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com

ScienceDirect
Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
http://www.keaipublishing.com/en/journals/underground-space/

Systems approach to underground safety

Marco Bettelini
Amberg Engineering Ltd., Switzerland

Received 18 July 2018; received in revised form 10 March 2019; accepted 30 April 2019
Available online 4 June 2019

Abstract

The safety of underground traffic infrastructures can be considered from several viewpoints as a fairly mature field. Common min-
imum requirements for road tunnel safety were developed for all European countries in 2004. Furthermore, safety is codified in a detailed
(at times even too detailed) manner, such as for road tunnels in several countries. Safety design can at times be extremely rigid and dif-
ficult for adapting to specific conditions, which in some cases may need to be more demanding than a ‘‘standard” tunnel.
Other types of underground infrastructure, particularly, rail tunnels and underground industrial facilities, share a number of common
safety-related issues with road tunnels, but are generally much less regulated. For example, there is no common regulation for the ven-
tilation of rail tunnels in Europe. Various metro systems have different safety standards, in spite of having similar requirements.
The present study illustrates selected aspects of a holistic approach required for achieving a high and sustainable safety level in under-
ground infrastructure. Common aspects and differences between the various types of ‘‘conventional” and ‘‘emerging” underground
infrastructure are outlined and the consequences are discussed, such as the different types of threats, widely differing probabilities of
occurrence, and widely differing number of persons exposed. Different facilities require different safety systems; however, they can rely
on common thinking and philosophies.
It is essential for all stakeholders, ranging from operators and safety officers to fire services and administrative authorities, to grasp
commonalities and differences to adapt requirements, regulations, and approaches to their specific needs.

Keywords: Safety; Underground space; Tunnel

1 Introduction and framework (1) road tunnels,

The safety of underground infrastructure is a fairly
mature but very heterogeneous field. On one hand, ‘‘con-
ventional” underground traffic infrastructures, such as
‘‘standard” road and rail tunnels, are well investigated,
and systematically developed technical solutions and
appropriate standards for design, construction, and opera-
tion are available and applied in many countries. On the
other hand, the safety culture, standards, and levels fre-
quently differ greatly from country to country as well as
from operator to operator.
For the present study, underground infrastructure will
be broadly classified as follows:
E-mail address: mbettelini@amberg.ch
(2) rail tunnels,
(3) metro systems, and
(4) other underground facilities.
The last category is very heterogeneous and includes
several rapidly evolving uses, including storage, industrial
facilities, office space, and living space.
The level of risk related to the different types of under-
ground infrastructure varies a lot, as listed in Table 1. This
indicates for example that travel by road is approximately
25–30 times more dangerous than travel by rail. These fig-
ures apply to the entire network and not directly to tunnels
but provide indications on underground safety.
A comparative analysis of fire risks for road, rail, and
metro systems and a compilation of relevant guidelines,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.undsp.2019.04.005
2467-9674/Ó 2020 Tongji University. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co. Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
Table 1
Fatality risk of passengers using different modes of transport (EU, period
2008–2010) (ERA, 2013).
Transport mode Fatalities per billion passenger-km
Airline 0.101
Railway 0.156
Car occupant 4.450
Bus/coach occupant 0.433
Powered two-wheeler 52.593
regulations, standards, or current best practices from Euro-
pean member states were provided in 2005 by the EU-
sponsored Thematic Network FIT ‘‘Fire in Tunnels”
(FIT, 2005). While not entirely up to date on details, that
report provides a useful overview of the different regula-
tions and illustrates very satisfactorily various approaches
adopted by different countries or operators.
A very useful framework for discussing underground
safety was provided by UNECE’s Ad hoc Multidisci-
plinary Group of Experts on Safety in Tunnels (UNECE,
2001). They identified various factors influencing tunnel
safety and collectively summarized them in four main
groups according to Fig. 1. While originally developed
for road tunnels, this concept is applicable for discussing
underground safety in general. These concepts will be fur-
ther developed in the following sections.
Figure 2 conveys another fundamental message: not all
safety measures are equally effective. Preventive measures
and reducing the likelihood of incidents are far more effec-
tive than facilities for self-rescue or rescue. This is essential
while developing a safety concept and planning safety mea-
sures in any underground facility.
The safety of underground infrastructure is a relevant
issue throughout its life cycle, from design and construc-
tion to refurbishment and eventually decommissioning.
This study focuses exclusively on the operational safety
after commissioning and excludes refurbishment works.
Fig. 1. Factors influencing road tunnel safety (UNECE, 2001).
259
Fig. 2. Line of defense for the promotion of safety in rail tunnels (EU,
SRT TSI).
2 Road tunnels
Over 25 000 people lost their lives due to road accidents
in the EU during 2017 (European Commission, 2018).
While significant, this value is less than 50% of the corre-
sponding value for 2001 (54 900 fatalities) and shows an
impressive and positive trend in road safety. Despite this
development, road tunnels represent a key safety issue.
With reference to Fig. 1, road tunnel safety is character-
ized by a thorough understanding of the infrastructure
(tunnel structure and equipment, see Fig. 3) and improving
operation but only an indirect and rather weak control on
users and vehicles. A number of large tunnel fires, which
occurred in Central Europe at the turn of the century
including the Mont Blanc tunnel (1999), the Tauern tunnel
(1999) and the St. Gotthard tunnel (2001), triggered a sig-
nificant and very effective effort for improving road tunnel
safety. This resulted in new or improved national regula-
tions in many countries, new recommendations issued by
international organizations such as PIARC (Permanent
International Association of Road Congresses) and ITA
(International Tunnelling Association), international
research efforts such as FIT (2005), and substantial techno-
logical innovations, e.g., in the sector of fixed firefighting
systems. At the international level, the most important reg-
ulations are probably the EU Directive 2004/54/EC and
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 502. Thus,
a well-established and accepted framework for road tunnel
safety design is available.
As expected, new regulations are generally applied to
new tunnels, but refurbishment of existing tunnels is very
expensive and requires time. This is well illustrated by the
implementation of the EU Directive 2004/54/EC ten years
after its publication (ICF & TRT, 2015): ‘‘The data show
that the implementation of the directive is far from com-
plete. Only 26% of the tunnels in operation by 30 April
2006 (29% if calculated based on the tube length) are fully
compliant with the directive. Excluding the tunnels in
260 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
Fig. 3. Overview of technological systems installed in a modern road tunnel (courtesy Dätwyler Cabling Solutions AG, www.cabling.datwyler.com).
member states that benefit from Article 11.7 (extension of
the refurbishment deadline to 2019), the percentage rises
to 78% (82% in terms of total tube length). The remaining
tunnels are either non-compliant or their state of compli-
ance is unknown.” Thus, refurbishing represents a costly
and time-intensive effort, particularly with respect to emer-
gency exits and tunnel ventilation. Progress in some coun-
tries is therefore extremely slow.
A safe road tunnel operation is a complex issue involv-
ing several stakeholders. Approaches and progress in this
field can be illustrated based on the European example.
Back in 2004, the EU Directive 2004/54/EC specified min-
imum requirements on road tunnel safety applicable to all
tunnels on the trans-European road network. While some
issues related to safe operation were included, operational
safety was addressed specifically, e.g., in the EU Directive
2008/96/EC. This provides now a solid, holistic directive
to road tunnel safety. The two directives, integrated by
national regulations, provide a reliable standard for tunnel
safety.
Tunnel operators generally have a limited influence on
tunnel users and vehicles. Measures for improving user
awareness on tunnel safety have been implemented in sev-
eral countries, including specific information for new and
professional drivers. In toll tunnels, informative material
can be distributed to users entering the tunnel and a mini-
mum level of vehicle control is possible. This type of direct
influence is almost impossible for other tunnel categories.
However, much progress has been achieved in some specific
fields, such as the regulation of the transportation of dan-
gerous goods through road tunnels. New challenges arise
because of new vehicle power sources, including in partic-
ular, natural gas and electric batteries. These new vehicle
concepts represent an emerging challenge to tunnel safety
and an important field in applied research.
3 Rail tunnels
Despite the very long tradition characterized by a num-
ber of large tunnels commissioned before the end of the
19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, fire
and other serious accidents in rail tunnels have been com-
paratively rare in the past. A well-known and thoroughly
investigated example is the fire in the Channel Tunnel
(UK–France), which caused no fatality but very severe
damage. As indicated in Table 1, serious accidents with vic-
tims are much rarer in rail than in road systems. Conse-
quently, the generalized implementation of minimum
safety standards is comparatively recent and its applica-
tion, particularly in existing rail tunnels, is extremely
heterogeneous.
Rail systems are characterized by very large concentra-
tions of persons (up to 1000–1500) with no knowledge
nor influence on the situation in the tunnel. In rare emer-
gencies, they need rapid information and guidance for
reaching emergency exits. The tunnel configuration is gen-
erally comparatively simple, with reduced equipment and
facilities for self-rescue and intervention. The rolling stock
circulating through typical tunnels is heterogeneous, with
newest-generation trains circulating with old material. At
times, mixed traffic, i.e., passenger and freight trains circu-
lating at the same time in a tunnel tube, is allowed. This
represents a special challenge for personal safety.
Intervention times in rail tunnels are typically long or
extremely long. Therefore, self-rescue plays a vital role.
Because of the large number of persons, appropriate
 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266 261

facilities for self-rescue are provided. The minimum The normative development is illustrated based on the
requirements are typically as follows (see also Fig. 4): example of the European regulations. An early background
and a set of recommendations were provided by the UIC-
(1) walkway (width usually 0.8–1.2 m), Codex 779–9 R from 2002, providing ‘‘a compendium of
(2) signage on tunnel walls, possible measures to increase safety in railway tunnels,
(3) handrail, reflecting the best practices of European railways”. Follow-
(4) lighting, and ing are the priorities for increasing rail tunnel safety,
(5) alarm buttons. ranked in the order of decreasing effectiveness and priority:

Only one walkway is generally available in the case of
single-track tunnel tubes and both in the case of double-
track tunnels.
Significant differences from country to country are
observed in particular with respect to the most expensive
safety features, emergency exits, and ventilation. In Eur-
ope, emergency exits are provided every 500 m for
double-tube systems and 1000 m for single-tube ones,
where the construction of emergency exits is generally more
expensive. The same principle is adopted by NFPA 130,
with smaller distances: 244 m and 762 m. Thus, a signifi-
cantly lower safety level is accepted for single-tube systems.
In the case of a large number of persons involved in train
accidents, the resulting self-rescue times can be of the order
of 15–30 min or more. Thus, proper fire ventilation is fre-
quently required for maintaining tenable conditions during
the entire self-rescue process. Emergency ventilation in rail
tunnels is still a relatively controversial issue. While it is
required in several countries, there are countries where this
is not accepted. It is interesting to note that the European
Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) do not
handle mechanical tunnel ventilation.
(1) prevent accidents,
(2) mitigate the impact of accidents,
(3) facilitate escape, and
(4) facilitate rescue.
The first set of TSIs related to infrastructure, energy,
rolling stock, control command and signaling, and mainte-
nance and operation prepared by the European Associa-
tion for Railway Interoperability was adopted in 2002 for
the trans-European high-speed rail system. These TSIs
were revised in 2008. The most relevant in the present con-
text is Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2014 of 18
November 2014 concerning the TSIs relating to safety in
railway tunnels of rail systems in the EU.
The recent evolution of rail tunnel safety is character-
ized by several long and extremely long tunnels (see
Table 2). The most recent tunnels are located under the
Alps, in Central Europe. Recent reviews on the safety fea-
tures of these tunnels are provided by Boissonnas and
Bettelini (2016) and Bettelini and Rigert (2016).
The following tunnel systems could be envisaged for
very long tunnels, including (Boissonnas & Bettelini, 2016)

Fig. 4. Walkway and emergency exit in a double-track tunnel (SBB/CFF/FFS, 2017).

Table 2
World’s longest rail tunnels.
Tunnel Length (km) Country Commissioning
Seikan 53.9 Japan 1988
Eurotunnel 49.7 France/UK 1994
Gotthard Base Tunnel 56.7 Switzerland 2016
Brenner Base Tunnel 55.0 Austria/Italy Under construction (2026)
Lyon-Turin Ferroviaire 57.5 France/Italy Under construction (2028)
262 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
(1) single-tube, double-track systems with rescue tunnel,
(2) double-tube (e.g., Gotthard, Brenner, and Lyon-
Turin Ferroviaire Base Tunnels),
(3) double-tube with emergency tunnel (e.g., Eurotunnel
and Gibraltar Tunnel), and
(4) mixed systems (e.g., Lötschberg Base Tunnel).
The most common tunnel system is the double-tube,
with or without an emergency tunnel. A prominent
example of new and very long rail tunnels is the Got-
thard Base Tunnel (Fig. 5) through the Swiss Alps, which
is part of the Trans-European Network connecting Rot-
terdam with Genova. The two rail tunnels are approxi-
mately 40 m apart and joined every 312 m by
connecting galleries. Two double crossovers allow trains
to change from one tunnel to another in the multifunc-
tion stations at Sedrun and Faido. An emergency station
is located in each multifunction station, allowing trains
to stop during emergencies. From there, passengers can
escape and be evacuated. Should an accident occur,
smoke is extracted from the affected tunnel and fresh
air is blown into the emergency stop station through
the side tunnels and connecting galleries. A slight over-
pressure is sufficient to prevent smoke from entering
the escape route to the unaffected tunnel. The distance
between the emergency stations and to the portals is just
below 20 km. If a train stops before it reaches an emer-
gency station, passengers can use the connecting galleries
to escape to the other railway tunnel. Firefighter inter-
vention is based on special firefighting trainings
Fig. 5. Overview of Gotthard Base Tunnel, the longest rail tunnel worldwide.
(Boissonnas & Bettelini, 2016). Emergency stations repre-
sent a fundamental safety element of very long tunnels.
Emergency or rescue stations are commonly provided in
tunnels exceeding approximately 20 km of length. The
rationale lies in the European classification of trains (TSI
1303/2014 and its previous version TSI 2008/163/EC) with
respect to fire protection and running characteristics in case
of fire. Two main train categories are defined:
(1) Category A passenger rolling stock (including passen-
ger locomotives) – for operation on lines, where the
distance between firefighting points or the length of
tunnels does not exceed 5 km;
(2) Category B passenger rolling stock (including passen-
ger locomotives) – for operation in all tunnels, irre-
spective of the tunnel length.
Depending on the rolling stock allowed, the maximum
distance from the portals to a firefighting point and
between firefighting points is limited to 20 km (transit
allowed only for category B trains) or 5 km (general case).
Rescue stations (‘‘firefighting points” according to the
terminology used in the TSI) are primarily required for
safety reasons, but are very useful for construction pur-
poses and for hosting a variety of tunnel equipment. They
must allow the proper handling of a large number of per-
sons. From the safety point of view, the key requirements
of rescue stations are
(1) optimum conditions for self-rescue,
 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266 263

(2) optimum conditions for intervention,

(3) possibility of evacuating the tunnel users in case of
emergency, and
(4) technical measures for mitigation, including a very
powerful ventilation for smoke management.

4 Metro

Mass rapid transit or metros represent the backbone of

mobility for many large cities. The first metro tunnels were
commissioned in the second half of the 19th century (Lon-
don and New York) and the systems evolved along the dec- Fig. 6. Fire development with low (up to some 6000 kJ) and high (170
000 kJ, 6.2 kg isopropanol) ignition energy (Blennemann & Girnau, 2005).
ades. This is one reason why metro systems tend to be
relatively heterogeneous from the point of view of safety.
On the other hand, safety standards can significantly Recent large-scale tests (Lönnermark et al., 2012)
change from operator to operator. showed that rail carriages can reach peak heat-release rates
Metro networks are generally closed systems operated of the order of 75–80 MW if an adequate ignition source is
by only one operator with full control of the train opera- provided (Fig. 7). They further showed that the fire-
tion and rolling-stock quality. In spite of sharing many fea- development time is highly dependent on the inner materi-
tures with rail tunnels, important differences are to be als used for seats and inner linings.
noted, particularly in terms of Because of the issues as discussed in the previous para-
graphs, there is generally a significant uncertainty in select-
(1) relatively short tunnel lengths between stations, with ing design fires. From the point of view of smoke
transit times of the order of 2–3 min; management and mechanical ventilation, the main issue
(2) short stopping times in stations, of the order of 1 min; is generally the protection of stations. Longitudinal
(3) quite homogeneous, well controllable rolling stock; ‘‘push-pull” ventilation systems are frequently used in
(4) very low probability of train stops outside the sta- metro systems, which have proper smoke management in
tions; and both stations and tunnels (see Fig. 8).
(5) dangerous goods are not allowed.
5 Underground space
Therefore, there is an extremely tight coupling between
tunnels and underground stations from the viewpoint of The spectrum of current and emerging uses of under-
safety. Stations provide access to the trains and facilities ground spaces is wide and includes storage, industrial facil-
for emergency evacuation and rescue. Trains experiencing
incidents generally should stop in the nearest station.
Compared with other means of transport, metro systems
usually have good safety records. Because of the large num-
ber of persons potentially involved in the case of a fire inci-
dent, the potential for damage is high. Well-publicized
incidents in the not too distant past include Kings Cross
(London, 1987, 31 fatalities), Baku metro (Azerbaijan,
1995, 286 fatalities), Kaprun funicular tunnel (Austria,
1996, 155 fatalities), and Daegu metro (South Korea,
2003, 192 fatalities). These examples illustrate satisfactorily
the high damage potential in case of serious metro acci-
dents, particularly for large fires involving several trains,
where self-rescue is not possible.
Fire protection of rolling stock plays a central role in
metro safety. Modern rolling stock, compliant with EN
45545, the German DIN 5510, or other corresponding reg-
ulations, only ignites if the fire source has a significant
energy, as in the case of arson using liquid fuels. Figure 6
illustrates widely different fire developments in the case of Fig. 7. Initial stages of a ‘‘flashed over” situation in a metro train carriage
high or low ignition energy. (Lönnermark et al., 2012).
264 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
Fig. 8. ‘‘Push-pull” ventilation system in case of fire in a tunnel.
ities, research centers, sports and leisure centers, and
churches such as the beautiful Rock Church in Helsinki.
Admiraal and Cornaro (2018) recently provided a broad
review on the concept of underground space development
for investigating the issues associated with the sustainable
development of urban underground space. Regardless of
the use, safety represents a central requirement on under-
ground space development.
Compared with the traffic infrastructure discussed in the
previous sections, underground space is characterized by a
very large variability in structure, use, and requirements.
The availability and applicability of regulations and best
practices are generally very limited. There are sometimes
attempts at applying national building codes to
‘‘building-like” underground facilities. This should be
avoided as the requirements and approaches to under-
ground safety are radically different from those of conven-
tional buildings. This was recognized early in Hong Kong,
as stated in the introduction to the 1994 Guide to Fire
Safety Design for Caverns: ‘‘Occupants in underground
caverns are subject to different life risks from those in
buildings erected above ground, e.g., easy accumulation
of smoke and heat, longer traveling distance in escape
routes, and lack of external communication” (BAFSD,
1994).
NFPA 520 on subterranean spaces (NFPA, 2016) specif-
ically addresses ‘‘the safeguarding of life and property
against fire, explosion, and related hazards associated with
developed subterranean spaces” and is one of the few reg-
ulations developed specifically for underground facilities.
Among others, the norm provides requirements on com-
partmentation of different areas, means of egress, and tech-
nical systems for fire protection. At least two separate exits
to the exterior are required and the maximum distance
between emergency exits shall not exceed 91 m. Interest-
ingly, protected refuge areas and chambers are required
whenever the escape distance exceeds 610 m. Such facilities
are generally not allowed in underground traffic infrastruc-
ture. Sprinkler systems are required throughout all devel-
oped areas, with a few exceptions.
Fires in underground spaces are characterized by the fact
that smoke moves in the same direction as escaping persons,
i.e., toward the surface. At the same time, smoke tends to
prevent rescue services from entering the facility. Thus, ven-
tilation systems and facilities for fire compartmentation are
generally significantly more complex than in buildings and
fixed firefighting systems are often required.
While traffic infrastructure tends to be relatively homo-
geneous in terms of structure, requirements, and operation,
other underground infrastructure and spaces are character-
ized by a large variety of uses and occupations, which can
evolve in a very significant manner during the lifespan of
the facility. This results in not only a wide spectrum of
threats and requirements, but also widely different cate-
gories of users. The access to underground industrial sites,
such as sewage treatment plants, might be strictly restricted
to trained staff in good mental and physical conditions.
Other types of underground infrastructure, such as
research or leisure centers, might be used by a much more
heterogeneous population. Evolving exploitation patterns
also represent a very severe challenge. Occupancy, activi-
ties, and stored goods might vary in a significant manner.
Thus, holistic approaches to underground safety are neces-
sary, even more than for transport infrastructure.
6 User behavior
‘‘The final outcome of some incidents may depend more
on the quick and right reaction of individuals than on the
technical safety level in the tunnel” (OECD, 2006). This
bold and, perhaps, surprising statement describes well an
important fact that is usually forgotten by engineers. Users
play a central role in underground safety. Incidents fre-
quently originate through human error and their outcome
depends on the reaction of the involved persons. User
behavior is difficult but not impossible to influence by rais-
ing awareness through appropriate education, preemptive
information, and specific guidance during incidents.
The human behavior in underground facilities was
investigated in a number of studies, including UPTUN
(Papaioannou & Georgiou, 2003). An important finding
is that people generally do not react in case of an alarm,
unless additional significant information is provided.
Group dynamics also plays a significant role. Panic, associ-
ated with ‘‘blind”, illogical, or irrational behavior as an
automatic, emotional response, is relatively rare and can
 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
be influenced by appropriate measures. UPTUN’s
researchers pointed out that ‘‘experiences from different
catastrophes show that no panic arises when there is a suf-
ficient number of known exits. Panic behavior can, instead,
arise when people fear that they cannot escape”
(Papaioannou & Georgiou, 2003).
The engineering challenge resulting from this body of
knowledge was presented very satisfactorily by the
National Research Council of the National Academies:
‘‘All forms of underground engineering not only must con-
sider that training and safety guidelines are necessary for
the smooth functioning of infrastructure in the best of cir-
cumstances, but also must anticipate the behavior of
underground occupants during both normal and worst-
case operation scenarios. Design must be holistic and cre-
ate an integrated environment that allows people to almost
intuitively understand how to remain safe should adverse
conditions arise” (NRCNA, 2013).
7 Operation
The main tasks of facility operators are
(1) secure the safety of users and operators both in nor-
mal conditions (prevention) and in the event of
incidents,
(2) monitor the proper performance of all parts and com-
ponents of the facility during normal operation and
adjust them as required in the event of an incident,
and
(3) maintain all structural and electromechanical compo-
nents (preventive and curative maintenance).
In case of emergency, the facility operator has to work
closely together with internal and external emergency ser-
vices. Tasks and roles may vary according to the facility
type as well as to local factors and circumstances:
(1) Operator: Monitoring, detection, and activation of
technical mitigating measures. The most relevant sys-
tems are generally ventilation, lighting, and traffic
control.
(2) Police: Traffic control, user alert, support of self-
rescue, alert and coordination of intervention, orga-
nization of emergency services, and information to
other users.
(3) Emergency services (fire brigade, breakdown service,
removal of chemicals, protection against radiation,
medical rescue, etc.).
The fundamental importance of proper emergency plan-
ning and training was fully recognized in recent years, par-
ticularly for road tunnels. Regulations, such as the EU
Directives 2004/54/EC and 2008/96/EC, specifically
address operational safety in road tunnels, in terms of role
definition, responsibilities, documentation, and periodic
training. Progress is ongoing in other sectors.
265
8 Code-oriented vs. safety-oriented design
As discussed in the previous chapters, several excellent
norms and recommendations are available for the safety
design of transport infrastructure, particularly for road
tunnels. While practical and comparatively easy from both
the designer and the owner’s side, this approach does not
usually lead to optimum design and to the correct safety
level. Safety standards generally consist of a set of mini-
mum requirements on safety-relevant components, such
as emergency exits and key equipment. While applicable
to ‘‘standard” facilities, such rules tend to be fully inflexible
and inadequate in more challenging cases as well as in the
case of expansions and changes in use.
Performance-based approaches respond in a much more
flexible way to evolving or unusual requirements. A useful
approach for rail tunnels was developed by ITA COSUF
(2014) based on the principle that ‘‘whenever incidents
occur, the persons affected must have a fair chance of sur-
vival”, which is stated by the Swiss FOT in its Safety Policy
for public transportation (FOT, 2016). Performance-based
safety mechanisms and codes do not only consider today’s
underground occupancies (e.g., mixed use, multilevel) and
risks, but also allow for expansion and change in use.
A further approach allowing for improvements com-
pared with purely prescriptive design is quantitative risk
analysis. A quantitative, probabilistic assessment of risks
can be used for assessing cost-effectiveness, in terms of
the ratio between benefits and cost of safety measures.
9 The need for a holistic approach
‘‘Safety in the underground is achieved by avoiding,
transferring, or reducing risks associated with naturally
occurring phenomena (e.g., gases, radiation, extreme tem-
peratures, water, and lack of oxygen) and human activity
(e.g., fire, smoke, hazardous materials, intentional or acci-
dental explosions, structural failure, or simple human fail-
ure). Safety is more challenging with increasing
infrastructure complexity. Human factors engineering
becomes essential to increasing the ability of people to
operate and occupy the underground safely” (NRCNA,
2013).
Normative requirements must be adapted to the evolv-
ing complexity of emerging underground infrastructure.
In principle, building codes can be expanded and adapted
to underground facilities but the development of specific
codes is the preferred way. Minimum safety requirements
shall be stated but the approach to safety must be func-
tional and must provide proper guidance for
performance-based design. This is particularly important
in the case of mixed uses where different occupancy types
are combined in one underground space (e.g., public trans-
portation and commercial), and because of the long-term
perspective required by the optimum safety design of
underground infrastructure.
266 M. Bettelini / Underground Space 5 (2020) 258–266
Fig. 9. The ‘‘Swiss cheese” model of accident causation (Reason,
Hollnagel, & Pariès, 2006).
Safety barriers protecting the users from hazards are
sometimes interpreted as multiple layers of Swiss cheese.
Because of the holes, protection is not complete. The Swiss
cheese model of accident causation illustrates that although
many layers of defense lie between hazards and accidents,
there are flaws in each layer that, if aligned, can allow acci-
dents to occur (see Fig. 9).
Multiple, consistent layers of protection are required for
preventing hazards from generating harm. Such levels of
protection can be best identified using a holistic approach.
The entire system must be analyzed taking properly into
account all safety-relevant aspects (Fig. 1) based on the
principle that ‘‘the whole chain is only as strong as its
weakest link”. ‘‘Capital construction and operational risk
mitigation costs for underground space can be substantial
and could preclude an underground project from being
started, or could result in improper system maintenance.
Human factors engineering can help to minimize costs
associated with avoiding or transferring risk, for example,
by identifying ways to reduce risk through safety regula-
tions and education when technological solutions are not
feasible.” (NRCNA, 2013).
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank colleagues and clients worldwide for
their continuous advice and support.
Declaration of Competing Interest
This paper reflects my technical views, expressed inde-
pendently from any internal or external pressure or
constraints.
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