Nevertheless, the occurrence of our expe-
rience and our consciousness of it is indubitable and impossible for us to doubt. The
epochè aids the phenomenological investigation by helping us to orient our regard
to the sphere of consciousness (or the being of consciousness or to be conscious)
to find what is immanent that is exists and operates within this consciousness. We
do this by investigating the transcendental objects of objectivity that appears within
‘immanent transcendence’ (Husserl, 1977b, §47, p. 103/134).

1.2.5 Noema and Noesis

Consciousness is an awareness of something or object (in the philosophical sense).

Consciousness is intentional and directed towards the object. The appearance of the
object in consciousness constitutes an act. An act refers to an experience of meaning.
The act of consciousness is the noesis (plural noeses) and the object at which con-
sciousness is directed is the noema (plural noemata). Husserl (1982) states, ‘Every
objectivating relates to something objectivated (§87, p. 211/179).’ For example, every
judging relates to something judged or every perceiving leads to something perceived.
The noesis is the objectivating whilst the noema is the something objectivated. The
noesis and its noema are correlated. Phenomenology seeks to determine the a pri-
ori conditions for the correlations between noeses and noemata. The correlations
between noeses and noemata are the eidetic possible conditions or essence of the
experience. The phenomenological reduction is the deliberation of the noetic–noe-
matic correlations in the absence of prior beliefs and judgments.
Consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of the act (noesis) and its object
(noema). Consciousness is the sum-total of our thinking and indeed all our men-
tal processes as we endow and fulfil meaning to the object. We synthesize and posit
judgments and assertions that we present to ourselves as evidence to fulfil our inten-
tion of the act. In the stream of mental processes to make sense of the object, what
appears in consciousness mingles with what really exists so that meanings are created
out of possible meanings. Thus, we come to ‘know’ the thing or object.
1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology 13

Husserl (1982, §88, p. 213/180) describes the noema as the ‘really inherent and
intentive components of mental processes’. For example, seeing and touching a piece
of paper is a perceptual experience (§35, p. 69/61). Consciousness is intentionally
directed to the paper that is the actual object. Perceiving is the act-quality or type of
intentional act. The act-matter or intentional content is that which is perceived by the
person. The noema is what appears in perception from the perspective of the person.
The noema is ‘that which appears’ in the person’s consciousness and not the actual
paper. The paper exists in nature (or the external world) but the perception of the
paper is in the consciousness of the person and it is as meant by the person. What is
meant might exist or it might not. The synthesis of noemata or perceived meanings
of the paper enable the person experiencing the paper to continue to see this piece
of paper and not another piece of paper. Husserl also refers to noema as the sense or
meaning of an act. The noema is immanent in consciousness and it is as intended or
envisioned by the person.
Noeses awaken the person to the meaning or sense of whatever is in the act of
perceiving, remembering, judging, feeling, and so on. Noeses bring into being the
consciousness of something. The meanings are recognized and drawn out. A meaning
or many meanings can be harboured in a conscious act. For example, one can write on
the paper only with a pencil. Through this initial meaning or noema, further phases
of meaning may develop (Husserl, 1982, §88, p. 213/181). For example, ink will
smudge on this paper. Noema is that which is ‘appearing as appearing’ and noesis is
the ‘complete evidence’ (§88, p. 216/183). The person describes ‘that which appears
as such’ and presents it in the light of ‘perfect self-evidence’ to fulfil meaning that
she endows to the object in her consciousness of it.
For every noema, there is a noesis and vice versa. The noema is continually chang-
ing because the person is unfolding and folding the manifold of what is presented in
consciousness. This is referred to as the noematic phases or partial views of the whole
entity. Noemata can connect and synthesize in such a way that the person comes to
know the parts and moments of the object and also its unity or wholeness. The noesis
is the mental processes that account for the noema. The process of intuition-reflection
adds layers of meaning to each other to form a comprehensive meaning of the whole-
ness of the object. In the incessant flux of the noeses and noemata, what appears in
consciousness becomes clearer and more distinct through continual explication from
different angles and perspectives coupled with reflecting on the mental objects of
consciousness to discover its hidden embedded meanings. In the aforementioned
example, the paper is described as of ‘inferior’ quality (noema) as the person recalls
the memory of ink smudging on paper of inferior quality (noesis). The person then
thinks one should not buy this paper and so on. All this thinking is based on perfect
self-evidence. The integration of the noematic and noetic correlates of intentionality
comprises a phenomenological description of the experience.
14 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

1.2.6 The Eidetic Reduction or Imaginative Variation

We are consciously aware and we have the ability to intuit or to understand something
immediately based on our instincts rather than reasoning. We have a priori knowledge
or certain intuitions in which the objects or things in our world ‘become themselves-
given as existing’ as we live through our experience of it. This conscious experiencing
or intuiting of something individual can be transmuted into eidetic seeing. The term
‘eidetic’ relates to or denotes mental images that are unusually vivid and detailed as
if actually visible. When eidetic seeing occurs, what is seen is the essence or eidos.
‘Seeing’ an essence is precisely eidetic intuition of an essence (§3, p. 9/11).
To see an essence is ‘… universalizing the appearing object, positing a universal
with regard to it … imagination and recollection can serve as its basis by provid-
ing possibilities that can be purely apprehended’ (Husserl, 1999, p. 49–50/68). By
this Husserl means that to ‘see’ an essence, we can start from the corresponding
experiencing intuition in the sphere of actual perception or equally well from non-
experiencing intuitions in the sphere of imagination; that is, from mere phantasy
without factual existence. On the basis of imagined data, we can form ideas and
intuitively ‘see’ essences. This is eidetic reduction or imaginative variation.
‘Seeing’ an essence is not a mere or ‘vague making present’ of the object but seeing
in the ‘pregnant sense’. Husserl (1982) cautions that, ‘… no intuition of essence
is possible without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a corresponding
individual object and forming a consciousness of an example (§3, p. 10/11–12).
Conversely, no intuition of an individual object is possible without the free possibility
of bringing about an ‘ideation’ or the formation of ideas in which one’s regard is
directed to the corresponding essence that is exemplified in what sighted. In short,
free imaginative variation of what is seen eidetically apprehends what is essential or
the essence.
The aim of eidetic reduction or imaginative variation is to uncover the essential
features of the phenomenon or its essence, without which the phenomenon cannot
be what it is. Each statement of essence is an ‘a priori statement in the highest sense
of the word’ (Husserl, 1982, §17, p. 32/32). Phenomenology is a descriptive anal-
ysis of the essence of pure consciousness. It is the scientific study of phenomena
just as we ‘see’ or experience them and as they appear to us as objects in our con-
sciousness. The phenomenon is explicated in terms of its constituents and possible
meanings. Essences are the conditions or possibilities of experience. An understand-
ing of the essences of experiences enables us to discern the features or structures of
consciousness.
The execution of the phenomenological epochè does not exclude the world of
essences. What remains is a region of individual being that is ‘given’ as actual by
the person’s experience of it. The being is that of purely mental processes or pure
consciousness and its correlates. The sphere of this being becomes constituted as the
experience is discovered in an endlessly welcoming and embracing manner of the
noetic–noematic phases. The suspension of positing and judgment makes possible
the turning of regard to transcendentally pure consciousness. In the stream of pure
1.2 The Main Ideas of Transcendental Phenomenology 15

consciousness is the flux of many and various mental processes that appear and dis-
appear. Nevertheless, in each mental process that comes and goes when the person’s
regard or intention changes from one cogito to the next, the person is necessarily
identical (Husserl, 1982, §57, p. 132/109) and her regard is directed to the object
through each cogito.
However, Husserl (1982) explains that ‘Positing of essences implies not the slight-
est positing of any individual factual existence’ and ‘… pure eidetic truths contain not
the slightest assertion about matters of fact’ (§4, p. 11/12). Seizing upon, grasping, or
positing essences do not imply any factual existence. Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy is concerned only with the immanent essence of consciousness. The actual
‘being’ of such essences is not posited. There are also no arguments for the validity
or non-validity of such essences and no postulates about the ‘ideal possibilities of
objectivities’ corresponding to these essences nor any ‘eidetic laws relating to them’
(§60, p. 138/114).
Husserlian phenomenology is a ‘purely descriptive discipline’ (Husserl, 1982,
§59, p. 136/113) that investigates the field of a person’s transcendental consciousness
to uncover what exists or operates in consciousness itself, that is, the ‘essentially evi-
dent’ of what is immanent or inherent in consciousness. Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy is an eidetic science of the ‘essence of transcendentally purified consciousness’
(§60, p. 137/113). The constitution of this pure consciousness becomes the ground
or ‘source of endlessly increasingly value-possibilities and value-actualities’ (§58,
p. 134/111).

1.3 Application of Husserl’s Phenomenological Method

Edmund Husserl described phenomenology as a science of transcendental phenom-

ena. However, the rigour of phenomenology is interpreted philosophically. Knowl-
edge derived from phenomenology is based on absolutely certain insights and the
assumptions that ground human understanding are clarified. Phenomenology pro-
vides an orderly and disciplined methodology that utilizes only the data available
to consciousness to derive knowledge (Husserl, 1965, pp. 5–6). No empirical asser-
tions are made and no truths are presupposed or asserted concerning natural realities
(Husserl, 1970a, p. 862). It is transcendental because of its adherence to what can
be discovered through reflection on subjective acts and their objective correlates.
It ‘attempts to eliminate everything that represents a pre-judgment, setting aside
pre-suppostions, and reaching a transcendental [or pure] state of freshness and open-
ness’ (Moustakas, 1994, p. 41). Transcendental Phenomenology is a ‘science’ and its
‘objectivity’ is evident in knowledge that is derived from what appears before us in
our consciousness (which is the only thing we know for certain) after the disposal of
all elements that could render the knowledge contingent (Husserl, 1965, p. 23). In the
1970s, phenomenological philosophy was finally realized as a methodology through
the establishment of the praxis of a systematic and sustained way of conducting a
phenomenological inquiry or investigation (Stones, 1998).
16 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

1.3.1 Phenomenological Inquiry

Phenomenology is considered a discipline in the broad sense, and a method of inquiry

in philosophy (Mastin, 2008). It is based on the premise that phenomena make
up reality as we know it. These phenomena are ‘perceived or understood in the
human consciousness’. Transcendental phenomenology is frequently referred to as
‘descriptive’ phenomenology. Description is explicitly referred to as a ‘new naïveté
that of simple descriptive act analysis’ (Cairns, 1972). Husserl (1999) expresses this
investigation or inquiry as two premises and a conclusion. The first premise is that
all forms of cognition are a correlation between mental processes of consciousness
and their respective objects (p. 68/12). The second premise is that these objects are
intertwined with the acts of consciousness (or intentionality) in various ways and are
‘essentially related to each other … and corresponding connections of fulfilment’
(p. 55/75). These objects ‘constitute themselves in these experiences even though
they are not to be found in the real sense’ (p. 28/36). The conclusion is that we must
focus on ‘the relation between knowledge, its sense, and its object’ (p. 18/22) to
reflect on how consciousness understands what is immanent and how consciousness
transcends in the way that it does.
What is explicated in the phenomenological method is ‘Objectivity in general: the
sense [of the object that is ascribed by the objectivating person] … which is prescribed
a priori to objectivity by virtue of the correlation between knowledge and its object’
(Husserl, 1999, p. 19/22). What is ‘a priori within absolute self-givenness’ (p. 66/9), is
‘track[ed] down, within the framework of pure evidence or self-givenness, [including]
all correlations and forms of givenness, and to elucidate them through analysis’
(p. 68/13). What we elucidate in phenomenology are all correlations between: (1)
the objects that appear in different ways, (2) the linking intentional relation, and (3)
the mental process (Owen, 2003). This ‘[phenomenological] inquiry into the objects
of knowledge and the modes of knowledge … mean[s] inquiry into essences that
… exhibit in their generality the definitive sense, the possibility, and the essence of
the objectivity of knowledge and of the knowledge of objectivity’ (Husserl, 1999,
p. 69–70/14).
Thus phenomenology aims to discover the transcendence of consciousness to what
consciousness is conscious of. The discovery of this transcendence throws light on
what is immanent in consciousness or the structures of consciousness. How objects
appear in our consciousness makes ‘possible to ascertain the conditions for judging
the legitimacy or warrant of claims to know or understand’ (Owen, 2003). Husserl
(1999) states it as, if ‘transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense,
then an outside is precisely—nonsense’ (§41, p. 84/117). With this, Husserl argues
that phenomenology serves to ground any academic discipline as phenomenological
philosophy and methods provide the ‘means for understanding prior to any empirical
action’ (Owen, 2003). Knowledge acquired through phenomenological inquiry is
therefore preconceptual and pre-empirical.
Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of phenomenology inspired the development of var-
ious orientations of phenomenology such as Existential Phenomenology, Hermeneu-
tical Phenomenology, Constitutive Phenomenology, and Realistic Phenomenology.
1.3 Application of Husserl’s Phenomenological Method 17

Besides as a discipline and a method of inquiry in philosophy, phenomenology is

also an approach to conduct research. Such research reports descriptions of indi-
viduals’ lived experiences or experiences of phenomena (Creswell, 2013). These
descriptions are written phrases or statements that represent the meaning, structure,
and essence the individual attributes to an experience (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin,
2009). With its beginnings as a philosophy, phenomenology evolved to become a
research methodology.
The two main approaches of phenomenology are Edmund Husserl’s
descriptive phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s interpretive phenomenology
(Connelly, 2010). Descriptive phenomenology is also known as pure or transcenden-
tal phenomenology (Spinelli, 2005). Interpretive phenomenology is also known as
hermeneutic phenomenology (Langdridge, 2007; Laverty, 2003; Smith et al., 2009)
or existential phenomenology (Webb & Pollard, 2006). Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Jean-Paul Sartre, Amedeo Giorgi, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Max van Manen fol-
lowed other lines of approach the origins of which can be traced back to Husserl. The
advent of different types of phenomenology certainly does not diminish the value
of descriptive or Transcendental Phenomenology. It is a matter of deciding which
approach is most appropriate based on the objective of the research study. The phe-
nomenological focus on experience is the ‘key’ to the research (Langdridge, 2007)
irrespective of the type of phenomenology adopted.

1.3.2 Phenomenology in Human Science Research

Transcendental phenomenology provided ‘a new way of looking at things’ that con-

trasted sharply with the natural science attitude regarding perception, judgment,
experience, and thought. It was ‘a return to things as they actually appear’ (Mous-
takas, 1994). It was knowledge that ‘emerged from internal perceptions and inter-
nally justified judging [that] satisfied the demands of truth’. By dissociating ourselves
from the individual or subject we are studying, we learn certain things. Conversely,
by intuitively ‘becoming one with’ the individual or subject, we get another kind
of knowledge. Indeed, ‘We do not learn about reality from controlled experiments
but rather by identifying with the observed’ (Harmon, 1991). Phenomenologists are
concerned with ‘understanding social and psychological phenomena from the per-
spectives of people involved’ (Welman & Kruger, 1999). Alfred Schultz provided
a point of departure from Husserl’s phenomenology by turning it ‘toward the ways
in which ordinary members of society attend to their everyday lives’ (Gubrium &
Holstein, 2000) or people’s lived experiences.
Moustakas (1994) lists the following principles, processes, and methods of Tran-
scendental Phenomenology in human science research:
1. The focus on phenomena or the appearance of things in our consciousness.
It is a return to things ‘originarily given’ that is free from biases and preconceived
notions that arise from our knowledge of the natural world of everyday living
18 1 The Framework of Transcendental Phenomenology

and what we are told is true about nature and also our taken-for-granted attitude
towards these things in our everyday routines.
2. The unity and wholeness of the essence of the experience.
The thing that appears in our consciousness is continually changing in the mental
stream of noemata and noeses. Examining this from different perspectives yields
a unified eidetic vision of the essence. This essence transcends the immanent
structures of consciousness that is the intentional unity.
3. Meanings are derived from conscious acts of experience.
The meanings of a phenomenon that appear in the person’s consciousness of
experiencing are seized upon in eidetic intuition. These meanings extend knowl-
edge of the phenomenon.
4. Experiences are described without explanation or analyses.
The description of what appears in consciousness preserves not only the ‘material
properties and phenomenal qualities’ but also retains the original texture of the
experience. The phenomenon is described as in actuality; complete, accurate,
vivid, alive and retaining its spirit, with the underlying meanings accentuated,
and its presence felt to the extent that it lingers.
5. Intimate researcher connection with the phenomenon
The emphasis is on meanings of the experience that stirs further interest and
concern. The researcher is intimately connected to the experience and her interest
or query is autobiographical. The dimensions of the findings are both for the
present and extend into the future.
6. Subject and object are integrated.
The ‘object’ is the thing that appears in the person’s (or subject’s) consciousness,
including that which is apprehended in the consciousness as correlates. To make
sense of this object, the person (or subject) expresses or ‘objectifies’ it through
a priori thinking. The object is thus made objective. However, the thinking of
the person (or subject) is subjective. Thus, the objectivities of the object are
subjective because the personal significations are subjective. Thus, the objective
is subjective. The person (or subject) and object are integrated. What the person
is conscious of and how the person is conscious of it is intertwined with the
subjective self or who the person is. The intentional act (act-quality), intentional
content (act-matter), and intentional object (act-character) are interrelated. Thus
the subjective is objective.
7. Intersubjective reality is part of the process.
Every perception begins with a person’s (or subject’s) sense of what the experi-
ence is and what the experience means. However, intersubjective reality is part
of the process at all points of the investigation.
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 "Uit Bazel;" en toen Theo verder zweeg: "Wil je eens zien?"

"Heb je hem bij je?" vroeg Theo verwonderd.

Eduard haalde uit zijn zak de briefkaart te voorschijn; Theo kwam

naast hem staan, en aandachtig kijkend bogen de jongenshoofden
zich over het Bazelsche stadsgezichtje.

"Aardig, zeg!"

"Ja." — En zonder verder iets te zeggen stak Eduard de briefkaart

weer in zijn zak.

Theo stootte hem aan. — "Kijk eens!" 't Was een heele sliert groote
jongens achter elkaar, die met veel gejoel voorbij gleed, en Eduard
zag dat Piet en Wouters er ook bij waren.

"Wat gaat dat dol," zei hij, en terwijl hij ze nakeek dacht hij er over
hoe leuk 't zou zijn als hij 't eenmaal zóó kende!

Theo was met zijn gedachten al weer bij een ander onderwerp.

"Waarom komt Meertens niet?"

"Meertens? O, die mocht niet omdat hij zoo vreeselijk verkouden

was. — Er zijn wel tien jongens uit onze klas verkouden, bij jullie
ook?"

"Bij ons wel vijftien!"

't Speet Eduard toen Theo's Moeder om kwart voor vier op de

ijsbaan verscheen om Theo te ha-[a136] len. Mevrouw de Beer
vroeg nog of Eduard meeging, maar de de Beers woonden eigenlijk
toch den anderen kant uit, en hij vond het dus maar beter te wachten
tot Piet straks meeging.

Hij reed nog wat alleen rond, maar 't was nu niet half zoo leuk
meer, en 't werd nog veel kouder ook.
 Om vijf minuten over vier bond hij af. Wat deden zijn voeten pijn
toen hij weer stond! Voorzichtig bleef hij op 't ijs heen en weer
loopen om Piet aan te klampen, en toen hij hem eindelijk zag liep hij
op een sukkeldrafje naar hem toe. "Ga je mee, zeg?" vroeg hij.

Piet, die in een echte pret-stemming was, keek Eduard ontevreden

aan. "Al mee?" herhaalde hij, "dank je feestelijk, hoor, 't wordt hier
nou juist leuk!"

"Maar we moesten om half vijf thuis zijn!"

"Nou, wat kan mij dat bommen?"

"En ik heb al afgebonden!"

"Wat geeft dat? Dan bind je maar weer aan!" en lachend reed Piet
door.

Eduard had geen zin om weer aan te binden. Bij iederen stap die
hij deed voelde hij de tintelende pijn in zijn voeten, en rillend bleef hij
op 't houten platform voor de tent staan, rammelend met zijn
schaatsen en telkens op de klok kijkend.

Aldoor gingen er menschen weg, en telkens zag hij Piet weer

voorbijrijden, pratend en lachend met de andere jongens. —
Wanneer zou hij nu toch [a137] eindelijk mee willen! Ze kwamen
natuurlijk veel te laat thuis! Zou hij maar vast weggaan?

Toen Piet weer langs de tent reed riep Eduard hem.

"Ik ga naar huis."

"Doe wat je niet laten kunt, maar ik ga nu anders dadelijk mee, nog
één baantje!"

Eduard wachtte op 't eene baantje, waar Piet blijkbaar drie maal
rond mee bedoelde. Maar toen had hij dan ook met ongelooflijke
vlugheid zijn schaatsen afgebonden.
 "Nou hollen!" zei hij met een haastigen blik op de klok. — 't Was
over half vijf.

En Eduard holde mee.

"Laten we toch wat lángzamer loopen," riep hij eindelijk, toen ze 't
nauwe poortje weer door waren, "mijn voeten doen zoo'n pijn."

Piet vond dat je juist lekker warm werd van hollen, en dat die pijn
straks wel zou overgaan, maar toch matigde hij het tempo wat.

't Was bijna donker toen ze thuis kwamen, maar niemand maakte
er aanmerking op. Tante Lina was uit, en kwam pas een kwartier
later thuis, Oom Tom zat in zijn kamer, de juffrouw was boven met de
kleintjes en ook Hugo was onzichtbaar. —

Aan 't eten deed Piet opgewonden verhalen over 't prachtige ijs.

"Zoo, je hebt dus plezier gehad," zei Oom Tom eindelijk, "en mijn
buurman, vond die 't ook prettig? Wel jongen, je hebt er een kleur
van!"

[a138] Eduard lachte. Zijn wangen gloeiden nu. "Ja Oom, het was
heerlijk!" verklaarde hij.

"Mooi zoo! En ben je dikwijls gevallen?"

"Twee keer!"

"Och," viel Piet in, "dat komt omdat hij niet durft! Verbeeld je dat je
er nog niets van kent en dat je dan maar twee keer valt! Twintig of
dertig keer moet je vallen, dan leer je het tenminste!"

"'t Vallen zeker!" zei Eduard verontwaardigd. — Dat hij niet zou
durven was natuurlijk groote onzin. Net of 't hem iets kon schelen om
te vallen! Daar gaf hij nou geen cent om! Maar in ieder geval: leeren
moest en zou hij het, en liefst zoo gauw mogelijk! — Wat zou Vader
't ook leuk vinden als zijn jongen 't volgend jaar goed kon
schaatsenrijden!
 [a139]

VIII.
"Eetje, doe je na 't eten weer een spelletje met me?"

Geen antwoord.

Eduard zat of liever hing op den stoel naast de kachel, en hield zijn
doornatte laarzen tegen 't gloeiende ijzer aan. 't Maakte een hard
sissend geluid. Een minuut of vijf geleden was hij met Hugo en Piet
thuisgekomen, moe en nat, want ze waren den heelen
Woensdagmiddag op de ijsbaan geweest, en 't dooide nu hard. 't IJs
leek wel borstplaat, en voor de groote tent was 't op 't laatst één
groote waterplas, een meer bijna, waar je telkens doorheen moest
waden en dat hoe langer hoe dieper werd, want op verschillende
plaatsen borrelde 't water naar boven. — Van half vier af had 't
gemotregend, maar toch hadden de jongens voor 't laatst nog maar
geprofiteerd, en ze waren gebleven totdat eindelijk om vijf uur de
ijsbaan gesloten werd. — Eigenlijk hadden ze om kwart voor vijf
thuis moeten zijn, maar ze waren nu al drie keer te laat gekomen, en
geen [a142] enkele maal had iemand er iets van gezegd, en toen
Hugo en Piet kalm door bleven rijden had Eduard 't ook niets noodig
gevonden om ze te waarschuwen. — Al was 't ijs niet mooi meer,
toch was 't nog niet zoo goed gegaan als juist vandaag.

"Eetje!"

"Wat is er?"

"Doe je na 't eten een spelletje met me?"

"'k Weet nog niet hoor," zei Eduard gapend, "'k heb nog een
heeleboel te doen."

"Ik dacht dat je iederen avond spelletjes met ons zou doen!" pruilde
Bep, die den heelen dag al zeurig geweest was van verkoudheid.

"Ik zeg je immers dat ik 't nog niet weet!" herhaalde Eduard knorrig.
— Vijf lastige sommen lagen nog op hem te wachten en een lange
Fransche les, en hij had van de week nog heelemaal niet viool
gestudeerd ook. — Er was ook heusch geen tijd voor geweest, want
ze hadden tot nu toe eigenlijk iederen dag schaatsen gereden. —
Zaterdag den heelen middag, Zondag, toen 't zulk prachtig helder
weer geweest was en Tom en Lineke ook mee gegaan waren, en
Maandag en Dinsdagmiddag ook al, want ze hadden die twee dagen
om drie uur vrij gekregen, voor 't ijs. — Heel veel huiswerk hoefde er
die dagen ook niet gemaakt te worden, maar doordat ze telkens na 't
eten nog spelletjes deden had het Eduard toch nog moeite genoeg
gekost om 't op tijd klaar te krijgen, en dan [a143] zag 't er nog alles
behalve netjes uit. — Van vioolspelen was natuurlijk heelemaal niets
gekomen, en Vrijdag had hij les!

"Ma, gaan we nu nog niet eten?" vroeg Lineke. Ze moest vanavond

op visite bij een van de vriendinnetjes en ze had met Mientje
afgesproken vroeg te komen.

"Ja, dadelijk, bel de anderen maar vast."

Een halve minuut lang stond Lineke om den hoek van de

kamerdeur de tafelschel heen en weer te zwaaien, en
langzamerhand kwamen ze allemaal opdagen. De juffrouw met Tom
en Broertje, die in de speelkamer een Indianengevecht hadden
gehouden, en nu met luidruchtig krijgsgeschreeuw de trap
afdaalden, Piet, die in de keuken zijn schaatsen had staan afdrogen,
want hij had zijn Vader een paar nieuwe afgebedeld en had daar nu
nog bizonder veel zorg voor, Hugo, die naar boven was gegaan om
zijn natte laarzen uit te gooien en pantoffels aan te trekken, en
eindelijk ook Oom Tom, die even eerder dan de jongens was
thuisgekomen en zijn uniform voor politiek verwisseld had.

"Edu, moet je je handen niet wasschen?" vroeg Tante Lina.

Eduard bekeek zijn vingers eens. Hij vond ze eigenlijk niet eens erg
vuil, maar toch liep hij naar de keuken om ze onder de kraan te
houden, en bood meteen Trijntje aan haar eens nat te spuiten.

"Met Sintjuttemis, als de kalveren op 't ijs dan-[a144] sen," zei

Trijntje, die heel wat steviger was dan Rika, en die vandaag ook al
niet bijster in haar humeur was, "en je handen ga je voortaan maar
boven wasschen, dat geklieder in m'n keuken wil 'k niet hebben."

"En Bakker heeft zoo op z'n kop gehad!" vertelde Hugo, toen
Eduard weer binnengekomen was en zijn stoel tusschen Oom Tom
en Beppie ingeschoven had, want dat was zijn plaats gebleven, "van
Leeuwen was woedend!"

"Ja, maar Wouters zei dat hij toch niets over dat overgeschreven
werk gezegd had!" vulde Piet aan.

"Nou, dat zullen ze toch wel gesnapt hebben!"

"Och, dat weet je niet!" merkte Piet wijsgeerig op, "in ieder geval is
er niets te bewijzen!"

"Praat toch niet zoo'n onzin, hoe kun jij nu bewijzen dat er niets te
bewijzen is!"

"Je bent niet wijs! Als je nu toch ...."

 "Jongens, houd op met dat gezanik," viel de Kapitein hen in de
rede. — Hij had al de halve week verhalen over die kwestie te
hooren gekregen en had er nu zoo langzamerhand volkomen
genoeg van. "Doe me nu 't plezier en verschoon me van verdere
mededeelingen over die Bakker, ik wil er nu geen woord meer over
hooren!" en om een ander onderwerp aan de orde te brengen vroeg
hij aan Eduard of 't schaatsenrijden al wat beter ging.

"O, ik geloof heusch wel dat het beter gaat," zei [a145] Eduard,
"veel beter dan Zaterdag tenminste, vond je ook niet Huug?"

Hugo haalde zijn schouders op en beweerde dat hij er Zaterdag

niet geweest was. "'t Ging wel beter dan Zondag, je kwam nu heel
wat vlugger vooruit!"

"Pa, weet u wie hier op de ijsbaan kampioen is?" vroeg Piet.

"Jij zeker!" antwoordde zijn Vader droogjes.

"Nee, Eduardje."

't Was een mop zooals Piet ze altijd verkocht, en waarmee hij
gewoonlijk nogal succes had. — Eduard vond 't dezen keer machtig
flauw.

"'k Heb nog een vers gemaakt ook," zei Piet, die nog meer
geestigheden in voorraad had.

"Zeg 't dan maar niet op," raadde Lineke aan, "'t zal wel niet veel
soeps zijn!"

Maar Piet vond 't veel te jammer om Eduard, die hij nu eens tot
mikpunt van zijn aardigheden gekozen had, niet nog wat te plagen,
en van een oogenblik dat zijn Vader en Moeder met de juffrouw aan
't praten waren maakte hij gebruik om zijn vers half hard op te
zeggen:
"Ik heb een aardig neefje,
Dat op zijn schaatsen rent!
 Zijn naam is Eduardje,
'k Wed dat je hem wel kent!"

"En jij bent een vervelend mispunt," viel Eduard nijdig uit.

Opeens voelde hij een krachtige hand op zijn schou-[a146] der.

"Bedaar jongen, bedaar!" kalmeerde Oom Tom, die van het vers
alleen iets over "Eduardje" opgevangen had, en tegen Piet: "en dat
steeds herhalen van 'Eduardje' moet nu uit zijn, daar is de
aardigheid nu wel zoowat af. We noemen jou toch ook niet 'Pietje!'"

De Kapitein had het niet als een grap bedoeld, maar toch lachten
ze allemaal, en Lineke knikte haar broer dadelijk toe met een "Dag
Pietje!"

"Dag juffrouw bemoeial!" zei Piet, die zich niet gauw van zijn stuk
liet brengen, en voor wie het hooren wilde deelde hij nog mede dat je
't zingen kon ook op de wijs van "Ik wou dat jij van was was."

"Spaar ons dat alsjeblieft maar," verzocht Tante Lina, "'t is hier al
drukte genoeg!" Want Broer maakte nog steeds Indianen geluiden,
en Tommy schopte aanhoudend tegen de tafelpoot.

"Ja, 't is of 't ijs ze in 't hoofd zit," verklaarde de Kapitein zuchtend.
"Waarom kwamen jullie eigenlijk zoo laat thuis, jongens?" En toen
het drietal zweeg: "He?"

"Nou," zei Hugo, "ik had haast nog niet gereden, en 't was vandaag
de laatste dag," en Piet mompelde iets van "wist niet hoe laat het
was."

"En waarom ging jij dan niet eerder naar huis?" vroeg Oom Tom
aan zijn neefje.

"Omdat Hugo en Piet nog niet gingen," antwoordde Eduard, half

verlegen, want hij vond zelf dat het klonk als: "Waarom lach je?"
"Omdat hij lacht."
 [a147] "'t Zijn me de verontschuldigingen wél!" merkte de Kapitein
op.

"Hadt u ons dan ook op de fiets laten gaan, dan waren we veel
eerder thuis geweest," waagde Piet. Maar nu werd zijn Vader
werkelijk boos en verklaarde dat ze verder van 't jaar heelemaal van
't ijs thuis konden blijven.

"'t Dooit nu ...." begon Piet, maar toen hij zijn Vader aankeek
oordeelde hij het toch wijzer de rest maar voor zich te houden.

En Oom Tom vervolgde brommend: "Dat rent maar naar de ijsbaan

en al het werk lijdt er onder ..."

Dat ellendige werk ook! En Eduard bedacht hoe door 't haastige
schrijven zijn sommen Maandag zoo slordig waren geweest, dat hij
er twee moest overmaken. — En dat moest nu ook al vanavond! —

"Nu gaan we Lineke aankleeden voor de visite, en dan zullen we

meteen Bep en die twee Indianen in bed stoppen!" zei de juffrouw na
het eten, want zij ging zelf ook uit, en dan zorgde ze altijd dat de
kleintjes eerst onder de wol lagen.

"Beppie gaat nog niet mee," vertelde 't kleine meisje, "Beppie gaat
eerst spelletjes doen met Ee."

Piet begon te lachen; Eduard zag het toen hij zijn stoel opnam om
die tegen den muur te zetten. Zijn humeur werd er niet beter op,
want Piet had hem al eenige malen met die kinderachtige spelletjes
geplaagd, en 't klonk dan ook onvriendelijker dan hij zelf wel
bedoelde toen hij kortaf zei: "Op mij [a148] hoef je niet te rekenen, ik
doe vanavond niet mee."

"En daarnet zei je dat je 't nog niet wist?"

"Toen wist ik 't ook nog niet, maar nu weet ik 't wel."
 De tranen kwamen bij Bep voor den dag. "Maar ik wou spelletjes
doen!" huilde ze.

"Kind, zeur niet zoo, ik heb geen tijd." En Tante Lina voegde er bij:
"Maar Bep, wat is dat nu, je begrijpt toch wel dat Edu niet altijd zin
heeft om spelletjes met jou te doen! Kom, droog gauw je tranen af."

"Ik heb geen zakdoek," snikte Bep, "en ik vind Ee een nare
jongen!"

"Dank je voor 't compliment!" zei Eduard, maar Tante Lina wenkte
hem dat hij nu maar liever verdwijnen moest.

Eduard ging naar de leerkamer, gooide met een ontevreden gezicht

zijn boeken en schriften op tafel, schoof met een ruk een stoel aan
en begon te rekenen. En hij keek zelfs niet op toen Hugo en Piet
even later ook binnen kwamen en aan 't werk gingen.

Van uit de huiskamer drong nog het huilen en dwingen van Beppie
tot Eduard door; dan weer hoorde hij Tante Lina's stem; en terwijl hij
haastig voortschreef aan zijn sommen, verstond hij opeens toen de
huiskamerdeur openging: "Beppie is stout!" Daarna hoorde hij de
juffrouw, die met Lineke en de kleine jongens naar boven was
gegaan, weer beneden komen; hij hoorde haar praten in de kamer
[a149] en met Bep de trap weer oploopen; 't kleine meisje snikte nog
steeds, en "Ee was ook niets lief!" meende hij nog te verstaan. —
Toen werd het stil in de gang.

En Eduard schreef weer verder, telkens gapend, met een akelig

stijf gevoel in zijn armen en ijskoude voeten.

Lineke vertrok naar het partijtje, en Eduard hoorde de stem van

den oppasser, die haar zou brengen. — Met een slag viel de
huisdeur achter hen dicht.

Heel stil was 't in de leerkamer, en half soezend luisterde Eduard

naar 't suizen van 't gas en 't krassen van Hugo's pen, en even keek
hij naar Piet, die vanavond bij uitzondering ook zoo heel rustig
doorwerkte. — En weer ging hij aan 't rekenen, totdat eindelijk om
kwart over acht de twee oude sommen overgeschreven en vier van
de nieuwe afwaren. — Eén zou wel fout zijn, en de vijfde kende hij
niet, maar er was geen tijd meer om langer te probeeren. — Waar
was dat vervelende Fransche boek nu? Eduard zocht op tafel en in
zijn tasch, maar 't was niet te vinden, en toen bedacht hij dat 't boven
was blijven liggen. — In een vlijtige bui had hij 's ochtends onder 't
aankleeden woordjes willen leeren, maar 't was bij 't goede
voornemen gebleven, en hij had vanmorgen 't heele boek vergeten.

En Eduard liep naar boven om 't te halen. — 't Zou zeker wel
ergens op zijn kamertje liggen, op tafel of zoo. Maar hij vond het niet
dadelijk, en toen [a150] hij licht wilde maken schenen de lucifers ook
al verdwenen te zijn. Waar waren die lamme dingen nu toch? 't
Maakte hem woedend, dat gezoek voor niets in 't donker, en
eindelijk liep hij 't portaal weer over naar de meisjeskamer, om daar 't
brandende nachtlichtje te halen.

Bij de deur bleef hij opeens staan. Wat was dat voor een geluid? Hij
luisterde even. — Was dat Bep die daar huilde?

Op zijn teenen liep hij naar binnen, zijn oogen op Beppie's

ledikantje gevestigd. Bij 't flauwe schijnsel van 't nachtlichtje was van
zijn kleine nichtje niets anders te ontdekken dan een verwarde
blonde krullebol. Maar toen hij voor 't bed stond, waar de dekens half
uithingen, hoorde hij heel duidelijk dat ze huilde.

"Beppie, slaap je niet?" vroeg Eduard, fluisterend om de kleine

jongens in de kamer er naast niet wakker te maken.

Een hevig gesnik volgde.

"Bep, lieve kleine Bep, wat is er toch?" en Eduard boog zich over
zijn nichtje heen.

Bep draaide zich half om, en even keken de groote blauwe oogen
hem aan.
 "Ik heb 't zoo vreeselijk warm," snikte een schor stemmetje, "en
mijn dekens zijn aldoor weg!"

"Wil ik ze dan weer goed leggen?"

"Dat geeft toch niets, ze zijn telkens wéér weg!"

Eduard begreep niet wat hij met haar beginnen moest. — Arme
kleine Bep! Had hij maar met haar [a151] gespeeld, of was hij
tenminste maar niet zoo onvriendelijk geweest! En wat moest hij nu
toch doen? Hij kon nu toch maar zoo niet weer naar beneden gaan!
En heel zacht vroeg hij: "Wil ik je dan even uit bed nemen, Bep, en
alles weer over instoppen?"

"Ja," huilde Bep, en voorzichtig sloeg Eduard een deken om haar

heen. — Ze was eigenlijk te zwaar voor hem, maar met veel moeite
tilde hij haar toch op den stoel naast 't bed.

"Ik wou wat drinken!"

Eduard ging naar de waschtafel en schonk een glas half vol water,
telkens schrikkend als hij tegen iets aanstootte. En toen Bep
gedronken had begon hij aan 't bed; eerst gooide hij de dekens er af;
hij legde het laken recht en stopte het aan de kanten zoo stevig
mogelijk in, en daarna zwoegde hij met de dekens tot zijn vingers er
pijn van deden. Maar eindelijk was 't toch klaar. En voor dat hij Bep
weer in bed tilde ging hijzelf nog even op den stoel zitten, en zijn
kleine nichtje voorzichtig op zijn knieën nemende vroeg hij zacht
dicht bij Beppie's oor, — "Vind je me nu nog zoo'n nare jongen,
Bep?" en even streek hij met zijn wang over het zachte haar.

"Nee, maar vanmiddag was je niets lief!"

"Dat weet ik wel, het spijt me erg." En stil bleef hij met haar zitten
tot ze heelemaal bedaard was, toen hielp hij haar weer in bed
kruipen en dekte haar toe.

"Nacht Bep!"
 [a152] "Nacht Eetje!" klonk 't heel slaperig; "ik houd nu weer heel
veel van je!"
 Eduard draaide zich om, zijn oogen vol tranen, en met de lucifers in
zijn hand liep hij op zijn teenen 't portaal weer over; 't nachtlichtje
wilde hij nu liever maar niet meenemen.
 In zijn kamertje stak hij de kaars aan; 't Fransche boek lag op zijn
bed en zijn lucifers waren op de waschtafel verzeild geraakt. — En
voor hij de kaars [a156] weer uitblies maakte hij zijn koffer nog even
open, en nam uit de chocola-doos van Vader een flik, die hij bij Bep
bracht en met een zacht "mond open!" in Beppie's mond duwde.

"Lekker!" fluisterde Bep half slapend, "hoe kom je daaraan?"

"Van Vader gekregen voordat Vader wegging," legde Eduard uit,

"ga nu maar gauw slapen!"

Toen holde hij de trap weer af. 't Was over half negen toen hij weer
op zijn stoel in de leerkamer zat en op de klok keek.

"Wat heb je toch uitgevoerd?" vroeg Hugo, "ik dacht dat je al naar
bed was!"

"Ik had jullie toch nog niet goeienacht gezegd!"

"Nee, maar je bleef zoo lang weg."

"Kon m'n Fransche boek niet vinden, en m'n lucifers waren weg, en
...."

"Och," viel Piet hem in de rede, "hij heeft natuurlijk vast een dutje
gedaan! Heb je niet gezien dat hij de heele avond al heeft zitten
gapen? En kijk z'n oogen eens raar staan!"
 [a157]

IX.
"Is er een brief van Vader voor me gekomen?"

Tante Lina keek verwonderd op van haar naaiwerk. — "Een brief

van Vader? Welnee! Hoe kom je daar zoo bij?"

"Ik dacht het zoo maar," zei Eduard teleurgesteld. Vanmiddag

onder de aardrijkskundeles had hij er ineens aan gedacht:
"Misschien is er straks als ik thuis kom wel een brief van Vader!" En
nu was er niets!

"'t Zal nog wel een dag of wat duren voor je een brief krijgt,"
vervolgde Tante Lina. "'t Is vandaag Dinsdag — laat eens zien —
nee, voor Donderdag kan er toch geen brief zijn. — Zou Vader uit
Port Saïd schrijven?"

"Ja, dat heeft Vader beloofd," verzekerde Eduard. Maar Tante ging
er niet verder over door. "In de maat spelen," zei ze tegen Lineke,
die piano studeerde, "Een twee drie vier, een twee drie vier!"

Eduard ging voor 't raam staan en trommelde tegen 't glas. Alles
was ook zoo vervelend! Op school [a162] en thuis, overal was 't
even akelig, en iedereen deed zoo vervelend, en hij was verkouden,
en hij had zoo'n naar gevoel in zijn hoofd, en 't regende aldoor. — En
was er nu maar een brief van Vader geweest!

Dat was tenminste iets prettigs!

 Donderdag pas.
— Dat duurde nu
nog zoo'n eeuwige
tijd! — En was 't
hier nu maar niet
zoo ongezellig! Dat
vervelende
getjingel op die
piano, en Tante
Lina die verder
maar niets meer
zei! En waar zaten
de anderen toch
allemaal? Zeker
boven ergens,
maar 't kon hem
eigenlijk ook niet
schelen, hij had
toch geen zin om
iets te gaan
uitvoeren! En stil
bleef hij door het
raam naar buiten
kijken, in den tuin,
waar alles er ook al
zoo nat en saai
uitzag.

[a163] Op school
was 't al even ellendig tegenwoordig. 't Was vandaag nu al de
tweede keer geweest sinds Vader weg was, dat hij had moeten
schoolblijven omdat hij zijn Fransche les niet kende. Wat zou Vader
er wel van zeggen als hij 't wist! Hier vertelde je 't natuurlijk niet,
niemand vroeg er naar, 't ging ook niemand iets aan! Als Vader er
geweest was had hij 't ook zeker die tweede keer wel gekend! Vader
zou wel gemaakt hebben dat hij 't wist, maar als je hier aan Hugo
vroeg om je te overhooren zei hij dadelijk: "'k Heb wel wat anders te
doen!" en Piet wou wel, maar die vroeg zulke gekke dingen dat je er
heelemaal niets mee opschoot. En Oom Tom wou hij 't niet vragen,
want Piet en Hugo's lessen werden ook niet overhoord.

Lineke hield op met studeeren, vertelde dat ze niet meer kon zien.

"'t Is nog licht genoeg," zei Tante Lina, "ik kan ook nog wel zien te
naaien. En anders speel je maar gamma's en vingeroefeningen, die
heb je toch ook nog niet gehad."

"Die hoeven niet elken dag," zeurde Lineke.

"Nu, gisteren heb je ze ook niet gestudeerd."

"Toen had ik les!" En na een halve minuut, want haar Moeder

naaide rustig verder: "Moeten ze nu toch?"

"Ja natuurlijk."

't Pianokrukje piepte toen Lineke zich weer omdraaide, en ze

begon met haar loopjes.

[a164] Zuchtend stopte Eduard zijn handen in zijn zakken en

duwde zijn voorhoofd tegen 't koude glas. Dat afschuwelijke
eentonige pianospelen maakte hem nog ellendiger dan hij al was, en
was er nu tenminste maar eens iemand die iets vriendelijks tegen
hem zei, maar 't was net of alle menschen hem even naar vonden.

"Edu!"

"Ja Tante."

"Waarom ga je zelf niet eens een brief aan Vader schrijven? Vader
vroeg nog of je vooral gauw schreef, weet je wel?"

Eduard kwam bij de tafel staan. "'k Weet niet wat ik schrijven
moet." Tante Lina keek hem verbaasd aan.
 "Weet je niet wat je schrijven moet? Je kunt toch vertellen over 't
schaatsenrijden, en hoe 't je hier bevalt, en over school, en ...."

"Ik heb geen zin in schrijven ook," viel Eduard in de rede. In ieder
geval hoefde Tante Lina hem niet te vertellen wat hij zetten moest!
Als hij schrijven wou schreef hij toch wat hij zelf wilde!

"Nu, ga dan viool studeeren, dat heb je van de week bijna niet
gedaan en morgen heb je immers les?"

"'k Heb Vrijdag pas les."

"Ik dacht dat je verteld hadt dat je 's Woensdags les hadt."

"Och ja, dat had ik vroeger ook," zei Eduard [a165] ongeduldig,
"maar verleden week kon mijnheer Hofman niet, en daarvóór had Ik
gevraagd of ik 't verzetten mocht omdat 't toen Woensdag Vaders
laatste dag was, en nu heeft Mijnheer Hofman gevraagd of we nu
vooreerst maar altijd op Vrijdag wilden komen. En studeeren kan 'k
niet als hier piano gespeeld wordt."

Eduard schrikte zelf toen hij 't gezegd had, maar Tante Lina gaf
hem heelemaal geen antwoord meer en liet hem stil staan. — Had
Tante nu toch maar iets prettigs bedacht! Dat vervelende taallesje
maakte hij nu ook niet; 't was nogal kort, en dat kon best na het eten,
maar wat moest hij nu dan doen?

Eentonig klonken de vingeroefeningen.

Tante Lina stond op om 't licht aan te steken en deed de gordijnen

dicht. — Toen nam zij zonder op Eduard te letten haar naaiwerk
weer op.

"Tante."

"Wat is er?"

"Hebt u ook een velletje postpapier voor me? Ik wou toch maar aan
Vader gaan schrijven."
 "In 't schrijfbureau op Ooms studeerkamer, 't bovenste laadje
rechts, haal daar maar een velletje uit en daar liggen de couverten
ook."

"En waar moet ik dan gaan zitten?"

Tante Lina's geduld was eindelijk uitgeput. "Hé, jongen, zeur zoo
niet, in de leerkamer niet natuurlijk, want daar is Keetje nog niet
klaar met schoonmaken, maar je kunt toch wel ergens anders zitten!
Hier, of [a166] boven, op je eigen kamertje, of blijf in Ooms
studeerkamer, Oom komt toch pas laat thuis, en dan mag je 't gas
optrekken, 't kan mij verder heusch niet schelen!"

Eduard liep naar boven; in Ooms studeerkamer leek hem nog 't
aanlokkelijkste.

Even duwde hij de deur van de speelkamer open toen hij er langs
liep; de kleintjes waren met den trein aan 't spelen en de grond was
in een spoorwegnet herschapen. In 't midden van de kamer stond
Piet, die zichzelf voor deze gelegenheid tot Directeur van de
Spoorwegmaatschappij bevorderd had, zijn bevelen uit te deelen. —
"Chef!" riep hij tegen Tommy, "wie heeft de nachtdienst voor de
Bazelexpres?"

"'t Is Beppie's beurt," vertelde Tom, en Piet vervolgde: "Nou,

machinist, wil je dan alsjeblieft eens dadelijk een beetje gang in je
locomotief brengen? Hij is al twee minuten over zijn tijd!"

"Ja maar de menschen zijn nog niet allemaal ingestapt!" beweerde

Bep.

"Die moeten dan maar met de volgende mee, denk je soms, dat we
daar op kunnen wachten? Allo, wind op, vlug een beetje!"

"Nou, Piet!" waarschuwde de juffrouw, die vanuit haar hoekje bij 't
raam een oogje in 't zeil hield.