Hugo Grotius: Property and Consent

Author(s): John Salter

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Aug., 2001), pp. 537-555
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 HUGO GROTIUS
Propertyand Consent

JOHNSALTER
University
ofManchester

G rotius'sdiscussionofprivate
property is usuallyregardedas thesemi-
nalworkwithin themodemnatural lawtradition anda pointofdeparturefor
thesubsequenthistory of thesubject.However,thereis no settledunder-
standing of someof Grotius'sprincipalideas,withtheresultthatdifferent
interpretationshaveproducedradicallydifferent histories.Accordingto a
widelyheldview,Grotiusunderstood theoriginalrelationshipbetweenmen
andthenatural worldas a kindofpositivecommunity, inwhichall hadequal
jointrightstotheearth'sresources.Theintroduction ofprivatepropertythus
requireda universalagreementto dissolvethe originalrights.Richard
SchlatterinterpretedGrotiusin thiswayandconcludedthatGrotius

basesprivate
ownership ona suppositious
conventionsubscribedtobythewholehuman
race.Naturallaw no doubtobligesmentorespectthatconvention; as he
nevertheless,
himselfconfesses, is,accordingto histheory,
property a creationofhumanlaw.I

According toRichardTuck,however, 'thegeneralprinciple ofoccupation

wasnottakentobe conventional'. Whiletherewasnoprivate propertyinthe
stateofnature,'Naturalmanwas thesubjectofrights. Moreover, therights he
possessed,althoughnotstrictly property rights,werenotcategorically dis-
similar'.Consequently, 'Therewas something naturalin thedevelopment
intotheinstitution
ofprivateproperty ofthebasicandinherent humanright to
use thematerialworld,and no agreement was evernecessary'.Rather,'all
thatwas necessarywas labourofsomekind.Menhadphysically totakepos-
sessionofthematerial object,orto alterordefineitin someway'.2 He con-
cludesthattheagreement toinstitute
privateproperty is a veryweakcondi-
tionandis morethe'recognition ofa right'ratherthan'whatconstitutesit'.3
andTuckbotharguethatGrotius'stheory
Schlatter ofproperty was repu-
diatedbyPufendorf. According toSchlatter,Pufendorf redefined thestateof
theworldbeforetheintroduction of privateproperty as a stateof negative

POLITICAL THEORY,Vol.29 No. 4, August2001 537-555

C) 2001 Sage Publications
537

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538 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

community, meaning,'Nothingbelongsto anyone'.' This, accordingto

Schlatter,removed onereasonfortheagreement: 'Sincemenhadnojointor
overlapping rightsin thestateofnature, itwas notnecessary toassumethat
thoserights must have beenextinguished by universal consent'.5 Pufendorf
stillneededa convention toshowhowitwaspossiblefortheseizureofthings
fromthenegativecommonto imposean obligation on otherstorespectthe
right ofthefirsttaker.So although Pufendorf hadnotentirely dispensedwith
theconvention, he hadmadean important stepinthatdirection andcleared
thewayforothers, principallyLocke,to establishtherightofproperty as a
naturalright.
Tuckthinks, however, thatPufendorf's principal innovationwashisfamous
'correlativitythesis':tohavea right requiresa corresponding obligation, and
nonnaturalobligations-suchas those governingproperty-require an
agreement of some kind. According to Tuck, this argument was, in effect,a
repudiation ofGrotius'sattempt toconstruct a naturalrights theory. Thetar-
getofPufendorf's argument wasHobbes,but'Grotiuscouldnotbe preserved
ifHobbeswastobe refuted'.6To denythattheoriginalstateofmanwasone
of war,itwas necessaryto denythattherewereoverlapping, andthuscon-
flicting,naturalrights, andtheonlywayto denythiswas todenythatthere
wereanynaturalrightsat all.
My firstaim in whatfollowsis to attempt to shedsomelighton what
appear to be thetwo disputed areas:Grotius's understanding ofhowtheprim-
itivegeneralrightworkedin practiceandthenatureandsignificance ofthe
agreement thataccompaniedtheintroduction of privateproperty. Grotius
arguedthatunderthetermsof theoriginalgrantof theworldto mankind,
everyone couldtakepossessionofwhattheyneeded,and'thefirst onetaking
possessionwouldhavetherightto use thingsnotclaimedandto consume
themuptothelimitofhisneeds'.' Ifthisright touse things notclaimedis to
be understood as a rightthatis notcategorically differentfroma property
right,thenthereis nocategorical difference betweenusingthings onthecom-
monandoccupation.Tuckis thendrawingtheonlyappropriate conclusion
whenhe assertsthattheagreement is a weakcondition. I shalltrytoshowin
Section2, however, thatwhatGrotiusmeantbyusingthecommonwas lim-
itedtotheconsumption anduninterrupted physicalpossessionofthefruits of
the common.This differed fromthe moreextendedmeaningfoundin
Pufendorf, whereby use entailslabourandstorage.The difference is essen-
tiallybetweenusingthingson thecommonand removing thingsfromthe
commonforprivate use.Grotius'smorerestricted conceptofusingthecom-
mondidnotrequirerights to,nordiditcreatenewrights in,thethings used.It
was possibleas a consequenceoftheoriginalrights toperform actionsthat
didnotviolatetherights ofothers.Thefirst use ofthecommon, therefore, is

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 Salter/HUGO GROTrIUS:PROPERTY AND CONSENT 539

categorically
differentfromoccupation,and Section3 explorestheprecise
natureofthisdifference to showwhytheagreement was necessary.
Mysecondaim is toarguethattheinterpretation
ofGrotius here
presented
pointstoa rather
differentassessmentoftherelationship
betweenhistheory
andthoseofPufendorf andLockethanis suggested bySchlatterandTuck.

COMMONPROPER7Y
In 1609, Grotiuspublisheda shortworktitledMare Liberum,which
aimedto establishtheprinciple that'Everynationis freeto travelto every
othernation,andtotradewithit'.8 As partofthisundertaking,Grotiusargued
thatthesea wasthecommonproperty ofall nationsandthatitmustremainso.
Thesea wascommoninthesamewaythateverything wascommoninancient
timesbeforetheintroductionoflaws ofprivateproperty. No country could
claimthesea as privateproperty andexcludeothersfromitsuse. Underthe
termsoftheoriginalgiftoftheworldtomankind, therewas noparticularor
privateownership:

God hadnotgivenall thingstothisindividual

ortothat,buttotheentire
humanrace,and
thusa number
ofpersons, as itwereenmasse,werenotdebarredfrom beingsubstantially
orownersofthesamething.9
sovereigns

Sovereignty or ownership heremeant'theprivilegeof lawfullyusingcom-

monproperty'.'0 Nobody,therefore,couldbe debarred
fromusingthesame
thing,butsincethesamethingcannotbe usedin thesamewayat thesame
time,itfollows,thatas a minimum, 'Allthings
belongedtohimwhohadpos-
sessionofthem'."I However, therewasnorighttoexcludeothersfroma simi-
laruse,eitherbeforeorafterourpossession.Animplication ofthisseemsto
be thatwe mustleavethecommonas we findit.Buttherearesomethings,
Grotiussays,suchas foodanddrink, theuseofwhich'consistsintheirbeing
usedup'. He concludesfromthisthatuse is inseparable'froma certain
kind
ofownership' because'own' implies'thata thingbelongsto someone per-
son,in sucha waythatitcannotbelongto anyotherperson'.'2
In De JureBelliac Pacis,whichwas publishedsixteenyearsafterMare
Liberum,Grotiussays,God had 'conferred uponthehumanracea general
rightoverthings ofa lowernature',
andinconsequenceofthisgeneralright,

Each mancouldatoncetakewhatever
hewishedforhisownneeds,andcouldconsume
was capableofbeingconsumed....Whatever
whatever eachhadthustakenforhisown
couldnottakefromhimexceptbyan unjustact.13
needsanother

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540 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

He saysthatreasonandthenatureofsocietydo notprohibit all use offorce

butonly'thatuse of forcewhichis in conflictwithsociety,thatis which
attempts totakeawaytherights ofanother'. Thiswouldbetrueevenifprivate
ownership hadnotbeenintroduced because'life,limbs,andliberty wouldin
thatcase be thepossessionsbelonging toeach,andno attackcouldbe made
upontheseby anotherwithout injustice'.Furthermore, undersuchcondi-
tions,'thefirst one takingpossessionwouldhavetherighttouse thingsnot
claimedandto use themup tothelimitofhisneeds,andanyone depriving
himofthatrightwouldcommitan unjustact' 4Thereis,then,a right touse
things notclaimedanda prohibition ontheuseofforcetotakeawaythatright
fromanother.
GrotiuscitesCicero'sfamousexampleofthepublictheatre to illustrate
howthecommongiftcan be usedbyindividuals:'Although thetheatre is a
publicplace,yetitis correct to saythattheseata manhas takenbelongsto
him'15Hethenspecifies theconditions underwhichtheexerciseofthisprim-
itiveright is possible:namely, as longas peoplewerecontent tolivea simple
life,thatis, to live 'on thefruitswhichtheearthbrought forthof itsown
accord,without toil'oriftheyhad 'livedon termsofmutualaffection'.16
Itis a pointofconsiderable importance inGrotius'saccountthatourlife,
limbs,andliberty areregarded as thepossessionsthatcomprisethenatural
suumandthatthesuumcanbe extended nonconventionally toincludenatural
objects.Itwasprecisely thispointthatPufendorf wastodenyonthegrounds
that'itis impossible toconceivehowthemerecorporalactofonepersoncan
prejudice thefaculty ofothers,unlesstheir consentis given'.17Pufendorf thinks
thatanykindofexclusivepossessionrequiresan agreement ofsomekind:

Foralthough afterGod hadmadethegift,nothing

remainedtoprevent manfromappro-
priating
thingstohimself, yettherewas needofsomesortofconvention ifitwas tobe
understood thatby suchappropriation
or seizuretherightof othersto thatthingwas
excluded.18

Pufendorf,likeGrotius,
usestheexampleoftheequestrian
seatsbelonging
to
all theRomanknightstoillustratehowmenoriginally
madeuse ofthecom-
mon,buthe takesitto illustrate
that

so longas theactualbodiesofthingswerenotyetassignedtocertainindividuals,
there
was a tacitconventionthateach mancouldappropriate
forhis ownuse,primarily the
fruitsofthings,whathe wanted,andcouldconsumewhatwas consumable. '9

Now,theknights havea righttouse thetheatre

inthesensethattheseats
belongtono one andareopentoall. Buttheydo nothavea rightthatwould

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 541

enablethemtodemandthatothers makeroomforthemifthetheatre is full.In

otherwords,theydo nothavea righttoa seat.Pufendorf is pointing
outthat
sincetheknights do nothavea right toa seat,occupants cannotkeeptheseats
theyhavetakenbyvirtueofhavinga right toit.Andheis makingthefurther
claimthattheactionofsitting downcannotcreatea right ina seat.Anacquisi-
tionofa right ina seatis conventionalandis contingent on theotherknights
agreeing toit.Grotius,ontheotherhand,is pointing outthatsincetheknights
do nothavea righttoa seat,theycannotdemandthatseatsarevacated.The
occupantsareonlydoingwhattheycan lawfully do. In sittinginan unoccu-
piedseat,theyhavenottakenawaytherights ofothers, andso,otherscannot
demandthattheystop.Itseemsthen,oratleastitdoestoGrotius, thattheydo
have a rightof some kindthatenablesthemto demandthattheyare not
evicted.Theydohavea right tobe there.So, whatkindofright do theyhave?
Theusualansweris thatGrotius thinkstheactofseizuresomehowcreates
a rightintheoccupiedseat.Home,forinstance, says,'It is important forthe
history ofproperty rightsthatGrotiusthought thata rightcouldbe created
simplyby theindividual'sseizure'.20Olivercronaunderstood Grotiusin
muchthesamewayandsuggested thatGrotiusis makinguseofa natural and
commonidea:

Whena childhas pickedstrawberries,theyare said to be 'his' or 'hers'. If theyare

takenfromthechildbya naughty boy,thisis acutelyfelt,notonlybecauseoftheloss
Theactis experienced
ofthestrawberries. bythechildas anattackonitself, thatis,onits
personality.21

However, as longas we confinethediscussiontotheexampleofthetheatre,

andtoactsofappropriation thatsharethesamecharacteristics, itis entirely
unnecessary toaccountforthefactthata knight
hasa righttobe inhisseatby
invoking theideathatbytakingit,hehascreateda newright init.Pufendorf's
denialthattakingpossessioncan createa rightin something is a denialofa
movethatGrotiusdoes notmake.Grotiusneversaysthatpeopleacquirea
rightin thingsthattheytake.He justsaystheyhavea righttouse them.
Theknights inthetheatre,
justlikepassengersonpublicbuses,do nothave
rightsto theirseats, nordo theyacquire rightsin themonce theyhave
occupied them.They merelyhave a libertyto occupy vacant seats.
Pufendorf'spointis thatbecause thereare no obligationsto allow the
occupantsto exercise this liberty,theyare unprotectedfromsecond
comers'exercisingthesameliberty. However,althoughtheknights arenot
protectedbyrights inortotheirseats,theyarenotentirely
unprotected. Hillel
Steinerhas written,

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542 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

Whileit's ... truethatmyexerciseofa liberty

is notprotected byothershavingduties
specifically themnottointerfere
enjoining withthatexercise,itcanalso be truethatthe
dutiestheydo havemaysometimes be suchas effectively
toruleoutsuchinterference.22

Now,occupying a seatina theatre ora buscanbe understood as an example

ofdoingsomething as wellas havingsomething. Itentailsphysicalactions,
andwe knowfromGrotius'sdiscussioninDe JureBellithatas longas peo-
ple's actions,eventheirviolentactions,do notencroachontherights ofoth-
ers,theyareprotected bythenaturallawdutynottophysically harmothers.
Anditseemsclearinthesecasesthateviction ordispossession couldnottake
placewithout somekindofphysicalassault,whichwouldundoubtedly be a
violation ofa right.Itis possibletoargue,therefore, thatthereareobligations
governing theuse ofpubliclyownedthings, whicharenotcorrelative toany
rights peoplehaveto,orin,thosethingsbuttotherights thatpeoplehaveto
personalintegrity.
The exampleofthepublictheatre is particularly appositeforGrotiusin
viewofwhathethinks usingthecommonmeans,namely, livingon 'thefruits
whichtheearthbrought forthofitsownaccord,without toil'.Menwerethen
content'to dwellincaves,tohavethebodyeithernakedorclothedwiththe
barkoftreesorskinsofwildanimals'.23 He thusconfines thelawfuluseofthe
commontotheimmediate consumption ofthings thatpeoplefindgrowing on
thecommonandtousesthatentailuninterrupted physicalpossession, suchas
wearingclothesand usingcaves fordwelling.He excludesfromconsider-
ationatthispointthings producedbylabourandthingsstoredforfuture use,
activitiesthatonlybeginas a resultofa desirefora morerefined wayoflife.
Claimstotheproducts oflabourandclaimstousestoresbothrequire thekind
of ownership thatresultsfromprivateproperty, as he definesit,because
'ownership, whichbeginswithpossession, is notlostwhenpossessionis lost;
rather, ownership givesus therightto recoverpossession'.24 Ownership of
theproducts oflabourandownership ofthings thatarestored requiretheright
torecoverpossessionaftertheinitialseizure,thatis,after'theconnexion of
bodywithbody'has beeninterrupted.25 Andas we shallsee inthenextsec-
tion,thisrightrequiresan agreement.
Grotiusdiscusseslabourand storagein a passagein whichhe deploys
Aristotle'sarguments againstthePlatonicpositivecommunity ofproperty to
makethepointthatwhenpeoplewereno longercontent tofeedoffthespon-
taneousproducts ofnaturebutappliedindustry to theproduction ofthings,
community ofownership couldonlybe maintained bysomekindofsharing.
Thatis, theoriginalnegativecommunity wouldhaveto be replacedwitha
kindofpositivecommunity. ButGrotiussaysthatthepracticeofgathering
theproducts ofthesoil intoa commonstorewas hindered by

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 543

theremotenessoftheplacestowhichmenhadmadetheirway,andthenbythelackof
justiceandkindness;inconsequenceofsucha lacktheproperfairnessin makingdivi-
sionwas notobserved, eitherinrespectto labourorintheconsumption
ofthefruits.26

Theproblem thatGrotiusis identifying

is theabsenceofa satisfactory princi-
pleofapportioning collectivelyownedproducts. Thisis a problem associated
withthedistribution ofgoodsfroma commonstoretowhichall hadcontrib-
uted.Inthecontext ofGrotius'shistory oftheearlydevelopment ofproperty,
itis a problemthatis encountered afterwholenationshadoccupiedseparate
countries butbeforethedivisionofthelandbetweenfamiliesorindividuals.
Forthiskindofpositivecommunity toworkharmoniously after
peoplebegan
tolabourandstorethings, theymustdo morethanrespecttheprimitive right;
theymust'liveontermsofmutualaffection suchas rarelyappears'.Itis not,
therefore, an argument aboutwhytheoriginalcommunity was abandoned
butaboutwhy,after thefirststepsinitsabandonment hadoccurred, a positive
community ofsharing enduredonlyin exceptional cases.
Pufendorf, bycontrast,understands theuniversaluse ofthingstorequire
labourandstoragefromthestart.He says,

Mostthingswhichareofusetomenimmediately andareemployedtonourish themand

protect
theirbodies,arenotproducedeverywherebynatureandwithout cultivation
in
suchabundancethattheyfullysuffice
foreveryone.Therefore,
anoccasionforquarrels
andwarslayreadyat hand.2

use of thingsthusrequireda convention,

The universal theeffectof which
wasthat'whateveroneofthesethings whichwereleftopentoall,andoftheir
a manhadlaidhishandsupon,withintent
fruits, toturnittohisuses,could
notbe takenfromhimbyanother'. thisfirst
28Furthermore, agreementdistin-
guishedmanfromanimalsin therespectthateveryanimal

takesforhisownnourishment hefirst
everything happensupon.Andevenifanyoneof
themhasstoredup somethingsforhisfuture use,othersarenotprevented
fromseizing
them,forthereasonthatthereis no conventionamonganimalswhichconfersa special
rightovera thingtotheone thatfirst
gotit.29

The differences
betweenGrotiusandPufendorf, aretheresult
therefore,
ofdifferentconceptionsofwhatusingthecommonmeans,andthishascre-
atedanambiguity aboutthemeaning ofthetermseizure.ForGrotius, thefirst
uses oftheworldhadthesamecharacteristics as theuse ofpublicparksand
theatres.
Theyareusesthatentailan uninterrupted seriesofphysicalactions
and are thusprotected by thenaturalrightto life,limbs,and liberty.
For
Pufendorf,thefirst
use ofthecommonentailstheremovalofthingsfromthe

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544 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

commonwiththeintention offuture use. Andas he rightly

says,thisis not
possiblewithout havingsomekindofspecialrightin thosethings.Without
sucha right,
itis lawfulforothersto seizethemoncetheyhavebecomedis-
connectedfromthebodyofthefirst taker.30

PRIVATEPROPERTY
When,inMareLiberum, Grotiussaysthatthereis a certain kindofowner-
shipinherent inthepossessionanduseofthings, heis drawing attentiontothe
factthatunderanyproperty regime-whether itis positivecommunity, nega-
tivecommunity, orproprietorship-it is a physicalnecessity thattheuse of
mostthings excludesothersfromthesameuse atthesametimeandthatpeo-
ple arepermanently excludedfromthethings thatareusedup.Ifthiscertain
kindof ownership impliestheexistenceofrightsthatarenotcategorically
differentfromexclusiveproperty rights, thenthereis no categorical differ-
encebetweenusingthecommonandoccupying it.However, forGrotius, the
transitionfromtheuse ofthingsin commonto privateproperty is fromthe
exclusionthatresultsfromthephysicalpresenceofanother, orfromthefact
thatthething usedbecomes'partoftheverysubstance oftheuser'31toexclu-
sionthatresultsfroma righttorecoverpossessionafterpossessionis relin-
quished.Andthisis a rightthatno one hadundertheprimitive rightto use
thingsin common.
The transitionto privatepropertywas a gradualextension ofthedutyto
abstain,brought aboutbyreasonanddecision.The firststepwas whenthe
dutytoabstainwasextended fromthethings thatareusedupbyuse,toother
things,suchas clothesand movables,whicharenotentirely consumedby
use,butthat'byusetheybecomelessfitforfuture use'. Grotiusthensaysthat
once this extensionhad come about, 'not even immovables,such,for
instance,as fields,couldremainunapportioned'. Foralthough thelandis not
consumed, itsuseis 'boundupwithsubsequent consumption' sincefieldsare
usedtoproducefoodandpasturelandtoraiseanimalsthatproduceclothing,
andcrucially, theuse oflandrequiresexclusionbecausethereis notenough
landforeveryone's use.Wemust,ofcourse,understand
indiscriminate these
developments in thecontextofGrotius'sdiscussionin De JureBelli ofthe
transition
from thesimplelifetoa morerefined wayoflife,whichis onlypos-
siblewithmoreextendedformsof exclusionand abstinence. Grotiuscon-
cludesfromthisthat'Whenproperty orownership was invented,thelaw of
property was establishedto imitatenature'.Occupationis an imitation of
natureinthesensethattheidea ofownership firstarisesthrough itsconnec-

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 545

tionwithactsofseizuretosatisfy bodilyneeds,andso, 'bya similarconnec-

tionitwas decidedthatthingsweretheproperty ofindividuals'.32
Grotiusthenarguesthatpositivelawsgoverning occupationmustalways
reflectthisconnection intwoways.First,sinceoccupationofconsumables
takesplacethrough physicalseizure,occupation ofthingsofthesecondand
thirdcategories
mustalsotakeplacethrough seizure.Second,occupation can
onlyapplytothosethingstheuse ofwhichis impossible without usingthem
up. So resourcesthatcannotbe physically seized,andthosethatcannotbe
usedup,cannotbecomeprivate property. Onbothcounts,Grotius reacheshis
primary conclusionthatthesea cannotbecometheproperty ofanyindividual
ornation.
Privatepropertyis thusan extension oftherighttouse unclaimedthings.
Grotiusunderstands thisextension in a verypreciseway.It is an extension
fromtherighttouse thethingsthatareseizedtotherighttorecoverposses-
sionafterseizure.Occupationmustalwaysbeginwithan actofseizure,that
is, withphysicalattachment, or connectionof bodywithbody.But with
to
respect thosethings thatareseized,butnotimmediately consumed, itmust
be decided(placuit)howlong,andunderwhatconditions, ownership is to
continue.Grotiusis hereaskingLocke's famousquestioninreverse.Locke
observes,

He thatis nourished
bytheAcornshe picktup underan Oak,ortheAppleshe gathered
fromtheTreesin theWood,has certainly appropriated
themto himself.
No Bodycan
denythatthenourishmentis his.I ask then,Whendidtheybegintobe his?33

Grotiusagreesthatthesethingsbelongto whoeverhas appropriated them,

buthe asksthequestionWhendo theystopbeinghis?His answeris thatfor
mostthings, itis enoughthataftertheinitialactofseizure,theintention to
possessis maintained,forexample,by 'theerectionof buildingsor some
determination of boundaries,
suchas fencingin'. Wildanimalsand other
thingsthatareresistant
toseizureareexceptions, andforthesethings, actual
physicalpossessionmustbe continually maintained.34 Grotiuselaborateson
thisin De JureBelli wherehe says,onceagain,thatownership beginswith
actualphysicalpossessionandcontinues as longas itcanbe inferredthatthe
ownerhasnotabandonedownership. In thecase ofescapedanimals,owner-
shipis lostbecauseofthenaturalinference thatwe haveabandonedowner-
ship.Buthe addsthateveninthecase ofwildanimals,itis possibletoattach
identification
markstothosewe capturetoindicateourintention tomaintain
ownership byrecoveringpossession.35
The significanceoftheserequirements is not,I believe,as Tuckthinks,
thatoccupationrequireslabourofsomekind.Rather, we muststakeoutthe

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546 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

landwe wishtooccupy,andwe mustmarkouranimalsinsomeway,toindi-

cateto othersourintention torecoverpossession.Takingbeyonduse is not
forbidden inthenatural state,butthatwhichis takenortransformed bylabour
is notprivateproperty becausethereis no rightto recoverpossession.For
example,labouring toproduceorcollectfoodforfuture consumption is not
forbidden, butafteritis producedorcollected,thefoodeffectively revertsto
if
thecommon physical possession is notmaintained. Similarly,taming wild
animalsis notforbidden, butthereareno rights attaching toanimalsbeyond
possession.So, although occupation has a naturalconnection withseizure
it is
andconsumption, introduced by reason and decision, and itcannothave
on
an effect others unless itis accompanied by actsthat othersrecognise as
indicatingthewilloftheoccupier.Itis forthisreasonthatGrotiussays,inDe
JureBelli,thattheintroduction ofprivateproperty couldnothappen'by a
mereactofwill'because'onecouldnotknowwhatthings anotherwishedto
have,in orderto abstainfromthem-andbesides,severalmightdesirethe
samething'.Rather, things becamesubjecttoprivate ownership 'bya kindof
agreement, either
expressed, as bya division,orimplied, as byoccupation' .36

PUFENDORF AND LOCKE

In Mare Liberum, Grotiushad said thatneithersovereignty, meaning'a
particularkindofproprietorship,suchinfactthatitabsolutely excludeslike
possessionbyanyoneelse' norcommon,meaningownership orpossession
'byseveralpersons jointlyaccording toa kindofpartnershipormutualagree-
mentfromwhichall otherpersonsareexcluded',appliedtotheoriginalstate
oftheworld.Commonoriginally meanttheabsenceofproprietorship, and
sovereignty meantthe'privilege oflawfully usingcommonproperty',.37 Itis
not the case, therefore,as Schlattermaintains, thatcommonpossession
meantforGrotiusa kindofjointownership thathadtobe dissolvedbyagree-
ment.Moreover, Pufendorf endorsesGrotius'saccountoforiginalcommu-
nitywhenhe says,'Grotiusrightly maintains thatif thiskindof negative
community was tocontinuewithout disturbancetothecommonpeace,men
hadtoliveingreatsimplicity'.38Pufendorf's onlydisagreement withGrotius
is overGrotius'sremark thatcommunity couldhavecontinued ifmen'had
livedonterms ofmutualaffectionsuchas rarely appears'.Pufendorfsaysthat
thisconfusesnegativecommunity withpositive.However,Pufendorf here
misunderstands Grotius.Grotiussaysthattheoriginalcommunity can only
lastas longas menlivewithout toil,andsincehisdiscussionoftheproblems
ofgathering theproductsofthesoilintoa commonstoreareaboutunfairness
withrespectto labour,he cannotbe talkingabouttheoriginalcommon.39

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 547

Schlatteralso misdescribes thenatureofPufendorf's agreement bysepa-

ratingtheprocessofacquiringan obligation fromtherenunciation ofprior
claims.Pufendorf's is an
negativecommunity inclusivestateto the extent
thatall haveequalnatural faculties,or 'indefinite rights', toeverypartofthe
common.Thus,'A manacquiresan originalright overthings, whenall other
menexpressly ortacitly renounce theirfaculty touse a thing, whichtheyhad
heldbeforeonequaltermswithhim'.' So whenonepersonacquirestheuse
ofanypartofthecommon,all theothersmustrenouncetheirfaculty tothe
same.Thefirst taker'sfacultybecomesa right as all theothers renounce their
claimsandthuscomeunderan obligation.4"
DespitethefactthePufendorf insists,againstGrotius, thatthefirstusesof
thecommonrequired a convention, itwas nothisprimary intention
torefute
Grotius'sgeneraltheory. Rather,as Tullyhas pointedout,Pufendorf was
defending Grotius againsta number ofcriticswho,Pufendorf says'havecon-
fusednegative community withpositive'.42ThegeneralpointthatPufendorf
upheldagainstthesecriticswas thatas longas commonproperty is under-
stoodas heandGrotius definedit,thereis nocontradiction insayingthatGod
gavetheworldtomenincommonandthattheysubsequently introduced pro-
prietorshipon theirowninitiative in keepingwithnaturallaw.Boecler,for
example,arguedthatonlyproprietorship can have theeffectof lawfully
excludingothers.So whenGrotiussaid thattherewas an originaluniversal
rightthatenabledpeopletolawfully use thecommon,andthatthisuniversal
righttooktheplace of proprietorship, he contradicted himself.Pufendorf
defendsGrotiusbysayingthatthefirst universal use ofthefruits ofthecom-
monwas notproprietorship becauseproprietorship is therightto thesub-
stanceof thething.So he says,following Grotius,that'a universaluse of
thingsin somewaytooktheplace ofproprietorship'."4
However, thephrase'in someway'is significant andreflects Pufendorf's
inabilityfullytosupport Grotius'stheory. Although proprietorshipis notthe
same as theuniversaluse right,both,accordingto Pufendorf, requirean
agreement ofsomekindbecausebothentailexclusion,andtothisextent, to
use Tuck'sphrase,theyarenotcategorically dissimilar. Pufendorfthuspro-
videsonlypartialsupport forGrotiusin hisreplyto Boeclerbysaying,

In this,as itwerelimited
community thebodiesofthingsbelongtonoone,buttheirfruits
aftergathering areproper.Sucha tempering
ofprimitive
community withproprietorship,
I feel,is comprehensibleevenbymenofordinary intelligence.44

Pufendorfthought, thattheGrotianpositioncould onlybe pre-

therefore,
servedagainstitscriticsbymodifyingittoincludethisfirst The
convention.
onlywayofpreserving theGrotiantheory thatGod gavetheworldto men

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548 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

equally,againstthealternative viewthatithadbeengivenintheformofpri-
vateproperty tothefirst man,wastoconstrue anykindofuse ofthecommon
as conventional.
As we haveseen,however, itis Tuck'sviewthatPufendorf's revisionof
Grotiusamounted to a repudiation rather thana defence.Whileitmayhave
preserved an intelligible
notionofcommonproperty, itdid so atthecostof
undermining whathad been a crucialfeatureof Grotius'soriginaltheory,
namely, thattheprimitive use rightdidnotpresuppose a prioragreement of
anykind.Tuckis correct totheextent thatiftherevisionwasnecessary, then
ithadfar-reaching implications. However,Grotius'stheory, as I haveinter-
pretedit,did notstandin needofPufendorf's defence.Grotiushad shown
howit was possibleforthecommonto be used without an agreement and
without theexistenceofanypriorrightto partofthecommon.Andhe had
shownthiswithout claimingthattheactofusingthecommoncreatesnew
rights init.ForGrotius, Godhadgiventheworldtomenso thattheycoulduse
itwithout havingto agreebeforehand preciselyhowtheywereto use it.
Itremains forus toconsidertherelationship betweenGrotius'stheory and
thatofLocke.The usefulness ofclaimsaboutcontinuity betweendifferent
authors inthenatural lawtradition dependsonthedegreeofgenerality ofthe
themesunderdiscussion.Grotius hadarguedthatGodhadgiventheworldto
all menincommon, andPufendorf hadtakenupthispositioninopposition to
the'Adamite'theory, whichheldthatGodhadconferred private property on
thefirst man.Lockedefended thesamepositionagainstthesameadversaries,
so fromthispointofview,therewasimportant commongroundbetweenthe
threeauthors.Whenwe considerthedifferences betweenthem,however,
theninviewofwhathasbeensaidabove,itis hardtosupport Schlatter'scon-
tention thatPufendorf movedthenatural lawtheory ofproperty inthedirec-
tionofLocke'stheory. Farfrombeing'a stepnearertoa theory ofproperty
which would dispense with agreementand conventionaltogether',
Pufendorf's theoryaddeda convention, whichaccording toGrotius, hadbeen
unnecessary.45 Thus,if we are seekinga possiblepredecessorto Locke,
Grotius, as Tuckargues,is a moreplausiblecandidatethanPufendorf. How-
ever,Tuck'sclaimsabouttherelationship betweenGrotiusandLockego fur-
therandaremorespecific.
According toTuck,De JureBelliis 'Janusfaced,anditstwomouths speak
thelanguageofbothabsolutism andliberty'.The absolutist arguments fol-
lowfrom thecontention thatrights enjoyedina stateofnature aregivenupby
agreement withtheresult, as Tullyremarks, thatmenincivilsocietycannot
appealto a naturalstandard of property to criticizeand opposeprevailing
formsofproperty.46 The 'libertarian'arguments followfromtheprinciple of
'interpretive charity',whichrequiresus toconsider

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 549

whatkindof agreements reasonablepeople mighthave made in thepast.While it

remainstruethatourrights
anddutiesarealwaystobe understood as formed
byanterior
agreements,itis nevertheless
thecase thatwe mustbe generousinourinterpretation
of
thoseagreements.47

Thusinrelation
totheagreement
toestablish
private Grotius
property, says,

We must,in fact,considerwhattheintention was ofthosewhofirst introduced private

ownership;andwe areforcedtobelievethatitwastheirintention todepartas littleas pos-
siblefromnatural equity.... Henceitfollows,first,
thatindirestneedtheprimitive right
ofuse revives,as ifcommunity ownership hadremained.48

AccordingtoTuck,however, ithadbeenunnecessary forGrotiustorely

ontheprinciple
ofinterpretative toproducethis'radical'conclusion.
charity
Butitfelltothe'farsighted'
Locketo see this:

WhileGrotiushadfeltconstrained
touseinterpretative
charitytojustify
therighttoseize
commoditiesnecessaryforlife,Locke realisedthata theoryof property of thekind
GrotiusadvancedinMareLiberumandwhichis stillfundamentally presentinDe Jure
Bellineededno suchadditionalprinciple
togeneratea rightofthatkind.49

As evidenceforthisclaim,TuckcitesLocke'sso called'spoilagelimita-
tion',whichLocke statesin replyto a possibleobjectionto his theoryof
appropriation,
namely, thatifgatheringthefruits
oftheearthmakesa right to
them,'thenanyone mayingrossas muchas he will'. Locke says,

The sameLaw ofNature,thatdoesbythismeansgiveus Property, doesalso boundthat

too.Godhasgivenusall things
Property I Tim.VI. 17.is theVoiceofReasoncon-
richly,
firmedbyinspiration.
Buthowfarhashe givenitus? To enjoy.As muchas anyonecan
makeuse oftoanyadvantage oflifebeforeitspoils;so muchhe maybyhislabourfixa
in.Whatever
Property is beyondthis,is morethanhisshare,andbelongstoothers.50

Tuckremarks thatthe'cleartenor'ofthispassageis that'theindustrious

poor
arealwaysentitled tothewherewithal withwhichto maketheirlivelihood'.
Whilesocietiescan make'explicitandpositiveagreements aboutthedistri-
butionofproperty', theseagreements 'cannotoverride thegeneralrulescon-
cerningtheexploitation of theworldbymankind whichGod laid down'.51
This, accordingto Tuck,was theradicalconclusionthatLocke detected
wouldfollowfroma Grotiantheory ofproperty,andthatmadetheprinciple
ofinterpretativecharityunnecessary.
LeavingasideTuck'scontroversial ofthespoilagelimita-
interpretation
tion,itis certainly
thecleartenorofLocke's wholetheory ofpropertythat
peopleareentitledtothemeansoftheir LockebeginsChapter
preservation.52 5

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550 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

of theSecondTreatisewiththestatement thatnaturalreasontellsus that

'Men,beingonceborn,havea righttotheirPreservation,
andconsequently to
Meat and Drink,and suchotherthings, as NatureaffordsfortheirSubsis-
tence'.5 One wayinwhichthisnaturalright canbe exercised
topreservation
is bylabouringontherawmaterialsthatGodhasgiven'toMankindincom-
mon'.5' Butitis nottheonlyway.In theFirstTreatise,
Locke says,

and thefair
giveseveryMan a Titleto theproductof his honestIndustry,
As Justice,
ofhisAncestors
Acquisitions descendedtohim;so Charity giveseveryMana Titletoso
muchoutof another'sPlenty,as willkeephimfromextreame want,wherehe has no
meansto subsistotherwise.55

HontandIgnatieff interpret thispassagetomeanthattheexcludedhaveonly

an imperfectrightinthesurpluses oftherich:'The obligationon thepartof
therichwaslefttotheindividual. Itwasa side-constraint,rather
thana struc-
turingcondition' .56 Other however,
interpreters, think itmeansthattheneedy
havea perfect right, whichfollowsdirectly fromthefundamental rightto
preservation.On thisview,charity, in additionto labourandinheritance,is
oneofthewaysinwhichman'snatural righttopreservationcanbe exercised.
Tully,forexample,says,'The man'sneedcreatesa titlein thegoodsof
another,thusindividuating his naturalrightnotto be excludedfromthe
meansofpreservation'.5'Thus,a proprietor whohasmorethanhe needsfor
hisownpreservation 'is undera positivedutytosustainthosewhodo not'.58
Ashcraftalso saysthatthenatural right topreservationcorrespondstoa duty
thateveryone is under'toprovideforthesubsistence ofeveryoneelse,where
thisdoesnotcomeintocompetition witha person'seffortstoprovideforhis
own subsistence'.59 And Waldron,similarly, arguesthatpeoplewho have
morethantheyneedarenotat liberty to letothersstarve.Locke says,

Everyoneas heisboundtopreserve andnottoquithisStationwilfully;

himself, so bythe
likereasonwhenhisownPreservationcomesnotincompetition,
oughthe,as muchas he
can,topreservetherestofmankind.60

Thisdoctrine, accordingtoWaldron, 'imposespositivedutiesonmentosat-

isfyothers'needs(oratleaststandasidewhiletheneedymakeuse ofprop-
ertyacquiredbythosewhoarenotneedy),and... thesedutiesarecorrelative
totherights oftheneedy'.61Thus,private
property are'constrained
rights by
a deeperand,inthelastresort,morepowerful generalrightwhicheachman
has tothematerial forhissurvival'.62
necessities
Thereis disagreement,however,overthescope of therightof charity.
Sreenivasan takesissuewiththeauthors citedaboveandarguesthatcharity
'is notdue in virtueofneedperse,butin virtueofneedgenerated ormade

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 551

pressing byan inability tolabour'.63Theright tothemeansofpreservation is

not-as Tully,Ashcraft, and Waldronthink-a 'consumption right'buta
right'toproducesubsistence quantitiesofmeat,drink, andwhatnot, thatis,a
rightnotto be excluded from the use of the common materials which have
been plentifully providedby God'.A' Charity,according to Sreenivasan
applies'onlywherea manis unableto labour'.Nevertheless, Sreenivasan
doesnotdenythat'charity andinheritance also constitute titlestothemeans
ofpreservation'.65
Locke's rightof charity, therefore, interpreted as a perfectright,is
grounded intheinclusivenatural rightthatall people'beingonceborn'have
totheirpreservation. Itis thusa differentkindofright fromGrotius'sright of
necessity. In Grotius'stheory, thereareno naturalentitlements eithertothe
meansofpreservation ortothewherewithal tomakethemeansofpreserva-
tion.Thereis merelya right tomakeuse ofthingsthatarenotbeingusedby
others. Thisuseright, nodoubt,ensuresthateveryone is preserved as longas
all are contentto livethesimplelife.Butthereis no rightto preservation,
whichtouse Tully'sphrase,is 'operative through time',thatis tosay,a right
thatcannotbe overridden bysubsequent agreement.'Nor,inGrotius'sthe-
ory,aretherepositivedutiesofcharity, whichobligeus toassistothersindis-
tress.Grotiusinsiststhatthegroundofhisrightofnecessity is not,'as some
allege,thattheownerofa thingis boundbytheruleoflovetogivetohimwho
lacks',andhe underlines thiswhenhe saysthattherightofnecessityis 'a
questionofwhatmaybe doneagainstthewillofanowner'.67 So if,likeTuck,
we takeGrotiustobe sayingthatoccupationis nonconventional, andthatit
merely requirestheperformance oflabourofsomekind,thenthoseexcluded
haveno claimat all to themeansoftheirpreservation. Theymerelyhavea
right touse a commonthatno longerexists.As Grotiussays,therightofpri-
vateownership wouldhavecompletely 'absorbedtheright whichhaditsori-
ginsin a stateof community of property'.68 It is, therefore, onlybecause
Grotiusunderstands privateproperty to be conventional, and because he
thinks wemustconsidertheintentions ofthosewhofirst introduced it,thathe
is able to saythata safetynetshouldexistforthosein direstneed.

CONCLUSION
It has been arguedthatthe essentialdifferencebetweenGrotiusand
Pufendorf is theirdifferent
conceptions of whatusingthecommonentails.
ForGrotius, therewasa primitive
righttotakepossessionandusethingsand
toexcludeotherswhilephysicalpossessionwas maintained. Sincethislim-
iteduse ofthingscanbe understoodas a seriesoflawfulactions,itwas pro-

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552 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

tectedbythenatural topersonalintegrity.
right No rights other
orobligations,
thantheonesall peoplearebornwith,arenecessary forpeopletolivea sim-
plelifeofhunting andgathering.Consequently, noagreement wasnecessary.
Theintroduction ofprivatepropertygavetheright torecoverownership after
possessionwaslost.Private propertythusentailedrights andobligationsthat
didnotexistoriginally,and so an agreement was needed.Grotiuswas thus
abletoarguethatGodhadgiventheworldtomenincommonandthatprivate
property hadbeenintroduced byagreement, without confrontingthedifficul-
tiesassociatedwiththetheory ofpositivecommunity andwithout theneed
foran agreement beforethefirst mencouldmakeuse oftheworld.
Thefirstuse ofthecommondiscussedbyPufendorf requiredlabourand
storage.Thismoreextended meaningofusingthecommon, inwhichthings
weretakenfromthecommonforfuture use, requiredthecreationof new
rightsin thethingstaken;hence,somekindof agreement was necessary.
However, Pufendorf'stheorywas nota repudiation ofGrotiusbuta defence
ofthenaturallawpositionagainstthetheory thatprivate property had
rights
beenconferred on thefirstman.
Bothauthors, in stressing
thegradualness ofthedevelopment ofprivate
property,conveytheidea thatproperty has a history.Grotius'saccounthas
theadditionalfeatureofidentifyinga stageinhistory inwhichtheuseofnat-
uralresourceswaspossiblewithout takingthefirst steptowardtheintroduc-
tionof privateproperty.Men thenhad possessionsbutno privateproperty
ForPufendorf,
rights. thehistoryofproperty is fromthebeginning thehistory
ofconventions. Thesedifferent conceptions wereto be takenup in thenext
century andreworked underdifferentphilosophical premises byAdamSmith
andDavid Hume.However,to exploretheseconnections wouldgo beyond
thescopeofthisarticle.

NOTES

1. RichardSchlatter,PrivateProperty, TheHistoryofan Idea (London:Allen& Unwin,

1951),130.
2. RichardTuck,NaturalRightsTheories:TheirOriginand Development (Cambridge,
UK: CambridgeUniversity Press,1979),61.
3. Ibid.,77.
4. Schlatter,PrivateProperty,145.
5. Ibid.,146.
6. Tuck,NaturalRightsTheories,161.
7. HugoGrotius, De JureBelliac PacisLibriTres,vol.2, trans.F. W.Kelsey(Oxford,
UK:
Clarendon,1925),1.11.1.5.
8. HugoGrotius, MareLiberum(New York:OxfordUniversity Press,1916),7.

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 553

9. Ibid.,24.
10.Ibid.,23.
11. Ibid.,24.
12.Ibid.
13. Grotius, De JureBelli,11.11.11.1.
14. Ibid.,1.11.1.5.
15.Ibid.Grotiusalsocitesinfootnote Seneca'ssimilarexampleoftheequestrian seats:'The
equestrianseatsbelongtoall theRomanknights; nevertheless, inthoseplaceswhichever one I
haveoccupiedis mine'.
16. Ibid.
17. SamuelPufendorf, De JureNaturaeetgentium libriocto,vol.2, trans.C. H. Oldfather
andW. A. Oldfather (Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1934),IV.IV.5.
18. Ibid.,IV.IV.4.
19. Ibid.,IV.IV.2andIV.IV.9.
20. ThomasHome,Property Rightsand Poverty:PoliticalArgument in Britain,1605-34
(ChapelHill: UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1990),12.
21. KarlOlivercrona, 'Appropriation in theStateof Nature:Locke on theOriginofProp-
erty',JournaloftheHistory ofIdeas,vol.35,no.2 (1974),213. However, Pufendorf 's objection
does notnecessarily entaila denialthattheremaybe goodreasonswhyone personrather than
another shouldacquirea right,noreventhatitmaybe morally wrongtotakesomething fromits
possessorevenwhenitis nottheirs byright.He doesnotthink thatfirsttakingis oneofthoserea-
sons,buthedoes say,inrelation totheintroductionofproprietorship, thatitis 'improper' thata
manwhohascontributed no labourtotheproduction ofsomething 'shouldhaveright tothings
equaltohisbywhoseindustry a thinghadbeenraisedorrendered fitforservice'.Anyproperty
regimethatdid nottakeaccountof thiscould notestablishpeace amongmen,presumably
becausethesenseofresentment feltbytheindustriousagainsttheidlewouldgenerate conflict.
Buteveninthiscase, where
thereappearstobe somereasonwhysuchthingsshouldbelongtosomemenrather than
toothers... thedominionofonegroup,involving, as itdoes,theexclusionoftherest,had
tobe confirmed atleastbya tacitpact,whichcontained atthesametimea tacitrenuncia-
tionon thepartoftherest.(Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,IV.IV.6)

So to havea moralclaimto a thingis notthesameas havinga rightto it.Pufendorf is merely

usingGrotius'sdistinction betweenan aptitudeanda legalfaculty:to be theworthy or fitting
subjecttoreceivesomething is notthesameas beingabletodemanditbyright. De Jure
Grotius,
Belli,I.I.VII andI.I.VIII.1.
22. HillelSteiner, AnEssayon Rights(Oxford,UK: Blackwell,1994),75.
23. Grotius, De JureBelli,11.11.11.4.
24. Ibid.,11.11.111.
25. Ibid.,II.II.VI.
26. Ibid.,11.11.4.
27. Ibid.,IV.IV.6.
28. Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,IV.IV.5(emphasisadded).
29. Ibid.,IV.IV.5.
30. Thereis roomfordoubt,however, overwhether eventhisrepresentsa substantial
differ-
encebetweenthetwoauthorsrather thandifferent points.Pufendorf
starting says,
Afterthehumanracehadmultipliedandacquireda cultured
modeoflife,thepeace of
thatthereshouldremainforeverymananequalpoweroverall things,
mendidnotsuffer

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554 POLITICAL THEORY /August2001

thatis,thatallthings
shouldlieopentoallforthepromiscuous
useofeveryman.(De Jure
Naturae,IV.IV.6)

Theimplication ofthisremarkis thattherewasa time,beforescarcity

andwhenwantsweresim-
ple,whenpromiscuous usewaspossible.So, agreements wereonlyneededafter
thehumanrace
hadmultiplied andacquireda cultured modeoflife.
31. Grotius,MareLiberum, 24.
32. Ibid.,24-25.
33. JohnLocke,TwoTreatiseson Government, ed. PeterLaslett(Cambridge,
UK: Cam-
bridgeUniversity Press,1970),11.28.
34.
Thisoccupationorpossession,however, in thecase ofthingswhichresistseizure,like
wildanimalsforexample,mustbe uninterrupted or perpetually butin the
maintained,
case ofotherthingsitis sufficient
ifafterphysicalpossessionis oncetakentheintention
to possess is maintained.Possessionof movablesimpliesseizureand possessionof
immovables eithertheerectingofbuildings or somedetermination ofboundaries,such
as fencingin.(Grotius,MareLiberum, 25-26)
35. Grotius,De JureBelli,11.11.111.
36. Ibid.,11.11.11.5.
37. Grotius, MareLiberum, 23. ForPufendorf's discussionofpositiveandnegativecommu-
nity,cf.De JureNaturae,IV.IV.2.
38. Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,IV.IV.9.
39. Pufendorf's commentthatGrotius'sconfusesnegativewithpositivecommunity is
unnecessarily argumentative. Havingmadethiscriticism, hegoesontosaythatAristotle'sargu-
mentsagainstcommonownership, whichGrotiususes, wereaimedat positivecommunity
'whilewe areinquiring intothedeparture fromnegative community'. He thenproceedstouse
Aristotle'sarguments to illustratewhymenleftthenegativecommunity (De JureNaturae,
IV.IV.7).
40. Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,III.IV.4.
41. Pufendorf's formulationoftherights ina stateofnatureas indefinite waseffective
rights
againstHobbes's contention thatin a stateof nature,everyonehas a rightto everything.
Pufendorf's correlativityargument meantthatthiscould not be true.However,although
Pufendorf's indefiniterightsdidnotoperateas realrights entitlingpeopletotakefromthecom-
mon,theystillhadtobe renounced beforeappropriationwas possible.
42. Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,IV.IV.2.JamesTully,A DiscourseonProperty: JohnLocke
and His Adversaries (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UniversityPress,1980),97.
43. Pufendorf, De JureNaturae,IV.IV.9.
44. Ibid.,13.
45. Schlatter, PrivateProperty, 146.
46. Tully,A Discourseon Property, 89.
47. Tuck,NaturalRightsTheories,79.
48. Grotius, De JureBelli,II.II.VI.1-2.
49. Tuck,NaturalRightsTheories,172.
50. Locke,TwoTreatises, 11.31.
51. Tuck,NaturalRightsTheories,172.
52. On the spoilage limitation, see Tully,A Discourse on Property,126-27; Richard
Ashcraft, Locke'sTwoTreatises ofGovernment (London:UnwinHyman,1987),131;andGopal

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 Salter/HUGO GROTIUS: PROPERTY AND CONSENT 555

Sreenivasan, TheLimitsofLockeanRightsinProperty (Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversity Press,

1995),30-31.
53. Locke,TwoTreatises, 11.25.
54. Ibid.
55. Locke,TwoTreatises, 1.42.
56. I. HontandM. Ignatieff, "NeedsandJustice intheWealthofNations:An Introductory
Essay,"in Wealth and Virtue:TheShapingofPoliticalEconomyintheScottishEnlightenment,
eds. I. HontandM. Ignatieff (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press,1983),37.
57. JamesTully,AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy: Lockein Contexts
(Cambridge, UK:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1993), 113.
58. Tully,A Discourseon Property, 132.
59. Ashcraft, Locke'sTwoTreatises,126-27.
60. Locke, TwoTreatises,11.6.,citedby Jeremy Waldron,TheRightto PrivateProperty
(Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1988), 146.
61. Waldron, Ibid.
62. Ibid.,139.
63. Sreenivasan, TheLimitsofLockeanRightsin Property, 45.
64. Ibid.,43.
65. Ibid.,44.
66. Tully,A Discourseon Property, 130.
67. Grotius, De JureBelli,II.II.VI.4 andII.II.XVIII.
68. Ibid.,II.II.IV.1.

JohnSalteris a lecturer
intheSchoolofEconomicStudiesat theUniversity ofManches-
terHis researchinterests are in thehistoryofpoliticaleconomy. Recentpublications
include"AdamSmith:Justiceand Due Shares" (Economicsand Philosophy, vol. 16,
2000), "Sympathy withthePoor: TheoriesofPunishment in Hugo Grotiusand Adam
Smith"(HistoryofPoliticalThoughtXX,2, summer 1999), "Justice and Price: Com-
mentonJeffrey T Young" (History ofPoliticalEconomy, 29:4, 1998),and "AdamSmith
on Slavery"(HistoryofEconomicIdeas,IV,1-2,1996).

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