The Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The Iranian nuclear negotiations
The Iranian nuclear negotiations: Overcoming four decades of enmity
Yadvinder S. Rana,
yrana@neglob.com
yadvinder rana@unicatt.it
Neglob, Catholic University – Milan, Italy
DOI:
Abstract
International negotiations usually involve multiple parties acting in specific contexts with divergent
objectives, priorities, cultures, and personalities. The complexity and ambiguity generated by the
potential number of interacting variables, including parties, roles, relationships, goals, interests,
alternatives and constraints, are the key challenges in understanding international multiparty
negotiations and developing a coherent theory.
The current paper investigates the negotiations between Iran and the UN Security Council’s five
permanent members (US, France, UK, China, Russia) plus Germany (P5+1) to limit Iran’s nuclear
program for the next decade in exchange for gradual sanctions relief.
The main purpose of this study is to define and validate a framework that integrates and expands
previous theoretical models, based on four basic elements and three contextual factors, for
understanding and analyzing the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program.
The second aim is to assess whether the framework can be generally applied to identify and isolate
the potential number of interactive variables involved in most multiparty international negotiations.
Keywords: Multiparty Negotiations, International Negotiations, Negotiation Process, Negotiation
Outcome, Iran, US, Middle East.
Introduction
Multiparty negotiations are complex and ambiguous (Watkins, 2003): They are complex because of
the potential number of interacting variables, including parties, roles, relationships, goals, interests,
alternatives and constraints (Crump & Glendon, 2003); they are ambiguous because the structure of
the game is indefinite and the potential number of variables and their interactions is unclear
(Watkins, 2003).
Complexity is the major challenge in understanding multiparty negotiations and developing an
adequate theory (Crump & Glendon, 2003) because the complexity of a negotiation increases
exponentially with the number of players.
Research into multiparty negotiation is considerable: the literature concerning legal, environmental,
institutional, trade, government, business, international, and merger and acquisition (M&A)
negotiations is substantial (Kremenyuk, 2002; Sebenius, 2013; Stein, 1989; Susskind, 2004;
Watkins, 1999; Weiss, 1997; Zartman, 1994), even if it lacks a coherent theory that can help to
explain the range of interactions that typify such negotiations.
The focus of the paper is on the negotiations between Iran and the UN Security Council’s five
permanent members (US, France, UK, China, Russia) plus Germany (P5+1) to limit Iran’s nuclear
program for the next decade in exchange for gradual sanctions relief.
The purpose of this study is to define and validate a framework, based on four basic elements and
two contextual factors, for understanding and analyzing the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1
on Iran’s nuclear program.
Basic Elements.
1. Key players (Crystal, 2008; Pruitt, 2005; Rana, 2014; Sebenius, 2006)
2. Interests and constraints (Sebenius, 2006; Susskind et al., 2005)
3. Perceived Power (Lewicki et al., 2003; Sebenius, 2005; Susskind et al., 2005)
4. Design of the game (Lax & Sebenius, 2003)
Contextual factors.
5. Trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013)
6. Ripeness (Zartman, 2001; Pruitt, 2005)
7. Justice and Fairness (Albin, 2001)
The main purpose of the framework is to understand and analyze the outcome of the negotiations
between Iran and the P5+1.
The second aim is to assess whether the framework can be generally applied to complex
international negotiations.
Understanding the other parties’ interests, constraints, concerns (Sebenius, 2006; Susskind et al.,
2005) and power (Lewicki et al., 2003; Sebenius, 2005; Susskind et al., 2005) is a key factor in
international complex negotiations, as is the ability to identify and map the key players involved in
the negotiation (Crystal, 2008; Pruitt, 2005; Rana, 2014; Sebenius, 2006), and shape the structure of
the game away from the negotiation table game (Lax & Sebenius, 2003). Two additional factors are
relevant to the specific case: the level of trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013) among the different parties,
and the perception of justice and fairness in the negotiation process (Albin, 2001).
A Theoretical Framework
Sebenius’ (2005) negotiation analytic approach was chosen as a starting point to develop a
framework that integrates and develops previous theoretical models (Crump & Glendon, 2003;
Crystal, 2008; Lax & Sebenius, 2003; Lewicki et al., 2014; Pruitt, 2005; Rana, 2014; Sebenius,
2006; Susskind et al., 2005; Watkins, 2003; Zartman, 2000).
The model is organized around four universal and basic elements:
1. Key players
2. Interests and constraints
3. Perceived Power
4. Design of the game
The four basic elements are combined with three contextual factors that can help in better
understanding and analyzing the specific negotiation process:
5. Trust
6. Ripeness
7. Justice and fairness
1. Key players (Crystal, 2008; Pruitt, 2005; Rana, 2014; Sebenius, 2006)
International negotiations have often been compared to a game of chess. Analyzing an international
negotiation, and following the chess metaphor, one can assume that an individual chess player
moves the pieces based on specific strategies aimed at bringing the opponent's king into checkmate
(Allison, 1969).
However, international negotiations rarely involve unitary players on each side; it is critical to
understand the complex interactions among different pawns, knights, rooks, and bishops within
each party and their often-conflicting interests (Rubin, 2002).
Every negotiation involves at least three levels of participants (Crystal, 2008; Rana, 2014).
Level one players are the actual negotiators and mediators.
In preparing for the meeting, negotiators should answer the following questions:
 Who are level one players (who will be at the negotiating table)?
 What are their formal titles and areas of responsibility?
 What is their decision authority? Do they have a broad mandate to close the deal or just an
exploratory mandate?
Level two players are those who directly affect the level one players (the actual negotiators), but do
not negotiate. Despite being outside the negotiation room, they maintain a strong presence inside
the room: neighbor countries, institutions, leaders, internal political parties, advisors, and even
spouses and family members. Understanding the dynamics between level one and level two players
helps in recognizing negotiators’ decision-making authority, constraints, interests, thinking patterns,
culture, and behavior.
Level three actors are interested in the outcome and can affect the negotiations indirectly: distant
countries, policy makers, and journalists writing about the talks.
The players involved in the negotiations can be mapped along three axes (see Figure 2):
 Level of support: Are they disposed or opposed to your proposal?
 Level of assertiveness: Will they voice their support or opposition? Will they influence the
process behind the scenes? Will they be proactive in supporting or opposing the proposal?
 Level of influence in the decision-making process: What is their position and credibility with
the other players? Do they have veto power? Is their voice heard? Can they persuade people
to change their minds? Are they recognized as leaders?
Figure 2. Mapping the players involved in the negotiation.
Because the different players are not monolithic, but rather are composed of internal parties and
various partisan factions, it is important to introduce the concept of political spectrum (Pruitt,
2005).
Figure 3 shows a political spectrum consisting of the politically active members of two groups that
are in conflict. One group is represented on the left of this spectrum and the other on the right. Each
group is divided into three somewhat arbitrary subsections. Hawks are at either end of the spectrum,
doves are on both sides of the midpoint, and moderates are between the hawks and doves.
Hawks are assumed to differ from moderates and especially doves in many ways. For example, they
have more extreme goals with respect to the issues in conflict.
Hawks Moderates Doves Doves Moderates Hawks
Figure 3. Political spectrum running from Party I’s hawks to Party II’s hawks.
There is an intense social distance between the hawks on either side of a conflict. They have
extremely contrasting values and narratives and are often reluctant to meet each other. In contrast,
doves on either side share some perspectives and may be in contact with each other in an e ffort to
understand the nature of the conflict and to move forward in a peaceful direction.
2. Interests and constraints (Sebenius, 2006; Susskind et al., 2005)

International negotiations usually involve multiple parties acting in specific contexts with divergent
objectives, priorities, cultures, and personalities (Rubin, 2002). Coalitions, defined as subsets of
actors who coordinate their actions to achieve common desired goals (Susskind, 2004), are crucial
for negotiators to progress their interests.
The next step is to probe deeply for each relevant party or faction’s underlying interests (the “why”
behind a position) and to carefully assess the trade-offs among interests. In principle, this
assessment is radically subjective in that less tangible concerns for self-image, fairness, process,
precedents, and relationships can have the same analytic standing as more objective interests
(Sebenius, 2006).
The ability to identify the varying interests, concerns, and constraints of the different players
involved (including behind-the-scenes players) and form stable alliances with the appropriate
parties is a vital skill for any international negotiator (Crump & Glendon, 2003; Rana, 2014;
Susskind, 2004; Zartman, 1994).
Coalitions can be categorized into two broad classes: winning and blocking. A winning coalition is
defined as “a subset of players that can effectively pressure, sidestep, or override dissenters”
(Hames, 2011, p. 375). A blocking coalition can hinder proposals, thereby guarding the interests of
coalition members (Crump & Glendon, 2003; Sebenius, 2002).
3. Perceived Power (Lewicki, 2003; Sebenius, 2005; Susskind, 2005)

As Lewicki et al. (2003, p. 192) stated, “The concept of power is a complex, elusive, and almost
paradoxical one. It is complex because there is a wide variety of definitions of what constitutes
power, and how it is effectively accumulated and used. It is elusive because there seems to be very
little consensus about the definitions, or the best way to describe power and talk about it in action.
Finally, power is paradoxical because it doesn’t always work the way it is expected to; sometimes
those who seem to have the most power really have the least, while those who may appear to have
the least power are most in control.”
Research on power in negotiations has focused largely on alternatives to a negotiated agreement as
the individual-level measure of power. For each side, the basic test of a proposed joint agreement is
whether it offers higher subjective worth than no agreement (Sebenius, 2005). Assessing one’s own
alternative is necessary, but not sufficient. Knowledge of the other players’ alternatives is also
required in multiparty negotiations (Susskind et al., 2005).
In examining a negotiation, therefore, one should analyze each party’s perceptions of its own and
the others’ alternatives to no agreement. Parties with objectively higher or more numerous
alternatives achieve greater individual gains than those with objectively lower or fewer alternatives
(Mannix & Neale, 1993).
In addition, negotiations in which both parties have highly valued outside alternatives are likely to
result in more integrative outcomes than negotiations in which one or both parties have less
valuable outside alternatives (McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986).
However, power in negotiation is a complex issue, mainly because power is situational and
dynamic: Offers, concessions, and alternatives change in value to the parties according to the
circumstances and over time (Zartman, 2002).
Furthermore, perceptions play a key role in power dynamics (Zartman & Rubin, 2002). For
example, Pinkley (1995) found that parties lacking information about their opponents’ alternatives
“filled in the blanks” and assumed that their opponents had alternatives similar to their own. These
findings suggest that parties’ perceptions of the relative power they hold in a negotiation do not
neatly correspond to objective conditions. Parties may assume they are in an equal-power
relationship regardless of the objective difference between the alternatives (Wolfe & McGinn,
2005).
Because perceptions are vital in assessing power dynamics, to maintain effective power, one must
be willing to use it or able to convince an opponent that one will use it.
Consistent with power-dependence and perceptual theories, we slightly modify the concept of a
negotiator’s potential power (Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005), arguing that a negotiator’s potential
power is a function of the counterpart’s dependence perception and that dependence and perception
are, in turn, based on two dimensions: (1) the counterpart’s perception of the value of the
negotiation and (2) the perception of the value of the counterpart’s best alternative if a negotiated
agreement is not reached.
4. Design of the game (Lax & Sebenius, 2003)

International deals are often decided away from the negotiation table. Being able to involve the
right parties in the right sequence at the right time is a vital skill for international negotiators.
Capable negotiators design the game in their favor even before they get to the table (Lax &
Sebenius, 2003). They also build alliances that influence key people to frame the outcome of the
negotiations. They change the negotiation’s setup by involving additional or different players,
introducing different interests than the obvious ones, managing the information flow among the
different players, and improving players’ alternatives.
By working behind the scenes, a negotiator can plant the seeds of ideas and start to build consensus
before formal decision making begins (Kolb & Williams, 2001).
5. Trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013)

We will define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395).
Trust is a crucial factor throughout a negotiation, serving as both the lubricant that improves and
facilitates the negotiation process and the binding element that holds deals together (Lewicki &
Polin, 2013). We can categorize trust according to two main dimensions: cognitive and affective
(Paliszkiewicz, 2011).
Cognitive trust is confidence in the ability of others, based on competence, with an emphasis on the
cognitive component. Affective trust is faith in the trustworthy intentions of others, based on
emotional bonds between individuals, with an emphasis on the affective component.
Despite the importance of trust in negotiations, violations of trust are common. According to
research, we can identify two barriers to trust building. First, trust involves a degree of risk: There is
no absolute confidence that trust will be honored. Second, trust and distrust are asymmetric: Trust is
built up slowly, gradually, and incrementally; distrust is usually sudden. Three main cognitive
factors contribute to the asymmetry between trust building and trust destroying (Slovic, 1993):
- Negative events are more evident and more easily recalled than positive events.
- Negative events carry more impact on trust judgments than positive events.
- Sources of bad news are perceived as more credible than sources of good news.
Once trust has been broken, “for full repair to occur, both parties must be willing to invest time and
energy in the repair process, perceive that the short and long term benefits of repair outweigh the
costs, and recognize that the benefits to be derived from repair are preferable to terminating the
relationship and attempting to have one’s needs met elsewhere” (Lewicki & Polin, 2012, p. 129).
To repair trust, the parties may engage in “structural solutions,” such as contracts, referees, and
monitoring systems that can minimize the likelihood of future trust violations.
6. Ripeness (Zartman, 2001; Pruitt, 2005)

While most research has focused on negotiation content, the timing of the negotiation is also a vital
factor in negotiations.
In game theory terms, a conflict is assumed to be ripe for resolution when both players recognize
that the status quo (a conflict situation with no negotiation) is a negative sum (lose-lose) situation,
not a zero sum (win-lose) situation.
In other words, a conflict is assumed to be ripe for resolution only when both players recognize they
cannot win, the conflict becomes too costly or painful for both of them, and both players seek a way
out. A decision to negotiate is therefore often caused by increasing pain with the current situation.
A conflict is ripe for resolution only if the situation is symmetrical: Both parties are motivated to
cease conflict escalation and are confident about reaching a settlement (Pruitt, 2005). However,
ripeness is only a condition, necessary but not sufficient for the initiation of negotiations (Zartman,
2001).
On the other side, anger, pride, feelings of injustice, and the desire for revenge often stand at such a
high level that there is no interest in accommodation, despite there being ample reasons to explore
that possibility (Pruitt, 2005).
In some circumstances, ripeness can be created by crafting proposals that reframe the conflict in a
way that allows one or both sides to relinquish highly publicized, entrenched positions via the
introduction of face-saving “decommiting formulas” (Rubin, 1991).
The “new leader” theory suggests that a change in leadership is often needed to pull away from
unsuccessful policies (Lieberfeld, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Stedman, 1991). New leaders “cannot be
held responsible for the policies of their predecessors, so that change is less costly in political
terms” (Mitchell, 2000, p. 89). The personality of the leader is a factor of great importance, as is his
or her motivation to make decisions in favor of conflict negotiation.
However, the leader’s intention and ability are not enough; also necessary are the surrounding
elements that make it possible for intention and ability to be realized (Rubin, 2002).
7. Justice and Fairness (Albin, 2001)

Justice can be considered a macro concept referring to general criteria of what is right and what is
wrong. Fairness, on the other hand, can be considered a micro concept that suggests what is right
and wrong in specific situations (Albin, 2001).
Ultimatum game experiments suggest that perceived unfair allocations are often rejected and that
the mean average offer is in the range of 37% to 50%. Experimental results are the same across
cultures.
Thus, justice and fairness play a key role in international negotiations (Leung & Tong, 2004).
The concept of distributive justice is based on several fundamental principles (Albin, 2001):
- Mutual advantage: Negotiations have to deliver benefits to both sides.
- Reciprocity: Parties have to respond to each other’s concessions.
- Equality: Parties have to receive identical resources, benefits, and obligations.
- Equity: Resources, benefits, and obligations should be allocated to each party in proportion
to the party’s relevant inputs (resources, efforts, actions).
- Need: Resources, benefits, and obligations should be allocated to the parties according to
their needs.
- Compensatory justice: Resources, benefits, and obligations should be allocated to the parties
that have suffered most from the situation.
Despite different understandings of what is just and fair, negotiations and agreements that the
affected parties perceive as just and fair are far more likely to be accepted and to lead to successful
conclusions (Albin, 2001).
What justice and impartiality entail is therefore a balancing among different principles and interests:
A single criterion can rarely take into account all pertinent factors in actual international
negotiations.
Method
Case studies are the favored research method when the research addresses either a descriptive
question— “What is happening or has happened?”—or an explanatory question— “How or why did
something happen?” (Yin, 2014). Additionally, a case study approach should be considered when
contextual factors are relevant.
The single-case study methodology was selected based on the perceived lack of a coherent theory
that can help analyze multiparty international negotiations, and explain their outcome. Complex
real-world case studies can provide important insights into the interaction among different factors
including parties, roles, relationships, goals, interests and constraints (Crump & Glendon, 2003).
The selected case study is the July 2015 negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear
program.
Data Sources
Case study research is not limited to a single source of data (Yin, 2014). My sources of information
consisted of newspaper accounts (periodical sources included newspapers from the US, UK, France,
Israel, Italy, Qatar, Russia, China in English, Italian, and French language news), articles from
journals, books, case studies, and company reports (see Appendix A for a selected list).
“Triangulation” of data from multiple sources was fundamental in establishing a full chronology
and account of each negotiation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Yin, 2014). Different pieces of
information have been cross-checked to establish converging lines of events, facts, and outcomes
for all the cases.
Data Analysis
After collecting data from multiple sources, I focused on determining (Yin, 2004):
1. The sequence of events: Key events were assembled into a chronology, resolving
discrepancies, and highlighting possible causal relationships.
2. The key players involved and their role in the negotiation: Sources of information were
classified according to level one, two, and three players.
3. The potential interacting variables: Sources of information, previously classified according
to player and role were now further categorized according to the relationship and potential
interactions among different players.
4. The framework: Sources of information were classified according to the different factors of
the framework.
The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program
A tortuous relationship
When Americans and Iranians deal with each other today, there is symmetry in their respective
views of recent history. Each side sees itself as the injured party, as victim of the other ’s
unacceptable actions.
Two crucial events have created this persistent mutual hostility. In the Iranian view, the central
event is the oil nationalization crisis and the British- and US-sponsored coup d’état that overthrew
Prime Minister Mosaddegh in August 1953. That action gave Iranians 25 years of royal
dictatorship, as well as the conventional wisdom that America, which Iranians once regarded as
their supporter against historical colonial powers, had assumed the British and Russian traditional
role as controller and manipulator of Iran.
In the American case, the comparable event is the Embassy hostage crisis of 1979–1981: On
November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking more
than 60 American hostages in response to President Jimmy Carter’s decision to allow Iran’s
deposed Shah to enter the United States for cancer treatment.
Whatever the reality of these two events, they still influence, in the most negative way, how the
United States and Iran view each other.
The anti-American trajectory of the Iranian revolution reflects several complementary dynamics:
1. The regime’s desire to find its place between the then-competing superpowers
2. The reflection of two centuries of humiliation at the hands of the West, most lately and
visibly of the US
3. The utility of a foreign scapegoat (Great Satan) to explain the nation’s enduring difficulties
Successive US administrations have reinforced the Iranian view: US-imposed sanctions, coupled
with US military assistance to Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war, validated the dominant narrative
and strengthened the sense of patriotism among Iranians
As Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, reminded his audience in January 2008, breaking off
ties to the United States is one of the bases of Iran’s policy.
Axis of Evil
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan brought
the US and Iran closer in shared enmity of the Taliban. Indeed, Tehran’s antagonism was older and
more deeply rooted than Washington’s. In 1998, the Taliban had killed eight Iranian diplomats and
a journalist in Mazar-e Sharif, bringing the two countries to the brink of war.
However, President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address referring to Iran along with Iraq
and North Korea as an axis of evil perplexed and damaged reform-minded Iranian President
Khatami.
From partner in the war against the Taliban, Iran suddenly became one of Washington’s prime
targets. According to a US analyst:
From Iran’s perspective, it was the ultimate reversal and betrayal. Tehran had worked with
America to get rid of a dangerous adversary. Then, without warning, Washington turned around,
branded it a member of [what President Bush called] “the axis of evil.” In the meantime, the U.S.
closed ranks with a country, Pakistan, that did precisely what Washington accused Iran of wishing
to do: acquire a nuclear bomb, harbor terrorists and provide support to militants in a neighboring
country, Afghanistan.
Grand Bargain Offer

Washington’s policy had a paradoxical, unintended effect. With the fall of the Taliban and Saddam
Hussein’s regime, the US could be seen as having militarily encircled Iran. At the same time,
though, it neutralized Tehran’s two most hostile neighbors.
US military and political power in the Middle East was at its height, and many in Tehran feared
Tehran could follow Iraq as the target of choice. Simultaneously, with the fall of two unfriendly
neighboring countries, Tehran’s theocratic regime sensed the opportunity to expand its ideological,
political, and military hegemony in the region.
According to senior officials, in May 2003, in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, Iran used its
Swiss channel to send a letter to the state department with a proposal for a broad dialogue,
suggesting everything was on the table‒including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance
of Israel, and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.
However, top Bush administration officials, convinced the Iranian government was on the verge of
collapse, disparaged the initiative. The argument by the hawks in the White House was that Iran is
weak and it’s giving this proposal precisely because of the fact that it is fearful of the United States
and that the US can achieve more by taking on the Iranian regime and just removing it than by
negotiating.
As a result, the moderate camp in Iran was discouraged and discredited when the US rejected its
“grand bargain” proposal, strengthening, on the other side, the position of the hardliners in Tehran.
For Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE), a
combination of ignorance and arrogance under the Bush administration squandered countless
diplomatic opportunities with Iran and so allowed it to forge ahead with its nuclear program. U.S.
policy consisted of two mantras — Iran should not have the knowledge and should not spin one
single centrifuge. They kept saying, wait, Iran is not North Korea, it will buckle.
Different perspective on sanctions
A key problem in the negotiations is that the West and Iran view the sanctions through their own,
highly dissimilar lenses. European and US officials’ view is that, on a cost-benefit analysis: The
Islamic Republic, at some point, will determine that persevering on the nuclear track will lead to
economic difficulties sufficiently great to trigger more extensive popular unrest, ultimately
threatening regime survival itself.
However, the world looks very different from Tehran. In Iran, the one thing considered more
dangerous than suffering from sanctions is surrendering to them; Tehran leadership is persuaded
that the West is intent on removing the regime, and it views the sanctions as just a step to
destabilize the current establishment.
The Iranian strategy, embedded in the experience of diplomatic isolation and the war with Iraq, can
be summed up in two words, resist and survive, the former being the prerequisite to the latter.
However, despite being isolated and ostracized, Iran has managed to gain some strategic breathing
room with the help of countries like China, Russia, India, South Korea, and Venezuela, allowing it
to resist Western pressure.
Thus, there are good reasons to think that, rather than changing its nuclear policy to remove the
sanctions, the regime will continue to modify its economic policy to adapt to them.
Furthermore, sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy are only as effective as the prospect of
relieving them in exchange for policy shifts is real; the measure of efficacy lies in what can be
obtained when they are removed, not what happens when they are imposed.
Therein lies another crucial problem. Iranian officials increasingly identify sanction removal as a
condition for any accord. They need to produce a tangible trade-off between any concessions and a
recognition of Iran’s right to legitimate enrichment plus a gradual lifting of sanctions. However, that
is far easier said than done. Sanctions have become so extensive and so intricately intertwined that
it will be hard to offer significant, concrete relief short of a major concession from Iran; reaching
the threshold for removing US sanctions in particular is hard to imagine (sanctions relief requires
approval from a majority Republican Congress). That leaves the option of a time-limited suspension
or waiver, which in turn is likely to prompt at best time-limited and reversible Iranian reciprocal
steps.
Iran’s nuclear strategy
Much of the expert opinion on the Iranian nuclear issue is divided into two main factions:
• Iran is seeking nuclear weapons - According to this interpretation, Iran is in pursuit of the
bomb and Tehran's diplomatic engagement is simply a means of buying time for the
program to advance. Supporters of this view are largely against any deal that leaves Iran
with enrichment capability.
• Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons option – According to this view, Iran is seeking to
develop the knowledge and infrastructure that would allow it to ‘go nuclear’ relatively
quickly if the decision was taken to do so. This is also known as ‘nuclear hedging’ (Bowen
& Moran, 2015).
According to the second perspective, there is much evidence to suggest that Iran is engaged in a
subtler strategy based on nuclear hedging, rather than unequivocal pursuit of the bomb.
The conclusion is based on five key factors:
1. The concern to avoid preemptive strikes by Israel and a war that it does not believe it could
win.
2. The belief that any Shia bomb would soon be matched by a Sunni one, making any regional
hegemony short‐lived.
3. Iran’s concern that weaponization could exhaust any remaining tolerance from Russia and
China.
4. The desire to avoid the further economic pain that universally applied sanctions would cause.
5. Iranian officials’ dismissal of concerns about a military objective of the nuclear program,
underlining Ayatollah Khomeini’s injunctions against weapons of mass destruction and, more
specifically, Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa (religious edict) against nuclear weapons officially
cited in 2005.
Juan Cole, an expert on Iran and the contemporary Middle East, described Tehran’s goal as nuclear
latency; it has all the advantages of actual possession of a bomb without any of the unpleasant
consequences, of the sort North Korea is suffering.
Is Iran ready to negotiate a deal?
In October 2009, experts and analysts agreed that Iran was likely ready to make a deal. The analysts
referred to four converging factors that can explain a change in strategy from Iran:
1. Internal political crisis after the July 12 contested elections: The Supreme Leader broke the
established rules of the game, clearly siding with one side and hurriedly validating
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection as president.
2. The change in leadership in Washington, with new Democratic President Obama.
3. The revelation by President Obama of an Iranian secret nuclear enrichment facility near the
holy city of Qum.
4. Iran’s leadership having achieved much of what it set out to accomplish when it stepped up
its clandestine nuclear program in 1999.
Abbas Milani, head of Iranian studies at Stanford, said: They are already where they wanted to be.
They are virtually a nuclear state and the issue of national pride is resolved.
Before a meeting in Geneva between the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (US,
France, UK, China, Russia) plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s
Atomic Energy Organization, told reporters: We are not going to discuss anything related to our
nuclear rights, but we can discuss about disarmament, we can discuss about nonproliferation and
other general issues. The new site is part of our rights and there is no need to discuss it.
On November 2, after agreeing just a month before to ship its low-enriched uranium to Russia for
additional processing and eventual return as fuel rods for a civilian reactor, Iran’s leadership raised
objections to the deal.
According to analysts, at the center of Iran’s reversal was a deep internal political crisis. President
Ahmadinejad, deeply alienated both reformist and conservative political leaders after his disputed
re-election as he tried to consolidate power and marginalize his rivals. Neither side was eager to see
him take credit for resolving the nuclear issue and, with that, restoring relations with the United
States.
On February 8, 2010, the IEAE confirmed that it had received a letter from Iran declaring its intent
to begin enriching uranium up to 20%, despite Russian and Chinese pressure on Iran’s government
to accept a United Nations plan on uranium enrichment.
Mark Lyall Grant, the British ambassador to the United Nations, confirmed that there was less and
less room for diplomatic maneuvering. At this stage, China also agreed to engage substantively on
the issue.
Secretive war
Despite many nuclear experts estimating that Iran was very close to enriching enough uranium to
build a bomb, the military option was at least momentarily off the table. President Obama has said
that the United States will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons and that “all options are on
the table” to prevent this outcome.
In September 2012, however, more than 30 former high-ranking U.S. officials and military officers
endorsed a report concluding that a sustained military strike on Iran by the United States would
only set back Iran’s nuclear program up to four years.
Even if a military option was beyond consideration, according to many observers, a silent and
secretive war was in progress. A computer virus known as Stuxnet had infected Iranian control
computers and damaged several hundred centrifuges from mid-2009 onwards. In 2006 and 2007,
three planes belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp crashed for unexplained reasons. In
November 2011, an explosion destroyed Iran’s ballistic missile center, killing a senior
Revolutionary Guard commander and up to two dozen colleagues. Iran views all this as an
undeclared war conducted by the US and Israel.
Furthermore, Iranian officials believed that Israel's Mossad intelligence service was behind the
killing of at least two Iranian nuclear scientists and the attempted assassination of several others in
recent years.
Mismatched expectations
On April 14, 2012, the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in Istanbul after 15 months
of stagnation. Although no problematic issues were tackled, the meeting in Istanbul gave rise to
optimism that an agreement might be reached. However, those hopes were remarkably disappointed
at the next meeting in Baghdad on May 23.
The positive tone that dominated the negotiations in Istanbul was mainly based on mutual
misperceptions and mismatched expectations. According to the P5+1, Iran decided to restart talks
and drop its previous preconditions (recognition of its right to enrich and removal of sanctions) for
one main reason: the massive costs of sanctions imposed on the country and fear that additional
sanctions in discussion at the UN Security Council would come into effect.
Before the meeting, a US official said, Iran came to the talks from a position of weakness. Gone
were the preconditions and lectures of the past; they are desperate for sanctions relief and it
showed.
On the other side, the Iranian leadership believed that the US and EU’s renewed interest in
negotiations was evidence that its strategy of nuclear brinkmanship was working at a time when the
West needed to moderate oil prices in the middle of an exceptional economic crisis in Europe and to
prevent a military confrontation before the impending US presidential elections.
Moreover, Iran came to the talks believing it was in a stronger position than in the past. According
to Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador at the IEAE, the main difference between today and two
years ago, is that Iran is in a much better position. Iran gained the upper hand by advancements in
producing 20 per cent enriched uranium, inauguration of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and
becoming self-reliant in manufacturing fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. Moreover, our
nuclear program is now better protected in the [underground] Fordow facility, which was created
as a result of the bellicose rhetoric and threats of Israel and the U.S.
However, if Iran were to engage in behavior deemed provocative by Washington, the US might not
be able to resist Israeli pressure and might even reach the conclusion that it should take the lead
militarily. The reality is that there is still too much inflexibility and mistrust in both parties. Neither
side is willing to give up assets acquired at great cost: enrichment for Iran and consensus on
sanctions for the West. Both the sanctions regime and the nuclear program have become so wide-
ranging and multidimensional that they now constrain the two sides at the negotiation table.
Rouhani becomes president
On June 15, 2013, Hassan Rouhani, the most moderate of the presidential candidates considered
suitable to contest the election by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, won the presidential
elections with just over 50% of the vote.
Rouhani’s victory pleased the international community, raising hopes for a nuclear deal between
Iran and the P5+1. It also provided hope to a nation suffering a remarkable economic crisis as a
result of the sanctions imposed by Western powers in the dispute over its nuclear program.
Despite being the outside contender for president, Hassan Rouhani has been a key player in Iran's
political life since the revolution in 1979. He was an influential figure in Iran's establishment during
the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and subsequently held several important political posts.
From 1989 to 2005, Rouhani was secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the
top decision-making body in Iran, appointed by and answerable to the Supreme Leader. He also
served as deputy speaker of Parliament between 1996 and 2000 and in 1997 became a member of
the Expediency Council, the highest arbitration body on issues of legislation. In addition, Rouhani,
as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005, brought about the first and only nuclear
agreement with the West. He had resigned from the SNSC and from his role leading the nuclear
talks just weeks after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, amid sharp differences with the new
president.
Coming into office, Rouhani had a clear priority: Fix a distressed economy; he knew that Iran
needed relief from sanctions to revive its economy and that a more constructive negotiating
standpoint on the nuclear program would be needed to get that.
A provisional agreement
On September 25, 2013, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani delivered his first UN General Assembly
address:
Unjust sanctions, as manifestation of structural violence, are intrinsically inhumane and against
peace. The Iranian people, in a judiciously sober choice in the recent elections, voted for the
discourse of hope, foresight and prudent moderation – both at home and abroad. In foreign policy,
the combination of these elements means that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regional power,
will act responsibly with regard to regional and international security, and is willing and prepared
to cooperate in these fields, bilaterally as well as multilaterally, with other responsible actors.
Iran’s nuclear dossier is a case in point. As clearly stated by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution,
acceptance of the inalienable right of Iran constitutes the best and the easiest way of resolving this
issue. Put otherwise, Iran and other actors should pursue two common objectives as two mutually
inseparable parts of a political solution for the nuclear dossier of Iran.
Iran’s nuclear program – and for that matter, that of all other countries – must pursue exclusively
peaceful purposes. I declare here, openly and unambiguously, that, notwithstanding the positions of
others, this has been, and will always be, the objective of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense
doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions. Our national interests
make it imperative that we remove any and all reasonable concerns about Iran’s peaceful nuclear
program.
The second objective, that is, acceptance of and respect for the implementation of the right to
enrichment inside Iran and enjoyment of other related nuclear rights, provides the only path
towards achieving the first objective.
In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran, insisting on the implementation of its rights and the
imperative of international respect and cooperation in this exercise, is prepared to engage
immediately in time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and removal of
mutual uncertainties with full transparency.
On September 26, at the United Nations Headquarters, US Secretary of State John Kerry joined
talks with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s new foreign minister, and their counterparts from Russia,
China, Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, marking the highest-level formal contact between
American and Iranian envoys since the Iranian Revolution. The next day Barack Obama and Hassan
Rouhani held the first direct talk between American and Iranian leaders in 34 years.
On October 15, Iran, the P5+1, and the EU met in Geneva to hold their first formal negotiations
with the new Iranian team. Iran’s foreign minister, Muhammad Javad Zarif, presented a meticulous
“road map” suggesting that in return for limits on Iran’s nuclear program, there would be
recognition of its right to continue enriching uranium and relief from the sanctions crippling its
economy.
Zarif stated: Not only do we consider that Iran’s right to enrichment is unnegotiable, but we see no
need for that to be recognized as ‘a right’, because this right is inalienable and all countries must
respect that.
Both sides now knew just what the other wanted and where the red lines were drawn. They also
knew this may have been the last chance for a diplomatic solution to one of the world’s most
dangerous disputes. Both parties also had to overcome strong domestic opposition.
Barack Obama had to convince a skeptical Congress of the case for easing sanctions and in turn be
sensitive to any accusation from Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, that Obama was
willing to sign up even to a bad deal if it got him off the hook of having to decide whether to launch
a military strike.
On the other side, Rouhani had to defuse internal critics and ward off attacks from the
Revolutionary Guard and other conservative factions and maintain full backing from Iran’s supreme
leader, Ali Khamenei.
On November 24, 2013, the P5+1 and Iran reached a first‐step agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program, known in diplomatic language as the Joint Plan of Action, that covered only the next six
months, during which both sides would try to reach a final comprehensive agreement.
The United States government’s initial statement on the agreement is as follows:
Iran has agreed to halt enrichment of uranium above 5% purity; neutralize its stockpile of uranium
enriched to near 20% purity; stop building its stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium; forswear “next
generation centrifuges”; shut down its plutonium reactor; and allow extensive new inspections of
its nuclear facilities. In return, Iran will get “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible relief”
from international sanctions.
As President Obama put it, from the US point of view, the burden remains on Iran to prove to the
world that its nuclear program will be exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Framing the issue this way reflects the need to sell even a limited, temporary deal to a skeptical US
Congress. Both Republicans and Democrats threatened to pass a new round of tough sanctions
against Iran in December. Thus, Obama had to focus as much on pushing back against domestic
hardliners as on taking a hard line with Iranian negotiators.
On the other side, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had to marshal support for the deal just as
much as Obama did. The Iranian government’s announcement to its own people read roughly the
same, in reverse, focusing on the important concessions that Iranian negotiators won. Relief
included suspension of international sanctions on Iran’s exports of oil, gold, and cars, which could
yield $1.5 billion in revenue, unfreezing $4.2 billion in revenue from oil sales, and releasing tuition‐
assistance payments from the Iranian government to Iranian students enrolled abroad.
Just after the signing ceremony in Geneva on Sunday, President Rouhani declared that the world
had recognized his country’s nuclear rights.
According to the interim deal concluded, in return for six months of “limited, temporary…and
reversible” relief from some international sanctions, Iran would not just freeze its progress toward a
possible nuclear bomb, but actually take a few steps back. This, too, was limited, temporary, and
reversible.
Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that the effect of the deal is
to double the “breakout time” it would take Iran to produce enough material for a few nuclear
weapons, that before the deal this was estimated at perhaps six weeks, and was steadily shortening.
Interim agreement
On January 20, 2014, the IAEA said its inspectors in Iran had confirmed that Iranian officials had
complied with their commitments: suspending the production of 20%-enriched uranium, disabling
thousands of centrifuges used to make that fuel, and beginning to convert its stockpile into a much
less potent form that cannot be weaponized.
In return, it received what the United States called limited, targeted, and reversible sanctions relief.
After nearly four months of talks, there has been little concrete progress. On May 17, 2014, Gary
Samore, Barack Obama’s senior adviser on arms control for four years, stated that four major
outstanding obstacles hindered an agreement: settling on the extent of Iran’s capacity to enrich
uranium and the kind of research it can do, the length of time an agreement would cover, the way in
which sanctions are unwound, and the implementation of a rigorous and verifiable inspections
system.
The distance between the P5+1 and the Iranian negotiators on all four points was wide. To sell a
deal to a skeptical Congress, already uncomfortable with conceding what Iran insists is its right
under the Non Proliferation Treaty to enrich, only a very low number of centrifuges would be
acceptable; people close to the talks suggested between 3,000 and 4,000 of the older IR-1
centrifuges at most. However, Iran wanted to keep all 19,000 of the centrifuges it had already
deployed and to substitute the current IR-1s models with newer IR-2ms that are six times more
efficient. It would also disregard any restriction on its nuclear research and development (R&D).
According to Mr. Samore, the requirement for Mr. Obama’s team, is to be able to say that the
breakout period (the time Iran needs to enrich enough uranium for just one nuclear device) is at
least a year, compared with about two months now. It would be politically impossible in America to
sell anything less.
The West was looking for an accord with Iran to last between 10 and 20 years. Iran was talking
about five years as an absolute maximum, after which it would be treated as a normal Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory.
The Americans and Iranians also contrasted over the sequencing of sanctions relief. The Iranians
argued that, once an agreement was reached, all sanctions should be removed permanently. The UN
and European Union might have accepted that, but the Americans would not. The best Obama could
offer was to use his “national-security waiver” to suspend sanctions, perhaps indefinitely. However,
he could not remove the legislation without Congress’s support.
Last, Iranian officials were still reticent to accept any commitment on rigorous and verifiable
inspections.
For their part, Mr. Zarif and President Rohani were under pressure from hardliners at home who
believed they had already given too much ground. Yet the clock was ticking for both sides.
Obama’s presidency was coming to an end, the Republicans were going to regain control of the
Senate in November’s midterm election, and Democrats were increasingly reticent to be viewed as
“soft on Iran.”
As a result, the US Congress appeared to grow more hostile toward a deal; actually, the longer it
took to conclude a final agreement, the more likely Congress was to sink it.
On July 25, 2014, after nearly three weeks of round-the-clock negotiations to achieve a
comprehensive nuclear agreement, the P5+1 and Iran chose to extend the current agreement for four
months and continue negotiations.
The talks were deadlocked mostly as a result of brinkmanship ahead of the July 20 deadline: Both
the P5+1 and Iran put forward maximalist positions hoping to compel their rival to concede at the
last minute, seemed shocked by the other side’s obstinacy, and, instead of exploring realistic
solutions, accused one another of making unrealistic demands.
On November 24, with a deadline approaching, the talks still appeared to be marked by a heavy
dose of brinkmanship; profound differences between the two sides were still evident.
According to one EU official involved in the negotiations, technical issues are not the main
problem. In the end, both sides are constrained by hard-liners at home.
Iranians close to Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that the main stumbling block is how quickly UN
and Western economic sanctions would be phased out, given the inability of the United States to
guarantee a full lifting of sanctions after the Democratic party lost control of the Senate in
America’s midterm election.
In Kerry’s view, the main obstacles remaining were the size and scope of Iran’s uranium
enrichment program and that any agreement to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only
to generate nuclear power, and not to make atomic bombs, could not be based only on trust; it had
to be verified.
At the end of the meeting, the negotiators gave themselves another four months to reach an outline
political deal and three more to get the comprehensive agreement.
In the meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear program remained frozen.
On January 28, 2015, Obama stated that he will not tolerate what he sees as congressional plans to
pull the rug out from under his diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear standoff.
The American president believed there was no strategic logic in levying more sanctions at that point
and that such a move risked destroying a functional interim agreement that both sides had honored
and that had set significant limits on Iran’s nuclear work.
Moreover, new measures at that point risked splitting the P5+1 coalition and would likely have
strengthened hardliners in Tehran.
The foreign ministers of the UK, France, and Germany, along with the EU high representative,
warned that additional pressure now could fracture the international coalition that has made
sanctions effective so far.
Finally, if such measures were passed over the objections of the White House, they would intensify
Iranian doubts regarding Obama’s ability to deliver on sanctions relief that would be part of a final
nuclear deal.
On March 3, 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of Congress, invited
by Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner. The speech represented a good guide to
how the Iran debate could develop in American domestic politics in the coming months.
Because Iran's nuclear program would be left largely intact, Iran's break-out time would be very
short -- about a year by U.S. assessment, even shorter by Israel's.
True, certain restrictions would be imposed on Iran's nuclear program and Iran's adherence to
those restrictions would be supervised by international inspectors. But here's the problem. You see,
inspectors document violations; they don't stop them.
In an interview after Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech at the US Congress, Mr. Zarif said the
Israeli leader’s position was absurd: Netanyahu has become everyone’s nonproliferation guru,
while sitting on 400 nuclear warheads.
The March 31 deadline passed without an agreement. The current biggest obstacle to a deal is the
principle described by Western negotiators as distrust and verify; implementing an enhanced
additional protocol of an inspection and verification regime is regarded as crucial because of Iran’s
long history of cheating and deception.
In practice, this means that inspectors from the IAEA would have the right to inspect any facility
(declared or otherwise, civil or military) on demand (without notice or reason). The expression that
has been used to describe this is “Additional Protocol Plus.”
On April 2, more than 42 hours after the deadline had passed for reaching a framework agreement
between the P5+1 and Iran to constrain its nuclear program in return for the lifting of sanctions, the
negotiators came up with a broad interim document outlining the parameters for a comprehensive
agreement to be concluded by June 30.
The document went into enough detail that the Obama administration should have been able to
persuade a skeptical Congress to postpone a vote on new sanctions when it returned on April 14.
The deal reached in Lausanne should extend Iran’s “breakout capability” from a couple of months
currently to at least a year and do so for a decade or more. To that end, Iran will reduce its installed
enrichment centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000, only 5,000 of which will be spinning. All of them will
be first-generation centrifuges.
Fordow, Iran’s second enrichment facility (its main one is at Natanz) buried deep within a mountain
and thought to be impregnable to conventional air strikes, will cease all enrichment and be turned
into a physics research center. It will not produce or house any fissile material for at least 15 years.
Iran will reduce its low enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile from 10,000 kg to 300 kg for the next 15
years, probably sending fresh stocks to Russia for reprocessing.
Most important, under the terms of the framework agreement, inspectors from the IAEA will be
able to inspect any facility, declared or otherwise, as long as it is deemed to be “suspicious.” These
powers for the IAEA will remain in place indefinitely.
Comprehensive agreement
In their November 24, 2013, interim agreement, the P5+1 and Iran had not yet come to an
understanding on the nature of Iran’s nuclear energy “rights,” but they recognized that Iran already
had a nuclear enrichment program and would be firm on retaining some enrichment capacity.
A comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue alone has been compared to a Rubik’s cube, a
multifaceted puzzle in which moving one piece displaces others and is solved only when all pieces
simultaneously fall into place (International Crisis Group, 2014).
On July 14, after 19 days of non-stop negotiations, a final and comprehensive deal was reached.
On vital issue concerning the verification regime is that it looks as if Iran has both withdrawn its
objections to the IAEA carrying out investigations. What has been agreed is a form of so-called
“managed access.” Inspectors will not be able to conduct “anywhere, anytime” visits. Instead, they
will have to give grounds for their concerns about prohibited activities and give the Iranians an
opportunity to address them before access is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this
must take place within two weeks. Refusal by Iran to provide inspectors access that persists for
more than another week would be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore subject to
reimposition of sanctions.
American officials said the core of the agreement lies in the restrictions on the amount of nuclear
fuel that Iran can keep for the next 15 years. The current stockpile of low-enriched uranium will be
reduced by 98%, most likely by shipping much of it to Russia. That limit, combined with a two-
thirds reduction in the number of its centrifuges, would extend to a year the “breakout time” (the
amount of time it would take Iran to make enough material for a single bomb should it abandon the
accord and race for a weapon). By comparison, analysts say Iran now has a breakout time of two to
three months.
However, the deal left open areas that are sure to raise fierce objections in Congress. It preserves
Iran’s ability to produce as much nuclear fuel as it wishes after year 15 of the agreement and allows
it to conduct research on advanced centrifuges after year 8. Moreover, the Iranians won the eventual
lifting of an embargo on the import and export of conventional arms and ballistic missiles.
Diplomats also came up with the unusual procedure to “snap back” the sanctions against Iran if an
eight member panel determined that Tehran was violating the nuclear conditions. The members of
the panel are Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, the European Union, and
Iran itself. A majority vote is required, meaning that Russia, China, and Iran cannot collectively
block action.
Speaking after the agreement, Barack Obama stated that the agreement was not built on trust, but on
verification. This deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that we established when we
achieved a framework this spring. Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off, and the inspection
and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place.
He also warned his opponents in Washington: So I will veto any legislation that prevents the
successful implementation of this deal. We do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict.
And we certainly shouldn't seek it. And precisely because the stakes are so high this is not the time
for politics or posturing. Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems. Put simply, no deal
means a greater chance of more war in the Middle East.
He added: Judge me on one thing: Does this deal prevent Iran from breaking out with a nuclear
weapon for the next 10 years and is that a better outcome for America, Israel, and our Arab allies
than any other alternative on the table?
The deal now had to be endorsed by the UN Security Council, which was expected to issue a new
resolution before the end of July.
In the meantime, the accord must be reviewed by the US Congress and the Iranian Majlis
(parliament).
Congress has 60 days to review and approve or reject the deal. On the Iranian side, the parliament
agreed on an 80-day review period on July 21. The Iranian parliament can also vote to reject the
agreement.
Republican presidential candidates are uniformly against the deal and have promised to make it a
fundamental part of the coming campaign. Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker called it one of America’s
worst diplomatic failures. South Carolina Sen. Lindsay Graham described it as far worse than I
ever dreamed it could be. Republicans in the Senate will seek Democratic allies in the coming
months in an effort to block the deal. In contrast, Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the
Democratic front-runner, is supporting the deal: It is an important step in putting the lid on Iran’s
nuclear program.
The struggle between Congress and the White House is likely to be tough; Obama has promised to
veto any congressional effort to change the agreement, and to get the two-thirds majority required to
overturn Obama’s veto, Republicans need to persuade at least 13 Senate Democrats and 44 House
Democrats to vote with them and against their president’s most important foreign policy
achievement.
On July 21, Mr. Kerry defended the deal before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The accord is the best that could be achieved and without it, the international sanctions regime
would collapse.
If the U.S., after laboriously negotiating this multilateral agreement with five other partners, were
to walk away from those partners, we’re on our own. A congressional rejection of the accord,
would amount to “a great big green light for Iran to double the pace of its uranium enrichment,
proceed full speed ahead with a heavy water reactor, install new and more efficient centrifuges,
and do it all without the unprecedented inspection and transparency measures that we have
secured”.
The belief in some sort of unicorn arrangement involving Iran’s complete capitulation is a fantasy,
plain and simple.
As Kerry defended the deal, President Hassan Rouhani of Iran told his own domestic critics that the
alternative would be an economic “Stone Age.”
Those calling on Congress to reject the deal argue that the United States could have gotten a better
deal, and still could, if the US unilaterally ramped up existing sanctions, enough to force Iran to
dismantle its entire nuclear program or even alter the character of its regime wholesale.
However, turning down the deal is more dangerous than moving forward with it because this was
not a bilateral American negotiation with Iran. It was an Iranandtheworld negotiation, with all five
permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany representing the latter.
The overwhelming global majority considers the deal fair and good. The United Nations Security
Council welcomed it unanimously.
On September 10, Senate Democrats delivered a major victory to President Obama when they
blocked a Republican resolution to reject a six-nation nuclear accord with Iran, ensuring the
breakthrough deal would take effect without a veto showdown between Congress and the White
House.
On October 13, the Majlis passed a motion to approve the nuclear deal with 161 yes votes, 59 no
votes, and 13 abstentions among the 250 members of parliament (MPs) present at the session.
On October 18, the deal was officially adopted by all its international signatories and the UN
Security Council. The US, EU, and UN issued the waivers and regulations necessary for the lifting
of economic and financial sanctions, but whose implementation is contingent upon IAEA
verification that Iran has successfully met its commitments.
On January 16, 2016, the IAEA reported that Iran has successfully met its commitments. On the
implementation day, the US and EU lifted oil and financial sanctions on Iran and released roughly
$100 billion of its assets after the IAEA inspectors concluded that Iran had fulfilled requirements to
limit its nuclear activities.
Findings from the application of the framework

We can apply the four basic and the three contextual factors of our framework to the negotiations
between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program.
Key Players
First, we identify and classify the key players (Crystal, 2008).
Level one players: Iran, the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (US, France, UK,
China, Russia) plus Germany (P5+1). The European Union. Specifically, the seven level one
players are the foreign ministers of the countries represented at the negotiation table: Javad Zarif
(Iran), John Kerry (US), Laurent Fabius (France), Philip Hammond (UK), Wang Yi (China), Sergei
Lavrov, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany). Federica Mogherini (EU).
Level two players: President Obama, the Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Rouhani, Sultan
Qaboos of Oman, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the IAEA, the United Nations Security Council, the US
Congress, the Iranian Parliament and the IRGC.
Level three players: international companies willing to enter the Iranian market, the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, the
Islamic State (ISIS).
Among Level 1 players, Iran and the US have the most influence and assertiveness level.
Among Level 2 players, Khamenei and President Obama, have the highest influence and
assertiveness level. The US Congress, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the IRGC have slightly less
influence, but the same assertiveness level.
On a political spectrum (Pruitt, 2005), the Hawks are represented by Israel, Saudi Arabia, the US
Congress, the IRGC.
Among the Moderates we can arguably include the Supreme Leader Khamenei, the IAEA, Russia,
China and the United Nations.
The Doves can be possibly represented by John Kerry, Javad Zarif, President Obama and President
Rouhani, the EU and Sultan Qaboos.
The attempt to isolate the nuclear issue from the multiple and overlapping regional crises, leaving
the talks and implementation of any agreement arising from them vulnerable to obstruction by
players with interests but without a seat at the table (specifically, among others, Israel and Saudi
Arabia).
Interests and constraints

Europe has a good opportunity to vindicate itself by committing to a united, coherent, and effective
foreign policy. Furthermore, The EU yearns to lessen its dependence on Russian gas imports and
Iran has even richer reserves of gas than it does of oil.
Israel has long identified the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat and Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu has made Iran’s nuclear program his highest foreign policy priority. Israel has
consistently argued that diplomacy will only succeed if it is accompanied by a credible military
threat.
Sunni‐ruled Saudi Arabia is the regional power competing most directly with Shia Iran for regional
influence. Riyadh has long made clear through its diplomacy with Washington that it vehemently
opposes Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and will respond in kind if this comes to pass.
Turkey’s main objective is to prevent a military intervention against Iran that would destabilize the
region further.
While censuring Iran for past violations, the IAEA has not hesitated to mention its more recent
cooperation; its head, Mohamed ElBaradei, has labeled the nuclear activities “suspicious” and
expressed concern about intentions, but nevertheless consistently insisted on the absence of
conclusive evidence of a concealed weapons program and on the necessity of sustained diplomacy
and negotiations.
The United Nations Security Council is charged with the maintenance of international peace and
security. The Security Council consists of 15 members. The great powers that were the victors of
World War II, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States, serve as the
body's five permanent members. These permanent members can veto any substantive Security
Council resolution. The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members. Critics of the
council argue that it has failed in its principal task, mainly because of the veto power of the
permanent members.
Russia and China have adopted broadly similar positions. Their approach reflects delicate balancing
between their relationship with the US and growing economic ties to Iran.
Throughout the nuclear crisis, the US and some of its EU partners have periodically invoked the
threat of UN Security Council-mandated sanctions in the hope this might spur a concession.
However, assembling Security Council support so far has proved difficult, with both Russia and
China pursuing a delay-and-weaken strategy with regard to UN sanctions by focusing on the
importance of a negotiated settlement.
President Obama devised a strategy aimed at progressively raising the difficulty and cost to Tehran
of crossing the nuclear threshold. He repeatedly stated that the United States will not allow Iran to
obtain nuclear weapons and that “all options are on the table” to prevent this outcome. According to
him, the military option is on the table, but war must be the last resort.
Any conceivable agreement with Iran involves lifting economic sanctions, and President Obama
cannot remove sanctions without Congress’s support.
In 2014, with 247 seats in the House of Representatives and 54 seats in the Senate, this Congress
began with the largest Republican majority in recent history and has been raising fierce objections
to the deal, threatening additional sanctions to compel Iran to relinquish its uranium enrichment
strategy.
Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the monarch of Oman since 1970, reportedly played a key role in
facilitating the secret US-Iran talks. As early as 2009, according to Wikileaks, the sultanate offered
to arrange talks between the US and Iran – which hadn’t had diplomatic relations for 30 years.
A former US official estimated that in all, about 9 or 10 secret US-Iran bilateral meetings were held
in Oman over the nine months between the March 2013 Oman meeting and reaching the interim
Iran nuclear deal in November 2013.
The 290 members of the Majlis, or parliament, are elected by popular vote every four years. The
parliament has the power to introduce and pass laws, as well as to summon and impeach ministers
or the president.
The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the revolution to protect the new leaders and institutions
and to fight those opposing the revolution. It has a powerful presence in other institutions and
controls volunteer militias with branches in every town.
The constitution describes the president as the second-highest ranking official in the country.
However, presidential powers are circumscribed by two main competing centers of authority and
influence. On one side is the Supreme Leader who is the nation’s most powerful figure, possessing
in particular final say on key appointments and policies, most notably in the foreign arena. On the
other side, presidential prerogatives are constrained by the legislative powers granted to the
Parliament (majles). The current Iranian President, Rouhani, has several advantages over his
predecessors. The first is his long history of direct work with the Supreme Leader.
The second is Rouhani’s long experience as a consensus-builder, what he has described as
coordinating and at times mediating factional and inter-agency disputes
The role of Supreme Leader in the constitution is based on the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini, who
positioned the leader at the top of Iran's political power structure. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei is
the single most powerful individual in a highly factionalized, autocratic regime.
Javad Zarif is Iran’s foreign minister. He is an American-educated former ambassador to the UN
who was part of a cadre of technocrats referred to in the Iranian press as “the New Yorkers”.
According to a former Iranian diplomat, Zarif has focused on maintaining good relations with John
Kerry, his US counterpart. Insiders say that Mr. Zarif has put his diplomatic skills to good use at
home, too, ensuring that he kept close relations with Ayatollah Khamenei, who gave the foreign
minister unfettered access.
John Kerry, former Senator, and former Presidential candidate, has been a strong promoter of the
agreement since its early days as US secretary of State
Perceived Power
Whatever the reality, Iran has consistently asserted that it can live without a deal.
According to Gareth Evans, former foreign minister of Australia, the question, then, is why has Iran
walked the precipice for so long by building a visible breakout capability bound to spook the West,
Israel, and its Arab neighbors? The answer, I believe, is overwhelmingly national pride – its
peoples’ desire to demonstrate that Iran is a power to be reckoned with, a country that has
impressive technical prowess, and that there are limits to its willingness to suffer international
humiliation.
Tehran has worked to improve its no-deal options and worsen those of the United States, such as by
pursuing deals to circumvent sanctions, pressing its campaign for influence in the Middle East as
the talks proceeded, and pursuing enrichment.
In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Foreign Minister Zarif argued: When sanctions started, Iran had
less than 200 centrifuges. Today Iran has 19,000 centrifuges; so the net product of the sanctions
has been about 18,800 centrifuges.
Iran continuously defied the UN Security Council resolutions and continued enrichment, despite
tougher sanctions. This act of withdrawing from the Additional Protocol and resuming uranium
enrichment, increasing the number of centrifuges to 19,000 from 200, similar to the continuation of
the war with Iraq and Operation Karbala in the late 1980s, gave Iran a full array of options at the
negotiations table, even as it resulted in greater economic pressure.
Meanwhile, the US has tried to raise progressively the difficulty and cost to Tehran of crossing the
nuclear threshold. However, trying to force Iran to back down with steadily mounting sanctions has
not produced results. Furthermore, the US administration has repeatedly emphasized the dangers of
a military conflict undermining its best alternative to no deal.
Michael Mandelbaum, a Johns Hopkins University foreign policy specialist, writing in The
American Interest, said:
In the current negotiations the United States is far stronger than Iran, yet it is the United States that
has made major concessions. After beginning the negotiations by insisting that the Tehran regime
relinquish all its suspect enrichment facilities and cease all its nuclear activities relevant to making
a bomb, the Obama administration has ended by permitting Iran to keep virtually all of those
facilities and continue some of those activities.
Surely the main reason is that, while there is a vast disparity in power between the two parties, the
United States is not willing to use the ultimate form of power and the Iranian leaders know this.
For Iran, the nuclear program is worth almost any sacrifice because it guarantees the regime’s
survival against external threats, as America’s differing policies toward Libya, Iraq and North
Korea illustrate.
Of all the justifications the regime could invoke to pursue its nuclear program, those provided by
the Americans were the most effective by far. Aside from Iran, two countries belonged to Bush’s
“axis of evil”: Iraq and North Korea. The former did not possess a nuclear weapon; the latter did.
Iraq was invaded, its regime overthrown, its territory occupied. Meanwhile, the US is seeking to
negotiate with North Korea. What conclusions do you think the Iranian regime would have drawn
from this?
To increase its no deal option, Iran used diplomacy on the nuclear issue as a means of dissipating
pressure and buying time for the nuclear program to advance.
For example, on May 17, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey
announced a deal with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, on the country's controversial
nuclear program.
According to UN officials, a broad sanctions deal was very close. Russia had recently joined
America in sending a stronger signal that Iran must stop enrichment, as the UN Security Council
demanded.
This would have left only China in a position to veto sanctions, and China has traditionally not liked
to veto alone. According to analysts, Iran may have successfully reiterated its recurrent strategy of
widening divisions between the countries preparing to approve a comprehensive set of sanctions.
The no deal option for the US is a military attack.
In September 2012, however, more than 30 former high-ranking U.S. officials and military officers
endorsed a report concluding that a sustained military strike on Iran by the United States would
only set back Iran’s nuclear program up to four years. An attack would likely be a route to a
nuclear-armed Iran. Even if it could take out all of Iran’s many nuclear sites, bombing cannot
destroy nuclear know-how. Instead the programme would go underground, beyond the reach of
monitors and subsequently increase Iran’s motivation to build nuclear weapons to inhibit any
future attack.
Moreover, because most facilities are dispersed throughout the country and, on the basis of Iran’s
track record, it can be assumed that they include clandestine facilities, it is unlikely that a sustained
military attack could destroy the nuclear program. Iran has dispersed, hidden and buried its
numerous facilities and some sites, including Natanz, are up to 75 feet underground.
To attack Iran in this way would make sense only if it were thought likely that a friendlier Iranian
regime would then emerge. However, Iran has no obvious, friendly government-in-waiting and the
country could strike back by closing the oil choke point of the Strait of Hormuz or hitting American
or Israeli interests. Furthermore, Israel is well within range of Iranian missiles.
A senior Iranian official said, an attack on Iran will condemn the region to more confusion and
more risks. It will unify our humiliated people. Don’t try to imagine what Iran’s reaction might be.
Just look back in time and remember the sacrifices that were made during the war with Iraq.
Design of the Game
Iran’s nuclear strategy is based on three schemes:
1. Using diplomacy on the nuclear issue as a means of dissipating pressure and buying time for
the nuclear program to advance. Tehran exploited diplomatic due process to maximum effect,
using tactics such as agreeing to talks then withdrawing and moving away from previous
agreements and suggesting different proposals more welcome to the regime. Over this period,
Iran’s nuclear program made considerable progress.
2. Gaining the support of members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by reframing the
debate and shifting the focus away from treaty non-compliance to a general discussion of rights
and entitlements under the NPT. Specifically, Iran has worked to establish the principle of the
right to enrichment and to demonstrate that this right is irreversible and inalienable.
3. Intensifying trade and political relations with China and Russia to partially mitigate the effects
of economic sanctions. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian support in the UN Security Council
has weakened the broader response to Iran’s nuclear non-cooperation.
On the other side the US has managed to assemble a coherent international coalition, including
Europe, China, Russia, and rising powers like India and South Korea, that has made sanctions
effective so far.
The difficult part for both the parties has been convincing the respective elites back home to accept
the deal on the table. The real negotiations arguably took place in Tehran and Washington, not
Geneva.
Mr. Kerry’s position was complicated by the Republican midterm election victory and the fear of
feeding the narrative that Obama was a weakened president; Congress seemed reluctant to approve
anything negotiated by the White House. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, for his part, faced
opposition from conservatives, specifically the IRGC, even though a deal promised to relieve
economic and regional pressures.
The bottom line is that if the United States walks away from the deal and tries to apply additional
pressure, the sanctions regime will crumble, and Iran will achieve much of the economic relief it
seeks and be freed to pursue its nuclear program with none of the restraints it accepted.
Trust
Besides the two crucial events have created this persistent mutual hostility, a history of mutual
suspicion threatened the negotiations. The West, in light of Iran’s record of concealing its nuclear
activities prior to 2003 and obfuscation of IAEA investigations, deemed Tehran’s intentions
suspect; since its nuclear know-how cannot be erased, its capabilities must be constrained.
It is through this perspective that the P5+1 justified treating Iran differently than other NPT member
states, placing the burden on Iran to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and insisting
on retaining sanctions leverage.
Iran in turn felt that the West discriminated by demanding that it, solely among NPT parties, prove
a negative: that it has no intention to acquire nuclear weapons.
It also suspected the West of seeking to diminish its nuclear program as part of a larger design to
subvert its regime. Given the enormous cost it has paid for its nuclear program, Tehran demanded
significant Western reciprocation for any concession on its nuclear achievements.
Ripeness
The real constellation of factors that made the framework agreement possible is more nuanced than
either side is prepared to admit. First, the key players seemingly realized that the status quo was
unsustainable and that prolonging the stalemate risked eroding their positions.
Second and foremost, both sides understood that there will never be better timing to achieve a
comprehensive deal. The timeframe between Rouhani becoming president and Obama ending his
second term represented a chance that had to be exploited; moreover, in February 2016, Rouhani
must also face Iranian parliamentary elections.
Under the terms of the November 2013 temporary agreement, Iran’s program is frozen and the
sanctions are in place. However, for President Obama keeping Congress on board, the sanctions
coalition together, and the Iranians at the table may have been impossible with further delays.
On the other side, conservatives around Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were looking for
any signs that Rouhani and his Americanized chief negotiator, Mr. Zarif, were ready to give away
too much nuclear infrastructure without getting Iran the sanctions lifted in return.
Rouhani, needed to quickly deliver a deal promised to relieve economic and regional pressures.
Never before had there been so much political will among so many on both sides, and a clear
channel for communicating it.
Justice and Fairness

From Iran’s perspective, real engagement must be built on four pillars:
1. Respecting Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Respecting the Islamic regime
3. Acknowledging Iran’s regional role
4. The nuclear file as a test case
From the regime’s standpoint, a key point in this respect will be whether the US eventually accepts
Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil and the extent to which it breaks from its predecessor’s
approach–namely, threatening increased sanctions or worse in the event of continued enrichment.
Furthermore, any resumption of formal relations between the US and Iran will require a sorting out
of the web of financial claims and counter claims linked to the frozen pre-revolutionary assets.
On November 14, 1979, 10 days after American Embassy personnel in Teheran were taken hostage,
President Jimmy Carter froze all Iranian assets in US banks and subsidiaries overseas.
Because of the difficulty of taking inventory of private accounts, the US Treasury could only
estimate the total of the assets frozen in 1979 at between $10 billion and $12 billion.
Discussion
The purpose of this study is to define and validate a framework, which integrates and expands
previous theoretical models, based on four basic elements and two contextual factors, for
understanding and analyzing the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program.
As a first step, we proposed a model organized around four universal and basic elements:
1. Key players
2. Interests and constraints
3. Perceived Power
4. Design of the game
The four basic elements are combined with three contextual factors that can help in better
understanding and analyzing the specific negotiation process:
5. Trust
6. Ripeness
7. Justice and fairness
In the last section of the paper, we first identified and mapped the key players ( stage 1 of the
framework). We categorized level one, level two and level three players, identified critical players
in the negotiation, and assessed their position according to their level of influence, assertiveness,
and support (Crystal, 2008; Pruitt, 2005; Rana, 2014; Sebenius, 2006).
Then we identified the interests, constraints and concerns of each party. (Sebenius, 2006; Susskind
et al., 2005) and highlighted their alternatives to a negotiated agreement (Lewicki, 2003; Sebenius,
2005; Susskind, 2005).
We also showed how the main parties tried different strategies to design the game, by creating
alliances, change the negotiation set up, and building alternatives (Lax & Sebenius, 2003).
We displayed how Trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013) was lost during the early stage of the
negotiations,
Then, we applied the concept of Ripeness (Zartman, 2001; Pruitt, 2005) to the negotiations,
determining the reasons why the conflict was ripe for resolution
Last, we introduced the concept of Justice and Fairness (Albin, 2001) and how the different parties
perceive differently what is just and what is fair in the specific negotiations.
The proposed framework has useful implications for research and management:
1. It integrates and develops previous theoretical models (Crump & Glendon, 2003; Crystal,
2008; Lax & Sebenius, 2003; Lewicki et al., 2014; Rana, 2014; Sebenius, 2006; Susskind et
al., 2005; Watkins, 2003; Zartman, 2000): The framework is based on previous theoretical
models, overcoming some of their weaknesses and providing a comprehensive theory to
understand and analyze complex international negotiations.
2. It provides a comprehensive framework for understanding and analyzing multiparty
international negotiations: The framework, organized around four basic and universal
elements and two contextual factors, offers a practical tool to evaluate and describe the
outcome of the specific negotiation between Iran and the P5+1. By changing the contextual
factors, the framework can be easily adapted to understand and analyze most complex
international negotiations.
3. It reduces the complexity and uncertainty inherent in multiparty negotiations: The different
factors of the framework identify and isolate many of the potential number of interactive
variables involved in multiparty international negotiations, providing an adequate theory to
reduce the number of potential interactions among these different variables, and categorizing
the different players involved in the negotiation.
Nevertheless, the study faces at least one methodological and two conceptual limitations, which
provide opportunities for further research:
1. The cases study is mainly based on secondary data, which must be carefully scrutinized and
“triangulated” to ensure its validity and reliability.
2. The distinction between basic and contextual factors, reduces the generality of the
framework.
3. The framework is a simplification of a complex process, used to understand and make

predictions of real world international negotiations. This simplification can lead to
neglecting the influence of important variables and their interactions.
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The Iran Nuclear Negotiations

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The Iranian nuclear negotiations

The Iranian nuclear negotiations: Overcoming four decades of enmity

Neglob, Catholic University – Milan, Italy

Figure 2. Mapping the players involved in the negotiation.

Hawks Moderates Doves Doves Moderates Hawks

2. Interests and constraints (Sebenius, 2006; Susskind et al., 2005)

3. Perceived Power (Lewicki, 2003; Sebenius, 2005; Susskind, 2005)

4. Design of the game (Lax & Sebenius, 2003)

5. Trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013)

6. Ripeness (Zartman, 2001; Pruitt, 2005)

7. Justice and Fairness (Albin, 2001)

Grand Bargain Offer

Findings from the application of the framework

Interests and constraints

Justice and Fairness

3. The framework is a simplification of a complex process, used to understand and make

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