Philosophy 1C, Introduction to Ethics Professor Cole

Background Info on Kant: Some Humean Claims about Morality

To understand the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), you have to understand that Kant
was in many respects reacting to the moral philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776), and that Hume
himself was essentially trying to overturn a conception of morality popular since the time of Plato
(428-348 bce).

Plato held a view according to which morally right actions were those that issued from a well-
ordered (or virtuous) soul. And, according to Plato, a soul is well-ordered when each part of the soul
was performing its proper function; that is, each part of the soul was performing the function for which
it was most properly suited.

According to Plato, the human soul is a complex entity divided into three parts:

1. The rational component (our faculty of reason)

2. The appetitive component (our desires/passions/inclinations)
3. The spirited component (our emotions)

Don’t let the terminology worry you. You do not have to believe in “souls” to see what Plato is getting
at. The idea is that human nature is complex. We are rational creatures, but we are also creatures with
animal appetites and spirits. We can reason through things, and form beliefs as a result of that
reasoning. But we also desire or want things. We desire food, shelter, love, friendship, and happiness.
And we are emotional creatures. We get angry, sad, jealous, and so on.

Now Plato also held that:

a. There can be internal conflict in the soul—the different parts of the soul my pull is in very
different directions at times. (e.g., our desires might pull is one direction, but reason pulls us
in another). [see example below]
and
b. The function of reason is to determine what is best for the soul—to guide our actions.

Suppose for example, that I am to have a surgery, but in order for the surgery to get well, it is essential
that I fast for 24 hours prior to the surgery. Presumably, at some point in time I will get hungry; that
is, I will desire food. But do I eat it? No! Despite the fact that I desire the food, I refrain from eating
it. But why? According to Plato, this is a case where reason steps in. Through reason I recognize that
giving in to the desire and eating the food would not be the best thing for me. Thus, reason steps in
and prevents me from acting on the desire.

Or suppose that a student makes me angry. I may desire to hit the student but refrain from doing so.
Why? Because, according to Plato, reason steps in and prevents me from doing so. Through a process
of reasoning I recognize that if I were to punch the student, things would likely turn out very bad for
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me. So, reason steps in and prevents me from acting out of anger.
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Philosophy 1C, Introduction to Ethics Professor Cole

So. Plato claims that…

Morally right actions are the result of (or issue from) a well-ordered soul;
and that…
A soul is well-ordered which each part does that for which it is most properly suited;
and that…
The function of reason is to determine what is best for the soul—to guide our conduct.

Thus, Plato believed that…

One is acting morally rightly just to the extent that reason is guiding her actions.

This picture of morality, that reason is in charge, and that morality is within the providence of reason,
was dominant until the time of David Hume. Hume thought that philosophers greatly over exaggerated
the powers of reason. Hume did more or less agree with Plato’s division of “the soul” into various
components (at least the rational and appetitive), but Hume disagreed about what component was (or
even could be) in charge. Hume writes…

“Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of
passion and reason, to give preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as
they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, it is said, is obliged to regulate
his actions by reason…On this method thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient
and modern, seems to be founded. In order to show the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall
endeavor to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and
secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.” (Hume, pg. 132)

Thus, in a Treatise of Human Nature (Book II, Part III, Section III), Hume argues for the following two
theses:

(T1) Reason alone cannot motivate action.

(T2) Reason alone cannot prevent a passion (desire) from motivating action.

Argument for (T1): (in 2nd and 3rd paragraph)

1. Reason produces beliefs and nothing else.

2. Beliefs alone cannot motivate action.
3. So, reason alone cannot motivate action.

According to Hume, the sole function of reason is to produce beliefs. But beliefs by themselves have
no practical significance. They cannot motivate action. For example, reason may lead me to believe
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that 15% of 10 is 1.5. But what will this belief cause? Nothing! The belief by itself is motivational
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inept. It does not, by itself, have the power to cause anything. However, suppose that I wanted to
Philosophy 1C, Introduction to Ethics Professor Cole

leave a 15% tip for a $10 dinner. Then, my belief that 15% 0f 10 = 1.5, together with my desire to
leave a 15% tip would cause me to leave $1.50. But notice, that it is only in the presence of some
relevant desire that the belief will lead to action!

According to the basic Humean Picture of Action, all action stems from a belief/desire pair:

Desire: for e
+ will lead to a-ing
Belief: I can get e by a-ing action

As another example, reason may supply me with the belief that six divided by three is two. But what
will that belief by itself cause me to do? Nothing! Beliefs alone do not motivate us to do anything.
But now suppose I wanted to divide 6 pieces of candy equally amongst three people. Well, my desire
to share the candy equally, together with my belief that six divided by three is two, will result in
action—viz., my giving two pieces of candy to each person. But again notice that it is only in the
presence of the relevant desire that action results. Reason may lead me to believe that I can distribute
the candy equally by giving two pieces to each person; but unless I have a desire to share my candy,
that belief will not result in action (my sharing the candy).

Thus, According to Hume, Reason produces the belief about how to satisfy the desire, but the
motivation comes from the desire. No action gets its motivation solely from reason. The passions (i.e.,
desires) determines what my goals are, and reason merely tells me how to satisfy them. According to
Hume, “Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.”

Hume takes the foregoing to establish (T1), that reason cannot motivate action. According to Hume,
reason produces beliefs, and nothing else. However beliefs are causally inept. They have no causal
powers. Thus, reason cannot motivate. But, if reason cannot motivate action, then it also cannot
prevent a passion from motivating action. That is, (T2) must be true as well. Since reason has no
power to “push” or motivate you in any direction, it cannot “push” or motivate in way opposed to
desire. The only thing that can oppose a desire is…another desire! So, when I refrain from eating
prior to the surgery (even though I want to), it is not because reason prevents me from doing so, but
rather because I have a stronger desire: The desire for a successful surgery!

From the foregoing, Hume concludes that moral judgments (e.g, judgments of the form: ‘it is wrong to
do x’, or ‘you ought to do x’) are not a product of reason. That is, we do not arrive at our moral
judgments by any kind of process of reasoning.

But assuming that Hume is right in thinking that reason can neither motivate action nor prevent a
passion from motivating action, how does this support the conclusion that morality is not within the
providence of reason? Because, argues Hume, Moral judgments ARE intrinsically motivational. In
other words, if you sincerely judge that stealing is wrong, then you will thereby be motivated not to
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steal. In other words, our moral judgments do have practical significance—they do have an influence
on our behavior. This supplies Hume with the following argument:

1. Moral judgments are intrinsically motivational.

2. No belief is intrinsically motivational.
3. So, moral judgments are not beliefs.
4. Reason produces beliefs and nothing else.
5. Therefore, moral judgments are not a product of reason.

So, Hume rejected the traditional (or Platonic) conception of morality according to which reason
opposes desires, and whereby morality consists in reason guiding our actions. According to Hume,
reason produces beliefs and nothing else. Beliefs are devoid of motivational force. So, reason cannot
oppose desire, no can reason guide are actions (because reason simply is not in control).

On all of these accounts, Kant thinks that Hume is mistaken. Kant is therefore going to try an revive
the tradition that Hume dismissed. According to Kant:

1. Reason can motivate (and must if our actions are to have any moral worth).
2. Reason can oppose desires.
3. Moral judgments are a product of reason.

Since Kantian Moral Philosophy (Deontological Ethics) tries to restore the platonic conception of
morality according to which morality is within the province of reason (our moral judgments are a
product of reason), Kant has to reject the following argument offered by Hume:

1. Moral judgments are intrinsically motivational

2. Beliefs are not intrinsically motivational.
3. So, moral judgments are not beliefs.
4. Reason produces beliefs and nothing else.
5. Thus, moral judgements are not produced by reason.

The first premise seems fairly plausible. It does seem as though morality (our moral judgments)
influences our behavior. If I sincerely judge that stealing is wrong, then it would seem that (other
things being equal) I will be compelled not to steal.

The second premise is also fairly plausible. Reason may produce the belief that 15% of 10 is 1.5, but
that belief by itself would not compel (or motivate) me to act.

Since premise three follows logically from premises one and two, it would seem as though premise 3 is
true as well.
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Thus, Kant rejects the fourth premise. Although it is true that reason produces beliefs, it is wrong to
think that reason produces beliefs and nothing else. According to Kant, reason can also produce
practical commandments (or imperatives), commands of the form, “Do this” or “Don’t do that”; for
example, “don’t lie” or “provide aid to others when you can”. These commands tell us what we must
do despite our own natural inclinations. The function of reason is to tell us what we ought to do.

Kant, like both Plato and Hume, thought that we had a complex nature. According to Kant, humans
have a dual nature: we are both physical beings and rational beings. And this is what makes morality
interesting. Reason tells us what we ought to do (by issuing practical commandments) but our natural
inclinations (that we have in virtue of being physical beings) try to lead us astray.

Thus, Kant (like most moral philosophers before Hume) does view morality as a combat between
reason and desire, and Kant thinks that one is acting morally rightly just to the extent that reason
is in control. Reason can and must be in control of our actions if our actions are ever to have any
moral worth (or value).

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