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Textbook Hobbesian Applied Ethics and Public Policy 1St Edition Shane D Courtland Editor Ebook All Chapter PDF
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Hobbesian Applied Ethics
and Public Policy
Courtland has drawn together leading Hobbes scholars whose original essays
address seminal topics in normative and applied ethics. The collection will
be a vital resource for scholars and students, and it demonstrates the endur-
ing value of Hobbes scholarship to contemporary controversies.
—Andrew I. Cohen, Georgia State University, USA
Most philosophers and political scientists readily admit that Thomas Hobbes
is a significant figure in the history of political thought. His theory was, argu-
ably, one of the first to provide a justification for political legitimacy from
the perspective of each individual subject. Many excellent books and articles
have examined the justification and structure of Hobbes’s commonwealth,
ethical system, and interpretation of Christianity. What is troubling is that
the Hobbesian project has been largely missing in the applied ethics and
public policy literature. We often find applications of Kantian deontology,
Bentham’s or Mill’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s contractualism, the ethics of care,
and various iterations of virtue ethics. Hobbesian accounts are routinely
ignored and often derided. This is unfortunate because Hobbes’s project
offers a unique perspective. To ignore it, when such a perspective would be
fruitful to apply to another set of theoretical questions, is a problem in need
of a remedy. This volume seeks to eliminate (or, at the very least, partially
fill) this gap in the literature.
Not only will this volume appeal to those who are generally familiar with
Hobbesian scholarship, it will also appeal to a variety of readers that are
largely unfamiliar with Hobbes.
5 Corporal Punishment
A Philosophical Assessment
Patrick Lenta
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Permissions ix
Editor’s Introduction 1
SHANE D. COURTLAND
SECTION I
Core Issues in Application 9
SECTION II
Medical Ethics 67
SECTION IV
Political Issues in Public Policy 179
SECTION V
Group Pluralism and Public Policy 229
This volume would not exist had it not been for the help of many people. I
offer my thanks to the contributors of this volume. It has been an honor to
work with such talented scholars and dedicated professionals. Their engage-
ment with Hobbes has been as inspiring as it has been thorough. I would
also like to thank the editors at Routledge for their advice at various stages
of the editorial process. This volume was completed, in part, with funding
from West Virginia University’s Center for Free Enterprise and the University
of Minnesota, Duluth (via the EVCAA Research and Scholarship Grant). On
a personal note, this work, as with all of my work, could not have come
about without the continued support and presence of my family. To my wife
(Kim), my children (McKenna, Logan, and Alix), my late father (not a day
goes by . . .) and my mother (one of the strongest people I know), you are
the reason my life has value.
Permissions
Most philosophers and political scientists readily admit that Thomas Hobbes
was a significant figure in the history of political thought. His theory was,
arguably, one of the first to provide a justification for political legitimacy
from the perspective of each individual subject. Since the 1980s there has
been a resurgence in the critical exegesis of Hobbesian theory. Many excel-
lent books and articles have examined the justification and structure of
Hobbes’s commonwealth, ethical system, and interpretation of Christianity.1
What is troubling is that the Hobbesian project has been largely missing
in the applied ethics and public policy literature. Quite often we find appli-
cations of Kantian deontology, Bentham’s or Mill’s utilitarianism, Rawls’s
contractualism, the ethics of care, and various iterations of virtue ethics.
Hobbesian accounts, however, are routinely ignored and often derided.
Their use in the literature is, at best, a foil for the exposition of another the-
orist’s view. Or, at worst, it is a propped-up straw man, hastily constructed
by scholars who are insufficiently familiar with Hobbes’s work.
This is unfortunate for a few reasons. First, and perhaps most important,
Hobbes’s project2 offers a unique perspective. A project, I might add, that has
been justifiably influential in political philosophy. To ignore such a perspec-
tive, when it can be fruitfully applied to another set of theoretical questions, is
a problem in need of a remedy. As many of the essays in this volume will attest,
the Hobbesian framework provides a unique perspective regarding some of
the problems facing applied ethicists. And, I would add, it offers a uniqueness
that will support interesting and novel explorations of public policy.
Second, even when the Hobbesian project fails to provide a novel answer
to particular issues in applied ethics (and, by extension, to affiliated public
policy discussions), its unique foundations can yet help foster an overlap-
ping consensus.3 Finding another theoretical “pathway” to get to a similar
“position” is, nonetheless, a significant discovery. One will find, especially
in public policy debates, that others often do not share one’s commitment to
particular theoretical foundations. The additional provision of a Hobbesian
foundation might help foster a consensus.
Third, this provides yet another avenue for Hobbes scholars to experi-
ence and explore the Hobbesian framework (his works, historical context,
2 Shane D. Courtland
arguments, etc.). By examining Hobbes through a new series of questions and
problems, one gets not only a fresh take regarding those problems, but also a
fresh take regarding Hobbes. Thus, as any true Hobbesian should appreciate,
a Hobbesian study of such applied problems will yield mutual advantage.
For the above reasons, this volume seeks to partially fill this gap in the
literature. To that end, the book comprises fifteen previously unpublished
essays from some of the top Hobbesian scholars in the world. The chapters
apply Hobbesian theory to a variety of current issues in both public policy
and applied ethics. As a collection, these essays should provide a fresh per-
spective upon a litany of intransigent problems. Moreover, they will demon-
strate what Hobbesian scholars have always suspected—that Hobbesian
theory should be studied as more than a mere historical curiosity and that
the reach of his theory is both far and wide.
This collection is divided into five sections.
Bibliography
Baumgold, Deborah. Hobbes’s Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988.
Boonin-Vail, David. Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Ewin, R.E. Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991.
Hampton, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668,
ed. by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis, IN: New Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.
Hobbes, Thomas. Man and Citizen, ed. by Bernard Gert. New York: Doubleday,
1972.
Kavka, Gregory. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1986.
Lloyd, S.A. Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s ‘Leviathan’: The Power of Mind over
Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Lloyd, S.A. Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of
Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Martinich, A.P. The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Poli-
tics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press, 1995.
von Hirsch, Andrew, and Nils Jareborg. “Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard
Analysis.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11 (Spring 1991): 1–38.
Section I
The only goals that the sovereign can use policy to pursue are safety, mean-
ing the absence of a reasonable fear that one will be subject to violence at
the hands of another unless one wrongs the other first,8 and the condition
for “contentments,” such that by one’s own industry one can provide for
oneself the basic necessities and whatever luxuries one desires and is willing
to work to acquire. We can see the significance of this when we contrast it
with other political theories that posited that the duty of the government
was to engage in ‘soulcraft’: that is, to make people good, or to save their
souls, or to allow them to fulfill their telos. This is already a distinguishing
feature of his approach to policy, when contrasted with much of the canon.
Hobbes’s is importantly and intentionally a minimalist picture. The good of
the people, understood in this special way, is the only criteria, and what he
is doing in the chapter on the “duties of the sovereign” is spelling out what
it takes to ensure that.
Equality
Hobbes gives an extended discussion of equality under the law, arguing
forcefully that people should not be treated differently according to their
social status; “the great” (as he calls them) should not enjoy immunity and
the “humble” or “the common people” should be treated just as well by the
law as the elite. He specifies that the great should not be treated as above
the law either because of their status or because of the status of their victims;
in fact, “the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated,
but aggravated by the greatness of their persons, because they have least
need to commit them.”10 The significance of this kind of directive was pow-
erfully illustrated in the Jim Crow South, where lynchings were routinely
recognized as extralegal but rarely punished. Lynchers were not prosecuted
because of the race of the victim; had they hung one rich white townsperson,
they certainly would have been prosecuted. Hobbes’s legal egalitarianism
is reinforced at two points: first, aristocrats/nobility cannot get away with
breaking the law because they are of a high class (now we might think of
the police ignoring drunk driving by celebrities) and second, crimes against
those of low class cannot be dismissed because of the class of the victim.
Social status should not determine how the case and the people involved get
treated, whether they are offender or victim.
But Hobbes’s egalitarianism has even broader consequences, as when he
states: “It is the duty of the sovereign also to see that ordinary citizens are
not oppressed by the great.” Equal protection is guaranteed not merely in
relation to the law, but in relation to one another. Depending on how we
understand oppression, this could rule out anything from slavery to exploita-
tion of immigrant workers. It is also significant from a gendered perspec-
tive, as traditional human rights theory has often struggled to account for
violations against women’s human rights, insofar as these typically occur
in the private (home) sphere, without the explicit sanction or assistance of
government agents. Of course, it is important to keep in mind what Hobbes
himself had in mind here (namely, the beggar’s revolt in Holland in the six-
teenth century) and that broader consequences are extrapolations from that.
Hobbes is most concerned with “the great” getting away with “scorn” and
A Hobbesian Approach to Public Policy 17
“insults” towards “citizens of modest means”; he specifies that people of
“humble stations” can be reproached for baseness—that is, doing something
wrong—but cannot be reproached simply for being “of a humble station.”11
Hobbes insists this should not be allowed to happen; he is saying the sover-
eign should somehow ensure that disrespect of the advantaged toward the
disadvantaged does not happen. It seems like Hobbes is decrying not only
economic exploitation but also disparagement.
Taxation
While Hobbes’s economic policy is underdeveloped and thus subject to
interpretive dispute, the fact that he suggests taxing consumption, not
income, is worth noting in this context.12 Taxes, for Hobbes, are payment
for protection and everyone enjoys that alike. His point seems to be that
the rich are no more protected from a given threat, for example invasion by
an enemy power, than the poor are. This is, of course, either a problematic
factual statement or a challenging normative one. Hobbes has protection
from foreign enemies in mind here, but if we take seriously his requirements
about equal treatment under the law, then a claim like his will rule out there
being neighborhoods where police will not go, or will not go as quickly,
in a Hobbesian society. And equal protection in this sense, as the basis for
Hobbesian taxation, is not something we have fully lived up to, at this point.
In many places the rich simply are more protected than the poor; if not from
a Russian nuclear bomb, then certainly from crime, violence, and other dan-
gers to personal security. They enjoy more actual protection from the police
18 Susanne Sreedhar
and they are more likely to be successful at trial. In fact, certain minorities
are under threat from the police instead of enjoying their protection. Hobbes
explicitly builds in safeguards against such inequities. The requirements of
equal protection—especially as justification for taxation—demands much
more for the poor, oppressed, and marginalized. Of course, taxing consump-
tion might be regressive because the poor spend more of their income on
consumption than the rich, and progressives might favor taxing wealth and
income over taxing consumption. But the larger point is about protection.
Social Welfare
Hobbes arguably advocates a substantial welfare state that provides for
the basic needs of every citizen. His first suggestion is job creation: people
should be given the opportunity to provide for themselves and their families
by their own hands. Hobbes says, “There ought to be laws as may encour-
age all manner of arts (as navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of
manufacture that requires labour).” But if by some unforeseen “accident” or
“through no fault of their own,” citizens “fall into misfortune” and cannot
work or provide for themselves, the government should “see that they do
not lack the things necessary for life.”13 It is important not to paint Hobbes
in purely rose-colored tones. Hobbes is not prepared to provide basic needs,
let alone health care or social security to those whose misfortune was their
own fault. It is not clear what it means for one’s misfortune to be one’s
own fault—this might eliminate smokers, junk food addicts, all manner of
risk-takers, and possibly even poor investors. Hobbes does not give us suf-
ficient criteria to specify what people would be included under this qual-
ification. What Hobbes was likely referring to, however, was people who
committed criminal offenses. Hobbes saw no reason for jailors to provide
prisoners with food, for example. In the seventeenth century, if ordinary
prisoners were to eat at all, family members or members of the community
would have to bring them food. Hobbes also might be manifesting an early
distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. Moreover, he specifies
elsewhere that the things necessary for life include not only air and food but
also medicine.14 Here we find the seeds of an argument for extending health
care to all.15 It is the duty of government to make sure no one lacks what he
or she needs to live, so it will provide medicine for those who cannot afford
it otherwise.
SUURI ONNETTOMUUS.
»Kuka tuo mies on, Gyuri»? kysyi kreivi Kantássy, joka myöskin oli
katsellut talonpoikaa jonkun aikaa ja ihaillut aito unkarilaisen tapaan
tuota hyvän hevosen selässä olevaa mainiota ratsastajaa.
HYVITYS.
Sillä aikaa oli András melkein jo saapunut kylään. Hän tiesi yhtä
hyvin kuin kreivikin, että illan hävitys oli ihmisten eikä Jumalan
toimeenpanema, ja aavisti, että noissa taloissa asuvat taikauskoiset
säikähtyneet raukat olivat tehneet tuo raukkamaisen teon ja
aiheuttaneet rikollisessa hulluudessaan tuon peloittavan
onnettomuuden, jonka estämisestä he nyt äreästi ja uhmaavasti
kokonaan kieltäytyivät.
»Älkää puhuko heille enää mitään, isä», sanoi äkkiä muudan ääni
pimeydestä. »He eivät ansaitse, että teidän ystävälliset silmänne
katselevat heidän ilkeitä kasvojaan sekuntiakaan enää».
»Niin onkin, mies, mutta ei puoleksikaan niin ilkeä kuin tuo synkkä
ja murhaava teko, jonka teidän rikolliset kätenne ovat panneet
toimeen tänä iltana. Peräytykää heti»! lisäsi hän, kun pari
talonpoikaa lähimmästä ryhmästä aikoi lähestyä häntä. »Kiellän teitä
puhumasta minulle, lähestymästä minua ja laskemasta kättänne
Csillagin lautasille, sillä teidän saastainen kosketuksenne voi sen
tappaa».