Paper-4

STUDY MATERIAL BY AVIKUMAR SHINDE MOB.
7218850888 / 9422562886
NOTES FOR
ADVANCE DIPLOMA IN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
SUB:Chemical and Process Safety Management(23111)
STUDY MATERIAL BY AVIKUMAR SHINDE

Mob. No.:- 7218850888 / 9422562886
E-mail: avikumar.shinde@gmail.com
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STUDY MATERIAL BY AVIKUMAR SHINDE MOB. 7218850888 / 9422562886
Index
Chapter Content Page
No.
Process safety management( PSM):Purpose of PSM, its element and
risk based process safety management(RBPSM),Process safety culture,
compliance with standard, process safety competency, work force
involvement, stakeholder outreach , process knowledge management,
hazards identification and risk Assessment ( HIRA) , Operative
procedures, safe work practices, asset integrity and reliability , contractor
management, training and performance assurance management of charge
(MOC), Operational readiness , conduct of operations, Emergency
1 management, incident investigation . Measurement and metrics, auditing, 4
management review and continuous improvement.
Major industrial disasters ( case studies):Flixborough disasters (1974),
Seveso dioxin disasters (1976), Mexico LPG tank farm fire and explosion
(1984),Bhopal disasters(1984),Sandoz- Basel disasters(1986).
Enhancing safety in chemical industry: Introduction to concept, criteria
for sitting and layout of chemical plants , hazardous area classification
(HAC), Layer of protection analysis (LOPA), Instrumentation for safe
and efficient operation of plants , safety integrity Level (SIL).
Unit Operations and process hazards :Piping and instrumentation
diagram (P& ID), various unit operations and their associated hazards ,
Control, precautions and prevention, specific safety measures for certain
chemical industry like Fertilizers, insecticide, pesticides-choler-alkali,
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explosives, polymer plants. Sampling technique for toxic and
flammables, pharmaceuticals, petro-chemical etc.Precautions in the
process and operations involving explosives, flammables toxic
substances, dusts, gases, Vapour cloud formations and combating.
Safe Handling of chemicals: safe in Receiving, Storage and handling of
chemical nitrogen blanketing of flammable ,liquid storage tanks, use of
material safety data sheet (MSDS),and understanding the terminology
used in MSDS, Chemical compatibility considerations. Transportation of
3 hazardous material Safety Precautions for transporting hazardous / toxic / 93
flammable /explosive/ radioactive substances by all modes.
U.N Classification of Hazardous materials,Safety in chemical industry,
Criteria for sitting and layout of Chemical and Petrochemical Plants,Plant
area classifications, Instrumentation for safe plant operations
Safety in plant operation and maintenance:
Safety process for plant startup and shut down identification of contents
Precautions for working on pipelines, safe entry procedures to confined
4 spaces including reaction vessels. Safety in preventive and emergency 107
maintenance operations, pressure relief systems and breather valves. flare
system ,mechanism of mechanical failure that lead to a loss of
containment prevention strategy
Fire & Explosion: Chemistry of fire, Factors contributing towards fire,
Classification of fires. Common causes of industrial fires.Determination
of fire load. Design of building plant, exists, etc. for fire safety and Fire
5 resistance of building materials. Prevention of fire. Portable
extinguishers. Hydrant system, sprinkler system, introduction to. Carbon-
di-oxide systems. Foam extinguisher system. Dry chemicalExtinguishing
systems Halon replacement of firefighting 131
2
products.
Fire detection and alarms system. Special safety precautionary
measures for control of fire and explosion in handling / processing
flammable liquids, gases, vapors, mists and dusts etc. BLEVE (Boiling
liquids expanding vapor Explosion, Vapor Cloud Explosion) Including
pesticides.Fire emergency action plan. Deflagration and detonations.
Factors of Pentagon, cause of Dust explosion and control.
Fire protection: Salient features of fire explosion and toxicity index,
Dow, dispersion, Probability analysis, modeling. Pressure vessels fired
and unfired, fire resistance of building material, fire doors and fire walls.
Determination of fire load, explosive index, salient feature of fire
explosion and toxicity index.
Fire detection and alarm system: various type of fire detection and
alarm system, special safety measures for control of fire and explosion in
handling/ processing of inflammable gases, liquids, vapours, mists, solids
,dusts and flying.
Fire-fighting systems: Different types of portable fire extinguishers,
their installation and periodic inspection and operation, Replacement of
Halon with safer Substitutes fire hydrant system, fire monitor, sprinkler
system and deluge system. Carbon dioxide flooding system, foam power
system
Pressure vessels: Pressure vessels (unfired), codes of the practices
governing their safety. Assessment of reliability of pressure vessels and
their testing inspection techniques of plants, reaction vessels. Checklist
for routine inspection, checklist for specific maintenance.
Pressure system hazards and control: Principle of Pressure system,
hazards of stem, mechanism of stem explosion, properties of liquid
petroleum gas, liquefaction of gases for bulk storage under pressure,
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pressure system for relevant fluids key components and safety features
for pressure system , failure for pressure system ,hazards for overpressure
and over temperature in pressure system .
Corrosion cause and protection: Corrosion and erosion location, cause ,
inspection and prevention, cathodic protection of underground tanks /
pipelines ,sacrificial anode ,protective cladding and lining .
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Chapter:- 1
Process Safety Management( PSM):
Purpose:
The major objective of process safety management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals is to
prevent unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals especially into locations that could expose
employees and others to serious hazards. An effective process safety management program
requires a systematic approach to evaluating the whole chemical process. Using this approach, the
process design, process technology, process changes, operational and maintenance activities and
procedures, Non routine activities and procedures, emergency preparedness plans and procedures,
training programs, and other elements that affect the process are all considered in the evaluation.
Application:
The various lines of defense that have been incorporated into the design and operation of the
process to prevent or mitigate the release of hazardous chemicals need to be evaluated and
strengthened to ensure their effectiveness at each level. Process safety management is the
proactive identification, evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases that could
occur as a result of failures in processes, procedures, or equipment.The process safety
management standard targets highly hazardous chemicals that have the potential to cause a
catastrophic incident. The purpose of the standard as a whole is to aid employers in their efforts to
prevent or mitigate episodic chemical releases that could lead to a catastrophe in the workplace
and possibly in the surrounding community.To control these types of hazards, employers need to
develop the necessary expertise, experience, judgment, and initiative within their work force to
properly implement and maintain an effective process safety management program as envisioned
in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard.The OSHA standard is
required by the Clean Air Act Amendments, as is the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk
Management Plan, which will be proposed in 1992. Employers who merge the two sets of
requirements into their process safety management program will better assure full compliance
with each as well as enhance their relationship with the local community.Although OSHA
believes process safety management will have a positive effect on the safety of employees and will
offer other potential benefits to employers, such as increased productivity, smaller businesses that
may have limited resources to them at this time, might consider alternative avenues of decreasing
the risks associated with highly hazardous chemicals at their workplaces. One method that might
be considered is reducing inventory of the highly hazardous chemical. This reduction in inventory
will result in reducing the risk or potential for a catastrophic incident. Also, employers, including
small employers, may establish more efficient inventory control by reducing, to below the
established threshold, the quantities of highly hazardous chemicals onsite. This reduction can be
accomplished by ordering smaller shipments and maintaining the minimum inventory necessary
for efficient and safe operation. When reduced inventory is not feasible, the employer might
consider dispersing inventory to several locations onsite. Dispersing storage into locations so that
a release in one location will not cause a release in another location is also a practical way to
reduce the risk or potential for catastrophic incidents.
Exceptions :The PSM standard does not apply to the following:
 Retail facilities;
 Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations;
 Normally unoccupied remote facilities;
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 Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel (e.g. propane used for
comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a process
containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard; or
 Flammable liquid stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred, which are kept below their
normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigerating and are not connected to a
process.
Hazards of the Chemicals Used in the Process: Complete and accurate written information concerning
process chemicals, process technology, and process equipment is essential to an effective process safety
management program and to a process hazard analysis. The compiled information will be a necessary
resource to a variety of users including the team performing the process hazard analysis as required by
PSM; those developing the training programs and the operating procedures; contractors whose
employees will be working with the process; those conducting the pre-startup reviews; as well as local
emergency preparedness planners, and insurance and enforcement officials.The information to be
compiled about the chemicals, including process intermediates, needs to be comprehensive enough for an
accurate assessment of the fire and explosion characteristics, reactivity hazards, the safety and health
hazards to workers, and the corrosion and erosion effects on the process equipment and monitoring tools.
Current material safety data sheet (MSDS) information can be used to help meet this but must be
supplemented with process chemistry information, including runaway reaction and over-pressure
hazards, if applicable.
Technology of the Process: Process technology information will be a part of the process safety
information package and should include employer-established criteria for maximum inventory levels for
process chemicals; limits beyond which would be considered upset conditions; and a qualitative estimate
of the consequences or results of deviation that could occur if operating beyond the established process
limits. Employers are encouraged to use diagrams that will help users understand the process.A block
flow diagram is used to show the major process equipment and interconnecting process flow lines and
flow rates, stream composition, temperatures, and pressures when necessary for clarity. The block flow
diagram is a simplified diagram.Process flow diagrams are more complex and show all main flow
streams including valves to enhance the understanding of the process as well as pressures and
temperatures on all feed and product lines within all major vessels and in and out of headers and heat
exchangers, and points of pressure and temperature control (see Figure 1 for a sample process flow
diagram). Also, information on construction materials, pump capacities and pressure heads, compressor
horsepower, and vessel design pressures and temperatures are shown when necessary for clarity. In
addition, process flowdiagrams usually show major components of control loops along with key utilities.
Equipment in the Process: Piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) may be the more appropriate type
diagrams to show some of the above details as well as display the information for the piping designer
and engineering staff. The P&IDs are to be used to describe the relationships between equipment and
instrumentation as well as other relevant information that will enhance clarity. Computer software
programs that do P&IDs or other diagrams useful to the information package may be used to help meet
this requirement.
The information pertaining to process equipment design must be documented. In other words, what
codes and standards were relied on to establish good engineering practice? These codes and standards are
published by such organizations as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American
Petroleum Institute, American National Standards Institute, National Fire Protection Association,
American Society for Testing and Materials, The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors, National Association of Corrosion Engineers, American Society of Exchange Manufacturers
Association, and Model Building Code groups.
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Figure 1
For existing equipment designed and constructed many years ago in accordance with the codes
and standards available at that time and no longer in general use today, the employer must
document which codes and standards were used and that the design and construction along with
the testing, inspection, and operation are still suitable for the intended use. Where the process
technology requires a design that departs from the applicable codes and standards, the employer
must document that the design and construction are suitable for the intended purpose.
Employee Involvement :Section 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments states that employers are
to consult with their employees and their representatives regarding their efforts in developing and
implementing the process safety management program elements and hazard assessments. Section
304 also requires employers to train and educate their employees and to inform affected
employees of the findings from incident investigations required by the process safety management
program. Many employers, under their existing safety and health programs, already have
established methods to keep employees and their representatives informed about relevant safety
and health issues and may be able to adapt these practices and procedures to meet their obligations
under PSM.Employers who have not implemented an occupational safety and health program may
wish to form a safety and health committee of employees and management representatives to help
the employer meet the PSM obligations. Such a committee can be a significant ally in helping the
employer implement and maintain an effective process safety management program for all
employees.
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Process Hazard Analysis: A process hazard analysis (PHA), or evaluation, is one of the most
important elements of the process safety management program. A PHA is an organized and
systematic effort to identify and analyze the significance of potential hazards associated with the
processing or handling of highly hazardous chemicals. A PHA provides information that will
assist employers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the
consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous chemicals.
A PHA analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or
flammable chemicals, and major spills of hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on equipment,
instrumentation, utilities, human actions (routine and Nonroutine), and external factors that might
affect the process. The selection of a PHA methodology or technique will be influenced by many
factors including how much is known about the process. Is it a process that has been operated for a
long period of time with little or no innovation and extensive experience has been generated with
its use? Or, is it a new process or one that has been changed frequently by the inclusion of
innovation features? Also, the size and complexity of the process will influence the decision as to
the appropriate PHA methodology to use. All PHA methodologies are subject to certain
limitations. For example, the checklist methodology works well when the process is very stable
and no changes are made, but it is not as effective when the process has undergone extensive
change. The checklist may miss the most recent changes and consequently they would not be
evaluated. Another limitation to be considered concerns the assumptions made by the team or
analyst. The PHA is dependent on good judgment and the assumptions made during the study
need to be documented and understood by the team and reviewer and kept for a future PHA.
The team conducting the PHA needs to understand the methodology that is going to be used. A
PHA team can vary in size from two people to a number of people with varied operational and
technical backgrounds. Some team members may be part of the team for only a limited time. The
team leader needs to be fully knowledgeable in the proper implementation of the PHA
methodology to be used and should be impartial in the evaluation. The other full or part-time team
members need to provide the team with expertise in areas such as process technology; process
design; operating procedures and practices; alarms; emergency procedures; instrumentation;
maintenance procedures, both routine and Nonroutine tasks, including how the tasks are
authorized; procurement of parts and supplies; safety and health; and any other relevant subjects.
At least one team member must be familiar with the process.
The ideal team will have an intimate knowledge of the standards, codes, specifications, and
regulations applicable to the process being studied. The selected team members need to be
compatible and the team leader needs to be able to manage the team and the PHA study. The team
needs to be able to work together while benefiting from the expertise of others on the team or
outside the team to resolve issues and to forge a consensus on the findings of the study and
recommendations.
The application of a PHA to a process may involve the use of different methodologies for various
parts of the process. For example, a process involving a series of unit operations of varying sizes,
complexities, and ages may use different methodologies and team members for each operation.
Then the conclusions can be integrated into one final study and evaluation.
A more specific example is the use of a PHA checklist for a standard boiler or heat exchanger and
the use of a Hazard and Operability PHA for the overall process. Also, for batch-type processes
like custom batch operations, a generic PHA of a representative batch may be used where there are
only small changes of monomer or other ingredient ratio and the chemistry is documented for the
full range and ratio of batch ingredients. Another process where the employer might consider
using a generic type of PHA is a gas plant. Often these plants are simply moved from site to site,
and therefore, a generic PHA may be used for these movable plants. Also, when an employer has
several similar size gas plants and no sour gas is being processed at the site, a generic PHA is
feasible as long as the variations of the individual sites are accounted for in the PHA.
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Finally, when an employer has a large continuous process with several control rooms for different
portions of the process, such as for a distillation tower and a blending operation, the employer may
wish to do each segment separately and then integrate the final results.
Small businesses covered by this rule often will have processes that have less storage volume and
less capacity and may be less complicated than processes at a large facility. Therefore, OSHA
would anticipate that the less complex methodologies would be used to meet the process hazard
analysis criteria in the standard. These process hazard analyses can be done in less time and with
fewer people being involved. A less complex process generally means that less data, P&IDs, and
process information are needed to perform a process hazard analysis.
Many small businesses have processes that are not unique, such as refrigerated warehouses or cold
storage lockers or water treatment facilities. Where employer associations have a number of
members with such facilities, a generic PHA, evolved from a checklist or what-if questions, could
be developed and effectively used by employers to reflect their particular process; this would
simplify compliance for them.
When the employer has a number of processes that require a PHA, the employer must set up a
priority system to determine which PHAs to conduct first. A preliminary hazard analysis may be
useful in setting priorities for the processes that the employer has determined are subject to
coverage by the process safety management standard. Consideration should be given first to those
processes with the potential of adversely affecting the largest number of employees. This priority
setting also should consider the potential severity of a chemical release, the number of potentially
affected employees, the operating history of the process, such as the frequency of chemical
releases, the age of the process, and any other relevant factors. Together, these factors would
suggest a ranking order using either a weighting factor system or a systematic ranking method.
The use of a preliminary hazard analysis will assist an employer in determining which process
should be of the highest priority for hazard analysis resulting in the greatest improvement in safety
at the facility occurring first.
Detailed guidance on the content and application of process hazard analysis methodologies is
available from the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for Chemical Process Safety,
345 E. 47th Street, New York, New York 10017, (212)705-7319. Also, see the discussion of
various methods of process hazard analysis contained in the Appendix to this publication.
Operating Procedures:
Operating procedures describe tasks to be performed, data to be recorded, operating conditions to
be maintained, samples to be collected, and safety and health precautions to be taken. The
procedures need to be technically accurate, understandable to employees, and revised periodically
to ensure that they reflect current operations. The process safety information package helps to
ensure that the operating procedures and practices are consistent with the known hazards of the
chemicals in the process and that the operating parameters are correct. Operating procedures
should be reviewed by engineering staff and operating personnel to ensure their accuracy and that
they provide practical instructions on how to actually carry out job duties safely. Also the
employer must certify annually that the operating procedures are current and accurate.
Operating procedures provide specific instructions or details on what steps are to be taken or
followed in carrying out the stated procedures. The specific instructions should include the
applicable safety precautions and appropriate information on safety implications. For example, the
operating procedures addressing operating parameters will contain operating instructions about
pressure limits, temperature ranges, flow rates, what to do when an upset condition occurs, what
alarms and instruments are pertinent if an upset condition occurs, and other subjects. Another
example of using operating instructions to properly implement operating procedures is in starting
up or shutting down the process. In these cases, different parameters will be required from those of
normal operation. These operating instructions need to clearly indicate the distinctions between
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startup and normal operations, such as the appropriate allowances for heating up a unit to reach the
normal operating parameters. Also, the operating instructions need to describe the proper method
for increasing the temperature of the unit until the normal operating temperatures are reached.
Computerized process control systems add complexity to operating instructions. These operating
instructions need to describe the logic of the software as well as the relationship between the
equipment and the control system; otherwise, it may not be apparent to the operator.
Operating procedures and instructions are important for training operating personnel. The
operating procedures are often viewed as the standard operating practices (SOPs) for operations.
Control room personnel and operating staff, in general, need to have a full understanding of
operating procedures. If workers are not fluent in English, then procedures and instructions need
to be prepared in a second language understood by the workers. In addition, operating procedures
need to be changed when there is a change in the process. The consequences of operating
procedure changes need to be fully evaluated and the information conveyed to the personnel. For
example, mechanical changes to the process made by the maintenance department (like changing a
valve from steel to brass or other subtle changes) need to be evaluated to determine whether
operating procedures and practices also need to be changed. All management of change actions
must be coordinated and integrated with current operating procedures, and operating personnel
must be alerted to the changes in procedures before the change is made. When the process is shut
down to make a change, then the operating procedures must be updated before re-starting the
process.
Training must include instruction on how to handle upset conditions as well as what operating
personnel are to do in emergencies such as pump seal failures or pipeline ruptures.
Communication among operating personnel and workers within the process area performing
Nonroutine tasks also must be maintained. The hazards of the tasks are to be conveyed to
operating personnel in accordance with established procedures and to those performing the actual
tasks. When the work is completed, operating personnel should be informed to provide closure on
the job.
Employee Training:
All employees, including maintenance and contractor employees involved with highly hazardous
chemicals, need to fully understand the safety and health hazards of the chemicals and processes
they work with so they can protect themselves, their fellow employees, and the citizens of nearby
communities. Training conducted in compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication standard
(Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1910.1200) will inform employees about the
chemicals they work with and familiarize them with reading and understanding MSDSs. However,
additional training in subjects such as operating procedures and safe work practices, emergency
evacuation and response, safety procedures, routine and Nonroutine work authorization activities,
and other areas pertinent to process safety and health need to be covered by the employer's
training program.
In establishing their training programs, employers must clearly identify the employees to be
trained, the subjects to be covered, and the goals and objectives they wish to achieve. The learning
goals or objectives should be written in clear measurable terms before the training begins. These
goals and objectives need to be tailored to each of the specific training modules or segments.
Employers should describe the important actions and conditions under which the employee will
demonstrate competence or knowledge as well as what is acceptable performance.
Hands-on training, where employees actually apply lessons learned in simulated or real situations,
will enhance learning. For example, operating personnel, who will work in a control room or at
control panels, would benefit by being trained at a simulated control panel. Upset conditions of
various types could be displayed on the simulator, and then the employee could go through the
proper operating procedures to bring the simulator panel back to the normal operating parameters.
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A training environment could be created to help the trainee feel the full reality of the situation but
under controlled conditions. This type of realistic training can be very effective in teaching
employees correct procedures while allowing them also to see the consequences of what might
happen if they do not follow established operating procedures. Other training techniques using
videos or training also can be very effective for teaching other job tasks, duties, or imparting other
important information. An effective training program will allow employees to fully participate in
the training process and to practice their skills or knowledge.
Employers need to evaluate periodically their training programs to see if the necessary skills,
knowledge, and routines are being properly understood and implemented by their trained
employees. The methods for evaluating the training should be developed along with the training
program goals and objectives. Training program evaluation will help employers to determine the
amount of training their employees understood and whether the desired results were obtained. If,
after the evaluation, it appears that the trained employees are not at the level of knowledge and
skill that was expected, the employer should revise the training program, provide retraining, or
provide more frequent refresher training sessions until the deficiency is resolved. Those who
conducted the training and those who received the training also should be consulted as to how best
to improve the training process. If there is a language barrier, the language known to the trainees
should be used to reinforce the training messages and information.
Careful consideration must be given to ensure that employees, including maintenance and contract
employees, receive current and updated training. For example, if changes are made to a process,
affected employees must be trained in the changes and understand the effects of the changes on
their job tasks. Additionally, as already discussed, the evaluation of the employee's absorption of
training will certainly determine the need for further training.
Contractors:
Employers who use contractors to perform work in and around processes that involve highly
hazardous chemicals have to establish a screening process so that they hire and use only
contractors who accomplish the desired job tasks without compromising the safety and health of
any employees at a facility. For contractors whose safety performance on the job is not known to
the hiring employer, the employer must obtain information on injury and illness rates and
experience and should obtain contractor references. In addition, the employer must ensure that the
contractor has the appropriate job skills, knowledge, and certifications (e.g., for pressure vessel
welders). Contractor work methods and experience should be evaluated. For example, does the
contractor conducting demolition work swing loads over operating processes or does the
contractor avoid such hazards?
Maintaining a site injury and illness log for contractors is another method employers must use to
track and maintain current knowledge of activities involving contract employees working on or
adjacent to processes covered by PSM. Injury and illness logs of both the employer's employees
and contract employees allow the employer to have full knowledge of process injury and illness
experience. This log contains information useful to those auditing process safety management
compliance and those involved in incident investigations.
Contract employees must perform their work safely. Considering that contractors often perform
very specialized and potentially hazardous tasks, such as confined space entry activities and
Nonroutine repair activities, their work must be controlled while they are on or near a process
covered by PSM. A permit system or work authorization system for these activities is helpful for
all affected employers. The use of a work authorization system keeps an employer informed of
contract employee activities. Thus, the employer has better coordination and more management
control over the work being performed in the process area. A well-run and well-maintained
process, where employee safety is fully recognized, benefits all of those who work in the facility
whether they are employees of the employer or the contractor.
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 STAKE HOLDER OUTREACH :

Having good relationships with appropriate stakeholders over the life of a facility is one of the five
elements in the RBPS pillar of committing to process safety. This chapter describes a process for
identifying, engaging, and maintaining good relationships with appropriate external stakeholder
groups (outreach); the attributes of an outreach system; and the steps an organization might take to
implement outreach. Section 7.2 describes the key principles and essential features of a
management system for this element. Section 7.3 lists work activities that support these essential
features and presents a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity,
depending on perceived risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 7.4 through 7.6
include (1) ideas for improving the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs
that support this element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3)
management review issues that may be appropriate for outreach.
What Is It?
Stakeholder outreach (outreach) is a process for (1) seeking out individuals or
organizations that can be or believe they can be affected by company operations and engaging
them in a dialogue about process safety, (2) establishing a relationship with community
organizations, other companies and professional groups, and local, state, and federal authorities,
and (3) providing accurate information about the company and facility‘s products, processes,
plans, hazards, and risks. This process ensures that management makes relevant process safety
information available to a variety of organizations. This element also encourages the sharing of
relevant information and lessons learned with similar facilities within the company and with other
companies in the industry group. Finally, the outreach element promotes involvement of the
facility in the local community and facilitates communication of information and facility activities
that could affect the community.
Why Is It Important?
Sharing information with industry peers will promote better process safety for everyone.
Sharing information in proactive ways with community and government stakeholders builds trust
and commitment. Trust supports a facility‘s license to operate, and regulators may be more willing
to work with the facility to resolve issues when they arise. The more the public understands the
facility‘s process safety systems, the more confident they will feel that the company takes every
reasonable precaution to protect public safety and the environment. By promoting openness and
responsiveness, an effective outreach program will increase all stakeholders‘ confidence in the
company.
Where/When Is It Done?
Information sharing and relationship building occurs (1) during employees‘ community
activities, such as speaking to school groups, service clubs, and senior centers, (2) during planned
events, such as industry conferences and community meetings, and (3) when episodic events such
as incidents and regulatory inspections occur. Events involving the subject facility, other company
facilities, or other facilities in the same industry can place the spotlight upon a company. In
addition, many companies routinely sponsor volunteer community activities, such as school
activities, neighborhood cleanups, beautification efforts, historic preservation, ―greenspace‖
improvements, and plant tours that also have a desirable relationship-nurturing effect.
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Who Does It?
Any person who is in a position to convey information or an impression of the company is
a potential communicator. Key personnel include not only those having management
responsibility, but also people who are in routine contact with the community, such as phone
operators, receptionists, or security guards. Communications training for key outreach personnel
should prepare them for a wide scope of outreach activities ranging from planned events to a press
conference in the aftermath of an incident. Keep in mind, however, that appropriate
communication and legal personnel should be consulted in the design and execution of the
outreach program in order to protect confidential business information. Facilities with solid
process safety cultures will generally have more performance-based outreach procedures, allowing
trained employees to use good judgment in communicating with stakeholder groups. Facilities
with an evolving or uncertain process safety culture may require more prescriptive communication
procedures, more frequent training, and greater command and control management system
features to ensure good public risk communication discipline.
What Is the Anticipated Work Product?
The main products of an outreach system are successful communications with relevant
stakeholders that build trust and good will. A reservoir of favorable stakeholder opinion can be an
invaluable resource when adverse events or conflicts occur. Ancillary products include
communication plans, messages, tools, brochures, training materials, and records. Outputs of the
outreach element can also be used to facilitate the performance of other elements. For example,
understanding the community concerns and participating in local emergency planning committee
activities can help provide inputs to the ongoing improvement of the facility emergency response
plan developed as part of the emergency element.
How Is It Done?
Companies train key personnel to interact with important stakeholder groups during
planned events and provide resources for all employees to use in their everyday encounters with
the public. Crisis communication and outreach training is provided to senior management to help
deal with episodic events. Higher risk situations usually dictate a greater need for formality and
thoroughness in the implementation of the outreach element. Conversely, companies having lower
risk situations may appropriately decide to pursue outreach activities in a less rigorous fashion. In
the case of the outreach element, risk takes on a twofold meaning: (1) the risk of experiencing an
incident and (2) the risk of experiencing an adverse stakeholder reaction as a result of a process
safety issue at the facility or other facilities within the company or industry. A higher risk situation
may demand a more formal risk communication program that provides detailed information to
stakeholders and keeps them updated. In a lower risk situation, a general community outreach
policy, via informal practices by trained key employees, may be sufficient.
Pre-Startup Safety Review:
For new processes, the employer will find a PHA helpful in improving the design and construction
of the process from a reliability and quality point of view. The safe operation of the new process is
enhanced by making use of the PHA recommendations before final installations are completed.
P&IDs should be completed, the operating procedures put in place, and the operating staff trained
to run the process, before startup. The initial startup procedures and normal operating procedures
must be fully evaluated as part of the pre-startup review to ensure a safe transfer into the normal
operating mode.
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For existing processes that have been Shutdown for turnaround or modification, the employer
must ensure that any changes other than "replacement in kind" made to the process during
shutdown go through the management of change procedures. P&IDs will need to be updated, as
necessary, as well as operating procedures and instructions. If the changes made to the process
during shutdown are significant and affect the training program, then operating personnel as well
as employees engaged in routine and Nonroutine work in the process area may need some
refresher or additional training. Any incident investigation recommendations, compliance audits,
or PHA recommendations need to be reviewed to see what affect they may have on the process
before beginning the startup.
Mechanical Integrity of Equipment: Employers must review their maintenance programs and
schedules to see if there are areas where "breakdown" is used rather than the more preferable on-
going mechanical integrity program. Equipment used to process, store, or handle highly hazardous
chemicals has to be designed, constructed, installed, and maintained to minimize the risk of
releases of such chemicals. This requires that a mechanical integrity program be in place to ensure
the continued integrity of process equipment.
Elements of a mechanical integrity program include identifying and categorizing equipment and
instrumentation, inspections and tests and their frequency; maintenance procedures; training of
maintenance personnel; criteria for acceptable test results; documentation of test and inspection
results; and documentation of manufacturer recommendations for equipment and instrumentation.
Process Defenses:The first line of defense an employer has is to operate and maintain the process
as designed and to contain the chemicals. This is backed up by the second line of defense which is
to control the released chemicals through venting to scrubbers or flares, or to surge or overflow
tanks designed to receive such chemicals. This also would include fixed fire protection systems
like sprinklers, water spray, or deluge systems, monitor guns, dikes, designed drainage systems,
and other systems to control or mitigate hazardous chemicals once an unwanted release occurs.
Written Procedures: The first step of an effective mechanical integrity program is to compile and
categorize a list of process equipment and instrumentation to include in the program. This list
includes pressure vessels, storage tanks, process piping, relief and vent systems, fire protection
system components, emergency shutdown systems and alarms, and interlocks and pumps. For the
categorization of instrumentation and the listed equipment, the employer should set priorities for
which pieces of equipment require closer scrutiny than others.
Inspection and Testing: The mean time to failure of various instrumentation and equipment parts
would be known from the manufacturer's data or the employer's experience with the parts, which
then influence inspection and testing frequency and associated procedures. Also, applicable codes
and standards-such as the National Board inspection Code, or those from the American Society for
Testing and Materials, American Petroleum Institute, National Fire Protection Association,
American National Standards institute, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and other
groups-provide information to help establish an effective testing and inspection frequency, as well
as appropriate methodologies.
The applicable codes and standards provide criteria for external inspections for such items as
foundation and supports, anchor bolts, concrete or steel supports, guy wires, nozzles and
sprinklers, pipe hangers, grounding connections protective coatings and insulation, and external
metal surfaces of piping and vessels. These codes and standards also provide information on
methodologies for internal inspection and a frequency formula based on the corrosion rate of the
materials of construction. Also, internal and external erosion must be considered along with
corrosion effects for piping and valves. Where the corrosion rate is not known, a maximum
inspection frequency is recommended (methods of developing the corrosion rate are available in
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the codes). Internal inspections need to cover items such as the vessel shell, bottom and head;
metallic linings; nonmetallic linings; thickness measurements for vessels and piping; inspection
for erosion, corrosion, cracking and bulges; internal equipment like trays, baffles, sensors ad
screens for erosion, corrosion or cracking and other deficiencies. Some of these inspections may
be performed by state or local government inspectors under state and local statutes. However, each
employer must develop procedures to ensure that tests and inspections are conducted properly and
that consistency is maintained even where different employees may be involved. Appropriate
training must be provided to maintenance personnel to ensure that they understand the preventive
maintenance program procedures, safe practices, and the proper use and application of special
equipment or unique tools that may be required. This training is part of the overall training
program called for in the standard.
Quality Assurance :A quality assurance system helps ensure the use of proper materials of
construction, the proper fabrication and inspection procedures, and appropriate installation
procedures that recognize field installation concerns. The quality assurance program is an essential
part of the mechanical integrity program and will help maintain the primary and secondary lines of
defense designed into the process to prevent unwanted chemical releases or to control or mitigate a
release. "As built" drawings, together with certifications of coded vessels and other equipment and
of construction, must be verified and retained in the quality assurance documentation.
Equipment installation jobs need to be properly inspected in the field for use of proper materials
and procedures and to ensure that qualified craft workers do the job. The use of appropriate
gaskets, packing, bolts, valves, lubricants and welding rods needs to be verified in the field. Also,
procedures for installing safety devices need to be verified, such as the torque on the bolts on
rupture disc installations, uniform torque on flange bolts, and proper installation of pump seals. If
the quality of parts is a problem, it may be appropriate for the employer to conduct audits of the
equipment supplier's facilities to better ensure proper purchases of required equipment suitable for
intended service. Any changes in equipment that may become necessary will need to be reviewed
for management of change procedures.
Nonroutine Work Authorizations: Nonroutine work conducted in process areas must be
controlled by the employer in a consistent manner. The hazards identified involving the work to be
accomplished must be communicated to those doing the work and to those operating personnel
whose work could affect the safety of the process. A work authorization notice or permit must
follow a procedure that describes the steps the maintenance supervisor, contractor representative,
or other person needs to follow to obtain the necessary clearance to start the job. The work
authorization procedures must reference and coordinate, as applicable, lockout/ Tag-out
procedures, line breaking procedures, confined space entry procedures, and hot work
authorizations. This procedure also must provide clear steps to follow once the job is completed to
provide closure for those that need to know the job is now completed and that equipment can be
returned to normal.
Managing Change:To properly manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment
and facilities, one must define what is meant by change. In the process safety management
standard, change includes all modifications to equipment, procedures, raw materials, and
processing conditions other than "replacement in kind." These changes must be properly managed
by identifying and reviewing them prior to implementing them. For example, the operating
procedures contain the operating parameters (pressure limits, temperature ranges, flow rates, etc.)
and the importance of operating within these limits. While the operator must have the flexibility to
maintain safe operation within the established parameters, any operation outside of these
parameters requires review and approval by a written management of change procedure.
Management of change also covers changes in process technology and changes to equipment and
instrumentation. Changes in process technology can result from changes in production rates, raw
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materials, experimentation, equipment unavailability, new equipment, new product development,
change in catalysts, and changes in operating conditions to improve yield or quality. Equipment
changes can be in materials of construction, equipment specifications, piping pre-arrangements,
experimental equipment, computer program revisions, and alarms and interlocks. Employers must
establish means and methods to detect both technical and mechanical changes.
Temporary changes have caused a number of catastrophes over the years, and employers must
establish ways to detect both temporary, and permanent changes. It is important that a time limit
for temporary changes be established and monitored since otherwise, without control, these
changes may tend to become permanent. Temporary changes are subject to the management of
change provisions. In addition, the management of change procedures are used to ensure that the
equipment and procedures are returned to their original or designed conditions at the end of the
temporary change. Proper documentation and review of these changes are invaluable in ensuring
that safety and health considerations are incorporated into operating procedures and processes.
Employers may wish to develop a form or clearance sheet to facilitate the processing of changes
through the management of change procedures. A typical change form may include a description
and the purpose of the change, the technical basis for the change, safety and health considerations,
documentation of changes for the operating procedures, maintenance procedures, inspection and
testing, P&IDs, electrical classification,training and communications, pre-startup inspection,
duration (if a temporary change), approvals, and authorization. Where the impact of the change is
minor and well understood, a check list reviewed by an authorized person, with proper
communication to others who are affected, may suffice. (See Figure 2 for a sample request for
change form that can be helpful in guiding this procedure.)
For a more complex or significant design change, however, a hazard evaluation procedure with
approvals by operations, maintenance, and safety departments may be appropriate. Changes in
documents such as P&IDs, raw materials, operating procedures, mechanical integrity programs,
and electrical classifications should be noted so that these revisions can be made permanent when
the drawings and procedure manuals are updated. Copies of process changes must be kept in an
accessible location to ensure that design changes are available to operating personnel as well as to
PHA team members when a PHA is being prepared or being updated.
Incident investigation is the process of identifying the underlying causes of incidents and
implementing steps to prevent similar events from occurring. The intent of an incident
investigation is for employers to learn from past experiences and thus avoid repeating past
mistakes. The incidents OSHA expects employers to recognize and to investigate are the types of
events that resulted in or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. These events are
sometimes referred to as "near misses," meaning that a serious consequence did not occur, but
could have. (See Figure 3 for sample incident investigation report form.)
 Management of Change :
ELEMENT OVERVIEW:
Managing changes to processes over the life of a facility is one of nine elements in the RBPS
pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the management practices involving (1) the
recognition of change situations, (2) the evaluation of hazards, (3) the decision on whether to
allow a change to be made, and (4) necessary risk control and follow-up measures. Section 15.2
describes the key principles and essential features of a management system for the MOC element.
Section 15.3 lists work activities that support these essential features and presents a range of
approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived risk,
resources, and organizational culture. Sections 15.4 through 15.6 include (1) ideas for improving
the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs that support this element, (2)
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metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) management review issues that may be
appropriate for MOC.
What Is It?
The MOC element helps ensure that changes to a process do not inadvertently introduce new
hazards or unknowingly increase risk of existing hazards (Refs. 15.1 and 15.2). The MOC element
includes a review and authorization process for evaluating proposed adjustments to facility design,
operations, organization, or activities prior to implementation to make certain that no unforeseen
new hazards are introduced and that the risk of existing hazards to employees, the public, or the
environment is not unknowingly increased. It also includes steps to help ensure that potentially
affected personnel are notified of the change and those pertinent documents, such as procedures,
process safety knowledge, and so forth, are kept up–to-date.
If a proposed modification is made to a hazardous process without appropriate review, the risk of a
process safety accident could increase significantly.
MOC reviews are conventionally done in operating plants and increasingly done throughout the
process life cycle at company offices that are involved with capital project design and planning.
MOC reviews should be done for bona fide ―changes‖ – not for replacements-in-kind (RIKs).
Who Does It?
An individual originates a change request. Qualified personnel, normally independent of the MOC
originator, review the request to determine if any potentially adverse risk impacts could result
from the change, and may suggest additional measures to manage risk. Based on the review, the
change is either authorized for execution, amended, or rejected. Often, final approval for
implementing the change comes from another designated individual, independent of the review
team. A wide variety of personnel are normally involved in making the change, notifying or
training potentially affected employees, and updating documents affected by the change.
The main product of an MOC system is a properly reviewed and authorized change request that
identifies and ensures the implementation of risk controls appropriate to the proposed change.
Ancillary products include appropriate revisions or updates involving other RBPS activities, such
as modifying process safety information, and change communication/training. Outputs of the
MOC element can also be used to facilitate the performance of other RBPS elements. For
example, approved change requests are necessary to determine when some readiness activities are
performed.
How Is It Done?
Organizations usually have written procedures detailing how MOC will be implemented. Such
procedures apply to all work that is not determined to be RIK. The results of the review process
are typically documented on an MOC Review form. Supplemental information provided by
system designers to aid in the review process is often attached to the MOC review form. Once the
change is approved, it can be implemented. Potentially affected personnel are either informed of
the change or provided more detailed training, as necessary, prior to startup of the change. Follow-
on activities, such as updates to affected process safety information and to other RBPS elements,
are assessed to identify which are required before startup, and which may be deferred until after
startup. All such activities are tracked until completed.
Higher risk situations usually dictate a greater need for formality and thoroughness in the
implementation of an MOC protocol, for example, a detailed written program that specifies
exactly how changes are identified, reviewed, and managed. Companies having lower risk
situations may appropriately decide to manage changes in a less rigorous fashion, for example,
through a general policy about managing changes that is implemented via informal practices by
trained key employees. Facilities that exhibit a high demand rate for managing changes may need
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greater specificity in the MOC procedure and a larger allocation of personnel resources to fulfill
the defined roles and responsibilities. Lower demand situations can allow facilities to operate an
MOC protocol with greater flexibility. Facilities with a sound process safety culture may choose
to have more performance-based MOC procedures, allowing trained employees to use good
judgment in managing changes in an agile system. Facilities with an evolving or uncertain process
safety culture may require more prescriptive MOC procedures, more frequent training, and greater
command and control management system features to ensure good MOC implementation
discipline.
Conduct of Operations
ELEMENT OVERVIEW
Developing and sustaining high standards in the conduct of operations is one of nine elements in the RBPS
pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the concept of conduct of operations, the attributes of a
reliable system for conducting operations, and the steps an organization might take to formalize the conduct
of operations. Section 17.2 describes the key principles and essential features of a management system for
this element. Section 17.3 lists work activities that support these essential features, and presents a range of
approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived risk, resources, and
organizational culture. Sections 17.4 through 17.6 include (1) ideas for improving the effectiveness of
management systems and specific programs that support this element, (2) metrics that could be used to
monitor this element, and (3) issues that may be appropriate for management review.
What Is It?
Conduct of operations (operations) is the execution of operational and management tasks in a deliberate
and structured manner. It is also sometimes called ―operational discipline‖ or ―formality of operations‖, and
it is closely tied to an organization‘s culture. Conduct of operations institutionalizes the pursuit of
excellence in the performance of every task and minimizes variations in performance. Workers at every
level are expected to perform their duties with alertness, due thought, full knowledge, sound judgment, and
a proper sense of pride and accountability (Refs. 17.2 and 17.3).
A consistently high level of human performance is a critical aspect of any process safety program; indeed a
less than adequate level of human performance will adversely impact all aspects of operations. As the
complexity of operational activities increases, a commensurate increase in the formality of operations must
also occur to ensure safe, reliable, and consistent performance of critical tasks.
Like culture, conduct of operations applies everywhere workers perform tasks – from the boardroom to the
plant floor. It applies every time a worker performs a task throughout the life of a facility or an organization
because it is an ongoing commitment to reliable operations.
Who Does It?
Conduct of operations applies to all work activities, not just those of the operations department. Thus all
workers, employees, and contractors are included. Each work group should define the framework of
controls necessary to ensure that tasks for which it is responsible are performed reliably. The manager of
each work group is responsible for the conduct of operations in his group, but overall responsibility rests
with the facility manager. The human resources group is often involved with the process because it
includes fitness-for-duty, progressive discipline, salary, bonus, and retention decisions.
The output of this activity is a policy describing the organization‘s overall expectations for worker conduct
and specific procedures and goals for implementing those policies. A defined framework of controls should
be established that implements a defense-in-depth strategy to ensure that process operations remain within
safe operating limits. A clear chain of command, defined authority, and accountability for reliable work
performance in accordance with approved procedures and work practices should also be established.
Outputs of the operations element can also be used to facilitate the performance of other elements. For
example, monitoring equipment status will improve asset integrity, and near miss reports will enhance the
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effectiveness of the incidents element. The ultimate product is the execution of each worker‘s tasks, from
the boardroom to the shop floor, in a disciplined, consistent manner that safely delivers the goods and
services required to meet the organization‘s objectives.
How Is It Done?
To develop an effective operations program, an organization must start with an honest statement of its
objectives and risk tolerance. Considering the outputs of other elements, the organization can then
formulate an operations policy and document it, along with the implementing procedures. However, the
program cannot be merely words on paper. Workers must be trained in the policies and procedures so that
they understand the goals and expectations, the lines of authority, and their personal accountability. They
must apply good reasoning and judgment (founded upon a sound process safety culture) in all situations,
but particularly when action is required in situations not specifically addressed by policy or procedure.
Beyond that, the most critical, ongoing requirement is that management lead by example. If a procedure
instructs workers to shut down the process under defined emergency conditions, but management praises
operators who ―ride it out‖ and avoid a shutdown, then operational discipline will suffer. Operations
tolerates no deviation from approved procedures, even if the outcome of a deviation is inconsequential or
desirable. Thus, management must hold workers accountable for their actions in all circumstances to avoid
the normalization of deviation.Conduct of Operations (CoO) is how a company executes tasks, and
improving it reduces operational risk, enhances operational integrity and benefits the bottom line.
CoO is sometimes called "Operational Discipline" and is closely tied to an organization's culture.
CoO entails putting management systems into place to ensure operating and engineering
disciplines are effective and that they continue to improve the entire process safety culture. At OS,
we have the experience and expertise necessary to assess, structure, and implement a Conduct of
Operations improvement plan that delivers results.
Key principles in our approach include:
 Human error can be reduced by the effective implementation and monitoring of a CoO
process safety management system.
 A best management and engineering discipline practice is to participate in an
accountability system that eliminates normalization of deviation (makes non-compliance
seem okay) by taking action on problems identified during the various operational
discipline activities that are in place.
 For operators to be effective in their role in CoO, they must have a structured purpose for
the various activities they perform. Follow-up should be done by managers and engineers,
to take action on any deficiencies found.
 Management discipline is recognition that achieving performance is a function of ensuring
employees:
o Know the right things to work on
o Have the experience, education, and training to know how to reliably and safely
perform those tasks
o Have the right tools
o Are assigned to the right tasks, at the right time
 The OSSuite™ software solution, a comprehensive, mobile-enabled set of integrated
modules, empowers companies to capture, analyze, and utilize asset, incident, operational,
and compliance data to drive sustainable improvements in every facet of CoO.
 Metrics in Process Safety Management (PSM):

Facilities Metrics are measures that are used to evaluate and track the performance of a facility‘s
process safety management program. For facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals,
metrics can be used to quantify how a process has performed historically, how it might perform in
the future, and where improvements can be made to keep workers safe. This document provides
employers with examples of metrics that are tracked by facilities that are enrolled in OSHA‘s
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Voluntary Protection Program (VPP). Because VPP sites have achieved a high standard of safety
excellence, tracking these metrics can make a positive contribution to the effectiveness of an
employer‘s process safety management program. Two types of metrics—lagging metrics and
leading metrics—are often used to track safety performance in process safety management:
 Lagging Metrics: Lagging metrics are a retrospective set of metrics that are gathered after
the occurrence of an incident that has met an established threshold of severity.1 Lagging
metrics evaluate the causes of an incident and whether the factors that led to the incident
indicate potential recurring problems. Metrics for relatively minor or ―near miss‖ incidents
are often included in the evaluation of process safety performance.
 Leading Metrics: Leading metrics are a preventive set of metrics that reveal the
performance of key work processes, operating discipline, and layers of protection that
prevent incidents.2 Leading metrics can provide an early indication of problems that can
be corrected before a major process safety incident occurs. Whether using leading or
lagging metrics, the metrics should be specific to a facility‘s operations and culture so that
they have the best chance at driving effective results. A majority of VPP facilities track at
least one metric electronically on at least a monthly basis. The metrics are being tracked in
a variety of ways. One way is by identifying areas in a PSM program where improvements
can be made. For example, during a monthly meeting, the PSM department of one facility
identified a problem with tracking the expiration dates for their temporary management of
change (MOC) process. The dates were not at the same place, and could not be located.
This made it difficult to search databases for the dates. As a solution, the PSM department
added a searchable data designation that would enable each MOC change requestor to
enter duration of no longer than 180 days for any temporary MOC. This not only enabled
the PSM department to identify expiration dates for temporary MOCs, but made it easier
for the change requestor to establish durations or time limits for temporary MOCs. Another
facility tracked the number of overdue items in an effort to reduce the number of tasks that
had not been completed in a timely manner. By holding monthly meetings to review the
overdue items, the management team was able to prioritize the completion of those items
and identify outstanding projects that were in need of additional resources.
 Lagging Metrics
• Injury and/or Incident Reports Related to Process Safety: Incident reports are created
after an incident investigation has been completed. Incident reports typically describe the
causes of an incident that were identified by the investigation, and the corrective measures
that should be taken to address those causes.3 VPP sites have used metrics to track a
number of process safety incidents and injuries including: Near miss incidents reported
that did or could have led to a loss of containment; Recordable injuries and first-aid
incidents due to loss of primary containment; Number of incidents vs. number of incidents
with formal reports; and Status of incident investigations.
• Loss of Containment: A Loss of Containment is an unplanned or uncontrolled release
of materials. For incidents related to loss of containment, VPP facilities have tracked: The
number of incidents; whether there was primary or secondary containment; and the cause
and location of the incident. Leading Metrics • Management of Change (MOC): An MOC
is a system that identifies, reviews, and approves all modifications to equipment,
procedures, raw materials, and processing conditions,
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 ASSET INTEGRITY AND RELIABILITY:

Asset integrity, the RBPS element that helps ensure that equipment is properly designed,
installed in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for use until it is retired, is one of nine
elements in the RBPS pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the attributes of a risk-based
management system for ensuring the integrity and reliability of critical equipment and safety
systems. Section 12.2 describes the key principles and essential features of a management system
for this element. Section 12.3 lists work activities that support these essential features, and
presents a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on
perceived risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 12.4 through 12.6 include (1) ideas
to improve the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs that support this
element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) issues that may be
appropriate for management review.
WHAT IS IT?
The asset integrity element is the systematic implementation of activities, such as inspections and
tests necessary to ensure that important equipment will be suitable for its intended application
throughout its life. Specifically, work activities related to this element focus on (1) preventing a
catastrophic release of a hazardous material or a sudden release of energy and (2) ensuring high
availability (or dependability) of
critical safety or utility systems that prevent or mitigate the effects of these types of events.
WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
Designing and maintaining equipment that it is fit for its purpose and functions when needed is of
paramount importance to process industries. Maintaining containment of hazardous materials and
ensuring that safety systems work when needed are two of the primary responsibilities of any
facility.
WHERE/WHEN IS IT DONE?
Asset integrity activities range from technical meetings involving experts seeking to advance the
state-of-the art in equipment design, inspection, testing, or reliability, to a plant operator on
routine rounds spotting leaks, unusual noises or odors, or detecting other abnormal conditions.
However, this element primarily involves (1) inspections, tests, preventive maintenance,
predictive maintenance, and repair activities that are performed by maintenance and contractor
personnel at operating facilities and (2) quality assurance processes, including procedures and
training, that underpin these activities. Asset integrityelement activities occur at many places and
extend throughout the life of the facility.
WHO DOES IT?
Asset integrity activities occur at several organizational levels. Industry sponsored technical
committees and organizations are continuously working to advance the state of knowledge
regarding proper design and inspection, test, and preventive maintenance (ITPM) practices to help
ensure that equipment is fit for service at commissioning, and remains fit for service throughout its
life. Companies (or business units) often establish centers of excellence in the asset integrity field,
establish corporate standards, and promote efforts to continuously improve the safety and
reliability of process equipment. At an operating facility, the asset integrity element activities are
an integral part of day-to-day operation involving operators, maintenance employees, inspectors,
contractors, engineers, and others involved in designing, specifying, installing, operating, or
maintaining equipment.
WHAT ARE THE ANTICIPATED WORK PRODUCTS?
Asset integrity element work products include:
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 Reports and data from initial inspections, tests, and other activities to verify that equipment
is fabricated and installed in accordance with design specifications and is fit for service at
startup.
 Results from ongoing ITPM tasks, performed by trained or certified personnel and based on
written procedures that conform to generally accepted standards, that help ensure that
equipment remains fit for service.
 Controlled repairs and adjustments to equipment by trained personnel using appropriate
written procedures and instructions.
 A system to control maintenance work, repair parts, and maintenance materials needed for
the work to help ensure that equipment remains fit for service.
 A quality assurance program that helps prevent equipment failures that could result from (1)
use of faulty parts/materials or (2) improper fabrication, installation, or repair methods (e.g.,
improperly supporting the engine as discussed at the start of this chapter).
The primary objective of the asset integrity element is to help ensure reliable performance of
equipment designed to contain, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of a release of hazardous
materials or energy. Although proper execution of work activities associated with this element
requires a high level of human performance, the ultimate work product for this element is reliable
and predictable equipment operation.
HOW IS IT DONE?
An effective asset integrity program depends on management ensuring that:
 Equipment and systems are properly designed, fabricated, and installed.
 The unit is operated within the design limits of the equipment.
 ITPM tasks are conducted by trained and qualified individuals using approved procedures
and completed as scheduled.
 Repair work conforms to design codes, engineering standards, and manufacturer‘s
recommendations.
 Appropriate actions are taken to address deficiencies, regardless of how they are discovered.
MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

Routinely reviewing the organization‘s process safety systems to spur continuous improvement is
one of four elements in the RBPS pillar of learning from experience. This chapter describes the
meaning of management review, the attributes of a good management review system, and the
steps an organization might take to implement management reviews. Section 22.2 describes the
key principles and essential features of a management system for this element. Section 22.3 lists
work activities that support these essential features and presents a range of approaches that might
be appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived risk, resources, and organizational
culture. Sections 22.4 through 22.6 include (1) ideas to improve the effectiveness of management
systems and specific programs that support this element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor
this element, and (3) issues that may be appropriate for management review.
What Is It?
Management review is the routine evaluation of whether management systems are performing as
intended and producing the desired results as efficiently as possible. It is the ongoing ―due
diligence‖ review by management that fills the gap between day-to-day work activities and
periodic formal audits. Management review is similar to a doctor giving a routine physical
examination – even when no overt signs of illness are present, life-threatening conditions may be
developing that are best addressed proactively. Management reviews have many of the
characteristics of a 1st party audit as described in Chapter 21. They require a similar system for
scheduling, staffing, and effectively evaluating all RBPS elements, and a system should be in
place for implementing any resulting plans for improvement or corrective action and verifying
their effectiveness.
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Effective performance is a critical aspect of any process safety program; however, a breakdown or
inefficiency in a safety management system may not be immediately obvious. For example, if a
facility‘s training coordinator unexpectedly departed, required training activities might be
disrupted. The existing trained workers would undoubtedly continue to operate the process, so
there would be no outward appearance of a deficiency. An audit or incident might eventually
reveal any incomplete or overdue training, but by then it could be too late. The management
review process provides regular checkups on the health of process safety management systems in
order to identify and correct any current or incipient deficiencies before they might be revealed by
an audit or incident.
Management reviews should be conducted wherever RBPS elements are implemented. The depth
andfrequency of each management review should be governed by factors such as the current life
cycle stage of the facility, the maturity or degree of implementation of the RBPS management
system, the level of management performing the review, past experience (e.g., incident history,
previous reviews, and audit results), and management‘s view of the risk posed by the activities to
be reviewed. Most of the management review effort will be focused on operating facilities. While
they can be scheduled on an as-needed basis, management reviews of a particular RBPS element
are typically conducted at a predetermined interval (e.g., frequencies ranging from monthly to
annually are common), and they may be scheduled in conjunction with other regularly scheduled
meetings, such as facility safety committee meetings.
Who Does It?

Strictly speaking, every level of management – from the process supervisor to the facility manager
to the board of directors – should conduct periodic management reviews. Further discussion in this
book focuses on program level reviews, which should be conducted by a manager who is one or
two levels above the person responsible for the day-to-day execution of a specific RBPS element.
This is usually the manager ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the facility‘s
overall process safety management system; however, larger facilities may charter a Process Safety
Committee to conduct the reviews under the leadership of a senior manager.
The output of a management review is generally an internal memorandum summarizing the

review, any deficiencies or inefficiencies noted, and recommendations for improvement or
corrective action. The recommendations should be given deadlines and then assigned to specific
individuals. All outputs of the management review element are intended to facilitate the
performance of other elements. In addition, the management reviews provide input that the audits
element can use to focus its efforts.
How Is It Done?
Management reviews are conducted with the same underlying intent as an audit – to evaluate the
effectiveness of the implementation of an entire RBPS element or a particular element task.
However, because the objective of a management review is to spot current or incipient
deficiencies, the reviews are more broadly focused and more frequent than audits, and they are
typically conducted in a less formal manner. Nevertheless, like an audit, a management review at
least checks the implementation status of one or more RBPS elements against established
requirements.
22
The management review team meets with the individuals responsible for managing and executing
the subject element to (1) present program documentation and implementation records, (2) offer
direct observations of conditions and activities, and (3) answer questions about program activities.
The team attempts to answer such questions as:
 What is the quality of our program?
 Are these the results we want?
 Are we working on the right things?
Organizational changes, staff changes, new projects or standards, efficiency improvements, and
any other anticipated challenges to the subject element are also discussed so that management can
proactively address those issues. Recommendations for addressing any existing or anticipated
performance gaps or inefficiencies are proposed, and responsibilities and schedules for addressing
the recommendations are assigned. Typically, the same system used to track corrective actions
from audit findings is used to track management review recommendations to their resolution. The
meeting minutes and documentation of each recommendation‘s resolution are maintained as
required to meet programmatic needs. Management review results should be monitored over time,
and more frequent reviews should be scheduled if persistent problems are evident.
Instrumentation for safe and efficient operation of plants

Accidents continue to happen because too many owner/operators still use injuries and
fatalities as the predominant metric for safe operation. This focus on direct impact can lead to
acceptance of loss of containment events and tolerance for latent weaknesses in process safety
management (PSM). Knowledge of gaps in equipment integrity and management systems
shouldn‘t depend on catastrophic events. Injuries and fatalities should occur so infrequently that
impact data are meaningless for trending performance.
Accidents often occur when equipment is improperly designed, installed, operated, tested
and maintained. Adequate theory and standards are available to ensure safe operation of process
equipment. The problem isn‘t bad people and lack of competency — it‘s that the systems
governing equipment integrity aren‘t rigorous enough to ensure the required reliability.
A plant must use a rigorous quality management system to sustain equipment reliability;
otherwise, accidents will occur when enough latent conditions in equipment, procedures and
personnel training accumulate. It‘s essential to take a proactive approach — not just monitoring
for behaviors, errors and failures that are known root causes for process safety incidents but also
identifying improvement opportunities to counter this accumulation and minimize risk.
Plan
W.E. Deming believed that 85% of a worker‘s effectiveness is determined by the system he works
within, only 15% by his own skill1. Planning ensures that work processes yield equipment that
operates consistently in a safe manner, fulfills government and jurisdictional requirements, and
meets recognized good engineering practices. The output of planning is a management system of
policies, practices and procedures that seeks to identify and control releases of highly hazardous
chemicals. Recommended work practices and activities are provided for instrumented protective
systems in ―Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems‖2 by the Center for
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and for safety instrumented systems (SIS) in
There is no substitute for knowledge only a small amount of knowledge can prevent mistakes
leading to process hazards. Unfortunately, many owner/operators are losing process knowledge
and history as operators and technical staffs retire or simply leave for better jobs. Errors
accumulate unless there‘s continuous analysis and improvement of safety practices. Counteracting
loss of expertise as well as equipment degradation through age and obsolescence requires
significant effort.
Written process safety information (PSI) covering the process hazards, technology and equipment
provide the foundation for sustaining internal process knowledge. A written design basis should
23
define the PSI for the safety equipment and should be traceable to the process hazards analysis.
For SIS, the design basis is the hardware and software safety requirements specification3. It should
be maintained under revision control for the equipment life.
Do
This phase implements the systems defined in the Plan phase. From a project perspective, detailed
engineering is completed, yielding an ISS installation that conforms to the design basis. Detailed
engineering includes sufficient information to ensure the ISS is properly specified, constructed,
installed, commissioned, operated and maintained. Equipment installed in ISS should be proven to
provide the required performance in similar operating environments.
Equipment classification also must consider the core attributes of protection layers, namely
independence, functionality, integrity, reliability, auditability, MOC and access security. To
counteract the unknown, owners/operators should rely on a defense-in-depth strategy of multiple
independent protection layers to lower operational risk. An independent and separate safety
instrumented system (SIS) is essential to ensuring safe and reliable operation. Defense-in-depth
also seeks to minimize common cause, common mode and systematic errors that cause multiple
layers to fail. Detailed design should provide an ISS equipment list identifying the equipment by a
unique designation (e.g., the tag number) and the required inspection and proof test interval.
Validation activities should include an input-to-output test of each new or modified ISS to
demonstrate and document that the equipment is installed according to specification and operates
as intended for each operating mode. It‘s crucial to satisfactorily complete validation prior to the
initiation of any operating mode where a hazardous event could occur.
Check By what method?
Only the method counts. The Check phase applies metrics to assess performance against
requirements. Sustainable operation is achieved by focusing on metrics providing real-time
indication. Table 1 provides example metrics for the ISS. CCPS has suggested additional
metrics.Overwhelming task. Sometimes technical personnel want to measure everything just
because they can. It‘s important to carefully choose metrics so that just the right amount of
meaningful data is collected. All systems involving humans and machines suffer some degree of
variation in output quality. Good metrics drive personnel to do the right thing by identifying and
correcting variation outside what‘s considered acceptable. Measuring the wrong things can
undermine process safety. It‘s unfortunate but true that personnel will behave contrary to reason
and the best interest of the company if necessary to ―make their numbers.‖
Lifecycle step Example Metric

 Total number of hazard and risk analysis scheduled during defined
interval
 Number completed
Hazard analysis  Number behind schedule
 Percentage hazard and risk analysis behind schedule
 For those behind schedule, total number of days behind schedule
 Total number of safety equipment

 Number of equipment with as-built documentation
Design basis  Number of equipment with redlined or missing documentation
 Percentage of equipment with redlined or missing documentation
24
 Total number of inspections scheduled during defined interval
 Number of inspections on schedule but incomplete
 Number of inspections completed
 Number of inspection behind schedule
 Percent on time for inspection
 Percent behind schedule for inspection
 For completed, number of successful inspections
 Percentage of successful inspections
 Total number of equipment tests scheduled during defined interval
 Number of tests incomplete
 Number of tests completed
 Number of test behind schedule
 Percent on schedule for test
Mechanical  Percent behind schedule for test
integrity  For completed tests:
 Number of tests with ―as found‖ within equipment specification
 Number of tests with ―as found‖ outside equipment specification
(i.e., failed dangerously, failed safe or degraded state)
 Percentage of tests within equipment specification
 Percentage of tests outside equipment specification
 Total number of safety equipment
 Total number of failures found by diagnostics
 Total number of failures found by inspection and testing
 Total number of failures requiring equipment repair or replacement
 Total number of failed equipment returned to service within
allowable repair time
 Percentage of equipment returned to service within allowable repair
time
 Total number of safety equipment that are out of service (bypassed,
disabled, overridden or under test/repair) during process operation
for defined interval
Degraded  Total number hours that safety equipment is out of service
operation  Number of safety equipment that are returned to service within
allowable repair time
 Number of safety equipment that are out of service, but covered
under MOC
 Percentage of start-ups involving abnormal or emergency operation
 Total number of process shutdowns during defined interval
Process  Number due to spurious operation of safety equipment
 Number due to abnormal or emergency operation
performance
 Total number of safety alarms during defined interval
 Number of standing or nuisance alarms
 Number of safety alarms requiring response
Employers must develop in-house capability to investigate incidents that occur in their facilities. A
team should be assembled by the employer and trained in the techniques of investigation including
how to conduct interviews of witnesses, assemble needed documentation, and write reports. A
multi-disciplinary team is better able to gather the facts of the event and to analyze them and
develop plausible scenarios as to what happened, and why. Team members should be selected on
25
the basis of their training, knowledge and ability to contribute to a team effort to fully investigate
the incident.
Employees in the process area where the incident occurred should be consulted, interviewed or
made a member of the team. Their knowledge of the events represents a significant set of facts
about the incident that occurred. The report, its findings, and recommendations should be shared
with those who can benefit from the information. The cooperation of employees is essential to an
effective incident investigation. The focus of the investigation should be to obtain facts and not to
place blame. The team and the investigative process should clearly deal with all involved
individuals in a fair, open, and consistent manner.
Emergency Preparedness: Each employer must address what actions employees are to take when
there is an unwanted release of highly hazardous chemicals. Emergency preparedness is the
employer's third line of defense that will be relied on along with the second line of defense, which
is to control the release of chemical. Control releases and emergency preparedness will take place
when the first line of defense to operate and maintain the process and contain the chemicals fails
to stop the release.
In preparing for an emergency chemical release, employers will need to decide the following:
 Whether they want employees to handle and stop small or minor incidental releases;
 Whether they wish to mobilize the available resources at the plant and have them brought
to bear on a more significant release;
 Whether employers want their employees to evacuate the danger area and promptly escape
to a preplanned safe zone area, and then allow the local community emergency response
organizations to handle the release; or
 Whether the employer wants to use some combination of these actions.
Employers will need to select how many different emergency preparedness or third lines of
defense they plan to have, develop the necessary emergency plans and procedures,
appropriately train employees in their emergency duties and responsibilities, and then
implement these lines of defense. Employers, at a minimum, must have an emergency action
plan that will facilitate the prompt evacuation of employees when there is an unwanted release
of a highly hazardous chemical. This means that the employer's plan will be activated by an
alarm system to alert employees when to evacuate, and that employees who are physically
impaired will have the necessary support and assistance to get them to a safe zone
26
Incident Investigation:
27
Figure 3
28
Figure 4
. The intent of these requirements is to alert and move employees quickly to a safe zone. Delaying
alarms or confusing alarms are to be avoided. The use of process control centers or buildings as
safe areas is discouraged. Recent catastrophes indicate that lives are lost in these structures
because of their location and because they are not necessarily designed to withstand overpressures
from shock waves resulting from explosions in the process area.
When there are unwanted incidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the process area,
the employer must inform employees of the actions/procedures to take. If the employer wants
employees to evacuate the area, then the emergency action plan will be activated. For outdoor
29
processes, where wind direction is important for selecting the safe route to a refuge area, the
employers should place a wind direction indicator, such as a wind sock or pennant, at the highest
point visible throughout the process area. Employees can move upwind of the release to gain safe
access to a refuge area by knowing the wind direction.
If the employer wants specific employees in the release area to control or stop the minor
emergency or incidental release, these actions must be planned in advance and procedures
developed and implemented. Handling incidental releases for minor emergencies in the process
area must include pre-planning, providing appropriate equipment for the hazards, and conducting
training for those employees who will perform the emergency work before they respond to handle
an actual release. The employer's training program, including the Hazard Communication standard
training, is to address, identify, and meet the training needs for employees who are expected to
handle incidental or minor releases.
Preplanning for more serious releases is an important element in the employer's line of defense.
When a serious release of a highly hazardous chemical occurs, the employer, through preplanning,
will have determined in advance what actions employees are to take. The evacuation of the
immediate release area and other areas, as necessary, would be accomplished under the emergency
action plan. If the employer wishes to use plant personnel-such as a fire brigade, spill control
team, a hazardous materials team-or employees to render aid to those in the immediate release
area and to control or mitigate the incident, refer to OSHA's Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) standard (Title 79CFR Part 1910.1 20). If outside assistance
is necessary, such as through mutual aid agreements between employers and local government
emergency response organizations, these emergency responders are also covered by
HAZWOPER. The safety and health protection required for emergency responders is the
responsibility of their employers and of the on-scene incident commander.
Responders may be working under very hazardous conditions; therefore, the objective is to have
them competently led by an on-scene incident commander and the commander's staff, properly
equipped to do their assigned work safely, and fully trained to carry out their duties safely before
they respond to an emergency. Drills, training exercises, or simulations with the local community
emergency response planners and responder organizations is one means to obtain better
preparedness. This close cooperation and coordination between plant and local community
emergency preparedness managers also will aid the employer in complying with the
Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management Plan criteria (1)
An effective way for medium to large facilities to enhance coordination and communication
during emergencies within the plant and with local community organizations is by establishing
and equipping an emergency control center. The emergency control center should be located in a
safe zone so that it could be occupied throughout the duration of an emergency. The center should
serve as the major communications link between the on-scene incident commander and plant or
corporate management as well as with local community officials. The communications equipment
in the emergency control center should include a network to receive and transmit information by
telephone, radio, or other means. It is important to have a backup communications network in case
of power failure or if one communication means fails. The center also should be equipped with the
plant layout; community maps; utility drawings, including water for fire extinguishing; emergency
lighting; appropriate reference materials such as a government agency notification list, company
personnel phone list, SARA Title III reports and material safety data sheets, emergency plans and
procedures manual; a listing the location of emergency response equipment and mutual aid
information; and access to meteorological data and any dispersion modeling data.
Compliance Audits: An audit is a technique used to gather sufficient facts and information,
including statistical information, to verify compliance with standards. Employers must select a
30
trained individual or assemble a trained team to audit the process safety management system and
program. A small process or plant may need only one knowledgeable person to conduct an audit.
The audit includes an evaluation of the design and effectiveness of the process safety management
system and a field inspection of the safety and health conditions and practices to verify that the
employer's systems are effectively implemented. The audit should be conducted or led by a person
knowledgeable in audit techniques who is impartial towards the facility or area being audited. The
essential elements of an audit program include planning, staffing, conducting the audit, evaluating
hazards and deficiencies and taking corrective action, performing a follow-up and documenting
actions taken.
Planning: Planning is essential to the success of the auditing process. During planning, auditors
should select a sufficient number of processes to give a high degree of confidence that the audit
reflects the overall level of compliance with the standard. Each employer must establish the
format, staffing, scheduling, and verification methods before conducting the audit. The format
should be designed to provide the lead auditor with a procedure or checklist that details the
requirements of each section of the standard. The names of the audit team members should be
listed as part of the format as well. The checklist, if properly designed, could serve as the
verification sheet that provides the auditor with the necessary information to expedite the review
of the program and ensure that all requirements of the standard are met. This verification sheet
format could also identify those elements that will require an evaluation or a response to correct
deficiencies. This sheet also could be used for developing the follow-up and documentation
requirements.
Staffing:The selection of effective audit team members is critical to the success of the program.
Team members should be chosen for their experience, knowledge, and training and should be
familiar with the processes and auditing techniques, practices, and procedures. The size of the
team will vary depending on the size and complexity of the process under consideration. For a
large, complex, highly instrumented plant, it may be desirable to have team members with
expertise in process engineering and design; process chemistry; instrumentation and computer
controls; electrical hazards and classifications; safety and health disciplines; .maintenance;
emergency preparedness; warehousing or shipping; and process safety auditing. The team may use
part-time members to provide the expertise required and to compare what is actually done or
followed with the written PSM program.
Conducting the Audit:

An effective audit includes a review of the relevant documentation and process safety information,
inspection of the physical facilities, and interviews with all levels of plant personnel. Utilizing the
audit procedure and checklist developed in the preplanning stage, the audit team can
systematically analyze compliance with the provisions of the standard and any other corporate
policies that are relevant. For example, the audit team will review all aspects of the training
program as part of the overall audit. The team will review the written training program for
adequacy of content, frequency of training, effectiveness of training in terms of its goals and
objectives as well as to how it fits into meeting the standard's requirements. Through interviews,
the team can determine employees' knowledge and awareness of the safety procedures, duties,
rules, and emergency response assignments. During the inspection, the team can observe actual
practices such as safety and health policies, procedures, and work authorization practices. This
approach enables the team to identify deficiencies and determine where corrective actions or
improvements are necessary.
31
Evaluation and Corrective Action:
The audit team, through its systematic analysis, should document areas that require corrective
action as well as where the process safety management system is effective. This provides a record
of the audit procedures and findings and serves as a baseline of operation data for future audits. It
will assist in determining changes or trends in future audits.Corrective action is one of the most
important parts of the audit and includes identifying deficiencies, and planning, following-up, and
documenting the corrections. The corrective action process normally begins with a management
review of the audit findings. The purpose of this review is to determine what actions are
appropriate, and to establish priorities, timetables, resource allocations and requirements, and
responsibilities. In some cases, corrective action may involve a simple change in procedures or a
minor maintenance effort to remedy the problem. Management of change procedures need to be
used, as appropriate, even for a seemingly minor change. Many of the deficiencies can be acted on
promptly, while some may require engineering studies or more detailed review of actual
procedures and practices. There may be instances where no action is necessary; this is a valid
response to an audit finding. All actions taken, including an explanation when no action is taken
on a finding, need to be documented.
The employer must assure that each deficiency identified is addressed, the corrective action to be
taken is noted, and the responsible audit person or team is properly documented. To control the
corrective action process, the employer should consider the use of a tracking system. This tracking
system might include periodic status reports shared with affected levels of management, specific
reports such as completion of an engineering study, and a final implementation report to provide
closure for audit findings that have been through management of change, if appropriate, and then
shared with affected employees and management. This type of tracking system provides the
employer with the status of the corrective action. It also provides the documentation required to
verify that appropriate corrective actions were taken on deficiencies identified in the audit
Elements of Risk Based Process Safety Management (RBPSM):
This online course will introduce you to the CCPS Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)
Management approach, described in the CCPS book Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,
2007. It covers the four pillars and twenty elements that define the structure for the RBPS
approach. The course will help you design, implement, and maintain a risk-based process safety
management system that will fit your company‘s needs and resources.
You will learn the definition and importance of RBPS and learn the four pillars of RBPS. Key
principles and essential features for each of the twenty elements that make up the pillars will be
discussed.
The four pillars include:
1. Commit to process safety
2. Understand hazards and risk
3. Manage risk
4. Learn from experience
Subjects discussed include:
 Process Safety Culture  Contractor Management

 Compliance with Standards  Training and Performance Assurance
32
 Process Safety Competency  Management of Change

 Workforce Involvement  Operational Readiness
 Stakeholder Outreach  Conduct of Operations
 Process Knowledge  Emergency Management
Management  Incident Investigation
 Hazard Identification and Risk  Measurement and Metrics
Analysis
 Auditing
 Operating Procedures
 Management Review and Continuous
 Safe Work Practices Improvement
 Asset Integrity and Reliability  Implementation and the Future
PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONCORDANCE TABLE

Comparison Of WCT HSE Management System (HSE MS) Documentation to the Centre For
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) - Guidelines For Risk Based Process Safety
To promote process safety management excellence and continuous improvement throughout industry,
CCPS created risk-based process safety (RBPS) as the framework for the next generation of process safety
management. The framework is built on four pillars which are further divided into 20 elements. If an
organization focuses its process safety efforts on these four pillars, then its process safety effectiveness
should improve, the frequency and severity of incidents should decrease, and the long term safety,
environmental, and business performance should improve. This risk-based approach also helps avoid gaps,
inconsistencies, overwork, and underwork that can lead to system failure.
RBPS Pillar / Element Key Reference to Applicable Comment

Principle Corporate Document for
Compliance
Pillar 1: Commit to Process Safety – ―The cornerstone of process safety excellence. A workforce that is
convinced the organization fully supports safety as a core value will tend to do the right things, in the right
ways, at the right ties – even when no one else is looking.‖
1. Process Safety Culture - maintain • HSE MS, Element 2.2, Goals and Management is responsible for
a dependable practice; development Objectives establishing and supporting HSE
and implement and sound culture, • HSE MS, Element 2.3, Roles and Management System. HSE
monitor and guide the culture Responsibilities implementation plans outline stated
(OSHA PSM 1) • HSE MS, Element 5.0, Review objectives and targets. Action plans
and Continual Improvement include responsibilities and
• HSE MS 3-Year Plans, Gap timeframes. Every person in the
Analysis and Implementation Plans organization has a personal
• HSE Manual, Section 1, Policy responsibility for HSE. Continued
and Planning success of the Company‘s HSE
• HSE Manual, Section 2, Roles and Management System means:
Responsibilities • Senior management is visibly
• Annual Corporate Key committed.
Performance Indicators • Frontline management leads the
• Corporate Asset Integrity process and is actively involved.
Programs • Supervision is performance
focused.
• Workers are engaged and actively
33
participating
2. Compliance with Standards • HSE MS, Introduction The HSE Management System
– ensure that a facility remains • HSE MS, Element 1.1, provides a framework to
in conformance with Management, Leadership and ensure that health, safety and
applicable standards, codes, Policy • HSE MS, Element environmental issues are
regulations, and laws 2.2, Goals and Objectives systematically identified,
(including Company policy, • HSE MS, Element 2.3, Roles controlled, and monitored.
standards, and practices) and Responsibilities The HSE MS is subject to
(OSHA PSM 1) • HSE MS, Element 5.0, periodic audit, ensuring
Review and Continual business risk and regulatory
Improvement needs / changes are addressed.
• HSE MS 3-Year Plans, Gap
Analysis and Implementation
Plans
RBPS Pillar / Element Key Reference to Applicable Comment
Principles Corporate Document for
Compliance
3. Process Safety Competency • HSE MS, Element 2.1, Risk Company objectives include
– implement management Management establishing a process to
systems to (1) help proactively • HSE MS, Element 3.4, identify, evaluate and review
identify learning needs, (2) Process Safety and Integrity training needs for each level
support efforts to learn or Management and function within the
obtain critical knowledge, (3) • HSE MS, Element 3.6, organization and develop a
maintain knowledge that helps Employee and Organizational training plan that addresses
promote risk-informed Capability these needs. Ensure that
decision making, and (4) share • HSE Manual, Section 9, documentation of HSE and
information. (OSHA PSM 6) Asset Integrity competency training is
• Corporate Asset Integrity maintained. The Company
Programs relies on a combination of
skill-, rule- , and knowledge-
based decision making to
achieve its HSE performance
goals. The Company‘s overall
HSE Management System and
the supporting programs have
been designed in consideration
of this model.
4. Workforce Involvement – • HSE MS, Element 2.3, Roles Every person in the
involvement of workers who and Responsibilities organization has a personal
(1) are aware of hazards at • HSE MS, Element 2.1, Risk responsibility for HSE.
workplace, (2) understand Management Supervisors, employees and
engineered controls and • HSE MS, Element 5.0, contractors are responsible
management systems provided Review and Continual for:
to address hazards, (3) accept Improvement • Understanding current HSE
and strive to fulfill their roles • HSE MS 3-Year Plans, Gap regulations, guidelines and
and responsibilities in support Analysis and Implementation corporate policies related to
of providing a safe work Plans their area of responsibility.
environment. (OSHA PSM 5) • HSE Manual, Section 4, • Ensuring that all plans,
Risk Management practices, and procedures
• HSE Manual Section 3, Site required to complete work in a
34
Safety Management safe and environmentally
• Project HSE Assurance responsible manner, are
Plans available and communicated.
• Environmental Protection • Participating in HSE and
Program and Plans competency training as
assigned
5. Stakeholder Outreach – • HSE MS, Element 4.1, The Company commits to an
ensure that a facility retains a Meetings and open dialogue with
good relationship with Communications employees, the communities
stakeholders and establishes • HSE Manual, Section 1, in which it operates, and other
and maintains connections HSE Management • HSE relevant stakeholders with
with all relevant industry, Manual, Section 2, Roles and respect to HSE issues
government, and public Responsibilities associated with Company
groups. (OSHA PSM 5) • HSE Manual, Section 3, Site operations.
Safety Management
• HSE Manual, Section 5,
Meetings and
Communications
• Project HSE Assurance
Plans
• Company Environmental
Protection Plans
RBPS Pillar / Element Key Reference to

Principles Applicable Comment
Corporate
Document for
Compliance
Pillar 2: Understand Hazards and Risk – ―The foundation of a risk-based approach. An
organization can use this information to allocate limited resources in the most effective manner.‖
6. Process Knowledge • HSE MS, Element Information systems in place to
Management – focuses on 4.5, Records identify, collect, protect, store,
information that can easily be Management retrieve, route and dispose of HSE
recorded in documents and • HSE MS, Element documentation to assure operational
supports any effort to apply the 3.4, Process Safety integrity and regulatory compliance
riskbased methods. Includes and Integrity are in place. The Company‘s
knowledge of design intent, Management Management of Change (MOC)
operating methods, equipment • HSE Manual, process is used to recognize,
ratings, and process hazards. Section 1, HSE document, review and approve
(OSHA PSM 2) Management permanent or temporary physical
• HSE Manual, and operational changes, before they
Section 9, Asset are made in order to ensure that the
Integrity ability to manage pipeline and
• HSE Manual, pressure equipment integrity is not
Section 15, Records compromised by such changes.
Management
• Environmental
35
Protection Plan,
Section 1
• Company Asset
Integrity Manuals
7. Hazard Identification and Risk • HSE MS, Element Management is responsible for
Analysis – formal, documented 2.1, Risk supporting risk management
review process of material, Management programs and decisions. Risks are
equipment, location with respect to • HSE MS, Element identified, consistently evaluated and
people, sensitive environments and 3.4, Process Safety mitigated using appropriate,
other vulnerable assets (new and and Integrity reasonable and practical risk
existing facilities Life-Cycle). Management management tools. Risks include
(OSHA PSM 3) • HSE Manual, potential hazards, operational
Section 4, Hazard- problems or noncompliance to:
Risk Management regulations, operating standards, or
• HSE Manual safe work practices. Changes are
Section 3, Site recognized, documented, formally
Safety Management reviewed and approved prior to their
• Project HSE implementation and the continuation
Assurance Plans of work as required to reduce
• Company Asset business and operation risks.
Integrity Manuals •
Emergency
Response Plans /
CEPA E2 Risk
Assessments, as
required
• Company
Environmental
Protection Plans
Pillar 3: Manage Risk – ―The ongoing execution of RBPS tasks. Organizations must (1)
operate and maintain the processes that pose the risk, (2) keep changes to those processes
within risk tolerances, and (3) prepare for, respond to, and manage incidents that do occur.‖
8. Operating Procedures – • HSE MS, Element Work plans, practices and
establish requirements for all 2.1, Risk procedures are developed and
operating procedures, assign Management • HSE implemented, as required, for the
responsibilities for development, MS, Element 3.1, work
use, and review, and address Program activities being conducted. They
document control. Implementation • outline standard operating and
(OSHA PSM 4) HSE MS, Element maintenance practices and
3.4, Process Safety procedures
and Integrity and hazards.
Management • HSE
Manual, Section 4,
Hazard-Risk
Management • HSE
Manual, Section 3,
Site Safety
Management • HSE
Manual, Section 9,
Asset Integrity •
36
HSE Manual,
Section 12, Work
Practices and
Procedures •
Company Asset
Integrity Manuals
Reference to Comment
RBPS Pillar / Element Applicable
Key Principles Corporate
Document for
Compliance
9. Safe Work Practices – establish • HSE MS, Element Site-specific procedures are
subordinate procedures that govern 2.1, Risk established and defined methods of
specific activities, including Management performing site-specific operations
responsibilities. • HSE MS, Element and address equipment and hazards
(OSHA PSM 4) 3.1, Program not included in operating and
Implementation maintenance procedures.
• HSE Manual,
Section 4, Hazard-
Risk Management
• HSE Manual,
Section 3, Site
Safety Management
• HSE Manual,
Section 12, Work
Practices and
Procedures
10.Asset Integrity and Reliability • HSE MS, Element The Company manages asset risk
– defines standards or technical 3.4, Process Safety by providing an effective integrity
bases used to develop the and Integrity management plan for designing,
inspection, Management constructing, maintaining,
testing and preventative • HSE Manual, inspecting and operating Company
maintenance of equipment, Section 9, Asset pipeline systems and facilities to
management systems in place to Integrity reduce loss, ensure worker safety
ensure that (1) equipment • HSE Manual, and protect the environment through
deficiencies are report and Section 4, Risk training and inspection.
managed, (2) equipment is Management These plans define the
fabricated, installed and maintained • Company Asset responsibilities and qualifications
in accordance with specifications Integrity Manuals required for all personnel involved
and certifications. Also, defines in the management of programs and
roles and responsibilities and the inspection of production facilities.
standards for training and
procedures to support this element.
(OSHA PSM 9)
11.Contractor Management – • HSE MS, Element The Company selects, hires, and
systems to (1) consider contractor 2.3, Roles and assesses contractor personnel to
safety- related qualifications, (2) Responsibilities ensure that the contracted workforce
ensure contractors are made aware • HSE Manual, is composed of competent, capable
of facility and operational hazards Section 2, Roles workers equipped with the skills
and potential hazards introduced by and Responsibilities required to meet the HSE
37
contractor • HSE Manual, requirements for the services being
work activities, and (3) maintain Section 6,contracted.
high standards of safety Qualifications, Contractors performing work for the
performance during the conduct of Orientations and Company are expected to perform
contracted services. Training activities in a safe and
(OSHA PSM 7) • HSE Manual, environmentally responsible
Section 14, manner, in accordance with industry
Contractor and specific craftsman trade rules,
Management regulations and standard industry
operating procedures
Reference to Comment
RBPS Pillar / Element Applicable
Key Principles Corporate
Document for
Compliance
12.Training and Performance • HSE MS, Element The Company selects, hires, trains
Assurance –includes education in 2.3, Roles & and assesses its personnel to ensure
specific operations procedures, Responsibilities that the workforce is composed of
maintenance, safe work, and • HSE MS, Element competent, capable workers
emergency planning and response, 3.6, Employee & equipped with the skills required to
as well as overall process and its Organizational meet the HSE requirements for their
risks. Work activities commonly Capability position.
categorized as skill-based, rule- • HSE Manual, Site
based or knowledge based. Safety Management
(OSHA PSM 6) • HSE Manual,
Section 6,
Qualifications,
Orientations &
Training
• HSE Manual,
Section 9, Basic
Safety
• HSE Manual,
Section 14,
Contractor
Management
• HSE Manual,
Section 13, Work
Practices and
Procedures
• Environmental
Protection Program,
Section 6
• Worker
Competency /
Training System
(CMDS)
• Company Asset
Integrity Manuals
38
13.Management of Change – • HSE MS, Element The Company‘s Management of
establish formal authorization 3.4, Process Safety Change (MOC) process is used to
(documented) and communication and Integrity recognize, document, review and
process (procedures, Management approve permanent or temporary
documentation, and training) for all • HSE MS, Element physical and operational changes,
changes that are not replacements- 4.5, Records before they are made in order to
in-kind. Specifically changes to Management ensure that the ability to manage
facility design, activities, • HSE Manual, equipment integrity is not
operations, organization or policies Section 4, Risk compromised by such changes.
that (1) introduce new hazards, or Management Risks are identified, consistently
(2) increases risk of existing • HSE Manual, evaluated and mitigated using
hazards. Section 9, Asset appropriate, reasonable and
(OSHA PSM 11) Integrity practical risk management tools.
• HSE Manual, Risks include potential hazards,
Section 15, Records operational problems or non-
Management compliance to: regulations,
• Company Asset operating standards, or safe work
Integrity Manuals practices.
14.Operational Readiness – • HSE MS, Element The Company‘s Management of
ensure that processes that have been 2.1, Risk Change (MOC) process is used to
shut down are safe to restart. Management recognize, document, review and
Includes practices for pre-startup • HSE MS, Element approve permanent or temporary
reviews of 3.4, Process Safety physical and operational changes,
(1) new processes, (b) processes and Integrity before they are made to ensure the
that have been shut down for Management ability to manage equipment
modification, • HSE MS Element integrity is not compromised by
(3) process that have been 4.1, Meetings and such changes.
administratively shut down for Communications The Company PSM process
other reasons. • HSE Manual, includes a requirement to conduct
(OSHA PSM 8) Section 4, Hazard- Operational Readiness / Pre-Startup
Risk Management Safety Reviews (PSSR) as part of
• HSE Manual, commissioning and start-up
Section 3, Site activities. The primary purpose is to
Safety Management ensure what was designed and
• HSE Manual, planned was carried out in the field
Section 9, Asset before facility startup. The
Integrity emphasis is on the design or
• Project HSE significant design changes, calling
Assurance Plans attention to the safety and
operability of the facility.
Introduction to Process Safety Culture:

Element Overview:
Developing, sustaining, and enhancing the organization‘s process safety culture is one of five
elements in the RBPS pillar of committing to process safety. This element describes what process
safety culture means, what the attributes of a sound culture are, and how organizations might
begin to enhance their own culture. Section 3.2 describes the key principles and essential features
of a management system for this element. Section 3.3 lists work activities that support these
essential features, and presents a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each work
39
activity, depending on perceived risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 3.4 through
3.6 include (1) ideas to improve the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs
that support this element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) issues that
may be appropriate for management review.
What is it?
Process safety culture has been defined as, ―the combination of group values and behaviors that
determine the manner in which process safety is managed‖ . More succinct definitions include,
―How we do things around here,‖ ―What we expect here,‖ and ―How we behave when no one is
watching.‖ In an especially sound culture, deeply held values are reflected in the group‘s actions,
and newcomers are expected to endorse these values in order to remain part of the group.
Why is it Important?
Investigations of catastrophic events, such as the Longford gas plant explosion and the Piper
Alpha disaster, have identified common process safety culture weaknesses that are often factors in
other serious incidents. The values of the group (e.g., corporation, facility, shift team) can help
shape the attitudes of the individual, which in turn, play a significant role in determining
individual behaviors. A sound culture provides its members with the values necessary for
understanding why strict adherence to procedures (one aspect of operating discipline) is the right
thing to do.
Where/When is it Done?
Efforts to nurture and sustain a sound process safety culture must occur everywhere, from the
boardroom to the production floor. Organizations that have determined the need for significant
enhancement of their culture should take calculated action, recognizing that this is a long-term
effort that will require dedicated resources for as long as the organization exists. While the
behaviors and attitudes associated with a sound culture, once established, should become the norm
for members of the organization, staff turnover will continually require the instilling of group
values and attitudes in new members of the organization.
Who Does it?
Everyone in the organization has a role in process safety culture. The leadership of an
organization has the primary responsibility for identifying the need for, and fostering, cultural
change and for sustaining a sound culture once it is established. However, similar to the concept
of safety as a line responsibility, the responsibility for fostering and maintaining a sound culture
cascades down through the organization.
The anticipated work product is a sound culture that (1) incorporates the features discussed in
Section 3.2 and (2) maximizes the effectiveness of all other RBPS elements and the overall safety
management system.
How Is It Done?
Successful cultural change requires that expectations of new attitudes and behaviors be
communicated and reinforced, that these new attitudes and behaviors demonstrate successful
results, and that the members of the organization recognize and appreciate the resulting successes.
Acceptable behaviors must be modeled at all levels of the organization through leadership by
example. The rationale for, and anticipated benefits of, expected behaviors must be made evident
to all. Positive reinforcement and accountabilities for expected behaviors must be clear and
certain.
40
 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA):

Introduction Safety in any operation works best if the person or people in charge take a leading
role in managing safety and health. Many business enterprises have proven that good safety
management leads to increased productivity, and the same works for farms.By having a good
safety management program, you can avoid not only farm injuries, but also other incidents that are
costly, time consuming, stressful and inconvenient. This makes good economic sense.
Safety Pyramid:
In 2003, ConocoPhillips Marine conducted a study demonstrating a large difference in the ratio of
serious accidents and near misses. This study was built on the original work of H.W. Heinrich
back in 1931. The Conoco study found that for every single fatality there are at least 300,000 at-
risk behaviors, defined as activities that are not consistent with safety programs, training and
components on machinery. These behaviors may include bypassing safety components on
machinery or eliminating a safety step in the production process that slows down the operator.
With effective machine safeguarding and training, at-risk behaviors and near misses can be
diminished. This also reduces the chance of the fatality occurring, since there is a lower frequency
of at-risk behaviors.
Definition
Hazard :A hazard is simply a condition or a set of circumstances that present a potential for harm.
Hazards are divided into two broad categories:
• Health hazards (cause occupational illnesses)
• Safety Hazards (cause physical harm - injuries)
Hazard Identification:
Hazard identification is the process of identifying all hazards inthe workplace. There is no set
method for grouping agriculturalinjury and illness hazards. Most production agriculture
hazardoverlap into different hazard categories. One way to group themwould be by major hazards
listed in the OSHA
Dairy Local Emphasis Program:
• Manure storage facilities and collections structures
• Dairy bull and cow behavior/worker positioning
• Electrical systems
• Skid-steer loader operation
• Tractor operation
• Guarding of power take-offs (PTOs)
• Guarding of other power transmission and functionalcomponents
• Hazardous energy control while performing servicingand maintenance on equipment
• Hazard communication
• Confined spaces
• Horizontal bunker silos
• Noise
Hazard Prevention and Control:
Class Question: What other ideas do you have for ways of grouping or identifying hazards?
Hazards are the main cause of occupational health and safetyproblems. Therefore, finding ways of
eliminating hazards orcontrolling the risks is the best way to reduce workplace injury and
41
illness.
How to Start ?
To assess safety management on your farm, check whether youhave:
• Regular hazard assessment surveys of operations,equipment, substances and tasks
• A system of recording injuries, near misses and identifiedhazards
• Safe procedures for dairy farm tasks
• Safety training and supervision for new and youngemployees
• Protective clothing and equipment (PPE)
• Safety training and practice for each new piece ofequipment
• Safety discussions between employers, contractors andemployees
• Safety information readily available for hazardoussubstances
• Copies of the regulations
Develop a plan: Develop a written safety and health program covering thepoints listed above.
(This will be covered in more detail in Module8 - Safety and Health Programs). Keep it with other
safetyinformation about operations, equipment and substances on thefarm.
• Discuss the program with others on the farm duringdevelopment to assure their safety concerns
are met.Incorporate a system for hazard identification, riskassessment and risk control.
• Make sure employees and others on the farm are familiarwith the plan, safe work procedures,
and current legalsafety and health requirements.
• Other components include providing farm workers withsafety information, orientation for new
employees, safetytraining for new procedures, special safeguards for youngworkers, and keeping a
record of injuries, near misses andpotential hazards.
Identify the hazard: The best safety outcomes on farms are achieved by a 24-hourapproach to
identifying and dealing with hazards.
• Environments (light, noise, rain, heat, sun)
• Substances (pesticides, fuels, dusts)
• Workplace layout (parlor designs, cattle passes)
 Work organization (unnecessary manual handling)
 Equipment (ladders, squeeze chutes, crowd gates)
 Farm animals (that bite, kick, butt, crush, toss, infect)
 Heights (roofs, vertical and horizontal silos, manure pits)
 Electricity (switches, cables, leads, power tools,connections)
 Hazards may be identified by:
 Observation - use your senses of sight, hearing, smell andtouch - combined with
knowledge and experience.
42
 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) - obtain themfrom manufacturers and suppliers.
Read them carefullyto identify possible harm from hazardous substances andprecautions
that need to be taken.
 Hazard and risk surveys - conduct hazard spottingsurveys of main work areas. Talk to
others about theirsafety concerns.
 Children and visitors - include in your surveys areas andactivities in which children or
visitors could be at risk.
 Record analysis - keep records of identified hazards, nearmisses, injuries and workers'
compensation claims to helpidentify possible trends.
 Discussion groups - are useful for identifying hazardsand recommending solutions.
 Safety audits - consider creating a safety committee toinvestigate safety and help prepare
a management plan.
 Information- keep informed of hazards in the industrythrough the latest available
information.
 Consumer information - carefully read and followconsumer guidelines on equipment and
substances.
 Regulations and best practices
 Assess the Risk:

Once a hazard has been identified, the likelihood and possible severity of injury or harm will need
to be assessed before determining how best to minimize the risk. High risk hazards will need to be
addressed more urgently than low risk situations. You may decide that the same hazard could lead
to several different possible outcomes. For each hazard consider how likely each possible outcome
is, and record the highest priority.
Make the changes
Consider the following control measures, listed in order of importance:
a) Remove the hazard at the source - e.g. get rid of it or replace it.
b) Substitute it with something less hazardous.
c) Isolate the hazardous process, item or substance from people.
d) Add engineering controls, such as safety barriers or exhaust ventilation.
e) Adopt safe work procedures, training and supervision to minimize the risk.
f) Where other means are not sufficient or practicable, provide personal protective equipment.
g) Implement and monitor the controls you decide upon.
One or more of the controls recommended above should be agreed upon and the changes made as
soon as possible before the hazard causes an injury. Sometimes it will require more than one of the
risk control measures above to effectively reduce exposure to hazards.
Checking the changes:

To make sure risk has been minimized, and a further hazard has not been created, the new safety
measures may need to be carefully tested before work begins again. Consultation between the
employer and others at the workplace will help to reach a safe decision.
43
In some cases, a new set of safe work procedures may be necessary, possibly even another
period of training and supervision, until the improvement can be shown to be working safely.
Safety improvements should be reviewed periodically, to make sure they continue to be effective.
Introduction to Workforce Involvement:

What Is It?
Workers, at all levels and in all positions in an organization, should have roles and responsibilities
for enhancing and ensuring the safety of the organization‘s operations. However, some workers
may not be aware of all of their opportunities to contribute. Some organizations may not
effectively tap into the full expertise of their workers or, worse, may even discourage workers who
seek to contribute through what the organization views as a nontraditional role. Workforce
involvement provides a system for enabling the active participation of company and contractor
workers in the design, development, implementation, and continuous improvement of the RBPS
management system.
Effective workforce involvement involves developing a written plan of action regarding worker
participation, consulting with workers on the development of each element of the RBPS
management system, and providing workers and their representatives access to all information
developed under the RBPS management system.
Workforce involvement provides for a consultative relationship between management and workers
at all levels of the organization. This element is not intended to create a system whereby any
worker or group can dictate the content of the RBPS management system; however, for workforce
involvement to succeed, management must provide due and fair consideration of the input
provided by workers.Unless a reason exists for distinguishing between company employees and
contract workers, the term worker, as subsequently used in this chapter, should be interpreted as
referring to both groups.
Those workers directly involved in operating and maintaining the process are most exposed to the
hazards of the process. The workforce involvement element provides an equitable mechanism for
workers to be directly involved in protecting their own welfare. Furthermore, these workers are
potentially the most knowledgeable people with respect to the day-to-day details of operating the
process and maintaining the equipment and facilities, and may be the sole source for some types
of knowledge gained through their unique experiences. Workforce involvement provides
management a formalized mechanism for tapping into this valuable expertise. Workforce
involvement also ensures that mechanisms exist for workers to access the information they need to
perform their jobs, including fulfilling their roles in support of the implementation of the RBPS
management system Workforce involvement either directly implements or helps reinforce a
number of the essential features of a sound process safety culture.
 Individual empowerment. Workforce involvement provides explicit roles,

responsibilities, and authorities for workers in the planning, implementation, and
improvement of the RBPS management system.
 Deference to expertise. Workforce involvement provides a mechanism for workers to
share their expertise in the operation and maintenance of the process. By having a role in
44
helping define their training needs, workers can also help direct the enhancement of their
expertise.
 Open and effective communications. Workforce involvement provides various
mechanisms for workers and managers to communicate.
 Mutual trust. By enhancing dialogue and interaction between workers and management
on process safety issues, workforce involvement provides opportunities for fostering
mutual trust within the organization.
 Responsiveness. The manner and timeliness of management response to worker
suggestions will be a primary determinant of the degree of success that can be achieved by
the workforce involvement program. Slow, no, or superficial response can both cause the
loss of time-critical opportunities to respond to problems and serve as a disincentive to
future worker participation.
By its nature, workforce involvement is associated with virtually every process safety activity,
whenever and wherever it occurs. Thus workforce involvement should begin during the design of
the RBPS management system and continue on through its implementation and continuous
improvement. Certain workforce involvement activities may be scheduled periodically; for
example, a periodic operatoropinion survey regarding the adequacy of the refresher training
program. In addition, a mechanism permitting continuous input or feedback from workers should
be provided as part of the workforce involvement program. Management‘s responsibility for
providing access to information developed under the RBPS management system provides a
continuing role for management as such information is developed and modified (see Chapter 8,
Process Knowledge Management).
Who Does It?

Management, with worker involvement, establishes the procedures and systems that constitute the
workforce involvement element, which, in turn, describe the process for identifying opportunities
for the workforce to be engaged in the development and implementation of each RBPS element.
The workforce involvement procedures also establish a responsibility for workers to make
suggestions for the development, implementation, and improvement of the RBPS management
system and, for management to respond to such suggestions. Management ensures that required
information is available to workers under the workforce involvement program.
Finally, workers must support the workforce involvement element through their active
participation (involvement) in process safety management system activities.
This chapter addresses workforce involvement as it pertains to only two groups – the company
and the workers. More complex dynamics may exist at a unionized facility at which the union
organization and its contract work rules will likely affect workforce involvement activities.

The output of the workforce involvement element is a RBPS management system that:
Defines the roles and responsibilities of all involved:
 Meets the current needs of all constituencies.

 Is maintained in an evergreen condition through both management attention and ongoing
worker input.
 Provides workers the information necessary to understand the hazards to which they may
be exposed, and to support their roles in RBPS management system implementation.
45
The workforce involvement element yields suggestions for the implementation and
improvement of any RBPS element. Such suggestions are directed to the respective
element custodians for consideration, response, and potential implementation.
Another product of this element should be the active engagement of workers at all levels of
the organization, and a correspondingly greater sense of worker ownership of, and
commitment to, the successfulimplementation of the RBPS management system.
How Is It Done?
Implementation of the workforce involvement element normally involves (1) identification of the
more common roles that workers can and should play in the implementation of the RBPS
management system and (2) the establishment of mechanisms to facilitate this participation.
Additional opportunities for worker involvement may be identified and formalized as the
workforce involvement program evolves. The resulting working environment should be flexible
enough to allow capitalizing on unexpected workforce involvement opportunities as they arise.
Table 6.1 lists general areas of activity in which workforce involvement could beencourage, as
identified by the United Kingdom (UK) Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
In addition, information required to be shared with workers must be identified and mechanisms
established for providing this information. Employers have the right to require that workers
seeking access to trade secret information sign confidentiality agreements before being given
access to such information. Written policies, protocols, or procedures may be appropriate for
documenting and controlling some of the activities mentioned above.
 Introduction to Asset Integrity and Reliability:

ELEMENT OVERVIEW
Asset integrity, the RBPS element that helps ensure that equipment is properly designed, installed
in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for use until it is retired, is one of nine elements
in the RBPS pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the attributes of a risk-based
management system for ensuring the integrity and reliability of critical equipment and safety
systems. Section 12.2 describes the key principles and essential features of a management system
for this element. Section 12.3 lists work activities that support these essential features, and
presents a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on
perceived risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 12.4 through 12.6 include (1) ideas
to improve the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs that support this
element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) issues that may be
appropriate for management review.
What Is It?
The asset integrity element is the systematic implementation of activities, such as inspections and
tests necessary to ensure that important equipment will be suitable for its intended application
throughout its life. Specifically, work activities related to this element focus on (1) preventing a
catastrophic release of a hazardous material or a sudden release of energy and (2) ensuring high
availability (or dependability) of
critical safety or utility systems that prevent or mitigate the effects of these types of events.
46
Designing and maintaining equipment that it is fit for its purpose and functions when needed is of
paramount importance to process industries. Maintaining containment of hazardous materials and
ensuring that safety systems work when needed are two of the primary responsibilities of any
facility.
Asset integrity activities range from technical meetings involving experts seeking to advance the
state-of-the art in equipment design, inspection, testing, or reliability, to a plant operator on
routine rounds spotting leaks, unusual noises or odors, or detecting other abnormal conditions.
However, this element primarily involves (1) inspections, tests, preventive maintenance,
predictive maintenance, and repair activities that are performed by maintenance and contractor
personnel at operating facilities and (2) quality assurance processes, including procedures and
training, that underpin these activities. Asset integrityelement activities occur at many places and
extend throughout the life of the facility.
Who Does It?

Asset integrity activities occur at several organizational levels. Industry sponsored technical
committees and organizations are continuously working to advance the state of knowledge
regarding proper design and inspection, test, and preventive maintenance (ITPM) practices to help
ensure that equipment is fit for service at commissioning, and remains fit for service throughout its
life. Companies (or business units) often establish centers of excellence in the asset integrity field,
establish corporate standards, and promote efforts to continuously improve the safety and
reliability of process equipment. At an operating facility, the asset integrity element activities are
an integral part of day-to-day operation involving operators, maintenance employees, inspectors,
contractors, engineers, and others involved in designing, specifying, installing, operating, or
maintaining equipment.
What Are the Anticipated Work Products?
Asset integrity element work products include:
 Reports and data from initial inspections, tests, and other activities to verify that equipment
is fabricated and installed in accordance with design specifications and is fit for service at
startup.
 Results from ongoing ITPM tasks, performed by trained or certified personnel and based on
written procedures that conform to generally accepted standards, that help ensure that
equipment remains fit for service.
 Controlled repairs and adjustments to equipment by trained personnel using appropriate
written procedures and instructions.
 A system to control maintenance work, repair parts, and maintenance materials needed for
the work to help ensure that equipment remains fit for service.
 A quality assurance program that helps prevent equipment failures that could result from (1)
use of faulty parts/materials or (2) improper fabrication, installation, or repair methods (e.g.,
improperly supporting the engine as discussed at the start of this chapter).
The primary objective of the asset integrity element is to help ensure reliable performance of
equipment designed to contain, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of a release of hazardous
materials or energy. Although proper execution of work activities associated with this element
requires a high level of human performance, the ultimate work product for this element is reliable
and predictable equipment operation.
How Is It Done?
47
An effective asset integrity program depends on management ensuring that:
 Equipment and systems are properly designed, fabricated, and installed.
 The unit is operated within the design limits of the equipment.
 ITPM tasks are conducted by trained and qualified individuals using approved procedures
and completed as scheduled.
 Repair work conforms to design codes, engineering standards, and manufacturer‘s
recommendations.
 Appropriate actions are taken to address deficiencies, regardless of how they are discovered.
What is contractor management and why is it important?
Safety and health obligations: Under the Mine Safety Inspection Act 1994, a contractor is owed
duties by the principal employer. Where a principal employer engages contractors to perform
work, effective contractor procurement and management are essential to ensure duties to a
contractor are met as both an employee (i.e. worker) as well as a third party.Integrating health and
safety requirements into contractor procurement and management, and aligning safety systems
where practicable, helps prevent incidents and fulfills health and safety obligations.
Contractors also have a duty as workers under the Mine Safety Inspection Act 1994. While
at work, a contractor must take reasonable care for his or her own health and safety, and take
reasonable care that their acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health and safety of others.
What are the elements of a good contractor management system?

Good contract management is the process that ensures both parties in a contract fully meet
their respective obligations as efficiently and effectively as possible, in order to continually deliver
both the business and operational objectives required by the contract.
Successful contract management exists when:
 all parties know their obligations under the contract

 the arrangements for service delivery continue to be satisfactory to both customer and supplier
 expected business benefits and value for money are being delivered and realized, including
safety and health performance
 the supplier is co-operative and responsive
 disputes are rare
 the contract is fully compliant and satisfies both legislative and audit requirements.
48
 Introduction to Training and Performance Assurance:
ELEMENT OVERVIEW
Training workers and assuring their reliable performance of critical tasks is one of nine elements
in the RBPS pillar of managing risk. In the context of process safety management systems, this
chapter describes the meaning of training, the attributes of a good training system, and the steps an
organization might take to implement a robust training program. Section 14.2 describes the key
principles and essential features of a management system for this element. Section 14.3 lists work
activities that support these essential features, and presents a range of approaches that might be
appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived risk, resources, and organizational
culture. Sections 14.4 through 14.6 include (1) ideas for improving the effectiveness of
management systems and specific programs that support this element, (2) metrics that could be
used to monitor this element, and (3) issues that may be appropriate for management review.
What Is It?
Training is practical instruction in job and task requirements and methods. It may be provided in a
classroom or workplace, and its objective is to enable workers to meet some minimum initial
performance standards, to maintain their proficiency, or to qualify them for promotion to a more
demanding position. Performance assurance is the means by which workers demonstrate that they
have understood the training and can apply it in practical situations. Performance assurance is an
ongoing process to ensure that workers meet performance standards and to identify where
additional training is required.
A consistently high level of human performance is a critical aspect of any process safety program;
indeed, a less than adequate level of human performance will adversely impact all aspects of
operations. Without an adequate training and performance assurance program, a facility can have
no confidence that work tasks will be consistently completed to minimum acceptable standards, in
accordance with accepted procedures and practices.
Training takes place both in the workplace and the classroom, and it should be completed before a
worker is allowed to work independently in a specific job position. Refresher training is provided
on an ongoing basis thereafter as needed. Ideally, training is based on needs analyses that define
the minimum acceptable knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required for a worker in a
specific position. These analyses also include any requirements imposed by regulations, codes,
industry standards, or company policies. The training program should then be developed to bridge
the gap between what is demanded of a qualified job applicant (e.g., basic reading and writing
skills) and what is required to succeed in a specific job. The performance assurance system then
tests the trained workers initially, and periodically thereafter, to demonstrate that they possess the
required KSAs and are qualified to work independently.
Who Does It?
Each work group should define the KSAs necessary to work successfully in their department. A
human resources group often manages the overall process because it affects hiring, job placement,
and retentiondecisions. A department or designated individual(s) usually plans and coordinates
training activities. The training itself is typically conducted by subject matter experts (SMEs) or
outside specialists who have been trained and qualified as trainers. Qualified peers, trainers,
managers, human resource personnel, or third parties, depending on the exact nature of the testing,
may conduct performance assurance testing.
49
The output of this activity is a set of job performance standards and a list of initial and ongoing
training needs for each job position. A set of training materials should be developed for each
training need that will be met by internal resources. For other training needs, a list of approved
suppliers should be developed. A training record should be provided for each worker showing that
person‘s training needs, the dates on which initial training and any refresher training was
satisfactorily completed, and a schedule of future training classes. In addition, the work group
should document an appropriate approach for verifying performance and provide examiners with
the resources (model tests, observation checklists, etc.) necessary to test workers. Outputs of the
training element can also be used to facilitate the performance of other elements. For example,
teaching employees about company history will reinforce the culture element, and teaching
employees to recognize hazards will improve the risk, management of change, and operations
elements.
How Is It Done?
To develop an effective set of training materials, start by identifying the jobs and tasks that must
be performed. Once the tasks are identified, determine the KSAs for personnel who will be
assigned to perform the task, and the KSAs of individuals qualified to apply for the job. Then
identify the gaps and develop or procure training materials and programs that will enable workers
to achieve the required KSAs. Also, use the list of required KSAs to develop testing methods that
will reasonably ensure that workers have the required performance competencies. Finally, validate
the training approach and develop acceptable norms for new workers by testing workers who are
currently considered qualified.
Introduction to Operational Readiness:

ELEMENT OVERVIEW
Ensuring the safe startup of processes over the life of a facility is one of nine elements in the
RBPS pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the management practices for performing
pre-startup reviews of (1) new processes, (2) processes that have been shut down for modification,
and (3) processes that have been administratively shut down for other reasons. These practices
verify the operational readiness (readiness) of a process and help to ensure that the process is safe
to restart. Section 16.2 describes the key principles and essential features of a management system
for this element. Section 16.3 lists work activities that support these essential features and presents
a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived
risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 16.4 through 16.6 include (1) ideas for
improving the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs that support this
element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) management review issues
that may be appropriate for readiness.
What Is It?
The readiness element ensures that shut down processes are verified to be in a safe condition for
re-start. This element addresses startups from all types of shut down conditions and considers the
length of time the process was in the Shutdown condition. Some processes may be shut down only
briefly, while others may have undergone a lengthy maintenance/modification outage, or they may
even have been mothballed for an extended period. Other processes may have been shut down for
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administrative reasons, such as a lack of product demand; for reasons unrelated to production at
all; or as a precautionary measure, for example, because of an approaching hurricane. In addition
to the shutdown duration, this element considers the type of work that may have been conducted
on the process (e.g., possibly involving line-breaking) during the shutdown period to help focus
the readiness review prior to startup. The readiness element in these Guidelines is defined more
broadly than the OSHA process safety management pre-startup safety review element in that it
specifically addresses startup from all shutdown conditions – not only those resulting from new or
changed processes (Refs. 16.1 and 16.2).
Experience has shown that the frequency of incidents is higher during process transitions such as
startups. These incidents have often resulted from the physical process conditions not being
exactly as they were intended for safe operation. Thus, it is important that the process status be
verified as safe to start.
Readiness reviews are conducted prior to startup on new processes, and on existing processes that
were shut down for any reason. A review involves some or all of the following concerns and
activities: (1) confirming that the construction and equipment of a process are in accordance with
design specifications, (2) ensuring that adequate safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency
procedures are in place, and (3) ensuring that training has been completed for all workers who
may affect the process. Also, for new processes, it confirms that an appropriate risk analysis has
been performed, and that any recommendations have been resolved and implemented. Modified
processes should have undergone a management of change (MOC) review. For all startups
(including those after minor, short-term shutdowns not involving any changes), readiness reviews
ensure that the process is safe to be released to operations by examining issues such as the
equipment lineup, leak tightness, proper isolation from other systems not yet ready for startup, and
cleanliness.
Who Does It?

Simple readiness reviews may involve only one operator, maintenance person, or engineer. More
complex startups, such as those for new units, entire plants, or a large unit after an extended
shutdown, may involve many people, from all of the disciplines that are typically a part of a large
capital project.

The output of the readiness activity is either (1) an affirmation that the process is ready to safely
start up and authorization to do so or (2) a list of actions that must be taken to make the process
ready. Many times the readiness process and startup authorization is documented on a form, which
creates an audit trail to ensure that all required actions have indeed been completed. For complex
startup situations, reviewers may use several different checklists of information and necessary
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actions to confirm the status of all of the items reviewed. Outputs of the readiness element can
also be used to facilitate the performance of other elements. For example, awalkdown of a process
prior to startup can identify deficient equipment conditions that can provide input to the asset
integrity element.
How Is It Done?
Readiness reviews of simple startups may involve only one person walking through the process to
verify that nothing has changed and the equipment is ready to resume operation. Complex reviews
may extend over many weeks or months as engineering, operations, and maintenance personnel
verify equipment conformance to design intent, construction quality, procedure completion,
training competency, and so forth. Typically, extensive checklists, multi-stage verification, and
multiple functional sign-offs are required for startup authorization. Higher risk situations usually
dictate a greater need for formality and for thoroughness in scope and level of detail; for example,
greater detail in the checklists used to guide the evaluation. Less rigorous approaches, such as
those using a simple checklist or no checklist at all, may be adequate for lower risk processes.
Facilities whose operations are very dynamic may require readiness practices that are very
flexible. Facilities with solid process safety cultures can often rely on more performance-based
pre-startup tools, since a strong culture provides greater confidence that employees will check out
the system thoroughly according to the designed startup procedure. However, in practice, those
facilities with a sound process safety culture normally embrace the use of comprehensive
checklists to guide and document readiness reviews. Facilities with an evolving or undetermined
process safety culture may require more detailed, prescriptive approaches and tools to provide
greater command and control management system features to ensure good performance.
 Introduction Conduct of Operations:

ELEMENT OVERVIEW
Developing and sustaining high standards in the conduct of operations is one of nine elements in
the RBPS pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the concept of conduct of operations, the
attributes of a reliable system for conducting operations, and the steps an organization might take
to formalize the conduct of operations. Section 17.2 describes the key principles and essential
features of a management system for this element. Section 17.3 lists work activities that support
these essential features, and presents a range of approaches that might be appropriate for each
work activity, depending on perceived risk, resources, and organizational culture. Sections 17.4
through 17.6 include (1) ideas for improving the effectiveness of management systems and
specific programs that support this element, (2) metrics that could be used to monitor this element,
and (3) issues that may be appropriate for management review.
What Is It?
Conduct of operations (operations) is the execution of operational and management tasks in a
deliberate and structured manner. It is also sometimes called ―operational discipline‖ or ―formality
of operations‖, and it is closely tied to an organization‘s culture. Conduct of operations
institutionalizes the pursuit of excellence in the performance of every task and minimizes
variations in performance. Workers at every level are expected to perform their duties with
alertness, due thought, full knowledge, sound judgment, and a proper sense of pride and
accountability (Refs. 17.2 and 17.3).
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A consistently high level of human performance is a critical aspect of any process safety program;
indeed a less than adequate level of human performance will adversely impact all aspects of
operations. As thecomplexity of operational activities increases, a commensurate increase in the
formality of operations must also occur to ensure safe, reliable, and consistent performance of
critical tasks.
Like culture, conduct of operations applies everywhere workers perform tasks – from the
boardroom to the plant floor. It applies every time a worker performs a task throughout the life of
a facility or an organization because it is an ongoing commitment to reliable operations.
Who Does It?
Conduct of operations applies to all work activities, not just those of the operations department.
Thus all workers, employees, and contractors are included. Each work group should define the
framework of controls necessary to ensure that tasks for which it is responsible are performed
reliably. The manager of each work group is responsible for the conduct of operations in his
group, but overall responsibility rests with the facility manager. The human resources group is
often involved with the process because it includes fitness-for-duty, progressive discipline, salary,
bonus, and retention decisions.

The output of this activity is a policy describing the organization‘s overall expectations for worker
conduct and specific procedures and goals for implementing those policies. A defined framework
of controls should be established that implements a defense-in-depth strategy to ensure that
process operations remain within safe operating limits. A clear chain of command, defined
authority, and accountability for reliable work performance in accordance with approved
procedures and work practices should also be established. Outputs of the operations element can
also be used to facilitate the performance of other elements. For example, monitoring equipment
status will improve asset integrity, and near miss reports will enhance the effectiveness of the
incidents element. The ultimate product is the execution of each worker‘s tasks, from the
boardroom to the shop floor, in a disciplined, consistent manner that safely delivers the goods and
services required to meet the organization‘s objectives.
How Is It Done?
To develop an effective operations program, an organization must start with an honest statement
of its objectives and risk tolerance. Considering the outputs of other elements, the organization can
then formulate an operations policy and document it, along with the implementing procedures.
However, the program cannot be merely words on paper. Workers must be trained in the policies
and procedures so that they understand the goals and expectations, the lines of authority, and their
personal accountability. They must apply good reasoning and judgment (founded upon a sound
process safety culture) in all situations, but particularly when action is required in situations not
specifically addressed by policy or procedure. Beyond that, the most critical, ongoing requirement
is that management lead by example. If a procedure instructs workers to shut down the process
under defined emergency conditions, but management praises operators who ―ride it out‖ and
avoid a shutdown, then operational discipline will suffer. Operations tolerates no deviation from
approved procedures, even if the outcome of a deviation is inconsequential or desirable. Thus,
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management must hold workers accountable for their actions in all circumstances to avoid the
normalization of deviation.
 Incident Investigation:
What is an incident and why should it be investigated?

The term incident can be defined as an occurrence, condition, or situation arising in the course of
work that resulted in or could have resulted in injuries, illnesses, damage to health, or fatalities.
The term "accident" is also commonly used, and can be defined as an unplanned event that
interrupts the completion of an activity, and that may (or may not) include injury or property
damage. Some make a distinction between accident and incident. They use the term incident to
refer to an unexpected event that did not cause injury or damage that time but had the potential.
"Near miss" or "dangerous occurrence" are also terms for an event that could have caused harm
but did not.
Please note: The term incident is used in some situations and jurisdictions to cover both an
"accident" and "incident". It is argued that the word "accident" implies that the event was related
to fate or chance. When the root cause is determined, it is usually found that many events were
predictable and could have been prevented if the right actions were taken - making the event not
one of fate or chance (thus, the word incident is used). For simplicity, we will now use the term
incident to mean all of the above events.
The information that follows is intended to be a general guide for employers, supervisors, health
and safety committee members, or members of an incident investigation team. When incidents are
investigated, the emphasis should be concentrated on finding the root cause of the incident so you
can prevent the event from happening again. The purpose is to find facts that can lead to corrective
actions, not to find fault. Always look for deeper causes. Do not simply record the steps of the
event.
Reasons to investigate a workplace incident include:
 most importantly, to find out the cause of incidents and to prevent similar incidents in the
future
 to fulfill any legal requirements
 to determine the cost of an incident
 to determine compliance with applicable regulations (e.g., occupational health and safety,
criminal, etc.)
 to process workers' compensation claims
The same principles apply to an inquiry of a minor incident and to the more formal investigation
of a serious event. Most importantly, these steps can be used to investigate any situation (e.g.,
where no incident has occurred ... yet) as a way to prevent an incident.
Who should do the investigating?

Ideally, an investigation would be conducted by someone or a group of people who are:
 experienced in incident causation models,

 experienced in investigative techniques,
 knowledgeable of any legal or organizational requirements,
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 knowledgeable in occupational health and safety fundamentals,
 knowledgeable in the work processes, procedures, persons, and industrial relations
environment for that particular situation,
 able to use interview and other person-to-person techniques effectively (such as mediation
or conflict resolution),
 knowledgeable of requirements for documents, records, and data collection; and
 able to analyze the data gathered to determine findings and reach recommendations.
Some jurisdictions provide guidance such as requiring that the incident must be conducted jointly,
with both management and labour represented, or that the investigators must be knowledgeable
about the work processes involved.
Members of the team can include:
 employees with knowledge of the work

 supervisor of the area or work
 safety officer
 health and safety committee
 union representative, if applicable
 employees with experience in investigations
 "outside" experts
 representative from local government or police
Should the immediate supervisor be on the team?
The advantage is that this person is likely to know most about the work and persons involved and
the current conditions. Furthermore, the supervisor can usually take immediate remedial action.
The counter argument is that there may be an attempt to gloss over the supervisor‘s shortcomings
in the incident. This situation should not arise if the incident is investigated by a team of people,
and if the worker representative(s) and the investigation team members review all incident
investigation findings and recommendations thoroughly.
Why look for the root cause?
An investigator or team who believe that incidents are caused by unsafe conditions will likely try
to uncover conditions as causes. On the other hand, one who believes they are caused by unsafe
acts will attempt to find the human errors that are causes. Therefore, it is necessary to examine all
underlying factors in a chain of events that ends in an incident.
The important point is that even in the most seemingly straightforward incidents, seldom, if ever,
is there only a single cause. For example, an "investigation" which concludes that an incident
was due to worker carelessness, and goes no further, fails to find answers to several important
questions such as:
 Was the worker distracted? If yes, why was the worker distracted?
 Was a safe work procedure being followed? If not, why not?
 Were safety devices in order? If not, why not?
 Was the worker trained? If not, why not?
An inquiry that answers these and related questions will probably reveal conditions that are more
open to correction.
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What are the steps involved in investigating an incident?

First:
 Report the incident occurrence to a designated person within the organization.

 Provide first aid and medical care to injured person(s) and prevent further injuries or
damage.
The incident investigation team would perform the following general steps:
 Scene management and scene assessment (secure the scene, make sure it is safe for
investigators to do their job).
 Witness management (provide support, limit interaction with other witnesses, interview).
 Investigate the incident, collect data.
 Analyze the data, identify the root causes.
 Report the findings and recommendations.
The organization would then:
 Develop a plan for corrective action.

 Implement the plan.
 Evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective action.
 Make changes for continual improvement.
As little time as possible should be lost between the moment of an incident and the beginning of
the investigation. In this way, one is most likely to be able to observe the conditions as they were
at the time, prevent disturbance of evidence, and identify witnesses. The tools that members of the
investigating team may need (pencil, paper, camera or recording device, tape measure, etc.) should
be immediately available so that no time is wasted.
What should be looked at as the cause of an incident?

Causation Models: Many models of causation have been proposed, ranging from Heinrich's
domino theory to the sophisticated Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT).
The simple model shown in Figure 1 attempts to illustrate that the causes of any incident can be
grouped into five categories - task, material, environment, personnel, and management. When this
model is used, possible causes in each category should be investigated. Each category is examined
more closely below. Remember that these are sample questions only: no attempt has been made to
develop a comprehensive checklist.
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Figure:1
Task
Here the actual work procedure being used at the time of the incident is explored. Members of the
investigation team will look for answers to questions such as:
 Was a safe work procedure used?

 Had conditions changed to make the normal procedure unsafe?
 Were the appropriate tools and materials available?
 Were they used?
 Were safety devices working properly?
 Was lockout used when necessary?
For most of these questions, an important follow-up question is "If not, why not?"
Material
To seek out possible causes resulting from the equipment and materials used, investigators might
ask:
 Was there an equipment failure?

 What caused it to fail?
 Was the machinery poorly designed?
 Were hazardous products involved?
 Were they clearly identified?
 Was a less hazardous alternative product possible and available?
 Was the raw material substandard in some way?
 Should personal protective equipment (PPE) have been used?
 Was the PPE used?
 Were users of PPE properly educated and trained?
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Again, each time the answer reveals an unsafe condition, the investigator must ask why this
situation was allowed to exist.
Work Environment:The physical work environment, and especially sudden changes to that
environment, are factors that need to be identified. The situation at the time of the incident is what
is important, not what the "usual" conditions were. For example, investigators may want to know:
 What were the weather conditions?

 Was poor housekeeping a problem?
 Was it too hot or too cold?
 Was noise a problem?
 Was there adequate light?
 Were toxic or hazardous gases, dusts, or fumes present?
Personnel:The physical and mental condition of those individuals directly involved in the event
must be explored, as well as the psychosocial environment they were working within. The purpose
for investigating the incident is not to establish blame against someone but the inquiry will not be
complete unless personal characteristics or psychosocial factors are considered. Some factors will
remain essentially constant while others may vary from day to day:
 Did the worker follow the safe operating procedures?

 Were workers experienced in the work being done?
 Had they been adequately educated and trained?
 Can they physically do the work?
 What was the status of their health?
 Were they tired?
 Was fatigue or shiftwork an issue?
 Were they under stress (work or personal)?
 Was there pressure to complete tasks under a deadline, or to by-pass safety procedures?
Management: Management holds the legal responsibility for the safety of the workplace and
therefore the role of supervisors and higher management and the role or presence of management
systems must always be considered in an incident investigation. These factors may also be called
organizational factors. Failures of management systems are often found to be direct or indirect
causes. Ask questions such as:
 Were safety rules or safe work procedures communicated to and understood by all
employees?
 Were written procedures and orientation available?
 Were the safe work procedures being enforced?
 Was there adequate supervision?
 Were workers educated and trained to do the work?
 Had hazards and risks been previously identified and assessed?
 Had procedures been developed to eliminate the hazards or control the risks?
 Were unsafe conditions corrected?
 Was regular maintenance of equipment carried out?
 Were regular safety inspections carried out?
 Had the condition or concern been reported beforehand?
 Was action taken?
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This model of incident investigation provides a guide for uncovering all possible causes and
reduces the likelihood of looking at facts in isolation. Some investigators may prefer to place some
of the sample questions in different categories; however, the categories are not important, as long
as each question is asked. Obviously there is considerable overlap between categories; this overlap
reflects the situation in real life. Again it should be emphasized that the above sample questions do
not make up a complete checklist, but are examples only.
How are the facts collected?

The steps in the investigation are simple: the investigators gather data, analyze it, determine their
findings, and make recommendations. Although the procedures are seemingly straightforward,
each step can have its pitfalls. As mentioned above, an open mind is necessary in an investigation:
preconceived notions may result in some wrong paths being followed while leaving some
significant facts uncovered. All possible causes should be considered. Making notes of ideas as
they occur is a good practice but conclusions should not be made until all the data is gathered.
Physical Evidence:
Before attempting to gather information, examine the site for a quick overview, take steps to
preserve evidence, and identify all witnesses. In some jurisdictions, an incident site must not be
disturbed without approval from appropriate government officials such as the coroner, inspector,
or police. Physical evidence is probably the most non-controversial information available. It is
also subject to rapid change or obliteration; therefore, it should be the first to be recorded. Based
on your knowledge of the work process, you may want to check items such as:
 positions of injured workers

 equipment being used
 products being used
 safety devices in use
 position of appropriate guards
 position of controls of machinery
 damage to equipment
 housekeeping of area
 weather conditions
 lighting levels
 noise levels
 time of day
You may want to take photographs before anything is moved, both of the general area and specific
items. A later study of the pictures may reveal conditions or observations that were missed
initially. Sketches of the scene based on measurements taken may also help in later analysis and
will clarify any written reports. Broken equipment, debris, and samples of materials involved may
be removed for further analysis by appropriate experts. Even if photographs are taken, written
notes about the location of these items at the scene should be prepared.
Witness Accounts
Although there may be occasions when you are unable to do so, every effort should be made to
interview witnesses. In some situations witnesses may be your primary source of information
because you may be called upon to investigate an incident without being able to examine the scene
immediately after the event.
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Because witnesses may be under severe emotional stress or afraid to be completely open for fear
of recrimination, interviewing witnesses is probably the hardest task facing an investigator.
Witnesses should be kept apart and interviewed as soon as possible after the incident. If witnesses
have an opportunity to discuss the event among themselves, individual perceptions may be lost in
the normal process of accepting a consensus view where doubt exists about the facts.
Witnesses should be interviewed alone, rather than in a group. You may decide to interview a
witness at the scene where it is easier to establish the positions of each person involved and to
obtain a description of the events. On the other hand, it may be preferable to carry out interviews
in a quiet office where there will be fewer distractions. The decision may depend in part on the
nature of the incident and the mental state of the witnesses.
Interviewing:
The purpose of the interview is to establish an understanding with the witness and to obtain his or
her own words describing the event:
DO...
 put the witness, who is probably upset, at ease

 emphasize the real reason for the investigation, to determine what happened and why
 let the witness talk, listen
 confirm that you have the statement correct
 try to sense any underlying feelings of the witness
 make short notes or ask someone else on the team to take them during the interview
 ask if it is okay to record the interview, if you are doing so
 close on a positive note
DO NOT...
 intimidate the witness

 interrupt
 prompt
 ask leading questions
 show your own emotions
 jump to conclusions
Ask open-ended questions that cannot be answered by simply "yes" or "no". The actual questions
you ask the witness will naturally vary with each incident, but there are some general questions
that should be asked each time:
 Where were you at the time of the incident?

 What were you doing at the time?
 What did you see, hear?
 What were the work environment conditions (weather, light, noise, etc.) at the time?
 What was (were) the injured worker(s) doing at the time?
 In your opinion, what caused the incident?
 How might similar incidents be prevented in the future?
Asking questions is a straightforward approach to establishing what happened. But, care must be
taken to assess the accuracy of any statements made in the interviews.
Another technique sometimes used to determine the sequence of events is to re-enact or replay
them as they happened. Care must be taken so that further injury or damage does not occur. A
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witness (usually the injured worker) is asked to reenact in slow motion the actions that happened
before the incident.
Other Information:
Data can be found in documents such as technical data sheets, health and safety committee
minutes, inspection reports, company policies, maintenance reports, past incident reports, safe-
work procedures, and training reports. Any relevant information should be studied to see what
might have happened, and what changes might be recommended to prevent recurrence of similar
incidents.
What should I know when making the analysis and recommendations?

At this stage of the investigation most of the facts about what happened and how it happened
should be known. This data gathering has taken considerable effort to accomplish but it represents
only the first half of the objective. Now comes the key question - why did it happen?
Keep an open mind to all possibilities and look for all pertinent facts. There may still be gaps in
your understanding of the sequence of events that resulted in the incident. You may need to re-
interview some witnesses or look for other data to fill these gaps in your knowledge.
When your analysis is complete, write down a step-by-step account of what happened (the team‘s
conclusions) working back from the moment of the incident, listing all possible causes at each
step. This is not extra work: it is a draft for part of the final report. Each conclusion should be
checked to see if:
 it is supported by evidence
 the evidence is direct (physical or documentary) or based on eyewitness accounts, or
 the evidence is based on assumption.
This list serves as a final check on discrepancies that should be explained.

Why should recommendations be made?
The most important final step is to come up with a set of well-considered recommendations
designed to prevent recurrences of similar incidents. Recommendations should:
 be specific
 be constructive
 identify root causes
 identify contributing factors
Resist the temptation to make only general recommendations to save time and effort.
For example, you have determined that a blind corner contributed to an incident. Rather than just
recommending "eliminate blind corners" it would be better to suggest:
 install mirrors at the northwest corner of building X (specific to this incident)

 install mirrors at blind corners where required throughout the worksite (general)
Never make recommendations about disciplining a person or persons who may have been at fault.
This action would not only be counter to the real purpose of the investigation, but it would
jeopardize the chances for a free flow of information in future investigations.
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In the unlikely event that you have not been able to determine the causes of an incident with
complete certainty, you probably still have uncovered weaknesses within the process, or
management system. It is appropriate that recommendations be made to correct these deficiencies.
The Written Report
The prepared draft of the sequence of events can now be used to describe what happened.
Remember that readers of your report do not have the intimate knowledge of the incident that you
have so include all relevant details, including photographs and diagrams. Identify clearly where
evidence is based on certain facts, witness accounts, or on the team‘s assumptions.
If doubt exists about any particular part of the event, say so. The reasons for your conclusions
should be stated and followed by your recommendations. Do not include extra material that is not
required for a full understanding of the incident and its causes such as photographs that are not
relevant and parts of the investigation that led you nowhere. The measure of a good report is
quality, not quantity.
Always communicate your findings and recommendations with workers, supervisors and
management. Present your information 'in context' so everyone understands how the incident
occurred and the actions needed to put in place to prevent it from happening again.
Some organizations may use pre-determined forms or checklists. However, use these documents
with caution as they may be limiting in some cases. Always provide all of the information needed
to help others understand the causes of the event, and why the recommendations are important.
What should be done if the investigation reveals human error?

A difficulty that has bothered many investigators is the idea that one does not want to lay blame.
However, when a thorough worksite investigation reveals that some person or persons among
management, supervisor, and the workers were apparently at fault, then this fact should be pointed
out. The intention here is to remedy the situation, not to discipline an individual.
Failing to point out human failings that contributed to an incident will not only downgrade the
quality of the investigation, it will also allow future incidents to happen from similar causes
because they have not been addressed.
However never make recommendations about disciplining anyone who may be at fault. Any
disciplinary steps should be done within the normal personnel procedures.
How should follow-up be done?Management is responsible for acting on the

recommendations in the investigation report. The health and safety committee or representative, if
present, can monitor the progress of these actions.
Follow-up actions include:
 Respond to the recommendations in the report by explaining what can and cannot be done
(and why or why not).
 Develop a timetable for corrective actions.
 Monitor that the scheduled actions have been completed.
 Check the condition of injured worker(s).
 Educate and train other workers at risk.
 Re-orient worker(s) on their return to work.
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 Continual Improvement Process :
PURPOSE: The Office of the President recognizes that the process of achieving quality is a
continual process. The purpose of this process is to outline the procedure used by all units within
the Office of the President to ensure continual improvement of our quality management system
and the services we provide.
RESPONSIBILITY:Overall responsibility for this process lies with the Director of Quality;
however, all units of the Office of the President are responsible for continual improvement. The
Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) is maintained by the Quality Officer.
PROCEDURE :The Quality Improvement Plan is used by the Office of the President to record
and monitor all quality-related improvement suggestions. The QIP contains details of all quality-
related improvement suggestions.
The following are used to identify the different sources of improvement suggestions:
a) COM Complaint
b) COR Corrective Action

c) GA Gap Analysis
d) PI Process Improvement
e) POS Positive Customer Feedback
f) QA QMS Audit (Inter-Dept.)
g) QR Quality Review
h) SA Self-Audit
i) SS Staff Suggestion
j) SUR Survey Feedback
The Action Plan is updated by the Quality Team to document newly identified activities and to
update progress on all activities recorded.
1. Continual improvement is a standing agenda item for all quality meetings.
2. New improvement suggestions are brought to the meeting by members of the quality team.
3. These are discussed by the team and agreement reached on: The activity; person responsible,
timeframe, source of action and the proposed action.
4. Once agreement is reached, the Quality Officer enters the details into Action Plan.
5. Actions are reviewed for progress at every meeting.
6. Once an identified improvement activity is complete, it is recorded in the ‗Completed Actions‘

section of the QI Plan.
7. Actions that are currently outside the scope/remit of the Office of the President are recorded in
the ‗On Hold‘ tab.
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8. When a decision is made not to pursue an action, the action item is recorded in the ‗Not
Pursued‘ tab with relevant justification.
9. Details of the review of QIP are recorded in the minutes of quality meetings.
10. Trend data is produced for the annual management review of the QMS.
 Major industrial disasters (case studies):
 BHOPAL TRAGEDY
If we see the history of worst chemical disasters, in industries the first thing that comes to our
memory is one at Bhopal.On the night of Dec. 2nd and 3rd, 1984, a Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, began leaking. due to run-away reactions, temperature and pressure rise and the safety
valve lifted to the atmosphere. About 25-27 tons of the deadly gas methyl isocyanate spread
through the city of Bhopal.Half a million people were exposed to the gas. Protective systems that
should have prevented or minimized discharge were out of service. Refrigeration system to cool
the reactor was down. Scrubbing system to absorb the released vapour was not immediately
available. Flare system to burn vapours getting past the scrubber was out of service.
Lessons we learned Form Bhopal Tragedy
1)Reduce inventory of hazardous material (MIC)
2)Keep all the safety related equipment in order
3)Keep residential areas away from the plant
4) Proper Management
Another worst chemical disaster: that comes to our mind was;
 Flixborough Disaster – A CASE SYUDY.

Flixborough (Nypro UK) Explosion 1st June 1974
Accident summary: At about 16:53 hours on Saturday 1 June 1974 the Nypro (UK) site at
Flixboroughwas severely damaged by a large explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and a
further 36 suffered injuries. It is recognized that the number of casualties would have been more if
the incident had occurred on a weekday, as the main office block was not occupied. Offsite
consequences resulted in fifty-three reported injuries. Property in the surrounding area was
damaged to a varying degree.
Prior to the explosion, on 27 March 1974, it was discovered that a vertical crack in reactor No.5
was leaking cyclohexane. The plant was subsequently shutdown for an investigation. The
investigation that followed identified a serious problem with the reactor and the decision was
taken to remove it and install a bypass assembly to connect reactors No.4 and No.6 so that the
plant could continue production.
During the late afternoon on 1 June 1974 a 20 inch bypass system ruptured, which may have been
caused by a fire on a nearby 8 inch pipe. This resulted in the escape of a large quantity of
cyclohexane. The cyclohexane formed a flammable mixture and subsequently found a source of
ignition. At about 16:53 hours there was a massive vapour cloud explosion which caused
extensive damage and started numerous fires on the site.
Eighteen fatalities occurred in the control room as a result of the windows shattering and the
collapse of the roof. No one escaped from the control room. The fires burned for several days and
after ten days those that still raged were hampering the rescue work.
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Failings in technical measures
 A plant modification occurred without a full assessment of the potential consequences.
Only limited calculations were undertaken on the integrity of the bypass line. No
calculations were undertaken for the dog-legged shaped line or for the bellows. No
drawing of the proposed modification was produced.
 Plant Modification / Change Procedures: HAZOP
 Design Codes – Pipework: use of flexible pipes
 No pressure testing was carried out on the installed pipework modification.
 Maintenance Procedures: recommissioning
 Those concerned with the design, construction and layout of the plant did not consider the
potential for a major disaster happening instantaneously.
 Plant Layout: positioning of occupied buildings
 Control Room Design: structural design to withstand major hazards events
 The incident happened during start up when critical decisions were made under operational
stress. In particular the shortage of nitrogen for inerting would tend to inhibit the venting
of off-gas as a method of pressure control/reduction.
 Operating Procedures: number of critical decisions to be made
 Inerting: reliability/back-up/proof testing.
Seveso disaster (1976):

The Seveso disaster was an industrial accident that occurred around 12:37 pm on July 10, 1976,
in a small chemical manufacturing plant approximately 20 kilometres (12 mi) north of Milan in
the Lombardy region of Italy. It resulted in the highest known exposure to 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) in residential populations,[1] which gave rise to numerous
scientific studies and standardized industrial safety regulations. The EU industrial safety
regulations are known as the Seveso II Directive.
Location of disaster:
The Seveso disaster was named because Seveso, with a population of 17,000 in 1976, was the
community most affected. Other affected neighbouring communities
were Meda (19,000), Desio (33,000), CesanoMaderno (34,000) and to a lesser
extent Barlassina (6,000) and Bovisio-Masciago (11,000).[2] The industrial plant, located in Meda,
was owned by the company ICMESA (IndustrieChimicheMedaSocietàAzionaria), a subsidiary
of Givaudan, which in turn was a subsidiary of Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche Group). The factory
building had been built many years earlier and the local population did not perceive it as a
potential source of danger. Moreover, although several exposures of populations to dioxins had
occurred before, mostly in industrial accidents, they were of a more limited scale.
Chemical event
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The accident occurred in the chemical plant's building B. The chemical 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (2)
was being produced there from 1,2,4,5-tetrachlorobenzene (1) by the nucleophilic aromatic
substitution reaction with sodium hydroxide. The 2,4,5-trichlorophenol was intended as an
intermediate for hexachlorophene.
This reaction must be carried out at a temperature above what was achievable using the normal
process utilities available at the plant, so it was decided to use the exhaust steam from the onsite
electricity generation turbine, and pass that around an external heating coil installed on the
chemical reactor vessel. The exhaust steam pressure was normally 12 bar and temperature 190 °C,
which resulted in a reaction mixture temperature of 158 °C, very close to its boiling point of
160 °C. Safety testing showed the onset of an exothermic side reaction if the reaction mixture
temperature reached 230 °C. Crucially, no steam temperature reading was made available to plant
operators responsible for the reactor.
The chemical-release accident occurred when a batch process was interrupted prior to the
completion of the final step – removal of ethylene glycol from the reaction mixture by distillation,
due to conformance with an Italian law requiring shutdown of plant operationsover the weekend.
Other parts of the site had already started to close down as the processing of other batches
finished, which reduced power consumption across the plant, causing a dramatic drop in the load
on the turbine and a consequent increase in the temperature of the exhaust steam to around 300 °C.
This much hotter steam then proceeded to heat the portion of the metal wall of the accident reactor
above the level of the liquid within it to the same temperature. Not having a steam temperature
reading among their instruments, operators of the reactor were unaware of the presence of this
additional heating, and they stopped the batch as they normally would – by isolating the steam and
turning off the stirrer in the reactor vessel. The abnormally-hot upper region of the reactor jacket
then heated the adjacent reaction mixture. With the stirrer not running, the heating was highly
localized – confined to just the portion of the upper layers of reaction mixture adjacent to the
reactor wall, and increased the local temperature to the critical temperature for the exothermic side
reaction seen in testing. Indeed, the critical temperature proved to be only 180 °C, 50 °C lower
than believed. At that lower critical temperature, a slow runaway decomposition began, releasing
more heat and leading to the onset of a rapid runaway reaction when the temperature reached
230 °C seven hours later.
The reactor relief valve eventually opened, causing the aerial release of 6 tonnes of chemicals,
which settled over 18 km2 (6.9 sq mi) of the surrounding area.[6] Among the substances released
was 1 kg of TCDD (3). At the nominal reaction temperature, TCDD is normally seen only in trace
amounts of less than 1 ppm (parts per million).However, in the higher-temperature conditions
associated with the runaway reaction, TCDD production apparently reached 100 ppm or more.
Immediate effects:-The affected area was split into zones A, B and R in decreasing order
of surface soil concentrations of TCDD. Zone A was further split into 7 sub-zones. The local
population was advised not to touch or eat locally grown fruits or vegetables.
 Zone A had a TCDD soil concentration of > 50 micrograms per square metre (µg/m²), it
had 736 residents.
 Zone B had a TCDD soil concentration of between 5 and 50 µg/m², it had about 4700
residents.
 Zone R had negligible or a TCDD soil concentration of < 5 µg/m², it had 31,800 residents.
Within days a total of 3,300 animals, mostly poultry and rabbits, were found dead. Emergency
slaughtering commenced to prevent TCDD from entering the food chain, and by 1978 over 80,000
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animals had been slaughtered. 15 children were quickly hospitalized with skin inflammation. By
the end of August, Zone A had been completely evacuated and fenced, 1,600 people of all ages
had been examined and 447 were found to suffer from skin lesions or chloracne. An advice center
was set up for pregnant women of which only 26 opted for an abortion, which was legal in special
cases, after consultation. Another 460 women brought on their pregnancies without problems,
their children not showing any sign of malformation or pathologies.Herwig von Zwehl (Technical
Director of ICMESA) and Paolo Paoletti (director of production at ICMESA) were arrested. Two
government commissions were established to develop a plan for quarantining and
decontaminating the area, for which the Italian government allotted 40 billion lire (US $47.8
million). This amount would be tripled two years later.
Studies on immediate and long-term health effect: -

A 1991 study14 years after the accident sought to assess the effects to the thousands of persons
that had been exposed to dioxin. The most evident adverse health effect ascertained
was chloracne (193 cases). Other early effects noted were peripheral neuropathy and liverenzyme
induction. The ascertainment of other, possibly severe sequelae of dioxin exposure (e.g., birth
defects) was hampered by inadequate information; however, generally, no increased risks were
evident. A study published in 1998 concluded that chloracne (nearly 200 cases with a definite
exposure dependence) was the only effect established with certainty. Early health investigations
including liver function, immune function, neurologic impairment, and reproductive effects
yielded inconclusive results.
An excess mortality from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases was uncovered, and excess
of diabetes cases was also found. Results of cancer incidence and mortality follow-up showed an
increased occurrence of cancer of the gastrointestinal sites and of the lymphatic and hematopoietic
tissue. Results cannot be viewed as final or comprehensive, however, because of various
limitations: the lack of individual exposure data, short latency period, and small population size
for certain cancer types.
A 2001 study confirmed in victims of the disaster, that dioxin is carcinogenic to humans and
corroborate its association with cardiovascular- and endocrine-related effects. In 2009, an update
including 5 more years (up to 1996) found an increase in "lymphatic and hematopoietic tissue
neoplasms" and increased breast cancer.
The male children of mothers who were, during pregnancy of those children, exposed to high
levels of toxic dioxins due to the Seveso disaster, have been found to have lower-than-average
sperm counts. This result of the underlying Seveso study has been noted to provide the most
pronounced evidence for prenatal exposure to an environmental chemical causing low sperm counts.[12]
Cleanup operations
In January 1977, an action plan consisting of scientific analysis, economic aid, medical monitoring
and restoration/decontamination was completed. Shortly after ICMESA began to pay the first
compensations to those affected. Later that spring decontamination operations were initiated and
in June a system epidemiological health monitoring for 220,000 people was launched. They then
used trichlorophenol to make a drug to fight the skin infections, which they tested in dogs.
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In June 1978, the Italian government raised its special loan from 40 to 115 billion lire. By the
end of the year most individual compensation claims had been settled out of court. On
February 5, 1980 Paolo Paoletti – the Director of Production at ICMESA – was shot and killed
in Monza by a member of the Italian radical left-wing terrorist organization Prima Linea. On
19 December 1980, representatives of the Region of Lombardy/Italian Republic and
Givaudan/ICMESA signed a compensation agreement in the presence of the prime minister of
Italy, ArnaldoForlani. The total amount would reach 20 billion lire
Waste from the cleanup
The waste from the clean up of the plant was a mixture of protective clothing and chemical
residues from the plant. This waste was packed into waste drums which had been designed for the
storage of nuclear waste. It was agreed that the waste would be disposed of in a legal manner.
To this end, in spring 1982, the firm Mannesmann Italiana was contracted to dispose of the
contaminated chemicals from Zone A. Mannesmann Italiana made it a condition that Givaudan
would not be notified of the disposal site which prompted Givaudan to insist that a notary public
certify the disposal. On September 9, 41 barrels of toxic waste left the ICMESA premises. On
December 13, the notary gave a sworn statement that the barrels had been disposed of in an
approved way.
However, in February 1983, the programme "A bon entendeur" on Television Suisse Romande,
a French language Swiss TV channel, followed the route of the barrels to Saint-Quentin in
northern France where they disappeared. A public debate ensued in which numerous theories were
put forward when it was found that Mannesmann Italiana had hired two subcontractors to get rid
of the toxic waste. On May 19 the 41 barrels were found in an unused abattoir (slaughterhouse)
in Anguilcourt-le-Sart, a village in northern France. From there they were transferred to a French
military base near Sissonne. The Roche Group (parent firm of Givaudan) took it upon itself to
properly dispose of the waste. On November 25, over nine years after the disaster, the Roche
Group issued a public statement that the toxic waste consisting of 42 barrels (1 was added earlier
that year) had all been incinerated in Switzerland. According to New Scientist it was thought that
the high chlorine content of the waste might cause damage to the high temperature incinerator
used by Roche, but Roche stated that they would burn the waste in the incinerator and repair it
afterward if it were damaged. They stated that they wanted to take responsibility for the safe
destruction of the waste.
Criminal court case:In September 1983, the Criminal Court of Monza sentenced five former
employees of ICMESA or its parent company, Givaudan, to prison sentences ranging from 2.5
years to 5 years. They all appealed.
In May 1985, the Court of Appeal in Milan found three of the five accused not guilty; the two still
facing prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court in Rome.
On May 23, 1986, the Supreme Court in Rome confirmed the judgment against the two remaining
defendants, even though the prosecuting attorney had called for their acquittal.
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Aftermath :The safety operations handled by the company's directors and local government were
well coordinated, but the ICMESA refused to admit the incident immediately. At least a week
passed before it was publicly stated that dioxin had been emitted and another week passed before
evacuation began (the government had to control which area was mostly polluted and, after that, to
organize everything for the evacuated people). Even worse, the factory's safety measures weren't
created to preserve also the external environment. As a result, the local population was caught
unaware when the accident happened and unprepared to cope with the danger of an invisible
poison.In the context of such heightened tensions, Seveso became a microcosm where all the
existing conflicts within society (political, institutional, religious, industrial) were reflected.
However, within a relatively short time such conflicts abated and the recovery of the community
proceeded. For, in Seveso, the responsible party was known from the outset and soon offered
reparation. Moreover, the eventual disappearance of the offending factory itself and the physical
exportation of the toxic substances and polluted soil enabled the community to feel cleansed.
Theresolution of the emotional after-effects of the trauma, so necessary for the recovery of a
community, was facilitated by these favorable circumstances."Industrial safety regulations were
passed in the European Community in 1982 called the SevesoDirectivewhich imposed much
harsher industrial regulations. The Seveso Directive was updated in 1996, amended lastly in 2008
and is currently referred to as the Seveso II Directive (or COMAH Regulations in the United
Kingdom).Treatment of the soil in the affected areas was almost perfect; the area now has a dioxin
level below the normal level. The whole site has been turned into a public park, Seveso Oak
Forest park. This is a really important place for the inhabitants of Seveso, and it's a protected area,
where it's forbidden to build anything (roads, buildings...). There are two artificial hills in the park;
today, under these hills there is all what remains of the toxic area (destroyed houses, tons of
poisoned dirt, animal corpses...), protected in a cement sarcophagus. Some inspections under them
declared the sarcophagus has to resist for almost 300 years before the toxic substances will
vanish.Several studies have been completed on the health of the population of surrounding
communities. While it has been established that people from Seveso exposed to TCDD are more
susceptible to certain rare cancers, when all types of cancers are grouped into one category, no
statistically significant excess has yet been observed. This indicates that more research is needed
to determine the true long-term health effects on the affected population.Epidemiological
monitoring programmers established as follows (with termination dates): abortions (1982);
malformations (1982); tumours (1997); deaths (1997). Health monitoring of workers at ICMESA
and on decontamination projects, and chloracne sufferers (1985) .The Seveso disaster gives
valuable comparative insight into the effects of Agent Orange on flora and fauna in Vietnam, not
to mention the Vietnamese people, as TCDD was a significant contaminant in Agent Orange.The
documentary Gambit is about JoergSambeth, the technical director of ICMESA, who was
sentenced to five years in the first trial, and had his sentence reduced to two years and was paroled
on appeal.
 The Mexico City Explosion of 1984:
PEMEX LPG Terminal, Mexico City, Mexico. 19th November 1984

Accident summary:
At approximately 05:35 hours on 19 November 1984 a major fire and a series of catastrophic
explosions occurred at the government owned and operated PEMEX LPG Terminal at San Juan
Ixhuatepec, Mexico City. As a consequence of these events some 500 individuals were killed and
the terminal destroyed.
Three refineries supplied the facility with LPG on a daily basis. The plant was being filled from a
refinery 400 km away, as on the previous day it had become almost empty. Two large spheres and
48 cylindrical vessels were filled to 90% and 4 smaller spheres to 50% full.
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A drop in pressure was noticed in the control room and also at a pipeline pumping station. An 8-
inch pipe between a sphere and a series of cylinders had ruptured. Unfortunately the operators
could not identify the cause of the pressure drop. The release of LPG continued for about 5-10
minutes when the gas cloud, estimated at 200 m x 150 m x 2 m high, drifted to a flare stack. It
ignited, causing violent ground shock. A number of ground fires occurred. Workers onthe plant
now tried to deal with the escape taking various action. At a late stage somebody pressed the
emergency shut down button.
About fifteen minutes after the initial release the first BLEVE occurred. For the next hour and a
half there followed a series of BLEVEs as the LPG vessels violently exploded. LPG was said to
rain down and surfaces covered in theliquid were set alight. The explosions were recorded on a
seismograph at the University of Mexico.
Failings in technical measures

 The total destruction of the terminal occurred because there was a failure of the overall
basis of safety which included the layout of the plant and emergency isolation features
 Plant Layout: positioning of the vessels
 Isolation: emergency isolation means
 The terminal‘s fire water system was disabled in the initial blast. Also the water spray
systems were inadequate.
 Active / Passive Fire Protection: survivability of critical systems, insulation thickness,
water deluge
 The installation of a more effective gas detection and emergency isolation system could
have averted the incident. The plant had no gas detection system and therefore when the
emergency isolation was initiated it was probably too late.
 Leak / Gas Detection: gas detection
 Hindering the arrival of the emergency services was the traffic chaos, which built up as
local residents sought to escape the area.
 Emergency Response / Spill Control: site emergency plan, access of emergency vehicles
 SANDOZ - BASEL DISATERS ( 1986) :
November 1986: fire at Sandoz chemical plant near Basel.
Water used to put out the blaze flushed huge amounts of insecticides and pesticides into the river,
sparking an ecological catastrophe.
Environmental awareness rose leading to demands to take much tougher actions against pollution
One famous pollution incident in Asia was the Songhua River pollution incident that
happened in 2005 in China.
The Songhua river is a major river in northeast China and is the main water source of many
cities and villages, including Harbin, the capital of Heilongjiang Province with a population of 3.5
million.
Common Problems with the Sandoz and the Songhua Incidents :
Aspects which were deficient:
1) Prepared Emergency Plans
2) Prepared Risk Assessments
3) Rapid organised response.
4) Defined links between government agencies, industry, and general public
5) 24 hour prepared response teams
6) Facilities to contain the fire water
7) Efficient Warnings downstream
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8) Legislation clearly defining these roles.
 Lessons Learnt :
To improve the ability of water pollution emergency response, to mitigate the loss by the water
pollution incidents a number of lessons were learnt:
(1) Conduct stratified management for water pollution incidents.
(2) Clarify the main body responsible for water pollution incident emergency response plans
(3) Enhance the organization and leadership for water pollution incident emergency response.
(4) Improve the water pollution incident reporting system.
ENHANCING SAFETY INCHEMICAL INDUSTRY:
 Plant Sitting:
Safety is a prime consideration in plant sitting. Other important factors include: access to raw
materials and to markets; availability of land, labour and cooling water; means of effluent
disposal; interlinking with other plants; and government policies, including planning permission
and investment incentives. It is only safety aspects which are considered here.
As far as safety of the public is concerned, the most important feature of sitting is the distance
between the site and built-up areas. Sites range from rural to urban, with population densities
varying from virtually zero to high. Separation between a hazard and the public is beneficial in
mitigating the effects of a major accident. An area of low population density around the site will
help to reduce casualties. In the ideal case, the works is surrounded by fields or waste land
forming a complete cordon sanitaire. In many situations, however, it is unattractive to sterilize a
large amount of land in this way, particularly in an urban area, where land is generally at a
premium.
The physical effects of a major accident tend to decay quite rapidly with distance. Models for fire
give an inverse square law decay, as do many of the simpler models for explosion and toxic
release, though other explosion and toxic release models give different decay relations, some with
less rapid decay. Information on the potential effects of a major accident on the surrounding...
Siting & Layout Planning of Chemical Industrial Parks :
 Improper sitting :
 ƒ Site conflicts with land use, lack of land use planning

 ƒ Environmental impacts
 ƒ Disaster risks Disaster risks
 Lack of site master planning :

 Lack of zoning, incompatibility
 Hazardous processes
 Lack of disaster risk management infrastructure
 Lack of fencing, security to industrial parks
 Lack of parking facilities for chemicals trucks
SITING CRITERIA
General Guidelines :
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At present industries are being located on the basis of -
1. Land availability and its cost.
2. Raw material availability.
3. Labour availability.
4. Infrastructure availability.
5. Access to market.
6. Transport facilities.
7. Drinking and process water facilities.
8. Sewage and Drainage.
9. Place for solid and liquid waste disposal.
10. Interlinking with other plants.
11. Surrounding population density or distancefrom the public.
12. Distance from highway and railway and from transport centre.
13. Suitability of climate, environment andfactors related to ecology, geology,meteorology,
micro& macro biology.
14. Government policy advantages likesubsidies, incentives and zoning (are a reservation) if
prescribed.
15. Other techno-economic criteria.Sitting of a nuclear plant poses potentialhazard to surrounding
public. Considering themagnitude and consequence of the worstscenario, its site should be
selected.Rules of zoning and town planning shouldconsider above factors.
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Some of these factors are explained below in brief.
Location: Plants producing or using highly explosive, inflammable or toxic substances in bulk
should be located away from dense population. As per Section 41 A of the Factories Act, now, the
Site Appraisal Committee shall examine the location of a hazardous factory. From safety point of
view increasing distance from the public reduces the effect of explosion, gas release and radiation
on them. But real problem is increasing population in vicinity after establishment of a factory.
Govt. should control them.
Climate:Study of prevailing winds is useful to decide location of offices and their air conditioning
air intakes, storage tanks, warehouses, drainage and waste disposal, direction of exhausted smoke,
fumes, dust, gas etc., with respect to surrounding locality. Data of rain, flood, hurricane,
temperature and other weather effects is also useful.
Terrain: If bridges over streams, ditches, etc., are necessary they should be fenced by handrails 1
m. high and intermediate rails. Natural structure like hills, mountains, sea or riverside, type of soil,
mine, underground source etc. may be useful for special purposes.
Nature of Site : It should be large enough for safe layout with sufficient space for all buildings,
roads, parking and storing areas, effluent treatment plant and future extensions. Minimum
distances as per fire laws, explosive laws and other laws must be considered. Scale relief models
of the site in addition to maps are useful for pre-design and spotting potential safety problems.
Soil testing should be carried out as per engineering advice.
Accessibility: Rail, road, river, sea and air facilities should be ensured. Post and telegraph,
telephone, fax, E-mail, internet etc. are useful for fast communications.
Environment: If air impurities and interaction of emissions or sources of ignition etc. from
adjacent sites are harmful, they should be considered. Noise and vibration due to neighbouring
industries, transport vehicles, running trains, low flying aircraft should be considered. Special
environmental guidelines are given in Part 4.2 below.
General Provisions: Adequate water supply for drinking, process and Fire Fighting, drainage of
rain water, process water, fire water etc., and water /air/ land pollution problems must be
considered.
Environmental Guidelines :
Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, gives following siting criteria to be
considered by the Government while prohibiting or restricting the location of industries in
different areas -
1. Standards for quality of environment.
2. Maximum allowable limits of pollutants (including noise) for an area.
3. Likely emission from the proposed industry.
4. Topographic and climatic features of an area.
5. Biological diversity of the area to be preserved.
6. Environmentally compatible land use.
7. Adverse environmental impact likely to be caused by the industry (EIA is required).
8. Proximity to a legally protected area.
9. Proximity to human settlements.
10. Any other relevant factor.
Site Appraisal Committee u/s 41A of the Factories Act, while considering any site
application, may go through above criteria.
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The Industrial Policy Statement of July 1980, recognized the need for preserving ecological
balance and improving living conditions in the urban centres of the country. On the basis of this
Policy, indiscriminate expansion of the existing industries and setting up of new industrial
undertakings within the limits of me tropolitan cities and the larger towns are restricted.
To prevent air, water and soil pollution arising out of industrial projects, the Industrial
Licensing procedure requires that the entrepreneurs before setting up the industry should obtain
clearance from Central/State Air and Water Pollution Control Board. In respect of certain
industrial development projects suitable pollution control equipment but also to identify
appropriate sites for their location. To give a concrete shape to this requirement, a select group of
20 industries has been notified by the Department of Industrial Development.
A formalised procedure has been stipulated for site selection from environmental angle with
regard to these projects.
These industries are :
1 producing industries viz. zinc, lead, copper, 11 Storage Batteries lead acid Type
aluminum and steel 12 Basic drugs
2 Paper, Pulp and Newsprint 13 Acids/ Alkalis
3 Pesticides/ Insecticides 14 Foundry
4 Refineries 15 Plastics
5 Fertilisers 16 Dyes -
6 Fermentation 17 Cement
7 Rubber - Synthetic 18 Asbestos
8 Leather Tanning 19 Paints
9 Electroplating 20 Rayon
10 Sodium/ Potassium Cyanide
According to this procedure for the select group of industries, the letters of intent should be
converted to industrial licenses only after the following conditions have been fulfilled:
1. The State Director of Industries confirms that the site of the project has been approved from
environmental angle by the competent State Authority.
2. The entrepreneur commits both to the State Government and Central Government that he will
install the appropriate equipment, implement and the prescribed measures for the prevention and
control of pollution.
3. The concerned State Pollution Control Board has certified that the proposal meets with the
environmental requirements and that the equipment installed or proposed to be installed are
adequate and appropriate to the requirement.
The entrepreneur will be required to submit half-yearly progress report on installation of
pollution control devices to the respective State Pollution Control Boards. Depending on the
nature and location of the project, the entrepreneur will be required to submit comprehensive
Environmental Impact Assessment Report, and Environmental Management Plans.
Siting Guidelines:
Economic and social factors are recognized and assessed while sitting an industry. Environmental
factors must be taken into consideration in industrial sitting. Proximity of water sources, highway,
major settlements, markets for products and raw material resources is desired for economy of
production, but all the above listed systems must be away for environmental protection. Industries
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are, therefore required to be sited, striking a balance between economic and environmental
considerations.
In such a selected site, the following factors must be recognized.
1. No forest land shall be converted into non forest activity for the sustenance of the industry (Ref.
: Forest Conservation Act, 1980).
2. No prime agricultural land shall be converted into industrial site.
3. Within the acquired site the industry must locate itself at the lowest location to remain obscured
from general sight.
4. Land acquired shall be sufficiently large to provide space for appropriate treatment of waste
water still left for treatment after maximum possible reuse and recycle. Reclaimed (treated)
wastewater shall be used to raise green belt and to create water body for aesthetics, recreation and
if possible, for aquaculture. The green belt shall be ½ km wide around the battery limit of the
industry. For industry having odors problem it shall be a kilometer wide.
5. The green belt between two adjoining large scale industries shall be one kilometer.
6. Enough space should be provided for storage of solid wastes so that these could be available for
possible reuse.
7. Layout and form of the industry, that may come up in the area must conform to the landscape of
the area without affecting the scenic features of that place.
8.Associated township of the industry must be created at a space having physiographic barrier
between the industry and the township.
9. Each industry is required to maintain three ambient air quality measuring stations within 120
degree angle between stations.
Introduction to LOPA:
Offshore accidents may result in causalities and economic loss. Determining specific safety
requirements of safety systems is an important part in ensuring that accidents are prevented.
In the 1990s the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 emerged, and the need for documenting
compliance with these in a consistent manner led to the introduction of the layer of protection
analysis (LOPA).
In chemical processes several protection layers are used, and in LOPA the number and the
strength of these protection layers are analyzed. LOPA can be considered as a simplified form of a
quantitative risk assessment. It can be used after a hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), and
before a quantitative risk analysis (QRA). A difference between LOPA and other tools is that
LOPA analyzes the different protection layers individually, and the mitigation they lead to. LOPA
is especially used to determine the safety integrity level (SIL) of safety instrumented functions in
conjunction with IEC 61511, but also as a general risk assessment tool to evaluate if the protection
layers in a system are satisfactory. In addition, several other applications as capital improvement
planning, incident investigation and management of change can be found.
The method is not used to a large extent in Norway, but widely implemented internationally. In
gas / oil industry LOPA is more frequently applied on topside equipment than subsea equipment.
The concept of protection layers was first covered in the book Guidelines for Safe Automation of
Chemical Processes published by the Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), a section of the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), in 1993. These thoughts were developed
further by the industry resulting in internal procedures (Dowell, 1998). In 2001 the CCPS
published the book Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Risk Assessment describing the
LOPA method (Gowland, 2006). The method is also described in Part III Annex F of IEC 61511.
Extensive literature can be found on LOPA, and stepwise approaches are given both in IEC 61511
and CCPS (2001).
75
The terms vary among different authors, and definitions and interpretations of terms like scenario
and independent protection layers (IPL) may be confusing.
Objectives: The objective of the master project is to gain extensive knowledge of various methods
to allocate requirements to safety instrumented systems, with focus on layer of protection analysis
(LOPA). As a part of this the following aspects shall be covered:
• Carry out a literature survey and compare and discuss the different approaches to LOPA found in
the literature.
• Give a thorough presentation of a recommended LOPA approach. The approach shall be
stepwise with a clear description of each step.
• Define and clarify all basic concepts of the recommended LOPA approach.
• Identify and describe interfaces between LOPA and other risk analysis methods (especially
HAZOP)
• Discuss pros and cons related to LOPA - and especially the limitations of LOPA.
• Define, exemplify, and discuss the independent protection layer (IPL) concept and discuss the
applicability of LOPA in cases where the independence is violated.
• Compare the applicability of LOPA in determining SIL, and compare LOPA with alternative
approaches (incl. risk graphs). If possible, this evaluation should be rooted in a practical case
study.
Limitations and structure
A bayesian approach is used in this thesis, which is concerned with the ‖degreeof belief‖
compared to a classical approach. The master project is executed ina limited time frame,
constraining the coverage of the topic. The reader shouldhave basic understanding of reliability
concepts. In addition, knowledge of IEC61508 and IEC 61511 is an advantage.
Relation to IEC 61508 and 61511:
Requirements to safety instrumented systems (SIS) are given in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
Raus and andHøyland (2004) describe a SIS as a system comprising sensors, logic solver(s), and
actuating (final) items, and can be looked upon as an independent protection shell for machinery
or equipment. What the safety systems shall protect is referred to as equipment under control
(EUC) and is defined as ‖Equipment, machinery, apparatus, or plant used for manufacturing,
process, transport, medical, or other activities‖ (IEC 61508, 2003). A SIS implements the wanted
safety function needed to maintain a safe state of the equipment and has the function of achieving
the essential risk reduction given by the requirements (IEC 61508, 2003). Subsequently to the SIS-
definition a safety instrumented function (SIF) can then be defined as a function implemented by
one or more SIS. However, usually a SIS realizes a number of SIFs (IEC 61508, 2003; Schönbeck,
2007).
Safety integrity is the probability of the safety related system performing the required safety
functions under all conditions, within a period of time. Safety integrity level (SIL) is classified
into four levels, and is defined by the probability of failure on demand (PFD). The PFD is the
average safety unavailability of an item, thus the mean proportion of time the item does not
function as a safety barrier. A protection layer is considered a safety barrier.
What is LOPA?
LOPA was introduced in the 1990s, and has recently gained international popularity. LOPA is
referred to in literature as both a simplified risk assessment technique and a risk analysis tool.
Capital improvement planning, incident investigation, and management of change can be found as
76
additional applications. LOPA is a flexible tool which can be used in different contexts and
applications making it confusing to understand what it really is. The application under
consideration is LOPA as a SIL determination tool.
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA):A practical one day training course to provide an
awareness and basic understanding of LOPA. Regulations today ask industry to manage risk by
assessing the risk and taking appropriate action. LOPA is a method of risk assessment which is
used to carry out SIL determination tocomply with the IEC 61508 / 61511functional safety
standards but isincreasingly used in early in design toassess whether further risk reduction
isrequired.LOPA is a tool that can be calibrated at thetime of use to allow assessment of the
riskreduction required to give a tolerable levelof risk.Inappropriate use and application of
LOPAcan adversely affect the integrity of layersof protection specified. Either resulting
ininsufficient risk reduction or overspecification leading to unnecessary spendin capital and
operational budgets.and engineers who need to use LOPA as amethod of risk assessment.The
courseOn completion of the course, you should beable to:
- Carry out a risk assessment using LOPA and appreciate the potential pitfalls
- Understand its application in SIL determination Course structure and content A one-day
technical course aimed at responsible managers and engineers.
- Basic risk assessment concepts and criteria, risk aversion, tolerability including an exercise
- Hazard identification, assessing frequency and consequence
- Identifying initiating causes and independent layers of protection (IPLs)
- LOPA use with several practical exercise examples
- The impact of humans in the equation
- Selection and application of data within a LOPA
- Illustration of importance of independent layers or protection
77
Chapter -2
 Hazard in Unit Process & Unit Operation:
FERTILISER INDUSTRY:
Fertilisers are natural (manure) or artificial. Artificial fertilizers are produced in chemical
plants and they may be organic or inorganic, nitrogenous,
phosphatic, potash and trace element fertilizers. In the
warehousing stage, phosphate. Potassium-salt and other dusts
are released. In chemical processing plant, air pollution by
toxic gases (Fluorine compounds, H2SO4, NO, HCI, CO and
NH3, gases) and dust, high air temperature and noise are
noticed. Closed and efficient ventilation is necessary. In
finishing processes, weighing, bagging and storing, gaseous
emissions and fluorine compounds are released. Phosphates
and other raw materials contain 10% or more free silica which
may cause pneumoconiosis. The dust of soluble fertilizers
causes irritation. The safety measures include:
1. Mechanizations and automation of production processes, provision of remote control,
careful assembly and safe operation of equipment and heat insulation.
2. Process segregation and walls and floor covering to absorb fluorine compounds.
3. Gen. Ventilation, exhaust ventilation of enclosed plant, cleaning of exhaust air and waste
water.
4. Education and personal hygiene.
5. Use of PPF and safety showers.
6. Safety and sanitary supervision.
7. Pre and post medical examination including radiographs of the locomotors system and
lungs.
IS : Fertilizer - Glossary 1304, sampling and tests 6092, bagged, handling and storage 5985,
mixtures 7863, 9024, effluents - tolerances 2590, treatment and disposal 9841, application
equipment glossary 9855, Metering mechanism plate type 12599, feed roller type 12613, Urea
ammonium phosphate based 8359, nitrophosphate based 7131, seed drills 6316, 6813,
Phosphaticfertilizer industry. Limits of emissions 8635. –
PESTICIDE INDUSTRY (INSECTICIDE): Pesticide is a chemical used to destroy an

organism detrimental to human interest. It includes insecticides, fungicides, herbicides,
rodenticides, bactericides, miticides, nematocides, moUuscicides. They are generally
halogenated (Cyclodienes, Bischlorophenyls, Cycloparaffins, Organo-chlorines and
Chlorinated terpenes) or Organophosphorus (Parathion, malathion, TEPP, OMPA, DDVP,
abate, ciodrin etc. ) type. They are classified as extremely hazardous, highly hazardous,
moderately hazardous, slightly hazardous etc. For these classifications and their details
including Lethal Dose values see Reference No. 1 given at the end of this Chapter. Strict safety
rules are necessary during their processing, handling, packaging etc. Exhaust ventilation and use
of PPE are essential.
78
Statutory Provisions:Schedule 15, Rule 102, GFR, Sch.l5, Rule 114, MFR and Sch.29,Rule 95,
TNFR give statutory provisions for manufacture and handling of dangerous pesticides listed in
Appendix-1 to that Schedule. Appendix-11 gives cautionary placard.
The measures include prohibition of employment of women and young persons, air
space of 500 m3 or more per person, efficient exhaust draft on charging, discharging, blending
and powder or liquid preparation, sound and sloping floor with gutters and drainage, daily
washing, workbenches of stainless steel, waste container with lid and waste disposal by burning,
safe disposal of empty containers, no manual or direct handling, protective clothing and their
daily washing, medical facilities including doctor and antidotes and medical examination - pre
employment, quarterly examination and record in Form 20, GFR additional rest interval of 10
minutes before each meal and before the end of the day's work, washing and bathing facilities
with at least 50% bathrooms and 1 place for 5 workers with clean towels, soap and nail brushes,
prohibition of food and drink in workrooms, cloak room for clothing and PPE, mess room with
incharge person and prior permission o? the CIF to start manipulation of a new pesticide i.e. not
listed in Appendix 1.Sch.l5, u/r 102, GFR defines "pesticides" as agents used for the purpose of
destroying or arresting the growth or increase of harmful organism and defines "dangerous
pesticides" as those listed in Appendix-1 as under:
Appendix-1, List of Dangerous Pesticides
(Under GFR & MFR both)
Prathion Mercury compounds
Diazinon Methyl bromide
Hexaethyltetraphosphate Cyanides
Tetrathyl pyrophosphate Chlordane
Tetraethyl ditripyrophosphate Endrin
Demeton (systex) Aldrin
Schradan (OMPR) Dieldrin
Para-Oxon (E. 600) Texaphene
Methyl Parathion Dinitro-o-cresol
Dimefox Arsenical compounds
Sulphotepp Cryloite
EPN Pentachlorophenol
Nicotine or its compounds Carbojuran
This list gives commonly better to refer the exhaustive Insecticides Act. used pesticides. It is list
u/s 3(e) of the
Sch.l5, u/r 114, MFR, defines "dangerous pesticides" as those defined in Sec. 3(e) of the
Insecticides Act 1968 or any other substance declared as such by the CIF in writing. List of
Insecticides u/ s 3(e) of the Act is very long with addition from time to time.
Sch.29, u/r 95, TNFR does not give Appendix1 i.e. a list of dangerous pesticides but
defines dangerous pesticides' as any product proposed or used for controlling, destroying or
repelling any pest or for preventing growth or mitigating effects of such growth including any of
its formulations which is considered toxic under and is covered by the Insecticides Act, 1968
and the rules made there under any other products as may be notified from time to time by the
State Government.
"Manipulation" includes mixing, blending, formulating, filling, emptying, packing or
otherwise handling.
Appendix-11, Cautionary Placard is similar in all above three State Rules and is reproduced
below:
79
Cautionary Placard:
1. Pesticides are generally poisonous substances.
2. Therefore in rooms where these are handled(a) do not chew, eat, drink Or smoke; keep
food or drink away from pesticides. (b) use the protective wear supplied e.g. gloves,
aprons, clothes, boots, etc
3. Before meals or when any part of the body has come in contact with the pesticides, wash
with soap and water.
4. Before leaving the factory, take a bath and change your clothing.
5. Do not use any container that has contained a pesticide as a pot for food or drink.
6. Do not handle any pesticide with bare hands; use a handled scoop.
7. Avoid spilling of any pesticide on body, floor or table.
8. Maintain scrupulous cleanliness of body and clothing and of your surroundings.
9. In case of sickness like nausea, vomiting or giddiness, inform the manager who will
make necessary arrangements for treatment.
Effects and Controls :
Pesticides and agrochemicals enter into the body through inhalation, ingestion or skin
absorption. They are classified as toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, flammable, explosive or
oxidizing. Toxicity is mostly denoted by LD,, or LC,, values. All agrochemicals should be
labelled, transported safely and correctly stored in a room (locked and cool). Containers should
be opened only after wearing correct respirator (positive air pressure), neoprene or plastic hand
gloves, aprons, boots etc. Protective clothing are always essential while handling pesticides.
Inhalation of vapour should be avoided. Contact with skin, eyes and clothing should also be
avoided. Contaminated clothing should be immediately changed, the entire body .should be
thoroughly washed with soap and water. After working with pesticides, shower bath should be
taken and clothing should be changed. Contaminated equipment should be cleaned with soap or
soda ash.
Local exhaust ventilation on filling line must be effective.
Types of effects may be acute (immediate) or chronic (prolonged or slow delayed). Some
common symptoms are - dizziness, headache, shaking and weakness. More toxic effects may
cause convulsions, irrational behaviour or unconsciousness.
First-aid treatment includes - removal of affected person to a safe, clean and airy place,
washing of the part affected and to put the person in recovery position (slipping on shoulder).
On swallowing, vomiting should be induced if person is in consciousness. Medical charcoal and
plenty of water may also be 'given.
Effect of organophosphorous pesticides is to reduce cholinesterase level in body and it can be
noticed by pin-point in pupils (eyes).
Blood cholinesterase activity test should be carried out every 15 days. If the level is
found less than 62.5%, the worker must be transferred to another place where no exposure is
possible. After medical treatment and. safe report he can be put back to his plant. But meantime
the engineering controls should be provided or revised to eliminate the exposure. Leakage and
spillage must be removed. Defect in PPE should be checked and removed.
An Office Circular dated 27-7-1995 of Factory Inspection Office, Bharuch, sent to
pesticide factories, seems to be more important and suggests following safety measures :
1. For filling bottles or small containers of liquid, granules or powder, automatic filling
machines with closed chamber and attached local exhaust ventilation must be used. Weighing,
plugging and sealing operations and conveyor movement should also be automatic and under
suction chamber so that a worker has not to touch Anything and no spillage, vapour or dust shall
touch his body.
2. To fill barrel or big container a chamber with exhaust hood and ventilation should be used.
80
3. To contain or collect leaking liquid small bund and pit shall be provided.Spilled pesticide
should be neutralized or washed with dry clean cloth and stored in a dust-bin with spring-lid.
Then it should be safely disposed or burnt out.
4. Workers engaged to shift, move, clean or pack the filled (plugged) container or to clean any
spillage, shall be given goggles, long sleeved shirt and pent, good quality rubber hand gloves,
waterproof suit or apron, gumboot and air-line respirator. Safety showers and bathrooms shall
be provided.
5. Illiterate, untrained and temporary contract workers are exposed to more risk. Therefore such
training should be given to them so that they can read or understand the necessary precautions.
6. Pedestal or positive air fan removes the vapour or dust from one worker to another. Therefore
it is inadvisable. Exhaust or negative air suction and air-line respirators are the effective
remedies. Exhaled air should be passed through carbon bed filter or effective absorber and final
vent discharge should be within safe limit.
7. Regular air monitoring at work place, ppm record and leakage checking are necessary.
8. A record of full name, address, signature, date of joining and photograph of all the workers
at the time of first employment are useful to detect cases of delayed effects or after-service
effects.
9. If pre-employment and subsequent medical examination shows blood cholinesterase level
less than 62.5%, that worker should not be employed in pesticide work. If RBC level is also
low, the worker should be kept away for 3 months from such process. Sufficient stock of PAN,
Atropine etc. (antidotes) should be kept in the factory first-aid centre.
10. The workers must be aware that in case of symptoms (dizziness, headache, vibration, vomit
etc.), which doctor they have to approach. They will follow the medical advice.
11. In each shift, qualified and trained supervisor shall strictly supervise the working conditions,
work habits, methods, use of PPE, washing, cleaning and no smoking, eating or drinking in
work area.
Specified medical treatment is as under :
1. In case of skin contact of-organo-phosphorous, it should be immediately treated with solution
of 5-10% ammonia or 2-5% chloramine.
2. Give injection Atropine sulphate according to age, 2 to 4 mg intravenous or intramuscular.
Continue this injection every 5 to 10 minutes till pupils size and heart beats become normal.
3. Give injection PAM (2-Pyridine AldoximeMethochloride) in glucose slowly. Toxogonin is
a condensation product of Pyridine aldoxime and dichlorodimethyl ether.
4. Maintain fluid and electrolyte balance.
5. Give antibiotic medicine to prevent secondary infection.
6. Give Frusemide if lungs are swallowed or water filled.
7. If breathing stops, artificial respiration must be tried till doctor comes. The patient should
be kept in a cool and quiet place. Give oxygen if difficulty is in breathing. If breathing trouble is
more, the victim should be shifted to hospital and put on ventilator.
Personal hygiene - to wash hands and mouth before and after lunch and bathing and
changing clothes at the end of the work - is highly essential.See Part 4.1 & 4.2 of Chapter-28 for
Insecticides Act & Rules.
IS : Handling cases of pesticide poisoning 4015 (Part I & 2), malathion- safety code
10872, technical 1832, phorate G 9359, methyl parathion 10630, benonyl 13786, dodine 13784,
diflubenzuron 14185, 14186, pesticide common names 885, determination of metalaxyl residues
14161, methods of test 6940, Residues determination in agriculture, food commodities, soil and
water - 13830, 13831, aldicarb 10629, aldrin, dieldrin, aptafol 13245, in food 5863,
81
organochlorine in tobacco products 11820, sampling 11380, solid and liquid packing
requirements 8190 (Part I to 4), solid packaging 6604, zinc phosphide 9278, aluminium
phosphide 9279, kitazin 13788 to 13790.
Packing containers - HDPE bags 8069, polyethylene 9754, aluminium bottles 9503,
aluminium containers (5 litres and above) 9445, tinplate cans 9992.
LAWS ON INSECTICIDES :
Insecticides Act, 1968 :
This Act (46 of 1968) was enacted on 2-9-1968. It came into force from 1-3-1971 (Sec.
4,7,8, & 36) and 1-8-1971 (remaining part). It extends to the whole of India. It has 38 sections
and a .schedule listing insecticides amended from time to time.
It is an Act to regulate the import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use of
insecticides with a view to prevent risk to human beings or animals and matters connected
therewith.
Provisions are made for the Central Insecticides Board, its committees, procedure and
officers (S.4 to 8), Registration of insecticides, appeal and revision (S.9 toll), Licensing (S.12 to
15), Central Insecticides Laboratory (S.16), Prohibition of import and manufacture (S.17), Sale,
stock, distribute, transport, use etc. (S.18) Insecticide Analysis (S.19), Inspectors (S.20 to 23).
Report of Insecticides Analyst (S.24), Confiscation of stock (S.25) Notice of poisoning (S.26),
Prohibition of sale etc. for reasons of public safety (S.27), Cancellation of registration (S.28),
Offences & punishment (S.29), Defences which may or may not be allowed (S.30),
Cognisance& trial (S.31), Special courts (S. 31A), Offences by companies (S.33), Power of
Central Govt. and State Govt. to make rules (S.36 & 37) and Exemption (S.38).
By various notifications from 1989 to 1996, many insecticides are banned or restricted in
India, e.g. DDT, chlorobenzilate, BBCP, PCNB, Toxaphene, Aldrin, Chlordane Heptachlor,
Tetradifon, Nitrofen, Benzene Hexachloride etc.
Insecticides Rules 1971 : (State or Central) or Gujarat Rules:
These rules came into force on 30-10-1971. They have 9 chapters, 46 rules, 2 schedules and 22
forms. Chapter-1 gives definitions.Tests' means any insects, rodents, fungi, weeds and other
forms of plant or animal life not useful to human being s [R. 2 (h)]'Laboratory' means the central
insecticides laboratory. [(R. 2(e))].Commercial Pest Control Operation means any application or
dispersion of insecticide(s) including fumigants in household or public or private premises or
land and includes pest control operations in the field including aerial applications for
commercial purpose but excludes private use.Pest Control Operator means any person who
undertakes pest control operations and includes the person or the firm or the company or the
organisation under whose control such a person(s) is operating.
Chapter-n is regarding the Board and its functions (R.3 to 5), Chapter-111 regarding
registration of insecticides (R.6 to 8), Chapter-IV for grant of licences (R.9 to 15), Chapter-V
for packing &labelling (R.16 to 20), Chapter-VI for insecticides analysts and Insecticides
Inspectors (R.21 to 34), Chapter-VII for transport & storage (R. 35 to 36), Chapter-VIII for
protective clothing, equipment and other facilities for workers (R.37 to 44) and Chapter-IX
miscellaneous (R.45 to 46).
The first schedule prescribes 22 forms of which the last one (for medical examination of
workers) is reproduced in this part. Second schedule u/r 25 prescribes fees for testing or
analysing the samples of insecticides.
Insecticides cannot be manufactured, stored or handled with any consumable article (R
IO-Q.
82
Packing and Labelling (R. 16 to 20):
Every container package should be of the approved type. A leaflet should be put inside
containing particulars about the plant disease, insects, animals or weeds for which it is to be
applied, manner of application, symptoms of poisoning, safety measures and first-aid treatment
necessary, antidote, decontamination or safe disposal procedure, storage and handling
precautions, effect on skin, nose eye, throat etc. and common name of the insecticide (R. 18).
In labelling, warning and cautionary statement should be included.
(1) For category-I (Extremely toxic) insecticides, the symbol of a skull and cross-bones and
the word 'POISON' should be printed in red. Statement "Keep out of the reach of children and if
swallowed or if symptoms of poisoning occur call physician immediately" should be added.
(2) For category II (Highly toxic) insecticides, the word TOISON' in red and statement
"Keep out of the reach of children" should be printed.
(3) For category III (moderately toxic) the word 'DANGER' arid statement "Keep out of the
reach of children".
(4) For category IV (Slightly toxic) the word 'CAUTION' should be mentioned.
Category classification is as under –
Classification of Oral route (acute Dermal route (dermal Colour of band on the
insecticides toxicity) LD50 mg/kg toxicity LD50 mg/kg label.
of test animal of test animal.
Extremely toxic 1-50 1-200 Bright red
Highly toxic 51-500 201-2000 Bright yellow
Moderately toxic 501-5000 2001-20000 Bright blue
Slightly toxic > 5000 > 20000 Bright Green
See Part 24 of Chapter-23 for pesticide industry.

Transport and Storage (R. 35, 36) :Packages for rail transport shall be packed as per Red
Tariff by Railways. No transportation or storage in such a way that insecticides may come in
contact with food stuffs or animal feeds. If it is mixed up due to any damage to packages during
transport or storage, it shall be examined by competent authorities notified by the State Govt.
and safely disposed. If any leak occurs, the transport agency or the storage owner shall take
urgent measures to prevent poi soiling and pollution of soil, water etc.
The packages of .insecticides should be stored in separate rooms or admirals under lock and
key. Such rooms shall be well built, dry, well-lit, ventilated and of sufficient dimension.
Protective Equipment and other Facilities for Workers (R. 37 to 44) :All persons engaged in
handling, dealing or otherwise coming in contact with insecticides during
manufacture/formulation or spraying shall be medically examined before employment and then
periodically once in a quarter by a qualified doctor who is aware of risks of pesticides and report
be kept in Form XXII given below. For persons working with organophosphorous or carbonate
compound, their blood cholinesterase level shall be measured monthly. The blood residue
estimation shall be done yearly of persons working with organo-chlorine compound. Any person
showing symptoms of poisoning shall be immediately examined and given proper treatment.
First-aid treatment shall always be given before the physician is called. IS 4015 part I
and II shall be followed in addition to any other books on the subject. The workers shall be
educated regarding effects of poisoning and the first-aid treatment to be given.
Protective clothing which shall be washable (to remove toxic exposure) and not allowing
penetration by insecticide shall be given to workers. A complete suit shall consist (a) Protective
83
outer garment/overalls/ hood/hat, (b) rubber gloves extending half-way up to Fore-arm (c) dust-
proof goggles and (d) boots.For prevention of inhalation of toxic dusts, vapours or gases, the
workers shall use (a) chemical cartridge respirator, (b) supplied air respirator. (c) demand flow
type respirator (d) full or half face gas mask with canister as per requirement. In no case the
exposure in air should exceed the maximum permissible level.Sufficient stocks of first-aid tools,
equipment, antidotes, medicines etc. should be kept.The workers shall be trained for safety
precautions and use of safety equipment.The packages and surplus materials shall be safely
washed and disposed to prevent pollution. The packages shall not be left outside to prevent re-
use. They shall be broken and buried away from habitation.
Aerial spraying precautions are given 'in rule 43.

Form XXII : Form of Medical Examination
For the Year............
Serial No. ………………..
Name ……………………………… Age…………..
Father's/Husband's Name ……………………… Full Address ……………………………….
Sex ……………….. Identification mark ………………………
Date of appointment ……………… Occupation: (Pleas specify the nature of duty)
PAST HIST
Illness Poisoning Allergy Exposure to No. of years / Remarks, if

Pesticides reasons any
(Compound)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FAMILY HISTORY
Allergy Psychological disorders Gaemorhagic disorder

(1) (2) (3)
PERSONAL HISTORY
Smoking Alcohol Other addiction

(1) (2) (3)
84
OBSERVATIONS
Medical Pre- End of 1st After 2nd After 3rd End of Remarks
Examination employment quarter quarter quarter the year
examination i.e. after 3 i.e. after 6 i.e. after 9
months months months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I GENERAL
EXAMINATION
General body limit Anaemia Fatigability
Weight Dadema Sweating
Pules Jaundice Sleep
Blood pressure Skin condition Urination
Respiration Temperature
II GASTRO INTESTINAL
Nausea Taste Liver
Vomiting Pain in abdomen Spleen
Appetite Bowel movement
III CARDIO RESPIRATOR
Nasal discharge Tightness of chest Heart
Wheeze Dyspnoea Cyanosis
Cough Palpitation Tachycardia
Expectoration
IV NEURO MUSCULAR
Headache Tremors Unconsciousness
Dizziness Convulsion Deep reflexes
Irritability Paranesthesia Superficial reflexes
Pulse Hallucination Co-ordination
Twitchings
V EYE
Pupil Double vision
Lachrymation Clumped vision
VI PSYCHOLOGICAL
Temperament Judgement Nervousness
VII KIDNEY
Kidney condition
VIII INVESTIGATION
Blood Hb % Serum Bilirubin Urine microsopic
Blood B.C. Urine routine examination X-ray of chest
* Serum cholinesterase
*Serum cholinesterase level should be measured in monthly intervals in case of
organophosphorus/carbamatic group of insecticides. General remarks of the Doctor in the light
of the above examination;
Advice given to : (1) the Patent : ……………………..
(2) the Employer : ……………………..
Steps taken by the Employer as per Doctor's advice
Signature/Thumb impression of:
1. Doctor:
85
2. Employee:
3. Employer/manufacturer:
4. Licensing officer at the time of inspection.
N.B. : In organochlorme group of insecticides the blood residue estimation should be done once a year
POLYMER PLANTS :
In organic chemistry certain giant molecules such as starch, rubber, plastic .or resin,
synthetic fibres, cellulose, proteins are called polymers and plants manufacturing them are
polymer plants. Thus rubber manufacturing plant, synthetic yarn (nylon, terylene etc.) unit,
plastic, resin or silicon making factory or a starch manufacturing factory can be called a polymer
plant.
The polymer (bigger) molecules are built up of smaller units joined together and form a
repeating structure. The repeating structure or the recurring unit in a given molecule is called the
monomer, and the entire molecule composed of several such repeating units is called a polymer.
Thus we can say that rubber is a polymer of isoprene, starch of a-glucose and cellulose of (3-
glucose. Polymerization process is of three types (1) Addition polymerization i.e. the
combination of monomers either of the same kind or different kind by a process of addition
involving no loss of fragments, for example, ethylene - polythene. (2) Copolymerization
involves two different types of monomers, for example, vinyl chloride with vinyl acetate. (3)
Condensation polymerization means the combination of monomers by a process involving loss
of a simple fragment or a molecule of water. The terminal units of the polymer chain may be
different from the units inside. For example, polyester from a dialcohol and diacid. The alkyd
resins are such polymers obtained from phthalic acid and glycol or glycerol. Linear polymers are
thermoplastic and cross-linked polymers are thermosetting. Proteins, starch and cellulosic
fibres, plastics and resins are used to make thousands of industrial products. The variety and
names of polymers are many, only a few are mentioned below :
Hazards and Controls :
Mostly the polymerisation processes are carried out in totally enclosed system and
therefore the hazards are reduced to much extent. Machinery is also mostly enclosed. The
hazards are possible from exposure to raw materials, leakage and spillage, dusts and fumes, hot
surfaces and radiant heat, noise and vibration and heat and humidity.
Chemicals like formaldehyde andcaprolactam cause burning in eyes, nose and throat.
High temperature and pressure of thermic fluid (e.g. Dowtherm) in oil heating system may cause
burn and sometimes fire. Extrusion machines have hot surfaces which need insulation to prevent
burn injury and hopper feeder to prevent hand contact with screw conveyor inside. Cutting
machines for plastic, rubber and other hard substances need safety guard on cutting blade and
machine drives. Charging of toxic materials (powder or liquid) need enclosed system with local
and room exhaust fans and necessary respirators.
Polyamides used to manufacture epoxy resin are skin irritant. Acrylonitrile used in
polyacrylonitrile (PAC or acrylic) fibre is toxic, skin irritant and carcinogenic. This effect was
noticed in polymerisation workers. Another chemical dimethyl formamide (DMF) causes
digestive effects, abdominal pain, skin effect and pancreatitis to workers exposed to it. (e.g.
spinning bath and solvent tanks).
Styrene monomer, acetone (used in cleaning) and organic peroxide catalysts used in
making polyester resins may cause fire and explosion. Styrene vapour may cause narcosis
(effects on head, nose and throat).
86
To control such vapour, dilution ventilation and spray booth are necessary. TLV is more
critical than the LEL of styrene. (Styrene monomer-phenylethylene or vinylbenzol – C8H8 TLV
50 ppm or 215 mg/ m3 STEL 100 ppm or 425 mg/m3, LEL 1.1%, UEL 6.1%, FP-33 °C, VD 3.6,
poison via oral, ivn). The inhalation dose of styrene can be measured by analysis of exhaled air
(gas chromatography).
Solvent storage should be kept away, covered metal containers should be used to collect
solvent wastes, electric fitting should be flameproof and smoking must be prohibited. Direct
contact of peroxide catalysts should be avoided. Neoprene or plastic gloves are not affected by
solvents.
Itching from fibrous glass particles can be minimised by good housekeeping, ventilation,
use of long sleeves, barrier creams and frequent washing with soap and water.
Ethylene, propylene and other olefin members to make polyolefins (polymer) are weak
anaesthetics at a concentration above 60%. Freezing burns due to liquid propylene and
hyperplasia due to prolonged exposure to diolefins have been reported. Aluminium alkyls are
flammable in air and explosive in water, their fumes may cause lung damage and in solution it
causes burns. Adequate body PPE should be given to workers.
Ethylene, propylene and butylene are gases at room temperature, highly flammable or
explosive when mixed with air or oxygen and large fires of olefins are difficult to extinguish. In
case of fire, their supply should be stopped, fire should be allowed to burn out and adjacent
structures be cooled by water. Small fires may be controlled with CO2 or DCP extinguishers.
Polystyrene is made by polymerisation of styrene and other monomers. They are
flammable. Polymerisation process is highly exothermic and uncontrolled reaction may reach
explosive stage. Cooling and pressure relief devices on vessels are essential. Foamed
polystyrene is also flammable. Most of the chemicals are toxic. Therefore leakage should be
prevented by quick maintenance and enclosed system. Female workers exposed to polystyrene
production showed disturbed menstrual cycles, sexual activity, disturbed pregnancy and child
birth. Biological indicators are blood styrene level and styrene metabolites in urine. Polystyrene
dust may cause weight loss and erythrocyte, leucocyte or hepatic changes.Polystyrene process
should be fully enclosed, automated or remote-controlled. Manual handling should be replaced
by mechanical one, leakage should be stopped, local exhaust ventilation on air contamination,
respiratory and other PPE to the workers and their medical examinations are necessary.
In making various types of synthetic rubbers, solvents like hexane, styrene, butadiene,
chloroprene, acrylonitrile, toluene diisocyanate (TDI) and other isocyanates in making
elastomers, ethylene dichloride (EDC), methyl chloride, ethylene, propylene etc. are used.
Safety measures are required depending on properties of these dangerous chemicals, their
splashes and leakage, pressure release, machine parts, entry into vessels, cuts and burns, fall
from height and on the floor.Health hazards are possible in handling raw rubber containing
extender oil and carbon black. During fire CO hazard is also possible.
Workers should be made aware of all these hazards and properly trained. Gas detectors
with alarms, welding permit, vessel entry permit, exposure measurement, good ventilation,
rubber gloves, eye protection, hearing protection and washing facilities are also required.
Thus depending on a type of polymer plant, a variety of control measures are applicable.
IS : Styrene polymers, safe use in contact with foods etc., 7961, 10142,10149, styrene vinyl
benzene 4105, styrenated phenol 7351, styrene butadiene rubber (SBR) - latex 11356, latices,
tests 4511 (Part I to 6), tests 4518 (Part I & 2), Polystyrene - for insulation 4671, wall tiles 3463,
fixing 4112, sheets 5210, Polybutadiene rubber (PBR), test methods 10016, Polyester resin bath
tubs 6411, tank, chemical resistant 10661, Polyolefin - plastic container 7408, fibre analysis
9896, Polypropylene and its copolymers, safe use with food stuffs, drinking water etc., 10909,
10910, thermoplastics 10951, Polyurethane foam - domestic mattresses 7933, insulation, code of
practice 13205. PVC - resin 4669, sheeting, flexible 2076, boots, oil & fat resistant 13038.
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Chapter-3
3.1 Receiving, Storing and Handling of Chemicals :
General Rules for Chemical Storage
First, identify any specific requirements regarding the storage of chemicals from (1) local. State,
and Central regulations and (2) insurance carriers.
Criteria for Storage Area:
1. Store chemicals inside a closeable cabinet or on a sturdy shelf with a front-edge lip to
prevent accidents and chemicals spills; a ¾ - inch front edge lip is recommended.
2. Secure shelving to the wall or floor.
3. Ensure that all storage areas have doors with locks.
4. Keep chemical storage areas off limits to all persons.
5. Ventilate storage area adequately.
Organization:
1. Organize chemicals first by compatibility - not alphabetic succession.

2. Store alphabetically within compatible groups.
Chemical Segregation
1. Store acids in a dedicated acid cabinet. Nitric acid should be stored alone unless the
cabinet. It provides a separate compartment for nitric acid storage.
2. Store highly toxic chemicals in a dedicated, lockable poison cabinet that has been
labeled with a highly visible sign.
3. Store volatile and odoriferous chemicals in a ventilated cabinet.
4. Store flammables in an approved flammable liquid storage cabinet.
5. Store water sensitive chemicals in a watertight cabinet in a cool and dry location
segregated from all other chemicals in the laboratory.
Storage Don'ts
1. Do not place heavy materials, liquid chemicals, and large containers on high shelves.
2. Do not store chemicals on top of cabinets.
3. Do not store chemicals on the floor, even temporarily.
4. Do not store items on bench tops and in laboratory chemical hoods, except when in use.
5. Do not store chemicals on shelves above eye level.
6. Do not store chemicals with food and drink.
7. Do not store chemicals in personal staff refrigerators, even temporarily.
8. Do not expose stored chemicals to direct heat or sunlight, or highly variable
temperatures.
Proper Use of chemical Storage containers
1. Never use food containers for chemical storage.
2. Make sure all containers are properly closed.
3. After each use, carefully wipe down the outside of the container with a paper towel
before returning it to the storage area. Properly dispose of the paper towel after use.
Transportation of Hazardous Material :

Transportation is by road, rail, water or air. Containers are mostly standardized to ensure
safety during transit. When a truck or tanker meets with accidents or leaks on the way, creates
problem. Fire or explosion can cause harm to public or property. Corrosive or toxic chemical
88
can cause harm to public, animals, birds and environment. Sometimes grave emergency is
created. Warning to public, speedy rescue operation, evacuation and calling helping hands may
become necessary.
While considering transportation of chemicals one has to consider the physical and
chemical properties of the product being handled, whether it is a solid, a powder, a liquid or a
gas under pressure; the type of packing, hazards, and the mode of transport available.
See Part 6.2 of Chapter-28 for Statutory Provisions for transport of hazardous goods
Before transfer or transportation of chemicals, their modes of packaging should be
considered.
 Modes of Packaging :
(1) Glass bottles and carboys are some of the oldest packaging available for corrosive liquids,
solvents etc. Some of the bulk industrial materials still being transported in bottles are Bromine,
Mercury etc. The laboratory reagents and pure grade chemicals are also transported in glass
bottles of various sizes. Many corrosive chemicals like Nitric acid,
Sulphurylchloride, Thionylchloride etc., are transported in glass carboys holding
25-50 kg of the material. These glass bottles and carboys have to be properly
protected against shocks. Wooden crates for carboys, plastic or paper packing for
bottles is usual. Dangerous chemicals are further protected by packing in clay or
other absorbent material so that in case the bottle breaks, the chemical is absorbed
and causes least damage.
(2) Plastic bottles, jars, carboys and drums : These could be constructed out of
polythene either of low density or high density, PVC or other materials. Quite a lot
of chemicals ranging from laboratory chemicals to industrial raw material are being
packed and transported in plastic containers. These containers may be further
protected by wooden cases. The material must be correctly chosen. Several
tragedies have occurred because, on long storage the plastic containers became
brittle and the chemical leaked out.
(3) Steel drums in various sizes have been used for storage and transportation of
solvents and chemicals. Even corrosive chemicals like chlorosulphonic acid are
shipped in steel containers. This is quite a common packing for chemicals of all description; and
quite economical too. Recently polythene and PVC liners, as well as polythene lined drums,
have been made available and these are used for packing even highly corrosive materials like
hydrochloric acid. Proper sealing of the drums is essential.
(4) Bags of various types: Jute bags and paper bags are used for the innocuous chemicals like
Soda ash, Salt, Kieselguhr, etc. Polythene lined jute bags have been used for the materials which
need to be protected against moisture. Woven high density polythene bags are being used for
packing corrosive and water sensitive materials like Caustic Soda and. Caustic Potash.
Obviously this packing cannot stand piercing and must be well protected and handled such that
the bags are not damaged. In transport, the bags must be properly stacked and secured.
(5) Gases under pressure in cylinders: Quite a few gases like Chlorine,Sulphurdioxide.
Ammonia, Ethylene oxide. Oxygen etc., are sold in cylinders containing quantities ranging from
50-100 KGs. Steel cylinders are the commonest, but various kinds if linings are also given for
special products. The rules governing the design, testing and filling of cylinders are quite
elaborate and must be followed.
(6) Tank cars for bulk transport of chemicals are very common, particularly for petroleum
products, solvents, acids and alkali solutions. Tanks can be made of various materials of
construction such as steel, stainless steel, rubber lined FRP or FRP lined, lead-lined or any other
special construction. The tank cars could be in various sizes, holding 5-10 tons for road
transport or 20-50 tons or more for rail transport. Now a Days long tankers/trailers have been
used to carry more weight.
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The tank cars should be properly designed and fabricated to meet the service condition.
Contamination should be avoided, as it could be dangerous for the product as well as the tanker.
Good arrangement for receiving the chemical as well as discharging should be provided. Vent
valves and arrangements to prevent static electricity build up when handling solvent, are a must.
Gases under pressure such as liquefied natural gas, chlorine, etc. are also transported by tank
cars. Then FFE and PPE should be carried with the vehicle and their safety rules should be
followed.
 Safety Precautions forTransporting:
o Railroad Transportation:
It accounts for quite a large proportion of the chemicals transportation. The greatest
hazard in this mode of transportation is that because of the far flung operations, it is not possible
to train everyone connected with the operation in the proper care to be taken. Proper labeling of
hazards involved is a help. Derailment and accidents are other hazards.
The preventive measures are:
(a) Improved design of the tankers and the couplers,
(b) Limitations on the size of the tanks,
(c) Positioning of the hazardous chemicals away from the locomotive
(d) Avoiding hunching together of hazardous chemicals
(e) Properlabeling of content and the hazardous nature of the chemicals.
A serious risk is that an accident may occur at a place which is not easily accessible and
where competent guidance may not be available. In the USA Dan organization (CHEMETREC)
has been set up to deal with such cases.
(2) Transportation of Explosives by Rail :
Such rules (Railway Red Tariff Rules 62 to 74) are as under:

1. No explosives other than safety fuses and fireworks shall be transported by rail except
in the van specially constructed for the carriage of explosives and approved by the Chief
Controller of Explosives and the Railway Board.
2. Label 'Explosive' on each side of the carriage shall be affixed.
3. Carriage containing explosives shall be kept away from the engine (other than electric
locomotive) and close coupled to the adjoining carriage not loaded with explosives or
other flammable or hazardous substances
4. Not more than 10 carriages containing explosives shall be attached to any one train. Not
more than 5 carriages of explosives shall be loaded oi unloaded at any one time at any
railway station.
5. No explosive shallbe transported by any passenger or mixed train.
6. Safety fuses for blasting, explosives of the third class (nitro compounds) in the form of
cartridges and not exceeding 2.5 kg in weight, detonators up to 200 (each weighing up to
225 gms) and sporting powders and propellants in double packing as prescribed, can be
transported by passenger or mixed trains.
7. Explosive consignment shall be received at the specified railway premises only, during
sunrise and sunset and by an authorized railway servant only.
8. Shunting of carriages containing explosives shall be carried out under the supervision of
authorized officer. Shunting speed shall not exceed 8 km/hi and no loose shunting will
take place.
9. The packages shall be removed by the consignee within 12 hours of day light following
their arrival. The Station Master shall keep the packages at a safe distance and covered
with tarpaulins or other suitable material.
90
10. No explosive shall be carried except by rail across any railway bridge. This rule is not
applicable to carry safety fuses or gunpowder or nitro compound up to 5 kg or
ammunition Class-6, Division 2 and 3.
International Regulations concerning carriage of dangerous goods by rail (RID) and
British Railways list of dangerous goods and conditions of acceptances also provide rail
transport guidelines.
Road Transportation:
Road tankers are constructed in a wide variety of materials like steel, stainless steel,
lined material and FRP construction. Sometimes they need to be heated or cooled.
Road tankers and their fastenings should be capable of absorbing following forces -
1. In the direction of travel-twice the total weight.
2. Vertically downwards-twice the total weight.
3. Vertically upwards-total weight.
4. Horizontally at right angles to direction of travel-total weight.
The service equipment such as valves, fittings, gauges etc. should be protected against
impact. Three types of independent stop valves - internal, external and blind flange- are
required. For certain gases like HF, shell opening at bottom is not permitted. Fusible plug to
operate below 93 °C is suggested in case of petroleum tanker. Spark arrester on exhaust, a
portable fire extinguisher, TREMCARD emergency kit and instructions to driver are also
necessary.
See Part 6.2 of Chapter-28 for Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 for transport of
hazardous goods also. Display of class labels on goods package (e.g. box, drum) and carriage
(e.g. vehicle, truck, tanker) are compulsory u/r 129 and 134 respectively.
(4) UN, DOT, ADR, or SOLAS-74 Classification
The hazardous chemicals/dangerous goods are divided by the United Nation Committee
of Experts on the Transport of dangerous goods into the following classes:
CLASS 1 : Explosives
Division 1 - Substances and articles which have a mass explosion hazard.
Division 2 - Substances and articles which have a projection hazards but not a
mass explosion hazards.
Division 3 - Substances and articles which have a fire hazard and either a
minor blast hazard or a major projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 4 - Substances and articles which present no significant hazard.
Division 5 - Very insensitive substances which have a mass explosion hazard.
CLASS 2 : Gases compressed, liquefied, dissolved under pressure or deeply refrigerated.

CLASS 3 : Inflammable liquids.
CLASS 4 : Inflammable solids, substances liable to spontaneous combustion; substances
which, on contact with water, emit inflammable gases.
Division 4.1 - Inflammable solids.
Division 4.2 - Substances liable to spontaneous combustion.
Division 4.3 - Substances which on contact with water emit inflammable gases.
CLASS 5 : - Oxidizing substances; organic peroxides.
Division 5.1 - Oxidizing substances.
Division 5.2 - Organic peroxides.
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CLASS 6 : - Poisonous (toxic) and Infectious substances.
Division 6.1 - Poisonous (toxic) substances.
Division 6.2 - Infectious substances.
CLASS 7 : - Radioactive substance.
CLASS 8 : - Corrosives.
CLASS 9 : - Miscellaneous dangerous substance.
See IS: 1446 for classification of dangerous goods.
Arrangement for loading and unloading of the liquid has to be well designed. It is
preferred to load toxic and flammable material from the bottom. It is preferable to provide a
discharge pump on the tank.
Drums, crates and cylinders are also transported by trucks. The-important thing to see is
that the chemical is securely packed so that spillage do not occur on the road and the toxic
vapors are not released. The cylinders or drums should be securely lashed so that they do not fall
off the truck and cause danger. The driver and the attendant should be fully conversant with the
nature of the material and the hazards involved; and trained to handle the situation.
U.N. Classification of Hazardous material :

Safety in chemical industry:
1. Study and identify chemical hazards using material safety data sheet (MSDS) and a
system of classification, packaging and labeling should be developed.
2. Select safer technology.
3. Select safer sitting of chemical industry for minimum loss to men, material, environment
etc.
4. Take all safety precautions at Design and construction stage.
5. Workplace hazards inside the factory should be controlled by good engineering controls,
(SOPs) safe operating procedure and using personal protective equipment.
6. All requisite safety devices, fittings, instruments, equipment, machines etc., must be
provided and well maintained.
7. Workers must be properly Educated & trained for safe operation of the plant such as
proper Warning signs, color codes, Safety Work Permit Systems, fire fighting.
8. Conduct Mock-drills of MAH Unit & Potential Emergencies due to Chemical Hazards to
know everybody their role in emergency planning and control.
9. Safe Storage, handling & transportation of hazardous chemicals within and out-side
factory premises.
10. Safe Storage, disposal of hazardous wastes within and outside factory premises.(Sewage
&Haz-Sludge)
11. Well monitoring and control of hazardous substances/Waste at work places (Inspection,
Audit & Analysis / ETP & STP) and of occupational ill-effects and diseases by pre and
periodical medical examinations of the workers.
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Criteria for sitting & Layout of Chemical and Petrochemical Plants :
SITING CRITERIA: There are 4 Siting Criterias as under:
General Guidelines :
1. Land availability and its cost.

2. Raw material availability.
3. Labour availability (Also the quality of labor-Strike).
4. Infrastructure availability (Different for different Products & even Models).
5. Access to market. (Not in Andaman Nikobar)
6. Transport facilities.
7. Drinking and process water facilities. (Igatpuri Plant laid down pipeline from a river for
making water available)
8. Sewage and Drainage.
9. Place for solid and liquid waste disposal. (Govt. approved facility distance like Taloja,
Pune Ranjangaon)
10. Interlinking with other plants.(Suppliers & Venders & Purchasers)
11. Surrounding population density and distance from the public.(In case of nuclear plant or
MAH Units like one in Manmad Petroleum unit)
12. Distance from highway and railway and from transport centers.(Cost cutting Factor)
13. Suitability of climate, environment and factors related to ecology, geology, and micro&
macro biology.
14. Government policy advantages like subsidies (M&M Haridwar –Some taxrelaxation),
incentives and zoning (area reservation eg. SEZ) if prescribed.
15. Other techno-economic criteria.
 Rules of zoning and town planning should consider above factors.
Environmental Guidelines :
Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, gives following sitting criteria to be
considered by the Government while prohibiting or restricting the location of industries in
different areas.
1. Standards for quality of environment laid down for an area.

2. Maximum- allowable limits of pollutants (including noise) for an area.
3. Likely emission from the proposed industry.
4. Climatic features of an area.
5. Biological diversity of the area to be preserved.
6. Environmentally compatible land use.
7. Adverse environmental impact likely to be caused by the industry (EIA is required).
8. Proximity to a legally protected area.
9. Proximity to human settlements.
10. Any other relevant factor.
Site Appraisal Committee u/s 41A of the Factories Act, while considering any site
application, may go through above criteria.
The Industrial Policy Statement of July 1980 recognised the need for preserving
ecological balance and improving living conditions in the urban centers of the country. On the
basis of this Policy,' indiscriminate expansion of the existing industries and setting up of new
93
industrial undertakings within the' limits of metropolitan cities and the larger towns are
restricted.
To prevent air, water and soil pollution arising out of industrial projects, the Industrial
Licensing procedure requires that the entrepreneurs before setting up the industry should obtain
clearance from Central/ State Air and Water Pollution Control Board.
Following conditions are also to be fulfilled:
1. The State Director of Industries confirms that the site of the project has been approved
from environmental angle by the competent State Authority.
2. The entrepreneur commits both to the State Government and Central Government that he
will install the appropriate equipment, implement and the prescribed measures for the
prevention and control of pollution.
3. The concerned State Pollution Control Board 'has certified that the proposal meets with
the environmental requirements and that the equipment installed or proposed to be
installed are 'adequate and appropriate to the requirement.
The entrepreneur will be required to submit half-yearly progress report on installation of
pollution control devices to the respective State Pollution Control Boards.
Depending on the nature and location of the project, the entrepreneur will be required to
submit comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment Report, and Environmental
Management Plans.
Refer the latest EIA (Envt. Impact Assessment) notification from the MoEF.
Sitting Guidelines:
In a selected site, the following factors must be recognized.
1. No forest land shall be converted into non-forest activity for the sustenance of the
industry.
2. No prime agricultural land shall be converted into industrial site.
3. Within the acquired site the industry must locate itself at the lowest location to remain
obscured from general sight.
4. Land acquired shall be sufficiently large to provide space for appropriate treatment of
waste water still left for treatment after maximum possible reuse and recycle.
Reclaimed (treated) wastewater shall be used to raise green belt and to create water body
for aesthetics, recreation and if possible, for aquaculture. The green belt shall be ½ km
wide around the battery limit of the industry. For industry having odour problem it shall
be a. kilometer wide.
5. The green belt between two adjoining large scale industries shall be one
kilometer. Green belt should also be provided within factory premises.
6. Enough space should be provided for storage of solid wastes so that these could be
available for possible reuse.
7. Layout and form of the industry, that may come up in the area must conform to the
landscape of the area without affecting the scenic features of that place.
8. Associated township of the industry must be, created at a space having physiographic
barrier between the industry and the township.
9. Each industry is required to maintain three ambient air quality measuring stations within
120 degree angle between stations.
Meteorological aspects:
While selecting a site, climatic conditions should also be considered. High or Low temperature,
more moisture, high or low wind velocity, frequent raining, cloudy atmosphere, nearby
seashore, effect of long time sunrays etc. have considerable effect on raw materials, products
and processes..
Global warming and green house effect should be decreased by preventing emissions of
CO2, and O3, depleting substances.
MoEF guidelines provide further information.
94
 Plant Area Classification :

SeperationDistances : from 5 areas:
Government guidelines are as under :

Safety distances to be maintained In sitting industries, care should be taken to minimize
the adverse impact of the industries on the immediate neighborhood as well as distant places.
Some of the natural life sustaining systems and some specific land uses are sensitive to
industrial impacts because of the nature and extent of fragility. With a view to protecting such
industrial sites, the following distances from the areas shall be maintained:
1. Ecologically and/or otherwise sensitive areas: at least 25 km; depending on the geo-
climatic conditions the requisite distance shall have to be increased by the appropriate
agency.
2. Coastal Areas: at least Vi km from high tide line.
3. Flood Plane of the Riverine Systems: at least ½ km from the flood plane or modified
flood plane affected by dam in the upstream or by flood control systems.
4. Transport/Communication System: at least ½ km from highway and railway.
5. Major Settlements (3, 00,000 population): distance from settlements is difficult to
maintain because of urban sprawl. At the time of sitting of an industry if any major
settlements notified limit is within 50 km, the spatial direction of growth of the
settlement for at least a decade must be assessed and the industry shall be sited at least
25 km from the projected growth boundary of the settlement.
Separation distances are either between two units or a single unit and a source of ignition. It is
normally between the adjacent edges of the units and not from centre to centre.
Factors to determine separation are
(1) Explosion effect
(2) 'Radiant .heat from a burning material
(3) Ignition of a vapour escape and
(4) Heavy concentration of a toxic gas.
Normally 15m (50 ft) is suggested for the storage of petroleum products excluding LPG. For
LPG a smaller distance is allowable if radiation walls and/ or water drench systems are
provided. From an ignition source, for ethylene storage, 90 m is suggested for pressure storage
and 60 m for refrigerated storage. Risk of failure of pressure storage is higher than that of
refrigerated storage. Some suggested distances are as under:
No. Unit Separation Distance (mt)

1 Flammable liquid, low to medium pressures 10-25
2 High flammability, high pressure 35-50
3 Direct fired boilers and furnaces 35-50
4 Blow down stack with flare 40-75
5 Loading facility 35
6 Public roads and railroads 35
7 Cooling towers 35
8 Storage tanks 25-50
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ILO guidelines suggest approximate separation distances for Major Accidents Hazard
works:
Chemical Largest tank size (tons) Separation distance (mt)

LPG at >1.4 bar absolute 25-40 300
OR 41-80 400
Flammable gas or moisture at 81-120 500
> Boiling Point 121-300 600
>300 1000
25 or more cylinders or tank
up to 5t 100
LPG, refrigerated, at ? 1.4 bar 50 or more 1000
absolute
Flammable gas or mixture 15 or more 500
Flammable gas or Mixture 50 or more 1000
having BP<0oC, refrigerated
or cooled at ? 1.4 bar absolute.
Liquid or mixture of liquids 10000 or more 250
o
having Flash Point < 21 C
HF 10 or more 1000
SO2 20 or more 1000
SO3 15 or more 1000
Acrylonitrile 20 or more 250
HCN 20 or more 1000
CS2 20 or more 250
Chlorine 10-100 1000
> 100 1500
Bromine 40 or more 600
H2 2 or more 500
Phosgene 2 or more 1000
Methyl isocynate 1 1000
EO, or 5-25 500
Propylene oxide (ambient > 25 1000
pressure)
Liquid O2 500 or more 500
Ammonium nitrate – bagged 300 t
in stacks of 600
- Loose distance =
1
stack size (t) 3
600
300
In above separation distances no restriction category B development, category C
restricted and within about 2/3 of the distance, category A is restricted. Categories are as under:
Cat A - Residential houses, hotels, flats.
Cat B - Industrial, factories, warehouses.
96
Cat C - Special, schools, hospitals, old peoples' homes.
These distances are tentative and may be slightly modified under local circumstances. If
they are found unacceptably large, quantified risk assessment (QRA) should be carried out to
assess distance.
Instead of using such fixed distance criteria, another approach is to calculate the hazard
range by using formulae for gas dispersion or fire/explosion effect.
Diversion walls can be used to divert vapour flows to a safe area. Firewalls can be used: to
protect from radiant heat and explosion (blast) wall to protect from the impact of explosion.
Steam curtains or drenches are used to provide separation from fire or ignition.
U.N. Classification of Hazardous material
 Identification and Classification of Chemicals:
Chemicalsare broadly classified asinorganic andorganic chemicals. Inorganic chemicals
are sub-classified as metals and non-metals. Out of 104 elements, 80 are metals and majority
of them (except mercury) are solids, shining, reflecting, good conductor and forming reducing
agents and basic hydroxides. In non-metals, more than half are gases and remaining are hard
solid, non-shining, less reflective, bad conductor and forming oxidizing agent and acidic
hydroxides. Some examples are given below:
Metals: Aluminum, Arsenic, Beryllium, Calcium, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Iron, Lead,
Manganese,' Mercury, Nickel, Radium, Sodium, Tin, Uranium, Zinc etc.
Non-metals :Bromine, Chlorine, Fluorine, Iodine, Oxygen, Phosphorous, Sulphur etc.
Organic chemicals include carbon compounds. They are subclassified as under -
Aliphatic Compounds (without benzene-rings) : Hydrocarbons, Halogen derivatives of
paraffin, Alcohol, Ethers, Aldehydes, Ketones, Carboxylic acids and their derivatives, organic
compounds of Nitrogen and Sulphur,. Carbohydrates, Alicyclic compounds etc.
Aromatic Compounds (with benzene-rings) : Benzene and its derivatives. Aromatic amines,
Diazo compounds. Dyes, Phenols, Aromatic alcohol.Aromatic aldehydes, Ketones and quinones
and Aromatic carboxylic acids.
Heterocyclic Compounds and Polymers (with other-rings) : Furan, Pyrrole, Thiophene,
Pyridine, Quinoline, Isoquinoline, Alkaloids-coniine, nicotine, Drugs, Hormones,
Vitamins/Enzymes and Polymers Natural and Synthetic Rubber like neoprene, butadiene;
synthetic fibres like nylon, orlon, vinyon, terylene, Synthetic plastics and resins like cellulose,
formaldehyde, alkyd, vinyl, acrylate and polystyrene resins and silicones.
 Instrumentation for safe plant operation :
Chemicals are also classified as under :

1. According to their Physical Statei.e. solid, liquid or gases. Fine particles of solid like
powder, dust, fumes and smoke are called particulate matter. Their suspension in air or
gas also exists. Liquids are classified as acid; alkali, solvent, suspension, liquid mixture,
aerosols etc. Gases are classified as inert (N21 C02), reactive, toxic, irritant, corrosive
etc.
2. Noxious Gases :
(1) Irritant gases – Cl2, NH3, SO2, NO2, COCL2, Aldehydes etc.
(2) Systemic poisons – C6H6, CS2, PH3, Stibine, Mn, Nickel carbonyl, Arsine,
Halogenated hydrocarbons etc.
(3) Simple asphyxiants – N2, CH4, CO2 etc.
97
(4) Chemical asphyxiants - CO, H2S, HCN etc.
3. Dust (Particulate Matter):
(1) Causing plenumoconioses - Coal, Silica, Asbestos etc.
(2) Causing Asthma - Cotton, Flour, TDI etc.
(3) Causing allergy - fungal spores, bird fanciers, lung, bagassation etc.
(4) Causing lung cancer - Chromium, Asbestos, Benzene etc.
4. Biological Agents and Diseases :
(1) Virus Rickettisia - Psittacosis, rabbis etc.
(2) Bacteria - Anthrax, Woolsorter's disease, Leptospirosis or Weal's disease,
Brucellosis, Tetanus etc.
(3) Fungi - Ringworm, Moniliasis etc.
(4) Parasites - Hookworm
(5) Plant products - Dermatitis due to mango tree and cashew seed processing.
For details see the Schedule given under the Rules for manufacture, use, import, export
and storage of hazardous micro-organism, genetically engineered organism or cells (Some
physical, chemical or biological agents cause skin diseases (dermatitis) and alcoholism, sickness
or accident may also cause health effects.
The chemicals should be properly identified, classified and handled accordingly.
Labeling on packages and containers is a basic requirement. For this purpose some major
divisions are given below :
Corrosive Chemicals: Amyltrichlorosilane, Anisoyl chloride. Antimony

pentachloride.Antimonypentafluoride, Benzylchloride. Benzyl bromide, Benzyl chloride.
Benzylchloroformate.Borontrichloride.Bromine, Bromine
pentafluoride.Brominetrifluoride.Causticpotash. Caustic soda, Chloroacetyl chloride. Chlorine
trifluoride, Chlorosulphonic acid, chromic acid solution, Diethyl dichlorosilane. Ethyl
chloroformate.Formicacid.Fluorine, Hexafluorophosphoric acid, Hydrazine, Hydrobromicacid.
Hydrochloricacid. Hydrofluoricacid. Methylchloroformate.Nitricacid.Perchloric acid,
Oxybromide, Oxychloride, Tribromide, Trichloride of phosphorous, Tetrachloride, Sodium
aluminats.Spentsulphuric acid, Sulphur chloride (mono and di).Sulphuric chloride,
Thionylchloride.Titaniumtetrachloride.Phenol etc.
OxidizingAgent :Aluminum nitrate. Ammonium nitrate. Ammonium perchlorate. Ammonium

permanganate. Bariumchlorate.Bariumnitrate.Bariumperchlorate.Barium peroxide, Benzoyl
peroxide. Nitrate peroxide. Permanganate of calcium.Chlorate and Magnesium chloride
mixture.Chlorate of potash and soda.Chromicacid.Dimethyl hexane. Lead nitrate, Lithium
peroxide, nitrate, perchlorate. Peroxide of magnesium.Potashpermanganate.Permanganate of
soda.Potassium bromate, nitrate, nitrite, perchlorate, permanganate and peroxide.Silver nitrate,
chlorate, chlorite, permanganate, peroxide, and nitrite.Zinc ammonium nitrite. Zinc chlorate.
Zinc permanganate, Zinc peroxide etc.
Carcinogens : Asbestos, Acrolein, Aniline, Acrylo-nitrile, Alpha- Naphthylamine,

BetaNaphthylamine, Benzidine, Benzene, Benzylchloride, Carbontetrachloride. Chloroform,
Chloropropane, Dioxin, Epichlorohydrin, Ethyleneoxide, Formaldehyde, Perchloroethylene,
Beta propiolacetone, Styrene, Tetrachloroethane, Toluidine (ortho-meta), Toluenediamine,
Trichloroethane, Trichloroethylene, Vinylchloride, Pyridine, Phenol, 4-aminodiphenyl,
Nnitrodiphenyl etc.
Poisonous Chemicals: Aldrin mixture. Aniline, Arsenate of lead.Arsenicacid.Bromide,

Chloride, Sulphide of arsenic.Calcium arsenate. Phenol, Dinitrochlorobenzol, Cyanide of
potassium and sodium, Cyanogen gas, Cyclohexane, Dinitrophenol, Ethyidichloroarsine,
98
Hexaethyltetraphosphate, Hydrocyanic acid and its fumes, Mercuric acetate, Mercuric
ammonium chloride and benzoate, Mercuric cyanide, bromide, oxide. Iodide, Methyl bromide.
Methyldichloroarsine.Mustardgas. Nickel cyanide, Nitrobenzol, Nitrogen peroxide. Phosgene,
Thiophosgene. Zinc arsenate, MIC (methyl iso-cyanate), Carbon monoxide. Cadmium, DDT,
Methanoi, Phosphine and dangerous pesticides such as Parathion, Diazeomon, Tetraethyl
pyrophosphate, Tetraethyl phosphate, Demeton, Scheadan, Methyl parathion, Cryolite,
Pentachlorophenol. Dinitro-o-cresol, Endrin etc.
Pesticides - Insecticides:
Pesticides:Aluminium phosphide, aldrin, acephate, antu, Butachlor, Chlordane,
Chlorpyrifos, Cycocel, Cypermethrin, DDT, Dimethoate, Decamethrin, DDVP, Dieldrin,
Endosulfan, EDB, Formothion, Fenitrothion, Fenvalerate, Hexachlorobenzene (BHC),
Heptachlor, Glyphosphate, Glyphosine, Malathion, Monocrotophos, Mercuric acetate, MEMC,
2,4-D Phosphomidone, parathion, Permethrin, Phenthoate, Phenyl Mercuric acetate,
Quinalphos, Zinc phosphide etc.
Insecticides : Cupric sulfate, DDT, Leadarsenate, Liver of sulfur.
Fungicides : Bordeaux mixture, Chlornil, Chloropicrin, Cyprusoxide, Mercurouschloride,
Pentachlorophenol.
Herbicides : Ammonium thiocynate NH,SCN
Vermicides: Anisole.
Explosive Chemicals: Amyl acetate. Carbon dust, Aluminum dust. Wood saw dust. Hydrogen,
Sodium metal. Sodiumnitrate. Potassiumnitrate. Ammonium nitrate, Benzoyl chloride, Nitro
glycerine.Phosphoroustrichloride.Titanium powder, Hexane, Trinitro toluene, Carbon
disulphide, Ethylene oxide. Cellulose films etc.
Solvents :Benzene, Acetone, Methanoi, Ethanol, Toluene, Carbon tetrachloride. Methyl

chloride, Methylene chloride.Ethylacetate.Ethylether.Methyl bromide, Nitro propane, Propyl
acetate. Spirit, Petrol, Carbon disulphide. Ethyl benzene, Methyl-propyl, Turpentine,
Chloroform, Aniline, Benzyl chloride, Bromobenzene, Chlorobenzene, Ethyl benzene,
Ethylamine, Formic acid.Heptane, Glycerol, Iso Propyl acetate, Methoxy benzene (anisole),
Methyloleat, Naphthalene, Nitrobenzene, Oleic acid.Phenol, Styrene, Vinyl acetate, Xylene,
Ether etc.
Other Flammable Chemicals :Acetonitrile, Acrylonitrile, Aluminiumtriethyl, Amyl acetate,

Amyl chloride, Amyl mercaptan, Amyl nitrate, Benzoyl peroxide. Butadiene, Calcium
phosphide.Carbondisulphide.Carbonmonoxide.Coaltar.Naphtha, Lacquer, Paint, Varnish,
Diethyl aluminium chloride, Diethylamine, Dimethylamine, Ethyl aluminium dichloride.Ethyl
chloride, Ethylene, Ethylene dichloride, Ethylene oxide.Ethylnitrate.Ethyl nitrite, Heptane,
Hexane, Iso octane. Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Lithium metal. Methane, Methyl acetone,
Monoethylamine, Nickel carbonyl, Pentane, Petroleum naphtha.Phosphorous, Phosphorous
anhydride, Photographic film.Sodium aluminium hydride.Sodium metal. Sodium methylate dry.
Titanium metal powder, Vinyl chloride, Vmyl fluoride. X-ray film scrap etc.
Reactive Chemicals :Acetic acid. Acetone, Acetylene, Sodium, Potassium, Lithium,

Magnesium, Calcium, Aluminium powder.Anhydrous ammonia, Ammonium nitrate.Aniline,
Bromine, Chlorates, Chromic acid.Chromiumtrioxide.Chlorine, Fluorine, Hydrocarbons
(Benzene, Butane, Propane, Turpentine etc.).Hydrocyanic acid.Hydrofluoric acid (HF),
Hydrogen peroxide.Hydrogen sulfide. Iodine, Mercury, Nitric acid (Cone.), Oxalic acid.
Peroxides, Phosphorous (white); Potassium chlorate.Potassiumpermanganate.Silver, Sodium,
Sodium nitrite.Sodiumperoxide.Sulphuric acid etc.
99
Alcohols :Allyl, ethyl, methyl, emyl, anisyl, benzyl, butyl, cetyl, citronellol, cyclohexanol, diols
or glycols, lauryl, nerol etc.
Refrigerant Gases :Carbon dioxide CO, Ammonia NH, Freonetc.
Esters :Amyl acetate, arsenate, benzoate, borate, citrate, cynate, decanoate, glyceride,
isocyanate, lipids, methacrylate, nitrite, oxalate, salicylate, stearate, succinate, sulfate,
sulphonate, tertrate, thiocynate, thiosulphate, toluate, xanthates etc.
Ethers :Anisole (methyl phenyl ether), benzyl cellulose, thio ethers, RSR, vinyl ether
Enzymes : Catalase, Deaminase, Dehydrogenase, Diastrate, Fermerit, hydrolases, lactose,
oxidase, urease etc. Resins : Alkyd (glyptal), Allyl, Aminoplastic etc. Acids:
Inorganic :Hydrochloric, hydrobromic, hydrofluoric, hydroiodic, nitric, sulphuric, nitrous,
sulphurous, sulphonic, chlorosulphonic, boracic or boric, phosphoric, phosphorous, perchloric,
arachidic, arsenic, ascorbic, aspartic, aspirin, hydrazoic, behenic or docosanoic, bromic, chloric,
chloroplatinic, chlorous, chromic, iodic, manganic, metaphosphoric, perboric, permanganate,
persulphuric etc.
Organic : .Acetic, acrylic, adipic, amino or carboxylic, alginic, uric, uncleic, succinic,
barbituric, benzenesulphonic, benzoic, capric or decanoic, hexanoic, caprylic or octanoic,
carbolic or phenol, carbonic, carboxylic, caro's or persulphuric, ricinoleic, chloroacetic,
cinnamic, citric, crotonic or butenoic, cyanic, cyanuric or tricyanic,
ethylenedi~mineetetraaceticacid (EDTA), fumaric, galic, gluconic, hexanoic, hydrodic,
hydrobromic, hydrocyanic, hydrofluoric, hydrozy, hypoclorus, hypophosphorous, isophthalic,
lactic, lauric, linolegic, meleic, malic, malonic, mandelic, methacrylic, molybdic, monobasic,
necotinic, nucleic, octanoic, oleic, oleum, osmic, oxolic, oxydiacetic, oxydiethanoic, palmitic,
pantothenic, pelargonic, phosphinic, phthalic, picric, pyrophosphoric, pyrosulphuric,
pyruvic, racemic, ribonucleic, ricinoleicsalicylic, sebacic, selenic, silicic, stannic, stearic,
suberic, sulphanilic, fannic, tartaric, thiocyanic, thiosulphuric, tribasic, trihydroxybenzoic, uric,
vanadic etc.
Compatible chemical means which can be stored or handled with that chemical to which it is
compatible.
Incompatible chemicalmeans which should not be stored or handled with that chemical to
which it is incompatible. A list is given below :
Table Examples of incompatible chemicals.
No. Chemical Incompatible Chemical
1 Ammonia Mercury, chlorine, calcium hypochlorite,
(anhyd.) iodine, bromine and hydrogen fluoride
2 Aniline Nitric acid, hydrogen, peroxide
3 Bromine Ammonia, acetylene, butadiene, butane and
other petroleum gases, sodium carbide,
turpentine, benzene and finely divided metals.
4 Chlorine Ammonia, acetylene, butadiene, butane and
other petroleum gases, hydrogen, Sodium
carbide, turpentine, benzene and finely divided
metals.
5 Copper Acetylene, Hydrogen peroxide.
6 Hydrogen Fuming Nitric acid, oxidising gases
sulphide
7 Nitric acid Acetic acid, acetone, alcohol, aniline, Chromic
(Conc.) acid, Hydrocyanic acid, Hydrogen sulphide,
flammable gases and nitratable substance.
8 Oxygen Oils, grease, hydrogen, flammable liquids,
solids or gases
9 Sulphuric acid Chlorate, perchlorates, permanganates.
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CHAPTER- 4
4.1 Safe Start-up & Shutdown Procedures:

Start-up or restart operation after a short or long shutdown and shutdown procedures need
special precautions.Starting sequence should be well defined, written and known to the workers
involved in this work. Starting in sequence of utilities like water, air, power; purging, charging,
slow and gradual heating, monitoring of pressure, temperature, flow and reaction rate, cooling if
necessary, starting of exhaust system, scrubber or condenser etc., observing noise, vibration,
speed, alignment, synchronizing etc. are all important.
During start-up if drains remain open, vent valves remain closed, wrong valves are operated,
unwanted material enters e.g. oxygen instead of nitrogen as blanketing over flammable reaction,
water where it is incompatible, air instead of steam or steam instead of air, excess or less
charging of material or catalyst, delayed cooling or heating, not starting of any pump or
instrument, no indication or alarm due to failure or malfunctioning of instrument in the
beginning, no starting of local exhaust or scrubber when it is essential and failure of interlock or
trip resulting in unwanted mixing or reaction, mixing of air with hydrocarbons, contacting hot
oil and water, thermal or mechanical shocks etc. are some of the examples of possible disorders.
Correct identification of pipelines, valves and gauges, correct sequence of control operation,
correct charging or addition-rate and instead of relying on instruments only Counter-check of
other parameters and strict manual observation and satisfaction are requisite precautions for safe
start-up procedure.
Attention should be paid on preparatory activity, verifying content, removal of air or venting,
purging and disposal of purged material, removal or addition of water, slow and sequential
starting of heating or cooling, gradual reaching of working parameters and normal operation.
Other points needing attention in start-up are removal of shutdown blinds, providing running
blinds, opening of scrubber or discharge line valve, opening of isolation valve before safety
valve, starting of local exhaust ventilation, pump cooling and priming, readiness of Fire Fighting
equipment, leak detection, opening vents and drains before allowing steam in the system, partial
opening of steam valves, introducing steam from the bottom part, observance of level and
overflow if any, safe increase in loading, avoidance of incompatible material, avoidance of
moisture and impurities in breathing air, purging of blow down tanks and flare, removing air
from vacuum equipment, inspecting joints and valves for leakage, verifying steam traps working
for condensate discharge, safe displacement of steam, water or purge gas after their use,
removing residual water before, introducing hot oil (initially cold oil should be introduced),
using heat-exchanger for indirect and gradual heating or cooling etc.
Shutdown operation needs sequential steps like cooling and de-pressuring, pumping out,
removal of residual content e.g. hydrocarbons, corrosive or toxic chemicals, water, oil,
pyrophoric catalyst, disposal of effluents and sludge, drainage and blinding and isolation
activities.Heat source should be cut off, cooling may be continued till required, where vacuum is
possible due to cooling, inert gas or air (if compatible) should be introduced to maintain
atmospheric pressure, pumping out material after cooling and de-pressuring and pumped out hot
oil should be cooled below its flash point. Residual hydrocarbons can be removed by purging
with steam, water or water followed by steam. After purging, air should be allowed into the
system. Residual water should be removed. Lastly running blinds should be removed and
shutdown blinds should be installed.
If the shutdown is required due to any fault, the cause of the fault should be found, studied and
removed before restarting the plant.
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4.2 Colour Coding identification of contents::
Indian Standards :
IS to be followed are : Code of practice for safety colours and safety signs 9457,
Pipelines, identification, colour code 2379, Standard colours for building and decorative finishes
1650, pipelines in thermal power plants 9404, Identification for canisters and cartridges 8318
and Gas cylinders and related medical equipment 3933.
Colours to Identify Hazards :Colour coding is most desirable and useful for safety
purposes. Standard colours are used to identify hazards as follows :
Red - Fire protection, prohibition, danger, emergency stops on machines,

red cross on medical facilities.
Yellow - Risk, danger or caution, hazards of slipping, falling, striking etc.,

flammable liquid storage, yellow band on safety cans, material
handling equipment viz. lift trucks, cranes, crane hooks, caution,
transport equipment, obstructions, change in floor level, stair
nosing etc.
Green - Safety equipment not identified elsewhere, safety board, safe

condition.
Blue - Warning and information signs, bulletin boards, rail road uses. It
indicates safety colour only if used with a circular sign.
Orange - Dangerous parts of machines or energized equipment such as

exposed edges of cutting devices, inside of movable guards,
enclosure doors, transmission guards, electric installations.
Purple - Radiation Hazards
Black & White - Housekeeping and traffic markings. Also used as contrast colours.
White is a contrast colour for red, green and blue. Black is a contrast colour for yellow.The
piping in a plant may carry harmless or hazardous contents. Therefore it is highly desirable to
identify them. Some standard colour coding is as follows:
Content in the piping Colour
Flammable or water for fire protection Red
Dangerous (hazardous chemical) Yellow
Safe (water, air) Green
Protective material (inert gas) Blue

The proper colour may be applied to the entire length of the pipe or in bands 20-25 cm wide
near valves, pumps and at repeated intervals along the line. The name of the specific material
should be stencilled in black at readily visible locations such as valves and pumps. Piping less
than 3/4 inch diameter is identified by enamel on metal tags. Anti-resistant colours should be
used where acids and other chemicals may affect the paints.
102
Following colour coding is also useful in identifying pipelines (IS:2379):
S. No. Material Colour
1. Water Sea green
2. Steam Aluminum, IS 2339
3. Air Sky blue
4. Acids Dark violet
5. Alkalis Smoke grey
6. Gases Canary Yellow
7. Hydrocarbons/ organic compounds Dark admiralty grey
8. Mineral, vegetable and animal oils, combustible liquids. Light Brown
9. Other liquids / gases which do not need identification Black
Entire length or a portion, more than 30 cm, of a pipeline should be painted so that it should not
be mistaken for a colour band. The colour bands are superimposed on the ground colour, applied
at start, near valves, joints, bends and end points. For a longer pipe, interval may be 50 m.
Minimum width of colour band should be as under :
Accident Prevention Signs :

Accident prevention signs arc most widely used safety measures in industry. Their
uniformity in the colour and design of sign are essential. Employees may be unable to read
English or may be colour-blind and yet react correctly to standard sign. Following colours are
normally used for signs:-
Sign Colour
Danger Red oval in top panel; back or red lettering in lower

panel.
Immediate and grave danger or peril.
Caution Yellow background colours; black lettering.

Against lesser hazards.
General Safety Green background on upper panel; black or green

lettering on lower panel.
Fire and Emergency White letter on red background. Optional for lower
panel; red on white background.
Information Blue for bulletin boards.
In-plant Vehicle Traffic Standard highway signs.
Exit Marking See Life Safety Code, NFPA 101, Section 5-10.
103
 Painting of Plant and Machinery :
No lighting scheme can be fully effective unless well-chosen (and well-maintained)

finishes are provided on main interior surfaces such as ceilings, walls, plant and equipment. The
main object is to use colours which will reflect rather than absorb light. Diffused light thrown
back in this way can contribute substantially to the total illumination on the work. It also
improves the quality of the lighting by softening shadows and minimizing harsh contrasts in the
field of view, thus contributing to visual comfort and efficiency.
Because of full reflection of light, to paint the plant and everything by white colour is
not advisable, because 'only white' .premises and equipment cause fatigue and boredom and are
no incentive for active or creative work if there is no combination of other colours. Any extreme
should also be avoided.
For ceilings, the reflection factor should be at least 75% which means white or near-
white. A matt finish is preferable. Aluminum paint is not recommended.
Furniture should preferably have a reflection factor of at least 20%, and the modern
blond (pale yellow) wood finishes and light grey paints for steel cabinets are preferred to the
old-fashioned dark stained wood and dull olive green finishes. On desk and table tops which
form a background to the work, it is important to guard against distracting reflections.
Floors should not be too dark. Practical considerations usually govern the nature of the
floor finish, but 20-25% or so is. generally a satisfactory figure. Floor finishes which are very
much lighter than this should be treated with caution since they can sometimes cause glare (e.g.
particularly well-lit office interiors).
A well painted machine inspires feeling of personal pride and proper maintenance is
encouraged. Under the General Code of Practice for Machine Guarding it has been provided
that:
Colour schemes for machines be so selected as to cause least visual disturbance to the
operator. Colour schemes should provide quite finishes of medium reflectance and should
separate critical from non-critical areas of the machine. Critical 'areas are those which might
constitute danger points or which need to be instantly visible. These should be painted in local
colours i.e. colours which command attention (Red, Orange, Yellow). Non-critical areas are
those which should be kept in the background. These should be painted in "Static" colours
(Cream, Stone Grey, Pale Green, Pale Blue). Control areas should be painted in suitable colour
to provide a neutral background for coloured indicator plates.
Guards should be regarded as part of the machine and should be painted in the same
colour as the colour of the machine. Colouring recessed surface of machines with lighter shade
than used for the outer surfaces help to minimise the effect of shadows on the inner surfaces
(Example : Static grey for outer surfaces, static stone for recessed surfaces).
Identification colours on machines should be reserved for things which really matter,
such as stop buttons and other safety tripping devices which must be found quickly in an
emergency. "Safety colours" must also be used with great restraint. Dangerous moving parts
should be guarded, not coloured, and when guarding is impossible, colour should be used to
highlight the actual hazard and not merely as a general warning.
For paints IS : 5 and for building and decorative finishes IS : SP 1650 are relevant.
4.3 Precautions for working on pipelines: Before commencing any work (including
minor repairs) on Pipe Lines/Installations, or opening any pipe Line for the same, the
Engineer/Supervisor In-Charge of the work must ensure that:
The Liquid or Gas Supply to the line is stopped, the control valve is properly closed & Liquid or
Gas line is properly and effectively blanked.
The Liquid or Gas line has been purged/flushed with nitrogen, other similar gas or steam/water,
as the case may be.
104
In case of flammable Liquid &Gas, the operations involving open flames, sparks, welding etc.
are stopped. Hot lines in the vicinity of the job have been screened. Sigris, burners etc. are
removed.
A Fire Fighting Team of two persons with two fire extinguishers is standing-by near the job
site.After completion of work the Liquid or Gas valve is opened only by an authorized person.
The provisions of Rule 73-C of the Maharashtra Factories Rules 1963 are fully complied with.
4.4 Safe entry procedures to confined spaces including reaction

vessels:
Before entering into any Confined Space for any repairs (including minor repairs), the
Engineer/Supervisor/Person-In-Charge of the work must ensure that:
a) Main Switch is put ‗OFF‘.
b) Fuses of the switch are removed and a Board Displayed (―MACHINE UNDER
REPAIRS – DO NOT SWITCH ‗ON‘).
c) Supply of Flammable Liquid / Gas is completely shut off and valve locked.
d) Doors etc. are locked properly in open position.
e) Physical stopper has been provided.
f) Door operation air valves etc. are locked.
g) Confined Space is completely free of toxic and poisonous substances/fumes.
h) Sufficient air circulation and ventilation is provided.
i) There is no deficiency of oxygen.
j) Hand Lamp used is of 24 volts.
k) Precautions for any welding work required to be done must be taken as mentioned in the
work permit for welding.
l) Proper arrangements for reaching the space such as ladders etc. are provided.
m) One experienced Supervisor is present near the Confined Space, supervising the work.
n) Use of Safety Equipment such as Safety Belt, Helmet and Safety Goggles by the person
entering Confined Space must be ensured.
o) The Life Line of the Safety Belt is held by another person outside the Confined Space, to
enable pulling out of the person from the Confined Space, in case of any emergency.
4.5 Safety in preventive and emergency maintenance operation :

Preventive Maintenance for repair of guards :
Section 21 of the Factories Act states that the guards shall be constantly maintained and kept in
position. Such maintenance is necessary because a machine running without guards or with
inadequate guard can cause Injury. Regular inspection of guards by Supervisor can detect the
guard removed, damaged or requiring repairs. A guard removed for repair should be fitted at the
earliest possible and meanwhile temporary guard should be installed or the machine be stopped.
Good maintenance increases the life of guards and vice versa.
A guard should be so designed or fitted that it is not to be opened for oiling/greasing or nearby
maintenance work. The parts needing regular service should be located outside the guard. If
oil/grease fittings are inside the guard, an extension through the guard should be provided.
Interlock type guard ensures that the machine cannot be operated unless all guards are in
position. Such planning helps maintenance without disturbing guards.
If a guard is not able to control flying particles, fume, dusting etc., additional ventilation should
be provided. Large guards should have self-closing doors for cleaning. Space should be
provided in surrounding for repair and maintenance. As a code of Standard & Practice
105
Dangerous part of the machinery is given red colour whereas Guard is shown by Green colour.
Where green colour is not visible due to less light, yellow colour is preferable.
Work on machinery in motion for maintenance purpose :

Only trained person shall work on machinery in motion for maintenance purpose
During maintenance of a machine, normally a guard is removed and observation for fault,
alignment, repairing or oiling/greasing is carried out in unguarded condition. Such condition
may kill or injure' an untrained or unknowing person. See foregoing Part 1.2, para 'Work on or
near machinery in motion' for statutory requirement u/s 22 of the Factories Act.
Preventive Maintenance work to be carried out in confined space:

a) Work permit to be drawn before commencing the job
b) Material creating unwanted, harmful fumes inside the confined space shall be removed.
c) Oxygen % inside the confined space shall be measured. It shall be same as outside the
confined space in the atmosphere.
d) Size of manhole shall be adequate to come out of the confined space.
e) B.A. Set to be provided to a person entering the confined space.
f) Safety Harness to be provided with a life line to be held by another person outside the
Confined space.
g) Outside person shall keep watch on the person working inside the confined space with
some signs.
h) Work shall not be started in the Furnaces until the workplace is much cool to work safely
for a person.
Preventive welding work on fuel tank:

a) No welding work shall be allowed to be carried out on the tanks containing flammable
oils, fuel unless the material & fumes inside the tanks are completely removed below
explosive limit.
b) Nylon clothes not allowed. Provide cotton clothes.
Preventive Work near Dry Grinding, Dry Turning, Welding or Gas-cutting of metals,
breaking of stones, slag:
Suitable goggles or screen shall be worn to avoid chips, hot burrs, UV & AV rays sand particles.
Preventive maintenance on electrical Installation:
a) Skilled & trained person shall be allowed to work on electrical Installation.

b) Do not work on live equipment to avoid electric shock
c) For Live line maintenance, follow electrical LOTO system after using rubber shoes,
gloves & mats
d) Ensure proper grounding. &earthing
e) Switches, Circuit breakers, isolators, shall be locked key should lie with the responsible
person
f) Testing equipments shall be calibrated for genuineness.
g) No outside material shall be left inside
h) During maintenance even a small bolt is to be replaced if missing
i) Damaged insulation has to be replaced
j) Insulation is required of proper resistant
k) Loose contacts shall be corrected
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l) Corroded, damaged elements should be changed
m) In oil circuit breakers the oil in which the arcing takes place shall be replaced
n) Earthing shall be checked for continuity periodically
o)
Emergency Maintenance while working on LPG / CNG installation:
Before commencing any work (including minor repairs) on LPG Lines/Installations, or opening
any LPG Line for the same,
TheEngineer/Supervisor In-Charge of the work must ensure that:
a) The LPG Supply to the line is stopped, the control valve is properly closed & LPG line is
properly and effectively blanked.
b) The LPG line has been purged / flushed with nitrogen, other similar gas or steam/water,
as the case may be.
c) The operations involving open flames, sparks, welding etc. are stopped. Hot lines in the
vicinity of the job have been screened. Sigris, burners etc. are removed.
d) A Fire Fighting Team of two persons with two fire extinguishers is standing-by near the
job site.
e) After completion of work the LPG valve is opened only by an authorized person.
f) The provisions of Rule 73-C of the Maharashtra Factories Rules 1963 are fully complied
with.
4.2 Transfer of chemicals by pipelines within and outsideinstallations,above

and under ground and submarines
Pipeline Transfer:
Pipelines are required to carry a variety of materials such as water, steam, air, oil, gas
(inert or toxic, vapour or compressed), brine, solvent and other liquid and gaseous chemicals.
From storage tanks to process vessels, from process vessels to product tanks and from there to
filling (loading) points, pipelines are required. They may be above ground, underground or as
per requirement. Some 20 to 30% costing is estimated in pipelines and their fittings like flanges,
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valves, gauges, nipples, glands, bends, elbows, plugs, reducers, joints, couplings, ferules, vents,
drains etc. Pipework may be of cast iron, mild steel, stainless steel, lead, copper, plastic i.e.
PVC, PP, HDPE, rubber, canvas, glass, FRP, glasslined, rubber lined, teflon coated, asbestos
cement, RCC, stone, ceramic etc. '
(1) Criteria for Piping Installation :

Main factors are - material of construction, design and layout, supports and clamps,
welding or flange joints, packing and gaskets, valves and other fittings, easy approach and
working platform and testing and maintenance.
Material of construction is selected depending on nature (corrosively, toxicity,
flammability etc.), quantity (weight, flow, pressure) and other parameters like temperature,
viscosity, colour, expansion etc. Thickness of pipe, its quality, welding pattern, flanging are to
be considered while selecting for high pressure and temperature. For extremely hazardous
chemicals, pipes are tested for inter granular corrosion and certified before used. Insulation is
applied .to preserve heat and tracing (contact tubing) for supplying heat to the inner material.
Various Codes like Indian Standards (hundreds of Indian Standards are prescribed for
variety of pipes, their fittings, couplings, threads, colour-code etc., see BIS Handbook), ASME
(American Code), British Standards (e.g. BS 1710, 1319, 537, 4159). and International
Standards ISO R 508 for colours for pipes for inland installations and on board ship. Indian
Boiler Regulations also provide details for pipe selection, design, fabrication and testing for
boiler purposes.
(2) Safety Aspects of Pipe work :

Generally probability of leakage from pipelines is proportional to the length of pipelines,
number of joints, valves, vents, bleeds, drains etc. and complexity such as number of pump
connections, recycle streams, hours of working, etc.
Therefore it is advisable to :
Minimise pipe length, branches and joints, and flanges on vacuum lines.Provide welding joints
for highly flammable or toxic chemical, good gaskets and gland packing, flange guard to deflect
leak downward, flexibility to allow thermal expansion, bellows subjected to axial movement,
drains and traps at visible places, removable plugs on sample points, adequate pipe supports,
walkways, platforms or working place, proper slopping for draining, overhead clearance for
vehicle movement (about 6 m), ergonomic design for valves to be operated and gauges to be
seen, earthing and bonding to remove static charge due to flow, overflow return from measuring
vessel to a storage tanks, painting with colour coding (IS:2379) and cathodic protection where
required.
More pipework in dyke is not desirable, particularly with hazardous chemical, as it may be
trapped in fire in the dyke. Similarly pipelines of flammable or toxic chemical should not be laid
in tunnel, as its leak may spread from one area to another. Electric cables or hot lines and
flammable gas or liquid lines should not run side by side. Solvent line should not be laid below
the corrosive line. Seam joints of rubber lined pipes should be kept upward.
Piping arrangement should be such that in case of failure at any point, the system can be
quickly isolated by closing valves, without disturbing the rest of the system. Flushing
arrangement should be provided for easy start up and maintenance. Pipe alleys should not run
over the walking alleys, normal layout should be near the walls or in sides. To allow for thermal
expansion special joints or loops should be provided.
Emergency control valves should be easily accessible. By-pass valves should be within
easy reach. Auto control valve should have bypass or manual valve which may be required in
the event of failure of auto control valve. Particularly at the outlet of bulk storage of hazardous
chemicals, manual and remotely controlled auto isolation valve both should be provided as near
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as possible to the outlet. Pressure relief device, liquid seal, manual vent valve etc. should be
provided to depressurize the system where necessary.
Many different types of valve exist. It is essential to choose the type best suited for the
particular operation it has to perform. For instance, if ball valves are to be fitted in a high
pressure position, they should be trunnion mounted. Where positive segregation of products is
required, say at a multi-product manifold, it is essential to provide block and bleed valves for
continuous monitoring of valve seats and seals. For positive isolation some form of soft .seat
with a wedge gate action is desirable.
Pumps must be designed not only to suit the immediate pipeline requirements, but
should take into account future developments. Thus, it may be necessary to stipulate a pump
casing pressure much higher than the pump can generate, if series or boosting pumping is
envisaged. Care should be taken to ensure that additional or larger impellers can be fitted as the
system demand grows. The maximum operating pressure for the pump mechanical seals should
match the pump capabilities. It may be necessary to provide product filtration to protect the
minimum clearance of the pump moving parts, particularly on modern high efficiency pumps.
Flexible pipes, joints and hoses should be safe, sound and properly tested. Bolted clips
are preferred to jubilee clips. Proper supports or hangers are necessary.
Glass piping, equipment or gauge needs external protection to protect against external impact or
internal bursting and flying fragments coming out.
Layout drawings of piping and fittings should be maintained and corrected when any
changes are incorporated.
Use of plastic piping is increasing. When it is used for hazardous gas like hydrogen,
LPG, chlorine etc., utmost care is required to ensure safe joint. Normally metal compression
fittings (rings and nuts) are used. Softer ring is preferred over hard compression ring. Nut should
not be loosened. It should be frequently checked for leakage. When any leakage is noticed, first
the supply cylinder valve should be closed instead of operating any electric switch or spark
generating device.
Semi-conductive material for hoses preferred over non-conductive or good conductive
material to avoid static electricity. The conductance should be between in 10-4 to 10-8 mho.
Failure of packing in valves, stems or flange gaskets, opening the wrong valve or failure
to depressurise the system before opening the joint and un insulated steam or hot lines can cause
accidents. Remedial measures are splash guard, replacement of gasket, tagging and work permit
procedure, colour coding and proper training and supervision.
In above ground pipe work which remains isolated during normal operations, thermal
relief system should be provided to protect against increasing ambient temperature.
 Underground Pipelines:
Petroleum products, crude oil, and natural gases are some of the more important
products transported by underground pipelines. The size may vary anywhere up to 50" diameter
and pressure up to 1200 psi. Pipelines are laid for long distances, often across national
boundaries. Booster stations are largely automatic stations requiring very fail-safe devices. The
pipelines are usually buried about 1 meter underground and must be protected against corrosion.
Leakage are likely -to occur. The pipelines have to be checked constantly. The biggest danger to
pipeline come from outside sources like unauthorised digging and from corrosion.
Pipelines should be given special additional protection at various points along the route
as road and river crossings. Generally, they may be placed at a greater depth beneath rivers and
ditches to allow for dredging or ditch deepening. Concrete protection slabs may be placed above
the pipe to warn anyone who may excavate in the area. If the ground is particularly stony or rock
filled, sand may be imported to cover the pipeline or a special protective wrap may be used.
During construction of a pipeline, all welds are visually examined. Generally, a percentage is
radio graphed to ensure that there is no cracking or undue slag intrusion and that there is suitable
109
fusion between the weld and the parent metal. The pipeline is wrapped to protect it against
corrosion once it is buried. The wrapping is normally tested by a 15,000 volt pressure test to
ensure there are no holes in it. Additionally, an impressed current cathodic protection system is
superimposed to protect against subsequent wrapping damage due to stones, roots, etc.
Pipeline control systems should be capable of recognising and measuring leak conditions
and initiating the appropriate action to shut down the system and minimise the amount of
product leaked.
 Pressure Relief Devices :If pressure inside a tank rises due to any reason, it may burst
the tank from its weakest part or cause leakage from where it is possible. The content
thus coming out is a material loss and in addition, it may create fire, explosion or toxic
hazard. Therefore to avoid such situation a pressure relief device is necessary.
A safety valveis a common pressure relief device. It can be set to a predetermined (desired)
pressure and when pressure exerted on it exceeds that pre-set value, it automatically opens and
allows the pressure to release in the atmosphere or in a catch-pot or drowning tank if the content
coming out is hot or hazardous. It automatically closes down also, after release of the excess
pressure. Safety valves are of four types - spring loaded, weight lever, solenoid and pilot. Safety
valves are used to release gas or vapour but not the liquid.
A Rupture Disc is required for the fast releaseor more flow from a bigger size hole or if internal
pressure is too high or too rapid or the material is sticky and chokes the safety valve.
This disc is selected based on many parameters (e.g. type of chemical, working pressure,
temperature, reaction, material of the tank, viscosity, corrosivity, toxicity and flammability of
the content etc.) One disc can be used for one pressure i.e. its set-pressure cannot be changed
like safety valve, and after rupture the same disc cannot be reused. Once opened, it cannot reset
at the lowered pressure like safety valve, and will allow the whole mass to come out till the hole
is closed or the disc is replaced. This is its disadvantage. Therefore, it is inadvisable on tanks
containing flammable gases or liquids. Rupture disc can be used in conjunction with a safety or
relief valve. Then the disc will burst first without affecting the valve. If pressure is further built
up, then the valve will open. Pressure gauge is provided between the disc and the valve to
indicate that the disc has opened and what is the bursting pressure. Imperfections in
manufacture, installation or caused by corrosion can result in premature failure of the disc. The
rupture discs are used to release gas, vapour or liquid.
Relief valves do not full open at set pressure like safety valve, but open slightly and then open
further as the pressure increases. They are of two types - spring loaded or power actuated by
electric, air, steam or hydraulic power activated by a pressure sensor in upstream of the valve.
Manually operated relief valves (like vent valve) are also possible but they are to be operated
after seeing the pressure in the pressure gauge or after hearing an alarm. Relief valves are used
for liquid discharge and not for gas or vapour.
Safety-relief valvescan be used either as a safety valve or a relief valve, depending on the
application. They are used for gas, vapour and liquids.
Fusible plug is a fitting filled with an alloy that melts at a predetermined temperature (not
pressure) and gives way to the material to come out. Fusible plugs are used in boilers, domestic
pressure cookers and compressed gas cylinders to prevent violent bursting. They are used for
gas, vapour and liquids of high temperature.
Fire or Explosion Reliefis provided by making the seam between the shell and the roof of the
tank deliberately weak so that it may rupture first and the shell stays intact.
Vacuum breaker is also a type of pressure relief device and works like a spring loaded safety or
relief valve but in the reversed direction. The outside atmospheric air pressure being higher than
that inside the vessel, opens it to break the vacuum. This is required when the vacuum may
increase to collapse the vessel. This device is used for air only.
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Thus a relevant pressure relief device can be selected from above discussion. Double Safety
Valves are required for bulk storage tanks of chlorine, ammonia, LPG, ethylene oxide etc., for
the purpose of double safety. In that case there should be slight difference in their pressure
settings so that functioning of both the valves can be verified by their one by one opening or no
need arising to functioning by the second valve as the first opened safety valve works
efficiently.
Where two or more safety valves are provided, their isolation valves are also provided to replace
them while keeping at least one on the line. In such case, isolation valves on the line should be
kept ‗locked open‘ so that they cannot be closed unknowingly or without authority.
If addition is controlled, pressure can also be controlled. In nitration process addition of nitric
acid should be at a slow or controlled rate, otherwise rapid pressure rise can burst the vessel.
Safety valvemay not be useful in that event. An efficient flowcontroller (automatic regulator) or
an excess flow valve with a niddle valve (for fine control) should be utilised in such condition,
along with the pressure relief device.
It is better and safer to keep the pressure under control by controlling heat source, temperature
or the rate of reaction.
Flare Systems - Purpose
 A system of Process Safety Management (PSM) critical A system of Process Safety
Management (PSM) critical mechanical equipment that gathers and safely burns mechanical
equipment that gathers and safely burns hydrocarbons from pressure hydrocarbons from
pressure-relieving and vapor relieving and vapor- depressurizing systems depressurizing
systems
 Must be continuously available Must be continuously available
 Must be reliable for years Must be reliable for years
 Capable of performing through all operating Capable of performing through all operating-
plant emergency conditions, including a site emergency conditions, including a site-wide
general power wide general power failure or a weather event including a hurricane failure or a
weather event including a hurricane
 Difficult to add equipment or modify because they are very Difficult to add equipment or
modify because they are very infrequently out of service as they serve many units that
infrequently out of service as they serve many units that are infrequently out of service.
Typical Flows to Flare Systems

 Typical Flows to Flare Systems „
 Emergency „
o Pressure relief flows Pressure relief flows „
o Emergency depressurization Emergency depressurization „
 Episodic
o Venting required for maintenance Venting required for maintenance „
o Venting required for regeneration Venting required for regeneration „
o Shutdown/Start Shutdown/Start-up operations (de up operations (de -inventorying)
inventorying)
 Continuous Continuous– 99+% of Typical Operation 99+% of Typical Operation „
o Sweep gas through the flare system piping Sweep gas through the flare system piping
o Process venting (continuous analyzer flows, gas Process venting (continuous analyzer
flows, gas seals, certain types of pressure control) seals, certain types of pressure
control) „
o Pressure Relief Valve leakage Pressure Relief Valve leakage.
 Flare System Major Components
 „Every flare system is unique and different Every flare system is unique and different
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 „Every flare system contains differential components Every flare system contains
differential components
 „Series of collection headers from sources Series of collection headers from sources
 „Knockout drum Knockout drum
 „Stack
o „Flare Tip Flare Tip
o „Liquid seal Liquid seal
o „Purge reduction device (stack seal) Purge reduction device (stack seal)
 „Integrated pilot system Integrated pilot system
 „Monitoring and operation instrumentation Monitoring and operation instrumentation
 „Flare hydrocarbon recovery systems Flare hydrocarbon recovery system.
 Hydraulic Design Hydraulic Design
 Flare header is sized to limit the back pressure of each Flare header is sized to limit the
back pressure of each
 Pressure relief device during various emergency events. Pressure relief device during
various emergency events.
 The hydraulic design is a li The hydraulic design is a line sizing / rating problem ne
sizing / rating problem
 Design minimizes the differential pressure to ensure Design minimizes the differential
pressure to ensure
 Each pressure relief device functions properly each pressure relief device functions
properly
 Design is based on specific Design is based on specific line size, line length and line
size, line length and
 Maximum expected relief load for each relief event maximum expected relief load for
each relief event.
Hydraulic Issues Hydraulic Issues:
Hydraulic issues specific to flare header design: Hydraulic issues specific to flare header design:
 Different relief events govern the size of various Different relief events govern the size
of various
 sections of the collection header sections of the collection header
 A variety of materials discharge to the flare system A variety of materials discharge to
the flare system
 Potential pressure discontinuities where pipe flows meet Potential pressure
discontinuities where pipe flows meet
 Volume expansion throughout header piping Volume expansion throughout header
piping
 High velocity and significant acceleration effects High velocity and significant
acceleration effects
Knock-Out Drum Out Drum
 Separates liquid from gas (2 phase separation) Separates liquid from gas (2 phase
separation)
 Prevents liquids from being discharged to atmosphere Prevents liquids from being
discharged to atmosphere
 Prevents or reduces smoke because of reduced liquid Prevents or reduces smoke because
of reduced liquid in the flame in the flame
 Increases flare tip life Increases flare tip life
 Allows draining of liquid prior to flare Allows draining of liquid prior to flare
 For reprocessing For reprocessing
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 For disposal For disposal
Flare System Purge Requirements
 „Purge gas composition Purge gas composition
 „Non
 -condensing condensing
– typically natural gas or nitrogen typically natural gas or nitrogen
 „Non
 -corrosive corrosive
 „Non
 -reactive to other gasses in the system reactive to other gasses in the system
 „Purge gas locations Purge gas locations
 „Upstream or downstream of a liquid seal Upstream or downstream of a liquid seal
 „End of major header or branch End of major header or branch
 „Purge must be continuous and measurable Purge must be continuous and measurable
 „Purge gas sweeps the header of O Purge gas sweeps the header of O2, corrosive,
reactive, , corrosive, reactive, or inert components
Purge Requirements: „
 System Requirements (manufacturer specified) System Requirements (manufacturer
specified)
 „Type of stack seal for air intrusion Type of stack seal for air intrusion
 „Flame stability Flame stability
 „Flare System Cooling Flare System Cooling
 „Offset pressure reduction after a hot release Offset pressure reduction after a hot release
 „Protect system until liquid seal can be re Protect system until liquid seal can be
reestablished established.
Flare Types Flare Types
 Single point Single point
 With or without smoke suppression With or without smoke suppression
 Vertical, elevated discharge point, but may be Vertical, elevated discharge point, but may
be horizontal (pit) horizontal (pit)
 May stage two single point flares for better control May stage two single point flares for
better control
 Multi-point
 Improved burning through multiple burning points Improved burning through multiple
burning points
 Smokeless Smokeless
 Divided into stages to facilitate better burning Divided into stages to facilitate better
burning
 Must operate with high back pressure Must operate with high back pressure
 Enclosed Enclosed
 Conceals flame from direct view Conceals flame from direct view
 Reduction in noise level Reduction in noise level
 Minimization of radiation Minimization of radiation.
Flare Tip Design
Provides safe and efficient burning of flare gases over Provides safe and efficient burning
of flare gases over wide flow conditions wide flow conditions
 Steam or air injection provided for smokeless operation Steam or air injection provided
for smokeless operation for most operating scenarios for most operating scenarios
 Smokeless operation a function of flow Smokeless operation a function of flow
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 Smokeless operation a function of gas composition Smokeless operation a function of
gas composition
 Maintain flame stability Maintain flame stability
 May require multiple flares and types May require multiple flares and types.
Flare System Operational Controls
 Steam or air flow to flare tip Steam or air flow to flare tip
 Cooling (minimum flow) Cooling (minimum flow)
 Protection for metal Protection for metal
 Eliminate internal burning (center steam) Eliminate internal burning (center steam)
 Smoke control Smoke control
 Upper steam Upper steam
 Steam Air tube steam (larger tip size only) Steam Air tube steam (larger tip size only)
 Center steam Center steam
 Keep steam hot (minimize condensate) Keep steam hot (minimize condensate)
 Water seal level Water seal level
 Flow and temperature control Flow and temperature control
 Staging control Staging control
 Knock
 -out drum liquid flow out drum liquid flow
 Assist gas flow Assist gas flow
 Collection header purge Collection header purge
 Oxygen level in flare header Oxygen level in flare header
 Pilot ignition Pilot ignition 29
Flare System Monitoring Instrumentation Flare System Monitoring Instrumentation
 Flare system operation monitoring Flare system operation monitoring
 Video camera Video camera
 Pilot gas flow and temperature Pilot gas flow and temperature
 Relief gas flow, pressure, temperature and composition Relief gas flow, pressure,
temperature and composition
 Knock
 -out drum level out drum level
 Water seal level, pressure, and temperature Water seal level, pressure, and temperature
 Steam flow to flare Steam flow to flare
 Collection header purge gas flow Collection header purge gas flow
 Flare gas recovery Flare gas recovery
 Control and monitoring equipment may not be available for Control and monitoring
equipment may not be available for maintenance with flare system in service
maintenance with flare system in service
 Each flare system monitoring requirement is unique and Each flare system monitoring
requirement is unique and can be different
Flare Recovery System
 Gas collection for routine operations limited in outlets when Gas collection for routine
operations limited in outlets when
 pressure is low pressure is low
 Low pressure streams generally have 1 of 4 outlets Low pressure streams generally have
1 of 4 outlets
 Lower pressure system (often not available) Lower pressure system (often not available)
 Eduction to higher pressure system Eduction to higher pressure system
 Compressor to increase pressure Compressor to increase pressureFlare
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 Eduction has some, but limited, applicability Eduction has some, but limited,
applicability.
 Pressure of eduction must be considered Pressure of eduction must be considered.
 Acceptability of stream being educted Acceptability of stream being educted.
 High H2S in stream is often a factor High H2S in stream is often a factor
 Compressor can be a viable option Compressor can be a viable option.
 Wet Gas compressor for FCCs is an example of viable Wet Gas compressor for FCCs is
an example of viable Option„If no compressor nearby, cost of new compressor often is If
no compressor nearby, cost of new compressor often isprohibitive prohibitive32.
 Flare Recovery System Flare Recovery System.
 Flare hydrocarbon gas recovery systems Flare hydrocarbon gas recovery systems
 More common in refineries More common in refineries.
 „Less common in chemical plants Less common in chemical plants.
 Flaring generally last preferred destination Flaring generally last preferred destination
 Any gases sent to flare are lost product for company Any gases sent to flare are lost
product for company.
 Flaring has regulatory, environmental and community Flaring has regulatory,
environmental and community.
 impacts that companies prefer to not have impacts that companies prefer to not have.
Flare Operation Flare Operation
 „Maintain stable flame Maintain stable flame
- EPA 40 CFR 60.18 defines EPA 40 CFR 60.18 defines
 requirements for stable flame: requirements for stable flame:
 „Have a continuous pilot with monitoring Have a continuous pilot with monitoring
 „Limits minimum heat content of flare gas: Limits minimum heat content of flare gas:
 „200 BTU/scf for non 200 BTU/scf for non
 -assist flare assist flare
 „300 BTU/scf for assist flare 300 BTU/scf for assist flare
 „Maximum exit velocity based on heat content of flare Maximum exit velocity based on
heat content of flare
 gas (60 gas (60
– 400 FPS) 400 FPS)
 „Flame may not always be visible Flame may not always be visible
 „Hydrogen Hydrogen Low BTU gas Low BTU gas
- e.g. CO e.g. CO35
 Operation Operation -Weather Effects Weather Effects
 „Wind
 „Alter flame shape Alter flame shape
 „Sheer unburned hydrocarbons Sheer unburned hydrocarbons
 „Extinguish pilot flame Extinguish pilot flame
 „Physical damage to equipment Physical damage to equipment
 „Rain
 Extinguish pilot flame Extinguish pilot flame
 „Extreme conditions (i.e. hurricane) Extreme conditions (i.e. hurricane)
 „Loss of steam Loss of steam
 „Loss of power Loss of power
 „Extinguish pilot & main flame
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Flame proof Fittings :Electric fittings like motors, starters, switches, lamps, tubes etc., near the
storage tanks containing flammable materials (see foregoing Part 7.3 for definition) should be of
approved flameproof types and conforming to Indian Standards like 2148, 4691, 5571, 5780,
7693, 8239, 8240 etc. Flameproof electric fitting is most essential if the material is having flash
point less than 23 0C or if it is to be heated upto or above its boiling point, and also in case of
solvent distillation. Other sources of ignition from welding, cutting, open flame, smoking,
sparking, friction etc. should also be avoided.
MECHANISM OF MECHANICAL FAILURE THAT LEAD TO A LOSS OF

CONTAINMENT PREVENTION STRATEGY
Failure Analysis and Prevention: Fundamental causes of failure This chapter defines the
failure and elaborates the conditions for failure of mechanical components. Further, the
fundamental causes of failure associated with design, materials, manufacturing and service have
been described in detail. Keywords: Failure analysis, causes of failure, modes of failure, fatigue,
creep, SCC, design deficiency, improper material, defective raw material, poor maintenance,
improper processing, failure mechanism vs. design criteria
Introduction: The failure of engineering components frequently leads to disruption in services
to the public at large. To avoid reoccurrence of the failure of engineering component during
service, it is important that whenever failure occurs, the same is thoroughly investigated to
establish primary factor and other important factors that led to failure so that suitable
recommendations can be made to avoid similar failure in future. Failure analysis and its
prevention needs a systematic approach of investigation for establish the important causes of the
failure. Therefore, it is worth to familiarize with fundamental causes of failure of mechanical,
general approach to be used for the failure analysis and failure analysis of welded joints.
Fundamental causes of the failure: In general, an engineering component or assembly is
considered to have failed under any of the following three conditions when the component is
a) inoperable,
b) operates but doesn‘t perform the intended function and
c) operates but safety and reliability is very poor.
However, metallurgical failure of a mechanical component can occurs in many ways
a) elastic deformation is beyond acceptable limit,
b) excessive and unacceptable level of plastic deformation,
c) complete fracture has taken place and
d) loss of dimension due to wear and tear besides variety of reasons. In two chapters, failure
analysis shall be oriented mainly towards the metallurgical failure of mechanical
components.
Elastic deformation : Elastic deformation occurs when stiffness of the component is less and
the same is primarily determined by modulus of elasticity and cross section. Elastic deformation
can lead to the failure of mechanical components especially in high precision assemblies and
machinery where even small elastic deformation under operating conditions is not acceptable.
Plastic deformation: Excessive plastic deformation of the mechanical components can lead to
the failure in two conditions a) externally applied stress is beyond the yield strength limit and b)
component is subjected to applied stress lower than yield stress but exposed to high temperature
conditions enough to cause creep. Both the cases should be handled using different approaches.
To avoid the failure by plastic deformation owing to externally applied stress more than yield
strength, the cross section should be designed after taking proper factor of safety and
considering the yield strength of materials of which component is to be made. For mechanical
components that are expected to be exposed in high temperature creep resistant materials should
be selected so that under identical load condition, low steady state creep rate of creep resistant
materials can allow desired longer creep life.
116
Fracture: Fracture of mechanical components is usually caused by a) overloading, b) fatigue
and c) stress rupture. Failure due to overloading can occur in many ways such as accidental
loading, gradual reduction in load resisting cross sectional area of component due to wear and
tear, deterioration in mechanical properties of component due to unfavorable metallurgical
transformations during service. To avoid failure due to overloading well thought out design
should be developed in light prevailing technological understanding and stress calculations
while regular monitoring the condition of component during the service should also be done
using suitable techniques and proper inspection and testing schedules. 39.2.4 Fatigue, SCC and
Creep the catastrophic fractures due to fatigue take place without any plastic deformation. The
fatigue fracture occurs only when the extent of variation of the load on the component in respect
of the loading parameters like stress range, stress amplitude, range of stress intensity factor and
maximum stress, is large enough and type of load is mainly tensile or shear. As first stage of
fatigue, crack nucleation and subsequent table growth of the crack during fatigue can occur only
under tensile and shear load by mode I and mode II or mode III respectively. Fatigue failure can
occur not just in components with stress raiser and internal defects but also in well polished
component having uniform cross-section. However, fatigue life of the components having stress
raiser and defects is generally found lower than those of smooth surface and uniform cross
section. Engineering components that are expected to experience the fatigue loading are
designed for specific life e.g. 1 million load cycles, 2 million load cycles, 10 million load cycles
and infinite life. The fatigue life (Number of load cycle) of a weld joint is primarily decided by
the stress range for a given joint configuration. Accordingly, weld cross section is designed to
have stress range within the specified limit for typical particular designed fatigue life. Fracture
surface of a component failed by fatigue exhibits concentric circular arcs usually called beach
marks. Stress rupture is another mechanism causing fracture of those components which are
subjected to high temperature exposure at high stresses. The stress rupture is third and last stage
of the creep where creep takes place at increasing rate as function of time by grain boundary
sliding mechanism that nucleates voids and subsequently coalescence of voids lead to fracture.
Generally, the surface of a component subjected to stress rupture has many cracks and severe
necking near the fracture surface which can be seen even by naked eyes.
Loss of Dimension: Loss of dimension takes placed primarily due to removal of the material
from the functional surface by variety of wear mechanisms such as abrasion, adhesion, corrosion
erosion etc. Gradual loss of the material from the functional surface eventually can lead to
reduction in load resisting cross sectional area to such an extent that failure takes place by any of
the above mentioned mechanisms like excessive elastic deformation, plastic deformation,
overloading, fatigue, creep or stress rupture singly or in combination with other mechanisms.
Moreover, the resistance to wear of materials by a particular mechanism is determined by a
combination of mechanical and chemical properties of materials.
Fundamental Causes of failure: The failure of an engineering component in actual working
conditions can occur due to very large of factors related with design, materials, manufacturing,
service conditions etc. To have systematic understanding on various factors which can lead to
metallurgical failure of engineering components, these can be groups under following headings:
Improper design Improper selection of materials Defects and discontinuities in metal itself
Improper processing of materials Poor service conditions Poor assembling Poor maintenance
Lack of Design: A deficient design frequently causes failure of engineering components under
external load. The deficiency in design of a component can be in various forms such as presence
of stress raisers owing to sharp change in cross section, changing the design without proper
consideration of its influence on stress distribution especially in high stress areas of the
component, duplicating a successful design for more severe loading conditions, design is
developed without full knowledge of stress conditions owing to complexity of the geometry and
inability to use proper criteria for designing the engineering components. It is believed that in
general more than 50% of the metallurgical failures of engineering components occur due to
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localization of the stresses in presence of stress raisers such as sharp fillets, notches, keyways,
holes etc. Localization of the stress initiates the cracks and facilitates their propagation hence
premature fracture is encouraged by presence of stress raisers. Fatigue failure is mostly triggered
by these stress raisers present either at the surface or in sub-surface region. Premature failures
are also observed when management encouraged by excellent performance of an engineering
component with one system decides to put the same component on some other similar kind of
system but of higher capacity without giving full consideration to the stress analysis which will
be developed in the component on the new system. In new conditions may not be compatible to
the same components in respect of material, design, and service conditions etc. which can lead
to premature failure.
Sometimes even slight modification in design made to facilitate the manufacturing at the shop
floor either (in absence or ambiguity in design specification) can lead to excessive stress
concentration and so the premature failure engineering components. A deficient design can also
results from important factors like inability to calculate the type and magnitude of stresses
accurately and dependence of designer on under of tensile data for the design purpose which
may not always be equally relevant. Designers frequently also come across the situation when
accurate calculations and clear analysis of stress (under prevailing technological understanding
and capabilities) is not practicable due to complexity in geometry of the component.
Improper selection of the materials Selection of a material for developing the design of a
mechanical component during service in light of operating conditions should be based on
expected failure mechanisms such as ductile or brittle fracture, creep, fatigue, wear etc. For each
type of expected failure mechanism a combination of the mechanical, physical and chemical
properties should be possessed by the material to be selected for developing a design. For
example, if failure of a component is expected to occur by excessive plastic deformation at room
temperature and high temperature conditions then yield strength and creep respectively will be
important criterion for design. Similarly, if failure of a component is expected to occur by
fracture under overloads, fluctuating loads and impact loads then ultimate strength, endurance
strength and impact strength respectively should be considered for design purpose.
Deficient material selection can occur due to reliance on tensile data for selection of materials,
and inability to select of metal in light of the expected failure mechanism and so as to develop
suitable criteria for the design purpose. The problem of the materials selection is further
complicated when the performance of materials varies as function of time e.g. creep, corrosion,
embrittlement etc. The selection of the material for design purpose is still being made on the
basis of the tensile data available in metal hand books despite of the fact that tensile data does
not correctly reflect the performance of the materials under different types of load and service
conditions. The criteria for the selection of metal for designing a component for a particular
service conditions must be based on the expected failure mechanism. Practically there are no
fixed criteria for selection of metal while designing the component. Design criteria for working
condition of each component should be analyzed carefully and then based expected failure
mechanism suitable design criteria may be developed. Only as a guide following table shows
few failure mechanisms and the corresponding design criteria that may be useful for designing
of the engineering component.
Presence of defects and discontinuities in raw/stock metal: Metal being used for fabrication
of an engineering component may be deficient in many ways depending upon the thermal and
mechanical stresses experienced by it during manufacturing steps used for developing the stock.
For example rods, plates, and flats produced by bulk deformation based processes like rolling,
forging and extrusion may have unfavorable flow of grains, surface cracks etc. while castings
may have blown holes, porosity and dissolved gases in solid state. Components developed using
such raw materials and stocks having internal discontinuity and minute surface defects generally
offer poor mechanical performance especially under fatigue load conditions as these
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discontinuities provide easy path for fracture. Therefore, raw materials away from fracture
location and near the fracture surface of the failed part must be studied using suitable
techniques. To identify the presence of such discontinuities in raw/stock material more attention
should be paid to the location wherefrom cracks have grown to cause fracture. 39.3.4
Unfavorable manufacturing processing conditions A wide range of manufacturing processes are
used for obtaining the desired size, shape and properties in stock material which includes
primary and secondary shaping processes such as castings, forming, machining and welding
apart from the processes like heat treatment, case hardening, surface coating etc. that are
primarily designed to impart the desired combination of properties either at the surface or core
of the raw materials as dictated by the requirement of the applications. The selection of
inappropriate combination of the process parameters for each of above mentioned
manufacturing processes can lead to development of discontinuities, defects, unfavorable
transformation and metallurgical changes and so deterioration in the performance of final
product during the service. These imperfections and discontinuities are mostly process specific
and can exist in variety of forms due to improper selection of manufacturing process and their
parameters. Therefore, due care must be taken by failure analyst to investigate the presence of
any defect, discontinuity or unfavorable features in end produced by manufacturing processes
and failed prematurely during the service. Presence of any undesirable feature or discontinuity
in failed component not just near the fracture surface but also in new one or at the location away
from the fracture surface indicates selection of inappropriate manufacturing process conditions.
Further, to establish the reason for development of discontinuities and defects, manufacturing
process and its parameters should be analyzed carefully to see whether these were compatible
with the raw material or not. Hence, the failure analyst or investigation team members must
have expertise in materials and manufacturing process in question in order to establish the cause
of failure owing to deficiency in manufacturing stage of material. Just to have an idea, few
manufacturing processes along with commonly found defects and discontinuities that can be
potential sources of the failure occurring due to abused manufacturing condition have been
described in the following sections. Forming and forging These are bulk deformation based
groups of manufacturing processes in which desired size and shape is obtained by applying
mostly compressive, shear and tensile force to ensure the plastic flow of metal as per needs. In
manufacturing of defect and discontinuity free formed/forged products, the ductility of the raw
material plays a very crucial role. Forming/forging can be performed either at room temperature
or elevated temperature according to the ductility and yield strength of the raw material. To
increase the ductility and reduce yield strength so as to facilitate bulk deformation is commonly
performed at high temperature. Apart from ductility and temperature, the rate of deformation
also significantly determines the success of bulk deformation based processes. Lack of ductility
owing to inappropriate stock temperature and excessively high rate of deformation can lead to
cracks and other continuities in end product.
Machining: Machining is a secondary shaping process and is also considered as negative
process as unwanted material is removal form stock materials to get the desired size and shape.
Further, the material from the stock is removed in the form of small chips by largely shear
mechanism. However in some of the advanced machining processes the application of the
localized intense heat is also used for removing the material from the stock by melting and
ablation. Improper machining procedure including unsuitable selection of machining process,
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tool, cutting fluid, process parameters etc. can lead to development of undesirable features such
as feed marks, overheating, decarburization, residual stresses and loss of alloying elements from
the surfaces of the machined components. These can act as a source of stress raiser and provide
easy site for nucleation of the cracks, softening of materials due to loss of alloying element. In
case, failure triggered by discontinuities generated during machining, the failure analyst should
look into the compatibility of machining procedure for a given material to establish the cause of
the failure and make suitable recommendations to avoid the reoccurrence of the similar failure.
Welding The development of a joint by welding and allied processes like brazing and soldering,
thermal spraying etc. generally involves application of localized heat, pressure or both, with or
without filler.
However, the weld joint itself is frequently considered as discontinuity owing to presence of
heterogeneity in respect of the mechanical, chemical, structural properties and residual stress
state a compared to the base metal or the components being joined besides the existence of weld
discontinuities within the acceptable limit in form of notches, porosities, poor weld bead profile,
cracks etc. Owing to presence of the above undesirable features in weld joints joint efficiency is
generally found less than 100%. Therefore, weld joints are not considered very reliable for
critical applications. The most of the weld discontinuities are welding process and base metal
specific. If failure has been triggered by weld discontinuities then failure analysis must look into
welding procedure specification and work man ship related aspects to establish the causes of
failure. Heat treatment Heat treatment of many metal systems like iron, aluminium, magnesium,
copper, titanium etc is a common industrial practice to obtain the desired combination of
properties as per needs of the end application of the component. Heat treatment mostly involves
a sequence of the controlled heating up to predetermined temperature followed by holding for
some time (soaking) and then controlled cooling.
Each step of heat treatment from heating to the controlled cooling is determined by the purpose
of heat treatment, method of manufacturing, size and shape of the component. Thus,
inappropriate selection of any steps of heat treatment namely heating rate, peak temperature,
soaking time and cooling rate can result in unfavorable metallurgical transformation and
mechanical properties that can eventually lead to failure. For example, overheating of
hardenable steel components for prolong duration can cause oxidation, decarburization,
excessive grain growth, dissolution of the fine precipitates, increased hardenability, high
temperature gradient during quenching and thus increased cracking tendency. Similarly,
unfavorable cooling rate can produce undesirable combination of the properties which may be
lead to poor performance of the component during the service. Therefore, hardness test on the
failed component is commonly performed to conform of heat treatment was done properly. In
case, failure investigation indicating that it was triggered by unfavorable properties and structure
generated during heat treatment, then failure analyst should look into the compatibility of heat
treatment parameters with material, size and shape of the component to establish the cause
potential of the failure and make suitable recommendations. Chemical cleaning Surface of the
engineering components is frequently cleaned using mild hydrogen based chemical and acids.
Sometimes, during the cleaning hydrogen gets diffused into the sub-surface region of the metal
if the same is not removed by post cleaning heat treatment or followed by development of the
coatings immediately then hydrogen is left in the subsurface zone which can subsequently be the
cause of the failure by hydrogen embrittlement or cold cracking. If the failure investigation
120
indicates the possibility of hydrogen embrittlement or cold cracking then failure analyst should
look into the detailed procedure used for chemical cleaning of the failed engineering
components besides measuring the hydrogen dissolved in subsurface region using suitable
method. 39.3.5 Poor assembling Error in assembly can result due to various reasons such as
ambiguous, insufficient or inappropriate assembly procedure, misalignment, poor workmanship.
Sometimes, failures are also caused by the inadvertent error performed by the workers during
the assembly. For example, failure of nut and stud assembly (used for holding the car wheel) by
fatigue can occur owing to lack of information regarding sequence of tightening the nuts and
torque to be used for tightening purpose; under such conditions any sort of loosening of nut
which is subjected to external load will lead to fatigue failure. 39.3.6 Poor service conditions
Failure of an engineering component can occur due to abnormal service condition experienced
by them for which they are not designed. These abnormal service conditions may appear in the
form of exposure of component to excessively high rate of loading, unfavorable oxidative,
corrosive, erosive environment at high or low temperature conditions for which it has not been
designed. The contribution of any abnormality in service conditions on the failure can only be
established after thorough investigation regarding compatibility of the design, manufacturing
(such as heat treatment) and material of the failed components with condition experienced by
them during the service. To avoid any catastrophic failure of critical components during the
service usually well planned and thought out maintenance plan is developed which involves
periodic inspection and testing of the components that is crucial for uninterrupted operations of
entire plant. For a sound maintenance strategy, it is important that procedure of inspection and
testing methods developed in such a way that they indicate the conditions of the component
from the failure tendency point of view by the anticipated and expected failure mechanism. Any
inspection and testing that doesn‘t give information about the condition of the components with
respect to failure tendency by the anticipated failure mechanism should consider redundant. For
example, a typical sound test is conducted in Indian railways on arrival training at each big
station for identifying the assembly condition; similarly, the soundness of the earthen pot is also
assessed by sound test. 39.3.7 Poor maintenance strategy The failure of many moving
mechanical components takes place due to poor maintenance plan. A well developed
maintenance plan indicating each and every important step to be used for maintenance such
what, when, where, who and how for maintenance, is specified explicitly. Lack of information
on proper schedule of maintenance, procedure of the maintenance, frequently causes premature
failure of moving components. For example, absence of lubrication of proper kind in right
quantity and conditions frequently leads to the failure of assemblies working under sliding or
rolling friction conditions.
Earthing& Bonding:Tanks and piping containing flammable substance should have double
earthings of appropriate type. Earthing pit should be recharged periodically for easy flow of the
current. Resistance should be measured (below 10 K-ohm) and recorded. IS:3043 is useful for
earthing code. Filling (inlet) pipe should be extended up to bottom or an inner limpet coil should
be provided to avoid free fall and static charge due to material flow.
Pipe joints/flanges should have copper bonding to maintain electric continuity. Flange-guard is
useful to divert the leakage downwards.
While loading or unloading flammable liquids or gases, the vehicle (road or rail tanker) should
also be earthed during such operation.
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Protective Media:Low-boiling chemicals (e.g. Methyl bromide, ethylene oxide,ethylamine),
toxic gases (e.g. chlorine, phosgene, HCN, NH3) or polymerizing materials (e.g. MIC, styrene,
acrylonitrile) should be kept below their boiling point/flash point. For this purpose either
underground tank or insulation, or jacket and brine circulation, or refrigeration, or water
showering etc. are employed. Brine and refrigerant gases are protective cooling media.
Chemicals of higher melting point (e.g. phthalicanhydride, dinitrobenzene, naphthalene) are to
be kept hot above their melting point for their easy flow in liquid state. For this purpose steam
jacket, limpet coil or tracings are used. Here steam is a protective heating medium.
Flammable chemicals or solvents of low boiling or flash points need inert gas blanketing (e.g.
N2, CO2). For examples, acetaldehyde, acrylonitrile, benzene, EO, H2S etc. need such inert gas
blanketing to prevent spark contact and fire.
When a safety or breather valve opens,first inert gas comes out and not the flammable vapour.
Here inert gas is a protective medium. Chemicals which catch fire in air (e.g. phosphorous, CS2)
are to be kept in water and chemicals which explode in water (e.g. sodium metal) are to be kept
in kerosene and protected. Here water and kerosene are protective media.
Water curtains, sprinklers (spray nozzles) and remote operating valve are provided for chemicals
like acetaldehyde, ammonia, HCN, where water can dissolve their vapourand keep the tank cool
in case of fire. Water can also be used as a scrubbing medium for such water soluble gases.
Water sprinklers should work at a rate of 10 Lit/m2/min. Foam injection system (in atmospheric
tanks) should work at a rate of 4.5 Lit/m2/min to extinguish the fire.
Thermal insulation (e.g. vermiculite cement of 2 inch thickness) for pressure storage and PUF
insulation for refrigerated storage are also useful. Thus selection and application of appropriate
protective media for chemicals are always desired for safety of their storage or processes.
Personal Protective and Fire Fighting Equipment :While working at storage, process,
handling, use or transfer of chemicals, appropriate personal protective equipment (helmet,
goggles, face shield, gloves, boots, apron, respirator etc.) should be worn by workers to protect
themselves in case of any accidental discharge or exposure. Similarly a trained Fire Fighting
team is also required to use appropriate Fire Fighting equipment. Training for use and
maintenance of such equipment is most essential.
.
Gauges, Valves, Remote and Auto Controls Miscellaneous :
Storage safety is a wide subject and includes so many things. Despite above discussion a few
things are to be mentioned. There should be minimum connections to a tank. Pipe joints should
be safe and sound. Stiffeners and other supports should be properly provided. Staircase with
handrail and working platform should be provided on the tank. For hazardous chemicals in bulk,
the main outlet valve should be remotely controlled. Unloading bay should have ready
connections with tankfarm piping and fixed location for truck/tanker parking. Tanker carrying
flammable material should have spark arrester (muffler) over his exhaust pipe.
Dump vessel (one empty tank of the identical design to the storage tank) should be installed
with ready connections to transfer the content in case of emergency. If possible, design should
be to transfer by gravity.
Pump should be of proper design and capacity. Double mechanical seals should be provided to
avoid gland leakage. Flange cap on flange-joint can divert the leakage downwards. Necessary
drain and sample points should be provided.
In acids and alkali tankfarm, acid proof lining/flooring, water showers, cautionary notice,
mechanical lifting device (e.g. trolley) and necessary PPE should be available. For spill control
lime, sand, soda ash and ample water should be readily available.
Near tanks of toxic or flammable material, gas and flame detector with alarm, high
pressure/temperature alarm, auto controllers, necessary scrubber or flare connections, FFE, PPE,
good lighting and ventilation, safety showers, dyke, connections to ETP (Effluent Treatment
122
Plant), emergency (alternate) power and water supply, emergency kit and tools, lightening
conductor, wind sock, etc. should be provided as per requirement.
Modern sophisticated plants are run by latest control rooms where all process parameters are
controlled and recorded from this control room. The latest instrumentation and computer control
technology (e.g. DCS) is utilised.
Pressure Vessels and their Safety Aspects :Pressure vessels are of two types : (1) Fired
Pressure Vessels which include Boilers, Economisers, SteamPipes, Fittings etc., as per section 2,
2A, 2D of theIndian Boilers Act 1923, and (2) Unfired Pressure Vessels which include reaction
vessels, autoclaves, digestors, heat-exchangers, receivers, containers, compressors, vulcanisers,
agers, kiers, dyeing vessels, jacketed kettles etc. operating above the atmospheric pressure.
The portable gas cylinders, metal bottles used for storage or transport of compressed gases or
liquefied or dissolved gases under pressure, gas tankers, vessels for nuclear energy, refrigeration
plant of less than 3 TPD capacity, vessels operating below 1 kg/cm2 etc., are not covered under
the purview of the pressure vessels.
Chapter-5
10.1 Fire Definition:Fire is a chemical chain reaction (Oxidation Process) initiated by factors
such as Combustible materials, Air & Heat source with ignition temperature exerting heat, light
and poisonous gases/ smoke/ CO2 gas due to combustion.
Classification of fire:CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE AND EXTINGUISHERS

Table A and B give the classes of fire (A to E) and portable fire extinguishers necessary
for them.
Table A :Classes of Fire and Extinguishers
Class of Description Extinguishing IS No.
123
fire Medium
A Fires involving ordinary combustible Water type 934
materials like wood, paper, textiles, (Soda acid)
fibres and vegetables etc. where the Water type (gas 940
cooling effect of water is essential for pressure)
the extinction of fires. Water type (constant 6234
air pressure),
Anti – freeze types
and
Water buckets
B Fire in flammable liquids like oils, Chem. Foam 933
grease, solvents, Petroleum products, Carbon dioxide 5507
varnishes paints etc. where a blanketing 10474
effect is essential. 2878
8149
Dry Powder 2171
4308
Dry Powder 10658
Mechanical foam 10204
Halon 1211 11108
Sand buckets
C Fires involving gaseous substances Carbon dioxide 2878
under pressure where it is necessary to 8149
dilute the burning gas at a very fast rate Dry powder 2171
with an inert gas or powder. Dry powder 4308
Halon 1211 11108
D Fire involving metals like magnesium, Dry powder 2171
aluminum,zinc, potassium etc., where Special dry powder 4861
the burning metal is reactive to water for metal fire 11833
and which requires special extinguishing Sand buckets
media or technique.
E Fires involving electrical equipment Carbon dioxide 2878
where the electrical non-conductivity of Dry chemical 2171
the extinguishing media is of first powder 4308
importance. Halon 1211 11108
When electrical
equipment is de-
energized, same as
for Classes A & B
Sand buckets.
* Class E is omitted is some literature (eg. IS: 2190)
Class K is suggested for fire involving cooking oils.
Table B :Types of Extinguishers and suitability for Fire (IS:2190)
Type of Extinguisher IS No. For type of Fires

A B C D
1. Water type (Soda acid) 934 S NS NS NS
4406 * *
2 Water type (gas cartridge) 940 S NS NS NS
124
3 Water type (stored pressure) 6234 S NS NS NS
4 Chemical foam type 933 NS S NS NS
5507
10474
5 Mechanical foam type 10204 NS S NS NS
6 Dry powder type 2171 NS S NS NS
10658
7 Dry powder type 11833 NS NS NS S
8 CO2 type 2878 NS S S NS
8149
9 Halon 1211 type 11108 NS S S NS
* S = Suitable , NS = Not Suitable
125
NFPA classification of Fire Extinguishers
126
Class A : Fires in ordinary combustible material, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber
and many plastics, that require the heat-absorbing coolant effect of water
or water solutions, the coating effects of certain dry chemicals that retard
combustion, or the interruption or the combustion chain reaction by the
dry, chemical or halogenated agents.
Class B: Fires in flammable or combustible liquids, flammable gases, grease and
similar material that must be put out by excluding air (oxygen), by
inhibiting the release of combustible vapor with AFFF or FFFP agents, or
by interrupting the combustion chain reaction.
ClassC : Fires in live electrical equipment. The operator's safety requires the use of
electrically non conductive extinguishing agents, such as dry chemical as
halon. When electric equipment is de-energized, extinguishers for class A
or B fires maybe used.
ClassD : Fires in certain combustible matals, such as Mg, Ti, Zr, Na, & K that
require a heat absorbing extinguishing medium that does not react with
the burning metals.
ClassK : Class K fires involve cooking oils. This is the newest of the fire classes.
Common Causes of Industrial Fire:

One study of more than 19000 fires in industrial plants revealed the following causes of fire:
Causes of Fire %
Electrical 19
Friction 14
Foreign Substance 12
Open flames 9
Smoking & matches 8
Spontaneous ignition 8
Hot surfaces 7
Not determinable 7
Combustion sparks 6
Miscellaneous 5
Overhead materials 3
Static electricity 2
100%
127
Another study of more than 25000 fires reported to the Factory Mutual Engineering
Corporation from 1968 to 1977 gives following causes:
Causes of Fire % Share
Electrical 22
Incendiaries (deliberate 10
fire)
Smoking 9
Hot surfaces 9
Friction 7
Overheated materials 7
Cutting & Welding 7
Burner flames 6
Spontaneous ignition 5
Exposure 4
Combustion sparks 3
Miscellaneous 3
Mechanical sparks 2
Molten substances 2
Static sparks 2
Chemical action 1
Lightening 1
Total 100
128
Above percentage indicates the frequency of fire causes. It is not indicative of their relative
importance at particular plant, place or property. These are old figures and old causes.
Change in causes is always possible.
These causes can be subdivided in many sub causes as under:
Sparks may be mechanical, electrical, static, due to cutting and welding etc.
Hot surfaces may be due to bearings and shafting, stoves, heaters and small appliances,
petrol, kerosene, LPG, acetylene or alcohol torches, potable furnaces, blow torches, smoke
pipes, chimneys, flues and stacks, stationary heating devices, gas fired appliances viz. stoves,
heaters, boilers, salamanders etc.
Spontaneous ignition is due to oxidation of fuel where air is sufficient but ventilation
is insufficient to carry away the heat as fast as it is generated. Exposure to high temperature
and, presence of moisture increase the tendency toward spontaneous ignition. We unslaked
lime and sodium chlorate, rags or wash saturated with linseed oil or paint, sawdust, hay
grains etc., and finally divided metals promote spontaneous ignition.
Hazardous chemicals and metals like phosphorous, sodium, potassium, oxidising
materials nitro-cellulose film and pyroxylin plastics, fuels solvents, lubricants, wood, paper,
cloth and rubber products, sprays and mists, LPG and other flammable or explosive gases are
known for fire hazards.
Hyperboles, pyrophoric substances, adiabatic compression, radiation, catalytic action,
natural sources, lightening, cooking equipment, electrical distribution and installation, static
electricity, arson, rubbish, playing with fire, hand tools, pallet material storage and explosive
dust, gas, vapour or air mixture are all causes contributing to fire.
10.2 Fire Load Determination :

After fire detection and alarm system and before fire suppression or extinguishing system, it
is necessary to know the fire load so that based on that, amount of fire extinguishing system
can be designed and number of fixed and portable fire extinguishers can be calculated.
Fire load is the concentration or amount of combustible material in a building per sq.
mt. of floor area. It is defined as the amount of heat released in kilo calories by the fuel per
square meter area of the premises. Fire loads are useful to calculate the water requirement to
quench the fire, as when water comes in contact with burning surface it absorbs heat. I cc of
water absorbs I cal of heat when the' temperature is raised by 1°C. The fact should also be
considered that all the fuel does not burn at a time and all the water does not absorb heat as it
flows away.
Bombay Regional Committee (BRC) on fire has prescribed rules for fire load
calculation. Fire loads are calculated to assess potentiality of fire hazard, need of amount of
fire prevention and protection systems (e.g. water or other agent) and amount of premiums
required for fire insurance.
Fire load classification is as follows:

Low fire load - Less than 1 lakh B.Th.U.
Moderate fire load - Between 1 to 2 lakhs B.Th.U.
Higher fire load - More than 2 lakhs B.Th.U
See Rule 66A(11) of the Gujarat Factories Rules for area calculation by ABCD formula.
For fire load calculation see-last Part 8.
129
WORKED EXAMPLES :
Fire load calculation:
For the purpose of solving examples, following information needs to be understood.An
important factor in establishing the basis for the assessment of the fire risk pertaining to any
building is the concept of 'fire load' which indicates the quantity of heat liberated per unit
area when a - building and its contents are completely burnt.All occupancies/buildings, etc.
can be graded according to their fire hazard and are to be provided for with suitable fire
precautions on the basis of the fire load.Hence, grading of buildings according to both, fire
load and fire resistance, can be made.
The formula for calculating fire load is as under:

Fire load= (combustibles in kg) x calorific value in kcal/kg
Floor area in square meters
 Fire grading of the structures:Structural elements of buildings are graded according

to the time factor which is nearly equal to but does not exceed the test period which
the element fulfills its specified requirements.
Accordingly, all structural elements have been graded under the following five
categories depending upon their fire resistance, viz.,
Grade 1......... 6 hours
Grade 5......... 0.5 hours
Occupancies of High fire load:

Godowns, warehouses, etc. This category as per I.S. specifications exceeds the fire load by
550,000 kcal/sq.mtr, but does not exceed an average of 1,100,000 kcal/sq.mtr of floor area. A
fire resistance of 4 hours for these types of occupancies is considered sufficient.
(For reference, the maximum for this type in F.P.S. system is 4,00,000B.Th.U/sq.ft
exceeding an average of 2,00,000 B.Th.U/sq.ft).
Occupancies of Moderate fire load:Retail shops, bazaars, stalls, factories, etc. Here the fire
load exceeds 2,75,000 kcal/sq.mtr, and is up to 550,000 kcal/sq.mtr. Occupancies of this type
should have a fire resistance of two hours.
Occupancies of Low fire load:Ordinary buildings for residential purposes, hotels, offices,
schools, etc, or occupancies having a fire load not exceeding 2,75,000 kcal/sq.mtr of net floor
area of any compartment, nor exceeding an average of 550,000 kcal/sq.mtr on a limited
isolated area. (for reference, the maximum for this type in F.P.S. system is 1,00,000
B.Th.U/sq.ft)
The fire resistance required by buildings of this category to withstand the complete
burn-out of their. contents without collapse is I hour as has been found after tests. Extensive
investigations carried out in Switzerland and Germany have shown that the fire load in
offices varies from 10 kg to 30 kg/sq.mtr wood equivalent to 43,356 to 130,068 kcal/sq.mtr.
This type of occupancy has an one hour rating with maximum fire loading up to 60 kg/sq.m.
Equivalent to 270,978 kcal/sq.mtr
130
Example-1: A manufacturing process industry uses the following material. Calculate
the Fire load by using the following data: -
Area in Sq. Calorific value

Material Quantity in Kg.
mtr. (kJ/kg) (Kcal/kg)
Paper 100 100 15600 3725.28
Wood 2000 300 17500 4179
Coal 10000 500 20000 4776
Rubber 500 200 40000 9552
Petroleum 5000 400 43000 10268.4

product
1 K Joul = 0.2388 K. Cal
Fire load = (Combustibles in kg) x Calorific value in kcal/kg

Floor area in square meters
Fire load (paper) = 100 x 3725 = 3725 kcal/sq.mt

100
Fire load (wood) = 2000 x 4179 = 27860 kcal/sq.mt

300
Fire load (coal) = 10000 x 4776 = 95520 kcal/sq.mt

500
Fire load (rubber) = 500 x 9552 = 23880 kcal/sq.mt

200
Fire load (petroleum products) = 5000 x 10268 = 128350 kcal/sq.mt
400
Total fire load = 279335 kcal/sq.mt
As this is less than 550000 kcal/sq.mt, as stated above, it indicates low fire load and
requires fire resistance of 1 hour.
Installation of fire extinguishers:
Example-2:
Determine the number of fire extinguishers required to give adequate protection for a
given property. Risk: Light engineering workshop (Light hazard) Area: 315m x 112
m.
Type of hazard: Class 'A' fire due to normal combustibles.As per IS 2190 this is Light hazard.
Therefore one 9 ltr.water expelling extinguisher for every 600 sq.mtr of floor area is
required.Extinguisher should be available within 25mtr. radius..
131
Here total area = 315m x 112 m. = 35,280 sq. mtr.
No. of extinguishers= 35,280 sq.mt = 58.8 = 59
600 sq.mt
Example-3:Determine the number of fire extinguishers required to give adequate protection
for a given property. Risk: Petroleum processing unit (High hazard) Area: 300m x 150 m. i.e.
45000 sq. mtr. Type of hazard: Class 'B' fire due to petroleum products.
As per IS 2190 this is High hazard. Therefore two 9 ltr foam chemical/mechanical type; or 5
kg capacity dry powder extinguisher for every 600 sq.mtr with minimum of four
extinguishers per compartment is required.
Extinguisher should be available within 15 mtr radius.
Here total area is 45000 sq.mt.
Therefore No. of extinguisher = 45000 sq.mt .= 75
600 sq.mt
Fire Resistance of Building Materials :

In flammable area when building materials and paints are used, they should have good
fire resistance. Steel and masonry are fire resistant materials. Fire resistive structural material
should be selected depending upon the type of fire possible.
There are three types of materials:

(1) Non-flammable viz. metals, brick, clay, asbestos, concrete, cement, gravel, ceramics, sand
etc.
(2) Hardly flammable viz. staw brick, dry gypsum plaster, fibreboard, linoleum etc.
(3) Flammable viz. organic origin such as wood, cardboard, felt, paper etc.
As far as possible non-flammable material should be selected.
Fire or flame resistance is the capacity of structural element to perform its load-
bearing and enclosing functions i.e. to retain its strength and ability to withstand action of
fire, for a particular time during fire.
The fire resisting limits of buildings should be high to ensure safety and escape in
case of fire. Such limits are measured in terms of time (h) from the start of the fire to the
indication of any crack or loss of load carrying capacity (collapse) .or rise of excessive
temperature. The fire resisting limits also depend on the size (thickness and cross section) and
the physical properties of the building material. For example, 12 cm thick wall can withstand
fire for 2.5 h and a 25 cm thick wall for 5.5 h. Fire retardant coatings on wood and flame
proofing of fabrics are useful to some extent.
IS-.1642, 3079, 3594, 3808, 3809 and 6329 provide further details.
Design of Fire Safety of building plant, exists, etc: The building should be
protected both horizontally and vertically from spread of fire through floors, stairs, walls,
ventilating ducts etc. Fire resistant barriers can be used for this purpose.A fire stopping is a
fire-check wall of nonflammable material with a fire resistance limit of at least 2.5 h. It may
be blind or with fire resisting doors or gates. Stopping can be internal, external, roof and
separate (stand alone) fireproof walls. They are constructed to intersect the floors, ceilings
and roofs with fibreboard of 30 cm over roofs from non-flammable materials. Fire-resistance
limit of doors and gates in stopping should be more than 1.5 h. The total area of such
openings should not be more than 25% of the total surface area of the stopping.
Where the construction of stopping is not possible, fire check-zones (strips of non-flammable
materials) should be provided to divide floors and walls into sections more than 6 m wide.
132
Ventipanes or smoke escape windows should be provided to facilitate smoke removal during
fire. Exits and escape ways should be as per statutory requirement. Width of escape should be
more than a meter and should increase depending upon the maximum persons likely to use it.
High fire risk areas; storage, packing and dispatch areas, boiler and fuel rooms,
transformer room, kitchen and car parks should be separated by fire resistant construction.
Storage of flammable liquids and gases should be minimum possible. Gas cylinders should be
stored either in open air with shade or in a room of non-flammable construction and
ventilated permanently to the external air. Fire hazards of storage of explosive and flammable
substances, electrical equipment, static electricity, heating processes, painting, sparkling etc.,
should be foreseen and fully protected.
Lightening protection of buildings is most important as the heavy electric charge (up
to 150000 KV and 200 KA) may prove destructive causing fir6 and explosion in the ground
structure. Appropriate lightening arrester (protector) should be fitted higher than the highest'
object and covering the lightening protected zone. The resistance of the grounding device
should be less than 10 or 20 ohms depending upon its category.
Fire safety should be well thought of from sitting: and location stage to the maintenance stage
as follows:
a) Sitting and location: sufficient space, water and emergency facilities, effects of past
disasters, location of process areas for quick vapour dispersal and location of control
rooms.
b) Plant layout: Segregation of hazardous processes and storage, drainage and

compliance of statutory standards.
c) Design and Construction: Relief valves, by-passes, rupture discs, explosion vents,
safety interlocks, flame arresters, flameproof fittings, selection of material, fire
resistant construction, Under Ground storage
d) Plant Operation: Limited storage of flammable materials, good housekeeping, good

ventilation, work permit system, emergency action plan and training of employees.
e) Plant Maintenance : Reliability and monitoring procedures, inspection, testing and

preventive maintenance, spares availability and maintenance of fail-safe safety
devices.
IS-.1642, 3594, 6329,1646 and 15:2190 must always be followed for material and
details of construction of buildings, storage and use of portable fire extinguishers.
See Part 3.1 for statutory detail.
133
10.3 Causes of Fire & Remedial Measures:
Cause Remedial Measure
1 Electricity Standard and safe wiring, over load protection, double insulation
and earthing on portable equipment, ELCB and waterproof cord in
wet environment, use of proper flameproof equipment in
hazardous area and periodical inspection.
2 Bad house Storing rubbish, waste, oil, grease etc. in a waste-bin with closed
keeping cover, regular cleaning and inspection, bund (dyke) to storage
tanks of flammable liquid dust collectors, safe disposal,
incineration.
3 Bidi-Cigarretts No-smoking notices, separate smoking booths, checking of match
box, lighter etc. at security gates.
4 Hot surfaces Good insulation, fencing, ducting for smokes and flue.
5 Friction Good lubrication, proper belt tension, alignment, dust removal,

inspection and maintenance.
6 Excessive Heat Cooling, temperature controls trained operators and supervisors.
7 Welding cutting Special place or partition, heat resistant floor, spark control,
keeping flammable substance away, hot work permit,
flammability test in tank before hot work, use of proper
equipment.
8 Flame and Proper design, operation and maintenance, sufficient ventilation
combustion and ignition safety, heater insulation, hood, chimney, keeping
flame away, trips and interlocks.
9 Self ignition Keep environment cool and dry, necessary ventilation and
protection, keeping ducts and passages of waste and smoke clean,
separate store of highly flammable materials, not to put oil soaked
rags on hot surfaces, lagging and cladding, small vessels, good
House Keeping.
10 Exposure Barrier wall, sprinklers on fire path, wire glass in windows.
11 Ignition sparks Proper equipment, closed combustion chamber, spark arrester on

flammable vent and vehicle exhaust, flare, trip.
12 Mechanical Machine guarding to avoid entry of foreign particle, fencing,
sparks magnetic separator, non-sparking tools.
13 Molten hot Proper equipment with handles, better operation, and Maintenance
substance Non- mixing of water.
14 Static electricity Grounding, bounding, ionization and humidification, vehicle
(Due to belt drive, earthing while transfer through pipeline, earthing of vessel,
paper/ plastic equipment and piping, flow rate reduction, avoiding flammable
reeling, human atmosphere, splashing and settling, using earthed probe, antistatic
134
body, fluidized device, conductive shoes and flooring, copper earthing with earth
bed, pneumatic resistance less than 10 ohm additive to change liquid resistance,
conveying, dust keeping filters away from storage tanks, extending inlet pipe up to
handling, liquid bottom to avoid free fall of liquid, non-conductive parts and
mixing, flow in earthing of l4evel gauges, avoiding oil drops in water, small size
vessel or pipe of non-conducting plastic containers, using N2 instead of CO2 as
agitation etc. inert gas, electrostatic eliminators on paper / plastic reeling
machines, use of radioactive ionization etc.
Control of Fire and Explosion in Flammable Substances :Fire or explosion in

flammable substance is possible only when it leaks and forms vapour in explosive range.
Therefore the first step necessary is to regularly check the tank, container, piping, equipment
etc. for leakage and to stop it.
Depending on the vapour density, ventilation should be provided at bottom or upper
level to remove accumulation of flammable vapour. If because of heating or cooling, the
vapour density is changeable, the ventilation/exhaust system should be designed for operating
conditions and not for MSDS value.
Natural ventilation openings can be provided near floor, near ceiling or both. Local
exhaust ventilation with explosion-proof .electrical equipment is the best measure.
Un-burnt gases or flammable vapour in combustion chambers of heater, ovens,
boilers, furnaces may form an explosive mixture. Therefore in the event of flame failure,
proper venting or purging time should be allowed or a timed precognition purge cycle should
be followed.
a) A gas detector can be used to check explosive range in the suspected area.
b) Gas valves and joints should be frequently checked for leaks. If gas is present,
ventilation should be allowed before restarting.
c) Source of ignition is another contributory factor for fire or explosion. Use of
flame/smoke detector, flameproof electric equipment, proper earthing to discharge
static electricity, checking of spark or heat generating processes and their control, hot
work permit etc. are the remedial measures.
 Fighting Fires of Pesticides :
Pesticides when bum emit toxic fumes and when dissolve in fire water; it cannot be allowed
to run anywhere as its contact will become poisonous and birds and animals may die if they
drink it. Effect depends upon its toxicity and concentration in air or water. Hazard is also
faced by the fire fighters, and the people in vicinity. Therefore utmost care is required while
fighting fire of pesticides.
Design of pesticide storage is most important in this regard. Fire detectors and automatic
sprinklers should work avoiding human need. Water inside must flow on well designed slope
to go to retention basin and from there to the specific collection pond or tank to collect
polluted water. Such pond/tank should have proper fencing to keep away people and animals.
After the control of fire, this contaminated water must be treated for safe discharge.
If fire takes place in open, persons fighting fire should wear self breathing apparatus,
should not face the wind direction, feet, hands and body should be protected, water should be
safely diverted to a safe place and covered by sand, lime or any inactivating media.
In case of solvent based liquid pesticide, foam and DCP may be more useful.
Other precautions include prohibition of smoking, keeping flammable pesticide away
from sun, heat and source of ignition, keeping people away from risk, calling help if needed
135
and cleaning up area and clothing after extinguishing the fire. Medical attention and treatment
without loss of time are necessary if any person is adversely affected.
Types of Extinguishers and suitability for Fire (IS:2190)

Type of Extinguisher IS No. For type of Fires
A B C D
1. Water type (Soda acid) 934 S NS NS NS

4406 * *
2 Water type (gas cartridge) 940 S NS NS NS
3 Water type (stored pressure) 6234 S NS NS NS
4 Chemical foam type 933 NS S NS NS

5507
10474
5 Mechanical foam type 10204 NS S NS NS
6 Dry powder type 2171 NS S NS NS

10658
7 Dry powder type 11833 NS NS NS S
8 CO2 type 2878 NS S S NS

8149
9 Halon 1211 type 11108 NS S S NS
S = Suitable , NS = Not Suitable
 NFPA classification of Fire Extinguishers
NFPA 10 classifies fires and fire extinguishers into the following 4 types:
Class A : Fires in ordinary combustible material, such as wood, cloth, paper,
rubber and many plastics, that require the heat-absorbing coolant effect
of water or water solutions, the coating effects of certain dry chemicals
that retard combustion, or the interruption or the combustion chain
reaction by the dry, chemical or halogenated agents.
Class B: Fires in flammable or combustible liquids, flammable gases, grease
and similar material that must be put out by excluding air (oxygen), by
inhibiting the release of combustible vapor with AFFF or FFFP agents,
or by interrupting the combustion chain reaction.
Class C : Fires in live electrical equipment. The operator's safety requires the use
of electrically non conductive extinguishing agents, such as dry
chemical as halon. When electric equipment is de-energized,
extinguishers for class A or B fires maybe used.
Class D : Fires in certain combustible metals, such as Mg, Ti, Zr, Na, & K that
require a heat absorbing extinguishing medium that does not react with
the burning metals.
Class K : Class K fires involve cooking oils. This is the newest of the fire
classes.
136
Foam System:It uses fixed foam apparatus either automatic or manual. It may consist of
one or more portable foam extinguishers suspended in such a way that flame or heat releases
a cord or fusible link to operate the extinguisher automatically. Discharge rate may vary from
15 to 4000 gpm. Foams are of two types - chemical and mechanical. Chemical foam is
produced by a chemical reaction of CCX, bubbles and a foaming agent. Mechanical foam is
created when air and water are mechanically agitated with a foam solution.
Fire fighting foam (gas-filled bubble solution) is lighter than most flammable liquids.
Therefore it forms a floating blanket on burning liquid, cuts off oxygen supply and also cools
the fuel.
137
Foam system is generally used to protect fuel tanks, oil and paint storage rooms,
asphalt coating etc. It can be injected on the liquid surface in a tank to provide blanketing
effect and to cut off flames and vapours.
Foam is of two types - Low expansion and High expansion foam. Low expansion
foam is of four types Chemical foam, Mechanical -or air-generated foam, Protein foam and
Synthetic (fluorinated surface active agent) foam. Foam generators of different types are
available.
Foam-water sprinkler and spray systems use mechanical foam equipment with a
deluge sprinkler system.
High-expansion foam is best suited for class A and B fires in confined spaces
such as sewers, basement. It is made by mixing a small amount (@ 1.5%) of foam liquid into
a foam generator where water and large quantities of air are mixed. Accumulated foam can
act as an insulating barrier for the surface not involved in fire. Thus it prevents fire spread.
Ventilation is necessary to vent the displaced air and gases when foam is being
applied.
Carbon dioxide systems :These are fixed, local or flood type. They are generally useful
for electrical, liquid and gas fires.CO2 system may be of high-pressure or low pressure type.
In the high pressure system, CO2 is kept in a compressed gas cylinder at normal temperature,
while in the low pressure system, it is stored in an insulated pressure vessel at —18 °C and
300 psi by mechanical refrigeration. At such low temperature more CO2, can be stored
economically. Safety valves are provided to take care of refrigeration failure. Liquid CO2 can
bedelivered through nozzles at 15 kg/sec.In both the systems, CO2 can be released manually
or automatically through nozzles close to the expected source of fire. Unlike water or
chemical, CO2 does not spoil the stock or equipment.
In a room, compartment or small building, total flood system can be used where wall
openings can automatically be shut when the gas is released. Warning alarm to alert people
working nearby is necessary. Sufficient time must be allowed to evacuate the area.In a
confined place, the area should be well ventilated and checked for 0, content after the fire is
extinguished.
Dry Chemical Powder (DCP): Dry Chemical Powder is neither toxic nor conductor of
electricity, nor does it freeze. It is stored in an inert gas cylinder under pressure. Installations
can be provided for simultaneous closing of fire doors, windows, ventilating ducts, operating
valves, shutting off fans and machinery and actuating alarms.
The dry chemical piped systems are developed for fast extinguishment in a confined
area or for localized application. They are useful on flammable liquid and electrical hazards
and can be operated manually, automatically or remotely. The agent is kept in a pressurized
container fixed or mounted on vehicles.
Action of extinguishment is to interrupt the chain reaction of fire by the dry chemical
agent.Dry chemicals include Sodium bicarbonate as standard dry chemical. Potassium
bicarbonate.General purpose powder (ABC) and Monnex powder. If electrical equipment is
not involved, foam can be used to follow DCP application.
Fixed Fire Installations:Fixed automatic fire installations are desirable from the design
stage, as they can be used for longer time and are more effective than the portable type.
(1) Fire Hydrants:Fire hydrants are economical and should be installed freely around the
plant. They should be kept accessible, unobstructed and protected for safety. Indicator posts
are advisable.
Fire hydrants, hoses, nozzles and couplers are part of the system. Fixed nozzles are
single or double headed. Monitor nozzles are on swivel joint and can be turned as desired and
138
to clear any obstruction. Hose nozzles can be extended and laid (i.e. more flexible) wherever
required. They are of fixed flow type, adjustable flow (variable discharge) type and a
combination type.
The number of hydrants needed depends on the fire exposure and the hose-laying
distance to the built-up areas. The discharge ports should be at least 18 inch (45 cm) above
the ground level.
Fire Hose and Nozzles of standard size, double jacketed rubber-lined should be stored
in hose boxes and should be subjected to a full pressure test once a year. Space around hose
lines and control valves should be clear. Aisles and door ways should be wide enough and
clear to allow rapid use of hose reel cart or mobile equipment.
Monitor Nozzles are used in yards and large congested areas where it is difficult to lay hose
line in an emergency. The nozzle is so positioned to direct a high pressure water stream over
desired area and height.
Water Reservoirs are necessary for the supply of fire water at good pressure and
volume. They should not be used for other purposes such as process requirement. If the
reservoir is common, suction pipe (its bottom end) for process water should be at a higher
level than the suction pipe for fire water into the bottom of the reservoir to maintain the level
of reserved water for fire protection.
Water Supply from reliable sources is essential. Reservoirs, overhead tanks, pressure
tanks, pumps, pipes and connections must be maintained well. Flow discharge may vary from
10 to 40 litres per second and pressure from 7 to 10 kg./cm2.
139
TAC guidelines(rules) for water supply for hydrants are as under :Water for the hydrant
service shall be stored in any easily accessible surface or underground lined reservoir or
above ground tanks of steel, concrete or masonry. The effective capacity of the
reservoir(above the level of the foot valve seat in case of negative suction and above the level
of the top of the pump casing in case of positive suction) for the various classes of
occupancies (as per rule 7.2) and size of hydrant installations shall be as indicated in Table C
hereunder:
Note 1: Reservoirs of and over 2,25,000litres capacity shall be in two interconnected
compartments to facilitate cleaning and repairs.
Note 2: Large natural reservoirs having water capacity exceeding ten times the aggregate
water requirements of all the fire pump drawing there from may be left unlined.
Table C : Capacity of water storage
Nature of Risk Capacity of static storage exclusively
reserved for hydrant service.
1. Light Hazard Not less than 1 hour‘s aggregate pumping

capacity with a minimum of 1,35,000litres.
2. Ordinary Hazard Not less than 2 hour‘s aggregate pumping

capacity.
3. High Hazard (A) Not less than 3 hours‘ aggregate pumping

capacity.
4. High Hazard (B) Not less than 4 hours‘ aggregate pumping

capacity.
Note 1 : The capacity of the reservoir for Ordinary and High Hazard Class Occupancies may,
at the discretion of the Committee, be reduced by 2 hours' inflow from a reliable source
(other than a town's main) but in no case shall the reservoir capacity be less than 60% of that
mentioned above.
Note 2 : In case of Light Hazard Class Occupancies the minimum capacity of the reservoir
shall be increased to 2,25,000 litres if the highest floor of the building is more than 15 mt
above the surroundings ground level.
140
The capacity for hydrant service shall be determined by the class of occupancy and
size of installation as per Table D.
Table D: Pump, Capacity and Delivery Pressure:
Sr. Nature of Number of Hydrants Pump Delivery
No. Risk Capacity in pressure at
Litres / Sec rated
3
(m / hour) capacity
kg/cm2
1 Light hazard i) Not exceeding 20 27 (96) 5.6

ii) Exceeding 20 but not exceeding 55 38 (137) 7
iii) Exceeding 55 but not exceeding 100 47 (171)
7
iv) Exceeding 100 47 (171) plus
47 (171) for
every additional 7/8.8
125 hydrants or
part thereof.
Note : The total pumping capacity need not be greater than 190 (683) irrespective of the
number of hydrant points.
2 Ordinary i) Not exceeding 20 38 (137) 7

Hazard
ii) Exceeding 20 but not exceeding 55 47 (171) 7
iii) Exceeding 55 but not exceeding 100 76 (273)
iv) Exceeding 100
76 (273) plus 7
76 (273) for
every
additional 125 7/8.8
hydrants or
part thereof.
Note : The total pumping capacity need not be greater than 302 (1092) irrespective of the
number of hydrant points.
3. High Hazard i) Not exceeding 20 47 (171) 7

(A) ii) Exceeding 20 but not exceeding 55 76 (273) 7/8.8
iii) Exceeding 55 but not exceeding 100
iv) Exceeding 100

114(410) 7/8.8
114(410) 7/8.8/10.5
114(410) for
every
141
additional 150
hydrants or
part thereof.
4 High Hazard i) Not exceeding 20 Two of 47 (171) 7

(B) Two of 76 (273) 7/8.8
ii) Exceeding 20 but not exceeding 55 Two of 114(410)
7/8.8
iii) Exceeding 55 but not exceeding 100 Two of 114(410)
plus one of
114(410) for
every additional
200 hydrants or
part thereof. 7/8.8/10.5
iv) Exceeding 100
This provision will apply only in cases where the hydrant service has been hydraulically
designed as per NB 3(13) u/r 7.5.10.
Note: In case of Light Hazard Occupancies, the pump delivery pressure will need to
be 7 kg/ cm2 if the highest floor of the risk is at a height exceeding 15 mt above the
surrounding ground level:
Proper drainage facility shall be provided to drain the fire-fighting water out of the
basement.
Storage of material in the open shall be protected as under:
Metals, Metallic goods, Machinery and goods, One single hydrant for every 60m. of the storage
Machinery and other non-hazardous storage. periphery located beyond 2 m., but within 15 m.
of storage area.
Coal or Coke One single hydrant for every 45m. of the storage
periphery located beyond 2 m., but within 15m.
ofstorage area.
Other storage One double hydrant for every 45 m. of the

storage periphery located beyond 2 m., but within
22.5m. of storage area.
Note 1:In case of open storage areas of following materials, at least 50% of hydrants shall be
replaced by fixed monitors having nozzle bore of 38 mm diameter if the individual stack
height is more than 6 m. and total storage exceeds 5000 tonnes.
Bamboo Bagasse.
Grass/Hay Timber.
Note 2: Where hydrants/monitors located along one longer side of a storage area are more
than 90 m. from those along the other longer side, such a storage area shall not be deemed
to be protected.
Protection for combustible/flammable liquid Storage Tanks:
Tank less than 20 m. in diameter. One double headed preferably two single
headed hydrants located beyond 15 m., but
within 35m.of tank shell.
Tanks over 20 m. in diameter. Two double headed or four single headed

hydrants located beyond 15 m. but within 35
m. of tank shell.
142
Note 1: In case tanks are located more than 22.5 m. from the dyke walls, one double hydrant
or two single hydrants shall be replaced by a 38 mm monitor.
Note 2 : Where the distance of tank from the monitor exceeds 45 m. in addition to provisions
of Note I, the tank shall be protected by Fixed Foam or Medium Velocity Water Spray
System having prior approval of the Committee.
Note 3 : Hydrants/Monitors shall not be installed within dyked enclosures nor can the hydrant
main pass through it.
Note 4 :Fixed roof type storage tanks, floating roof type storage tanks exceeding 30 m. in
diameter and Bullets/Spheres containing products having flashpoint below 32 °C shall be
protected by Medium Velocity Water Spray System conforming to relevant regulations.
However, manually-operated systems shall also be acceptable.
Water spray systems shall not be insisted for Insulated Vessels/Spheres."
Water spray protection for small size tanks up to 10 mtr. diameters in ordinary and high
hazard risks shall not be insisted upon."
(2)Automatic Water Sprinklers :They are of six types. Wet pipe, dry pipe, pre-action,
deluge, combined dry pipe and pre-action and sprinklers for limited water supply system.
Automatic alarms operated by the flow of water should be a part of sprinkler installation.
Such an alarm may be connected to a central fire station. The sprinklers should be regularly
checked to avoid their failure to work.Automatic sprinklers are most efficient and widely
used. It reduces insurance premium considerably.
Its basic function is to spray water automatically to a fire, the system can also work as
a fire alarm. This can be done by installing an electrical water flow alarm switch in each main
riser pipe.
Sprinklers should be selected on the basis of temperature rating and occupancy. Their
types are Either heat-element or chemical melts or expands to open the sprinkler. Normal
detector setting is 68 °C. Sprinklers heads normally cover 12 m3 per head. Amount of water
required depends on risk protected, flow range being 0.04 to 0.514 I/m'.
In deluge system, water is admitted to sprinklers that are open at all times. Deluge
valves (water supply valves) can be operated manually or automatically by an automatic
detection system.
Maintenance and inspection of water supply valves, system piping for obstruction,
nozzles and water supply tests etc. are necessary.
(3) Water Spray System :Water spray system uses water in small droplets through
special nozzles giving various pressures. The system is supplemented to and not a
replacement for automatic sprinklers. It should be checked that the water should not be
reactive with the material burning.
The system is similar to the deluge system except that the open sprinklers are replaced
by spray nozzles. The system is generally applied to flammable liquid and gas tanks, piping
and equipment, electrical equipment such as oil filled transformers, switches and motors. To
avoid short circuit, current should be cut off before applying tile spray.
The spray nozzle holes are smaller than those in ordinary sprinklers, therefore they
can be choked. To avoid this, strainers (filter or screen) are required in water supply lines.
The nozzles having the smallest holes, have their own internal strainer in addition to the
supply line strainer.
TAC guidelines on Water Spray Systems give retailed rules. Some extract is given
below:
Definitions and terminology relating to the components of the water spray systems are as
follows:
143
(a) Water Spray System : A special fixed pipe system connected to a reliable source of fire
protection water supply and equipped with water spray nozzles for specific water discharge
and distribution over the surface or area to be protected. The piping system is connected to
the water supply through an automatically actuated Deluge Valve which initiates flow of
water. Automatic actuation is achieved by operation of automatic detecting equipment
installed along with water spray nozzles. There are two types of systems namely High
Velocity and Medium Velocity systems. The former is useful for liquids with flash point
above 65 °C and the latter for flash point below 65 °C.
(b) Spray Nozzle and Valves: A normally open water discharging device which, when
supplied with water under pressure will distribute the water in a special directional pattern
peculiar to the 'particular device. Nozzles used for High Velocity Water Spray systems are
called "Projectors" and nozzles used for Medium Velocity Water Spray systems are called
"Sprayers". Both these nozzles are made in a range of orifice sizes with varying discharge
angles so that discharge can be controlled for optimum protection.
Different types of valves are used with fire water piping system or water hydrants as
shown in fig.
(c) Deluge Valve : A quick opening valve which admits water automatically to a system of
projectors or sprayers and is operated by a system of detectors and/ or sprinklers installed in
the same areas as nozzles.
(d) Control of Burning : Application of water spray to equipment or areas where a fire may
occur to control the rate of burning and thereby limit the heat release from a fire until the fuel
can be eliminated or extinguishment effected.
(e)Exposure Protection: Application of water spray to structures or equipment to limit
absorption of heat to a level which will minimise damage and prevent failure whether source
of heat is external or internal.
(f) Impingement: The striking of a protected surface by water droplets issuing directly from
projectors and/or sprayers.
(g) Run Down : The downward travel of water along a surface caused by the momentum of
the water or by gravity.
(h) Slippage : The horizontal component of the travel of water along the surface beyond the
point of contact caused by the momentum of water.
144
Fig .Types of valves.
(i) Insulated Equipment : Equipment, structure vessels provided with insulation which for
the expected duration of exposure, will protect steel from exceeding a temperature of 454 "C
(850 °F) for structural members and 343 °C (650 °F) for vessels.
(j) Density: The unit rate of water application to an area or surface expressed in litres/min/ m
145
(k) Automatic Detection Equipment : Equipment which will automatically detect one or
more components directly related to combustion such a heat. Smoke, flame and other
phenomenon and automatic actuation of alarm and protection equipment.
(l) Fire Barrier : It is a continuous wall or floor that is designed and constructed to limit the
spread of fire.
(m) Range Pipes : Pipes on which sprinklers are attached either directly or through short
arm pipes which do not exceed 30 cm in length.
( n) Distribution Pipes : Pipes which directly feed the range pipes.
Testing and maintenance of water spray system is given m Table Table Periodical
Testing and Maintenance Chart
Sr Subject Activities Duration
1 Reservoir Level checking Weekly
Clearing One in 2 years
2 Pump Running test Daily
Test flow 5 minutes
Lubrication Annually
Gland Quarterly
Packing Weekly
Overhaul One in 2 years
3 Engine Running Once in day (5 mins)
Fuel tank check Daily
Lubrication Quarterly
Battery status Weekly
Load test Annually
Overhaul Once in 2 years
4 Motor Lubrication Weekly
Starter contact checking Weekly
Insulation resistance check Half yearly
5 Main piping Gauge pressure Check daily
Flushing Once in 2 years
6 Sluice valves Operation Monthly
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Gland packing Monthly
Lubrication Quarterly
7 Deluge valves Operation Weekly
Alarm check Weekly
Cleaning Quarterly
Overhaul Annually
8 Sprayers Cleaning Quarterly
Flow test Quarterly
9 Detectors Performance Six monthly
10 Spray installation Performance Quarterly
Physical check up of piping for Monthly

seeing dislocation of support,
wrong orientation overloading
etc.
11 Pressure gauges Calibration Annually
12 Painting of entire Every 2 years

installation
(4)Foam System :It uses fixed foam apparatus either automatic or manual. It may consist of
one or more portable foam extinguishers suspended in such a way that flame or heat releases
a cord or fusible link to operate the extinguisher automatically. Discharge rate may vary from
15 to 4000 gpm. Foams are of two types - chemical and mechanical. Chemical foam is
produced by a chemical reaction of CCX, bubbles and a foaming agent. Mechanical foam is
created when air and water are mechanically agitated with a foam solution.
Fire fighting foam (gas-filled bubble solution) is lighter than most flammable liquids.
Therefore it forms a floating blanket on burning liquid, cuts off oxygen supply and also cools
the fuel.
Foam system is generally used to protect fuel tanks, oil and paint storage rooms,
asphalt coating etc. It can be injected on the liquid surface in a tank to provide blanketing
effect and to cut off flames and vapours.
Foam is of two types - Low expansion and High expansion foam. Low expansion
foam is of four types Chemical foam, Mechanical -or air-generated foam, Protein foam and
Synthetic (fluorinated surface active agent) foam. Foam generators of different types are
available.Foam-water sprinkler and spray systems use mechanical foam equipment with a
deluge sprinkler system.High-expansion foam is best suited for class A and B fires in
confined spaces such as sewers, basement. It is made by mixing a small amount (@ 1.5%) of
foam liquid into a foam generator where water and large quantities of air are mixed.
Accumulated foam can act as an insulating barrier for the surface not involved in fire. Thus it
prevents fire spread.Ventilation is necessary to vent the displaced air and gases when foam is
being applied.
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Fire Detection and Alarm Systems:Various types of detectors are available operating
on principles of thermal expansion, thermoelectric sensitivity, thermo conductivity or
photosensitivity to detect presence of smoke, increase in temperature, light intensity or total
radiation. Their types are: Thermal expansion detectors. Radiant energy detectors.Light
interference detectors and ionization detectors. They should be properly located depending
upon their range. They simply give alarm and cannot extinguish fire. They make us alert for
fire fighting.
Fire detectors (A & B) and LPG detector (C)

Though fire detection and alarm systems are separate systems but the latter has to operate just
after the former operates. Therefore they are considered together. IS 2175 and 2189 also deal
with them together.
Two main functions of any fire detection system are
1. To give alarm to start up extinguishing procedure, and
2. To give early warning to area occupants to escape.
It is wrong to speak 'fire detectors'. Actually they detect sensible heat, smoke density or flame
radiation to operate before actual fire follows. Their 'sensor' detects measurable quantity of
these parameters. A decision making device coupled with the sensor, compares the measured
quantity with a predetermined ' value, and when it is different, an alarm is sounded. A
detector both detects and signals.
Human being is a good detector as he can act m a flexible way i.e. run away, put out
the fire or call the fire department. No other detector can work in such selective manner.
Selection of the type of detector is important For example, low risk areas need
thermal detectors, a ware house may have infrared and ionization detectors and a computer
area requires ionization or combination detectors.
Location and spacing should be determined to obtain the earliest possible
warning.Sensitivity, reliability, maintainability and stability are important factors for
selection.
Fire process has four stages - incipient stage, smouldering stage, flame stage and heat
stage. Many types of fire detectors are available for various situations and useful at different
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stages of a fire (see part 1.4). Thermal detectors are of fixed temperature detectors, rate-
compensated thermal detectors, rate of rise thermal detectors, line thermal detectors and the
bulb detection system.
Smoke detectors are of photoelectric type and are of two classes - The beam
photoelectric or reflected beam photoelectric detectors.
Flame detectors are of infrared (IR) or ultraviolet (UV) type.
Ionization (combustion products) detectors are the
single chamber or dual chamber ionization detector and the
low-voltage ionization detector.
Fire Alarm system may be separate to run manually or
connected with fire detectors and operable automatically. All
workers must be made aware of the sound pattern and its
meaning. Fire alarm sound should be distinguishable from
other sound m that area. It should be clearly audible to all
facility personnel. Sound for beginning of fire and end of fire
should be kept different.
10.5 BLEVE (Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion ):

Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE), also referred as a fireball, is a
combination of fire and explosion with an intense radiant heat emission within a relatively
short time interval.
When a tank or pressure vessel containing liquid or liquefied gas above its boiling
point (so heated) fails or ruptures the contents release as a turbulent mixture of liquid and gas,
expanding rapidly and dispersing in air as a cloud. When this cloud is ignited, a fireball
occurs causing enormous heat radiation intensity within a few seconds. This heat is sufficient
to cause severe skin burns and deaths within a few hundred meters depending on the mass of
the gas involved. A BLEVE involving a 50- tone propane tank can cause '"third-degree burn
at @ 200 mt and blisters at @ 400 mt
Road/rail accident to a tank car/wagon or due to weakening of structure by fire or
physical impact on a overstressed vessel/tank can cause a BLEVE.
Some reported major BLEVE examples are as under:
Year Location Chemical Death Injury
1966 Feyzin, France LPG (Propane) 18 90
1969 Laurel, Miss LPG 2 -
1970 Cresent City, III LPG 0 66
1971 Houston, Tex Vinyl chloride 1 -
1972 New Jersey Propylene 2 -
1985 Mexico City LPG 650 2500
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Types of Explosion
Dust Explosion: It is possible due to flammable dusts of wood, coal, food(starch, flour,
sugar, cocoa, feed stuffs), chemicals, plastics (urea formaldehyde, resin, polyethylene,
polystyrene), metals(aluminum, magnesium) etc.
It results from rapid combustion of fine solid particles like iron, aluminum, wood,
starch etc. Many solid particles when reduced to fine powder becomes very flammable and
explosive.
At a starch/corn plant at Ceder Rapids, Iowa in 1919, 43 people were killed and at
Peking, Illinois in 1924, 42 people were killed due to dust explosion.
At a starch plant at Ahmedabad, 29 workers injured and out of them 20 died due to
starch dust explosion on 19-12-1991.
Explosion characteristics of dust suspension are as under:
1. Explosibility classification.
2. Minimum explosible concentration.
3. Minimum ignition temperature.
4. Minimum ignition energy.
5. Maximum permissible oxygen concentration to prevent ignition.
6. Explosion pressure characteristics.
(a) maximum explosion pressure.
(b) maximum rate of pressure rise.
(c) average rate of pressure rise.
Sources of ignition for dust explosions are :
(1) Flames, heat or hot surfaces (4) Self-heating
(2) Welding and cutting (5) Static electricity and
(3) Mechanical sparks (6)Electricalequipment.
Preventive methods for dust explosion include:

(1) Avoidance of dust suspensions
(2) Wet process
(3) Elimination of source of ignition and
(4) Inserting.
Methods of protection against dust explosion include;
(1) Isolation
(2) Containment
(3) Explosion suppression and
(4) Explosion venting.
Dust fires can occur in dust deposits and are of two types - flaming and smouldering fires.
 Halon Gas Extinguisher (Halon Alternatives):

Halon 1011, 1211 or 1301 a liquid gas is filled in extinguishers. It is used in place of CO,
extinguishers but is lighter in comparison. 1.5,3 and 6 kg cylinders and bigger sizes are
available in wheel mounted model. By pressing a knob in cap-assembly it can be started.
Nose should be covered to avoid direct inhalation.
It is suitable for class B and C fires. See IS 11108 for Halon 1211.
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Halon is a fast extinguishing agent. It is ideal for intense and rapid fires. It is non-conductive
and leaves no traces when applied. Therefore it is also suitable for electrical fires, computer
rooms etc.
Halon interrupts the chain reaction at the flame zone of fire. It is two times as effective as
CO2 on a weight basis and five times as effective as CO2 on volume basis.
Halon is stored under pressure in a cylinder. A squeeze grip type nozzle is provided on top of
the cylinder valve depending upon capacity. It is available in 2,4,5,25 and 50 kg capacities.
Mostly two types of Halons (halogenated agents) are used as they are less toxic - (1) Halon
1211-Bromochloro difluromethane i.e. CF2BrCI and (2) Halon 1301 - Bromotrifluromethane
CF2Br.
Portable Fire Extinguishers:In addition to the fixed fire installations stated in next
part, portable (first-aid) fire extinguishers are always desirable for quick manual use on small
fires and fort the period till automatic equipment or outside fire fighters work. All such
extinguishers should be (1) of reliable make, standard (IS) and properly identified (2) of right
type depending upon the class of fire (3) sufficient in number (4) properly located where they
are necessary and readily accessible (5) recharged periodically, inspected and maintained in
good working condition and (6) known by the operators who are trained to use them.
Their types are : (1) Water type (2) Soda acid type (3) Carbon dioxide type (4) Foam
type (5) Dry chemical powder type and (6) Vaporizing liquid type. IS:2190 is most useful for
selection, installation and maintenance of portable first aid fire extinguishers. Details of these
six types are also given in IS:940, 6234, 934, 2878, 933 and 2171. Tables of their suitability
according to class of fire and scale i.e. their range or area coverage arc also given therein.
Based on them, number of extinguishers can be determined. Methods of their testing and test
form are also prescribed. Refer them for further details.
For small fires mostly portable fire extinguishers are used. They are explained below
in brief:
(1) Soda Acid (Water Type) Extinguisher:This extinguisher is useful for class
A fire (wood, paper, fabrics, rubbish etc.). It should not be used on fires of
electricity, oil, chemical or metal. It is available in both the shapes cylindrical
and conical.Its normal capacity is 9 Ltr (weight 14 Kg) and to be used in a range
of 6 to 8 mt. It consumes within I to 1.5 minute. It should be checked every 3
months.It is held vertically up (not inverted). By standing 4 to 5 mt. away from
the fire, after opening the plunger, it is struck on the hard surface. A small
H„SC) (Sulphuric acid) bottle breaks and due to its mixture with soda
bicarbonate solution, C0„ (Carbon dioxide) is generated. Pressure of CO, throws
water at a distance. Its handle and bottom are held by two hands and water is
sprayed on fire to extinguish it.
(2) Foam Extinguisher:It is used on class B small fires. It: should not be
used on electrical or metal fire. It is available in 9 Ltr cylinder and used
in 4 to 6 mt range. It consumes within 1.5 minute. It is available in wheel
mounted trolley of 18 Ltr and 150 Ltr capacity for longer use. It should be
checked every 3 months.
By standing 3 to 4 mt away from the fire, the plunger is. pulled up and
turned right up to a slot. It is shaked by turning 180" twice. Then it is held
inverted. By chemical reaction CO is generated which throws foam outside.
The foam is not thrown directly in fire but it is thrown on nearer hard surface
so that because of striking further foam is generated and spread on burning
surface. It stops oxygen availability for burning and controls the fire. Foam
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is effective up to 120 °C temperature only.
(3) CO2 (Compressed gas) Extinguisher:It is useful on class E i.e. electrical fire
because CO2 is nonconductive gas. It can be used on class B and C fire also, as it
diminishes oxygen to control fire. It is not advisable to use it in a closed room as more
CO2 may be inhaled. Therefore open doors and windows before using it in a room. It
should not be used on fires of metal, sodium, potassium and metal hydrides.
It is available in 2 kg ,4 kg, 6.8 kg and 22.5 kg capacities. Small cylinders have
handles and big cylinders have wheels. Its range is 1 to 1.5 mt. CO2 pressure is at 64 to
70 bar. It should be checked every three months.
(4) Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) Extinguisher :This can be used on any class of
fire. Therefore it is known as 'universal type extinguisher'. It is generally used on fire of
flammable liquid. It is not effective on fire of benzene, ether, EO and
CS2 For metal fire, special powder extinguishers are available. 1,2,5 and
10 kg extinguishers in cylinders and 68 kg in wheel models are
available.
A 10 kg cylinder is consumed within 12 to 15 seconds and its
range is 3 to 6 mt. A 68 kg cylinder is consumed within I to 1.5 minute
and its range is 6 to 8 mt. Both should be checked at 3 months interval.
By standing 6 to 8 mt near the fire, the cylinder is shacked twice
by turning 180°, a safety clip is removed and plunger is pressed or struck
so that CO, bottle breaks and it throws dry chemicals out. The dry
powder blankets the burning surface, stops 0, contact and CO, coming
out also diminishes 0 proportion. Therefore fire is controlled by double
action. Its long nozzle should be turned in wind direction like a broom.
(5) Halon Gas Extinguisher (Halon Alternatives):Halon 1011, 1211 or 1301 a liquid gas is
filled in extinguishers. It is used in place of CO, extinguishers but is lighter in
comparison. 1.5 ,3 and 6 kg cylinders and bigger sizes are available in wheel mounted model.
By pressing a knob in cap-assembly it can be started. Nose should be covered to avoid direct
inhalation.
Halon is a fast extinguishing agent. It is ideal for intense and rapid fires. It is non-
conductive and leaves no traces when applied. Therefore it is also suitable for electrical fires,
computer rooms etc.
Halon interrupts the chain reaction at the flame zone of fire. It is two times as
effective as CO2 on a weight basis and five times as effective as CO2 on volume basis.
Halon is stored under pressure in a cylinder. A squeeze grip type nozzle is provided
on top of the cylinder valve depending upon capacity. It is available in 2,4,5,25 and 50 kg
capacities. Mostly two types of Halons (halogenated agents) are used as they are less toxic -
(1) Halon 1211-Bromochloro difluromethane i.e. CF2BrCI and (2) Halon 1301 -
Bromotrifluromethane CF2Br
Fixed Fire Installations :Fixed automatic fire installations are desirable from the design
stage, as they can be used for longer time and are more effective than the portable type.
10.6 Deflagration:It is an explosion with a resulting shock wave moving at a speed less
than the speed of sound in unreacted medium.
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Deflagration is very rapid auto combustion of particles of explosive as a surface
phenomenon. It may be initiated by contact of a flame or spark but may be caused by impact
or friction. It is a characteristic of low explosives.
Deflagration or detonation is a form of explosion, the former is due to low burning
velocity (flame speed as I m/s) while the later is due to high burning velocity (flame speed as
2000-3000 m/s). A detonation generates high pressure and is more destructive than a
deflagration. The peak pressure caused by a deflagration in a closed vessel can reach up to
70-80 kPa (8 bar), whereas in case of detonation it easily reaches up to 200 kPa (20 bar).
A deflagration can turn into a detonation while travelling through a long pipe. In that
case deflagration velocity exceeds that mentioned above.
Detonation:It is an explosion with a resulting shock wave' moving at a speed more than
the speed of sound in unreacted medium.
Detonation is extremely rapid, self-propagating decomposition of an explosive
accompanied by a high pressure-temperature wave that moves at from 10009000 m/sec. It
may be initiated by mechanical impact, friction or heat. It is a characteristic of high
explosives which varies considerably in their sensitivity to shock, nitro-glycerine being one
of the most dangerous in this regard.Whether a deflagration or detonation takes place depends
on the material involved and the conditions under which it occurs. A vapour phase explosion
requires some degree of confinement for a detonation to take place.
Detonation of a gas-air mixture is possible directly by a powerful ignition source or
by transition from deflagration. Such transition requires a strong acceleration of the flame
front. It is possible in pipelines but rarely possible in vessels.
A number of substances are listed which can produce detonation in gas-air mixture.
Some commonly known substances are:
Acetone Ethylene
Acetylene Hydrogen
Benzene Methane
Chloroform Methanol
Cyclohexane Naphthalene
Diethyl ether Trichloro ethylene
Detonation usually occurs at well below the upper explosive limits. Separate Detonation
Limits are available for some substances as under:
Substance Detonation Limits (%) Explosive Limits (%)
Lower Upper LEL UEL
Acetylene 4.2 50 3 82
Ether 2.8 4.5 1.8 48
Hydrogen 18.3 59 4 75
Though upper detonation limits are normally below upper explosive limits, exceptions have
been reported.
FIRE AND EXPLOSIONPHENOMENA
To understand these, some definitions arenecessary.
2.1 Definitions:
1. Auto-ignition (spontaneous ignition)temperature is the temperature at which amaterial will
self-ignite and sustaincombustion in the absence of a spark orflame.
2. Automatic Fire Alarm System is a fire alarmsystem comprising components and
subsystem required for detecting a fire,initiating an automatic alarm for fire andinitiating
other action as required.
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3. Combustibility (Flammability orIgnitability) is the capacity of a substance toignite and
continue to burn in the presenceof a heat source.
4. Combustion is a chemical changeaccompanied by the evolution of heat andlight.
5. Control Centre is a permanently mannedroom preferably on ground floor within
thepremises at risk for the receipt of emergencycalls and equipped with communications
needed for transmission of calls forassistance to services, such as fire and police.
6. Detonation is propagation of flamesfollowing shock wave through pipes, vessels,etc., at a
very high speed (supersonic) and high localized pressure.
7. Explosion is an extremely rapid chemical(explosive) transformation of fuelaccompanied
by release of energy andcompression of gases capable of producingmechanical work.
8. Extinguishing media are agents which canput out fires. Common extinguishing agentsare
water, carbon dioxide, dry chemical,alcohol foam, halogenated gases (Halons)and water jel
compound.
9. Fire is a rapid oxidation-reduction reactionwhich results in the production of heat
andgenerally visible light.
10. Fire Alarm System is a combination ofcomponents for giving an audible andvisible
and/or other perceptible alarm offire. The system may also initiate otherancillary action. It
includes manual callpoints for initiating alarm.
11. Fire Point is the lowest temperature atwhich a mixture of vapour and air continuesto burn
when ignited.
12. Fire Resistance is the ability of an element ofbuilding construction, component
forstructure to fulfill, for a stated period of time,the required stability, fire integrity
and/orthermal insulation and/or other expectedduty in a standard fire resistance test (see
IS3809).
13. Fire Resisting Wall is a wall capable ofspecifying the criteria of fire resistance
withrespect to collapse, penetration and excessivetemperature rise.
14. Flammability limits (Explosive range) i.e.the values (upper and lower) expressed
inpercent by volume of fuel vapour in air, isthe range of concentration within which
aparticular vapour or gas mixture with airwill burn (or explode) when ignited. Belowthe LEL
the mixture is too lean to burn andabove the UEL it is too rich to burn.
15. Flameproof Enclosure is an enclosure forelectrical machinery or apparatus that
willwithstand, when the covers or other accessdoors are properly secured, an
internalexplosion of the flammable gas or vapourwhich may enter or which may
originateinside the enclosure, without sufferingdamage and without communicating
theinternal flammation (or explosion) to theexternal flammable gas or vapour in which itis
designed to be used, through any joints orother structural openings in the enclosure.(The term
‗explosion proof‘ is synonymous).
16. Flash back occurs when a trail of flammablegas, vapour or aerosol is ignited by a
distantspark, flame or other source of ignition. Theflame then travels back along the trail of
fuelto its source resulting into fire or explosion.
17. Flash fireis vary rapid combustion.
18. Flash Point is the lowest temperature atwhich a liquid will give off enough flammable
vapour at or near its surface, suchthat its mixture with air can be ignited by aspark or flame. It
is of more interest in safetythan the fire point.
19. Fuel is a substance that acts as a reducingagent, giving up electrons to an oxidizer
(e.g.Oxygen in air) in a chemical combustion. Itmay be an element like carbon,
hydrogen,magnesium etc., a single compound like CO,methane CH4, a complex compound
likewood or rubber or mixture like LPG.
20. Ignition Temperature is the lowesttemperature at which ignition occurs in amixture of
explosive gas and air when themethod specified in IS 7820 is followed.(Flash point is a
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higher temperature at whichthe most explosive mixture will ignitespontaneously on account
of theenvironmental temperature).
21. Material Factor of a substance is a measureof its energy potential and is a function
offlammability and reactivity of the substance.The flammability depends upon the flashpoint
or heat of combustion while thereactivity depends upon the instability ofwater. Higher is the
Material Factor, higheris the fire and explosion hazard potential of aparticular substance. For
details see NFPA-704-M-1969.
22. Smoke Vents are openings, fitted withmanual shutters for removal of smoke froma fire.
23. Spontaneous Ignition or Combustionoccurs as the result of the gradualdevelopment of
heat generation by chemicalchanges. For example, baggas (grass) cubesheaped to be used as
fuel, generatesometimes, spontaneous combustionwithout spark and resulting into fire.
Similarly oil soaked rags can sometimesignite without spark due to combining withoxygen
(oxidation), evolving heat and if theheat given off reaches the apparent ignitiontemperature of
the rags it may burst intoflame and result in fire. Water spraying canavoid such phenomenon.
24. Venting Fire is the process of inducting heatand smoke to leave a building as quickly
aspossible by such paths that lateral spread offire and heat is checked, fire fightingoperations
are facilitated and minimum firedamage is caused.
Chapter-6
 Pressure vessel :
Horizontal pressure vessel in steel.
A pressure vessel is a container designed to hold gases or liquids at a pressure substantially
different from the ambient pressure.
Pressure vessels can be dangerous, and fatal accidents have occurred in the history of their
development and operation. Consequently, pressure vessel design, manufacture, and
operation are regulated by engineering authorities backed by legislation. For these reasons,
the definition of a pressure vessel varies from country to country.
Design involves parameters such as maximum safe operating pressure and temperature,
safety factor, corrosion allowance and minimum design temperature (for brittle fracture).
Construction is tested using nondestructive testing, such as ultrasonic testing, radiography,
and pressure tests. Hydrostatic tests use water, but pneumatic tests use air or another gas.
Hydrostatic testing is preferred, because it is a safer method, as much less energy is released
if a fracture occurs during the test (water does not rapidly increase its volume when rapid
depressurization occurs, unlike gases like air, which fail explosively).
In most countries, vessels over a certain size and pressure must be built to a formal code. In
the United States that code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC). These
vessels also require an authorized inspector to sign off on every new vessel constructed and
each vessel has a nameplate with pertinent information about the vessel, such as maximum
allowable working pressure, maximum temperature, minimum design metal temperature,
what company manufactured it, the date, its registration number (through the National
Board), and ASME's official stamp for pressure vessels (U-stamp). The nameplate makes the
vessel traceable and officially an ASME Code vessel.
The earliest documented design of pressure vessels is described in the book Codex Madrid I,
by Leonardo da Vinci, in 1495, where containers of pressurized air were theorized to lift
heavy weights underwater, however vessels resembling what are used today did not come
about until the 1800s where steam was generated in boilers helping to spur the industrial
revolution. However, with poor material quality and manufacturing techniques along with
improper knowledge of design, operation and maintenance there was a large number of
damaging and often fatal explosions associated with these boilers and pressure vessels, with a
death occurring on a nearly daily basis in the United States. Local providences and states in
the US began enacting rules for constructing these vessels after some particularly devastating
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vessel failures occurred killing dozens of people at a time, which made it difficult for
manufacturers to keep up with the varied rules from one location to another and the first
pressure vessel code was developed starting in 1911 and released in 1914, starting the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC).[1] In an early effort to design a tank capable of
withstanding pressures up to 10,000 psi (69 MPa), a 6-inch (150 mm) diameter tank was
developed in 1919 that was spirally-wound with two layers of high tensile strength steel wire
to prevent sidewall rupture, and the end caps longitudinally reinforced with lengthwise high-
tensile rods. The need for high pressure and temperature vessels for petroleum refineries and
chemical plants gave rise to vessels joined with welding instead of rivets (which were
unsuitable for the pressures and temperatures required) and in 1920s and 1930s the BPVC
included welding as an acceptable means of construction, and welding is the main means of
joining metal vessels today.
There have been many advancements in the field of pressure vessel engineering such as
advanced non-destructive examination, phased array ultrasonic testing and radiography, new
material grades with increased corrosion resistance and stronger materials, and new ways to
join materials such as explosion welding (to attach one metal sheet to another, usually a thin
corrosion resistant metal like stainless steel to a stronger metal like carbon steel), friction stir
welding (which attaches the metals together without melting the metal), advanced theories
and means of more accurately assessing the stresses encountered in vessels such as with the
use of Finite Element Analysis, allowing the vessels to be built safer and more efficiently.
Today vessels in the USA require BPVC stamping but the BPVC is not just a domestic code,
many other countries have adopted the BPVC as their official code. There are, however, other
official codes in some countries (some of which rely on portions of and reference the BPVC),
Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, and Europe have their own codes. Regardless of the
country nearly all recognize the inherent potential hazards of pressure vessels and the need
for standards and codes regulating their design and construction.
Pressure vessel features
Shape of a pressure vessel
Pressure vessels can theoretically be almost any shape, but shapes made of sections of
spheres, cylinders, and cones are usually employed. A common design is a cylinder with end
caps called heads. Head shapes are frequently either hemispherical or dished (torispherical).
More complicated shapes have historically been much harder to analyze for safe operation
and are usually far more difficult to construct.
Spherical gas container.
 Cylindrical pressure vessel.
 Picture of the bottom of an aerosol spray can.
Fire Extinguisher with rounded rectangle pressure vessel
Theoretically, a spherical pressure vessel has approximately twice the strength of a
cylindrical pressure vessel with the same wall thickness,and is the ideal shape to hold internal
pressure. However, a spherical shape is difficult to manufacture, and therefore more
expensive, so most pressure vessels are cylindrical with 2:1 semi-elliptical heads or end caps
on each end. Smaller pressure vessels are assembled from a pipe and two covers. For
cylindrical vessels with a diameter up to 600 mm (NPS of 24 in), it is possible to use
seamless pipe for the shell, thus avoiding many inspection and testing issues, mainly the
nondestructive examination of radiography for the long seam if required. A disadvantage of
these vessels is that greater diameters are more expensive, so that for example the most
economic shape of a 1,000 litres (35 cu ft), 250 bars (3,600 psi) pressure vessel might be a
diameter of 91.44 centimetres (36 in) and a length of 1.7018 metres (67 in) including the 2:1
semi-elliptical domed end caps.
Construction materials
Composite overwrapped pressure vessel with titanium liner.
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Many pressure vessels are made of steel. To manufacture a cylindrical or spherical pressure
vessel, rolled and possibly forged parts would have to be welded together. Some mechanical
properties of steel, achieved by rolling or forging, could be adversely affected by welding,
unless special precautions are taken. In addition to adequate mechanical strength, current
standards dictate the use of steel with a high impact resistance, especially for vessels used in
low temperatures. In applications where carbon steel would suffer corrosion, special
corrosion resistant material should also be used.
Some pressure vessels are made of composite materials, such as filament wound composite
using carbon fiber held in place with a polymer. Due to the very high tensile strength of
carbon fibre these vessels can be very light, but are much more difficult to manufacture. The
composite material may be wound around a metal liner, forming a composite overwrapped
pressure vessel.
Other very common materials include polymers such as PET in carbonated beverage
containers and copper in plumbing.
Pressure vessels may be lined with various metals, ceramics, or polymers to prevent leaking
and protect the structure of the vessel from the contained medium. This liner may also carry a
significant portion of the pressure load.
Pressure Vessels may also be constructed from concrete (PCV) or other materials which are
weak in tension. Cabling, wrapped around the vessel or within the wall or the vessel itself,
provides the necessary tension to resist the internal pressure. A "leakproof steel thin
membrane" lines the internal wall of the vessel. Such vessels can be assembled from modular
pieces and so have "no inherent size limitations".There is also a high order of redundancy
thanks to the large number of individual cables resisting the internal pressure.
Safety features
Leak before burst
Leak before burst describes a pressure vessel designed such that a crack in the vessel will
grow through the wall, allowing the contained fluid to escape and reducing the pressure, prior
to growing so large as to cause fracture at the operating pressure.
Many pressure vessel standards, including the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code[citation needed] and the AIAA metallic pressure vessel standard, either require pressure
vessel designs to be leak before burst, or require pressure vessels to meet more stringent
requirements for fatigue and fracture if they are not shown to be leak before burst.
Safety valves
Example of a valve used for gas cylinders.
As the pressure vessel is designed to a pressure, there is typically a safety valve or relief
valve to ensure that this pressure is not exceeded in operation.
Maintenance features
Pressure vessel closures
Pressure vessel closures are pressure retaining structures designed to provide quick access to
pipelines, pressure vessels, pig traps, filters and filtration systems. Typically pressure vessel
closures allow maintenance personnel.
Uses
An LNG carrier ship with four pressure vessels for liquefied natural gas. Pressure vessels are
used in a variety of applications in both industry and the private sector. They appear in these
sectors as industrial compressed air receivers and domestic hot water storage tanks. Other
examples of pressure vessels are diving cylinders, recompression chambers, distillation
towers, pressure reactors, autoclaves, and many other vessels in mining operations, oil
refineries and petrochemical plants, nuclear reactor vessels, submarine and space ship
habitats, pneumatic reservoirs, hydraulic reservoirs under pressure, rail vehicle airbrake
reservoirs, road vehicle airbrake reservoirs, and storage vessels for liquefied gases such as
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ammonia, chlorine, and LPG (propane, butane). A unique application of a pressure vessel is
the passenger cabin of an airliner: the outer skin carries both the aircraft maneuvering loads
and the cabin pressurization loads.
Safety and Health Codes Board to formulate rules, regulations, etc.; cost of
administration.
A. The Board is authorized to formulate definitions, rules, regulations and standards which
shall be designed for the protection of human life and property from the unsafe or dangerous
construction, installation, inspection, operation, maintenance and repair of boilers and
pressure vessels in this Commonwealth.
In promulgating such rules, regulations and standards, the Board shall consider any or all of
the following:
1. Standards, formulae and practices generally accepted by recognized engineering and safety
authorities and bodies.
2. Previous experiences based upon inspections, performance, maintenance and operation.
3. Location of the boiler or pressure vessel relative to persons.
4. Provisions for operational controls and safety devices.
5. Interrelation between other operations outside the scope of this chapter and those covered
by this chapter.
6. Level of competency required of persons installing, constructing, maintaining or operating
any equipment covered under this chapter or auxiliary equipment.
7. Federal laws, rules, regulations and standards.
Installations, repairs and alterations to conform to rules and regulations; existing
installations:
(a) No boiler or pressure vessel which does not conform to the rules and regulations of the
Board governing new construction and installation and which has been certified by the Board
shall be installed or operated in this Commonwealth after twelve months from July 1, 1973.
Prior to such date no boiler or pressure vessel shall be installed and operated unless it is in
conformity with the rules and regulations established pursuant to this chapter which were in
existence on July 1, 1972.
(b) This chapter shall not be construed as in any way preventing the use, sale or reinstallation
of a boiler or pressure vessel constructed prior to July 1, 1972, provided it has been made to
conform to the rules and regulations of the Board governing existing installations prior to its
reinstallation or operation.
(c) Repairs and alterations shall conform to the rules and regulations set forth by the Board.
Exemptions.
The provisions of this article shall not apply to any of the following:
1. Boilers or unfired pressure vessels owned or operated by the federal government or any
agency thereof;
2. Boilers or fired or unfired pressure vessels used in or on the property of private residences
or apartment houses of less than four apartments;
3. Boilers of railroad companies maintained on railborne vehicles or those used to propel
waterborne vessels;
4. Hobby or model boilers as defined in
5. Hot water supply boilers, water heaters, and unfired pressure vessels used as hot water
supply storage tanks heated by steam or any other indirect means when the following
limitations are not exceeded:
a. A heat input of 200,000 British thermal units per hour;
b. A water temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit;
c. A water-containing capacity of 120 gallons;
6. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only which are located on vehicles or vessels
designed and used primarily for transporting passengers or freight;
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7. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only, installed on the right-of-way of railroads and
used directly in the operation of trains;
8. Unfired pressure vessels used for containing water under pressure when either of the
following are not exceeded:
a. A design pressure of 300 psi; or
b. A design temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit;
9. Unfired pressure vessels containing water in combination with air pressure, the
compression of which serves only as a cushion, that do not exceed:
a. A design pressure of 300 psi;
b. A design temperature of 210 degrees Fahrenheit; or
c. A water-containing capacity of 120 gallons;
10. Unfired pressure vessels containing air only, providing the volume does not exceed eight
cubic feet nor the operating pressure is not greater than 175 pounds;
11. Unfired pressure vessels having an operating pressure not exceeding fifteen pounds with
no limitation on size;
12. Pressure vessels that do not exceed:
a. Five cubic feet in volume and 250 pounds per square inch gauge pressure;
b. One and one-half cubic feet in volume and 600 pounds per square inch gauge
pressure; and
c. An inside diameter of six inches with no limitations on gauge pressure;
13. Pressure vessels used for transportation or storage of compressed gases when constructed
in compliance with the specifications of the United States Department of Transportation and
when charged with gas marked, maintained, and periodically requalified for use, as required
by appropriate regulations of the United States Department of Transportation;
14. Stationary American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) LP-Gas containers used
exclusively in propane service with a capacity that does not exceed 2,000 gallons if the owner
of the container or the owner's servicing agent:
a. Conducts an inspection of the container not less frequently than every five years, in which
all visible parts of the container, including insulation or coating, structural attachments, and
vessel connections, are inspected for corrosion, distortion, cracking, evidence of leakage, fire
damage, or other condition indicating impairment;
b. Maintains a record of the most recent inspection of the container conducted in accordance
with subdivision a; and
c. Makes the records required to be maintained in accordance with subdivision b available for
inspection by the Commissioner;
15. Unfired pressure vessels used in and as a part of electric substations owned or operated by
an electric utility, provided such electric substation is enclosed, locked, and inaccessible to
the public; or
16. Coil type hot water boilers without any steam space where water flashes into steam when
released through a manually operated nozzle, unless steam is generated within the coil or
unless one of the following limitations is exceeded:
a. Three-fourths inch diameter tubing or pipe size with no drums or headers attached;
b. Nominal water containing capacity not exceeding six gallons; and
c. Water temperature not exceeding 350 degrees Fahrenheit.
Employment and appointment of inspectors and other personnel; inspections; reports.
The Commissioner is authorized to employ persons to enforce the provisions of this chapter
and the regulations of the Board. He shall be authorized to require examinations or other
information which he deems necessary to aid him in determining the fitness, competency, and
professional or technical expertise of any applicant to perform the duties and tasks to be
assigned.
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The Commissioner is authorized to appoint a Chief Inspector and to certify special inspectors
who shall meet all qualifications set forth by the Commissioner and the Board. Special
inspectors shall be authorized to inspect specified premises and without cost or expense to the
Commonwealth. Reports of all violations of the regulations or of this chapter shall be
immediately made to the Commissioner. Other reports shall be made as required by the
Commissioner.
Examination of inspectors; certificate of competency required.
A. All applicants for the position of inspector authorized by § 40.1-51.9 shall be required to
have successfully completed an examination monitored by the Examining Board and to have
received a certificate of competency from the Commissioner prior to commencing their
duties. A fee as set under subsection A of shall be charged each applicant taking the
inspector's examination.
B. Each inspector holding a valid certificate of competency and who conducts inspections, as
provided by this chapter, shall be required to obtain an identification card biennially, not later
than June 30 of the year in which the identification card is required. Application for the
identification card shall be made on forms furnished by the Department upon request. Each
application shall be submitted to the Department, accompanied by a post-office money order
or check drawn to the order of the Treasurer of Virginia in the amount as set under subsection
A
Financial responsibility requirements for contract fee inspectors.
A. Contract fee inspectors inspecting or certifying regulated boilers or pressure vessels in the
Commonwealth shall maintain evidence of their financial responsibility, including
compensation to third parties, for bodily injury and property damage resulting from, or
directly relating to, an inspector's negligent inspection or recommendation for certification of
a boiler or pressure vessel.
B. Documentation of financial responsibility, including documentation of insurance or bond,
shall be provided to the Chief Inspector within thirty days after certification of the inspector.
The Chief Inspector may revoke an inspector's certification for failure to provide
documentation of financial responsibility in a timely fashion.
C. The Safety and Health Codes Board is authorized to promulgate regulations requiring
contract fee inspectors, as a condition of their doing business in the Commonwealth, to
demonstrate financial responsibility sufficient to comply with the requirements of this
chapter. Regulations governing the amount of any financial responsibility required by the
contract fee inspector shall take into consideration the type, capacity and number of boilers or
pressure vessels inspected or certified.
D. Financial responsibility may be demonstrated by self-insurance, insurance, guaranty or
surety, or any other method approved by the Board, or any combination thereof, under the
terms the Board may prescribe. A contract fee inspector whose financial responsibility is
accepted by the Board under this subsection shall notify the Chief Inspector at least thirty
days before the effective date of the change, expiration, or cancellation of any instrument of
insurance, guaranty or surety.
E. Acceptance of proof of financial responsibility shall expire on the effective date of any
change in the inspector's instrument of insurance, guaranty or surety, or the expiration date of
the inspector's certification. Application for renewal of acceptance of proof of financial
responsibility shall be filed thirty days before the date of expiration.
F. The Chief Inspector, after notice and opportunity for hearing, may revoke his acceptance
of evidence of financial responsibility if he determines that acceptance has been procured by
fraud or misrepresentation, or a change in circumstances has occurred that would warrant
denial of acceptance of evidence of financial responsibility under this section or the
requirements established by the Board pursuant to this section.
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G. It is not a defense to any action brought for failure to comply with the requirement to
provide acceptable evidence of financial responsibility that the person charged believed in
good faith that the owner or operator of an inspected boiler or pressure vessel possessed
evidence of financial responsibility accepted by the Chief Inspector or the Board.
Right of access to premises; certification and recertification; inspection requirements.

A. The Commissioner, his agents or special inspectors shall have free access, during
reasonable hours to any premises in the Commonwealth where a boiler or pressure vessel is
being constructed, operated or maintained, or is being installed to conduct a variance review,
an owner-user inspection agency audit, an emergency repair review, an accident
investigation, a violation follow-up, and a secondhand or used boiler review for the purpose
of ascertaining whether such boiler or pressure vessel is being constructed, operated or
maintained in accordance with this chapter.
B. On and after January 1, 1973, no boiler or pressure vessel used or proposed to be used
within this Commonwealth, except boilers or pressure vessels exempted by this chapter, shall
be installed, operated or maintained unless it has been inspected by the Commissioner, his
agents or special inspectors as to construction, installation and condition and shall be
certified. A fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 shall be charged for each inspection
certificate issued. In lieu of such fees both for certification and recertification, an authorized
owner-user inspection agency shall be charged annual filing fees as set under subsection A of
§ 40.1-51.15.
C. Recertification shall be required as follows:
1. Power boilers and high pressure, high temperature water boilers shall receive a certificate
inspection annually and shall also be externally inspected annually while under pressure if
possible;
2. Heating boilers shall receive a certificate inspection biennially;
3. Pressure vessels subject to internal corrosion shall receive a certificate inspection
biennially;
4. Pressure vessels not subject to internal corrosion shall receive a certificate inspection at
intervals set by the Board, but internal inspection shall not be required of pressure vessels, the
content of which are known to be noncorrosive to the material of which the shell, heads or
fittings are constructed, either from the chemical composition of the contents or from
evidence that the contents are adequately treated with a corrosion inhibitor, provided that
such vessels are constructed in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Board;
5. Nuclear vessels within the scope of this chapter shall be inspected and reported in such
form and with such appropriate information as the Board shall designate;
6. A grace period of two months beyond the periods specified in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
this subsection may elapse between certificate inspections. The Chief Inspector may extend a
certificate for up to three additional months beyond such grace period subject to a satisfactory
external inspection of the object and receipt of a fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15
for each month of inspection beyond the grace period.
D. Inspection requirements for operating equipment shall be in accordance with generally
accepted practice and compatible with the actual service conditions and shall include but not
be limited to the following criteria:
1. Previous experience, based on records of inspection, performance and maintenance;
2. Location, with respect to personnel hazard;
3. Qualifications and competency of inspection and operating personnel;
4. Provision for related safe operation controls; and
5. Interrelation with other operations outside of the scope of this chapter.
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E. Based upon documentation of such actual service conditions by the owner or user of the
operating equipment, the Board may, in its discretion, permit variations in the inspection
requirements as provided in this section.
F. If, at the discretion of the Commissioner, a hydrostatic test shall be deemed necessary, it
shall be made by the owner or user of the boiler or pressure vessel.
G. All boilers, other than cast iron sectional boilers, and pressure vessels to be installed in
this Commonwealth after the six-month period from the date upon which the rules and
regulations of the Board shall become effective shall be inspected during construction as
required by the applicable rules and regulations of the Board.
H. Ninety-one days after expiration of a certificate for any boiler or pressure vessel subject to
this section, the Commissioner may assign an agent or special inspector to inspect such boiler
or pressure vessel, and its owner or operator shall be assessed a fee for such inspection. The
fee shall be established in accordance with subsection A of § 40.1-51.15.
Issuance of certificates; charges:
The Commissioner may designate special inspectors and contract fee inspectors to issue
inspection certificates for boilers and pressure vessels they have inspected. If no defects are
found or when the boiler or pressure vessel has been corrected in accordance with
regulations, the designated special inspector or contract fee inspector shall issue a certificate
on forms furnished by the Department. The designated special inspector or contract fee
inspector shall collect the inspection certificate fee required under § 40.1-51.10 at the time of
the issuance of the certificate and forward the fee and a duplicate of the certificate to the chief
inspector immediately.
Each designated special inspector or contract fee inspector may charge a fee as set under
subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 for each certificate issued, but the charge shall not be
mandatory. No charge shall be made unless the inspector has previously contracted therefor.
Suspension of inspection certificate; injunctive relief.
A. The Commissioner or his authorized representative may at any time suspend an inspection
certificate when, in his opinion, the boiler or pressure vessel for which it was issued, cannot
be operated without menace to the public safety, or when the boiler or pressure vessel is
found not to comply with the rules and regulations herein provided. Each suspension of an
inspection certificate shall continue in effect until such boiler or pressure vessel shall have
been made to conform to the rules and regulations of the Board, and until such inspection
certificate shall have been reinstated. No boiler or pressure vessel shall be operated during the
period of suspension.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, in the event of
violation of any provision of this chapter or the regulations promulgated thereunder, the
Board or the Commissioner may petition any appropriate court of record for relief by
injunction, without being compelled to allege or prove that an adequate remedy at law does
not exist.
Owner-user inspection agencies.
Any person, firm, partnership or corporation operating pressure vessels in this
Commonwealth may seek approval and registration as an owner-user inspection agency by
filing an application with the chief inspector on forms prescribed and available from the
Department, and request approval by the Board. Each application shall be accompanied by a
fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15 and a bond in the penal sum of $5,000 which
shall continue to be valid during the time the approval and registration of the company as an
owner-user inspection agency is in effect. Applicants meeting the requirements of the rules
and regulations for approval as owner-user inspection agencies will be approved and
registered by the Board. The Board shall withdraw the approval and registration as an owner-
user inspection agency of any person, firm, partnership or corporation which fails to comply
with all rules and regulations applicable to owner-user inspection agencies. Each owner-user
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inspection agency shall file an annual statement as required by the rules and regulations,
accompanied by a filing fee as set under subsection A of § 40.1-51.15.
Violation for operating boiler or pressure vessel without inspection certificate; civil
penalty.
A. After twelve months following July 1, 1972, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
partnership or corporation to operate in this Commonwealth a boiler or pressure vessel
without a valid inspection certificate. Any owner, user, operator or agent of any such person
who actually operates or is responsible for operating such boiler or pressure vessel thereof
who operates a boiler or pressure vessel without such inspection certificate, or at a pressure
exceeding that specified in such inspection certificate shall be in violation of this section and
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100. Each day of such violation shall be deemed a
separate offense.
B. All procedural rights guaranteed to employers pursuant to § 40.1-49.4 shall apply to
penalties under this section.
C. Investigation and enforcement for violations of this section shall be carried out by the
Department of Labor and Industry. Civil penalties imposed for violations of this section shall
be paid into the general fund.
Posting of certificate.
Certificates shall be posted in the room containing the boiler or pressure vessel inspected. If
the boiler or pressure vessel is not located within the building the certificate shall be posted in
a location convenient to the boiler or pressure vessel inspected, or in any place where it will
be accessible to interested parties.
When inspection certificate for insured boiler or pressure vessel invalid.
No inspection certificate issued for an insured boiler or pressure vessel based upon a report of
a special inspector shall be valid after the boiler or pressure vessel for which it was issued
shall cease to be insured by a company duly authorized to issue policies of insurance in this
Commonwealth.
Operations and maintenance.
A. A hobby or model boiler must be attended by a person reasonably competent to operate
such boiler when in operation. For the purposes of this section, a hobby or model boiler may
be considered as not being in operation when all of the following conditions exist:
1. The water level is at least one-third of the water gauge glass;
2. The fire is banked and the draft doors closed or the fire is extinguished; and
3. The boiler pressure is at least twenty pounds per square inch below the lowest safety valve
set pressure.
B. All welding performed on hobby or model boilers shall be done by an "R" stamp holder in
accordance with the inspection code of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors.
C. Repairs to longitudinal riveted joints are prohibited.
Variances: Upon application pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 9 of § 40.1-6, the
Commissioner may allow variances from a specific statutory requirement of this article
provided the applicant proves by clear and convincing evidence his hobby or model boiler
meets substantially equivalent construction and operating criteria and standards.
Civil penalty: A. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership or corporation to
operate in the Commonwealth a hobby or model boiler without a valid certificate. Any such
person shall be subject to a civil penalty as provided by § 40.1-51.12.
B. Any owner or user who leaves or causes to leave a hobby or model boiler unattended
while in operation at an event to which members of the general public are invited shall be in
violation of this article and subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000. Each instance of
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such violation shall be deemed a separate offense.The chapters of the acts of assembly
referenced in the historical citation at the end of these sections may not constitute a
comprehensive list of such chapters and may exclude chapters whose provisions have
expired.
The Virginia General Assembly is offering access to the Code of Virginia on the Internet as a
service to the public. We are unable to neither assist users of this service with legal questions
nor respond to requests for legal advice or the application of the law to specific facts.
Therefore, to understand and protect your legal rights, you should consult an attorney.
The Code of Virginia online database excludes material copyrighted by the publisher, Michie,
a division of Matthew Bender. Copyrighted material includes annotations and revisors' notes,
which may be found in the print version of the Code of Virginia. Annotated print copies of
the Code of Virginia are available in most Virginia public library systems, from LexisNexis
(1-800-446-3410), and from West, a Thomson-Reuters business (1-800-344-5008).
5.Maintenance and use in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions
Manufacturers and suppliers are required to specify servicing requirements to purchasers of
machinery. This would include service periods for conditions of ―normal use‖. To ensure safe
use, all machinery used in the work place, including pressure vessels must be serviced and
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer‘s recommendations.
The Department owning the vessel is responsible for establishing the equipment maintenance
contract and meeting the cost of maintenance.
The Local Estates Representative should be contacted when a maintenance contract is being
established or renewed – they may know of alternative suppliers offering more favourable
terms or if a College-wide contract is in place. In any case, the local Estates representative
will need to be made aware of service visits, as this can then be co-ordinated with insurance
inspections when necessary, usually at time of thorough examination.
Equipment may require more frequent and more stringent servicing as well as additional
control measures depending on its location and use. Advice should be sought from the
manufacturer in this instance. See 8. Information required by the Insurance Inspector
6. Requirement to inspect and examine
If a pressure vessel or part of a pressurised system fails, the consequences could be severe
(explosion, scalding etc). Therefore the User is responsible for ensuring that College-owned
(including grant-funded) pressure systems are maintained, operated safely, and precautions
taken to prevent over-pressurisation.
In addition, the User must ensure that a competent person (the College Insurance Inspector)
makes a thorough annual inspection and regular examination of any College-owned pressure
systems containing steam or having a pressure x volume equal to 250 bar litres or more.
The scope and frequency of the examination is defined in a Written Scheme of Examination,
drawn up by the College Insurance Inspector. Usually a written scheme is produced as part
of the commissioning process, but in any case will be provided by the Insurance Inspector on
the first examination. The Decision Tree in Appendix 1 helps to determine the duty holders.
7. Written scheme of examination (WSE)

If the supplier has not provided documentary evidence on commissioning and testing, advice
must be obtained from the College Insurance Inspector(s) on whether a WSE should be
drawn up before first use of any relevant pressure equipment. The scope of the examination
depends on the complexity of the equipment and the harm resulting in the event of failure.
The User must determine the scope of the WSE – if for example the equipment is likely to be
weakened due to chemical or environmental conditions then pipe work should be included or
if sudden failure of pipe work would give rise to danger. In practice, the College Insurance
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Inspector would do this on the User‘s behalf provided he is supplied with certain information
(see below).
The College Insurance Inspector sends the original WSE to the Estates Helpdesk, who in turn
will send copies to the local Estates representative. The Insurance Inspector will notify any
subsequent modifications to the WSE (after repair for example) to the Estates Helpdesk, who
will notify to the local Estates Contact by means of an amended hard copy and an electronic
version, which is then circulated as an update. Appendix 2 – Local Estates Contacts
8.Information required by the Insurance Inspector
To determine the depth and frequency of an examination, the Inspector will need to be
informed of the use and environmental conditions that the equipment is subjected to, for
example:
i)If environmental conditions are extreme, if corrosive chemicals such as acids or salts are
used within the vessel or are present in the external atmosphere, then physical degradation of
the equipment components is expected and the service frequency may need to be increased.
Similar consideration must be given to extremes of temperature, moisture, dust, etc.
ii)If domestic-type equipment is being used for research purposes (as this would not be
considered to be normal use by the manufacturer or supplier). Note that domestic pressure
cookers must not be used for laboratory-type work within the College.
The User should note under such circumstances, maintenance and servicing periods may need
to be more frequent then those specified by the manufacturer. See 5. Maintenance and use in
accordance with manufacturers‘ instructions
9.Arranging an Insurance Inspection
This should coincide with annual maintenance, as the machine may need to be stripped down
for the Inspector to access its workings. To ensure that maintenance coincides with
inspection, two actions are necessary.
i)Your vessel(s) will need to be registered with the Estates Help Desk and the
Dept/Divisional Safety Officer.
ii)Your maintenance contractor‘s details will need to be registered with the local Estates
Contact who will try to co-ordinate the visit of the Inspector with that of the service engineer.
The College currently meets the cost of the Insurance inspection.
Once the Inspector has visited he will issue a certificate. This will be issued as hard and
electronic copy to the Estates Helpdesk. The Estates Helpdesk will send hard copy to the
local Estates representative and to the Department Safety Officer.
If the Insurance Inspector identifies a safety problem he will inform the user and the local
Estates representative, who will be required to isolate and remove from service the piece of
equipment pending its repair by the department. See 15. Failing an inspection - actions to be
taken
10. Procedures for registration with Estates
You must register existing, newly purchased and second-hand equipment by email to
estates_help@imperial.ac.uk. You will need to provide all the information required on the
Estates form. See Appendices Pressure Vessel Registration Form.
In addition, the supplier will provide commissioning and testing data. Pressure vessels may
continue to be used in departments for many years, and may even be moved between
buildings, campuses etc. It is important that original commissioning and testing data is not
lost, so Users should send a copy of the commissioning and testing data to the local estates
contact, and give the original to the Department Safety Coordinator.
On receipt of the completed form, the Estates Helpdesk will arrange for the Insurance
Inspector to visit the Department to make a WSE and inform the local Estates contact,
maintenance provider, User, Department Safety Coordinator and Divisional Safety Advisor
that the Insurance Inspector has been notified. Estates will add the item(s) to the College
Register for subsequent annual inspections.
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Newly purchased equipment must be registered in the same way, but the insurance inspection
will only be necessary 12 months after installation.
If registering newly installed second-hand pressure systems, unless the supplier has provided
commissioning and testing data, you will also need to ask the Helpdesk whether or not a
WSE needs to be drawn up before first use. Estates will contact the College Insurance
Inspector to determine if this is necessary and to arrange a visit.
The maintenance and inspection of fixed installations (those that form part of the building
pressure system) is organized by the Local Estates contact on some campuses. It remains the
responsibility of the department to check that maintenance and inspection is being done.
If vessels are already registered, they may have been marked with a unique identifier – such
as a consecutive number and a Building/campus code. The unique identifier will identify the
equipment regardless of where it is located within the College. The unique identifier will
appear on the Inspector‘s report, and on the College and Divisional database of pressure
vessels. The serial number will act as the unique identifier where this is not in evidence.
11. Entry of non-authorized personnel into laboratories
Insurance Inspectors, service engineers, Estates personnel etc may not enter biological
Containment Laboratories, plant rooms or other high-risk workplaces unless permit-to-work
or equipment decontamination procedures are followed accordingly (see College Guidance
Note).
12.Rented and second-hand vessels
Mobile vessels are often on long-term hire. The owner of any pressure vessel is required to
have it maintained and tested (and examined where relevant). This applies to nitrogen
pressure vessels owned by nitrogen supply companies such as BOC. BOC are responsible for
carrying out the annual maintenance and testing on all of their vessels and would normally fix
a label to the equipment showing when this was next due. They usually provide a copy of the
test certificate to the hirer (on Hammersmith Campus these are kept by Stores), or a copy
may be obtained directly from the BOC. The hirer is responsible for checking that tests have
been carried out, and for ensuring that vessels failing the test are removed from service and
either repaired or replaced by the supply company.
The purchase of second-hand pressure systems should be avoided to minimize risks. They
may be in poor condition and the maintenance history may be unknown. Before use of such
equipment it is essential that a full service visit (combined with an Insurance Inspection if
over 250 bar litre) is arranged. See 10. Procedures for registration with Estates
13. Laboratory equipment which is integral with the building
Some equipment is linked to a building steam generating plant, for example non-self
generating autoclaves. This type of machine will be examined in accordance with a WSE, as
it forms part of a larger, unseen steam system. Estates will arrange for the maintenance and
testing of plant supplying the service to the autoclave. However departments are responsible
for ensuring that maintenance and examinations of any attached autoclaves are carried out (as
in 6-10). Other items such as gas generators and some compressed gas supply lines may also
be part of building-wide pressure system. The Estates Department currently recharges user
departments for the cost of maintaining this type of system. Pressure vessels operating via a
standard 13 Amp plug are unlikely to fall into this category. If you are uncertain, contact the
Estates Helpdesk for advice.
14. Procedures for inspection and re-inspection after repair or modification
On occasion, equipment will need to be repaired or modified. The Estates Helpdesk and the
local Estates contact must be informed immediately of any planned repairs or modifications
so that these may be notified to the Inspector, who may need to make an extra inspection,
perhaps whilst the machine is still stripped down by the service engineer.
Self-modifications made for example, as part of an experimental procedure must be subject to
a full risk assessment.
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15.Failing an inspection - actions to be taken
 The Insurance Inspector will take the following actions if he considers there to be
―imminent danger‖ from a pressure vessel:
 Inform local laboratory staff, and advise that the machine is removed from use
immediately.
 Issue a Site Defect Notice to the User or other responsible person (who must sign it),
stating what requirements are needed to make the machine safe (either repair or
scrapping), and a time scale in which to do it.
 Telephone the Estates Helpdesk and the local Estates Contact, who will complete a
Dangerous Occurrence Form.
 Inform the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
The local Estates contact, once informed by the Insurance Inspector, will email the User,
copying the Department Safety Coordinator, their named deputy, the Head of
Section/Department and the Divisional Safety Advisor, advising that action is required.
Users are responsible for carrying out required actions (repair or disposal), but must not
return a repaired item to service until authorized to do so by Estates.
The DSC or deputy should check that the required action has been carried out, and send
written confirmation of this to the local Estates contact, to the Estates Helpdesk (who will
inform the Inspector), the Divisional Safety Advisor and the Head of Section/Department.
HSE may write or check personally whether the appropriate action has been taken; if action is
not taken by the specified deadline, HSE may serve an Improvement Notice or a Prohibition
Notice depending on the danger involved.
Pressure System Inspection Frequency
Equipment Inspection Type Inspection Frequency

Heating boiler External 3 years
Pressure vessel, corrosive
External and internal 2 years
service
Pressure vessel, non-corrosive
External 3 years
service
Vacuum vessel External 5 years
 Pressure system hazards and control:

General safety requirements for compressed air :
1. All pipes, hoses, and fittings must have a rating of the maximum pressure of the
compressor. Compressed air pipelines should be identified (psi) as to maximum working
pressure.
2. Air supply shutoff valves should be located (as near as possible) at the point-of-operation.
3. Air hoses should be kept free of grease and oil to reduce the possibility of deterioration.
4. Hoses should not be strung across floors or aisles where they are liable to cause personnel
to trip and fall. When possible, air supply hoses should be suspended overhead, or
otherwise located to afford efficient access and protection against damage.
5. Hose ends must be secured to prevent whipping if an accidental cut or break occurs.
6. Pneumatic impact tools, such as riveting guns, should never be pointed at a person.
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7. Before a pneumatic tool is disconnected (unless it has quick disconnect plugs), the air
supply must be turned off at the control valve and the tool bled.
8. Compressed air must not be used under any circumstances to clean dirt and dust from
clothing or off a person‘s skin. Shop air used for cleaning should be regulated to 15 psi
unless equipped with diffuser nozzles to provide lessor pressure.
9. Goggles, face shields or other eye protection must be worn by personnel using
compressed air for cleaning equipment.
10. Static electricity can be generated through the use of pneumatic tools. This type of
equipment must be grounded or bonded if it is used where fuel, flammable vapors or
explosive atmospheres are present.
 Safety Requirements for Operating & Maintaining Compressed
Air Machinery:
All components of compressed air systems should be inspected regularly by qualified and
trained employees. Maintenance superintendents should check with state and/or insurance
companies to determine if they require their own inspection of this equipment.
Operators need to be aware of the following:
Air receivers:The maximum allowable working pressures of air receivers should never be
exceeded except when being tested. Only hydrostatically tested and approved tanks shall be
used as air receivers.
1. Air tanks and receivers should be equipped with inspection openings, and tanks over 36
inches in diameter should have a manhole. Pipelug openings should be provided on tanks
with volumes of less than five cubic feet.
2. The intake and exhaust pipes of small tanks, similar to those used in garages, should be
made removable for interior inspections.
3. No tank or receiver should be altered or modified by unauthorized persons.
4. Air receivers should be fitted with a drain cock that is located at the bottom Of the
receiver.
5. Receivers should be drained frequently to prevent accumulation of liquid inside the unit.
Receivers having automatic drain systems are exempt from this Requirement.
6. Air tanks should be located so that the entire outside surfaces can be easily inspected. Air
tanks should not be buried or placed where they cannot be seen for frequent inspection.
7. Each air receiver shall be equipped with at least one pressure gauge and an ASME safety
valve of the proper design.
8. A safety (spring loaded) release valve shall be installed to prevent the receiver from
exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure.
9. Only qualified personnel should be permitted to repair air tanks, and all work must be
done according to established safety standards.
Air Distribution Lines:
1. Air lines should be made of high quality materials, fitted with secure connections.
2. Only standard fittings should be used on air lines.
3. Operators should avoid bending or kinking air hoses.
4. Air hoses should not be placed where they will create tripping hazards.
5. Hoses should be checked to make sure they are properly connected to pipe outlets before
use.
6. Air lines should be inspected frequently for defects, and any defective equipment repaired
or replaced immediately.
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7. Compressed air lines should be identified as to maximum working pressures (psi), by
tagging or marking pipeline outlets.
Pressure regulation Devices:
1. Only qualified personnel should be allowed to repair or adjust pressure regulating
equipment.
2. Valves, gauges and other regulating devices should be installed on compressor equipment
in such a way that cannot be made inoperative.
3. Air tank safety valves should be set no less than 15 psi or 10 percent (whichever is
greater) above the operating pressure of the compressor but never higher than the
maximum allowable working pressure of the air receiver.
4. Air lines between the compressor and receiver should usually not be equipped with stop
valves. Where stop valves are necessary and authorized, ASME safety valves should be
installed between the stop valves and the compressor.
5. The Safety valves should be set to blow at pressures slightly above those necessary to pop
the receiver safety valves.
6. Blowoff valves should be located on the equipment and shielded so sudden blowoffs will
not cause personnel injuries or equipment damage.
7. Case iron seat or disk safety valves should be ASME approved and stamped for intended
service application.
8. If the design of a safety or a relief valve is such that liquid can collect on the discharge
side of the disk, the valve should be equipped with a drain at the lowest point where
liquid can collect.
9. Safety valves exposed to freezing temperatures should be located so water cannot collect
in the valves. Frozen valves must be thawed and drained before operating the compressor.
Air Compressor Operation:
1. Air compressor equipment should be operated only by authorized and trained personnel.
2. The air intake should be from a clean, outside, fresh air source. Screens or filters can be
used to clean the air.
3. Air compressors should Never be operated at speeds faster than the manufacturers
recommendation.
4. Equipment should not become overheated.
5. Moving parts, such as compressor flywheels, pulleys, and belts that could be hazardous
should be effectively guarded.
Compressed Air Equipment Maintenance:
1. Only authorized and trained personnel should service and maintain air compressor
equipment.
2. Exposed, Noncurrent-carrying, metal parts of compressor should be effectively grounded.
3. Low flash point lubricants should not be used on compressors because of its high
operating temperatures that could cause a fire or explosion.
4. Equipment should not be over lubricated.
5. Gasoline or diesel fuel powered compressors shall not be used indoors.
6. Equipment placed outside but near buildings should have the exhausts directed away from
doors, windows and fresh air intakes.
7. Soapy water of lye solutions can be used to clean compressor parts of carbon deposits, but
kerosene or other flammable substances should not be used. Frequent cleaning is
necessary to keep compressors in good working condition.
8. The air systems should be completely purged after each cleaning.
9. During maintenance work, the switches of electrically operated compressors should be
locked open and tagged to prevent accidental starting.
10. Portable electric compressors should be disconnected from the power supply before
performing maintenance.
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Pressure Measurement: Principles:

How Is Pressure Measured?
As with most measure and pressure measurement methods have varying suitability for
different applications. Measurement engineers need to be familiar with several techniques in
order to select the one that is most appropriate for their specific requirements.
Deadweight Tester:
The most fundamental pressure measurement technique, and favored as well for primary
calibration of pressure sensors, is the deadweight tester, or piston gauge (see Figure 1). This
device uses calibrated weights (masses) that exert pressure on a fluid (usually a liquid) through
a piston. Deadweight testers can be used as primary standards because the factors influencing
accuracy are traceable to standards of mass, length, and time. The piston gauge is simple to
operate; pressure is generated by turning a jackscrew that reduces the fluid volume inside the
tester, resulting in increased pressure. When the pressure generated by the reduced volume is
slightly higher than that generated by the weights on the piston, the piston will rise until it
reaches a point of equilibrium where the pressures at the gauge and at the bottom of the piston
are exactly equal.
The pressure in the system will be:Various pressure ranges can be achieved by varying the
area of the piston and the size of the weights. For extremely accurate and precise pressure
calibrations, many corrections must be made, exact areas and weights must be known, and
great care must be taken in the procedure. Obviously, this is not a practicable method for day-
to-day pressure measurements.
Fluid Head—Manometers: The height of a column of liquid, or the difference between the
heights of two liquid columns, is used to measure pressure head in devices called U-tube
manometers (see Figure 2). If a fluid is installed in an open U-shaped tube, the fluid level in
each side will be the same. When pressure is applied to one side, that level will go down and
the level on the other side will rise until the difference between the heights is equal to the
pressure head. The height difference is proportional to the pressure and to the density of the
fluid. The U-tube manometer is a primary standard for pressure measurement.
Although many manometers are simply a piece of glass tubing formed into a U shape with a
reference scale for measuring heights, there are many variations in terms of size, shape, and
material (see Figure 3). If the left side is connected to the measurement point, and the right is
left open to atmosphere, the manometer will indicate gauge pressure, positive or negative
(vacuum). Differential pressure can bemeasured by connecting each of the legs to one of the
measurement points. Absolute pressure can be measured by evacuating the reference side. A
mercury barometer is such an absolute pressure measuring manometer indicating atmospheric
pressure.In some versions, the two legs of the U are of different diameters. Some types
incorporate a large-diameter "well" on one side. In others, one tube is inclined in order to
provide better resolution of the reading. But they all operate on the same principle. Because of
the many constraints on geometry of installation and observation, and their limited range,
manometers are not practical or effective for most pressure measurements.
Force-Summing Devices:Mechanical pressure gauges and electromechanical pressure sensors

incorporate an elastic element called a force-summing device that changes shape when pressure
is applied to it.
The shape change is then converted to a displacement. Of the wide variety of force-summing
devices, the most common are Bourdon tubes and diaphragms. Bourdon tubes provide fairly
large displacement motion that is useful in mechanical pressure gauges; the lesser motion of
diaphragms is better in electromechanical sensors.The motion of the force-summing device can
be linked to a linear variable differential transformer, which acts as the electromechanical
transduction element. Alternatively, it can be linked, usually through a motion amplifying
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mechanism, to the wiper of a potentiometer. To reduce acceleration error, a balancing mass
may be provided.
Mechanical Pressure Gauges.: In mechanical gauges, the motion generated by the force-
summing device is converted by mechanical linkage into dial or pointer movement. The better
gauges provide adjustments for zero, span, linearity, and (sometimes) temperature
compensation for mechanical calibration. High-accuracy mechanical gauges take advantage of
special materials, balanced movements, compensation techniques, mirror scales, knife-edge
pointers, and expanded scales to improve the precision and accuracy of readings. The most
accurate mechanical gauges, test gauges, are used as transfer standards for pressure calibration,
but for applications requiring remote sensing, monitoring, or recording they are impractical.
Their mechanical linkages also limit their frequency response for dynamic pressure
measurements.
ElectromechanicalPressureSensors: Electromechanical pressure sensors, or pressure

transducers, convert motion generated by a force-summing device into an electrical signal.
These sensors are much more useful and adaptable than mechanical gauges, especially when
applied in data acquisition and control systems. In well-designed transducers, the electrical
output is directly proportional to the applied pressure over a wide pressure range. For rapidly
changing—dynamic—pressure measurement, frequency characteristics of the transducer are an
important consideration.
Types of Pressure Sensors

Pressure sensors are available with a variety of reference pressure options: gauge (psig),
absolute (psia), differential (psid), and sealed (psis). All use a force-summing device to convert
the pressure to a displacement, but that displacement is then converted to an electrical output
by any of several transduction methods. The most common are strain gauges, variable
capacitance, and piezoelectric.
Strain Gauge Transducers: Strain gauge transducers are based on metal or silicon
semiconductor strain gauges. The gauges can be discrete units attached to the surface of the
strained element or unbonded gauges. The gauge material can be sputtered onto a diaphragm or
diffused into a silicon diaphragm structure. The most common force-summing device for strain
gauge transducers is the diaphragm, which may be flat or sculptured. Strain gauges are also
used on Bourdon tubes and bellows assemblies.
Strain gauges are made of materials that exhibit significant resistance change when strained.
This change is the sum of three effects. First, when the length of a conductor is changed, it
undergoes a resistance change approximately proportional to change in length. Second, in
accordance with the Poisson effect a change in the length of a conductor causes a change in its
cross-sectional area and a resistance change that is approximately proportional to change in
area. Third, the piezoresistive effect, a characteristic of the material, is a change in the bulk
resistivity of a material when it is strained. All strain gauge materials exhibit these three
properties, but the piezoresistive effect varies widely for different materials. Metal strain
gauges are networks of wire or patterns of thin metal foil fabricated onto or into a backing
material and covered with a protective film.Their design permits the use of a large active length
(= large R) in a small area. They are made of specially formulated alloys with relatively large
piezoresistive effects. Silicon strain gauges are doped to resistivity levels that produce the
optimum combination of piezoresistive and thermoresistive effects. Strain gauge materials are
characterized by their strain sensitivity, but when fabricated into strain gauges they are
characterized by their "gauge factor," defined as relative resistance change divided by strain.
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Bonded Strain Gauges: Discrete metal or silicon strain gauges are usually bonded (glued) to
the surface where strain is to be measured, and provide an output proportional to the average
strain in their active area (see Figure 6). The typical gauge factor is around 2; a strain of 1
µin./in. would produce a resistance change of 2 µ/. Unstrained resistance ranges from 120 to
several hundred ohms. Because a significant length of wire or foil is necessary to provide high
unstrained resistance, metal strain gauges cannot be made extremely small.
Unbonded Strain Gauges: Unbonded strain gauge transducers use relatively long strands of
strain gauge wire stretched around posts attached to a linkage mechanism (see Figure 7). The
linkage is designed such that when pressure increases, half of the wire isfarther stretched and
the other half is less so. The primary advantage of unbonded over bonded is a higher gauge
factor, on the order of 3. Because no adhesives are required, they can also be designed and
fabricated for use at higher temperatures. Unbonded strain gauge transducers tend to be large.
Sputtered Strain Gauges: Strain gauge material may be sputtered onto a nonconductive
diaphragm to create the strain gauges (see Figure 8). Location and orientation are controlled by
masking, and the molecular bond created by the sputtering process eliminates any problems
with adhesive bonding. Gauge factors are similar to those of unbonded gauges. Surface
preparation and other process controls are quite critical. The fabrication process offers some of
the advantages of a silicon diaphragm, such as good linearity and highnatural frequency, as
well as the good temperature characteristics of metal gauges.
Semiconductor Strain Gauges: These devices are made of semiconducting silicon. Their
gauge factor is dependent on the doping level—more lightly doped, higher resistivity material
has a higher gauge factor. However, it also has greater thermal sensitivity, causing both
resistance and gauge factor to change significantly with temperature. Most silicon gauges are
doped to provide a gauge factor of 100?200, which gives acceptable temperature
characteristics. Discrete silicon strain gauges are used just as are metal gauges, glued to the
strained surface in the desired orientation to provide maximum sensitivity for pressure
measurement. In addition to their higher gauge factor (which provides higher sensitivity), they
are also smaller, allowing more miniaturization.
Bonded Discrete Silicon Strain Gauges: Early silicon strain gauge transducers used discrete
silicon strain gauges bonded with adhesives to the surface of a strained element. These devices
were similar to bonded metal strain gauges, except that the silicon typesprovided much higher
output and had greater temperature errors. Furthermore, the silicon gauges were smaller than
metal gauges, so the sensors could be made smaller.
Diffused Diaphragm Sensors: Discrete strain gauges, metal or silicon, require tedious micro
assembly for installation, but diffused diaphragm sensors (see Figure 9) can be fabricated using
semiconductor masking and processing techniques. This approach provides precision location
and orientation of the gauges for optimum linearity and sensitivity, allows extreme
miniaturization, and reduces assembly costs. It also removes the variability of the adhesive and
its application.
Sculptured-Diaphragm Sensors: Early diffused silicon diaphragm pressure transducers used a
simple, flat silicon diaphragm of uniform thickness. Silicon micro fabrication techniques
(MEMS) allow great flexibility in the mechanical design of the diaphragm.
Anisotropic etching provides precise control of etching directions in the silicon crystal.
Extremely small yet complex shapes can be fabricated, permitting the diaphragms to be shaped
for optimum combinations of linearity, sensitivity, and frequency response characteristics.
Variable Capacitance Transducers: When one plate of a capacitor is displaced relative to the
other, the capacitance between the two plates changes. If one of the plates is the diaphragm of a
pressure sensor, the capacitance can be correlated to the pressure applied to it (see Figure 10).
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This change of capacitance is either used to vary the frequency of an oscillator or is detected by
a bridge circuit. If the dielectric material is maintained constant, this mechanism provides a
very repeatable transducer. The primary advantages are low hysteresis; good linearity, stability,
and repeatability; static pressure measurement capability; and a quasi-digital output. However,
complicated electronics are required.
Piezoelectric Transducers: Piezoelectric (PE) pressure transducers (see Figure 11) use stacks
of piezoelectric crystal or ceramic elements to convert the motion of the force-summing device
to an electrical output. Quartz, tourmaline, and several other naturally occurring crystals
generate an electrical charge when strained. Specially formulated ceramics can be artificially
polarized to be piezoelectric, and they have higher sensitivities than natural crystals. Unlike
strain gauge transducers, PE devices require no external excitation. Because their output is very
high impedance and their signal levels low, they require special signal conditioning such as
charge amplifiers and noise-treated coaxial cable.
Some designs of PE transducers (ICP or voltage mode) therefore include an integral
preamplifier within the transducer's case. The output can then be an amplified (mill volt level)
low output impedance signal, greatly reducing cabling problems and simplifying signal
conditioning. The integral amplifier requires external power from a constant-current supply,
using the same two conductors as the signal circuit. The signal conditioner has a blocking
capacitor to block the DC power supply voltage and to transmit an AC signal.Because the PE
transducers are self-generating, dependent on changes of strain to generate electrical charge,
they are not usable with DC or steady-state conditions. They have an inherent low-frequency
rolloff that is dependent on the signal conditioning's low-frequency time constant.Their primary
advantage is their ruggedness, and, without integral electronics, their usefulness at high
temperatures. If not properly compensated, though, they are sensitive to shock and vibration
and may exhibit large changes of sensitivity with temperature variations.
Other Electromechanical Sensors. Virtually every technique for converting motion to an
electrical signal—variable reluctance, variable inductance, force balance, vibrating wires,
vibrating columns and tubes, piezoelectric film, and Hall effect—has been tried in pressure
transducer design. Several varieties of fiber-optic sensors have also recently become available.
These make use of variable reflectance, phase coherence, and microbend effects to convert the
sensed pressure into light variations that can be excited and caused to transmit signals via
optical fibers. These sensors may be advantageous in environments of high-amplitude
electromagnetic fields or pulses. Some "hybrid" systems use conventional transducers, then
convert the electrical outputs to optical signals for fiber-optic transmissions.
Scanners:Multichannel scanning pressure measurement systems are sometimes the best
selection when many measurement points are required. Two types are available: mechanical
and electronic. Mechanical scanners use only one sensor and mechanically route the pressure
sequentially from each measurement point to the sensor. Electronic scanners use many sensors
in a common body, and electrically time-multiplex the signals to data acquisition equipment. In
both types, tubing transmits the pressure from measurement points to one sensor.
Pressure-Scanning Valves: A pressure-scanning valve is a pneumatic switch capable of
sequentially multiplexing a number of pressures to a single transducer. The most common
design is based on a matched pair of lapped surfaces with one rotating relative to the other. The
transducer is typically flush mounted very close to the valve in order to minimize the volume of
gas subject to the changes in pressure. The valve rotor is driven by a stepper motor, and the
valve position is indicated by a rotary encoder. A periodic recalibration can be incorporated
into the system by supplying accurately known pressures to one or more ports. The maximum
scanning rate is dependent on the accuracy required. If the dwell time at each measurement
position is long enough for the pressure equilibrium to be achieved, the accuracy is that of the
transducer. Equilibrium time is a function of the traveling volume and the magnitude of the
pressure change. The typical scanning rate for aerodynamic or jet engine pressure
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measurements is 5?10 measurements/s. Multiple scanners can be time sequenced to provide
faster effective scanning rates.
Electronic Pressure Scanners:combining miniature semiconductor strain gauge transducers
and solid-state electronic multiplexing into an integrated measurement system provides much
higher rates than possible with mechanical scanners. A multiple transducer array, a low-level
multiplexer, and an instrumentation amplifier in a shared housing make up the typical system.
Some systems also include a pneumatic valve that can be automatically switched to subject
each sensor to a calibrated pressure at any time. The calibrated pressure is supplied by a
calibration manifold. Because there is no mechanical switching of pressurized passages, there
is no need to delay measurements while a traveling volume is stabilized. Each transducer is
always measuring, and its output is periodically sampled by the electronic multiplexer
scanning. Scanning speeds can be 10,000 to 20,000 sps. Of course, the connecting tubing
between the measurement point and the sensor will still impose a physical low-pass filter.
A steam explosion is an explosion caused by violent boiling or flashing of water into steam,
occurring when water is either superheated, rapidly heated by fine hot debris produced within
it, or heated by the interaction of molten metal‘s (as in a fuel–coolant interaction, or FCI, of
molten nuclear-reactor fuel rods with water in a nuclear reactor core following a core-
meltdown). Pressure vessels, such as pressurized water (nuclear) reactors, that operate above
atmospheric pressure can also provide the conditions for a steam explosion. The water changes
from a liquid to a gas with extreme speed, increasing dramatically in volume. A steam
explosion sprays steam and boiling-hot water and the hot medium that heated it in all directions
(if not otherwise confined, e.g. by the walls of a container), creating a danger of scalding and
burning.
Steam explosions are not normally chemical explosions, although a number of substances react
chemically with steam (for example, zirconium and superheated graphite react with steam and
air respectively to give off hydrogen, which burns violently in air) so that chemical explosions
and fires may follow. Some steam explosions appear to be special kinds of boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), and rely on the release of stored superheat. But many
large-scale events, including foundry accidents, show evidence of an energy-release front
propagating through the material (see description of FCI below), where the forces create
fragments and mix the hot phase into the cold volatile one; and the rapid heat transfer at the
front sustains the propagation.
STEAM EXPLOSION:
If a steam explosion occurs in a confined tank of water due to rapid heating of the water,
the pressure wave and rapidly expanding steam can cause severe water hammer. This was the
mechanism that, in Idaho, USA, in 1961, caused the SL-1 nuclear reactor vessel to jump over 9
feet (2.7 m) in the air when it was destroyed by a criticality accident. In the case of SL-1, the
fuel and fuel elements vaporized from instantaneous overheating.
Events of this general type are also possible if the fuel and fuel elements of a liquid-cooled
nuclear reactor gradually melt. Such explosions are known as fuel–coolant interactions
(FCI).[citation needed] In these events the passage of the pressure wave through the
predispersed material creates flow forces which further fragment the melt, resulting in rapid
heat transfer, and thus sustaining the wave. Much of the physical destruction in the Chernobyl
disaster, a graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled RBMK-1000 reactor, is thought to have been
due to such a steam explosion.
In a nuclear meltdown, the most severe outcome of a steam explosion is early containment
failure. Two possibilities are the ejection at high pressure of molten fuel into the containment,
causing rapid heating; or an in-vessel steam explosion causing ejection of a missile (such as the
upper head) into, and through, the containment. Less dramatic but still significant is that the
molten mass of fuel and reactor core melts through the floor of the reactor building and reaches
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ground water; a steam explosion might occur, but the debris would probably be contained, and
would in fact, being dispersed, probably be more easily cooled. See WASH-1400 for details.
Steam explosions are often encountered where hot lava meets sea water. Such an occurrence is
also called a littoral explosion. A dangerous steam explosion can also be created when liquid
water encounters hot, molten metal. As the water explodes into steam, it splashes the burning
hot liquid metal along with it, causing an extreme risk of severe burns to anyone located nearby
and creating a fire hazard.
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG)
LPG is a mixture of commercial butane and commercial propane having both saturated
and unsaturated hydrocarbons. LPG marketed in India shall be governed by Indian
Standard Code IS-4576 (Refer Table 1.0) and the test methods by IS-1448.
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AND CHARACTERISTICS
DENSITY
LPG at atmospheric pressure and temperature is a gas which is 1.5 to 2.0 times heavierthan air.
It is readily liquefied under moderate pressures. The density of the liquid isapproximately half
that of water and ranges from 0.525 to 0.580 @ 15 deg. Cosine LPG vapour is heavier than air,
it would normally settle down at ground level/ lowlying places, and accumulate in depressions.
VAPOUR PRESSURE
The pressure inside a LPG storage vessel/ cylinder will be equal to the vapour
pressurecorresponding to the temperature of LPG in the storage vessel. The vapour pressure
isdependent on temperature as well as on the ratio of mixture of hydrocarbons. At liquidfull
condition any further expansion of the liquid, the cylinder pressure will rise byapprox. 14 to 15
kg./sq.cm. for each degree centigrade. This clearly explains thehazardous situation that could
arise due to verfilling of cylinders.
FLAMMABILITY
LPG has an explosive range of 1.8% to 9.5% volume of gas in air. This is
considerablynarrower than other common gaseous fuels. This gives an indication of hazard of
LPGvapour accumulated in low lying area in the eventuality of the leakage or spillage.The
auto-ignition temperature of LPG is around 410-580 deg. C and hence it will notignite on its
own at normal temperature.Entrapped air in the vapour is hazardous in an unpurged vessel/
cylinder during pumping/filling-in operation. In view of this it is not advisable to use air
pressure to unload LPGcargoes or tankers.
COMBUSTION
The combustion reaction of LPG increases the volume of products in addition to thegeneration
of heat. LPG requires up to 50 times its own volume of air for completecombustion . Thus it is
essential that adequate ventilation is provided when LPG is burntin enclosed spaces otherwise
asphyxiation due to depletion of oxygen apart from theformation of carbon-dioxide can occur.
ODOUR
LPG has only a very faint smell, and consequently, it is necessary to add some odorant,so that
any escaping gas can easily be detected.Ethyl Herceptin is normally used as stanching agent for
this purpose. The amount to beadded should be sufficient to allow detection in atmosphere 1/5
of lower limit offflammability or odor level 2 as per IS : 4576.
COLOUR
LPG is colorless both in liquid and vapor phase. During leakage the vaporization ofliquid cools
the atmosphere and condenses the water vapour contained in them to form awhitish fog which
may make it possible to see an escape of LPG.
TOXICITY
LPG even though slightly toxic, is not poisonous in vapor phase, but can, however,suffocate
when in large concentrations due to the fact that it displaces oxygen. In view ofthis the vapor
possesses mild anaesthetic properties.
SAFETY:
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LPG is just as safe as any other fuel. In fact, it is safer than most fuels because neither LPG
itself nor the end products that are produced by burning LPG in a suitable appliance are
poisonous to inhale. Since LPG cannot burn without air, there can never be a ‗flashback‘ into
the cylinder.You can feel safe with LPG as the most thorough precautions are taken to ensure
your safety. All you have to do is to handle it correctly while adhering to the simple
instructions provided.
Location of LPG storage area
 Cylinders should be stored in a well-ventilated position in the open air on flat, suitable
hardstanding.
 Unless fire separation walls are provided, the cylinders should be kept at least 1 meter
awayfrom any boundary, building or source of ignition.
 LPG should not be kept, stored or displayed below ground level, such as in a cellar, pit
orbasement where escaping gas is likely to accumulate.
 There should be no opening into buildings, cellars or pits within 2 meters of the LPG
storagearea.
 If a drain or gully is unavoidably within 2 metres of the storage area the opening should
besecurely covered or fitted with a suitable water seal to prevent the entry of vapour.
 Electrical fittings within 1.5 metres vertically and 1 metre horizontally of any cylinder
containingLPG are required to be suitable for use in a Zone 2 area (BS EN 60079 -10-
1:2015 Explosiveatmospheres. Classification of areas. Explosive gas atmospheres).
 A suitable notice should be displayed prominently to indicate: the presence of LPG;
thecontents are highly flammable; smoking and other sources of ignition are prohibited;
whatto do in the case of fire or leakage of LPG.
 The extent of the storage area, unless a fence or cage is provided, should be clearly
marked.
 The storage of LPG should not obstruct means of access, egress, passageways
oremergency exits.
Security of LPG storage area
 For retail and temporary storage such as petrol station forecourts, cylinders may be
kept ina small lockable wire cage. A small mesh size should be selected to prevent
any unauthorized tampering with the cylinder valves from outside the cage.
 If a secure storage compound is used instead of a lockable cage, the compound must
besurrounded by a substantial fence constructed from industrial type mesh, for
example 12 gauge 52mm x 52mm welded panels or 12 gauge link fencing, and at least
1.8 metre high.
 A single entrance to the compound is permitted provided that the escape travel
distance from any part of the storage area is less than 12 meters, measured around the
containers.
 The gate should not be self-locking, must open outwards and be easily and
immediatelyoperable from the inside.
 The doors or gates to any storage facility must be kept locked when unattended.
Emergency measures
 There should be adequate firefighting equipment on the premises. Specific guidance on
this matter may be obtained from the States of Jersey Fire & Rescue Service. However,
forquantities of LPG less than 400 kg, it is advised that at least one 9 litre water
extinguisherand one 2 kg dry powder extinguisher be provided and kept ready for use.
 People on premises where LPG is stored should receive adequate instruction and
trainingon the actions to be taken in the event of fire or a leakage of LPG. These
instructions shouldbe repeated on a regular basis.
176
 Notices setting out the emergency procedures should be prominently displayed near
theLPG storage area.
 In the event of a leakage of gas being detected from an LPG cylinder, the Fire &
RescueService should be called immediately.
 PROVIDED IT IS SAFE TO DO SO, nearby sources of ignition should be extinguished,
thecylinder valve closed and any plug or cap securely replaced. If the leak cannot be
stopped, AND IT IS SAFE TO DO SO, the container should be removed to a well-
ventilated openspace which is well away from drains, buildings, sources of ignition and
other LPG cylinders.
General access to the leaking cylinder should be prevented, by barriers if necessary.
Notices advising of the presence of a leaking cylinder and prohibiting smoking and other
naked lights should be displayed. The supplier of the cylinder should then be
informedimmediately. No attempt should
 Corrosion, Erosion, Causes, Inspection and Prevention:

Reasons of Pressure Vessel Failure are many. Wrong selection of material of construction,
mechanical failure due to overpressure, overheating, external loading (e.g. platform, stairs,
ladders, supports, brackets etc.), excessive stress (uneven or over tightening), brittle fracture,
creep (due to fire or maloperation), mechanical fatigue and shock (due to pressure or flow
variations, vibrations, expansion effects), thermal fatigue and shock (due to temperature
difference and rate of change of temperature), hydrogen attack (blistering or embrittlement)
and corrosion failure are some of the reasons.
Corrosion is an electrochemical reaction between a metal and its environment. It
results in a loss of metal or weakening of it Corrosion reaches deeply, creates maintenance
problems and incurs cost of loss in lacs of rupees over the years.
Corrosion failure has also many reasons to occur. General, local and external
corrosion, galvanic, crevice, knife-line, intergranular and stress-related corrosion, scaling,
exfoliation, corrosion pitting and erosion are some common types of corrosion in process
plants including pressure vessels.
Corrosion due to oxidation at high temperature is called scaling, e.g. steam boilers.
Exfoliation is a type of scaling caused by oxidation in steam atmosphere e.g. feed water
heaters. General corrosion takes place due to a corrosive chemical or impurity over the
exposed surface.
Inter granular corrosion occurs in stainless steels heated upto 500-800 °C and then
exposed to corrosive conditions.
Galvanic corrosion happens due to current flowing between tow dissimilar metals
which form a galvanic cell. It occurs when two such metals are joined together at a weld. A
typical pair is iron and copper.Corrosion pitting results from electrochemical potential set up
by differences of oxygen concentration inside and outside the pit. The oxygen-lean part acts
as anode and the metal surface as cathode.
Knife-line corrosion takes place between parent and weld metals, e.g. austenitic stainless
steels.Crevice or contact corrosion occurs at the point of contact of a metal and non-metallic
material, e.g. threaded joints.Erosion is a type of corrosion and is caused by flow restriction
or change of direction, e.g. elbows, tees, baffles, nozzles and valves and point opposite to
inlet nozzle. It is increased if the flow contains solid particles or by bubbles in liquids and by
two phase flow. Wet steam flow, air jet flashing flow and pump cavitation can cause severe
erosion.External corrosion occurs by material of insulation. Leaching of chloride salts from
insulation can corrode pipe work.
177
Underground piping can be corroded by soil due to electrochemical action and cathodic
protection is used to control it.
Stress corrosion cracking is the result of corrosion and static tensile stresses.
Corrosion fatigue is caused by corrosion and by alternating fatigue stresses. Chlorides are a
common cause of stress corrosion cracking. Stress may be internal or external. Stress
corrosion cracking caused by an alkaline solution is known as caustic embrittlement, which
has been a frequent cause of failure in boilers. Therefore treatment to boiler feed water
(removal of caustic and chloride content) is necessary. Control measures are elimination of
corrodants, reduction of residual stresses and vibrations etc.
In plants handling nitric acid and nitrates, "nitrate stress corrosion cracking" of mild
steel is possible. This was the reason of crack in the reactor at Flixborough resulting in
removal of the reactor and temporary installation of the 20" pipe which gave way and the
disaster took place.
At high stresses and temperatures, traces of other metals like zinc can cause rapid and
severe zinc embrittlement of some types of steels. Wetting of the steel by molten zinc is a
favourable condition to zinc embrittlement. This may cause local fire and catastrophic failure.
To avoid this, zinc-coated items should not be placed in direct contact with stainless steel or
in positions where they can drip molten zinc on it. For example galvanized wire netting used
in insulation should not be in direct contact with stainless steel pipe. During welding and
fabrication, zinc contamination of stainless steel should be prevented. Special metallurgical
examination will reveal zinc embrittlement.
Corrosion Prevention is of high importance as it prevents accidents and reduces cost
of corroded materials. Substitution of non-corrosive or less corrosive material (e.g. SS instead
of MS) tolerated by the process technology and economy and selection of such material from
the design and erection stage avoids most of the corrosion problems. Then selection of
powder coated metal parts (sheets, structural members, machine parts, guards, covers etc.)
instead of painted, give long life. Mild steel parts of tanks structures piping, machines and
vessels must be regularly painted by anti-corrosive paints. Protection from rain and plant
water, dripping and leaking of corrosive chemicals, oxidation and contact of zinc and copper
is necessary. Rapid cleaning of spillage, good housekeeping, cathodic protection, control of
flow, fluctuations and vibrations, water softening and removal of salts, checking of scale
formation on plates and tubes, thickness measurement and defect monitoring by NDT
methods stated in foregoing Part 9.5.2 and latest instruments and equipment, scanning by
computer methods, descaling, dechoking, scrapping, timely repairing and preventive
maintenance are also useful to avoid corrosion and erosion.
Other methods to stop corrosion and erosion are as under:
1. Two compatible metal prevent or slow down the rate of corrosion.
2. A strategically placed gasket i.e.to provide insulating material between the two metals.
3. Cathodic protection and conversion coating.
4. Crevice corrosion can be avoided by choosing materials having corrosion resistance.
Stainless steels are prone to crevice corrosion and not recommended for such use.
5. Dezincificaiton (removal of zinc from brass) can be prevented by using alloys of brass
containing Sn, As, P or Sb.
6. Use of non-metallic material like plastic.
7. Applying monomolecular film (inhibitor) of grease, paint, synthetic organic coating or a
plastic sheet (liner) over the surface.
8. Use of oxygen scavengers (e.g. Sodium sulphite and hydrazine) to add into boiler water to
remove oxygen.
9. Inhibitors like phosphonates are used in cooling water for corrosion control.
10. Use of acid pickling as corrosion inhibitors.
178
11. Use of heavy oils or greases, waxes dissolved in solvents or sulphonate salts dissolved in
petroleum as a barrier between die environment and the metal surface.
However it should be verified that chemicals being selected as inhibitors should not be
carcinogenic.as they can cause cancer. For example p-t-butyl benzoic acid, sodium nitrite,
nitrosamines, thiourea etc. are carcinogenic and should not be used.
12. Non-metallic materials like plastic, rubber and synthetic elastomers can also be
attached by corrosion or cracking due to solvent, environmental stress or thermal effect.
Corrosion process in plastic takes place because of swelling, softening or loss of physical
properties. Polyurethane, polyethylene, polystyrene, ABS, acetal homopolymers and
polyethersulfone are the plastics having good resistance against corrosion.-Rubber lining (e.g.
chloroprene, nitrile and butyl rubber) on steel tank prohibits attack of strong acids.
179

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STUDY MATERIAL BY AVIKUMAR SHINDE MOB.

ADVANCE DIPLOMA IN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

SUB:Chemical and Process Safety Management(23111)

STUDY MATERIAL BY AVIKUMAR SHINDE

Exceptions :The PSM standard does not apply to the following:

 STAKE HOLDER OUTREACH :

 Metrics in Process Safety Management (PSM):

 ASSET INTEGRITY AND RELIABILITY:

MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

Who Does It?

What Is the Anticipated Work Product?

The output of a management review is generally an internal memorandum summarizing the

Instrumentation for safe and efficient operation of plants

Lifecycle step Example Metric

 Total number of safety equipment

Conducting the Audit:

Subjects discussed include:

 Process Safety Culture  Contractor Management

 Process Safety Competency  Management of Change

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONCORDANCE TABLE

RBPS Pillar / Element Key Reference to Applicable Comment

RBPS Pillar / Element Key Reference to

Introduction to Process Safety Culture:

 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA):

 Hazards may be identified by:

 Assess the Risk:

Checking the changes:

Introduction to Workforce Involvement:

 Individual empowerment. Workforce involvement provides explicit roles,

Who Does It?

What Is the Anticipated Work Product?

Defines the roles and responsibilities of all involved:

 Meets the current needs of all constituencies.

 Introduction to Asset Integrity and Reliability:

Who Does It?

What are the elements of a good contractor management system?

Successful contract management exists when:

 all parties know their obligations under the contract

 Introduction to Training and Performance Assurance:

Introduction to Operational Readiness:

Who Does It?

What Is the Anticipated Work Product?

 Introduction Conduct of Operations:

Who Does It?

What Is the Anticipated Work Product?

What is an incident and why should it be investigated?

Who should do the investigating?

 experienced in incident causation models,

 employees with knowledge of the work

Should the immediate supervisor be on the team?

What are the steps involved in investigating an incident?

 Report the incident occurrence to a designated person within the organization.

The organization would then:

 Develop a plan for corrective action.

What should be looked at as the cause of an incident?

 Was a safe work procedure used?

 Was there an equipment failure?

 What were the weather conditions?

 Did the worker follow the safe operating procedures?

How are the facts collected?

 positions of injured workers

 put the witness, who is probably upset, at ease

 intimidate the witness