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Berlusconi
‘The Diplomat’
POPULISM &
FOREIGN POLICY
IN ITALY
Emidio Diodato
& Federico Niglia
Berlusconi ‘The Diplomat’
Emidio Diodato · Federico Niglia
Berlusconi
‘The Diplomat’
Populism and Foreign Policy in Italy
Emidio Diodato Federico Niglia
University for Foreigners LUISS University
Perugia, Italy Rome, Italy
ISBN 978-3-319-97261-9 ISBN 978-3-319-97262-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97262-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950564
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
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Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
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Cover design: Tom Howey
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Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
At what rate solver the World talks of me (for I am not ignorant what an ill
report Folly hath got, even amongst the most Foolish), yet I am that She, that
only She, whose Deity recreates both gods and men, even this is a sufficient
Argument, that I no sooner stept up to speak to this fully Assembly, than all
your faces put on a kind of new and unwonted pleasantness. […] and so
what the otherwise great Rhetoricians with their tedious and long-studied
Orations can hardly effect, to wit, to remove the trouble of the Mind, I have
done it at once, with my single look.
Desiderius Erasmus (1913 [1509], p. 8)
Contents
1 Italy in the Post-Cold War Landscape: In Search of a New

Identity 1
2 Populism and Foreign Policy in Italy: An Overview 23
3 (Re-)Public Diplomacy: Silvio the Storyteller 53
4 The ‘New Diplomatic Look’: Silvio the Reformer 75
5 Berlusconi’s Security Policy and the Global Financial

Crisis 97
6 Italy and the EU in the Berlusconi Governments 143
7 Populism and Foreign Policy in Italy: The Legacy 169
8 Epilogue 191
Bibliography
195
Index 223
vii
Introducing Silvio Berlusconi
Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister for eight months in 1994, for nearly
five years from 2001 to 2006, and three and a half years from 2008 to
2011. His historical contender Romano Prodi ruled for two and a half
years from 1996 to 1998, and two years from 2006 to 2008. Berlusconi
was in office twice as much as the years that Prodi ruled, becoming the
longest-running prime minister in republican Italy. No political leader
has marked the history of post-1992 republican Italy such as Berlusconi.
From 1994 to 2011, he was constantly either prime minister or leader of
the opposition. However, if we compare Berlusconi and Prodi the most
important thing to consider is not durability, but the fact that one of
their name indicates a historical period: Berlusconism.
During the first phase of republican Italy, important politicians of the
Democrazia Cristiana (DC—Christian Democratic Party) such as Giulio
Andreotti or Amintore Fanfani were in office for a long time. However,
their names do not indicate a historical period (Ignazi 2014, p. 7). Alcide
De Gasperi served as prime minister from 1945 to 1953, in eight con-
secutive governments. The so-called De Gasperi era is one of the most
successful moments of Italian history. Nonetheless, the substance of De
Gasperi’s public discourse did not entirely represent the spirit of postwar
Italy. On the contrary, Berlusconi’s political durability has to do with mes-
sages contained in his public discourses, in a time of political and social
transformation. As a media tycoon, he benefited from the availability of
monetary and communications resources. However, most important
were the effects of using these resources in the political sphere. The only
ix
x Introducing Silvio Berlusconi
exception to be found is the socialist leader Bettino Craxi, since Craxism

also indicates a historical phase in the 1980s. Not by chance, there is a
political legacy of Craxism with regards Berlusconism. However, it
denoted a much shorter phase compared to that of Berlusconi’s rule.
The political substance of Berlusconism went together with the course
of the so-called Second Republic. Berlusconism refers to a cultural phe-
nomenon and a political experience aimed at incarnating the spirit of the
time. What distinguished this period was the redefinition of the Italian
political system along the right/left axis. Berlusconi and Prodi were the
two principal frontrunners of center-right and center-left. Nonetheless,
this development took place with a strong imprint of Berlusconi.
Prodi was a sober Catholic, a reformist, and an economist. His
major foreign policy achievement was that of enabling Italy to enter the
Eurozone, which it did in 1999. According to Mark Donovan and Mark
Gilbert (2015, p. 402), “it was probably the last time that an Italian gov-
ernment could mobilize support for a project of deepening European
integration”. Once his first cabinet unexpectedly ended, Prodi served
as president of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Since he
lost office for the second time in 2008, he has emerged as an elder states-
man in world affairs. Indeed, Prodi became the advisor to the United
Nations on peacekeeping in Africa and enjoyed good personal relations
with many leaders, especially in China. Prodi was, in few words, “a figure
of genuine international standing” (ibid., p. 404).
Berlusconi’s cursus honorum was much more controversial. In the
1970s, he constructed the Milano 2 residential complex and president of
the republic Giovanni Leone decorated him with the Order of merit for
Labour in 1977. In the 1980s, the Cavaliere (Knight) began a career as a
television tycoon by breaking the state monopoly on national broadcast-
ing. He became a rampant businessperson and a very rich man. In 1988,
he appeared for the first time on Forbes’ billionaires list. Political connec-
tions with Craxi were crucial to his economic ascent, but Berlusconi was
always alien to politics. People and commentators continued to perceive
him as an outsider even after he entered into politics in 1994. While he
developed considerable skills, essentially of communication and market-
ing, as a politician he remained a peculiar leader both on the domestic
and international landscape. Berlusconi’s approach to summits and global
politics during his governments, as well as his performance in the inter-
national scene, are important factors to consider. Donovan and Gilbert
(2015, p. 401) stated that “he was perceived by his supporters at least
Introducing Silvio Berlusconi xi
as rather effective in furthering Italy’s national interest”. This was due to

his ability to maintain personal relationships with other political leaders,
heads of state or government. However, European media outlets includ-
ing The Economist, Le Monde, El Mundo, proved to be important watch-
dogs of the Berlusconi governments (Verbeek and Zaslove 2016, p. 316).
The Cavaliere was involved in nearly 20 criminal trials concern-
ing, among other things, connections with the mafia, tax evasion and
the bribing of politicians, judges and the tax police. In 2013, judges
definitively sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment for fraud.
Consequently, he was required to surrender his passport and debarred
from holding public office. Of course, Berlusconi accused the judges of
being personally against him. However, the degradation of his political
image weakened his political activities. Two things have made Berlusconi
controversial in Italy and abroad. The first is that he become a newly
minted billionaire before achieving office, which he then used to protect
himself. The second is that the principal source of his wealth and power
were television channels, which he converted into a propaganda machine.
Opponents accused Berlusconi of having used television to gather vot-
ers and political power, so to protect his wealth from multiple criminal
charges for the ways he acquired it (Anderson 2014, p. 5). In addition,
his private life was a public issue in Italy and abroad. Sensational reve-
lations of Berlusconi’s sexual extravagances traveled around the world.
Judicial proceedings against him also concerned prostitution.
Despite his public and personal scandals, Berlusconi achieved great elec-
toral successes in Italy and international fame and sympathy worldwide.
The list of denunciations and clamors about Berlusconi’s life are wide and
grave. Despite all this, Berlusconi remains the major figure of the last phase
of Italian history. He incarnated the spirit of the Second Republic and the
phenomenon of Berlusconism goes far beyond Berlusconi’s fortunes or mis-
fortunes. Although many books have been devoted to Berlusconi as tycoon
or political leader, no one has put attention on Berlusconi as a “diplomat”.
References
Anderson, P. (2014). The Italian Disaster. London Review of Books, 36(10), 3–16.
Donovan, M., & Gilbert, M. (2015). Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi. In E.
Jones & G. Pasquino (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
xii Introducing Silvio Berlusconi
Ignazi, P. (2014). Vent’anni dopo. La parabola del berlusconismo. Bologna: Il

Mulino.
Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2016). Italy: A Case of Mutating Populism?
Democratization, 23(2), 304–323.
Prologue
We need to talk about Silvio Berlusconi. He played a central role in

Italian history and is still a key figure in the national political game. Any
attempt to assess his contribution to politics leads to partisan confron-
tation. On the one side, there are the supporters, on the other side, the
detractors of the Cavaliere. This book will probably frustrate both sides.
When we decided to write a book on Berlusconi, however, we accepted
the probability of paying an intellectual price.
The end of the Cold War marked a turning point for Italy. The coun-
try suffered from a loss of geopolitical importance, which occurred as a
result of being the southern frontier between the Western world and the
Soviet camp. In the early 1990s, Italy had to adapt to the changing inter-
national system while committing itself to participation in the European
Union. In those years, the nexus between the domestic life of the coun-
try and its international action was under great stress. The collapse of the
party system was transforming both politics and society, thus leading to
the so-called Second Republic. The rules of what Robert Putnam (1988)
considered as the “two-level games” between the domestic and the inter-
national changed radically, and most of the transformation that occurred
in Italy were connected to Berlusconi’s decision to “take the field” of
politics.
This book intends to go beyond the debate on Berlusconi’s role in the
Italian party system and society. This is the first attempt to assess his con-
tribution to the transformation of the Italian role within Europe, and the
world, after the Cold War. We have written a critical interpretation of the
xiii
xiv Prologue
most relevant facts, rather than a detailed account of all the events that
occurred between the year 1994, when Berlusconi entered into politics,
and 2011, when he dramatically resigned as prime minister. Our basic
goal is to explain whether Berlusconi has transformed and innovated not
only the style of Italian politics and society, but also the contents and
procedures of Italian foreign policy.
An assessment of Berlusconi’s international success and failures can-
not follow traditional analytical interpretations. Berlusconi is a noncon-
ventional politician. What differentiates him from his predecessors (and
partially from his successors) is the belief that Italy (and the Italians) do
not require external models and constraints. Therefore, even if Italy’s
foreign policy did not really change significantly under Berlusconi’s rule,
we decided to look at him as the one who completely reframed the pat-
terns of Italian foreign policy. Berlusconi, indeed, tried to link decisions
and actions on the international scene to the domestic situation. This
happened because he considered the Italians as the first recipients of his
foreign policy.
The acceptance of this peculiarity justifies our decision to present
Berlusconi’s foreign policy in primis as a program of reforms for the
Italians (intended as public opinion, the parliamentary institutions, and
the intellectuals framing the political debate). The fact that Berlusconi
presented his foreign policy as a program of reforms should be under-
lined. This might sound eccentric, since the conduct of international
affairs is traditionally slightly different from the domestic policy-making
process. Berlusconi, however, was not a traditional policy-maker. His
previous life as entrepreneur gave him the belief (sometimes the illusion)
that international problems could be quickly resolved, and that he could
renovate that basic pattern regulating the relations between states.
This program of reform, which changed significantly during his four
governments (1994–1995, 2001–2005, 2005–2006, 2008–2011), was
affected by the “reality” of international relations. Despite his plans,
Berlusconi operated in an age of global turmoil from both a political and
economic viewpoint. The emergence of new threats and the increasing
disagreement among the great powers forced him to play a game that
was not the one expected after the optimistic environment of the early
1990s, when he made his decision to enter the political arena. The over-
all and compulsory impact of international relations strongly affected the
foreign policy of Berlusconi’s governments after 2001, in particular with
Prologue xv
regard to security issues, and after 2008, given the effects of the interna-
tional financial crisis.
The legacy of Silvio Berlusconi in the field of foreign affairs is con-
troversial. The thesis advanced here, nonetheless, is that Berlusconi had
a transformative impact on the Italian way of facing international poli-
tics. It is difficult to understand the current approach of Italian govern-
ments and public opinion towards international events and problems
without bearing in mind the changes that occurred during the years
when Berlusconi was in office. This conclusion is useful not only for
gaining a clear picture of Italian foreign policy, but also for discussing
the broader nexus between populism and foreign policy. Berlusconi was
a populist leader, even though this attribution is far from being unani-
mously accepted. If we agree that in Berlusconi there was some degree of
political populism, then this book discusses, through the Italian case, the
impact that populisms have on the European and international scene.
From a methodological viewpoint, this book opens problems in terms
of substance and analytical instruments. Considering the first, one can
mention the lack of attention to the image of Italy and to the issue of
credibility affecting Italy in the years of Berlusconi. This is an issue high-
lighted by many critical observers. However, we decided to go beyond
the debate on Berlusconi’s peculiar style, and we made this choice in
order to focus on the structural aspects that have characterized his polit-
ical action.
The second potential criticism refers to the sources used to write this
book. Looking at our book from the analytical perspective of diplomatic
history, one realizes the impossibility to make use of archival sources. It
is important to underline, however, that this book capitalizes on analyt-
ical tools and theories deriving from political science and international
history. An essential advantage also came from the use of oral sources.
Interviews contributed to identifying what Jeffrey M. Berry (2002)
defined as the “grand design”. This methodological choice refers to the
technique of elite interviews in the study of foreign policy. In the last
decades, social scientists have increasingly turned their attention towards
the role of elite members. This research method allows an understanding
of perceptions, cognitions, and ideas of people responsible for identifying
policy lines. Furthermore, by conducting interviews we gathered infor-
mation and discovered particular issues.
We made all the interviews in Rome between December 2017 and
May 2018. Of course, we have recorded these meetings and, before
xvi Prologue
reporting arguments or statements, we asked for consent. We inter-

viewed Giovanni Castellaneta, Massimo D’Alema, Fabio Fassino,
Giuliano Ferrara, Gianfranco Fini, Franco Frattini, Ferdinando Nelli
Feroci, Lapo Pistelli, Franco Venturini. Some senior officials inter-
viewed asked for anonymity, and obviously did not allow us to record
the interviews. We would like to acknowledge the following people
for their help in facilitating the interviews or for exchanges of ideas on
the content: Alessandro Campi, Stefania Giannini, Leonardo Morlino,
Giovanni Orsina, Marco Tarchi. In addition, we are grateful to Hannah
Doyal, who already revised our first Palgrave book Italy in International
Relations, and did an excellent job homogenizing the chapters and
resolving linguistic questions. Despite the fact that this book is the prod-
uct of ongoing debates between the two authors, Federico Niglia wrote
Chapters 1, 3, 4, Section 7.1, and Emidio Diodato Chapters 2, 5, 6,
Section 7.2.
References
Berry, J. M. (2002). Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing. PS:
Political Science and Politics, 35(4), 679–682.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games. In International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
CHAPTER 1
Italy in the Post-Cold War Landscape:

In Search of a New Identity
1.1 Craxi’s Children: 1980s Neo-nationalism and Its

Legacy
The decisions taken by the Italian governments during the late 1940s
and early 1950s to pursue the integration into the European and Atlantic
systems was a foundational choice for republican foreign policy. The fol-
lowing age was supposed to be the period in which to implement and
enforce the new assumptions of Italian foreign policy. The Italian ambas-
sador and writer Pietro Quaroni once said, answering the question as
to “who” makes foreign policy in Italy that the right answer should be
“nobody”. He polemically argued, “in fact, a proper [Italian] foreign pol-
icy does not exist” (in Vigezzi 1991, p. 173). Quaroni’s argument was
that by choosing the anchorage to the Euro-Atlantic system, Italy had
already decided its future in 1949 and 1951. He also stated that from
that moment Italian foreign policy was focused on keeping up with the
developments of the international system without changing the funda-
mental patterns of national foreign policy. Quaroni was correct in affirm-
ing that between 1948 and 1989 the main problem of Italian foreign
policy was the one of adjustment to the international system through
active participation in the Euro-Atlantic framework. He died in 1971 but
his interpretation can be extended to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
The Atlantic option was not a source of confrontation since the mid-
1950s when the commitment of the Italian government to integrate into
the Atlantic defensive system hindered any attempt to transform Italy
© The Author(s) 2019 1

E. Diodato and F. Niglia, Berlusconi ‘The Diplomat’,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97262-6_1
2 E. DIODATO AND F. NIGLIA
into a “quasi-Austria”: namely, a half-neutralized country open to Soviet

influence and penetration. Leftist forces finally accepted the Atlantic
option. The decision of the Socialists led to their inclusion into the
center-left coalition government. Later the Communists, who were ini-
tially strongly opposed the Western choice, decided to accept the Italian
participation with Western institutions. This happened in the year 1976,
and the Soviets were fully informed and supported the decision of the
Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer (L’Unità 2000).
However, the policy of international adjustment was only one of the
three components that defined and shaped the international role of Italy,
along with the definition of national identity and the peculiarity of being
a middle power. Despite the growing convergence on the fundamental
choices of Italian foreign policy, from the 1960s a frustration emerged
because of the lack of initiative of the country on the international scene.
An increasing number of intellectuals and practitioners of international
affairs advocated the transition to a new stage of Italian foreign policy.
According to them, the Italian universities did not sufficiently promote
studies and research on international relations and on national for-
eign policy (Are 1977, p. 108). A debate also emerged on the role that
political parties had to play in order to increase the awareness of public
opinion on the main international issues. Some important innovations
occurred moving Italy toward the establishment of a more comprehen-
sive foreign policy community. In 1965, the Istituto Affari Internazionali
(IAI), an important think tank for the study of international affairs, was
established. Its first mandate was to promote research and debate on
the main problems related to the nuclear age, on the role of Italy in the
developing world, and on the problems of European integration (Graglia
2016, p. 51).
Despite this initiative, the transition to a more advanced and con-
crete debate on international relations and foreign policy-making par-
tially failed due to the circumstances of the Cold War. Furthermore,
this failure was also the outcome of a conscious decision of the polit-
ical parties in power. Until the early 1980s, Italy was one of the most
ideologized countries in Western Europe. This was due to the pres-
ence of the strongest Communist party of Western Europe. The strug-
gle between two opposite visions of the Italian role in the East–West
confrontation survived until Berlinguer’s approval to join the Western
world, thus reflecting the peculiarity of the Italian political system. It was
very difficult that the Communist party, even after successful elections
1 ITALY IN THE POST-COLD WAR LANDSCAPE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY 3
in the 1970s, could rule the country or even enter into a coalition gov-
ernment because of its pro-Soviet position. As a result, the debate on
Italian foreign policy was stuck in a sort of ideological trap. This condi-
tion hindered the transformation of the debate on foreign policy into a
real debate on the policies that Italy should promote on the international
scene.
In the late 1970s, Italy entered into a new and more troubled phase
of its international life. The destabilization of the Southern flank of the
Mediterranean region was not entirely a Cold War problem. The emerg-
ing security spillover effects generated by the civil war in Lebanon and,
broadly speaking, by the political instability in the MENA region could
not be solved by the Western defensive institutions. Italy was alone in
facing a number of security concerns but, in the end, the reaction was
unexpectedly positive. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Italy
developed its first security capabilities for addressing regional crises. The
intervention in the civil war in Lebanon was a positive experience for
Italy. The country was successful in operating out of the national terri-
tory to restore and maintain peace and stability. In the same years, two
main events shook the pacific-led foreign policy of Italy: the Euro missile
crisis and the first elections for the European parliament.
As pointed out in the literature, the Italian decision to engage in the
Atlantic response to the installation of the medium range Soviet missiles
marked a turning point for the international credibility of the country
(Nuti 2011). In 1979, the government chaired by Francesco Cossiga
adopted the decision (finally implemented in 1983) to install the Cruise
missiles in Italy as a countermeasure to the Soviet SS-20. The first elec-
tion of the European parliament on June 10, 1979 was another impor-
tant turning point, since for the first time the Italian people vote for a
member of the European Parliament. The European elections took place
only one week after the national ones. Nevertheless, 86% of the Italian
population attended the second event (ISTAT 2015, p. 9)
The national mobilization in the European elections, along with the
emergence of a harsh debate on the Euro missile crisis, were signals of
an increasing willingness to participate in the public debate on foreign
policy. As pointed out by research from the Istituto Affari Internazionali
in 1976, thirty years after the end of the World War the main challenge
for Italian foreign policy was the enlargement of public support to for-
eign policy. This mobilization of public opinion was, at the same time, an
“opportunity” and a “factor of stalemate” (Walker 1976).
In the political landscape of the First Republic, the Democrazia

Cristiana (DC—Cristian Democratic Party), which was the majority
party and had the leading position in the setting up of the foreign pol-
icy, was completely unready to address the debate on foreign policy to a
larger audience. The party lacked the structures for both analyzing the
main foreign policy issues and to conduct non-ideological campaigns on
those specific issues. Moreover, the discussion on foreign policy inside
the party was a prerogative of senior leaders, and a broader discussion
was not encouraged. On the contrary, leftist parties had solid struc-
tures in charge for foreign policy analysis and were still able to influence
changes. Almost thirty years after the glorious (and unfortunate) cam-
paign against the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the Partito Comunista
Italiano (PCI—Italian Communist Party) was equipped to engage in a
new stage of the public debate.
Despite the charismatic leadership of Berlinguer, the PCI of the
late 1970s was suffering from the credibility crisis of Soviet-inspired
Communism. The other party of the Italian left, the Partito Socialista
Italiano (PSI—Italian Socialist Party), on the contrary, emerged as a new
political force and exploited the need for a new foreign policy in order to
increase its consensus.
In 1976, the Socialist congress held in Rome at the Midas hotel
appointed Benedetto (Bettino) Craxi as its new leader. He was repre-
sentative of the new political generation coming from the municipality
of Milan. Craxi would become the “bridge” between the First and the
Second Republic. Many scholars see in Craxi and Craxism the precur-
sor and the antecedent of Berlusconi and Berlusconism. For the oppo-
nents of Berlusconi, Craxi embodied the same negative path toward a
corrupted and already degenerated party system. He was the most prom-
inent leader involved in Tangentopoli, which is the judicial scandal that
would bring about the end of the First Republic. This fact led oppo-
nents of Berlusconi to argue that the pathologies of Berlusconism were,
to some extent, the result of the same pathologies of Craxism. On the
other hand, scholars who have a more positive judgment highlighted
that Craxi paved the way for the most important innovation introduced
by Berlusconi. Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni (2005, p. 95),
for instance, pointed out that Craxi was fundamental in changing the
approach to leadership in Italy, transforming the Presidente del Consiglio
into a modern prime minister. Giovanni Orsina, for his part, underlined
that Craxi anticipated the normalization between traditional parties
and the Italian right, thus paving the way for the transformation of the
post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN—National Alliance) into a govern-
ing party in coalition with Berlusconi (Orsina 2013).
An interesting point of contact between Craxi and Berlusconi is pre-
cisely in the field of foreign policy. One can even argue that Craxi’s influ-
ence on Berlusconi was more radical and relevant in the field of foreign
policy than in others because of the innovations introduced. Capitalizing
on a decade of scholarship on this topic, four main areas emerge in which
Craxi operated significant changes: (1) transatlantic relations; (2) rela-
tions with the East; (3) basic values of Italian foreign policy and its con-
stituencies; and (4) Italian role in the Mediterranean.
Craxi led two governments, from August 4, 1983, to April 14, 1987,
that shaped the last political decade of the First Republic. He operated
within the traditional paradigms of the Cold War, and maintaining the
friendship with Washington was the cornerstone of his foreign policies.
Nevertheless, Craxi renewed the spirit of the Italian–American relation-
ship by looking for a third way between the traditional Atlanticism of
the DC, on the one hand, and the anti-American mantras of the PCI
and the political left, on the other. Scholars often judge Craxi’s approach
to transatlantic relations by considering two main decisions taken by
his governments. The first was to proceed with the installation of the
Pershing missiles. This choice shows the willingness of the Italian lead-
ership to confirm and enforce the commitment within the Atlantic
Alliance. According to Sergio Romano, a historian and prominent diplo-
mat of those years, the inclusion of Italy in the missile program stopped
the decadence of the Italian position in the Alliance, which had increased
during the 1960s and 1970s (Romano 2006). The second decision is
related to the so-called Sigonella crisis, an important diplomatic crisis
that occurred in 1985. Craxi refused to hand over to the US military
the terrorist Abu Abbas, responsible for the hijacking of the Italian ship
Achille Lauro and the murder of the US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The
decision by the Italian government to resist Ronald Reagan’s muscular
and assertive approach proved to be rewarding. After a harsh confron-
tation between the White House and Palazzo Chigi, Italy gain respect
from the US administration as confirmed by the archival documents
(Gualtieri 2004).
Craxi’s contribution to transatlantic relations was not limited to the
restored commitment and increased assertiveness toward the United
States. Craxi understood that the United States was a fundamental ally
for addressing the increasing international instability. Craxi believed that

the Soviet system was entering into a deep crisis and that this posed a
threat both to the West and to the international system (Quagliariello
2006, p. 41). Despite the persisting engagement in the European
Community, he believed that European countries were unable to address
threats coming from a destabilized East. This is probably the most
important part of Craxi’s legacy for transatlantic relations. Even though
Craxi and Berlusconi operated in two completely different international
political scenarios, the two leaders agreed in according relevance to the
pivotal role of the United States in a changing world.
With regard to the East, Craxi changed the way in which Italy
approached the Soviet threat in both ideological and geopolitical terms.
In line with his Socialist spirit and with the center-left vision of Italian
foreign policy, he believed in a close dialogue with the East. In particu-
lar, he believed that Eastern Europe was a strategic area for both Italy
and Europe. Contrary to the Communists, however, he believed that the
place of the Socialists was with the opponents of Soviet Communism.
Even before his election as leader of PSI, Craxi believed in the “Socialism
with a human face”. He was not able to bring back the Italian left toward
the European tradition of social democracy. However, Craxi marked an
ideological distance from Soviet Communism and the PCI, transform-
ing the PSI into a large collector of moderate votes. In particular, he
was able to speak for that liberal area not represented either by the small
Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI—Italian Liberal Party) or by the too popu-
lar DC.
Since the age of De Gasperi, Craxi was the first leader who pro-
posed a straight anti-Communist paradigm. Understanding Craxi’s
anti-Communism is fundamental to explaining Berlusconi’s anti-
Communist obsession, which we will discuss later. Despite their exclu-
sion from the governmental sphere, the Communists were able to pene-
trate the cultural identity of the First Republic. In the public discourse of
the 1960s and 1970s, the PCI developed a strong anti-Fascist rhetoric.
Between March and July 1960, the monarchists and the right-wing party
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI—Italian Social Movement) voted their
confidence for a DC-led government. This vote raised harsh criticisms
by the leftist parties. The following decision of the MSI to organize its
national congress in Genoa, a city awarded the gold medal for its par-
ticipation in the Resistenza, caused mass protests during which a num-
ber of people died. Since this so-called Tambroni crisis, the PCI took the
leadership of a campaign in support of a renovated resistance (resistenza)

against the Fascists and the fascist ideas that were supposed to endanger
democratic life. In the years between 1963 (the establishment of the first
center-left cabinet chaired by Aldo Moro) and 1978 (the death of Aldo
Moro), the PCI emerged as the main counterpart of the political parties
in power, and those years can be seen as the run-up for the inclusion
of the Communists in the government. In Moro’s and Berlinguer’s per-
spective, the political convergence between the Christian Democrats and
the Communists was necessary in order to address the growing instabil-
ity in the country and to contrast the spread of terrorist and social vio-
lence. At the same time, this convergence between the two main parties
of the First Republic created dissatisfaction among a significant section of
Italian people. Craxi tried to contrast the logic of consociativismo (conso-
ciationalism) between DC and PCI. In his opinion, Italy needed a new
and more dynamic political system (Craveri 2010, p. 92).
Craxi devoted great interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East. Craxi’s policy toward the MENA region had three focuses: the
Israeli-Palestinian question, the Lebanon crisis, and the Maghreb. The
Italian engagement in this area was accompanied by an increasing impor-
tance of the armed forces in the framework of Italian foreign policy.
The main difference between the Mediterranean policy of Italy of the
1950s–1960s and that of the 1980s is in the fact that Italian action was
not limited to those of a political and economic nature. Italy took part in
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after the Israeli
occupation of the Southern part of the Lebanese territory. As pointed
out by Luciano Tosi (2014, p. 244), the Italian armed forces operated
in a framework characterized by the absence of regional security insti-
tutions, the lack of European initiative, and the dearth of effectiveness
in the same UN action. Italy first accepted the US request to contribute
with its military forces in the implementation of the Camp David agree-
ments. Later, between 1982 and 1984, the country was part of two mis-
sions in Lebanon. In the years when Craxi was prime minister, Italy drew
the attention of the international community for its capability to act as
a stability provider in the Mediterranean. In 1986, thanks to its com-
mitment in peacekeeping mission, Italy obtained its fourth election as a
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Broadly speaking, in the 1980s new patterns of Italian foreign pol-
icy emerged and Craxi played a key role in setting the new framework.
He understood the changing scenarios and tried to adapt Italy’s foreign
policies to operate in a changing world. However, this transition was

incomplete because the main international paradigms was still that of the
Cold War. In the early 1990s, the sudden fall of the Italian party system
interrupted the transition that Craxi was trying to promote and led, to
some extent, to a loss of memory of the program of projects and reforms
carried out in the previous decade.
1.2 Cold War Nostalgia

The early 1990s opened a new age for Italy. From the perspective of
international relations, the changing global scenario brutally affected the
country that ceased to be the southern-eastern frontier of the free world.
Three main factors explain the Italian transition onto the international
stage: the fall of the Berlin Wall and, broadly speaking, the end of the
Cold War; the process of economic globalization; the establishment of
the European Union. These three factors are unanimously identified in
the literature as changing the international scenario in which Italy was
accustomed to operate, thus forcing political and economic actors to
develop new approaches and strategies in order to survive in the new
world. However, the real effect of these factors needs to be clarified in
the light of the domestic conditions of Italy during those years, thus by
discussing the capacity and incapacity of the governing elites to under-
stand and address the ongoing transformation. After all, the Second
Republic was established after the scandal of Tangentopoli and, as we are
going to see, after the electoral referendum of 1993.
The Italian political transition covers the years between 1989 and
1994 during the X legislature (1987–1992) and XI legislature (1992–
1994). According to historian Luciano Cafagna (2003), three main
domestic events led to what we might define as the “great landslide” of
Italian politics: the collapse of the party system, the fiscal crisis, and the
secessionist drift fostered by the Lega Nord (LN—Northern League).
Despite the fact that national institutions and practices did not adapt
immediately to the rapid change occurring in the realm of domestic
dynamics, what happened in those years was a “regime crisis” (Pinelli
2014, p. 32).
The emerging crisis of the political institutions, especially of the tra-
ditional political parties, was evident since the late 1980s. The PCI was
the first party to collapse as a result of global events. On November
12, 1989, at La Bolognina (an industrial district of Bologna) the PCI
secretary Achille Occhetto announced the end of the Italian Communist

Party. The new party changed its name another two times: Partito
Democratico della Sinistra (PDS—Democratic Party of the Left) and,
from 2007, simply Partito Democratico (Democtratic Party—PD). The
nostalgia of Communism converged in smaller parties among which we
can remember the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC—Party
for the re-Foundation of Communism). The fade of the PCI was only
the beginning of a larger process, which led to the collapse of the other
parties. The President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga, understood
the emerging weakness of the party system and favored the ongoing pro-
cess. Commentators harshly criticized Cossiga for a supposed attack on
the constitutional balance of power and for his attempt to influence the
composition of the government in 1991. Even though the actions taken
by Cossiga are controversial, he was right in pointing out that the crisis
of the party system was also a crisis of the republican institutions.
In the early morning of February 17, 1992, the police arrested Mario
Chiesa, president of the Pio Albergo Triulzio, a charity association in
Milan. The investigation paved the way for Tangentopoli, which led to
the fall of the PSI and to the voluntary exile of Craxi in Tunisia. The
electoral success of the separatist LN in the general elections of April
4, 1992, and the terrorist attacks ordered by the Sicilian Mafia against
two popular judges, in May and July 1992, contributed to the increase
in political instability. When on May 23 a Mafia bomb killed judge
Giovanni Falcone, the parliament was proceeding with the elections of
the new President of the Republic. The tragedy fostered the convergence
on the name of Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, an old representative of the DC.
A coalition government that included PSI and DC tried once again to
rule the country, even though the Prime Minister Giuliano Amato was a
university professor with a strong international reputation. Furthermore,
he was one of the few prominent socialist politicians who was not under
investigation. Downgraded by Moody’s rating agency from Aaa to Aa1
in July 1991, Italy faced another economic downgrading in August 1992
from Aa1 to Aa2. In September 1992, Danish citizens opposed to the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty causing a currency crisis that forced
the Italian Lira out of the European Monetary System. In April 1993,
Scalfaro appointed the former Governor of the Bank of Italy Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi as the new prime minister.
The two cabinets of the XI legislature—the Amato government
(from June 28, 1992 to April 28, 1993) and the Ciampi government
(from April 28, 1993 to May 10, 1994)—saw Italy embark on the most
transformative reforms since the 1950s. This transformation had begun
in the previous X legislature. Beyond the negotiations for the European
Union (from December 1990 to December 1991), which we will discuss
later, the years 1989–1990 saw the approval of a number of structural
reforms. Among others, the reform of the university system (1989), the
reform of local authorities (1990), and the reorganization of adminis-
trative procedures (1990). In 1993, the agreement between Beniamino
Andreatta (Italian foreign minister) and European Commissioner Karel
van Miert opened the door to the privatization of Italian public compa-
nies. In the same year, a referendum dismantled the proportional com-
ponent of the national electoral law, paving the way to a new system
(the so-called Mattarellum) in which the centrality of the political leader
replaced the centrality of the party system. Despite all these transforma-
tions, the credibility of the national political forces was questionable:
between 1992 and 1994, 16% of MPs were under investigation by the
judiciary pool of Tangentopoli and 7% by the attorney of Milan.
The years 1943–1946 and 1991–1994 marked two turning points in
Italian history. Both are benchmark dates in which political transition at
domestic political level overlapped with changes occurring at the inter-
national system (Diodato and Niglia 2017). In the post-World war,
however, the political forces were recognized and legitimized by the par-
ticipation in the Resistenza, and by the contribution to the liberation of
the country. On the contrary, the political forces of the early 1990s suf-
fered from a large discredit resulting from the judiciary investigations.
Such a discredit closed the door to a new constituent assembly, which
could have had the opportunity to rethink and rewrite the institutional
framework and to promote a renewal of the existing parties. The regime
crisis did not bring a regime change. The Second Republic was, in fact,
the beginning of an informal transition in the political and institutional
system. This transition remained partially “unaccomplished” (Negri
2000) also because the alternative interpretation of the new political sys-
tem coexisted and clashed in the following years. In those years of transi-
tion, the party system did not adapt as fast as the circumstances required.
The only novelty was the rise of a secessionist party that threatened
national unity.
The absence of a strong and consolidated opposition party favored,
as already said, the appointment of Giuliano Amato and Carlo Azeglio
Ciampi as heads of government. However, the absence of politics
sanctioned the primacy of institutions. For the first time, the President
of the Republic and other institutions such as the Bank of Italy were able
to impose political solutions on the Italians. The premise was that polit-
ical parties were unprepared to understand and address the national and
international changes that were taking place in the country. Evidence of
the institutional approach to the crisis emerged from the negotiations of
the Maastricht Treaty. The key figure of Italian negotiators was the min-
ister of Treasury Guido Carli, former Governor of the Bank of Italy and
a symbol of the technocratic elite (Diodato 2014; 2015).
The changing global scenario that brutally affected Italy explains the
weakness of politics. As already said, three main factors explain the Italian
transition on the international stage: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the pro-
cess of globalization, and the Maastricht Treaty.
The attitude of the Italian elites toward the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the German reunification is explanatory of the inability to understand
and address the changing European landscape. Traditionally, Italy was
one of the closest political allies and economic partners of the Federal
Republic. Both countries shared a common history and were two suc-
cessful examples of democratic restoration after the respective dicta-
torships. They also shared the same orientation in terms of East–West
confrontation and European integration. In theory, Italy was a sincere
supporter of the German reunification. In 1990, the president of the car
industry FIAT and influential senator for life Giovanni Agnelli affirmed,
“I cannot envisage a strong Europe without a strong Germany” (Il Sole
24 Ore 1990). However, the political elites did not share this pro-
active attitude. The key personality to this regard was the DC leader
Giulio Andreotti, who served as prime minister from July 1989 to June
1992. As pointed out by Antonio Varsori (2013, p. 25), Andreotti’s
suspicion toward a reunified Germany had already emerged during
the 1980s. In a public convention, he echoed François Muriac saying
“I love Germany so much that I like to see two of them”. When the
Berlin Wall fell, Italian public opinion had a positive reaction and, of
course, the main political forces expressed their approval for the end
of the Cold War. The Italians saw in the German events the confirma-
tion that the shadow of the Cold War was almost over. The problems
emerged for the Italian government when the eventuality of a rapid
German reunification emerged.
The fear of a restored Germany was an old nightmare of the Italian
diplomats and foreign policy practitioners, who believed that a strong
Germany would have had negative consequences for the independence

and authority of Italy in Europe. As a result, the Italian government pro-
posed a long-term strategy for the German reunification. The Italian
diplomacy proposed to progress step by step. First, the German reuni-
fication needed the consensus of both West and East Germany (thus
denying the incorporation of East Germany into the institutional and
political system of West Germany). Second, the reunification had to be
in accordance with the Helsinki principles, especially those concerning
the recognition of European borders. Third, the reunification had to
occur in parallel with the negotiations for the reduction of armaments.
Finally, the reunification should not endanger the European balance of
power, thus implying that the reunification had to be the final step of a
long-term process producing a new balance of power between East and
West (D’Ottavio 2014, p. 39). This strategy received no attention from
the main players (the German federal government and the other Western
powers). During the Ottawa Atlantic meeting of February 1990, the
German foreign minister Hand Dietrich Genscher addressed the Italian
foreign minister with the famous sentence: “you are not part of the
game” (Rusconi 1993).
The Italian government also attempted to counterbalance the dis-
ruptive effects of the ongoing German reunification through dia-
logue with the Central European countries. The architect of this plan
was the foreign minister Gianni De Michelis. Having been born into a
wealthy Venetian family, the foreign minister balanced the European and
Mediterranean focus of Andreotti with a special attention for the Balkans
and Central Europe. His main initiative was the so-called Pentagonale
(1989–1990), a project of cooperation including Italy, Austria, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. De Michelis’ initiative had great poten-
tial and anticipated the most significant changes taking place in the
region. He understood that a controversial transition was taking place in
the region and, therefore, there was a danger of regional destabilization.
From the Italian perspective, this strategy was also useful for counter-
balancing the effects of German reunification, and to prevent the estab-
lishment of a German exclusive influence over the region (especially in
the Balkans). In the eyes of foreign diplomats and head of governments,
however, this was just an attempt to balance the impact of the German
unification, adopting a strategy that ironically recalled the diplomatic
solutions to counterbalance German revisionism in Europe after World
War I. In conclusion, the Andreotti-De Michelis strategy to address
the effects of the German reunification proved to be unsuccessful. In

the eyes of the European and Atlantic partners, Italy was just a second
rank partner scared by the ongoing change in the continental balance
of power, whose main goal was to maintain its position in the power
hierarchy.
After the reunification, a new stage in the process of European inte-
gration occurred. The European Council held in Dublin in April 1990
ended with the decision to activate two intergovernmental conferences.
The first one was on the political aspects of European integration and the
second on the economic and monetary ones. This two-track solution was
a merger between two different (both in terms of approach and vision)
discourses in the process of European integration. On the one side, the
project to establish a politically integrated European Union satisfied the
most ambitious goal in the process of integration. On the other side, the
economic and monetary union was not an emotional project, since it was
just a further step in the implementation of the single market. However,
the technocrats of the member states supported this second project and
they capitalized on the close cooperation between central banks. When
the negotiations started, Italy was the main supporter of a traditional
approach, giving priority to the political aspects of the negotiation. This
was the result of the vision of De Michelis, who believed in the impor-
tance of the political negotiation in order to counterbalance the emer-
gence of a German–French axis. The foreign minister was less interested
in the technical aspects of the economic integration. This negotiation
was in the hands of the bureaucrats working with the treasury minister
Guido Carli and that of the Bank of Italy. In particular, Carli had control
of the economic dossier since he had previously served as the governor of
the Bank of Italy and was one of the most authoritative and recognized
experts of European economic integration. He received the support of
a highly qualified team of experts, such as Mario Monti, later European
Commissioner, and Mario Draghi, future governor of the European
Central Bank.
During the negotiations, the war in Yugoslavia captured the attention
of the Italian diplomacy. The Italian government was relatively satisfied
with the agreement regarding the political aspects but was unable to fully
understand the implications of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The year 1991 saw a deterioration in the economic performance of the
country. As already said, Italy was the first European country down-
graded by Moody’s. The difficulties in adopting structural reforms
because of the conservative approach of trade unions and the incapacity

of the main parties to develop new policies confirmed the emerging sus-
picions and contributed to the skepticism of the other European gov-
ernments. Serious doubts emerged on the Italian capacity to catch up
with the standards of the EMU. Italian diplomacy was unable to impose
an alternative line based on the recognition of different economic struc-
tures and standards. In the absence of a political voice, Carli and the
Italian technocrats agreed with other European technocrats in imposing
European economic standards, or an external constraint (vincolo esterno)
in order to overcome the incapacities of the political system (Diodato
2015). The treaty of Maastricht was one of the factors that favored the
end of the Prima Repubblica, changing the domestic and European
political priorities and contributing to the fall of the existing party system
(Varsori 2013, p. 211). Maastricht extensively operated a large transfer
of sovereignty to European institutions, thus changing the patterns of
sovereignty and the sources of political legitimation. Maastricht was the
“silent killer” of the First Republic.
A third factor that contributed to the loss of vision in the early 1990s
was the economic crisis, which deeply affected the country in connection
with the traumatic perception related to the new wave of globalization.
Domestically, from the early 1990s Italians started to perceive the shrink-
ing of their economic conditions. Between 1991 and 1995, the real per
capita income decreased by 3.3%. This decline was not dramatic in abso-
lute terms, but it appeared as an extraordinary event compared with past
performances. Between 1972 and 1976, for example, the weakening of
the Lira was similar to the one in 1992, but the per capita incomes aug-
mented by 94% (Rossi 2010). The fear of an inflationary boom led the
national monetary institutions to adopt a cautious approach, thus hin-
dering any stimulus to consumption and production. During the 1980s,
Italians had the false perception of living in a better economic envi-
ronment: indeed, the country recovered from the economic recession
that had occurred in the 1970s. This happened thanks to a significant
increase in domestic mass consumption. On the contrary, in the 1990s
the Italian people perceived that the economic situation was worse than
in the past and that the commitments imposed by the European Union
were affecting their salaries and taxes.
Furthermore, the 1990s consolidated the image of Italy as one of
the weakest and more fragile economies of the European community.
At the beginning of 1991, the spread between the German Bund and
the Italian long-term treasury bonds (Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali—

BTP) reached 500 points. This was a signal of the lack of confidence
among international investors on the solidity of the Italian economy. In
1991, the public debt/GDP ratio was 97%, at an inflation rate of 6.5%.
In the same moment, the entire structure of the state-owned compa-
nies operating in the most strategic sectors (energy, chemical, steel,
industrial development) was shocked by a number of financial scandals,
while the international analysts highlighted their high level of public
debt and the lack of reforms. In 1985, the EU had passed a norm in
order to prohibit state aids. When the crisis of Italian state-owned com-
panies became evident, the government could not support the econ-
omy before the beginning of a process of economic privatization. When
in the summer of 1992 the government transformed the three main
companies (the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, ENI; the Istituto per la
Ricustruzione Industriale, IRI; the Ente Nazionale per l’energia elet-
trica, ENEL) into holdings, the revenues for the public finance were
only one billion lira instead of the expected seven (Ministero del Tesoro
2001, p. 16).
On the black Wednesday of September 16, 1992, the Lira became,
along with the British pound, the target of international speculation. The
exchange rate between the Lira and the Deutsche Mark became unsus-
tainable and the German monetary authorities refused to act in accord-
ance with the agreements established by the European Monetary System,
and did not buy the necessary amount of Lira on the currency market to
prevent the speculation (Verde 1999, p. 536). Shortly after, the Lira had
to leave the European Monetary Union (EMU) along with the pound.
In order to address the crisis, and to guarantee Italy the possibility to be
part of the third stage of the EMU (which officially started on January
1, 1999), the government imposed a significant cut on public expendi-
ture. Furthermore, there was a rise in taxation (sometimes with specific
taxes and fiscal initiatives) and a large number of reforms in the public
sector occurred. In the perception of the Italian people, these measures
were oppressing the country without achieving clear and understanda-
ble goals. This conjunction created a political vacuum that was a political
laboratory for Berlusconi and his party, Forza Italia (Go Italy—FI).
The structural changes of those years were barely understood by
Italian citizens. In particular, they did not understand the changed
nature of the European Union. The Italian people and traditional par-
ties had a pro-European attitude. According to a Doxa poll conducted
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Fig. 5
SCALE 40
265 REVS. PER MIN.
11¹⁄₄″ × 16″ PORTER-ALLEN.
Fig. 1
Fig. 4
SCALE 40
265 REVS. PER MIN.
4.416 „ „ SEC.
Fig. 2 Fig. 3
Apparatus for Graphically Showing the Acceleration and Retardation of the

Reciprocating Parts of an Engine.
Let the motion be in the direction from the crank. The crank now
begins insensibly, by pulling through the spring e, to arrest the
motion of the weight h. This pull will increase in intensity to the end
of the stroke, when the weight is brought to rest, and the spring will
become correspondingly elongated. Then, by a continuance of the
same pull, the crank puts the cross-head and this free weight in
motion in the reverse direction. This pull gradually relaxes, until at
the mid-stroke it has ceased. The weight h has acquired its full
velocity again; all stress is off the spring, and the spring and weight
are back in the positions in the box d from which they started. This
action is repeated during the opposite half of the revolution, but in
the reverse direction, the pull being changed to a push, and the
spring being compressed instead of elongated. Thus at every point
the position of this free weight shows the amount of the accelerating
or retarding force that is being exerted upon it at that point,
elongating or compressing the spring.
This varying accelerating or retarding force is recorded as follows:
A paper b, Fig. 2, is stretched on the surface ff. This surface is the
arc of a circle described about the center j, and is secured on the
lath B, so that as this lath vibrates by the motion of the cross-head
the different points in the length of the paper pass successively
under the pencil. This is set in the end of the long arm a of the right-
angled lever-arms 4 to 1 seen in Fig. 2, which is actuated by the rod
e passing centrally through the spring and secured in the head c.
This pencil has thus imparted to it a transverse motion four times as
great as the longitudinal motion of the weight h in the box d. The
pencil is kept lifted from the paper (as permitted by the elasticity of
the arm a) by the cord m. By letting the pencil down and turning the
engine by hand, the neutral line x, Fig. 2, is drawn. Then when the
engine is running, on letting the pencil come in contact with the
paper, the diagonal lines are drawn as shown on Fig. 2.
Edwin F. Williams
If the rotation of the shaft were uniform and there were no lost
motion in the shaft or connecting-rod, this diagonal line would repeat
itself precisely, and would be a straight line modified by the angular
vibration of the connecting-rod. On the other hand, these lost
motions and the variations in the rotative speed must be exactly
recorded, the latter being exhibited with a degree of accuracy not
attainable by computation and plotting, and their correctness would
be self-demonstrated. For this purpose this instrument must be
found highly valuable, if it is really desired to have these variations
revealed rather than concealed. Fig. 5 represents the inertia diagram
drawn by this instrument applied to a Porter-Allen engine running in
the Boston Post Office at the speed of 265 revolutions per minute.
Fig. 4 shows the same diagram with the transverse motion of the
pencil enlarged to correspond with the scale of the indicator, so
exhibiting the force actually exerted on the crank-pin at every point,
which is represented by the shaded area, and from which the
rotative effect on the crank can be computed. The steam pressure
absorbed at the commencement of the stroke by the inertia of these
parts is represented by the blank area above the atmospheric line
xx. This is not all imparted to the crank at the end on account of the
compression.
I have myself had no experience in the use of this instrument, but I
do not see why it might not be so made that the diagonal line or lines
in Fig. 4 would be drawn at once. The variations of motion would
thus be shown much more accurately than they can be by the
enlargement of these small indications. This would require the spring
e to bear the same relation to the inertia of the weight h that the
spring of the indicator bears to the steam pressure on its piston area.
The steam diagram and the inertia diagram would then be drawn to
the same scale. A separate instrument would be required for each
scale. It would seem desirable that this instrument, which is not
expensive, should be brought before the public in this practical
shape.
The 16″×30″ engine exhibited at this fair of the American Institute
was sold from the exhibition to the Arlington Mills, at Lawrence,
Mass. For a reason that will appear later, I have always regarded this
sale as the most important one that I ever made.
CHAPTER XIX
Boiler Tests in Exhibition of 1871. We Lose Mr. Allen. Importance of Having a

Business Man as President. Devotion of Mr. Hope.
he next year we were not exhibitors at the Institute

fair, but our boiler remained in its place and was run by
the Institute. This boiler and its setting are shown
correctly in the accompanying reproduction of a
drawing made about that time, except that it consisted
of nine sections instead of six. At the close of the
exhibition a boiler test was made by the Institute, through a
committee of which Professor Thurston, at that time Professor of
Mechanical Engineering in the Stevens Institute, afterwards until his
death Director of the Sibley College of Mechanic Arts, in Cornell
University, was the chairman. Five boilers, including the Allen boiler,
were tested, one on each day, in a continuous run of twelve hours.
The four besides our own were all different from the boilers exhibited
the year before.
A week was spent in preparation for this test. A large wooden tank
was constructed, in which was built a surface condenser, consisting
of a pile of sections of the Root boiler, laid horizontally, having a total
of 1100 square feet of cooling surface. The steam was exhausted
into the pipes which were surrounded by the cooling water, thus
reversing the construction of surface condensers.
Professor Robert H. Thurston
ALLEN BOILER.
OF
80 HORSE POWERS.
Area of Effective Heating Surface 810-Square Feet.
Area of Grate 24-Square Feet.
scale-1 inch-1 foot. Allen Engine Works.
July-1872.
Each boiler was tested by setting its damper and its steam-valve
wide open, so burning all the coal that could be burned by it under its
draft, and delivering freely all the steam that it made. This latter
entered the condenser at the top, and the water formed by
condensation was drawn off at the bottom, while the condensing
water entered the tank at the bottom and was drawn off at the top,
the currents of steam and water being thus opposite to each other,
which was an ideal construction. The condensing water at a
temperature of 45.5 degrees flowed in under the pressure in the city
main and was measured in a Worthington meter, and the
temperature of the overflow taken. The condensed steam was drawn
off into a barrel and weighed, 300 pounds at a time, and its
temperature taken. This method was an excellent one.
Not having high chimneys, no boiler had a strong draft, as shown
by the coal burned per square foot of grate. Our draft was the
strongest of all. Only the Allen boiler and the Root boiler gave
superheated steam, and the competition between them was very
close. The valve being wide open, giving a free current into the
condenser, the superheat of our steam fell to 13.23 degrees
Fahrenheit. Root’s superheat was 16.08 degrees.
Root’s boiler, the trial of which occupied the first day, blew steam
from the open try-cock, from water at 46 degrees Fahrenheit, in
sixteen minutes from lighting the fire. Next morning our boiler blew
steam from water at the same temperature, in twelve minutes, and
Mr. Root holding his watch could not resist the ejaculation,
“Wonderful boiler!” The Allen boiler, burning 13.88 pounds of coal
per square foot of grate per hour, evaporated one cubic foot of water
per hour from each 17.41 square feet of heating surface. Root’s
boiler, burning 11.73 pounds of coal per square foot of grate per
hour, required 23.59 square feet of heating surface to evaporate one
cubic foot of water per hour.
Our stronger draft, 13.88 against 11.73, accounted for 3.2 pounds
of the above superior evaporative efficiency, leaving 3 pounds to be
accounted for by the more rapid circulation in the Allen boiler. The
great value of the inclination of the tubes was thus established. The
report contains this sentence: “The Committee desire to express
their appreciation of the excellent general arrangement and
proportions which gave to the Allen boiler its remarkably high
steaming capacity.”
The reader will observe in the plan of this boiler the pains taken to
maintain as far as possible parallel currents of the heated gases
through the boiler, and taking the flues off at the bottom, thus
bringing all the heating surfaces at the same distance from the
furnace into approximately equal efficiency.
RESULTS OF THE COMPETITIVE TRIAL OF STEAM BOILERS AT
THE FAIR OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE, NOVEMBER, 1871.
Name. Ratio of Ra
Square Feet. heating Total Weights. wa
surface pri
Grate Heating to grate Coal. Com- Feed. Steam. Primed to w
surface. surface. surface. bustible. water. eva
ra
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H.
Root 27 876¹⁄₂ 32.5 3800 3185.5 27896 27896 0. 0.
Allen 32¹⁄₄ 920 28.5 5375 4527 39670 39670 0. 0.
Phleger 23 600 26.1 2800 2274 20428 19782.94 645.06 3.2
Lowe 37³⁄₄ 913 24.2 4400 3705 34000 31663.35 2336.65 6.9
Blanchard 8¹⁄₂ 440 51.8 1232 1047.5 10152.5 9855.6 296.9 3.
The boiler had one defect, seen in the front view, cross-section. A
straight passage 2 inches wide was given to the gases between
each pair of tubes.
The boilers having all had a preliminary trial during the first week, I
observed the vapor arising from the exposed surface of the water in
the tank, and that this unmeasured loss of heat differed considerably
in the different boilers, and was enormously greatest on the trial of
the Allen boiler. I said nothing, but went down early on next Monday
morning and on my way bought a common tin cup about 3 inches
deep and 4 inches in diameter, and secured it in one corner of the
tank, immersed to a quarter of an inch below its rim, and filled even
full of water. This was completed before the arrival of the Committee,
and was at once approved by them. I made it my business every day
to note the fall of the water level by evaporation from this cup. On the
trial of the Allen boiler only the water in the cup was all evaporated,
and I had to fill it again. The temperature of the water in the cup was
always 8 degrees below that of the surrounding water. It was thus
obvious that the evaporation from the tank was greater than the fall
of the level in the cup would indicate. The Committee considered
that this should be increased as the tension of the vapors. The result
was that the report contained the following item: Units of heat carried
away by evaporation at the surface of the tank:
Root boiler 721,390.8 units
Allen boiler 1,178,404.5 „
Phleger boiler 378,371 „
Lowe boiler 692,055 „
Blanchard boiler 268,707 „
The same Bulkley pyrometer was used in all the furnaces to
indicate the temperature of the escaping gases. On Tuesday
morning, when my boiler was to be tried, I saw that before my arrival
the pyrometer had been set in the brick chimney, where the readings
could be conveniently taken by a person standing on the brick
surface of the boiler chamber. Its readings averaged 260 degrees
Fahrenheit. I did not believe this to be true. At about half-past two
o’clock, when seven readings had been taken, one each half hour,
having got ready some bricks and mortar and tools, I pulled the
pyrometer out and filled up the hole. I then knocked a hole in the
side of the brickwork at the bottom, in front of the flue, and set the
pyrometer there. The reading rose to 405 degrees, which was the
temperature at which the gases then entered the flue, and averaged
about 385 degrees during the remainder of the sixteen readings.
Root’s average was 416 degrees, and Phleger’s (also tubular)
averaged 503. Obviously the readings taken before the pyrometer
was moved should have been rejected; but the boys who did this
kind of work added them all together, and our average temperature
is printed 345.87 degrees, giving the boiler more credit than it was
entitled to by about 40 degrees. I lost a little by this operation. While I
was bricking up the hole the fireman came around and told me I was
spoiling his fire. When I got the figures of water evaporated and coal
burned, I found that in that half hour I had only 900 pounds (three
barrels) credited to the boiler, instead of 1800 pounds (six barrels)
during every other half hour, being a loss of about .023 in water
weighed in the barrel, 38,400 pounds, instead of 39,300 pounds,
while, curiously enough, the coal burned was rather increased.
The point of interest in this incident was the fact that the gases
had lost 125 degrees of heat in traversing a distance in flues and
chimney of less than 20 feet. This seems difficult to believe, but they
did. There was no leakage as the excellent draft clearly proved, nor
any other way of accounting for the discrepancy. The length of the
pyrometer tube exposed to the heated gases was the same in both
positions. The heat had been lost by radiation through the brickwork.
I have been waiting ever since for a chance to turn this knowledge to
useful account, but it has not come yet. I will content myself with
suggesting to somebody else the idea of facing the boiler setting,
flues and chimney, not only outside but inside also after leaving the
furnace, with white encaustic tiles, which will neither absorb nor
radiate heat appreciably. This will pay in maintaining the temperature
in a large degree to the top of the chimney, so increasing, perhaps
doubling, the strength of the draft. An enormous amount of heat
must be lost through the extended surface of the brick boiler setting.
It is always observed that the hotter a boiler-room is kept the greater
the efficiency of the boiler becomes. This is a slight indication of the
great gain which might be effected by the plan I propose.
Before this boiler trial we had lost Mr. Allen. He had conceived the
idea of the pneumatic riveter and the high-speed air-compressor to
furnish this riveter with power. In the latter he utilized the inertia of
the reciprocating parts, including two pistons, the steam and the air
piston. This he did with my cordial consent, and indeed there was
nothing patentable about that feature anyway. Mr. Allen thus became
the originator of the important system of pneumatic riveting, in its two
methods, by percussion and by pressure. Mr. Allen sold out his stock
in the engine company to Mr. Hope and Mr. Smith, and built a shop
in Mott Haven for the manufacture of the riveters and compressors.
He took the boiler in the fair in part payment, and sold it directly to a
party who had erected a wood-working shop at some point on the
Harlem River.
The Croton water which had been fed to the boiler contained no
lime, but some sediment. Mr. Allen had the boiler taken down and
brought to our shop for inspection and cleaning. I determined to
improve the opportunity to observe the effect of the circulation on the
deposit of sediment, and the result of the examination proved most
interesting. Each inclined tube had been provided at the end with a
brass plug, by removing which it could be cleaned by the running out
of the water which it contained. This had not yet been done.
I took out the tubes on one side of one section, ten in all, five over
the furnace and five behind the bridge wall, and planed them in two
longitudinally, and had the following revelation: The tubes over the
furnace were entirely empty. In those back of the bridge wall a
deposit of sediment appeared, only about an inch deep in the first
one, and increasing regularly to a depth of 18 inches in the last one,
which was not the tube receiving the feed-water. So the water fed
into the last tube of each section deposited its sediment most largely
in the first tube it reached, in which the circulation was least active,
and had deposited it all before reaching the tubes over the furnace.
The remaining long tubes were then cleaned, the tubes cut in two
were replaced by new ones, and the boiler delivered to Mr. Allen.
The next stage in its history was very funny. The purchaser, to save
the cost of Croton water, fed his boiler from the Harlem River, and
within a month it was found to be filled solid with salt. What was
done about it I never heard.
I thought I could sell the boilers where, as in New York City, they
could be fed with water free from lime, and I made a few such sales,
but the inspiration which led me to employ the second drum for
superheating the steam had deserted me.
I came to the conclusion that by making the first drum a large one,
and not extending the nipples into the drum to trap a puddle of water,
as I had done, I could superheat the steam in one drum. That was a
blunder. I had underestimated the furious circulation, which carried a
large amount of spray into the drum. I was misled by the quiet
position of the water-level, as always shown in the glass gauge.
Instead of superheated steam, I found the boiler to give very wet
steam. That fault, of course, I could have remedied by returning to
my first design. But I was discouraged by other things. The first, of
course, was the impossibility of removing scale by any mechanical
means. The most serious discouragement was a cracked header.
The inclined tubes, on any plan for their use that I could then design,
made cast-iron headers necessary. I had taken great pains to obtain
perfect castings, making them of the best iron in baked molds in iron
flasks, of uniform thickness, ⁵⁄₈ in., and ³⁄₄ in. where threaded, with
cores held perfectly central and remarkably well vented, and felt that
I could rely on their soundness; but this defect showed that I could
not. So reluctantly I abandoned the manufacture of the boiler.
I believe, however, that there is yet a future for the inclined boiler
tube, with independent circulation in each tube, the whole made
entirely from forged steel; and that better results will be obtained
from it than any other form of boiler has as yet given. I have been
told by Chief Engineer Melville that all water admitted to the boilers
in the United States Navy is made pure enough for pharmaceutical
purposes. If this can be done in the navy, where sea water and the
mud of harbors have to be used, it can be done anywhere. Cooling
towers make it practicable to return all water to the boiler even from
non-condensing engines. Then only the waste needs to be made
good, and any water can be purified for this purpose. Oil or grease
with the feed-water is readily avoided. Only electrolysis remains to
be provided against, which can be done by avoiding the use of any
alloy of copper in contact with the water. We may then have boilers
of the most durable character and safe to carry any desired
pressure.
The following incident near the close of my experience in Harlem
would be too ridiculous to print except for its consequence. One day
Mr. Smith sent me word that he would like to see me in his office.
When I entered he asked me, “What do you pay for the castings of
your governor arms and balls?” Of course he knew perfectly well, as
he had the bills and the books, but that was his way of introducing
the subject. I replied, “Forty cents a pound.” He held up both hands
in affected amazement, and exclaimed, “Forty cents a pound! Well,
sir, I can assure you of one thing, no more of this company’s money
is going to be squandered in that way.” I overlooked his insulting
language and manner, and said quietly, “Are you sure, Mr. Smith,
that you have all the information you need to form a correct judgment
in this matter?” “I am sure,” he replied, “what the market price is of
copper and tin, and that I can get castings made from our own metal
at a price that will bring the cost to not more than 25 cents a pound.”
“This, then, I presume, is all you know about the subject,” I said,
“and you ought to know a great deal more, which I will tell you. It is
necessary that I can rely upon getting a pure copper and tin alloy, in
the proportion known as gun-metal, on account of its strength, its
rigidity, and its wearing qualities. The latter is of especial importance,
because the governor joints are in continual motion under the weight
of the heavy counterpoise. Experience shows that this purity cannot
be relied upon where it is possible that any inferior metal can
become mixed with this alloy in even the smallest proportion. This for
us, not making our own castings, must be wholly a matter of
confidence.
“Another risk must be avoided, that is, of getting bad castings. The
castings must not have the least imperfection. The time lost, through
finding defects that make it necessary to reject arms after more or
less work has been put on them, would soon wipe out all the little
gain you look for; as these castings, at 40 cents a pound, only cost
about five dollars a set, as an average of all the sizes.
“I made a careful study of this subject when I commenced the
governor manufacture about fifteen years ago, and found David
Francis, who had a small gun-metal foundry on Vestry Street, to be
just the man I wanted. No inferior metal ever goes into his place. He
enjoyed the entire confidence of manufacturers. He has made my
governor arms and balls ever since. I have never had a bad casting
from him, and always got the pure metal, and have paid him the
same price that everybody pays him for small castings. I consider
the security that I have had respecting this metal to have been
fundamental to the great success of my governors, and that I would
be crazy to make any such change as you propose.”
He made no reply, and I left him, supposing my statement to have
been perfectly satisfactory. What was my amazement when, a few
days after, he informed me that he had made a contract with a brass
molder on Rose Street for casting our governor arms, “subject to
your approval, sir,” and he asked me to visit the place and see what
its facilities were.
I told him I would go, but that my position on the subject was
already well known to him. I found the place on a little lane, and that
the business done in it was making brass castings for plumbers. The
proprietor told me he had never made gun-metal castings, but he
could make any kind of composition, and I could rely on getting them
of just the metal I furnished him.
I reported to Mr. Smith that such an arrangement would be
ruinous, that his plan of furnishing the metal was most
unbusinesslike. “What do you know about business?” he shouted
with a sneer. “I know,” said I, “that if you should propose this plan to
any well-informed, practical man, he would laugh in your face, and
tell you if you wanted to ruin your business this would be as good a
way as any to do it.” He replied, “That is not the question, sir; the
only question is, will you, or will you not, approve the contract I have
made?” “I will not,” I replied, and walked out of his office.
A few days after I received a note from Mr. Hope, asking me to call
on him. I called next day, and he told me that Mr. Smith had been to
see him, with a bitter complaint of my insubordination and defiance
of his authority, which he would not endure, and he asked me to tell
him what the trouble was about. I told him substantially as above
related. “Is that all?” said he. I assured him that it was all the trouble
that I knew of. Mr. Hope replied, “I cannot express my amazement at
his interference with your management. That must be absolutely
entrusted to you, and he ought to see it. He is a rational man and I
can easily show him his error, and that you must take the stand you
have done. I don’t think you will have any more trouble.”
I did not hear again from Mr. Hope for a fortnight, during which
time I had no occasion to meet Mr. Smith. Finally a letter came from
him, telling me that I must prepare for the worst; he had exhausted
all his efforts on Mr. Smith, and found him absolutely immovable,
declaring that I must go, I was of no use there, anyway. Mr. Hope
said he told him his conduct was outrageous and suicidal. If I went,
that I would be the end of the business. He snapped his fingers at
that, saying, “Mr. Goodfellow can make the engines, and I can sell
them; what more do you want?” He declared that no business could
succeed unless the will of the president was law. They had several
very disagreeable conferences, which Mr. Smith always closed by
saying, “Repay me my investment in this company,” which he figured
at $24,000, “and I’ll give you my stock.” He had announced to Mr.
Hope his determination to call a meeting of the directors to discharge
me, and as he had a majority of votes, having some time before
given to each of his two sons qualifying shares and had them elected
members of the board of directors, he held the power in his hands to
do it.
Directly after, I received a copy of a notice of a regular meeting of
the board, convened strictly according to law. I could see no ray of
light. The night before the meeting I walked the Third Avenue bridge
half the night. The meeting was called to order by Mr. Smith at the
appointed hour. Mr. Hope was absent. Mr. Smith said Mr. Hope had
sent word to him the day before that he might be detained, but if so
would come up on the next boat, which ran hourly, and asked Mr.
Smith to wait that time for him.
So the meeting was adjourned for an hour, when Mr. Hope arrived.
Mr. Smith prefaced the resolutions discharging me from my
position as superintendent and electing Mr. Goodfellow in my place,
by quite an oration, setting forth the solemn sense of his Christian
duty which left him no alternative, and the necessity of proper
subordination in any business, if it was to be successful, and the
especially aggravated character of my offense, and the demoralizing
nature of my example.
He was about to put the question on the adoption of the
resolutions, when Mr. Hope said, “Before you put this question to
vote, Mr. Smith, I would like to say a word. I have concluded to
accept your offer. Here is my certified check for $24,000 to your
order, and I demand from you the transfer to me of the stock in this
company standing in your name and the names of your sons.”
When the Smiths were gone (they left by the next boat) Mr. Hope
and I sat down to confer on the business of the company. When
these matters were concluded, I said to him, “Mr. Hope, if you had
determined to make this grand proof of your confidence in the engine
and in myself, why did you not tell me sooner, and save my wife and
myself a great deal of distress?”
“My dear fellow,” he replied, “I did not know till this morning that I
should be able to do it. That is why I was late.”
CHAPTER XX
Close of the Engine Manufacture in Harlem. My Occupation During a Three Years’

Suspension.
n the autumn of ’72, following the above incident, we

had a proof of the sagacity of Mr. Smith in rejecting my
plan for the establishment of works for the
manufacture of the engines, and taking a five years’
lease of an abandoned shanty. The property had
changed hands, and we received a note from the new
owner, saying that he had purchased the property with a view to its
improvement. He should therefore be unable to renew our lease, and
he gave us six months’ notice, that we might have time in which to
make other arrangements before its expiration.
Here was a situation. To move and establish the business in a new
locality would require a large expenditure, and we had no money.
The natural thing to do would be to enlarge our capital. On
consultation with several parties, Mr. Hope found the financial
situation at that time would not warrant this attempt. The Civil War
had ended between seven and eight years before. Hard times had
been generally anticipated after its close, but to the surprise of
capitalists these did not come. The country continued to be
apparently prosperous. The best observers were, however,
convinced that a financial reaction was inevitable, and the longer it
was delayed the more serious it was likely to be; an anticipation that
was more than realized in Black Friday in September, 1873, and the
collapse of values and years of absolute stagnation that followed.
For some time before that eventful day capitalists had felt anxious
and there had been a growing timidity and indisposition to invest in
any enterprise, however substantial it might be, so there was nothing
for us to do but to wind up our business and wait for more propitious
times, when we might attempt its revival.
In the winter of ’72-3 I had a call from my friend, J. C. Hoadley,
accompanied by Mr. Charles H. Waters, manager of the Clinton Wire
Cloth Company. Mr. Waters wished to obtain one of our engines. I
told him I was very sorry, but we should not be able to make one for
him. I then explained our situation. Our lease would expire in a
month or two, and could not be renewed, and we had made
arrangements then to close our business, had sold all our tools
deliverable before that date, were rushing two engines to completion,
but absolutely could not undertake another order.
“Never mind,” said he, “one of your engines I must have.” He then
told me that he was about to introduce a new feature in weaving wire
cloth. This was then woven in various narrow widths, according to
customers’ orders, having a selvage on each side. He had satisfied
himself that this latter was unnecessary. The wire, being bent in
weaving, had no tendency to ravel, and he had planned a loom to
weave the cloth seven feet in width, and slit it up into narrow widths
as required. In this loom the shuttle alone would weigh a hundred
and fifty pounds, besides the great weight of wire it would carry; it
had to be thrown nearly twelve feet, and he wanted to make as many
picks per minute as any narrow loom could do. In order to make
these throws uniformly, he required absolutely uniform motion. From
a careful study of slow-moving variable cut-off engines, he had
satisfied himself that none of them could give him the uniformity of
motion he needed. They were driven by a succession of violent
punches, these excessive amounts of force at the commencement of
each stroke were absorbed by the fly-wheel, the velocity of which
had to be increased to do it, and at the end of the stroke its velocity
had to be reduced in the same degree, to supply the total failure of
the force of the steam. This involved a variation of speed which in
ordinary business would not be regarded, but which would ruin the
action of this new loom. In the high speed of my engine, and the
action of the reciprocating fly-wheel, which compensated the
inequalities of the steam pressure without affecting the uniformity of
the speed, he found just what he needed, and that engine he must
have. I was astonished at the man’s penetration.

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Berlusconi ‘The Diplomat’: Populism

and Foreign Policy in Italy Emidio

Italy in International Relations : The Foreign Policy

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Brief Insights on Mastering Bible Study 80 Expert

ISBN 978-3-319-97261-9 ISBN 978-3-319-97262-6 (eBook)

Cover image: © Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo/Alamy Stock Photo

1 Italy in the Post-Cold War Landscape: In Search of a New

2 Populism and Foreign Policy in Italy: An Overview 23

3 (Re-)Public Diplomacy: Silvio the Storyteller 53

4 The ‘New Diplomatic Look’: Silvio the Reformer 75

5 Berlusconi’s Security Policy and the Global Financial

6 Italy and the EU in the Berlusconi Governments 143

7 Populism and Foreign Policy in Italy: The Legacy 169

exception to be found is the socialist leader Bettino Craxi, since Craxism

as rather effective in furthering Italy’s national interest”. This was due to

Ignazi, P. (2014). Vent’anni dopo. La parabola del berlusconismo. Bologna: Il

We need to talk about Silvio Berlusconi. He played a central role in

reporting arguments or statements, we asked for consent. We inter-

Italy in the Post-Cold War Landscape:

1.1 Craxi’s Children: 1980s Neo-nationalism and Its

© The Author(s) 2019 1

into a “quasi-Austria”: namely, a half-neutralized country open to Soviet

In the political landscape of the First Republic, the Democrazia

for addressing the increasing international instability. Craxi believed that

leadership of a campaign in support of a renovated resistance (resistenza)

policies to operate in a changing world. However, this transition was

1.2 Cold War Nostalgia

secretary Achille Occhetto announced the end of the Italian Communist

Germany would have had negative consequences for the i­ndependence

the effects of the German reunification proved to be unsuccessful. In

because of the conservative approach of trade unions and the incapacity

the Italian long-term treasury bonds (Buoni del Tesoro Pluriennali—

Apparatus for Graphically Showing the Acceleration and Retardation of the

Boiler Tests in Exhibition of 1871. We Lose Mr. Allen. Importance of Having a

he next year we were not exhibitors at the Institute

Close of the Engine Manufacture in Harlem. My Occupation During a Three Years’

n the autumn of ’72, following the above incident, we

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Germany would have had negative consequences for the independence