TRBS2152 - 02 en

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TRBS 2152 Part 2

(TRGS 722)
Hazardous explosive atmosphere

- Avoidance or limitation of hazardous explosive atmospheres
Issue: March 2012
GMBl 2012 p. 398-410 [No. 22]
T EC HNIC AL REGELS FOR ECONOMICALPRODUC
TION
PUBLISHED BY KÜPPERS ENGINEERING
Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2
for Prevention or restriction of hazardous (TRGS 722)
Issue: March 2012
operational safety explosive atmospheres Page: 2 / 25
Preliminary remark Contents

The Technical Rules for Industrial Safety and Health (TRBS)/Hazardous Substances (TRGS) 1
Scope of application the
state of the art, occupational medicine and occupational hygiene as well as other
reliable labour science findings for the provision and 2 Measures to prevent hazardous explosive atmospheres Use of work
equipment and for the operation of equipment requiring monitoring (prevention of explosive atmospheres) (avoidance of explosive
atmospheres) and for activities involving hazardous substances.
You will be informed by 3 Zoning of potentially explosive atmospheres
Committee for Operational Safety (ABS) and
by the Committee for Hazardous Substances (AGS) Annex: Information on inertisation and zone design
determined or adapted and by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
announced in the Joint Ministerial Gazette.
This TRBS/TRGS specifies the requirements of the Ordinance on Industrial
Safety and Health and the Ordinance on Hazardous Substances within the
scope of application. By complying with the technical rule, the employer
can assume that the corresponding requirements of the regulations are
fulfilled. If the employer chooses a different solution, it must achieve at
least the same level of safety and health protection for employees.
© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

Issue: March 2012
1 Area of application 2.2 Avoiding or restricting substances that can cause explosions
This technical rule specifies the requirements for the prevention or capable atmosphere
Restriction of hazardous explosive atmospheres. It must be checked whether flammable substances can be replaced by substances
that are not capable of forming explosive mixtures for work equipment, systems requiring monitoring and activities.
even though this technical rule always refers to systems and systems
parts, their application extends to work equipment
and systems requiring monitoring and on activities. Remark:
Examples of replacement options:
- flammable solvents and cleaning agents with aqueous solutions,
2 Measures to prevent or limit hazardous explosive
hydrocarbons with low flash points caused by hydrocarbons with a sufficiently safe flash point above room and processing
(avoidance of explosive
temperature (see No. 3.2 of TRBS 2152 Part 1/
atmospheres) temperature (cf. TRGS 721 "Hazardous explosive atmospheres -Assessment of the risk of
explosion".
2.1 General Explosion hazard"),
Explosion protection measures that prevent or limit hazardous explosive atmospheres include - combustible powdery fillers by non-combustible fillers.
sphere include the following:
1. Avoid or restrict substances that can cause explosive atmospheres. Note:
are able to form (see number 2.2), If low-boiling non-flammable or hardly flammable hydrocarbons are
2. Preventing or limiting explosive atmospheres inside If halogenated hydrocarbons are added, the flash point of this mixture can be
of systems and system components (see section 2.3), be increased or even suppressed. In these cases, however
due to the different evaporation behaviour of the proportion of
3. Preventing or limiting hazardous explosive atmospheres
halogenated hydrocarbons in the liquid decrease to such an extent that the
in the vicinity of systems and system components (see section 2.4)
vapours that are released later form an explosive atmosphere again,
4. Monitoring the concentration in the vicinity of installations or z. e.g. during cleaning work, or if the solvent mixture is used in open
plant components (see number 2.5), vessels is handled. For such mixtures, no further
5. Measures to remove dust deposits in the vicinity of protective measures only if, for the respective application, the
dust-carrying systems and system components as well as containers. safety is ensured.
Issue: March 2012
2.3 Preventing or restricting explosive atmospheres Note 1:

spheres inside systems and system components If the concentration in work equipment, including installations and
2.3.1 General information parts of the system above the upper explosion limit, there is a risk of explosion
inside the
(1) If the handling of substances that can cause explosive atmospheres can be prevented No risk of explosion; however, escaping mixtures can be ignited by air
If the formation of explosive mixtures cannot be avoided, the formation of explosive mixtures mixture may cause a risk of explosion outside the system
component.
Atmospheres in hazardous quantities within plants and installations. Note 2:
by limiting the quantity or the concentration or by If the temperature of a liquid surface in a part of the system is
inertisation can be prevented or restricted. above the upper explosion point, it is not necessarily the case that
(2) Measures in accordance with paragraph 1 must be monitored in an appropriate manner, with mixture concentrations above the upper explosion limit.
unless compliance with a safe concentration is ensured by the calculate.
process conditions are ensured. Remark: It is possible to increase the flammability by adding
combustible gases.
(3) Monitoring can be carried out, for example, by suitable and sufficiently functional devices such as flow The total concentration of flammable components
must always be monitored by suitable and sufficiently functional devices, such as flow monitors or gas detectors with the above the upper
triggering of alarms, automatic protective measures or explosion limit applicable to the entire mixture. explosion limit.
automatic emergency functions.
(4) Lowering the pressure below atmospheric pressure can reduce the explosion (2) In the case of
flammable liquids, the lower explosion limit is safely lower than the maximum explosion pressure or risk, as either the maximum
explosion pressure decreases if the temperature at the surface of the liquid decreases
sufficiently or an explosion no longer occurs. (about 5 K to 15 K, see section 3.2 paragraph 4 subsection 2 letter b of the
TRBS 2152 Part 1 /TRGS 721) is kept below the flash point.
2.3.2 Concentration limitation
(1) Concentration limiting measures shall be taken to minimise the concentration (3) In the case of dusts, the avoidance of explosive mixtures is difficult to
achieve by limiting the concentration of combustible substances below the lower or above the upper limit. concentration is difficult to
achieve. In particular, the alternating explosion limit must be maintained. During start-up and shutdown, the When starting up and
shutting down, the effect between whirled up and deposited dust must be taken into account. the explosion zone. This must be suitably
Homogeneous dust/air mixtures occur extremely rarely. Therefore, it must be
taken into account. As a rule, it is only rarely possible to determine the total quantity of the dust
concentration.

Issue: March 2012

dust in relation to the entire room or the total volume of a room. Note:
work equipment, including systems and system components, and As a rule, total inertisation can only be carried out for explosive
atmospheres.
assume a uniform distribution. The product can be used in atmospheres with flammable gases and
vapours.
(4) In the event of inhomogeneous dust distribution, the dust may be distributed in parts of systems and system
added
In the
case of partial inertisation, so much inert material is
if the amount of dust in relation to the total
to the mixture
volume i s outside of the limit
oxygen concentration (see
.
number 2.3, paragraph 4TRBS 2152/TRGS 720) 4TRBS 2152/TRGS 720) is safely undercut (maximum permissible
concentration).
oxygen concentration). After adding sufficient quantities of
2.3.3 Inertisation oxygen or air (e.g. discharge into the open air), the mixture is inerted again.
2.3.3.1 General information explosive.
(1) During inertisation, the addition of gaseous inert substances (e.g. Note:
nitrogen, carbon dioxide, noble gases, water vapour) or of powdery substances. The oxygen limit concentration depends primarily on the flammable
substance
The formation of explosive mixtures can be prevented by using inert substances. This depends not only on the inert gas, but also on the temperature and
pressure.
Remark: As inertisation methods with gaseous inert substances
pressure cycling methods with or without vacuum application have proven themselves in practice. (3) The maximum permissible
oxygen concentration results from the expe- without vacuum application, the flow flushing as well as the pressure maintenance.
oxygen limit concentration determined by the deduction of an inert gas
ventilation with pressurisation to maintain a safety distance. safety distance. The safety distance between the experimentally determined
oxygen limit concentration and the highest oxygen limit concentration and the maximum permissible oxygen
concentration.
Note: The oxygen concentration must be taken into account, taking into account
the local and temporal fluctuations in the oxygen concentration caused by operation and malfunctions. and the time period for protective measures to take effect
or emergency functions.
(2) A distinction must be made between partial and total inertisation.
(4) An essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of inertisation is its
- In the case of total inertisation, the ratio of the proportion of inertisation
(e.g. by monitoring the oxygen concentration, the flammability of the flammable
gas to that of the flammable substance is so high that the mixture can also be
substance).
Inert gas concentration, the total pressure or the flow rates of
is not explosive after the addition of any amount of air.
inert gas and flammable substance). Furthermore, an alarm threshold below

Issue: March 2012

of the maximum permissible oxygen concentration. When reaching 2.3.3.2 Inertisation of explosive atmospheres from flammable
substances
the alarm threshold must - in accordance with the conditions of the individual case Gases and vapours
(1) Table 1 shows for some substances which are to be safely under- or carried out during inertisation. The alarm threshold to be set, the
limit values exceeding the properties are specified.
of the monitoring devices, their required functional safety
and the reaction times of the personnel and the system are synchronised. Note:
Sufficient safety distances must be maintained from the experimentally
determined
to be coordinated. Depending on the reliability of the inertisation, a
limit values must be provided.
Zone reduction possible for the inside of containers and system parts.
(2) With total inertisation, explosive mixtures are inerted by
The ratio of the partial pressure of the inert gas to that of the combustible
gas or vapour is prevented from exceeding a certain limit value (see
Table 1).
The annex to this TRBS/TRGS contains a calculation example for total
inertisation.
Note:
The particular technical difficulty is that the partial pressure of the
flammable gas or vapour is often predetermined by the process or
physically (i.e. according to the vapour pressure curve of the liquid) and
therefore a considerable total overpressure may be required to maintain
total inertisation.
(3) For partial inertisation, the oxygen limit concentration specified in

Table 1 must be undershot or the minimum value of the ratio of the
molar proportions of inert gas (N2 or CO2 ) and air (L) (for inertisation
with any addition of flammable substance) must be exceeded. A
calculation example for partial inertisation is given in the annex to this
TRBS/TRGS.

Issue: March 2012
Partial inertisation Total inertisation
Flammable material Temper Oxygen limit concentration in Minimum value of the ratio of Minimum value of the ratio of
ature the total mixture of flammable the molar proportions of inert the molar content of inert gas
in °C substance/inert gases/air gas (N2 or CO2) and air (L) to the (N2 or CO2) and flammable
during inertisation with Inertisation with any train substance
of flammable material (B) for inertisation with any
Addition of air
N2 CO 2 N 2/L CO 2/L N 2/B CO 2/B
Cmax O2
in mol %
Acetaldehyde 50 8,4 - 1,5 - - -
Acrylic acid 80 8,0 - 1,6 - - -
Benzene 100 8,5 11,8 1,4 0,7 42 22
i-Butane 20 10,3 13,1 1,0 0,5 28 13
n-butane 20 9,6 ~12 1,1 - 27 -
Butanal 100 8,2 - 1,6 - - -
1-Butanol 130 8,2 - 1,6 - - -
t-butanol 100 8,6 - 1,4 - - -
1-Butoxy-2-propanol 100 8,0 - 1,6 - 49 -
Botyl acetate 100 9,5 - 1,2 - - -
Cyclohexane 100 8,5 11,3 1,3 0,8 54 27
Cyclohexanol 100 8,8 - 1,4 - - -
Cyclohexanone 100 8,0 - 1,6 - - -
Cyclopropane 20 9,0 ~12 - - - -
Dimethyl ether 20 8,5 - 1,5 - - -
1,4-Dioxane 100 7,0 - 2,0 - - -
Dipropylene glycol- 150 7,4 - 1,9 - - -
dimethyl ether
Dipropyl ether 100 8,4 - 1,5 - - -
Ethan 20 8,8 11,7 1,3 0,7 21 11
Ethanol 20 8,5 - 1,4 - 17 -
Table 1: Ethyl acetate 20 9,8 - 1,1 - 23 -
Limit values for the inertisation of flammable Ethylene 20 7,6 10,5 1,7 0,9 24 13
gases and vapours at 1 bar total pressure
"~" = estimated value * Concentration not achievable at 20 °C

Issue: March 2012
Partial inertisation Total inertisation
Flammable material Temper Oxygen limit concentration in Minimum value of the ratio of Minimum value of the ratio of
ature the total mixture of flammable the molar proportions of inert the molar proportions of inert
in °C substance/inert gases/air gas (N2 or CO2) and air (L) to the gas (N2 or CO2) and flammable
during inertisation with Inertisation with any train substance
of flammable material (B) for inertisation with any
Addition of air
N2 CO 2 N 2/L CO 2/L N 2/B CO 2/B
Cmax O2
in mol %
Ethylene oxide 20 due to decay fall capability of Et hylene oxide 17 15
exist these values are cht
not
Heptane 100 - 10,9 - 0,9 - 35
Hexamethyldesiloxane 80 8,9 - 1,4 - - -
Hexane 20 9,3 11,6 * (100°C) 1,3 0,8* (100°C) 42 32* (100°C)
1-Hexanol 100 8,5 - 1,5 - - -
Carbon monoxide 20 4,3 4,6 3,1 1,7 6 3
Methane 20 9,9 13,7 1,0 0,4 11 5
Methanol 20 9,5 - 1,4 - 7 -
Methyl ethyl ketone 20 9,5 - 1,2 - 26 -
Pentane 20 9,3 - ~1,3 - ~42 -
Pentyl acetate 100 9,2 - 1,3 - - -
Propane 20 9,8 12,6 1,1 0,6 26 13
Propanol-1 20 9,3 - 1,3 - 19 -
Propanol-2 20 8,7 - 1,4 - 25 -
Propylene 20 9,3 12,6 1,2 0,6 23 12
Propylene oxide 25 7,7 - 1,7 - 26 -
Propyl formate 20 9,8 - 1,1 - 21 -
Carbon disulphide 20 4,6 - 3,5 - 49 -
Tetrahydrofuran 100 8,3 - 1,5 - - -
Tuluol 100 9,6 12,9 1,1 0,6 42 21
Table 1 (continued) : Carburettor fuel 20 ~9,3 - ~1,3 - ~42 -
Limit values for the inertisation of flammable Hydrogen 20 4,3 5,2 3,4 1,8 17 12
gases and vapours at 1 bar total pressure Xylene 100 9,7 13,1 1,1 0,6 42 21
"~" = estimated value * Concentration not achievable at 20 °C
Issue: March 2012
2.3.3.3 Inertisation of explosive atmospheres from combustible Fineness Oxygen limit concentration
dusts (median (molar content in the gas
value) [ µm ] phase) [%]
The oxygen limit concentrations relevant for the inertisation of dust/air ABS mix 125 11
mixtures with nitrogen are compiled for some dusts in Table 2. Aluminium 22 5
Barium stearate < 63 13
Lignite 63 12
Note 1: Cadmium laurate < 63 14
Cadmium stearate < 63 12
Sufficient safety distances from the experimentally determined limit values Calcium stearate < 63 12
Cellulose 22 9
must be provided. Pea flour 25 15
Urea < 10 10
Note 2: Resin < 63 10
Herbicide 10 12
As with gases and vapours, the limiting oxygen concentration depends on the Wood 27 10
type of inert gas. When carbon dioxide is used as an inert gas, higher values Hops 500 17
Cocoa < 63 9
are measured for the limiting oxygen concentration than when nitrogen is used. Rubber 95 11
The limiting oxygen concentration decreases with increasing temperature and Rosin, balsam resin 440 12
increasing pressure. Lycopodium 30 7,5
Maize starch 17 9
Note 3: Malt grist 25 11
Methionine < 10 12
As many light metal dusts can react with carbon dioxide and in some cases Methylcellulose 70 10
Organic pigment < 10 12
also with nitrogen, these cannot be used as an inert gas in these special Paraformaldehyde 23 6
cases. In such cases, inert gases can be used, for example. Polyacrylonitrile 26 10
Polyethylene (HDPE) 26 10
Polymethacrylate 18 7
Rye flour type 1150 29 13
Carbon black 13 12
Table 2: Starch derivative 24 14
Oxygen limit concentration for various dusts for the inertisation of dust/air Hard coal (fat) 17 14
mixtures by nitrogen at a mixture temperature of Wax < 10 11
about 20 °C and a total pressure of about 1 bar. Wheat flour type 550 60 11
Zinc < 10 10

Issue: March 2012
Note 4: 2.3. 3.4 Inertisation of potentially explosive atmospheres from hybrid

To prevent smouldering or smouldering fires in the event of deposits of flammable mixtures
If gaseous, dusty and non-gaseous combustible substances are present at the same time, considerably
lower oxygen concentrations must be maintained than is
necessary to prevent dust explosions in order to determine the
maximum permissible oxygen concentration. The relevant oxygen concentrations must be determined separately on the basis of the
component with the lowest oxygen limit concentration.
Note 5:
Explosive dust/air mixtures can also be created by adding inert substances. 2.3.4 Prevention of hazardous explosive atmospheres by
Dusts (e.g. rock salt, sodium sulphate or phosphate) sufficiently inertised Depressurisation
can be used. In general, however, an inert dust addition of more than (1) The expected explosion pressure is usually 50 % (by mass).
eight to ten times the initial pressure. By reducing the operating
pressure to below atmospheric pressure, the expected explosion pressure can be reduced.
Explosion pressure can be reduced. If the operating pressure is
reduced below 0.1 bar, the expected explosion pressure is below
atmospheric pressure. In this case, no unauthorised overpressure is
to be expected.
(2) If the operating pressure is lowered below approx. 50 mbar, a
dangerous explosion propagation is generally no longer to be
expected.
(3) Start-up and shut-down processes must be considered separately
with regard to explosion protection.
(4) The lowered pressure must be monitored by measurement. Additional
suitable measures (e.g. temporary inertisation or temporary
avoidance of ignition sources) must be provided for operational
faults (e.g. in the event of air ingress) and start-up and shut-down
processes.

Issue: March 2012

2.4 Preventing or limiting hazardous explosive2 .4.2 Process engineering measures, design and spatialatmosphere
in the vicinity of systems and system components organisation of systems and system components
2.4.1 General information When planning a system for handling flammable substances in the
of components
vicinity systems and system , the formation of
large quantities of hazardous substances must b e prevented or
restricted at all times. For example, the filling and
as far as this is possible according to the state of the art. The following Emptying containers with flammable liquids in closed containers
The measures described above are suitable for preventing or limiting the formation of hazardous systems when both liquid and explosive
atmospheres are present. the gas compartments of the containers are connected to each other by
pipes
(vapour recovery process).
Note: Continuous procedures are generally preferable to discontinuous, batch
procedures. Work processes in neighbouring etc. can be dangerous outside the
systems and system components. Systems should be operated in such a way that no dangerous interference
occurs.
explosive atmosphere and, in the case of dusts, can also form deposits. can occur. This can be prevented, for example, by spatial separation or
mutual
In the case of dusts, particular attention must be paid to the fact that undesirable dust shielding can be achieved. The extensive portioning of
flammable deposits away from the point of discharge can lead to the formation of an explosive atmosphere, especially if the substances
are in small quantities and the simultaneous presence of only very fine-grained dust. They can
lead to the formation of explosive
by whirling up small quantities at a particular location - even with a
atmospheres
large volume of dust. - can bring safety advantages. Frequent and thorough removal
As a protective measure
(without whirling up) of the systems in buildings is therefore generally preferable,
especially with regard to dust deposits. to natural air movement.
Note: Dust deposits can also be prevented from forming an explosive

atmosphere, at least temporarily, by moistening or
covering with powdered inert materials.

Issue: March 2012
2.4.3 Tightness of system components 2.4.3.2 Permanently technically tight system components
2.4.3.1 General (1) The formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres is not to be
expected outside of the installation.
system components can be prevented by the tightness of the system component or (2) System components shall be deemed to be technically leakproof in
the long term if
can be restricted. A distinction is made between a) they are designed in such a way that, due to their construction, they are
technically
- technically tight system components in the long term, remain tight
- technically tight system components and system components with operational or
leakage of flammable substances. b) their technical tightness is constantly ensured by maintenance and
monitoring Note 1: is guaranteed.
When designing system components for handling flammable (3) system components that are technically leakproof in the long term,
their gases, liquids and dusts should be selected in such a way that they do not cause any explosion hazards
in their environment when unopened.
withstand stresses. Hazards due to abrasive stresses are (4) Permanently technically tight plant and equipment components in
accordance with paragraph 2
must be taken into account. Hazards due to reactions of the wall material with the letter a are e.g.
flammable substances/mixtures must be excluded.
1. Welded system parts with
Note 2:
- detachable components, whereby the detachable components
required for this
When selecting the materials, the corrosion behaviour must be taken into account; the following detachable pipe connections must be taken into
account when calculating the wall thickness; pitting corrosion must
be protected against as a matter of principle (exception: metal-sealing connections),
materials and, in particular, detachable connections to pipes
- detachable connections to pipelines, fittings or dummy pipes.
carry out appropriate conservation measures during downtimes.
The necessary detachable connections for this must be
are only rarely detached and are designed in the same way as the
detachable pipe connections referred to in paragraph 5,

Issue: March 2012

2. for gases, vapours, liquids:System components thatcan alsocontain sealing
Flanges with tongue and groove
elements, such as flanges with protrusion
and recess,
a. Shaft bushings with double-acting mechanical seal (e.g. - Flanges with V-grooves and V-groove seals,
e.g. pumps, agitators),
- Flanges with smooth sealing strip and special seals, such as
b. Canned motor pumps, z. e.g. soft material seals up to PN 25 bar, metal inner rim seals
c. magnetically coupled sealless pumps, or metal-encased seals, if the pump is to be used with
d. Fittings with sealing of the spindle feedthrough by means of folded use of standard flanges, a mathematical verification
bellows and
safety stuffing box, sufficient safety against the yield strength,
e. glandless fittings with permanent magnetic drive (SLMA- - metal-to-metal sealing connections in pipes larger than DN 32,
fittings). excluding cutting and clamping ring connections.
3. for dusts: system components that also contain sealing elementsFor dusts, simple flange
can, such as gaskets or clamp closures, are generally considered sufficiently
connections with
tight.
a. Shaft feedthroughs with monitored sealing air, e.g. labyrinth or
stuffing box seal
b. Valves with standard sealing systems, e.g. disc valves,
(6) Permanently technically tight connections in accordance with paragraph 2
gate valve with a closed design, valves
ball and fittings, insofar as they are rarely
letter a to the
loosened, e.g.
c. magnetically coupled, seal-less drive systems
1. the aforementioned pipework connections and
(5) Permanently technically tight pipe connections1 in accordance with paragraph 22. NPT threads (National Pipe Taper Thread) letter a are, for example
or other tapered pipe threads with sealing in the thread up to
DN 50, as long as they are not subject to alternating thermal loads (delta
1. non-detachable connections, e.g. welded,
t > 100°C) are exposed.
2. detachable connections that are rarely loosened during operation, e.g.
- Flanges with weld lip seals,
1 Hose lines are to be treated like pipework

Issue: March 2012
(7) In addition to the purely constructive measures, technical measures combined with organisational measures may be taken in accordance with
paragraph 2. (9) For monitoring purposes, one of the following measures may also be
sufficient: (b) technical measures combined with organisational measures. organisational measures may be sufficient:
measures, lead to a technically tight system component in the long term. 1. for gases and vapours:
With appropriate monitoring and maintenance, this includes
z. B. a) Inspection of the system and checking for e.g. streaks, ice formation,
Odour and noise due to leaks,
1. dynamically stressed seals, e.g. for shaft feedthroughs
b) Inspection of the system with mobile leak detectors or portable leak
detectors
on pumps,
gas warning devices,
2. thermally stressed seals on system components
c) Continuous or periodic monitoring of the atmosphere
3. mechanically stressed parts of the system, e.g. conveying of substances by automatically operating, permanently installed measuring
devices with abrasive propertiesWarning function .
4. for dusts: self-adjusting stuffing box packings for 2. for dusts:
Checking the correct fit and checking the wear limit
Inspection of the system and checking for dust leaks and deposits.
5. for dusts: single-acting sealing systems only for systems
a) without internal overpressure
Note: Appropriate preventive maintenance can reduce the scope
b) with low mechanical and thermal stress and and reduce the frequency of monitoring for leaks.
c) with low vibration load, ren.
z. e.g. on screw conveyors, trough chain conveyors
(8) The scope and frequency of monitoring and maintenance depend in detail
on the type of connection and design, mode of operation, load and
condition and properties of the materials. They should ensure technical
tightness in the long term. Care must be taken to ensure that the scope
and frequency of monitoring and maintenance to maintain technical
tightness in the long term are specified in the explosion protection
document or in documents referred to therein,
z. e.g. in an associated operating instruction or in the maintenance plan.
Issue: March 2012
2.4.3.3 Technically tight system components c) Stuffing box seal

(1) For system components that are technically leakproof, infrequent releases are to be expected. d) detachable connections in accordance with
section 2.4.3.2 that are not expected to be opened only infrequently. be opened
(2) System components are considered to be technically leakproof if they are leak-tested or leak-monitored in a
suitable manner for the application (e )
Access and inspection openings that are not only opened infrequently.
-control, e.g.
a) for gases and vapours with foaming agents or with leak detectors 2.4.3.4 Reducing operational leaks of flammable substances
devices
(1) Outside parts of the system that are neither permanently technically
leakproof nor
b) The formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres due to the escape of flammable liquids during operation must be prevented by regularly checking for dust
leaks and dust discharge . atmosphere due to operational leakage of flammable liquids,
a leak is not recognisable. gases, vapours or dust.
Note 1: Operationally-related outlets are, for example, venting and
(3) Examples of technically tight system components are:
pressure relief lines, transfer connection points, dipstick
valves, etc.
1. for gases and vapours tile, sampling points, drainage facilities and
a) Flange with smooth sealing strip and no special design features. for dust, e.g. transfer valves.
Requirements for the seal, Note 2: Other possible leakage points are non-controlled
b) Cutting and clamping ring connections in pipes larger than DN 32, Flange or housing connections (e.g. pump housings)
c) pumps whose tightness is based only on a single-acting mechanical seal. se).
seal,
d) (2) Technical measures can be taken to minimise the leakage quantities, the ignition expansion or the probability of occurrence of explosive
atmospheres. expansion or the probability of the occurrence of explosive atmospheres.
2. for dusts atmosphere if, for example:
a) Compensators 1. a full hose system is used for decanting,
b) flexible connections2 . in closed systems using vapour recovery,

Issue: March 2012

3. Ventilation and expansion lines routed into gas collection systems 2.4.4 Ventilation measures
be used, 2.4.4.1 General
4. at sampling points and dipstick valves by means of special equipment be ensure that
(1) Ventilation measures shall taken to as far as possible
only small quantities can escape the formation of potentially explosive atmospheres is prevented or
,
restricted.
5. Drainage via airlocks with a small room volume with interlocking shut-off valves. The effectiveness of a ventilation measure is determined by
various parameterised shut-off valves, metres, including strength, availability and type of air flow (quality).
6. object extraction systems can be used, (For details, see DIN EN 60079-10, date of issue: Sept. 1996,
informative appendix B).
7. the transfer containers for dusty or dust-containing products
with a flexible coating, if necessary, made of largely Note:
dust-impermeable materials, When assessing ventilation measures, it is not always possible to assume
7. can be assumed due to negative pressure operation with operational conditions can be assumed. The expected source strength
The leakage of flammable substances is avoided or reduced, flammable substances in operating and fault conditions is not always easy
can be estimated. In addition, the distribution of flammable substances in the
8. when using the negative pressure mode (e.g. 900 mbar abs.) the
room, the
flow conditions, the "dead zones" and the dilution of the explosive atmosphere
Probability of the occurrence of hazardous explosive flow conditions
The atmosphere must be taken into account. Particularly in corners,
atmosphere in the vicinity of system components (e.g. openings),
partitioned
areas, floor depressions, etc., can become very hot in the event of gases or
shaft ducts) is very low.
vapours that
are heavier than air, form hazardous explosive atmospheres. Despite
2.4.3.5 Checking the system components for leaks Ventilation measures, explosive concentrations may remain in the area of
the outlet point of flammable explosive concentrations of
systems in accordance with 2.4.3.2 paragraph 2 letter a before initial commissioning.
ventilation measures is
flammable substances may remain. An assessment of and after longer interruptions to operation, modifications and repair and
often only possible with special expertise.
or remodelling work on a larger scale as a whole or in sections to
Check for leaks. Technically leakproof installations and installations according to number (2) The formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres can only be
prevented by
2.4.3.2 Paragraph 2 letter b must also be regularly checked for leaks in accordance with a Ventilation measures must be safely avoided where an
assessment of the test plan for leak tightness is possible. maximum quantity (source strength) of any escaping gases and vapours
capable of forming an explosive atmosphere is possible and the location
of the source and the propagation conditions are sufficiently known.

Issue: March 2012
Note : Note 2: In the most favourable case, ventilation measures can be taken to
avoid
In the case of dusts, ventilation measures generally only provide sufficient protection if the dust is extracted at the point of
origin. However, ventilation measures generally only provide sufficient protection if the dust is extracted at the point of origin and dangerous dust
deposits are also reliably prevented (cf. reduction the probability of the occurrence of hazardous
in
atmospheres (zones 1 or 2 instead of explosive atmosphere (zone 1 or 2 instead of zone 1 or
2.6).
2).
Zone 0, Zone 2 instead of Zone 1) or a reduction of the
Expansion of the potentially explosive areas (zones)
In addition, the following circumstances must be taken into account: is achieved.
- The flammable gases and vapours have a density different from air Note:
and can therefore be located close to the ground, e.g. pits, gullies, inclined planes, etc. Even simple changes to the boundary conditions can influence the effective
or in the ceiling area, e.g. coffered ceilings and in particular in places significantly impair the efficiency of the ventilation.
where the airflow generated by the ventilation system is only
is relatively low or non-existent. The change in density with the 2.4.4.2 Natural ventilation
Temperature must also be taken into account.
Natural ventilation is air exchange without targeted technical means. The
- Flow obstructions can cause dead spaces in which air movement is weak or non-existent. Air exchange occurs only weakly or not at all due to density
or pressure differences in the air. neighbouring areas, triggered by temperature differences
inside/outside a room or by wind.
(3) If the local ventilation conditions in the ventilated areas under
consideration are highly inhomogeneous, the assessment must be based on
the conditions of local ventilation if the necessary driving forces of natural ventilation ensure
lowest ventilation.
sufficient air exchange, in the absence of any further additional information . Note 1: In rooms above ground level without
special ventilation and Note 1: For gases that are lighter than air, the design of the ventilation openings must not be changed due to weather conditions.
ventilation openings may not be used due to weather conditions.
of ceilings and ceiling outlets is important. Here air exchange rate in terms of air flow and structural design.
helps to support ventilation, the smooth, possibly to the of at least n = 1 can be assumed (exceptions:
Rising ceiling towards the exhaust air opening. Cassette ceilings energy-saving construction method). Industrial buildings with
ventilation
and wide cross beams or ceiling beams, the openings openings in the roof area often have a higher
prevent sufficient dilution of such gases. Air change to.

Issue: March 2012

Note 2: In cellar rooms, less natural ventilation must be used. 2.4.4.3 Technical ventilation (room ventilation)
calculate. There a r e usually only small openings and windowsTechnical ventilation is
the exchange of air using specific technical means (e.g. fans, air injectors). It leads to a reduction in flammable substances
from outside the room
within the ventilation area under consideration. If the
under consideration is low. As
technical ventilation is used as an explosion protection measure, it is
The air exchange rate must be assessed for all sides below ground level
Basement rooms can be assumed to have a guideline value of around nmust be assessed in terms of strength, quality and availability.
= 0.4.
Targeted air inlet and outlet openings allow the - Remark:
This value can increase to approximately double. A driving force in technical ventilation is either negative pressure
further increase is possible with large heat sources (e.g. with local extraction) with generally low "range" or (temperature
difference compared to outside temperature at least) positive pressure (e.g. from fresh air outlets) with high "range". The
following requirements must be observed:
Note 3: The spatial arrangement of the openings for supply air and exhaust air1 . The effectiveness of the ventilation depends on the probability of natural
convection . In the case of small rooms where
explosive atmospheres can arise or occur, the best effect is generally
achieved if the openings are to be monitored. If the openings are
located diagonally opposite each other ( cross ventilation ) , they must be
monitored for the occurrence of hazardous atmospheres. The clearly recognisable explosive atmosphere itself in
larger rooms (e.g. by gas detectors) or convection rollers can be used and
supported at least on the air flow to be monitored (e.g. by flow through corresponding
exhaust air openings in the ceiling area). monitors). Monitoring the operation of parts of the
Note 4: If structural measures are taken to ensure unhindered entry and ventilation system (e.g. monitoring the fan speed), it is generally necessary to
air outlet and are not sufficient as a driving not sufficient.
Forces for natural ventilation large areas continuously warm2
. The mixture conveyed in a potentially explosive exhaust air system must
areas with a temperature difference of at least 5 , taken
be discharged to kin areas without ignition hazards; otherwise measures must be
that are significantly higher than a temperature difference
against ignition hazards (corresponding to the zone present in the exhaust air system)
of at least 5
kin. in these areas or a flashback into the exhaust air
system must beventilation.
usual technical prevented.In these cases
natural ventilation can be equivalent in terms of explosion protection exhaust air system.
be treated as technical ventilation in accordance with number Note:This requirement is of particular importance for avoiding
2.4.4.3. of ignition hazards due to downstream exhaust air purification
systems.

Issue: March 2012
3. Intake of supply air from potentially explosive atmospheres may not cause the 2.5 Monitoring the concentration in the vicinity of plant and equipment
Do not increase the hazard. If supply air from potentially explosive parts
additional measures are therefore required (e.g. the use of 2.5.1 General information
gas detectors) are required.
(1) For the detection of hazardous explosive atmospheres, gas detectors may
be used.
4. To design the ventilation, knowledge of the location, maximum strength warning devices must be used. They serve as a basis for the and
frequency of the source of explosive atmospheres; initiation of protective measures. They are used for the manual (e.g.
leakage from sealing elements) or automatic triggering of protective measures or emergency functions
. Emergency functions for shutting down the system.
to shut down the system
Note:
2.4.4.4 Object extraction In addition to their task of warning of explosion hazards, gas
(1) If a leakage point of flammable gases, vapours or dusts from a warning device is also responsible for warning of
known to be
health hazards
(e.g. vents and feed openings), then the relevant concentrations are generally lower than the lower explosion limits by powers
of ten . The relevant concentrations for this are generally lower than the
lower explosion limits by orders of magnitude.
z. e.g. through edge extraction on open containers.
(2) The following applies to the use of gas warning devices:
(2) Extraction must be carried out on the basis of the specific parameters of the
the substances to be collected, the plant and process engineering and the 1. sufficient knowledge of the substances to be expected, the location of their
sources and the
operational conditions. Possible interference must be their maximum source strengths and the propagation conditions,
take into account. 2. a functional capability of the reference device appropriate to the
operating conditions: Devices, in particular with regard to response time, response value
and
If no special technical measures are taken, the cross-sensitivity remains,
Detection of flammable gases, vapours or dusts in the immediate vicinity 3. avoid dangerous conditions in the event of failure of individual functions
limited to the area of object extraction. of the gas warning device (availability),

4. to detect the expected substances sufficiently quickly and reliably by
selecting the appropriate number and location of the measuring
points,

Issue: March 2012

5. (4) The function of the gas warning devices must be checked at appropriate intervals after they have been installed and the protective measures to be
triggered in the device have become effective. They
must be checked at appropriate intervals. In addition, the protective
measures must be regularly maintained in this area (depending on items 1 to 4) .
required to avoid ignition sources,
6. (5) Gas warning devices must be installed and operated in such a way that manual intervention in the protective measures to be triggered
by the gas warning device and controlled automatic
sequence is possible at any time outside the area in section 5 . This
intervention must not lead to a loss of explosion safety and may only be carried out by authorised personnel.
7. No other hazards to persons may be caused by a false triggering. persons.
step.
(3) Gas warning devices for use as part of explosion protection systems
2.5.2 Gas warning devices with alarms
measures in accordance with TRBS 2152 Part 2/TRGS 722 must be taken with regard to the
(1) The measuring points of the gas detectors must be suitably selected in the vicinity of the points of the intended application. In doing
so, the points at which the occurrence of explosive atmospheres is to be expected in
accordance with the specifications made by the manufacturer in the operating instructions. The alarm threshold of the device
must be set to a concentration at least as far below the lower explosion limit as possible be such that, after the alarm has been sounded, the
.
measures can become effective in good time.
The effectiveness of gas warning devices can be found in Annex II,
Sections 1.5.5 to 1.5.7 of Directive 94/9/EC (2) It must be checked whether organisational measures alone are
sufficient to prevent hazardous explosive atmospheres.
Note 2: The information contained in the "Raw Materials" trade association's
and Chemical Industry " (www.exinfo.de, page ID concentrations
as low as is feasible for operational reasons.
1316.0) are considered suitable. reasons is still appropriate.

Issue: March 2012

2.5.3 Gas warning systems with automatic switching functions (2) These measures therefore generally have an influence on the
(1) In addition to raising the alarm, gas warning devices can also expansion of the hazardous
be used for additional
explosive atmosphere or for
functions. The system remains in operation. The measures can affect either the atmosphere outside or the
atmosphere .
inside the system components. When a switching threshold is reached
or at concentrations above this level but still harmless, the gas warning
device triggers measures via automatic switching operations.
which experience has shown can lead to the formation of hazardous explosive atmospheres. 2.6 Measures to remove dust deposits in the surrounding
area
atmosphere. For example, when reaching the of dust-carrying system parts and containers can
Switching threshold for special ventilation equipment by the gas warning device
(1) Dust deposits in the vicinity of dust-carrying system components
the system can be put into operation. In the plant section, further
and containers should be avoided wherever possible. Unavoidable
measures, e.g. reducing the internal pressure,
Dust deposits must be removed regularly.
Shutting off the leaking parts of the system, inertisation, switching off
effective ignition sources. (2) Regular cleaning measures must therefore be carried out in work and
operating rooms, e.g. on the basis of cleaning schedules,
(2) These measures therefore generally have an influence on the type, scope and frequency of cleaning measures and the extent of
the hazardous explosive atmosphere or on the respective responsibilities. The specifications regarding the
probability of the occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres must be adapted to the individual circumstances of each case. (see also
TRBS 2152 Part 1/TRGS 721).
2.5. 4 Gas warning systems with automatic triggering of emergency
Note:
Functions
(1) If the concentration reaches a switching threshold to be defined, which is usually Particular attention should be paid to poorly visible (e.g. higher) or
above the switching threshold according to number 2.5.2 or number surfaces that are difficult to access and on which considerable
2.5.3, are detected by the gas warning device above the quantities specified in point quantities of dust can be deposited. In addition, it must be ensured that
2.5.3, additional measures for the immediate removal of dust deposits must
be taken in the event of major dust release due to operational
malfunctions (e.g. damage or bursting of containers, leaks).
Issue: March 2012
3 Zoning of potentially explosive atmospheres Note 3: Zone 2 may include, among others:
(1) Unless hazardous explosive atmospheres can be prevented completely - areas surrounding zones 0 or 1,
In order to avoid explosion hazards, it is necessary to divide hazardous areas into
zones around technically tight pipework and plant
components. parts.
(2) The zone classification determines the scope of the measures to be taken Note 4: As a rule, zone 20 can only include the interior of containers
to ensure safety and health protection or the interior of plant components (e.g. containers,
pipelines , apparatus).
can be jeopardised.
(3) With regard to the zone definition, reference is made to number 2.2 of "TRBS 2152 - Part Note 5: Zone 21 may include areas
inside plants (e.g. silos, mixers) or areas in the immediate Remark 1:
General/TRGS 720
Zone 0 may generally only include the inside of containers or the immediate vicinity of plants (e.g. dust extraction points or dust extraction points).
the surroundings of installations (e.g. dust extraction points or
filling stations). This can also include areas
or the interior of plant components (evaporators, reaction
in which deposited dust is present in such large quantities.
vessels, etc.).
that even in normal operation it is occasionally
Note 2: Zone 1 may include, among other things for raising hazardous explosive dust/air
- the immediate vicinity of zone 0, air mixtures can occur.
- the immediate vicinity of charging openings, Note 6: Zone 22 may also include areas in the vicinity of dust
- the immediate area around filling and emptying equipment. containing equipment, if dust is only present in
tions, non-explosive concentration and can be
- the immediate area around easily breakable system components only form dust deposits in the longer term, which also
made of glass, ceramics and the like, only briefly to dangerous explosive dust/vapours.
air mixtures can be whirled up.
- the immediate area around insufficiently sealing
stuffing boxes, e.g. on pumps and gate valves, (4) If there is any doubt about the division into zones, there must be
- the inside of equipment such as vaporisers, reactors and vessels with special measures to
reduce the risk of explosion , the scope of the protective measures
must be based on the highest possible probability of the occurrence of hazardous explosive atmospheres. explosive atmosphere. For
this reason, in the cases,

Issue: March 2012
in which dusts with gases, vapours or mists can together form a hazardous
explosive atmosphere (hybrid mixtures), the division of the potentially
explosive atmosphere into zones 0, 1 and 2 as well as zones 20, 21 and
22 must be considered.
(5) The probability of the presence of an explosive atmosphere can be
reduced by taking appropriate measures in accordance with sections 2.2 to
2.6. This must be taken into account when categorising zones.
(6) A functionally safe, easily monitored operational inertisation with
appropriate measures in the event of inertisation failure (e.g. shutdown of
the system) generally enables a reduction by one level compared to the
non-inertised state (e.g. from zone 1 without inertisation to zone 2 with
inertisation).
(7) Inertisation, which is still effective when a foreseeable fault occurs,
generally allows a reduction of two levels compared to the non-
inertised state (e.g. from zone 0 without inertisation to zone 2 with
inertisation).
(8) Inertisation, which is still effective when two independent faults occur,
can be used to convert a Zone 0 or 20 hazardous area into a non-
hazardous area.
(9) Paragraphs 6 to 8 also apply analogously to ventilation measures.

Issue: March 2012
Annex to TRBS 2152 Part 2/TRGS 722
1 Design of inertisation
1.1 Partial inertisation
A calculation example for partial inertisation is given below: 3. this reduces the maximum permissible oxygen concentration to
1. A certain process with propane (as the only flammable substance) is (9,8 - 2 - 1) % = 6,8 %
at approx. 20 °C and 1 bar with nitrogen in such a way that the inside is defined. In order to take into account the properties of the oxygen
overpressure of the system components and pipelines, no dangerous explosive atmosphere (e.g. measurement deviations, alarm delays).
. The
monitoring device (e.g. measurement deviations, alarm delays)
oxygen concentration of the gas phase can The oxygen concentration of the gas phase can still be monitored at an
alarm threshold below the maximum permissible oxygen concentration. oxygen concentration. The safety distance required for this
2. The oxygen limit concentration is taken from Table 1 (molar content is approx. 3 % in the present case, so that the alarm threshold at
Cmax 02 = 9.8 %, old designation Cmax 02 = 9.8 % by volume). In the present (6,8 - 3) % = 3,8 %
case, it is known that, due to the process, the oxygen concentration
is too low. If the oxygen concentration measured in the process exceeds
can fluctuate locally and over time by ± 1 % (mole content). Furthermore
this value, it the alarm threshold of 3.8 % (molar content), the protective
functions are triggered so quickly that after the alarm has been triggered, the protective functions are triggered.
the oxygen concentration by a maximum of 1 % when they are triggered triggered.
can increase. A fluctuation of 2 % is assumed here, as with a
possible fluctuation of ± 1 % around an average value, the highest
value (which in this example must not exceed 9.8 % - the value of the
oxygen limit concentration) and the lowest value (which may be present
at the location of the oxygen concentration measurement, for example)
may be 2 % apart.

Issue: March 2012
1.2 T otal inertisation b) Carbon dioxide as an inert gas:

The following i s a calculation example for total inertisation with two
different inert gases: of carbon dioxide to hexane vapour according to Table 1 is at least
1. hexane should be pressurised in a container at 20 °C with inert gas (without air) to below32 . The analogue calculation shows that in order to
achieve the protection target, the pressure must be such that a total pressure ofexplosive atmosphere
cannot occur in the open aira leak in the gas space of the container due to the addition of carbon dioxide. Hexane (32x 0.16 +
0.16) bar = 5.3 bar
has a saturated vapour pressure of approx. 0.16 bar at 20 °C. (corresponding to an overpressure of 4.3 bar).
a) Nitrogen as an inert gas:
Table 1 shows that for inertisation with stick-
the ratio of the mole fractions and thus, to a good approximation
of the partial pressures of nitrogen and hexane vapour at least 42 2. Sources of knowledge for the zone classifications
i.e. the partial pressure of the nitrogen must be at least For certain applications, the DGUV's collection of
examples for BGR 104 can be used as a source of information for the classification of potentially
explosive atmospheres in
(42 x 0.16) bar = 6.7 bar zones can be used.
lie. If the nitrogen is mixed homogeneously with the hexane
vapour in the container, a total pressure of
(6.7 + 0.16) bar = 6.9 bar
(corresponding to an overpressure against the atmosphere of 5.9
bar) is required in the tank.

Disclaimer and copyright
This edition has been compiled conscientiously and carefully. Nevertheless, no guarantee can be given that the information corresponds
exactly to the adopted text and is necessarily complete, accurate and up-to-date. No responsibility is accepted for the content provided.
The user is responsible for the correct selection and the consequences of using or not using the information provided, as well as the
intended or achieved results. In particular, no liability is accepted for any consequential damage arising from the use of the information
(including, without limitation, direct and indirect damage due to personal injury, loss of profit, business interruption or any financial
loss). The official versions of the official announcements are legally binding.
Imprint:
KÜPPERS Engineering
DIpl.-Ing. Andreas Küppers
An der Flachsroth 32
52525 Waldfeucht

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TRBS 2152 Part 2

Hazardous explosive atmosphere

Preliminary remark Contents

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

2.3 Preventing or restricting explosive atmospheres Note 1:

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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(3) For partial inertisation, the oxygen limit concentration specified in

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Partial inertisation Total inertisation

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Partial inertisation Total inertisation

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Note 4: 2.3. 3.4 Inertisation of potentially explosive atmospheres from hybrid

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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Note: Dust deposits can also be prevented from forming an explosive

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Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

2.4.3.3 Technically tight system components c) Stuffing box seal

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

Technical rules Hazardous explosive atmospheres TRBS 2152 Part 2

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© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

© KÜPPERS Engineering Published by KÜPPERS Engineering www.druckgeraete-online.de

Annex to TRBS 2152 Part 2/TRGS 722

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1.2 T otal inertisation b) Carbon dioxide as an inert gas:

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