Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese
Peer F. Bundgaard
Received: 27 October 2006 / Accepted: 6 August 2008 / Published online: 14 July 2009
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
Abstract This paper provides a précis of Ernst Cassirer's concept of art as a sym-
bolic form. It does so, though, in a specific respect. It points to the fact that Cassirer's
concept of "symbolic form" is two-sided. On the one hand, the concept captures gen-
eral cultural phenomena that are not only meaningful but also manifest the way man
makes sense of the world; thus myth, religion, and art are considered general symbolic
forms. On the other hand, it captures the formal structures and semiotic tools thanks
to which meaning is constructed within each general symbolic form (Cassirer called
these structures "modes of objectivation"); thus, in art, perspective or the golden sec-
tion are well-known examples of symbolic forms, now in a narrow sense, i.e. they
are means to configure parts into an organized, meaningful whole. The paper will
comment on art along both these two dimensions, but its main goal is to provide with
concrete examples of aesthetic symbolic forms in the narrow sense in order to show
how conceptual meaning can be inscribed in the space of aesthetic intuition.
Der Gehalt des Geistes erschliesst sich nur in seiner Äusserung; die ideelle
Form wird erkannt nur an und in dem Inbegriff der sinnlichen Zeichen, der-
en sie sich zum Ausdruck bedient. Gelänge es, einen systematischen überblick
über die verschiedenen Richtungen dieser Art des Ausdrucks zu gewinnen -
gelänge es, ihre typische und durchgängigen Züge, sowie deren besondere Ab-
stufungen und innere Unterschiede aufzuweisen, so wäre damit das Ideal der
'allgemeinen Charakteristik' wie Leibniz es für die Erkenntnis afzustellte, für
das Ganze des geistigen Schaffens erfüllt. Wir besässen als dann eine Art Gram-
matik der symbolischen Formen als solcher, durch welche deren besondere
P. F. Bundgaard (CE3)
Center for Semiotics, Scandinavian Institute, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark
e-mail: sempb@hum.au.dk
â Springer
1 Preamble
1 Cassirer constantly - whatever the context - refers to and quotes different poets (Goethe being secon
to none), but this does not, of course, amount to a phenomenological description of the work of art as
symbolic form, nor of those symbolic forms artists make use of to give form to their aesthetic intuitio
and meaning intentions. The French neo-Kantian Alexis Philonenko goes as far as to claim Cassirer faile
in fulfilling his overarching research programme since he never developed a "symbolic phenomenology
of art" (Philonenko 1989, p. 144). While I do not think this has any consequences for his philosophy
symbolic forms, it is hard to disagree with Philonenko on the absence of a thorough examination of art
a symbolic form in Cassirer's writings: the rather vague generalities exposed in An Essay on Man hardl
qualify as such.
â Springer
â Springer
4 Using René Thorn's terms one can call mythical space an absolute pregnant space (Thorn 1988, Chap. 2).
<0 Springer
Ö Springer
â Springer
â Springer
Springer
Springer
Fig. 1 a Neckar's Cube from a generic point of view (with 3D effect), b Neckar's Cube from a non-generic
point of view (appears as a hexagon)
it detects very well the rare events and treats them as intrinsically significant
because of their rarity. (Petitot 2004, p. 57)
Moreover, the visual system is particularly attentive to all critical phenomena (qual-
itative discontinuities of all sorts) and therefore naturally sensitive to unstable con-
figurations that qua unstable or critical appear morphologically (non-conceptually)
significant. This distinction is quite crucial. What is meant here is that non-generic
configurations may very well be assessed by the cognitive system as unpleasant phe-
nomena in a natural or categorizing attitude: it is obviously the case for Fig. lb that
the cognitive system has a slim to no chance of conceptually grasping the config-
uration of spatial relations as a cube and thus successfully performing one of its
very main tasks, viz. automatic object recognition. Yet, the fact that such configura-
tions are ambiguous as to their conceptual signification and thus are negatively valo-
rized in everyday perception does not imply that they are not inherently perceptually
significant and that this perceptual signification cannot be exploited in experiential
domains (like art) where subjects are not engaged in the same type of intentional set
as when they are recognizing and automatically categorizing things in their environ-
ment. Aesthetic experience does not entail recognizing, but rather appreciating the
distribution of forms and qualities in space.12
12 Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) also include the problem of genericity and non-genericity in
their principles underlying artistic expression and experience. However, they reach exactly the opposite
Ô Springer
Footnote 12 continued
conclusion from mine here, namely, that artists in general avoid the "suspicious coincidences" displayed in
non-generic viewpoints, since they hinder automatic object recognition. This is wrong on a purely empiri-
cal basis: artists massively resort to non-generic viewpoints and configurations in order to morphologically
enhance the saliency of their paintings. It is furthermore wrong for reasons that could be revealed by an ad
absurdum argument: applied to language, their argument would indeed imply that since as a rule humans
avoid syntactic, semantic, phonetic, and prosodie oddities in their language use, in order not to hinder the
automatic recognition of the communicated meaning, then such oddities are also carefully avoided in the
poetic use of language. Eventually, the argument is also wrong for a somewhat deeper reason: the authors
do not seem to operate with the essential distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual significa-
tions. This distinction is key in Husserl's phenomenology, where it concerns the huge program of founding
conceptual-logical structures on pre-conceptual, intuitive meanings. It is nowadays the cornerstone in Jean
Petitot's impressive work in morphodynamic semiotics, the neuroscience of vision as well as aesthetic
inquiries (Petitot 1992, 2003, 2004).
â Springer
Ô Springer
6 Closing remarks
Springer
References
Springer
Springer