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Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine

Edited by
Gülistan Gürbey, Sabine Hofmann, Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder
Between State and Non-State
Gülistan Gürbey • Sabine Hofmann • Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder
Editors

Between State and


Non-State
Politics and Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine
Editors
Gülistan Gürbey Sabine Hofmann
Department of Political and Social Department of Political and Social
Sciences, Sciences,
Freie Universität (FU) Berlin Freie Universität (FU) Berlin
Berlin, Germany Berlin, Germany

Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder


Mustafa Barzani Section for Kurdish
Studies,
University of Erfurt
Erfurt, Germany

ISBN 978-1-349-95065-2    ISBN 978-1-137-60181-0 (eBook)


DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-60181-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957335

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017


This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known
or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover image © Planet Observer / Getty Images

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature


The registered company is Nature America Inc.
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A.
Preface

Our publication has only been made possible through committed coop-
eration and our colleagues’ ambitious work. An anthology is only as good
as all of its contributions.
As editors of this book, we were fortunate to have a constellation of
internationally recognized scholars who believed in the project and agreed
to write the individual chapters. We are very grateful for having won such
outstanding authors for our project. A particular matter was also to include
the specific perspective out of the region. Therefore, we are very glad to
have won authors from Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine. We would like to
express our gratitude to all the authors who contributed to this book.
Especially, we thank Palgrave Macmillan for agreeing to publish this
book. We are grateful to Dr. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, former Editorial
Director, for her support during the whole process and Alisa Pulver, former
Editorial Assistant, Ravi Ashok, Project Manager and Alina Yurova, Editor.
We would also like to thank Sarah Haeckel for the layout of the manu-
script and the whole team at the Mustafa Barzani Section for Kurdish
Studies at the University of Erfurt for their technical support.
We hope that our essays will be a source of inspiration for the inter-
ested reader to find new questions and thoughts about Kurdistan-Iraq
and Palestine.

February 2016 Gülistan Gürbey


Bonn, Berlin, and Erfurt Sabine Hofmann
Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

v
Contents

1 Introduction: Conceptualizing De Facto Statehood


of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine   1
Gülistan Gürbey, Sabine Hofmann,
and Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

Part I Historical Background and Turning Points  23

2 The Iraqi Kurds: Historical Backgrounds


of a Nonstate Nation  25
Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

3 Historical Background of the State-Building


Process in Palestine  43
As’ad Ghanem

Part II Political System and Internal Power Structure  59

4 The Evolution of the Political System of the Kurdistan


Region of Iraq  61
Gareth Stansfield

vii
viii Contents

5 The (Quasi-) Political System of Palestine  77


Ghada alMadbouh

Part III Economic Fundamentals and Challenges 101

6 The Economic System(s) of the Kurdistan


Regional Government, Iraq103
Sardar Aziz

7 What Is the “Palestinian Economy”? 123


Raja Khalidi

Part IV Civil Society and “State” 141

8 The Reality of Civil Society in Kurdistan Region 143


Murad Hakeem

9 Civil Society in Palestine 159


Samir Awad

Part V Foreign Relations: Examples 175

10 The United States and the Kurds of Iraq: Strange Allies 177


David Romano, Rikar Hussein,
and Stephen Rowe

11 Palestinian Diplomacy: Past and Present 197


Mkhaimar Abusada
Contents  ix

12 Conclusions 213
Gülistan Gürbey, Sabine Hofmann,
and Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

Chronology 227
Kurdistan-Iraq
Müzehher Selcuk

Palestine 245
Silvia Nicola

Fact Sheets 261
Kurdistan-Iraq
Palestine

List of Contributors 267

Index 273
List of Tables

Table 6.1 The Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey 2007,


http://www.iier.org/i/uploaded files/301208Household
Survey COSIT5D1.pdf  110
Table 7.1 Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory:
Key Indicators, 2010 and 2013 133

xi
CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Conceptualizing De Facto


Statehood of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine

Gülistan Gürbey, Sabine Hofmann,


and Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

The Middle East is experiencing turbulent times. Especially, the threat of


the so-called “Islamic State” is dramatically shaking the regional order, cre-
ated by the interests of the old European colonial states after World War
I. Already, previous borders are partially dissolved—the states of Syria and
Iraq do not exist in the forms we knew anymore. Classified as “failed states”
(Rotberg 2003), their territorial and national unity only exists on paper.
Those processes of state decay and tendencies of dissolution of the previ-
ous order raise several critical questions: Are we going through a historical

G. Gürbey (*)
Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität (FU) Berlin,
Berlin, Germany
S. Hofmann
Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität (FU) Berlin,
Berlin, Germany
F.I. Seyder
Mustafa Barzani Section for Kurdish Studies, University of Erfurt,
Erfurt, Germany

© The Author(s) 2017 1


G. Gürbey et al. (eds.), Between State and Non-State,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-60181-0_1
2 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

period, similar to the time after World War I, during which new borders
and new states could actually emerge? Are we experiencing an erosion of
the demarcation of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, as critical observers pre-
dict? Do the current events mark “[t]he end of the Middle East as we
know it?”, as Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, titled his opening
speech at the Security Conference in Munich in February 2015 (Annan
2015). Which formations of state and statehood in the Middle East are
to be expected? And which consequences do those developments have,
especially on such nonstate entities in the region, which emerged from this
historic demarcation and from the violent conflicts connected with that?
What does that exactly mean for the situation and political future of the
Palestinians who defend themselves against the Israeli occupation, and that
of the Kurds who currently fight in the front lines against the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and experience a remarkable historical impetus? In
the face of the complexity and the unpredictability of the current events,
these questions cannot be answered easily.
With this anthology, we want to put Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine into
focus and aim to observe both regions in comparative respects. The cur-
rent events, the common regional localization, as well as the mutual histor-
ical starting point make an analysis especially appealing. The anthology is
dedicated to that. Therefore, we focus primarily on the “internals” of both
political entities. The internal political systems and structures of power are
in the center of attention, their development and transformation. Thus,
it is not about debating the exciting controversy if Kurdistan-Iraq and
Palestine should be regarded as states or if the chances for international
recognition are higher because of the current developments. Our interest
applies primarily to the analysis of the internal dynamics and the demo-
cratic–political developments of both entities. Furthermore, we aim to
bring out the essential common grounds and differences of both entities,
though without seeking a systematical, theoretical comparison.

Theoretical and Conceptual Dimension


Today as well, without a doubt, national states have double sovereignty,
they shape the international system: internally, vis-à-vis their own citizens,
and externally, toward other states. However, especially beyond the legal
international recognition of new states, there is a global multitude and
diversity of entities in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East
which do not fit to the description of national states in today’s world.
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 3

Those political entities are internally characterized as political rule through


specific processes of institutionalization of power relations and repre-
sent new forms of political rule beyond the state. To those belong both
Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, which are the focus of this anthology.
Nevertheless, it can be stated that the discourses about political rule are
always state focused. State or statehood—especially regarding the model
of the ideal state shaped by the Westphalian sovereignty—and its global
spread are constantly the focus of such discourses. Also undefeated is the
global appeal of state and statehood for communities and political move-
ments all over the world because at the center of their aim are the goals
of statehood and state sovereignty. This close link of political rule with
the Western-dominated ideal of state as a political framework of reference
results from the different historical waves of new statehood during the
twentieth century. Processes such as colonization, decolonization and the
end of the Cold War thus played an essential role. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, of Yugoslavia, and of Czechoslovakia, in the early 1990s, a
short founding wave of new, internationally recognized states took place.
However, this process has since lost momentum because receiving formal-­
state independence was only successful in a few cases, such as Eritrea in
1993, East Timor in 2002, Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011. On
the other hand, critics point out that the unbroken state centeredness of
the discourses about new forms of nonstate orders makes it more difficult
to face the reality of nonstate orders and to explore their order- and peace
opportunities. Because they are forms of rule without a power monopoly
or entitlements to the power monopoly, the challenge lies in making peace
and order without a power monopoly. Some scholars even conclude that
the global rise of the modern state as a political power has reached “its
zenith” (von Trotha 2011, 25).
The reference point for statehood was and is the modern national state,
as it has developed since the seventeenth century. Historically, the monop-
olization of power is the first step in the development of the modern state
in Western Europe. Even for the sociologist Max Weber, the decisive cri-
terion for the state was sovereign power. He describes it as the monopoly
of legitimate physical compulsion, which an administration support is in
charge of to impose order (Weber 1988 [1922]). In the Weberian sense,
as is known, state rule is legitimate power, and rule can be legitimized in
various ways: legally and rationally, traditionally, (neo-) patrimonially and
charismatically.
4 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

With the increasing nationalization of political rule, the state monopoly


of power as well was bound to structural processes of change. Following
the monopolization of the use of force and the consolidation of territorial
sovereignty were the establishment of a fiscal monopoly, as well as a legal
constitutionalization of the rule of law and the democratic legitimation of
state rule. The binding of the use of force to the enacted law, as well as
the democratic control of power decisions overmolded the power monop-
oly over time—a monopoly of legitimate use of force transformed itself.
Thus, from the 1950s until the 1970s, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) states were not only constitu-
tional states, but also democratic states, welfare states and states having
the power and the fiscal monopoly and controlling their external borders
effectively. They should fulfill that especially because it was generally seen
as a genuine task of the state to provide for the rule of law, legitimacy,
welfare and security.
Taking up the basic elements of the ideal state (territoriality, external
and internal sovereignty, power-, fiscal- and dispensing monopoly, and
administrative apparatus), state means a political order, which has success-
fully monopolized legitimate use of force, legislative and tax collection
through a bureaucratic administration support toward the population of a
specific territory, and therefore has external recognition. A nonstate order
however, exercises legitimate rule without such bureaucratic administra-
tive support or external recognition.
But how can the diversity of political forms of rule beyond the state be
understood scientifically and theoretically as a new phenomenon in the
international system? A cursory view shows that in spite of the increased
scientific interest, the theoretical discussion is still at the beginning. This
is particularly expressed in the different terms of “quasi states”, “de facto
states”, “unrecognized states”, “states-within-states” and “contested
states”. However it is noted here that Robert H. Jackson specifically deliv-
ered the first important impetus with the concept of “quasi-states”. Based
on postcolonial states in sub-Saharan Africa, he points out a qualitative
new form of statehood: “quasi-states” which have a “legal sovereignty out-
ward” but which are missing the “empiric sovereignty inward” (Jackson
1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Quasi-states in Jackson’s understand-
ing are failed states, differing from strong states through missing or partial
existence of empiric statehood in Western understanding.
From that, various authors conceptually concluded an opposite from
quasi-states, expressing it with different terminologies: “de facto states”
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 5

by Scott Pegg (Pegg 1998, 2004), “unrecognized quasi states”1 by Pal


Kolsto (Kolsto 2006) and “states-within-states” by Paul Kingston and
Ian Spears (Kingston and Spears 2004). Those concepts start exactly at
the political formation of order inside a formal-state territory. In spite of
the different terminologies, partially leading to confusion, those concepts
include political entities which distinguish themselves through an empiric
statehood in the sense of a higher political, economic and normative force
of integration, though missing the quasi-states’ legal sovereignty to the
external. Whereas the mentioned concepts cover a wide range of entities
with a variety of dynamics and causes of their establishment and persis-
tence, as well as domestic forms of rule, the criteria for classification and
differentiation are more complicated.
In spite of different terminologies, Pegg notes (1998, 2004) a wide
consensus regarding the basic elements for a definition of de facto states.
Some of those basic elements result from the definition of state in the
1933 Montevideo Convention about rights and duties of states, and
include the main elements of state territory, nation and state authority.
Altogether, Pegg lists six basic elements, which characterize de facto states:
an organized political leadership which receives support from the society,
has reached sufficient capacity, offers government services for a defined
population in a defined territory, has effective control over its territory (at
least for two years), feels able to enter into relationships with other states,
searches actively for a widespread international recognition but is not able
to reach such, and regardless of how effective control and government are,
is partially or totally not recognized by the international community of
sovereign states and therefore stays illegitimate. Other authors (Caspersen
and Stansfield 2011) add the criterion of a proven aim for independence,
for example, through a formal declaration or with a referendum.2
Nevertheless, it remains true that the scientific research interest regard-
ing de facto states is largely determined by questions regarding external sov-
ereignty and statehood, factors of recognition and nonrecognition as well as
effects on the international system. Research provides important knowledge
for that. However, the scientific analysis of the internal dynamics of political
rule and democratic–political development of de facto states stays largely
unnoticed. This internal level affects the spectrum of the urgent questions
of peace and conflict research and democracy research, the correlation
between peace and democracy and building of democratic institutions and
values, especially with regard to the aspect of orders of rule beyond the
state. This also affects the causal relation, as the status of de facto statehood,
6 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

which results from external and internal factors, affects the behavior, the
development and the decision-making process of de facto states. It is now
necessary to take those aspects even more into focus in order to understand
and be able to improve the description of de facto states.
With the anthology on hand we want to begin exactly with this dimen-
sion by focusing on the internal dynamic of de facto states using the exam-
ple of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine. Our book is the first which compares
the internal dimension, politics and society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine:

• It gives an overview of the current political, economic and societal


situation and challenges in both regions.
• It gives an insight into the historical fundamentals and the trans-
formation processes of the internal power structures, the economic
basics, the civil societies and the relationship between “state” and
civil society.
• It shows the similarities and differences between the cases of Palestine
and Kurdistan, provides explanations and contributes to a better
understanding of both entities.

With that, we do not claim to have a theoretical science-based system-


atic comparison. We rather set a broad framework in order to ensure the
topic’s contextual localization. The Pegg understanding of de facto states,
completed by Caspersen/Stansfield, serves as a conceptual starting point.
It should also be noted at this point that for ease of reading we—as the
anthology’s editors—use “Kurdistan-Iraq” as a synonym for the federal
region of Kurdistan in Iraq or Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
and “Palestine” as a synonym for the Palestinian territories on the West
Bank and in the Gaza Strip under the rule of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) of 1994. Our choice of terminology, though, does not oblige the
other authors to take it on. This also applies to the term “de facto state” to
which we, as editors, only assign KRG and PA contextually. Here also the
anthology’s authors are naturally free in their own conceptual–contextual
mapping.
The preference of this contextual localization of Kurdistan-Iraq and
Palestine as de facto states we account for with two factors:

1. First of all, it is the term itself because it puts the focus on the con-
nection of the de facto state, and therefore its autonomy and sover-
eignty, which it achieves with its own actions. Instead of focusing
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 7

on questions of recognition or nonrecognition the term essentially


highlights the actor and his development. It offers clear criteria for
the definition of the actor as a de facto state, takes the crisis of legiti-
macy of de facto states and the importance of the permanent striving
for legitimation of the understanding of de facto states into account
and considers the processual causal relationship of interaction and
communicative action in a transnational context.
2. Second, the basic elements in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, as men-
tioned by Pegg, are each to be found in different intensity and shap-
ing. In this anthology, attention is given primarily to the internal
power structure and the link between factual statehood and demo-
cratic–political development. That is because de facto states and the
striving for international legitimacy are not per se a guarantee for
successful state-building and democratization. In both regions,
political forms of rule or orders beyond national sovereignty have
developed which are marked by an external framework (regional and
international politics and economy), by long-lasting historic violent
conflicts and their internal dynamics. In various respects, both
regions are going through a conflict transformation process which is
not finished and affects internal power structures. Without consider-
ing this conglomerate and its interdependencies, the concrete for-
mation and shaping of the political orders are incomprehensible.

The analysis of the internal dynamics of political power structure is done


according to three substantial elementary functions of social orders, postu-
lated by Norbert Elias (1939, 1983) and Dietrich Jung (2001), control of
physical power, guarantee of economic reproduction, establishment of cul-
tural norms and values, and creation of legitimacy as well as with recourse
to the functions of a state, which are derived from it by Joel Migdal
(Migdal 1988, 1998, 2001). The state should be able to p ­ ermeate territo-
ries through negative (“security”) and positive (“welfare”) procedure man-
agement, regulate societal relations as well as mobilize and appropriately
apply resources (procuring and allocation). Thus, functioning social orders
are characterized by a certain degree of “specific” and “diffuse support”
(Easton 1965) as well as a genuine trust in the state’s monopoly of power.
Other than in “strong states”, this is not based on the faith in a democratic
rational constitutional order but rather is often achieved by the integra-
tion into patrimonial networks or by reference to traditions (Brinkerhoff
and Goldsmith 2002). According to Migdal, mobilization and utilization
8 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

of resources are two fundamental categories which already played a role


for “strong states” and are responsible for the physical reproduction of an
order. The modality of using resources gives information about the organi-
zation between actors and their position in the societal system of reproduc-
tion. Resources can, for example, be oriented in the public interest or can
be used particular-clientelistically. Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism
(Eisenstadt 1973; Erdmann and Engel 2007) are in this context the main
structural element of nonstate orders, in delineation of Western legal and
rational organization, in the sense of the meaning of the predominance of
informal relations over formal regulations.
Resuming, we want to focus on such internal processes in Kurdistan-­
Iraq and Palestine in their specific shaping, development and transforma-
tion. On the basis of formulated key questions, the results are summarized
comparatively. These key questions deal with legitimacy and transforma-
tion of governance and the relationship between formation, political par-
ticipation and democratization:

• How is political power structured and where does it draw its legiti-
macy from?
• How does the internal transformation affect the system of gover-
nance, political participation and democratic development?

To bring together individual contributions with considerable stand-­


alone value in a simple, yet comprehensive structure, the analysis will focus
on these key questions. The aim is (1) to set out the basic principles and
conditions of the internal power structure of Kurdistan and Palestine, and
(2) to win new insights that affect the governance contexts from beyond
the state.

Anthology Structure
The analysis of each internal power structure occurs in four areas: Historical
development process, process of institutionalization and state-building,
economic basics and civil society. With this, the process of institutionaliza-
tion and transformation of each political order is elaborated with consider-
ation of the historic caesura. In detail, the basics and functions of internal
power structure of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, the economic basics, the
shaping of civil society and the relation between “state” and civil society
will be analyzed.
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 9

Beyond that, the external and regional political action beyond the state
will be partially explained and exemplified.
In conclusion, the findings will be summarized comparatively and a
prospect will be provided without making any claim to a scientific theo-
retical comprehensive systematic comparison. In the conclusion, the feed-
back will be offered on the introduction and the key questions. Based on
the key questions, the results will be worked out in detail. The particular
challenges and characteristics of the Palestinian and Iraqi Kurdish de facto
states, as well as the outstanding comparative features, similarities and dif-
ferences of the two cases will be discussed. Conclusions that go beyond
the specific study of the Kurdish and Palestinian experiences will be drawn
from the comparison and contribute to the wider study and understanding
of statehood in the Middle East.
Last but not least two chronologies present an overview over the
most important events: Müzehher Selcuk prepared the chronology for
Kurdistan-Iraq and Silvia Nicola for Palestine.

Articles of the Anthology


Historical process of development is the focus of the contributions of Ferhad
Ibrahim Seyder and As’ad Ghanem. Both authors bring out the historic
basics and interruptions in the formation of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine.
Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder deals with the historical genesis of the Kurdish
issue in Iraq. He assumes that the Kurdish issue was a result of the impact
of the Kurds’ aim for independence on the British project to found a state
under the name of Iraq. The conflict was not solved after Iraq’s indepen-
dence; on the contrary, it got worse with the overthrow of the monarchy
and the seizure of power by Arab nationalists. The escalation through the
Baath-rule reached dramatic forms with the use of poison gas. The Kurds
were looking for security after the erection of the UN security zone. The
federal structure, determined in the constitution of 2005, and the option
of statehood are inter alia results of the traumatic experiences under
Saddam Hussein’s rule.
The Kurdish issue in Iraq starts with the British conquest of
Mesopotamia. The foundation of a state, which the three occupied prov-
inces Mosul, Baghdad and Basra should be part of, also started with the
realization of the project. The majority of the inhabitants of the province
of Mosul, the Kurds, were against the annexation of their native country
to the Arab state of Iraq. The negative attitude of the Kurds was met with
10 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

empty promises that were not binding, but first of all with violence by the
British who realized the project step by step. This policy was continued
even after the formal independence of Iraq. The policy of forced integra-
tion did not change even when Iraq stopped being a monarchy and became
at first a republic and then a republic of fear under Saddam Hussein. The
Kurds have fought against the national oppression under the leadership of
the Kurdish Democratic Party and their legendary leader Mustafa Barzani
(died in 1979) since 1961. Finally, they managed to make the government
in Baghdad accept their autonomy. It was a question of power for the Arab
nationalist rulers in Baghdad. That is why they went back on their prom-
ises, when they believed that the Kurds could subjugate them by force.
The most important historical moments before Saddam Hussein’s over-
throw as a result of the war in 2003 were: the use of poison gas in 1987
and 1988, the establishment of the UN protection zone in 1991, the
formation of a quasi-state after 1991. The Kurdish Achilles’ heel remains
the missing national consensus. The national consensus will decide if the
Kurds can establish their own state in the light of the disintegration of the
state system in the Middle East.
Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder comes to the conclusion that the differences in
the Kurdish elites seem to be an obstacle for statehood.
As’ad Ghanem shows the historical backgrounds of the development
of the political system in today’s Palestine and the factors of influence. He
categorizes the processes in Palestine on three levels of the Middle Eastern
conflict system. Starting from the finding that Palestine had never been
an independent state system, the author analyzes the process which went
through several stages and took many years until the current situation. He
differentiates several stages of the Palestinian development and renames the
most important results considering the objective of national sovereignty.
The start of the development of a unique Palestinian national move-
ment, is traced by Ghanem to the beginning of the twentieth century. As
three determining factors of that time he recalls the Zionist movement
and the Jews’ aspirations to establish a state; the failure of King Faisal’s
efforts to establish an Arab state in “Greater Syria” and finally the British
mandate over Palestine.
Thus, Ghanem identifies the first structures of a Palestinian national
movement at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s.
Along with societies, parties and organizations, institutions such as the
“Palestinian Higher Committee” were founded to represent the biggest
part of the Arab-Palestinian population and to argue for the rights of a
Palestinian people with a right to a Palestinian homeland.
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 11

The unsuccessful revolt from 1936 to 1939 and its consequence caused
a weakening of the Palestinian National Movement. In return, the Zionist
movement became stronger economically, politically and militarily in the
then mandated territory of Palestine and gained stronger international
support after World War II. The culmination of this stage was the adop-
tion of General Assembly Resolution 181 for the partition of Mandatory
Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab in 1947 and the
establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. The Nakba (“catastro-
phe”) disrupted political and social processes that had been at work in
the Palestinian community before the war. Even more so, the processes
that should have led to the formation of a Palestinian political entity were
halted in their tracks.
According to Ghanem, a new political activation took place in the fol-
lowing stage: During the decades following the Nakba, Palestinian activists
established their own national organizations. It was Yasser Arafat, leader
of the Fatah and later of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO),
who, as Ghanem shows, progressively took advantage of the difficulties of
running a national liberation campaign to tighten his control of the PLO
as a whole, including bodies and organizations viewed as posing a threat
to his dominant position within the organization. With the foundation of
Hamas and the first Intifada, a further stage in the Palestinian institutional
framework started. It came full circle, when the PLO leadership returned
to Gaza from exile and “the outside” and “the inside” came together after
the signing of the Declaration of Principles between the Israeli govern-
ment and the PLO leadership in 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian
Authority in 1994.
In the following stage, Ghanem identifies two parallel processes
of state-building in the Palestinian National Movement. On the one
hand, Arafat tightened his control of the PLO. On the other hand,
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were characterized by an
advanced process of pluralism and acceptance of the rules of democratic
decision-­making. These processes, however, did not take place under
the conditions of national independence but rather, as Ghanem states,
under the conditions of the continued measures of the Israeli govern-
ment towards the Israeli settlement in the West Bank.
Gareth Stansfield and Ghada alMadbouh look into the process of
institutionalization and state-building. They analyze the institutionaliza-
tion, shaping and functioning of the political system in Kurdistan-Iraq
and Palestine. Stansfield presents how the Kurds had accomplished the
creation and institutionalization of governmental structures within the
12 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

context of the federal Iraqi constitution. He analyzes the formation and


changes in the structural framework of the Kurdish political system, the
importance of executive and legislative branches of the government, the
significance of the leading political parties and of the leadership as the
traditional power-holders in today’s system. Stansfield also explains the
role of the legacies of historical evolutions that are evident in several forms
today. He shows how the features of the structures, processes and mul-
tiple behaviors come together into today’s system and suggests how it
may evolve in future years. Stansfield especially brings out the historic
context of justification of current formations in the political system as well
as the ongoing process of transition of the political system and the politi-
cal culture. This affects the political DNA—the notion of the autonomy
of the Kurds in Iraq—of the Kurdistan Region and its political system,
the rivalries between the parties (KDP and PUK), the inherent political
cultures as well as the political and territorial division. Despite the process
of standardization of the KRG, this division continues to have an effect
in various ways. At the same time, it is observed that the Kurdish political
culture is still shifting from a very traditional shaping to a modern and
democratic system, and a more curious and innovative culture is evolving.
This also leads to a change in the body of the Kurdish national project
from the elite to the masses. Stansfield points out that the power-sharing
concept, as determined by the Constitution of 2005, has been used as a
verification of seriousness of the political system. Now, the Kurdish elite
has found a functioning way through political debate without the mutual
use of military power. Stansfield emphasizes that internal conflict would
be improbable but the power play between the three parties (KDP, PUK,
Gorran) is the cause of strained relations and instabilities. Despite this, the
system is still somehow unified today and the political system continues its
transformation in different ways. Perhaps most important is the continued
democratization of the Kurdistan Region following the rise of Gorran and
the on-going endeavors of some members of the KRG to increase trans-
parency and accountability. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the need
to ensure the security of the political system of the Kurdistan Region pres-
ents more possibilities for continued positive development of its political
system. The Kurdish elites need to concentrate on their internal cohesion
and stability and strengthen their political system rather than to focus on
their internal conflicts and old legacies.
Ghada alMadbouh deals with the complexity of the Palestinian politi-
cal system. She discusses the theoretical basics, formation, change and
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 13

transformation of the system, its specifics and essential elements. The the-
oretical concepts currently available for a description of the political con-
struct of use of power are seen by alMadbouh as deficient when regarding
their application to Palestine’s government institutions. The focus should
be expanded. In contrast to the Western-shaped conceptual content, the
specific aspect of the Palestinian political system lies in the further determi-
nant of the Israeli occupation of the political system. Therefore, she uses
the term “quasi political system”.
AlMadbouh especially focuses on the power situation. Caused by the
Palestinian setting, she differentiates Palestinian politics between inter-
nal and external politics. In the internal politics she concentrates on the
leading internal power institutions and their competition (PLO, PA,
Hamas). For the analysis, she divides the term of office of the Palestinian
self-­administrative institutions into three phases: 2004, 2005–2007 and
2007–2015. She shows the internal mechanisms in the PLO and the neces-
sity of a transformation of the organization under the changed conditions.
In chronological order, she deals with results, complications and expe-
riences during the formation as a government/rule leading political unit
and the difficulties of the transition from activity in the diaspora to work
in the government responsible for the Palestinian entity. At the same time,
she shows the difficulty of performing the mechanisms of power in the face
of the serious obstacle that the PA does not rule over a unified territory
of disposal and the occupying power still dominates. However, alMad-
bouh also refers to internal rivalries in the PLO, political competition and
the aim for supremacy of both main political powers of Palestinian politics,
Fatah/PA und Hamas, as well as the political and armed measures/agents
Hamas uses toward Fatah and its followers.
Internal disunity and fractionality, rent-seeking of the authoritarian sys-
tem and changes of the client–state structure weaken the political and
institutional formation process. Thus, after the election of 2006 it came to
the breakup of the PA and open political separation in 2007 and the so far
open installation of a Palestinian unity government. Overall, alMadbouh
deduces, it is a political system still dependent on the inflow of external
funds and still externally dominated and in which the democratic and edu-
cational process therefore is limited.
Economic Fundamentals are the center of the contributions of Sardar
Aziz and Raja Khalidi. Sardar Aziz analyzes the essential characteristics of
the economic system in Kurdistan-Iraq. Aziz defines the economic system
as unsettled and divided between the KDP and PUK and sees the cause
14 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

of that in the absence of a unified sovereign authority. Officially the KRG


is trying to create a free market-oriented liberal economy. In reality, it is
a combination of a command and control economy with a sort of market
economy clearly dominated by politics. The KRG’s actual nonproduc-
tive economy is still carried by the two main pillars natural resources and
consumption. The real economic transition took place in 2003 after the
regime change that strengthened the role of the Kurds in Iraq. Iraqi oil
started to flow, and Kurds for the first time had their share (17 percent
of oil revenues) and the KRG started its own oil excavation in the region.
The KRG’s boom is phenomenally strong and quick and together with the
opening toward the world it has resulted in an opening of the labor mar-
ket and the flow of external workers has increased. The quick economic
development and big infrastructural investments are still accompanied by
structural challenges in socioeconomic progress and equality. The largest
demographic group in the KRG consists mainly of unemployed young
people who are mostly university graduates. This leads to sporadic demon-
strations and conflicts with the police in towns and districts in the region.
Aziz also deals with the historic roots of the genesis of the rentier sys-
tem. He shows how the economic basics were systematically destroyed and
the conditions for the genesis of the rentier system were created through
the Saddam regime, his genocidal campaigns and wars, which have still not
been overcome. The essential characteristics of the economic system are
the market monopoly of the KDP and PUK as well as the dominance of the
traditional families Barzani and Talabani, patronage networks and personal
relationships, patrimonialism, corruption and nepotism. The d ­ ominant
families in the region draw on personal links between the government
and the private sector and with that strengthen their political positions
and their ability to distribute wealth. There has been major development
in real estate and construction in the region. The sector is controlled by
the ruling political elites and their business associates. While the market
is not fully controlled, important economic activities such as the oil sec-
tor, the construction sector, real estate and telecommunications are led by
two main parties’ figures and their business associates. The region suffers
from serious corruption activities in significant areas such as oil produc-
tion, public contracts, government services and employment. There are
strong signs of development toward rentierism: high dependency on oil
revenues, an increasingly bloated government sector, subsidies, import of
food and steps backward on democratization. Nevertheless, Aziz points
out that the KRG does not have many characteristics of the typical rentier
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 15

state. The opposition is active, the democratic system is quasi-plural and a


level of free speech and media freedom exists. While the natural resources
sector might deliver so much revenue to satisfy the elites, the elites are
under immense pressure to distribute the resulting wealth.
Raja Khalidi offers a pronounced political economy contribution
on Palestine. Based on the theoretical baseline of the center–periphery
approach and the dependencia, he examines the economy. By examin-
ing status, historical background, changes, obstacles and chances for the
future of the economy as a basis for a Palestinian community, he denotes
the main problem: the financial and economic externalization of the
Palestinian community. The background to this lies in the conditions of
the decades lasting conflict with Israel and the intertwining of the econ-
omy in the Palestinian territories with the economy in Israel. Khalidi goes
back to the processes during the mandatory period and wants to localize
the roots of today’s dualism in the Jewish–Arab dichotomy in Mandatory
Palestine. In his alternative proceeding, he observes the territory of his-
toric Palestine and differentiates two economies in this territory: Israel’s
economy, belonging to the globally integrated OECD-states, and the
economy of the Palestinian territories on its periphery.
According to his classification, in the end, the “economy of Palestine”
consists of at least five different “enclave economies” orienting to the
“Israeli metropole”.
With the signing of the treaties between the PLO and Israel’s govern-
ment, the political framework was set; an economic political “envelope”
was the protocol on the economic relation between the PLO and Israel
(PER), which was signed in 1994. As the PA determined the fiscal and cus-
toms policy after the approval by Israeli government positions, the most
important instruments in economic political questions again did not only
lie with the Palestinian Authority. Khalidi explains that from the beginning
of the autonomous administration, the framework for Palestine’s economy
has not been a market based development and economic modernization,
but rather the PER and thus the political determinant of colonial control.
Khalidi deals with the development of political core problems. He criti-
cizes that instead of growth and progress, the economy shrank over and
over and the public institutions omitted to invest in the productive sec-
tors, but rather expanded the tertiary sector. Therefore, the dependence
of the economy on access to the Israeli market for ex- and imports is fac-
tually as high as before 1994, in spite of occasional business activity and
an upswing in exports.
16 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

However, Khalidi identifies the reasons, including not only economic


and political shocks and the Israeli occupation. He also names the political
instability, the state mentality, based on rent-seeking, and the insecurity
over income or break off of private external sources.
Furthermore, the PA’s neoliberal economic policy, following loyally to
the Washington Consensus, can hardly lead to massive investment of the
state sector in the productive economic sectors.
In fact, the donor economy stimulates the autocratic system in its rent-­
seeking and the striving of the private sector for seizing profits in the course
of the allocation of rents. Investments continue to go to traditional, profit
promising sectors, and those are still the real estate sector and not the
productive sector, primarily the public, as well as the private service sector.
With the view to the future and the regional and global perspective,
Khalidi himself is aware that a Palestinian state is not achieving sovereignty
overall, when it cannot cooperate in the basic economic relations, but
rather is dependent asymmetrically.
Murad Hakeem and Samir Awad examine the Civil Society, its devel-
opment and transformation. Murad Hakeem puts the delayed formation
of civil society in Kurdistan-Iraq in the context of the long history of
war, violence and destruction. The division into two zones also has effects
on the societal development. In the last two decades, several organiza-
tions have been formed in Kurdistan aiming to defend the law, democ-
racy, women’s rights, children’s rights, freedom of press, human rights,
solidarity, development, training and awareness. This development can be
regarded as the civil society’s foundations in addition to various media
channels and a version of political pluralism, as well as the public involve-
ment in the political process. The large numbers of such institutions and
their work in various fields is a fresh and modern phenomenon in the
Kurdistan region. Hakeem argues that two important reasons hinder the
effectiveness of these organizations: lack of financial independence (often
founded by two parties) and lack of working spirit among their members.
In their own enormous companies, the high influence of the two parties
KDP and PUK can be observed. These companies dominate the mar-
ket and each has several newspapers, TV and radio stations of their own.
All Kurdish parties have organizations such as students’ unions, youth’s
unions and women’s unions. These organizations alongside the parties are
trying to conquer their own ranks. Other civil society institutions besides
the political parties, are the syndicates, associations and the NGOs, which
unfortunately in the Kurdistan region, are also extensions of the parties.
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 17

After 1991, for the first time in Kurdish history the media made big
progress. Many periodicals, radio and TV stations were founded. Currently,
there are over 15 Kurdish satellite channels and many local ones broad-
casting. Furthermore, several radio stations, hundreds of magazines and
newspapers as well as a large number of websites are operating. It is impor-
tant to know that the majority of these publications and broadcasting sta-
tions are associated to the parties. After 2004, the number of independent
publications increased, independent TV stations though just arose after
2007. Freedom of the press and expression have considerably improved.
But still, members of the press have to face difficulties and danger from
physical violence, destruction of their equipment and even assassinations.
Nevertheless, the possibility for a free press exists, although there is a lack
of an unambiguous law to state the duties and rights of journalism.
With the civil society, Samir Awad tackles one of the most dynamic
issues in the Palestinian society. He analyzes the civil society in the context
(1) of Israeli relations and (2) of dealing with the autocratic institutions in
the process of Palestine’s state formation. In the actor oriented approach,
he shows roots, actors and areas, the status and development of the civil
society. Finally, he fits the NGOs into the structure of state, NGO and
donors.
While depicting this genealogy of the civil society, he traces the histori-
cal interruptions in the periods from the mandatory time until today to
the Nakba, the foundation of the PLO, the first and second Intifada, as
well as to the enthronement and shaping of the PA. Awad opposes external
influences with the civil action as a “natural product” and a “reaction” to
foreign domination, occupation and the deformed state-building process.
As reasons, Awad considers the rather charitable and traditional orga-
nizations during the British reign in historic mandatory Palestine. From
this elitist social base, the civil society transformed to a mass base in several
phases of national development. Under the prevailing structures of power,
the societal activity had an effect as part of the resistance movement against
foreign domination, as well as part of the striving for pluralism and as part
of the declaration of intention and mode of expression, and finally also in
the conflict/debate with today’s autocratic regime.
The first Intifada might have been the strongest effective changing
point. The highly vibrant civil society expanded during that phase and has
strongly changed in the following phases. Nevertheless, it kept its effects
until today, especially the high level of politicization and the high density
in Palestine (“NGOization”). The pluralistic culture and active societal
18 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

networks that Palestinians had developed in the past led to the fact that
numerous scholars working on Palestine speculate that once a Palestine
state is established it will most likely become a democracy.
However, currently the PA system and the dependence on donor inflow
have an adverse impact on most of the civil society associations. Thus,
the civil society was unable to effectively resist the Palestinian Authority’s
attempts at control, mostly because of its involvement in the national
struggle and its overpoliticization.
After the examination of the internal dimensions of Kurdistan-Iraq and
Palestine, the contributions presenting the foreign policy relations follow as
an example. David Romano, Rikar Hussein, and Stephen Rowe take a close
look at the US policy toward Kurdistan-Iraq and their mutual relationships,
while Mkhaimar Abusada deals with the Palestinian diplomacy.
Romano, Hussein and Rowe give an overview of Iraqi Kurdish ambi-
tions and American policies toward Kurdistan-Iraq. Using the controversy
of directly arming the Kurds in the fight against the IS, the chapter goes on
to discuss several explanations for these policies put forth by the Americans
and their supporters. At the same time, the transformation of the relations
is explained from a historical point of view and how they changed during
and after the end of the Cold War from very limited contacts to a hid-
den relationship and currently “partnership”. The authors emphasize that
the United States government was a supporter of the idea of Palestinian
autonomy or a Palestinian state. United States policy toward the Kurds,
in contrast, was always opposed to Kurdish independence. After 1991,
the mutual relationships intensified and in the course of the develop-
ments after the Second Gulf War in 2003 further differentiated. Relations
were more institutionalized during that time and the Kurds became more
vital for America’s new policy toward Iraq. The USA started cooperating
with the Kurds in other areas than the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.
In the post-Saddam era the US–Iraqi Kurdish relations were extended
from military coordination and intelligence sharing to civic relationships
in diplomacy, economics, education, culture and other areas. Currently,
the Iraqi Kurds are an important US ally in the region in the fight against
IS. Nevertheless, the US administration does not allow direct military sup-
port but rather pursues a Baghdad-centered policy in order to not pro-
mote the KRG’s independence or the division of Iraq.
Mkhaimar Abusada deals with the PLO’s and Palestinian’s exter-
nal work for reaching their goals: termination of the Israeli occupation,
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, state sovereignty
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUALIZING DE FACTO STATEHOOD... 19

and international recognition of a viable Palestine. Abusada traces the


Palestinian’s path of national liberation from armed fight over negotia-
tions to diplomacy. Embedded in the historical external conditions of the
period, he documents the change in leadership, in the use of means, part-
ners and results, and the tasks of the future.
The starting point is the historical background, which is rooted in
the loss of the homeland through the Nakba in 1948. In the following
years, the PLO imposed its leadership position. Charismatic Arafat led the
armed fight of the national movement with the means of time, in order
to gain international attention. In the beginning of the 1970s, the PLO
eased its radical position to a more pragmatic position which accepted the
establishment of a Palestinian national authority over any liberated part
of Palestine. The Palestinians were prepared to compromise with Israel.
Finally, the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people during the Arab summit in 1974 gained international recogni-
tion when the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the UN General
Assembly in 1974. However, until the signing of the Oslo agreement in
1993, Palestinian armed groups consistently described armed struggle
as the principal means of ending the Israeli occupation and liberating
Palestine. But armed resistance failed to achieve the Palestinian dream of
statehood. So in 1988, the PLO adopted negotiations as a strategic option
that aimed to put an end to the Israeli occupation and achieve an indepen-
dent Palestinian state.
Military weakness, financial pressure and regional and global politi-
cal changes moved the PLA and finally also the Israeli government to
embark on conflict resolution and to agree to direct negotiations. In the
end, the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 marked the turning point
and a shift in Palestinian strategy in which more emphasis was put on
negotiations and diplomacy, as Abusada shows. With the PA, not only
a new period began, but also a new actor stepped onto the diplomatic
ground. Abusada ascribes a much more vigorous diplomacy to the PA; it
is now about the area of diplomatic relations and the international recog-
nition of the Palestinians on state level. In the foreign policy of president
Mahmoud Abbas, following Arafat in his office, Abusada sees finally a clear
estrangement from violence and terrorism and a commitment to peace
negotiations and diplomacy to reach an end to the Palestinian Israeli con-
flict. With this approach, Abbas achieved the biggest success through the
enhancement of international recognition of the Palestinians in the UN in
November 2012. More than 23 years after Oslo, Abbas has not achieved
20 G. GÜRBEY ET AL.

the termination of the Israeli occupation in the negotiation process. In


the context of the regional and international external conditions, Abusada
states that in the face of Palestine enjoying enormous support within the
international community and Israel being criticized by its own leftist and
liberal elites, diplomacy has been regarded as the right instrument for the
future path to liberation.

Notes
1. Because “quasi states” is in the literature often used undifferentiated for
both phenomena, Pal Kolsto suggests to call internationally recognized
states with missing empiric, meaning internal statehood “failed states” and
to use the term “quasi states” for internationally unrecognized de facto
states (Kolsto 2006, 723f.).
2. For the theoretical and conceptional discussion and localization of unrecog-
nized states see especially: Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Caspersen 2012;
Geldenhuys 2009; Bahceli et al. 2004.

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yards. The Austrian army was similarity equipped. The Italians were
equipped with a 105-mm gun essentially of the same characteristics
as the French 105-mm M-1913.
Medium Gun. Ideal. A caliber of between 4.7 and 5” on a carriage
permitting a vertical arc of fire of from minus 5 degrees to plus 80
degrees; a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees. Shrapnel and shell
weighing not over 60 pounds, maximum range 18,000 yards; with
semi-fixed or separate loading ammunition permissible.
Medium Gun Practical. Corps artillery should be armed with the
present type 4.7” gun, Model 1906, except that at least one regiment
should be armed with the British type 5”-guns purchased abroad.
Transport. All corps guns should be developed for long, rapid
hauls. Similar ammunition vehicles should be developed. The wheels
for the gun carriage should be rubber-tired.
Medium Howitzer. In the opinion of the French, Italians, British
and the Americans, the 155-mm howitzer (Schnieder) was
conspicuously successful in the present war. It should, therefore, be
retained as a type. The howitzer and carriage as it stands at present,
is a highly satisfactory and efficient piece of armament. For the
future it is believed that effort should be made to increase the range
by improvements in the form of projectile, and it is believed that the
form of howitzer and carriage should be studied with a view of
obtaining, through modifications, a maximum range of approximately
16,000 yards.
Many batteries of 155-mm howitzers (Schnieder) were motorized
in the American Army in France, and the consensus of opinion is
definitely toward the retention of this form of prime mover. It is
interesting to note that all the important belligerents have settled
upon a howitzer of approximately 6” in caliber, and otherwise
essentially of the same ballistic characteristics as the type in
question. The projectile of this caliber is the smallest projectile which
can be called upon to give adequate mining effect against material
targets of semi-permanent nature. The place of this howitzer is,
therefore, determined by considerations of its destructive ability. It is
a splendid destruction and neutralizing weapon.
Medium Howitzer. Ideal. A caliber of about 155-mm on a carriage
permitting a vertical arc of fire of from minus 5 degrees to plus 65
degrees; and a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees. The projectile
should not weigh over 100 pounds and should be interchangeable
with projectiles for other guns of this caliber referred to later on. High
explosive shell, only, should be supplied.
Medium Howitzer. Practical. The corps should be armed with the
155-mm (Schnieder) howitzer referred to above. The type of fuses
for shell should be super quick and long delay.

ARMY ARTILLERY.
Missions. In addition to the division and corps artillery fulfilling the
missions outlined above there must be additional artillery available.
There are missions of interdiction, neutralization and destruction
which fall beyond the activities or capabilities of the normal corps or
medium field types; there must exist a surplus of division or corps
types, properly transported, for strategic reinforcements of divisions
and corps during such times as the normal allotment to such units is
insufficient; there must be artillery of special purpose—mountain
artillery, trench and super guns and howitzers. Of the above
additional artillery, a type of heavy field gun and a type of heavy field
howitzer are considered normally necessary in the armament of a
field army; the gun should have a range of approximately 25,000
yards, and the howitzer a range of about 18,000 yards. These
weapons are more powerful than the medium field types, add range
to the interdiction and harassing and to the neutralization and
destruction possible with the corps type. Considering the paragraphs
pertaining to divisional artillery and the introduction to corps artillery
it will be seen that the normal artillery of a field army can be
accomplished by the assignments of two caliber, i. e., two light
weapons, two medium weapons and two heavy weapons—a gun
and a howitzer in each class—and a satisfactory anti-aircraft gun.
Heavy Field Gun. The consensus of opinion of all artillery officers
—British, Italian and American—is that the heavy field gun should be
of approximately 6” caliber and that guns of greater caliber than this
are necessary in limited number for field operations. The French
were constructing 194-mm guns during the latter stages of the war. It
is believed that in developing this type of gun the French were
actuated almost entirely by the necessity for increased range, since
the German 150-mm gun, Model 1916, outranged the G. P. F. by
approximately 5,500 yards. The French have recently made
considerable progress in securing the necessary increase in range
with the G. P. F. All of the principal nations engaged in the war used
a heavy field gun of approximately 6” caliber. This type has given
such general satisfaction that its continuance is assured. The
principal mission of the heavy field gun is harassing and interdiction
fire, and for these uses the 6” projectile is sufficiently heavy. The
maximum practicable traverse and elevation should be provided by
the carriage of the heavy field gun. The G. P. F. carriage has given
general satisfaction, but its wide tread and the excessive time
required to occupy a position are very objectionable features. It is the
consensus of all artillery officers—French, British and American—
that the heavy field gun should be of approximately 6” caliber and
with a range in excess of 25,000 yards, with not less than 60 degree
traverse, weighing not more than 12 tons, limbered, capable of
occupying and leaving a position quickly, and with a width of tread
which does not prevent two-way traffic on ordinary roads. The
Italians differ from this opinion only in that they are satisfied with a
maximum range of 18,000 yards.
Heavy Field Gun. Ideal. A caliber of about 155-mm on a carriage
permitting a vertical arc of fire from 0 degrees to plus 65 degrees;
with a horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees. The maximum range
should be about 25,000 yards.
Heavy Field Gun. Practical. Arm with the present type 155-mm
G. P. F. and carry on experiments for type of carriage as outlined for
division field gun. The fuses should be super-quick and short delay.
Transport. All artillery of this type should be motorized and tested
and experiments for ammunition vehicles to correspond with the
types of carriages developed, and should be carried on
simultaneously.
Heavy Field Howitzer. No type of heavy field howitzer developed
during the war has given general satisfaction. The consensus of all
army artillery officers—French, English and American—is that two
calibers of howitzers are necessary—one a companion piece for the
6” gun and one of the maximum possible power consistent with the
necessary mobility. The lighter of these two howitzers should have
the same mobility as the 6” gun, with a caliber of about 8” and a
maximum range of not less than 16,000 yards. The heavy field
howitzer should be of about 9.5” caliber with a range in excess of
16,000 yards; the carriage should provide for wide traverse and must
have sufficient mobility to accompany the army in the field. It will
probably be necessary to transport this howitzer in more than one
load, and the maximum weight of any load should not exceed 12
tons. The average time necessary for occupying a position should
not exceed six hours under actual field conditions.
Heavy Field Howitzer. Ideal. A caliber of about 8” on a carriage
permitting a vertical arc of fire of from 0 to plus 65 degrees; and a
horizontal arc of fire of 360 degrees. The maximum range should be
18,000 yards.
Heavy Field Howitzer. Practical. Use at present 8” material of
British design which is on hand.
Railway Artillery. The war has demonstrated the necessity for
long range and powerful guns for distant interdiction and harassing
work and for super-heavy howitzers for the destruction of semi-
permanent fortifications. Artillery of these types can best be mounted
on railway carriages and this type of mount offers no serious
disadvantages since these guns will not be used except with large
forces which require extensive railroad systems for their supply. This
does not apply to guns of the type used to bombard Paris; such guns
have no military value and their construction is not justifiable.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.
Light Gun. Ideal. Caliber about 3” with initial velocity of at least
2,600 f. s.; semi-automatic breechblock, mounted on carriage,
permitting 80 degrees elevation and 360 degrees traverse;
projectiles weighing not less than 15 pounds, of one type high
explosive shell with maximum ballistic qualities and as large
explosive charge as possible; fixed ammunition; smokeless,
flashless powder, mechanical fuse. In this type every effort must be
made to increase the rate of fire and decrease time of flight; this
latter is limited only by considerations of a reasonable accuracy life
for the gun.
Light Gun. Practical. Arm units with present 3” anti-aircraft
equipment. Continue experiments leading to the development of the
ideal.
Transport. Ideal. Caterpillar mount or caterpillar trailer mount
drawn by caterpillar tractor, each unit to permit a sustained speed of
12 miles per hour.
CHAPTER V
THE 3-INCH FIELD GUN.

THE GUN.
The Gun is known officially as the 3-inch Field Gun, Model 1905. It
is a built-up construction of nickel-steel and consists of a tube with a
rifled bore, 3 inches in diameter, upon which are shrunk the jacket,
locking hoop and front clip hoop. The jacket reinforces the rear half
of the tube. The locking hoop serves to secure the jacket from any
longitudinal movement to the rear. On the under side of the gun,
extending the entire length of the jacket, locking hoop, and front clip,
are formed two recoil guides or clips which fit over and secure the
gun to the guide rails of the cradle. When the gun is fired, it slides
along the guide rails. The dust guard covers the part of the guide
rails between the locking hoop and the front clip. The rifling of the
bore is right-hand twist and starts with 0 turns at the breech
increasing to 1 turn in 25 calibers at 10 inches from the muzzle, then
uniform to the muzzle.

Weights and Dimensions.

Weight of gun 788 lbs.


Calibre 3 inches
Length about 7 feet
Number of lands and grooves 24
Muzzle velocity 1700 ft. sec.
Maximum pressure per sq. in. 33,000 lbs.
Limit of depression (90 mils.) 5 degrees
Maximum elevation (265 mils.) 15 degrees
Maximum range, trail sunk, about 8,500 yds. (5 M)
Range at 15° elevation (265 mils) 6,000 yds. (3½ M)

3 Inch Field Gun, Models of 1904 & 1905.


Breech Mechanism Assembled.

Nomenclature of parts of Gun:—

Jacket.
Locking hoop.
Tube.
Bore.
Rifling.
Lands.
Grooves
Breech recess.
Front clip.
Muzzle.
Dust guard.
Recoil guides or clips.
Chamber.
Recoil lug.
Line sight (front and rear).
Handy oilers.

THE BREECH MECHANISM.


The breechblock is of the interrupted-screw type, and is provided
with four threaded and four slotted sectors. The front end of the axial
recess in the block is closed by a bushing. Four ventholes lead from
a cavity in the bushing and permit the escape of gas to the rear in
case of a ruptured primer. On the rear face of the breechblock are
cut gear teeth, in which the gear teeth of the operating lever
bevelgear mesh. The breechblock is concentrically mounted on a
hub on the block carrier, in which the firing-lock case is fitted. Its
position in the breech of the gun with reference to the axis of the
bore is eccentric.
The breechblock is closed or locked by a continuous movement of
the operating lever. When the block is swung to the closed position
the front face of the block latch comes in contact with the rear face of
the breech of the gun, thus forcing the latch out of the notch in the
breechblock and back into a recess in the carrier. By continuing the
motion of closing the mechanism, the breechblock is then rotated on
the hub of the carrier and its threads engage with corresponding
ones in the gun. When the breechblock is in the closed position, a
lug on the firing-lock case serves to lock the carrier to the
breechblock and prevents displacement due to a blowback.
The firing mechanism belongs to that type known as a
continuous-pull mechanism; that is, no cocking of the firing-pin is
required.
The firing-lock case is eccentrically fitted in the hub of the block
carrier, in such a position that the axis of the firing-pin is always in
line with the bore of the gun. The vent bushing in the front end of the
breech block through which the firing pin passes when in the fired
position, is fitted eccentrically with reference to the breechblock. This
eccentric arrangement of the breechblock, masks the point of the
firing-pin and prevents any possible contact between the pin and the
primer in the cartridge case when the block is unlocked. The block
will be practically fully locked before any contact between the firing-
pin and primer can take place.
Nomenclature of important parts of Breech & Firing Mechanism.
Mod. 1905:—
Name of Part Where located
Breech Block On block carrier
Vent Bushing Front end of block
Block Carrier Hinged to jacket; supports block
Block Stop Screwed into front face of carrier
Hinge Pin Hinges carrier to jacket
Hinge Pin Catch In hinge pin
Extractor In breech recess
Extractor Lever Mounted on hinge pin
Operating Lever Pivoted on block carrier
Lever Pivot Pivots lever on block carrier
Lever Latch In operating lever
Lever Latch Spring In operating lever, lower part
Lever Latch Pivot In operating lever, lower part
Block Latch In recess in carrier
Block Latch Spring Around latch bolt
Firing Lock Case In hub of the block carrier
Locking Bolt Nut and Pin On firing lock case, rear face of carrier
Firing Pin In axle hole, center of firing lock case
Firing Pin Spring Around firing pin
Firing Spring Sleeve Around firing pin spring
Sear In slot in firing lock case
Trigger Fork Rear end firing lock case
Trigger Shaft On rear end firing lock case
Trigger Shaft Detent On trigger shaft
Firing Pallet On pallet shank
Pallet Shank On recoil lug of gun
Firing Handle On firing handle shaft
Firing Handle Bracket Attached to right side of cradle
Firing Handle Shaft Assembled in bracket, right side of cradle
Trip Latch Attached to trip latch plunger
Trip Latch Plunger Assembled to firing handle
Adjusting Screw Assembled to firing handle bracket
Check Nut Assembled in adjusting screw
3 Inch Gun Carriage, Model of 1902.
Plan

THE GUN CARRIAGE.


The gun carriage for the 3-inch gun Model 1905 is of the type
known as the long-recoil, in which the gun is permitted a sufficient
length of recoil (about 45 inches) upon the carriage to render the
latter stationary under firing stresses. The gun is mounted upon a
cradle which forms a housing for the recoil controlling parts. The
cradle rests upon the rocker and has a small traversing motion of 70
mils on each side of the axis of the carriage. The rocker is journaled
upon the axle and its rear end is supported by the elevating
mechanism, which is seated in the trail.
The principal parts of the carriage are the wheels, axle, trail and
elevating mechanism forming the lower carriage, the cradle and
recoil-controlling parts constituting the upper carriage, and the rocker
and traversing mechanism intermediate between the two. In addition
there are provided shields, ammunition carriers, the road brake, and
the axle seats.
The Wheels and the Axle. The wheels are a modified form of the
Archibald pattern, 56 inches in diameter, with 3-inch tires. The axle is
hollow and forged from a single piece of steel. The wheels are held
on by the wheel fastenings.
Trail.—The trail consists of two steel flasks of channel section with
the flanges turned inward, tied together by transoms and plates to
form the sight and the tool boxes. Attached to the trail are the trail
spade, float trail handspike, trail handles and the lunette.
Elevating Gear.—The elevating gear is of double-screw type and
consists of an inner and outer elevating screw, an elevating-gear
bracket, an elevating bevel gear, two elevating bevel pinions, and
two elevating crank shafts. The inner elevating screw is a steel
screw, threaded with a right-hand thread. It is attached at its upper
end by the elevating pin to the rear end of the rocker. The outer
elevating screw is of bronze and is threaded on the exterior with a
right-hand thread to take the inner elevating screw. On the exterior
are also cut two longitudinal keyways, in which the keys of the bevel
gear work.
Traversing Mechanism.—The traversing mechanism consists of
a shaft, called the traversing shaft, mounted in bearings in the
traversing-gear case, and a traversing nut moving longitudinally on
the shaft, but restrained from turning with it by its bearings in the
gear case. A cylindrical lug on top of the nut fits in a hole in a bronze
traversing link, the right end of which is pivoted by the traversing-link
pivot to the traversing lug on the underside of the cradle. This pivot is
secured to the cradle-traversing lug by a nut and split pin. The left
bearing of the traversing shaft is split for the purpose of assembling
and rests between two collars on the shaft. The bearing, with the
shaft in place, is slipped into its seat in the gear case, where it is
held in position by two pins.
TRAVERSING GEAR, VERTICAL SECTION

Elevating Gear Half Elevation and Half Section


The Cradle Complete.—The cradle supports the gun, guides it in
recoil, and forms a housing for the recoil-controlling parts; it consists
of a flange steel body with the upper edges flanged outward. The
flanges are bronze lined, engage the clips on the gun, forming the
guide rails for the gun on recoil. Riveted to the bottom of the cradle
are four steel forgings, the pintle, traversing lug, rear clip, and
elevating and traversing lock lug. The pintle fits the pintle socket in
the rocker and forms a bearing upon which the cradle is traversed.
The traversing lug has been heretofore mentioned as affording a
point of attachment for the traversing-link pivot. The cradle rear clip,
in addition to embracing the rear end of the rocker, has a broad
bearing on the latter directly over the point of attachment of the
elevating screw.
To relieve the pointing mechanism from all strains in travelling, an
elevating and traversing lock is provided, by which the cradle may be
securely locked to the trail.
The recoil-controlling parts contained inside the cradle are the
cylinder, the piston rod, the counter-recoil buffer, the counter-recoil
springs and the spring support.
To the rear end of the cradle is riveted a steel cradle head, rear,
through which the cylinder moves in recoil and projects for
attachment to the recoil lug on the gun by means of the cylinder end
stud and nut. The front end of the cradle is closed by the cradle
head, front, and the retaining ring.
Recoil Controlling Mechanism

The cylinder lies inside the cradle and is surrounded by the


counter-recoil springs. Its rear end is closed and has a projection on
the inside to which is screwed the counter-recoil buffer, a tapered
bronze rod which fits with small clearance into a bore at the rear end
of the piston-rod. The front end of the cylinder is closed by a bronze
oiltight gland, through which the piston-rod slides. The cylinder is
filled with a neutral oil called hydroline. The interior of the cylinder is
cylindrical. Three longitudinal ribs or throttling bars of uniform width
but varying height extend along the interior from the rear end to
within 19 inches from the front end. Three notches are cut in the
piston head, forming ports for the passage of the liquid from one side
of the piston to the other. The height of the throttling bars is
calculated so that the resistance which the liquid offers, plus the
resistance of the springs, is constant and such that the recoil will be
checked at the desired point. During recoil the front end of the
cylinder is supported by the spring support.
The piston rod is of steel, and is provided with a bronze piston
head, screwed against a shoulder at the rear end. The head has
three notches cut in its perimeter, which fit over the throttling-bar
projections on the cylinder wall. The rear end of the piston is bored
out to take the counter-recoil buffer. In counter recoil the oil in this
bore can escape only by a small clearance. In this way the return of
the gun into battery is so eased and regulated that very little shock
and consequent derangement of the aim of the piece occur. The
front end of the piston-rod is attached to the cradle head, front, by
means of the piston-rod nut.
The counter-recoil springs (three in number each 36 inches long)
are helical, being made from a rectangular steel bar coiled on edge.
They are assembled in the cradle, end to end around the cylinder
and bear in front against the spring support and in the rear against
the cradle head, rear. They are assembled under an initial
compression of approximately 750 lbs. which is sufficient to return
the gun into battery at the maximum elevation. In place of the single
counter-recoil springs a set of three inner and three outer counter-
recoil springs is also being issued.
The spring support forms a support for the front end of the cylinder
and a bearing for the front end of the spring column. It has guide
lugs which fit into and glide along guide rails inside the cradle during
recoil. The spring support is held in place by the retaining ring.

Action of the Mechanism.


The action of the recoil mechanism when the gun is fired is as
follows:—The gun moves to the rear 45 inches on the cradle,
carrying with it the cylinder and compressing the recoil springs. The
piston rod being attached to a fixed part of the carriage in front, (the
cradle-head) does not move. Therefore, since the cylinder moves to
the rear, the oil in it must pass from one side of the piston head to
the other. The energy of recoil of the gun is therefore absorbed by
the resistance which the oil offers when being forced through small
openings between the notches in the piston head and the throttling
bars along the inside of the cylinder and also by the resistance of the
counter-recoil springs to additional compression. The energy stored
up by the springs during this compression, returns the gun and
cylinder to the firing or original position. This return movement is
eased and regulated by the counter-recoil buffer. The piston rod pull
and the spring resistance are transmitted to the carriage, but owing
to the latter’s weight and the resistance opposed to the trail spade by
its engagement in the ground the carriage remains stationary.

Weights and Dimensions.

Weight of gun and carriage complete 2,520 lbs.


Width of track 60 inches
Length of recoil on carriage 45 inches
Amount of traverse of gun on carriage 140 mils
Nomenclature of important parts of the Gun Carriage:—

Axle
Trail, consisting of—
Flasks (right and left)
Tool box
Elevating gear transom
Rear sight box
Spade
Spade Edge
Float
Handspike fulcrum
Cradle, head, rear
Gun slides or Guide Rails
Cradle Pintle
Traversing lug
Rear clip
Lug for elevating and traversing lock
Bracket seat, firing handle
Quadrant fastening
Rear-sight bracket support
Front-sight bracket support
Spring-support guides
Retaining ring, with hasp and fastening
Cradle head, front
Shoulder guard
Cradle brush
Recoil-indicator throw
Recoil indicator
Cylinder head
Cylinder with cylinder end screwed in
Cylinder end stud and nut
Counter-recoil buffer
Rings, packing
Gland
Piston rod, with plug, screwed in
Piston
Piston-rod nut
Filling plug with gasket
Drain plug
Spring support
Counter-recoil springs
Rocker
Cradle Pintle socket
Elevating and traversing lock
Traversing mechanism, consisting of—
Traversing-gear case
Traversing plate
Handwheel with handle and spindle
Traversing shaft
Traversing-shaft bearing in two parts
Traversing link with bushing
Traversing-link pivot with nut
Azimuth pointer and scale
Elevating mechanism, consisting of—
Elevating pin
Inner elevating screw
Outer elevating screw
Wheels guards
Trail handles
Trail seats
Trail-seat supports
Sponge-staff socket
Name plate
Handspike
Lunette
Cradle, consisting of—
Cradle body
Elevating bevel gear
Elevating bevel pinions
Elevating crank shafts, with handles
Elevating screw cover
Axle seats, include—
Seat arms
Seat-arm guards
Foot rests
Tie rods
Shield braces
Apron shield
Apron latches
Main shield, consisting of—
Main shield
Hood
Shutter, open-sight port
Shutter, panoramic-sight port
Top shield, consisting of—
Top shield
Top shield fastenings
Road brake, includes—
Brake beams
Brake shoes
Springs with covers
Brake rods
Brake lever
Brake shaft
Brake segment with two segment racks
Ammunition carriers
Range quadrant case

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