Unfulfilled Promises: Women and Peace in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Author(s): Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims

Source: International Journal , Summer, 2007, Vol. 62, No. 3, What Kind of Security?
Afghanistan and Beyond (Summer, 2007), pp. 642-663
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian International Council

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Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims

Unfulfilled promises
Women and peace in post-Taliban Afghanistan

BACKGROUND

Following 30 years of protracted conflict, Afghanistan has begun a sl

laborious path to peace, and Canada has been one of its most staun
porters both in words and deeds. Understanding the root causes of th
flict is a difficult task requiring analysis of a plethora of issues, actors
vations, and other complexities. The conflict and its impact in fact st
years before the arrival of the Taliban, and in some ways continues to
day. In essence, politics took a dramatic turn with the coup in 19
replaced the monarchy with a communist government headed by the
cousin. Efforts to maintain power resulted in the Soviet occupation
91), which gave birth to a strong and passionate resistance move
under the mujahedin, who were heavily trained and funded by neighb
ing states and the United States, all of which were concerned with th
no effect taking place in the oil-rich Middle East region.
Rather than peace, the departure of the Soviet troops in 1989 and
loss of interest in Afghanistan by the United States and other wester

Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims is a peace researcher, educator, and activist. She is a

professor in the MA program in conflict studies at St. Paul University in Ottawa

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

tries led to continued violent struggles between the mujahedin factions as

well as by the mujahedin against the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan government that they finally defeated in 1992. The political
vacuum led to a military campaign among the mujahedin and a virtual divi-
sion of the country among warlords, who along with their heavily armed
militia enjoyed complete control in the various regions of the country and
continued to fight for power and authority. The warlords included
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Rashid Dostum, Ismail
Khan, Yunis Khalis, and others who have long histories of animosity and
switching loyalties, and who ironically dominate the new and "democrati-
cally" elected Afghan Parliament.
Afghans argue that the civil war period of 1992-95 constitutes the
bloodiest and most destructive period in Afghan history. Neighbourhoods
became the frontlines of battles between competing warlords that in the
end led to the destruction of whole towns, resulted in tens of thousands of
civilian deaths, the kidnapping and rapes of countless women, a refugee cri-
sis, the destruction of Afghanistan's political, economic, and social infra-
structures. Most importantly, they set the foundation for religious extrem-
ism in Afghan society and politics.
It was during this period of unrest that the Taliban movement was born
in the Islamic schools that had been established inside Afghan refugee
camps in Pakistan. What started as a modest and very local initiative to
bring an end to roadblocks and bribery led to greater ambitions and a suc-
cessful military campaign that was initially well received by a battle-weary
population ready for an end to violence and the return of some remnants of
normalcy in their lives. By 1996, the Taliban had captured the capital and
pushed the warlords into the northern part of the country. Once in power,
the Taliban sought to create a theocratic state based on their strict interpre-
tation of the Qufan, and further repressed human rights, civil liberties,
and, most acutely, women's rights and freedoms. The Taliban ruled
Afghanistan with an ever-increasing iron hand, completely isolating them-
selves in the international community. The Taliban and the plight of
Afghanistan's population fell off the international radar until the tragic
events of 11 September 2001. By the time the world returned its attention to
Afghanistan, the country was decimated and its population had paid a
heavy price: 1.5 million were dead and millions were international or inter-
nally displaced refugees. The conflict was worsened by a drought, starva-
tion, the birth of extremist attitudes and policies, and severe human rights
abuses by ruling factions.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

In the spring of 2003, 1 travelled to Afghanistan for seven weeks to pro-

vide human rights and peacebuilding advocacy training to Afghan women
working with grassroots organizations, government ministries, and
UNIFEM. The training curriculum provided an introduction to human
rights discourse; highlighted women's human rights issues; introduced the
UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women and UN security council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and
security; and explored the relevance of these advocacy tools to Afghanistan.
The female participants were inspiring. Despite decades of war and vio-
lence and personal losses, they were inquisitive, empowered, committed to
peace, and determined to play an active part in the transformation of their
society. They were concerned about the ways in which western media
wrongly portrayed them, and even more troubled by the ways in which
western powers coopted their plight under the Taliban to justify a strong
military presence in their country and a "war on terror" that they knew
would only bring further suffering to the people and strengthen insurgency
movements.

The severe damage caused by war was visible everywhere. Whole

neighbourhoods were ruined from the civil war fighting; cemeteries a
landmine fields were plentiful between cities; and although the UN an
international agencies had been operating in the country for almost tw
years, the weakness of government ministries and services was clear
apparent. What was most disturbing was the obvious poverty. Tens of thou
sands of men had died during the decades of war, leaving widows and par-
ents to fend for themselves. The sight of women and the elderly begging
was heartbreaking, but there was hope behind the despair. The intern
tional security assistant force's (ISAF) presence in the capital had brought
measure of security, making it possible for Kabul to come back to life. Th
bustling markets, the paving of roads, the rebuilding of partially dem
ished buildings, and the full restaurants were all positive signs of progress
and development. Most striking was the presence of Afghan women ba
in the public domain. They were everywhere, with or without their burqa
We saw them in English and computer classes, NGO offices, governme
ministries, and even at work paving the new roads. The resilience of t
Afghan population was remarkable and their kindness and hospitalit
heart-warming. They had a sense of deep optimism and certitude that if t
appropriate policies were to be implemented, the country would have
chance at peace. They spoke passionately about the ways in which decad
of war had transformed their culture into a violent one and introduced

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

extremism to their otherwise moderate religious views. They criticized the

warlordism that continued to dominate the political scene. They had clear
and cogent views on the causes of past conflicts and spoke persuasively of
prerequisites for a new and sustainable peace. The solutions most people
spoke about were the need for universal education and equal rights and
opportunities for women and men.1
I left Afghanistan with renewed optimism. Three years later however,
peace continues to be elusive and the promises of the international com-
munity continue to be largely unfulfilled. This has led to disillusionment
among the Afghan population and can cause distrust if left unresolved. All
long-term protracted conflicts pose immense challenges when it comes to
peacebuilding and development. In such conflicts, violence has been long-
term, destruction widespread, and paths to conflict management and reso-
lution complex. There are many impediments to peace and no single or
simple answers. Understanding root causes and designing effective solu-
tions requires an appreciation of cultural and historical realities that if left
unaddressed can serve to deepen tensions and threaten an already fragile
peace. Nation-building and efforts at a sustainable peace are particularly
challenging in Afghanistan for a number of reasons, including
Afghanistan's geo-political location and neighbours with competing inter-
ests; its terrain that lends itself to regional loyalties as opposed to loyalty to
a central government; a culture based on clan ties and allegiances; a histo-
ry that has resulted in deep suspicion of foreign actors; and the strength-
ening of warlordism resulting from decades of war and external funding
and support of warlords. Success demands commitment from Afghan polit-
ical actors and the international community. The latter must not base its
policies on national self-interest but rather genuinely develop and imple-
ment policies that support sustainable peace and serve the Afghan popula-
tion. The former must do more to combat corruption, strengthen rule of
law, and make decisions not based on personal gain and self-interest, but
for the long-term benefit of the nation and its citizens.
As already mentioned, the complexities resulting from militarism and
violence are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I would like to touch
on three main issues that are particularly relevant to discussions of peace in
Afghanistan. The first two will be addressed only briefly, and the third will

l See Human Rights Watch report, "Lessons in terror: Attacks on education in

Afghanistan," http://hrw.org.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

be discussed more thoroughly. The first is the deteriorating security situa-

tion that poses a severe challenge to development and reconstruction
efforts, particularly in the rural areas. Security is essential to providing an
enabling environment for peacebuilding, development, and reconstruction.
Insurgency is on the rise and insurgents are using increasing violence
against foreign soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and the general public.
In August 2006, Taliban forces hanged a 71-year-old woman and her son,
accusing them of being government spies. There are also reports of Taliban
forces forcing young men into service.2 But there seems also to be increased
support for the Taliban in some rural areas where displeasure is increasing
due to continued foreign troop deployment on Afghan soil.
Afghans in general oppose the presence of foreign troops on their soil.
They opposed it during the Soviet occupation and they are questioning the
longer-than-anticipated presence of foreign troops there now. The ongoing
presence of coalition forces engaged in the war on terror has not weakened
the insurgency and is actually strengthening and attracting support to it in
some areas of the country. Fighting has resulted in civilian casualties, dis-
ruptions in daily life, and damage to civilian farming and property. It is
especially disconcerting that Canada has shifted its focus from supporting
development, reconstruction, capacity-building, and civilian protection, and
is instead spending millions of dollars on military action aimed at counter-
insurgency operations. While 6000 troops are stationed in the south battling
the Taliban, over 500 Afghan civilians have been killed in a six-week span.
This raises the question of the efficacy of our current military policy and
requires us to see beyond militarism to understand the basis for the present
conflict and address it in a more comprehensive and effective manner.
Amidst the increasing insurgency and Taliban resistance, there are
pockets of Taliban fighters and their leadership who have extended an olive
branch and offered to put down their weapons in exchange for inclusion in
the political process. From their perspective, the Bonn process did not
include all "legitimate" political actors and constructed them as enemies of
the Afghan people, while including individuals who have sewn violence and
destruction in the country. One of the most important rules of conflict res-
olution and peacebuilding is the controversial contention that all parties
with a stake in the conflict and in the peace should be included in the nego-
tiation process, however difficult and contentious this may appear. Many

2 Benjamin Sand "Rival warlords clash in northern Afghanistan," Voice of America

(VOA News) Islamabad, 09 August 2006.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

factors are contributing to the current social and political climate in

Afghanistan, and some would argue that the absence of moderate Taliban
representatives at the Bonn peace talks is a contributing factor to today's
ongoing violence. The solution to the Taliban dilemma does not lie in
killing them as a means of destroying them. Somehow they are able to
recruit fighters, and they have the financial resources to train, arm, and
fight some of the best-trained soldiers in the world - thus demonstrating
the ineffectiveness of our policies thus far. The solution instead lies in a
three-pronged approach which aims at finding and putting an end to the
financial support provided to the Taliban, implying cooperation on the part
of Pakistan, Arab states, and Iran; accelerating the rate of development and
reconstruction projects and otherwise addressing the grievances that attract
support for the Taliban; and increasing a military presence for the purpose
of civilian protection rather than counterinsurgency. We have seen that five
years of targeting and killing the Taliban has not stopped their growth or
reduced their strength.
The second ongoing concern is the undeserved and continued power
and authority bestowed upon warlords who support and benefit from the
drug trade and who use threats, intimidation, and injury to secure support.
These warlords continue to violate human rights with impunity, yet have
seats in the parliament and represent people who truly did not want them
as representatives. This culture of warlordism and the presence of warlords
in politics, including the parliament, government ministries, and the judi-
ciary is the single most pervasive threat to Afghanistan's transition from a
failed state to a democratic and peaceful one. It is breeding cynicism among
the public and threatens the ability of the country to recover and build a
strong foundation for future peace. The policy of "working" with the war-
lords to assimilate them into the political process with the hopes that they
will support the peace is flawed. It ignores their long history of conflict and
vying for territory and power. If there was any element of cooperation
among them during the Soviet occupation, this was due to the presence of
a common enemy that was to be rejected from Afghan soil. It is not uncom-
mon to hear of clashes among warlords in rural areas. One recent incident
in August 2006 saw violence in Faryab province between militant forces
loyal to rival warlords Abdul Rashid Dostum and Abdul Malik. Both are eth-
nic Uzbeks with sizeable private armies stationed in the north of the coun-
try. Dostum is presently serving as Afghanistan's military chief of staff, one
of a number of former warlords who now hold senior positions in the
Afghan government.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

On the one hand, foreign governments are spending millions of dollars

trying to disarm militia and train the national army to be loyal to the con-
stitution and the central government, while on the other President Karzai
is asking corrupt and powerful warlords to rearm their illegal milita and
join the fight against the Taliban. According to Ahmed Rashid, an authori-
ty on Afghanistan, "Karzai is now seen by many Afghans and Western
diplomats as betraying the reform and nation building agenda set out by the
Bonn Agreement of 2001 and reverting back to rule by fiat on tribal and eth-
nic lines/'3 Karzai for his part is critical of the international community and
accuses it of not investing enough money and resources into counterter-
rorism initiatives and not being able to get Pakistan to end its support of
insurgency along the Afghan border. Beyond the political rhetoric on all
sides, it is the Afghan population that continues to suffer and pay the price
for policies that are based on personal gain and national self-interest and
that do not meet the needs and challenges of peace building. A 2004 sur-
vey report by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium found
that the vast majority of Afghan civilians felt that disarmament was the
number one priority for ensuring peace and security.4
The third concern is the lack of progress on the advancement of
women and the international community's failure to deliver on promises
made to Afghan women five years ago. The status of women is a litmus test
for success in Afghanistan. The ability of women to enjoy equal rights and
access equal opportunities in any given society is an important - though
less talked-about - characteristic of sustainable peace. As in other conflicts
around the world, the women of Afghanistan bore the brunt of the suffer-
ing. Their progressively increased absence and exclusion from public life
made them particularly vulnerable to the effects of conflict. The role of the
man as the primary breadwinner, particularly in the rural areas, led to mass
poverty among women who were widowed as a result of the conflict but did
not have access to economic opportunities due to lack of education or skills
and later the oppressive laws banning women from employment. The
breakdown of any health infrastructure and the absence of female health
professionals had a pervasive impact on Afghanistan's women, leading to
the world's highest maternal mortality rates during the Taliban era.

3 Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan and its future," Eurasianet commentary, 26 June 2006.
4 "Take away the guns," www.wraf.ca.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

Although the United Nations, NGOs, and feminist organizations had

long decried the situation of women under the Taliban, it was the tragedy
of ii September 2001 that finally brought their plight to the forefront of
international consciousness and mobilized international action. Within
days, news coverage shifted to the Taliban's "gender apartheid." Pictures of
burqa-dad women and accounts of human rights violations against
Afghanistan's women dominated western media, which resulted in the
plight of Afghan women becoming one of the rallying points for the coali-
tion's war on terror. According to Gillian Wylie, "establishing women's
rights became part of the moral justification for waging 'war on terror' by
ensuring regime change in Afghanistan."5 While trying to gain support for
the campaign by highlighting the situation of Afghan women in official
speeches, press meetings, etc., officials met great resistance from a vast
number of feminist academics and organizations around the world who
argued that continued violence would not decrease the suffering of women
but would in some ways exacerbate it. In the five years since the fall of the
Taliban, these feminist scholars and women's advocacy groups have been
proven right. Despite gains, the security situation in Afghanistan continues
to deteriorate and women have not made the projected gains or enjoyed the
freedoms promised by the US administration.
While the international community takes pride in listing positive
changes such as the new constitution; successful presidential and legisla-
tive elections; reforms in the defence, justice, and finance sectors; de-min-
ing; the reintegration of millions of Afghan refugees; and the enrolment of
over a million children - including girls - in schools, human rights organi-
zations point to a failing security situation and increasing attacks on
women and girls. The war on terror has not ameliorated the effects of two
decades of devastation, and in fact has contributed to aggravating the root
causes of Afghanistan's ongoing conflict. Underdevelopment, poverty, radi-
calization of religious ideology, and personal insecurity have now been
added to by new dimensions of violence such as insurgency attacks on mil-
itary forces and innocent civilians.
For political actors inside and outside of Afghanistan, the fall of the
Taliban in November 2001 signalled the first opportunity for peace in
Afghanistan in decades. For the women of Afghanistan, it offered the pos-

5 Gillian Wylie, "Women's rights and 'righteous war': An argument for women's
autonomy in Afghanistan," Feminist Theory 4, no. 2 (2003).

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

sibility of a longed for opportunity to participate in the healing and rebuild-

ing of their nation. Peace agreements are a crucial component of a peace
process and serve the twin purposes of marking the end of war and the ini-
tiation of peace. Ideally, a peace agreement will address both the immediate
consequences of war and seek to understand and undermine the root caus-
es of violence. Although peace agreements do not produce an immediate
cessation of violence or immediate improvements in the standard of living
and human rights enjoyment, they are important in that they signify the
formal cessation of armed conflict and provide the framework for the recon-
struction of political, legal, economic, and social structures. For feminists
they have added value in that "their content will have direct bearing on
women's participation - as a reflection of women's inclusion in formal
peace negotiations is a determinant of their involvement in post conflict
peace building."6

PEACE AGREEMENTS AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY

The participation of women in all aspects of peace processes is critical to the
transition from a culture of violence to a culture of peace. As the blueprint
for the future of a conflict habituated society, peace processes have particu-
lar significance for women and in developing new structures to ensure the
promotion and protection of women's rights. Hence the work of translating
the gains outlined in Bonn requires the full and equal participation of
women in all aspects of Afghanistan's peace process. Although women con-
tinue to be prevented from full participation in the rebuilding of their war-
affected societies, the important role they play in postconflict peacebuilding
and reconstruction efforts have been clearly and unequivocally articulated
in various international documents and instruments. The Beijing platform
for action, which was adopted at the fourth world conference on women in
1995, highlighted the need to "increase the participation of women in con-
flict resolution and decision making" and urged governments and interna-
tional and regional institutions "to integrate gender perspectives in the res-
olution of armed or other conflicts and foreign occupation."7 Another inter-
national articulation of the importance of women's participation in peace-

6 "Peace agreements as a means for promoting gender equality and ensuring partic-
ipation of women - a framework of model provisions," DAW (DESA)/UNIFEM report
of the expert group meeting, 2003, www.un.org.
7 Beijing platform for action, wwwi.umn.edu.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

building efforts is found in the outcome document of the 23rd session of

the general assembly. In the document entitled "Women 2000: Gender
equality, development and peace for the 21st century," the general assem-
bly called on governments to "ensure and support the full participation of
women at all levels of decision making and implementation in develop-
ment activities and peace processes, including conflict prevention and res-
olution, post-conflict reconstruction, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace
building."8
The most relevant and influential instrument in recent times, however,
is United Nations security council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and
security (1325) that was adopted on 31 October 2000. This resolution has
been a critical contribution to advocating for the full participation of women
in all levels of decision-making and peacebuilding consultations. As a secu-
rity council resolution, 1325 is effectively considered customary interna-
tional law, giving it a strength not enjoyed by resolutions from other UN
organs. The resolution has four important components. It calls on actors to
adopt a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace
agreements. It also highlights the need to address the special needs of
women and girls during conflict and postconflict zones with regard to repa-
triation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Furthermore, the
resolution calls for measures to ensure the protection and respect of
women's human rights, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the
electoral system, the police, and the judiciary, and encourages all parties to
consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants. Finally, it
recommends strong measures to integrate women in all levels of peace-
keeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding efforts, and to integrate a gender
perspective in policy development and implementation.9
The literature on the subject of women and peacebuilding highlights
several important points. First, the absence of women from crafting peace
agreements and engaging in their implementation "leads to perpetuation
of discrimination against women and their continued marginalization in
their post-conflict rebuilding of society." Second, "explicit attention to the
participation of women, and reflection of gender perspectives in such
agreements, is vital to ensure that such commitments fully address the

8 www.un.org.
9 "Peace agreements," 2.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

needs and priorities of women in the aftermath of conflict, and are sup-
portive of women's equal participation in the reconstruction of postconflict
societies, and thus in prevention of future conflict."10 Third, despite increas-
ing evidence of women's participation as a prerequisite for peaceful transi-
tions in conflict transformation, women remain largely absent from formal
peace processes due to religious and cultural customs, traditions, and
stereotypes that limit their role in public space and discourse. The efforts of
the few who do participate are often impeded and obstructed by male par-
ticipants and a process that does not provide equal time and opportunity to
articulate a unique insight, wisdom, and contribution. Fourth, while gov-
ernments and international donors can play an important role in promot-
ing women's full participation, their commitment and interest in this vital
effort is lacking or short-lived. Clearly, the desire to increase women's par-
ticipation in peace processes requires commitment, human resources, and
political will. Furthermore, increased participation without a thorough and
comprehensive analysis of the gender dimension of militarism, conflict,
and violence - and efforts to address these - will not bear fruit.
Afghanistan's peacebuilding process began with a historic meeting in
Bonn in December 2001. This meeting brought together various Afghan
factions who, under the auspices of the United Nations, were given the task
of consulting and beginning the difficult task of rebuilding Afghanistan.
The parties at the table included military commanders, representatives
from various ethnic groups, and expatriate Afghans as well as representa-
tives of the exiled monarch. The meeting was dominated by the Northern
Alliance. The outcome document, known as the Bonn agreement, "set out
a schematic roadmap and timetable for establishing peace and security,
reconstructing the country, re-establishing some key institutions, and pro-
tecting human rights."11 The Bonn agreement called for "the establishment
of a broad-based, multi-ethnic, fully representative, gender-sensitive gov-
ernment and drew attention to 1325, reminding all factions that the partici-
pation of women and attention to their rights and status are critical to
national peace and reconstruction processes."12 For women's rights activists,
the highlight of the agreement was the establishment of a women's min-
istry that would be committed to advancing the status of women in

to Ibid., 7.
11 Ibid.

12 www.un.org.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

Afghanistan through the promotion of literacy programs, social-economic

development projects, and other initiatives aimed at increasing women's
participation in the social, political, and economic life of the country.
Furthermore, they were cautiously optimistic about the promise of equality
provisions in the new constitution and the opportunity for women to par-
ticipate in the political process of the country by standing for election and
exercising a right to vote. The caution can be attributed to skepticism link-
ing the end of the Taliban with the beginnings of peace and security.
In the days and weeks leading up to the US war on terror, the rhetoric
surrounding American and coalition objectives in Afghanistan centred
around the gender apartheid that had consumed the country since the rise
of the Taliban in 1995. In fact, gender was instrumentalized by the west to
rally support for the impending war on Afghanistan and to justify this mil-
itary campaign. The rhetoric failed to appreciate that the suffering of
Afghanistan's women did not begin with the reign of the Taliban regime -
nor the oppressive edicts they imposed during their administration. The
violation of women's human rights, including incidents of physical and sex-
ual abuse of women and their lack of access to education, healthcare, pub-
lic participation, etc., was a reality in Afghanistan throughout the conflict,
and was in fact at its worst during the civil war when mujahedin leaders
fought for control of Kabul. Contrary to popular belief and the rhetoric of the
time, the war on terror did not present Afghan women with an immediate
change in status, rights, or opportunity. In fact, the deteriorating security sit-
uation has severely negatively affected women's ability to enjoy the rights and
opportunities promised them by the international community.
Further, the war on terror cannot and has not addressed the cultural,
historical, and traditional foundations for gender discrimination and vio-
lence, and despite the commitment and financial support of the interna-
tional community and the enthusiasm of women in Afghanistan and
around the world, women in Afghanistan must overcome strict cultural,
traditional, and historical barriers. This was clear and evident when women
participants experienced intimidation and threats from powerful warlords
at the presidential and constitutional loya jirgas. Another example is the
linking of the equality clause in the new constitution to an unclear frame-
work of Islamic sharia law, thereby leaving clauses open to interpretation by
Afghanistan's appointed grand imam. This stipulation is of great concern to
women's groups in Afghanistan and their supporters who fear that conser-
vative interpretations of sharia will threaten women's autonomy, human
rights, and legal standing. As for the much-anticipated ministry of women's

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

affairs, lack of capacity - and funding - has ghettoized women's rights and
relegated this ministry to the margins with little or no influence or impact.
Clearly, the inclusion of an equality clause in the constitution, the par-
ticipation of women in elections, standing and winning seats in the new
parliament, and so on are important first steps, but they are certainly not a
guarantee of immediate benefits for women. The reality is that addressing
women's equality issues, undoing decades - indeed centuries - of inequali-
ty and translating rights from paper to practice goes beyond these initiatives
and will require patience and careful attention. These efforts must take a
multifaceted approach that is culturally and religiously appropriate, grass-
roots based, and supported by domestic, regional, and international net-
works and forces as well as the international community. Failure to do so
will threaten gains that have already been made and provoke resistance, vio-
lence, and further destabilization.

WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In discussing the critical role of Afghan women in postconflict peace and

development initiatives, a brief historical overview of the status of women
in Afghanistan proves instructive in deciphering the historical barriers to
women's participation in the country's social, economic, and political life.
From these we may suggest strategies for removing these barriers in our
current and future endeavours. As Huma Ahmed-Gosh argues, the situa-
tion of women in Afghanistan cannot be categorized neatly into pre-Taliban
and post-Taliban frameworks of analysis, but requires an understanding
that there is a long history of women's subjugation in that country. Afghan
women have been subject to patriarchal attitudes and traditional customs
that have greatly affected their ability to participate in society and enjoy
equal access to education, health, marriage rights, and equality before the
law. Furthermore, when efforts were made to remove constraints to
women's advancement, particularly in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1970s, these
efforts were perceived as dishonourable and culturally and religiously inap-
propriate, and therefore the subject of great opposition and resistance
among Afghanistan's powerful clergy and tribal leaders.13 Ahmed-Gosh
notes that "Afghanistan may be the only country in the world where during
the last century kings and politicians have been made and undone by strug-

13 Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, "Overcoming religious and cultural barriers to

women's full participation in post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts:
The relationship between women's human rights and peacebuilding in Afghanistan,"
Unpublished dissertation.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

gles relating to women's status."14 This history highlights the importance of

taking gender issues into consideration in development policy planning
and implementation so as to avoid social agitation and further threat to an
already volatile peace process.
The plight of women in Afghanistan today, and in the periods noted
above, offers an especially stark contrast to the situation of women in the
days leading up to the Soviet occupation. By the mid 1970s, women in
Afghanistan's urban areas were enjoying increasing access to education and
employment. Women doctors, teachers, lawyers, and civil servants dotted
the employment landscape and increasing numbers of young women and
men were travelling outside of Afghanistan to further their education.
Although these advances were centred on the urban areas, and mainly the
capital, efforts were being made to increase educational opportunities of
women and girls in the rural areas as well, though these often met with
fierce resistance and opposition.
The first efforts to advance women's rights were introduced by King
Amanullah (1919-29) who was determined to modernize Afghanistan
socially and economically. In a bold move, he reformed the 1921 family code
in order to provide Afghan women with improved legal standing in the pri-
vate sphere, while also commissioning the drafting of a new constitution
(1923) that made generic reference to gender equality and made education
compulsory for all Afghans. Amanullahs efforts were met with great oppo-
sition by the Afghan population, particularly the clergy and rural residents,
who denounced the reforms as un-Islamic and revolted, leading to
Amanullahs ultimate downfall in 1929. It was not until the reign of Zahir
Shah that the issue of women's rights was discussed again in the political
sphere.
By the late 1950s, some advances in women's human rights had been
made in urban areas, particularly in Kabul. For example, in 1959, Kabul
University was declared coeducational and increasing numbers of girls
attended schools, while large numbers of women entered the work force as
public servants, teachers, doctors, and lawyers. There was also some meas-
ure of political gain for the women of Afghanistan. In 1958, the country
sent its first female delegate to the United Nations. It established universal

14 H. Ahmed Cosh, "A history of women in Afghanistan: Lessons learned for the
future or yesterdays and tomorrow," Journal of International Women's Studies 4, no.
3 (May 2003): 1.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

suffrage in 1965, following the 1964 constitution. The first female minister
of public health served in the Afghan cabinet from 1965-69, while two
women were appointed to the senate and another was made a political advi-
sor to the prime minister. On the social front, voluntary observance of pur-
dah (seclusion) was reintroduced.15 Unfortunately, these reforms were
short-lived and, as a result of Afghanistan's pervasive urban/rural divide,
mostly benefited upper and middle class women in the urban areas. In our
efforts to transform women's realities in Afghanistan, therefore, we must
be mindful of the urban/rural divide and develop a social and economic
development policy that addresses the very unique constraints and oppor-
tunities presented in each of these regions.
Things changed again in 1973 when the king's cousin organized a coup
resulting in the king's exile and Daoud's establishment of Afghanistan as a
republic. In an effort to consolidate his regime, Daoud quickly called for the
drafting of a new constitution (1974) that, among other things, granted
women equal rights and obligations under the law and provided them with
rights to education and development. While these efforts had some impact
on the elite class, the benefits once again did not trickle down to rural
women. When Karmal took over leadership of Afghanistan in 1978, he built
on these initiatives by prohibiting forced marriage of girls and widows, ban-
ning arranged marriages, introducing a minimum age of marriage for
women and men, abolishing the bride price, making female education
compulsory, encouraging women to unveil and become more active mem-
bers of society, and enforcing literacy classes in the rural areas. The weak-
ness of these measures lay in the methods used to enforce them. Karmal's
forced reforms without sensitivity to culture and religion "almost guaran-
teed failure" and gave rise to fanaticism and violence throughout
Afghanistan.16
The situation of women during the civil war (1992-95) and under
Taliban rule deteriorated significantly. Most people are well aware of the vio-
lations of women's human rights under the Taliban regime, but it is impor-
tant to note that systematic violations of women's human rights did not
begin with the Taliban regime and were evident and of grave concern dur-
ing the civil war years and mujahedin rule. Northern Alliance forces (also
known as the United Front) represented a coalition of Tajik, Uzbek, and

15 "Afghanistan: Women and reconstruction," ICC Asian Report^, 14 March 2003.

16 Ibid., n.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

Hazara parties and were complicit in violations of international human

rights and humanitarian laws, with women bearing the brunt of the vio-
lence and discrimination. According to human rights organizations, "in the
civil war, women suffered massive, systematic and unrelenting human
rights abuses that permeated every aspect of their lives."17 Both groups have
been known to kidnap, rape, forcibly marry, and otherwise impose misogy-
nistic edicts based on extreme interpretations of Islam against women.
Under both regimes, women lost their freedom of movement, liberty, and
previously enjoyed rights to education, employment, healthcare, and other
basic human rights. The Taliban went further in their maltreatment of
women by banning them from public life. They completely forbade girls'
education, prohibited the movement of women in public without the per-
mission and the accompaniment of a male relative, and enforced the wear-
ing of the burqa outside of the home. Their extremism went so far as to
require windows to be painted black to prevent anyone from seeing a
woman in her home. Their oppressive rules were enforced by "religious
police" from the ministry for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of
vice, who patrolled the streets and indiscriminately beat women publicly for
such offences as wearing socks that were not sufficiently opaque, showing
wrists, hands, or ankles, or for working, begging, or being in public with-
out a male relative.

THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN TODAY

The media coverage in recent months on Canada's military campaig

Afghanistan has focused on efforts to combat the Taliban and the ensu
loss of Canadian lives. What we do not hear about in the media is the civ
ian casualty toll and the lack of progress on international commitm
particularly the lack of improvement in the life of Afghan women and
rising resistance to their efforts at achieving equal rights and opportun
Girls' schools are being burned on a weekly basis at such a rate that int
national aid agencies have largely stopped efforts to rebuild t
Afghanistan's first "democratic" elections were hailed as a victor
marked by impressively high participation by women voters. It is also
however, that female candidates faced widespread intimidation and thr
by male opponents, and many women found it difficult to access the d
ocratic process due to geographic remoteness, illiteracy, or fear of repr

17 Human Rights Watch report.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

for their participation. Many were intimidated by male family members

into voting for their candidates.
In a recent interview, Khorshied Samad, the wife of Afghanistan's
ambassador to Canada, remarked that only "a negligible percentage of
CIDA funding to Afghanistan is being directed to Afghan women's rights
projects."18 According to Samad, "Canada and the international community
are missing an opportunity to assist with the development of Afghan
women's rights, instead choosing to focus on big projects that rarely affect
the everyday lives of Afghans. That's why the grassroots projects are so
important, because they deal directly with women, there is no middleman."19
CIDA representatives argue that they are fulfilling requests by the Afghan
government to increase financial support of the government to build capac-
ity. While this is an important consideration, it should not compromise
equally critical efforts to build and strengthen civil society and the grassroots
organizations that are committed to improving the lives of women.
In July 2006, troubling news emerged from international human
rights organizations that brought to light the disturbing reestablishment of
the department for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice in
Afghanistan. According to Human Rights Watch, "President Hamid
Karzai's cabinet has approved the proposal to reestablish the department
and it will go to Afghanistan's parliament when it convenes in late sum-
mer."20 In an interview, "Nematullah Shahrani, who would oversee the
department, has stated that it would focus on alcohol, drugs, crimes and
corruption," which are already covered by existing criminal laws. Analysts
argue that "the proposed department's vague standards for upholding
morality could be used to silence critical voices, and further limit women's
and girls' access to work, health care and education."21 The women's politi-
cal participation committee in Afghanistan released a strongly worded
statement opposing the creation of the department.22 The statement argued
that the reestablishment of the department is contrary to the new Afghan

18 Tara M. Campbell, "Afghan women still unheard," http://straight.com, 29 June

2006.

19 Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, "Incorporating gender analysis into Canada's for-

eign policy," presented at "Canada in Afghanistan" meeting at Wilfrid Laurier
University.
20 Human Rights Watch report.
2i Ibid.

22 www.womankind.org.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

constitution as well as international human rights treaties to which

Afghanistan is party. The organization rejects the formation of the depart-
ment and "asks for reconsideration as women are always the sacrifice of
customs, tradition and partial interpretations of Islam in the name of
Islam." It states, "We women as first Islamic Umah (Muslims) do not want
any more that Islam be used for male dominance and politicization."23
Reading this statement was a reminder of the women I met in Afghanistan
who were so clear and determined in their quest for equality, unhindered
by the cultural and religious barriers they faced. The support of the United
Nations, international NGOs, feminist networks, and donor states is vital to
their ability to achieve their objectives. The international community must
go beyond the rhetoric of gender equality and ensure that the pledges made
in Bonn by Afghan political actors are upheld. Canada should be at the
frontlines of this movement and set an example.

WHY/HOW DO WE INCORPORATE GENDER INTO OUR 3D APPROACH IN AFGHANISTAN?

Gender refers to a social construction of femininity and masculinity that
varies over time and place. Gender is constructed through learned rather
than innate behaviour and finds itself played out in the ways that we ascribe
roles and responsibilities to men and women in our societies and the
degree to which these ascriptions are a result of choice or imposition with
subsequent methods of enforcement. Gender analysis is central to discus-
sions of Canada's 3D approach in Afghanistan because "as a central catego-
ry of analysis it exposes unequal social structures, particularly gender hier-
archies, and provides with a frame of reference on how these structures
negatively impact the security of individuals and groups, and ultimately
society as a whole/24 Gender considerations are not about "adding women
and stirring" for the right outcome. They are about considering the unique
impact that war and violence have on men and women, understanding how
unequal gender relations sustain military activities and promote cultures of
violence that adversely impact women in both public and private spheres,
and formulating and implementing policies that recognize and appreciate
each sex's different experiences in conflict and postconflict zones, and
ensuring their equal participation in the rebuilding of their societies.

23 Ibid.
24 J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold
War World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 48.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

Gender-blind analysis privileges a male experience in conflict and postcon-

flict zones and thus fails to consider the impact of conflict and its aftermath
on women. In order to change women's realities after the start of the peace
process, we need to ensure that women are fully engaged in the decision-
making processes, both in government and civil society.
Incorporating gender analysis into the development and implementa-
tion of peace processes has been shown to have a significant impact on the
effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts.
In order to change women's realities after the start of the peace process, we
need to ensure that women are fully engaged in the decision-making
processes, both in government and civil society. Ariane Brunet of Rights
and Democracy argues that, "democracy can only be called as such when
there is a symbiotic relation between the state and civil society. "25 This is
what research and experience from the field clearly illustrates. Building civil
society in Afghanistan means the complete involvement of women who
lived with war for 23 years and can give of their unique experiences and
insights. It also means understanding gender issues within the historical
and cultural context in which they operate.
Gender analysis provides an effective analytical tool for understanding
gender dynamics by asking appropriate questions that highlight gender
inequalities in any given society. Gender analysis highlights the fact that
even within any given society, "man" or "woman" is not a homogenous,
undifferentiated category of analysis, and that many factors outside of one's
biological sex determine one's gendered experience. Differences such as
rural versus urban, poor versus wealthy, educated versus uneducated, and
one's ethnic group greatly affect one's gender experience.26 In Afghanistan,
"broad, generalized references to 'Afghan women' have led to the miscon-
ception that they somehow constitute a single, homogenous group" when,
in fact, the experience of an uneducated, Hazara woman in a rural village
in Afghanistan is not comparable to an educated, elite woman in Kabul.27
These are the gender differences that policies often overlook - by clumping

25 Personal interview with Ariane Brunet, women's rights coordinator, Rights &
Democracy, May 2005.
26 Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, "Development in Muslim societies: Constraints
and opportunities for Afghan women," www.asiapacificresearch.ca.
27 S. Barakat and C. Wardell, "Exploited by whom? An alternative perspective on human-
itarian assistance to Afghan women." Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (2002): 910.

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I Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims |

all women in the same category and making assumptions about their expe-
riences as women in a conflict and postconflict space. So the question is
which of these women is being used as the measuring stick for the devel-
opment, implementation, and evaluation of our 3D policy and how will the
other recipients who are not considered be impacted? Clearly one size does
not fit all, and gender analysis can help us to understand the different gen-
der dynamics in order to better mainstream gender into policy for the
advancement of gender equality.
If we are to make a lasting impact in Afghanistan with well-intentioned
policies and hard-earned tax dollars, we must approach this work with an
understanding that war in essence does not have a beginning and end for
women (start of violence, start of peace process). In fact it continues to
plague women's lives long after formal peace has been declared. This is par-
ticularly relevant for women in Afghanistan who continue to experience
limitations to their rights, freedoms, opportunities, and safety in a highly
militarized, volatile, and culturally patriarchal context. In Afghanistan
therefore, in addition to a focus on women's effective and active participa-
tion, and perhaps as a precursor for it, there needs to be a discussion and
consensus on the causes and processes of women's disempowerment, and
the different ways in which diverse women are oppressed. In this manner,
plans can be formulated to challenge the multiple sources of women's
oppression and actions can be taken that seek women's empowerment.28
With Canada's commitment to human security in mind, we must
remember that building peace is not solely about the rebuilding of social,
political, and economic infrastructures, but about rebuilding the fabric of
society and creating social, economic, and political structures that promote
healing and social transformation based on human rights, equality, and
principles of justice and equity. A useful model is to divide peace building
activities into three categories - political, structural, and social - and to plan
policies that would affect each of these interdependent elements.29 Such a
process requires the concerted efforts of various actors committed to both

28 Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, "Women and peacebuilding," Essays on

Human Rights and Democratic Development 8, International Centre for Human
Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, 1999.
29 James Notter and Louise Diamond, "Building peace and transforming conflict:
Multi-track diplomacy in practice," The Institute for Multitrack Diplomacy,
Washington, DC, 1996.

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 I Unfulfilled promises |

state-building and social development. Governments, national and interna-

tional NGOs, and civil society must work together in this enterprise. The
present day situation in Afghanistan begs for our attention and continued
commitment. Canada and other countries working with Afghans for peace
and reconstruction must use all channels - diplomatic, financial (develop-
ment aid), and military (security enhancement) - to promote gender analy-
sis and implementation by the Afghan government.

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