602080

research-article2015
ACH0010.1177/1032373215602080Accounting HistoryVosslamber

Article Accounting History

Accounting History

After the earth moved: 2015, Vol. 20(4) 518­–535

© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1032373215602080

earthquake relief and recovery

ach.sagepub.com

in early twentieth-century
New Zealand

Rob Vosslamber
University of Canterbury, New Zealand

Abstract
There has been little discussion of what archival accounting evidence can contribute to an understanding
of a society’s response to a natural disaster. This article focuses on two severe earthquakes which struck
New Zealand in 1929 and 1931 and makes two main contributions to accounting history. First, by discussing
evidence from archival sources, it contributes to the literature on accounting in a disaster. This provides
a basis for future theory building and for future comparative research related to the response to more
recent natural disasters such as the 2010–11 Canterbury earthquakes. Secondly, it questions the conclusions
of recently published research concerning the role of central and local government in this and recent
earthquakes.

Keywords
accountability, archive, earthquake, government, natural disaster, New Zealand

Introduction
New Zealanders experience frequent earthquakes, but few earthquakes cause damage or loss of
life. However, in 1929 17 people perished when an earthquake struck the remote South Island set-
tlement of Murchison. Two years later, 256 lives were lost in the Hawke’s Bay earthquake, which
devastated the cities of Napier and Hastings on the east coast of the North Island (see Figure 1).1
The devastation caused by these earthquakes resulted from the interaction of geophysical forces
and society (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; cf. Quarantelli, 1982). While these geophysical forces are
beyond human control and are popularly referred to as “acts of God”, the social system is largely
a human construction which directly affects the extent of loss of life, property damage, and speed

Corresponding author:
Rob Vosslamber, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800,
Christchurch, 8140, New Zealand.
Email: rob.vosslamber@canterbury.ac.nz

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Vosslamber 519

Figure 1. Location of the Murchison (1929), Hawke’s Bay (1931), and Canterbury (2010–2011)
earthquakes.

of subsequent recovery following a natural disaster (Abbott, 2014). This is tragically illustrated by
the contrasting progress of Canterbury and Haiti after each recently suffered similar earthquakes
(Bennett et al., 2014; Farmer, 2011).
Relief efforts to locate dead and injured, remove hazards, ensure the supply of food, water and
shelter, and restore power, transport and communication commence immediately after an earth-
quake. In the subsequent recovery, damaged properties and services are rebuilt. Both the relief and
the recovery phases involve the procurement and allocation of scarce resources from both private
and public sources.
Burchell et al. (1980) note that the core functions of accounting include the provision of infor-
mation for decision making, the allocation of resources, and the maintenance of institutional
accountability and stewardship. These functions are particularly relevant in a crisis, and accounting
provides a rich source of evidence of the social response to a disaster. Although this evidence can
provide a basis for subsequent theory building, few studies have been based upon archival

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520 Accounting History 20(4)

accounting evidence pertaining to natural disasters. This article reviews accounting evidence
related to the relief and recovery following the 1929 and 1931 earthquakes. Informed by such evi-
dence, it contributes to an understanding of society’s response to these earthquakes.
Miley and Read (2013) similarly used the perspectives of accounting history to illustrate
changes in the relationship between central and local government in the wake of three large New
Zealand earthquakes, including the 1929 and 1931 earthquakes that are the focus of this article.
They concluded that central government played a much greater role in post-earthquake recovery in
the Murchison and Hawke’s Bay earthquakes than after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010/2011.
This article questions Miley and Read’s interpretation of the role of government in the response to
the earlier earthquakes, and concludes that there was a clear demarcation between the responsibili-
ties of local and central government in 1929 and 1931.
This article adds to the literature on accounting and accountability in the context of disaster, and
answers the call for more research on the relationship between local and central government and
the private sector, and on the role of accounting in other than for-profit organizations, including
local government (Sargiacomo and Gomes, 2013). It illustrates the fecundity of accounting evi-
dence in enhancing retrospective knowledge of social institutions. In reviewing archival evidence,
the article provides a basis for future historical comparative studies and contributes to the basis for
theory building (Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, 2003). In doing so it also responds to Miley and
Read’s concern that, “Perhaps more accounting histories of local government accounting are
required before theory can be developed, and the current lack of theory in this field reflects the lack
of local government accounting histories” (2013: 450).
The next section discusses prior literature and the approach adopted in this article. In particular,
it reviews the ongoing debate about the scope of accounting history and the place of the archive in
accounting history research. The following section places the 1929 and 1931 earthquakes in their
institutional context by reference to the New Zealand government’s response to need, before dis-
cussing the funding and administration of the relief and recovery operations on the West Coast and
Hawke’s Bay respectively. Implications are drawn in the concluding sections, and suggestions are
provided for further research.

Literature review and approach

Accounting and accountability are social practices evident in a wide variety of contexts and with a
wide range of purposes. Accounting refers to the practice of record keeping, usually (but not exclu-
sively) of a financial nature, that is useful for decision making in the allocation of resources and
responsibility in a context of scarcity (Davis et al., 1982). Accountability is the “liability to account
for and answer for one’s conduct, performance of duties, etc.” (OED Online, 2014). As a social
activity, accounting reflects and structures the social institutions which determine how a society
responds to an event. The records produced by accounting provide evidence of a wide variety of
past events, including natural disasters, and of social norms and practices.
Accounting has been implicated in a variety of human catastrophes, including slavery (Fleischman
and Oldroyd, 2008), the Highland clearances (Walker, 2003), the Irish Potato Famine (O’Regan,
2010), and the Holocaust (Funnell, 1998). Based on historical evidence, the authors concluded that
the effects of accounting extend well beyond a mere passive recording of events. Rather, accounting
can disguise evil (Funnell, 1998), support and question abhorrent processes (Fleischman and
Oldroyd, 2008), and legitimate social engineering and imperialism (O’Regan, 2010). In the context
of human disaster, accounting has the capacity to reflect and constitute social norms.
There is little research, however, that considers accounting in the context of natural disasters.
Shimizu and Fujimura (2010) described the accounting practices of a Japanese trading enterprise

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Vosslamber 521

in the great Kanto earthquake of 1923 by reference to the entity’s internal accounting records. In a
New Zealand context, Miley and Read (2013) compared the response of local and central govern-
ment following severe earthquakes in New Zealand in 1929 and 1931 with those following the
Christchurch earthquakes of 2010/2011. These articles enhance knowledge about past events, and
demonstrate the social significance of accounting by situating archival accounting evidence within
an institutional context. They also address Hopwood’s (1985: 365) concern that there has been:

a tendency for technical histories of accounting to be written in isolation of their social, economic and
institutional contexts. Accounting seemingly has been abstracted from its social domain with many of the
understandings that are available tending to present a view of the autonomous and unproblematic
development of the technical.

The “new accounting history” (Miller et al., 1991: 395) challenged this technical focus, and brought
historiographical concerns to the foreground of accounting history (Carnegie, 2014).
Debates within accounting history indicate a division between traditional evidence-based
accounting history, and the new accounting history with its concern for theory and theory building.2
A key aspect of this debate is the role of evidence. Although traditional accounting historians rely on
evidence to understand the past, they have been criticized for failing to recognize that their interpre-
tation of evidence was theory-laden, that they necessarily drew on, and deployed, a metahistory
(Miller and Napier, 1993). Resort to the archive could be little more than an empiricist ideology, a
fallacious and unsupportable claim to independence and objectivity (Sy and Tinker, 2005, cf. Tyson
and Oldroyd, 2007). Instead, the new accounting history emphasized the importance of theory and
questioned the priority that had been given to evidence in studies of accounting history.
New accounting historians argued for the need to go beyond the appearance of unrelenting pro-
gress suggested by conventional accounting history (Miller and Napier, 1993). Rather than view-
ing history from the standpoint of the present, they promoted analysis of the local conditions out of
which accounting practices emerged, and extended the boundaries of accounting history beyond
technical questions of origins to include a range of methods and approaches, and a broad under-
standing of what constitutes the archive (Carnegie, 1996).3
Recently, Carnegie (2014: 736) expressed the concern that some researchers might be “more
interested in exploiting opportunities for theory innovation or development than in amassing and
digesting the evidence which underpins their research”. Without an evidential basis, theory-focused
scholars could be challenged by reference to primary archival material (Carnegie and Napier, 1996;
Napier, 1989). While recognizing the limitations of evidence, Fleischman, Mills and Tyson (1996:
69) argued that there was a place for both archival researchers and those focused on theory, since
“archival researchers … make an important contribution to the discipline, just as do those histori-
ans who write so profoundly and persuasively but without recourse to primary source material”.
This article bridges these two approaches and contributes to the accounting history literature by
addressing the role of accounting in an under-researched context, namely natural disaster. It dis-
cusses archival evidence which provides the basis for an improved understanding of the past. This
evidence provides a basis for subsequent theory development, both positively by providing evi-
dence upon which theory may be developed, and negatively, by questioning the conclusions of
recent research.

Approach
Accounting creates a range of archival evidence, including source documentation such as invoices
and purchase orders, minute books, and insurance and related claims. This article is based on

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522 Accounting History 20(4)

primary evidence held at New Zealand’s national archive and at local libraries, complemented by
a range of secondary sources. Since these resources are mediated through the researcher, there is a
danger that the researcher rather than the past is speaking (Fleischman and Tyson, 2003). To avoid
this, a range of sources is used, and this evidence is treated within the relevant New Zealand con-
text to provide a narrative of the responsibility for post-earthquake relief and recovery.
Since both the evidence and the researcher’s time to locate and review it are limited, the inter-
pretation is necessarily tentative. Although it may be true that “an objective knowledge of the past
can only be obtained through the subjective experience of the scholar” (Stanford, 1986: 27), this
article accepts that “there was a real past for historians to study” (Stanford, 1986: 27), since “the
past does speak through the sources, and is recoverable through them” (Evans, 1997: 126).

Background
The respective responsibilities of local government, central government and the private sector in
responding to an earthquake are likely to reflect established institutional norms, but applied to an
unusual situation. The evidence left by accounting, “a profoundly normalising activity” (Miller and
Napier, 1993: 645), confirms and illustrates these norms and how they change.
Responsibility for earthquake relief and recovery in New Zealand could rest with the private
sector, local government, central government, or a mix thereof. Prior to the introduction of “cradle
to grave” social security by the First Labour Government in 1938 (Gustafson, 1986), central gov-
ernment played a limited role in relieving personal distress. The relief of distress was largely
funded and administered locally (Thomson, 1998; Labrum, 2009; McClure, 1998), as was local
government itself, which was funded by local authority rates and loans, aided by some central
government subsidization of local road and hospital boards (New Zealand Government, 1931).
Local authorities (commonly referred to in New Zealand as “local bodies”) comprise locally
elected and legally independent entities accountable to their constituents. Prior to restructuring in
the 1980s, they comprised a wide range of entities including city, borough and county councils, as
well as harbour, road, drainage, water supply, electric power, fire, and hospital boards, all created
by, and subordinate to, Parliament (Ashby, 1949; O’Dea, 1960; Stephens, 1949). Local bodies had
no powers, including to levy rates or to borrow, unless granted either explicitly or implicitly by
Parliament (Stephens, 1949). This reflects the sovereignty of Parliament to tax, and Parliament’s
desire to control the possibility of a local authority “circumvent[ing] any legislative restriction on
taking powers by raising money by way of loan instead of by taxation” (Stephens, 1949: 21).
At the time of the Murchison and Hawke’s Bay earthquakes, responsibility for local government
expenditure was clear (New Zealand Government, 1928: 671f.):

with the exception of subsidies on rates and occasional grants for special works, all expense is borne
locally. … at the present time, although the credit of the State is still available for the benefit of those local
authorities requiring loans, … they are to all intents and purposes self-supporting.

Local authorities performed and paid for a range of functions, including the relief of distress. Until
the Great Depression, this “was almost wholly the responsibility of the local hospital and charitable
aid board. Economic distress was conceived of as originating locally, and hence relief was admin-
istered locally” (Stephens, 1949: 15). Local authorities were also solely responsible for local assets,
including non-national roads and hospitals, but central government provided partial funding by
way of matching grants (Sutch, 1956).
Although local government was responsible, central government was concerned about effi-
ciency at all levels of government, and local authorities were required to report to central

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Vosslamber 523

government (Ashby, 1949). In the 1920s, central government continued its preoccupation with
business methods in government, including “proper account-keeping in government departments”
(McKinnon, 2003: 89), and “applying principles of commercial accounting to state activities in
New Zealand” (McKinnon, 2003: 91).

Summary
At the time of the 1929 and 1931 earthquakes there was a “complex dance” (Miley and Read,
2013) between local government, central government and the private sector, but responsibility for
local body funding and spending largely rested at the local level, overseen by central government.
The focus on self-help and concern for efficiency suggest that, even in the context of crisis, central
government would require careful accounting and accountability of resources, even if these were
sourced and funded locally. The Great Depression severely constrained the government (McKinnon,
2003; Sinclair, 1991), but past experience suggested that even in prosperous times the govern-
ment’s response to a disaster was likely to be limited. In particular, like accounting itself, the gov-
ernment’s response was characterized by a concern to maintain institutional accountability and
stewardship (Burchell et al., 1980). This is borne out by the response to the Murchison and Hawke’s
Bay earthquakes.

Murchison Earthquake, 1929

On 17 June 1929 the remote Murchison region of the West Coast of the South Island of New
Zealand experienced a severe earthquake which caused 17 deaths and significant property damage.
The Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, immediately authorized the transmission of limited discre-
tionary funds for emergency relief (Ward, 1929b).
The public contributed to a large number of mayoral, newspaper and other relief funds, with
subscriptions from the public totalling almost £190,000 by 31 March 1930 (House of Representatives,
1930: 14f). These funds were expended by local relief committees established by local citizens to
address relief questions and to allocate relief aid. Local committees addressed a range of issues,
including restoration of property, medical treatment, clothing, food, and accommodation
(Earthquake Relief Fund, 1930). They also provided annuities for widows. A decade before the
social welfare provisions of the Social Security Act 1938, these relief funds were a private sector
response to a disaster.
Central government sought to control these funds and appointed a Central Earthquake Committee
to administer relief contributions made by the general public (Ward, 1929b). Chaired by the Prime
Minister, the Committee included the Leader of the Opposition, the Members of the area most
affected by the earthquakes, and the mayors of the four main centres. At its initial meeting concern
was expressed that “a check is kept on those who might attempt to get money under false pre-
tences” (Earthquake Disaster, 1929). Wellington’s mayor expressed relief that a central body would
be monitoring the (privately subscribed) funds (Earthquake Disaster, 1929).
Despite this oversight exercised by central government’s Central Committee, most relief funds
did not come from central government but from the private sector, and were administered by local
relief committees. As an example, two weeks after the earthquake, residents established the
Karamea Relief Committee. Damage to roads and telegraph lines had isolated the Karamea region.
The Committee’s minute book records their activities in coordinating relief and recovery efforts,
and its decisions concerning the allocation of relief aid. On 2 August 1929 the Karamea committee
transferred the balance on hand to the Central Relief Committee, but continued to draw relief funds
from the Central Committee from an imprest account (Karamea Relief Committee, 1929).

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524 Accounting History 20(4)

Aside from the immediate relief funds, Parliament did not vote any specific funds for personal
property or local government losses. Ward (1929a), the Prime Minister, specifically rejected the
suggestion that the government should offer a pound for pound subsidy of the amount raised by the
public, since the government’s expenditure on public (but not private or local) infrastructure repairs
and replacement would vastly exceed such a subsidy.

Summary
The government’s response to the 1929 earthquake highlights the stability of contemporary institu-
tional norms despite a disaster. Central government provided limited immediate relief funds, and
restored public assets. It also ensured accountability for privately subscribed relief funds by placing
these under the oversight of a central relief committee. Neither local authority nor private property
damage was paid for by the central government, but from private sources via the relief fund.

Hawke’s Bay earthquake, 1931

On the 3rd of February 1931, a severe earthquake struck the Hawke’s Bay region on the east coast
of the North Island (McConnochie, 2004). This earthquake devastated the cities of Napier (popula-
tion 16,025) and Hastings (population 10,850) as well as outlying townships (Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research, 1933). Casualties and property losses were considerably higher
than in the Murchison earthquake.
Despite the constraints of the Great Depression, the scale of the disaster motivated an unprece-
dented government response. An official report noted that, “some £2,500,000 was paid by the
Government and by insurance companies in respect of damage done” (Department of Scientific
and Industrial Research, 1933: 3). The cost of the earthquake to the State was estimated at
£1,770,000 (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1933: 35). However, as discussed
below, the latter figure included £1,090,000 advanced to businesses and local bodies from the
Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Fund, most of which were repayable loans and thus constituted an
asset of, rather than an expense to, the State. It also included £100,000 of “assistance from [the]
Unemployment Fund” presumably for work undertaken by the unemployed – a cost the State
would have incurred regardless of the earthquake. Excluding these items leaves a balance of
£580,000. It is unclear how much of this was due directly to the earthquake, as opposed to ongoing
operating costs of, for example, the railways or the armed forces. In any event, the government
contribution to relief and recovery was small compared to total losses incurred.4 Looking beyond
official statements, and consistent with past practice such as at Murchison, the response to the
earthquake was largely localized and private, rather than publicly coordinated and funded.

Immediate response
Official reports suggest that central government played a leading role in the relief efforts in the
weeks following the earthquake. The government provided over £3,000 “to ensure that proper
provision was made for the immediate sufferers” (Forbes, 1931). Forbes, the Prime Minister,
noted that:

… the immediate personal needs of the residents were in substantial measure provided for by the health,
railway, defence and native departments … In the measures taken subsequently to provide for the return
of sufferers to their homes very great help was given by the Public Works Department in the repair of
dwellings and in the restoration of public services. (Forbes, 1931: 3f.)

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Vosslamber 525

However, Forbes overstated the role of central government. The private sector subscribed
almost £400,000 to relief funds.
Relief efforts, which commenced immediately, were coordinated locally. In Napier, an
Emergency Relief Committee was established comprising a Minister of the Crown, the Mayor, the
Chair of the Hospital Board, the local MP and others. This Emergency Relief Committee estab-
lished several subcommittees to address essential matters such as sanitation and water, demolition
and safety, food distribution, and shelter. The Emergency Relief Committee was disbanded upon
the appointment of two Commissioners who, due to the extent of damage in Napier, acted in place
of the Napier Borough Council for two years from 11 March 1931.
At its first meeting, the Napier Emergency Relief Committee noted that “the Government would
provide equipment and food but the local committee must arrange distribution” (Napier Emergency
Committee, 1931a). However, where possible, relief was provided on a user pays basis, and
detailed accounting was required. Payments were only to be made “on presentation of claims on
the Official Voucher Form” (Hawke’s Bay Tribune Earthquake Edition – No. 2, 1931). To receive
supplies gratis, recipients required an order signed by an officer of the Salvation Army; otherwise
recipients were required to pay for relief supplies unless they were incapacitated or unemployed
(Napier Emergency Committee, 1931b). The same rule applied to food (Napier Food Control
Committee, 1931), while workers living at relief camps were charged for their meals. Within a
week a system was instigated whereby “all in need of relief will be registered as unemployed then
employed as relief workers” (Hawke’s Bay Tribune Earthquake Edition – No. 7, 1931b).
Identification cards were issued to ensure that only residents received support (Hawke’s Bay
Tribune Earthquake Edition – No. 7, 1931b).
In general, personal relief was provided on the basis of need, and not by right, and careful
accounting ensured this. Accountability, even in the midst of crisis, was a priority, and the process
of distributing aid mirrored pre-existing social norms: personal responsibility; aid for need and not
by right; cost recovery where possible; local provision but central control; and careful accounting.
In respect of property damage, the central government’s Public Works Department was
instructed to demolish ruins and clear debris. However, individual owners would be responsible for
the cost of clearing each particular section (Napier Property Owners, 1931). Private property was
a private responsibility, and the possession of private property implied the responsibility, if not the
means, to repair it. Councillor Morse, the Mayor of Napier, commented that, “The government will
not pay for the clearing of all sections [i.e. plots of land] but will consider each case on its merits
and if funds are available will pay for the clearing of sections where circumstances warrant this”
(Napier Property Owners, 1931). Although administered by the government, these funds were
largely provided by the general public.
The immediate relief efforts were short-lived. Less than two months after the earthquake, the
Central Committee returned responsibility for decisions concerning relief to the local Hospital and
Charitable Aid Boards (Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Relief Fund, 1931). However, the Central
Committee confirmed that local committees were authorized to refund from the local relief fund all
relief granted by the Hospital and Charitable Aid Boards. Reimbursement was also envisaged (if
funds permitted) for tents provided by the government, and for rail transport.

Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Relief Funds

The remaining activity of the local relief committees was the distribution of relief funds totalling
almost £400,000 which had been raised by the public. Of this amount £241,000 assisted with
repairs to 8,500 dwellings (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1933: 34). Few
houses were covered by insurance, since most fire policies specifically excluded cover for

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526 Accounting History 20(4)

earthquakes (Reed, 1936). Even where there was a policy, the sum insured was often insufficient
to cover the loss.5 In the absence of comprehensive social security, funds were also all set aside to
maintain 110 widows and dependents who suffered from the earthquake as the result of death or
injury in the family (Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Relief Fund, 1932).
As in Murchison, local relief committees were required to operate in accordance with “definite
directions of the central committee” (Forbes, 1931: 8). Formal and detailed applications with sup-
porting evidence had to be made to the Central Committee for repairs to dwellings, and these were
dealt with by local subcommittees. Incomplete applications were returned to the applicants for
completion. All applications were carefully vetted, and funds were allocated based on need, not full
reinstatement. One applicant was reminded that “only essential repairs are allowable” (Hastings
Earthquake Relief Committee, 1931a), and another was advised that part of his claim was “an
improvement and is not a matter which can be paid by the Central Committee” (Hastings Earthquake
Relief Committee, 1931b).
Since the relief fund was limited and the level of claims unknown, all advances were initially by
way of loan. An early applicant was advised that it was anticipated that a certain amount will be a
free grant, but to what extent was not yet known, and they would be advised in due course as to
repayment (Hastings Earthquake Relief Committee, 1931c). Another applicant was informed that
loans of up to £100 would be repayable in no more than 12 monthly instalments (Hastings
Earthquake Relief Committee, 1931d). This led a disgruntled applicant to write:

I understand that this money was to be a free grant out of the moneys given by the people of other parts of
New Zealand to help us in the earthquake area. If that is so why have I to be bound over to pay it back in
these instalments? If I have to pay it back I would rather have nothing to do with it. (Hastings Earthquake
Relief Committee, 1931e)

Although central government did not contribute money to the relief funds, it provided oversight.
As in Murchison, local relief committees were supervised and controlled by a Central Committee,
which was chaired by the Prime Minister and met several times in 1931 and 1932.6 This Committee
set policy and confirmed the activities of local committees.
The actions of the local relief committees were (retrospectively) ratified in the Hawke’s Bay
Earthquake Relief Funds Act 1931, which “provided for the administration and control of funds
raised wholly or partly by Private Subscription for those affected by the Hawke’s Bay earthquake”
(Preamble). The Act ratified the work of the Central Relief Committee in receiving and administer-
ing funds contributed for the relief of sufferers (s. 3), vested all earthquake relief funds in the
Central Committee (ss. 5 and 9), circumscribed the use of such funds (s. 13), provided for the audit
of these funds (s. 14), and validated transactions made in good faith prior to enactment (s. 17).
The Act mirrored the government’s role following the 1929 Murchison earthquake in centrally
administering and monitoring privately-sourced aid, and confirmed the extant institutional arrange-
ments in New Zealand, central control of privately-sourced funds, with delegated authority to the
relief funds. Moreover, there was no universal entitlement to relief. Instead, individual cases were
investigated, recorded, and assessed, while existing local channels (such as the local Charitable Aids
Boards and the Salvation Army) were used to control and distribute aid. Careful accounting and
audit were designed to ensure accountability and to maintain extant institutional arrangements.

Rehabilitation
Recovery and rehabilitation followed the immediate relief phase. As with relief, much of the recov-
ery was financed from private sources. However, the government assisted by establishing a

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Vosslamber 527

rehabilitation fund under the Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act 1931, which authorized the Minister of
Finance to make payments by way of loan or grant not exceeding £1,250,000 in total to applicants
who had suffered loss or damage due to the earthquake (s. 41). A further £250,000 was made avail-
able for loans to local authorities. Applications for assistance were to be made to the Hawke’s Bay
Rehabilitation Committee (HBRC), established under the Act (s. 42). Assistance was not automatic
or generalized. Rather, and similar to the administration of relief funds, an application with sup-
porting evidence had to be provided by the applicant (s. 43). Loans and grants were a first charge
upon the land in favour of the Crown, and grants were repayable if the land was sold within five
years (s. 47).
Barnard (1931), the Opposition Labour Party Member of Parliament for Napier, criticized the
adequacy of this fund and proposed an amendment permitting the government to borrow £4,000,000
to rehabilitate the earthquake area. Barnard also expressed concern that much of the £1,500,000
would be distributed by way of loan, not grant. True to his radicalism (Atkinson, 2012), he com-
mented that, “if this House would agree to restore everybody’s losses 100 per cent. by way of free
grant, I should be extremely happy” (Barnard, 1931: 746). The House would not. Only £34,000 of
the £1,250,000 was distributed as grants, and £804,000 as loans (Conly, 1981). The £250,000 local
body fund was distributed entirely on a loan basis.
At its first meeting the HBRC adopted rules of procedure and a policy statement which stressed
accountability: applications would only be considered “when made in the prescribed form”; the
HBRC, based in Wellington would confirm “compliance with formalities”; would “forthwith
obtain such reports and valuations from Government Departments, local authorities, and other
sources as are deemed necessary, for the verification of the figures and facts supplied”; and decide
“what further investigations (if any) are necessary and proper” (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation
Committee, 1931c). Moreover, the HBRC operated under the watchful eye of the Minister of
Finance, who made detailed and specific comments which at times overruled the Committee’s
recommendations.7
The HBRC Policy Statement reflected contemporary norms. Although the HBRC’s Chairman
acknowledged that the Act used “the very widest possible terms … to denote the kind of assistance
that may be given” (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Committee, 1931a), he suggested that the HBRC
would not recommend grants or loans to applicants who could finance their own recovery or bor-
row elsewhere (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Committee, 1931b). The HBRC expected to lend for
buildings but not for working capital requirements, since if a business could be reinstated in suit-
able premises, it should have little trouble obtaining stock to carry on business (Hawke’s Bay
Rehabilitation Committee, 1931c).
Conversely, the HBRC would not lend to insolvent applicants even where this was due to
the earthquake (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Committee, 1931b), or where there were out-
standing rates and/or taxes. Each applicant would be considered on his or her own merits, but
character and past behaviour affected eligibility for assistance. The HBRC approached its
task as a business would approach any investment decision, in looking for a maximum social
return (or minimum loss) from limited resources (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Committee,
1931a).
Unlike the relief funds, the HBRC was funded by central government. The HBRC noted that the
Great Depression limited the assistance it could provide (Hawke’s Bay Rehabilitation Committee,
1931c), and followed established practice in that thrift and self-sufficiency were encouraged, and
only limited social security was available as a backstop in cases of extreme need (McClure, 1998).
The HBRC acted consistently with existing “State Advances” schemes,8 in that it funded fixed
rather than circulating capital, provided loans rather than grants, and made a careful assessment of
the merits of each applicant and application before offering assistance.

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528 Accounting History 20(4)

Advances to local authorities

Under the Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act 1931 the government also made £250,000 available for
loans to local authorities. These funds were over-subscribed, and applications exceeded £400,000.
There is no evidence that central government contributed other significant funds to local authori-
ties for reconstruction purposes outside of the existing loans process.9
Local authorities struggled to cover earthquake costs. Havelock North, a village close to
Hastings, was refused any reimbursement for relief costs it had incurred and had to borrow on the
open market when the Local Government Loans Board approved only half of the loan for which it
applied from the Rehabilitation Fund (Wright, 1996).
Local authorities also struggled to cope with the additional loan servicing costs. Following a
pre-election promise made by the Leader of the Opposition, in 1936 the government remitted
Napier’s HBRC £101,200 debt (Treasury, 1936). Other local body loans were not remitted.
Hastings protested that it was being penalized for its efficiency; it had taken the precaution of tak-
ing out insurance cover before the earthquakes and had also sold its municipal electrical undertak-
ing. Although the loans were made interest-free in 1938, no further concessions were forthcoming
(Boyd, 1984; Minister of Finance, 1939), resulting in lingering resentment (Wright, 1994).
Like private individuals, local government was responsible for its own earthquake recovery.
Government assistance was provided by way of loan, of which £250,000 came from the
Rehabilitation Fund. The balance of the costs had to be met from current revenue and reserves or
by loans approved by the Local Government Loans Board. The remittance of Napier’s rehabilita-
tion loan was exceptional and reflected both the particular circumstances Napier faced, but also a
degree of political opportunism by the Leader of the Opposition at election time.

Discussion
Severe natural disasters test any society and could provide an opportunity for significant social
change, but this was not the case with the 1929 and 1931 earthquakes in New Zealand. Rather than
treating the disasters as national events that were the central government’s responsibility, private
and local body relief and recovery were largely funded from private sources. Although central
government resources were mobilized to address immediate needs, the private sector contributed
much of the relief funds. Central government did establish a £1,500,000 rehabilitation fund after
the Hawke’s Bay earthquake, but this was managed conservatively, and as a loan, rather than a
grant, funded along the lines of earlier state advances loan schemes. Central government was no
more generous to local bodies, aside from providing (insufficient) loan funds through the HBRC.
The accounting-based evidence reviewed in this article illustrates the contemporary norms of
New Zealand society. Furthermore, it indicates that central government’s response to the 1929 and
1931 earthquakes reflected, rather than challenged, those norms. Certainly, accounting was used to
provide information for decision making and the allocation of resources in the aftermath of the
disasters; but careful accounting, and a concern for accountability, was also a means to maintain
institutional accountability and stewardship, even in the midst of crisis (Burchell et al., 1980).
Accounting evidence of the response to these earthquakes enhances understanding of the role of
government in the period prior to the introduction of comprehensive social security for personal
need heralded by the Social Security Act 1938, and provides a basis to test claims concerning sub-
sequent social change. The Great Depression certainly constrained the government, but it is
unlikely that the government would have acted differently in more prosperous times, since it had
not been generous in the past. The respective roles of central government, local government, and
the private sector did not change in the wake of the earthquakes. This demonstrates the resilience

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Vosslamber 529

of a society’s institutional norms even in the face of crisis (North, 2005; Steinmo, 2008). Aside
from illuminating the past using accounting sources, this research also provides a basis for com-
parative studies that compare past and present responses to natural disasters, and which draw
implications from the changes that are identified.

Miley and Read (2013)

Miley and Read (2013) compared the government’s response in 1929 and 1931 with that following
the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes. They suggested that there had been a significant change in
the relationship between central and local government since the introduction of efficiency reforms
to government accounting in the 1980s, and sought to illustrate this by comparing the two periods.
Miley and Read argued that, at the time of the Murchison and Hawke’s Bay earthquakes, the
relationship between the national and local governments had been much simpler since “[t]he
national government was in control” (Miley and Read, 2013: 464), and “there was no split between
nationally-owned and locally-owned government assets. All were nationally owned” (Miley and
Read, 2013: 462). As for the cost of the earthquake recovery, they claimed that “local government,
although an agent of national government, often made spending decisions virtually unfettered by
national government control, and without a comprehensive or consistent approach to financial
record-keeping” (Miley and Read, 2013: 451). In contrast, they note that at the time of the
Canterbury earthquakes, “the national government would not automatically bear costs, as occurred
with Murchison and Napier” (Miley and Read, 2013: 463).
In contrast, this article indicates that, at the time of the Murchison and Napier earthquakes, the
financial and practical burdens for post-earthquake rebuilding rested largely with the private sector
and local government, and there was a clear distinction between nationally-owned and locally-
owned government assets. Central government did not stop assuming sole financial responsibility
for reparation following the Canterbury earthquakes (Miley and Read, 2013: 464), for it had never
assumed this responsibility in the past.
The differing conclusions of Miley and Read and this article stem in part from their sources and
use of evidence. Miley and Read’s discussion of the Murchison and Hawke’s Bay earthquakes does
not refer to primary sources. Miley and Read acknowledge this concern and comment that, “Perhaps
more accounting histories of local government accounting are required before theory can be devel-
oped, and the current lack of theory in this field reflects the lack of local government accounting
histories” (Miley and Read, 2013: 450).
Miley and Read’s (2013) article demonstrates the importance of evidence in historical research,
particularly in areas where previous research is lacking. In this regard Arnold and McCartney
(2003) commented that, although “papers identifying historical facts that do not lead to theories
(antiquarianism) have little value in the academic world … challenging and critical theorisations
require a substantial evidential base to substantiate their claims” (Miley and Read, 2013: 228).
Without rigorous evidence to support the construction of competing theories, there is a risk that
theoretical discussion will not be sustained by evidence. Thus, Funnell (2007: 298) called for
accounting historians to renew their determination to pursue their research with greater care and to
re-examine their sources.

Comparisons with the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes

The earthquakes of 1929 and 1931 suggest comparisons with the recent sequence of earthquakes
which struck the Canterbury region between September 2010 and December 2011 and devastated
Christchurch. Miley and Read (2013: 449) aptly suggested that historical comparison is useful

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530 Accounting History 20(4)

because it reveals intricacies that are not apparent in a single episode, illustrating shifting dynam-
ics, and revealing weaknesses of contemporary practice (McKerchar, 2010; Neuman, 2006).
Similar events separated by time may provide an informative context to assess social and institu-
tional change.
There are, however, several difficulties in attempting to compare events separated by eight dec-
ades, and this article does not attempt to do so. First, there is the danger of ‘failing to see the wood
for the trees’ by proposing broad patterns or trends from limited data. Static comparisons of iso-
lated events risk ignoring the dynamism of history. Any comparison of the events of 1929 and 2011
should take into account the significance of changes such as: the introduction of social security
(1938), which shifted much responsibility for the relief of personal need from individuals and local
government to central government; the introduction of state-sponsored earthquake cover via the
Earthquake and War Damages Act 1944; and the increased availability and affordability of earth-
quake insurance cover for individuals and government. Unless events are set within their evolving
institutional contexts, and the choice of comparatives is justified, there is a danger of caricature,
and an increased risk of a selective use of evidence.
Moreover, history can be written too soon. The series of earthquakes that struck Canterbury
between 4 September 2010 and 2 December 2011 (Canterbury Quake Live, 2014) are still recent.
Christchurch City Council’s emphasis only shifted from emergency response and repair to the
long-term rebuild from 1 September 2011 (Christchurch City Council, 2011). By the end of 2014
the rebuild was finally underway, but demolition work continued. It is premature to attempt an
historical assessment of the government’s response to an earthquake when that response continues
to evolve. Moreover, premature judgements can be contradicted by subsequent events,10 and by the
evolving experience of those who lived through the events and continue to experience their after-
math. Like a good wine, history should be allowed to mature before it is bottled.

Conclusion
Accounting evidence from two New Zealand earthquakes in the first half of the twentieth century
contributes to understanding the respective roles of the private sector, local government and cen-
tral government at the time. This evidence suggests that relief resources were primarily provided
by the private sector but the distribution of these resources was coordinated and monitored by
central government. Central government also assisted the rehabilitation of affected businesses by
advancing loans rather than grants. Central government lent money to local government to finance
reconstruction. These arrangements were consistent with the existing norms and organization of
society.
This article demonstrates the usefulness of archival accounting evidence in clarifying what
actually happened. Accounting is a means to maintain institutional structures. Whereas documents
evidencing accountability may provide an improved understanding of society and of the past,
archivally sourced accounting evidence provides fresh insights into the source and allocation of
scarce resources.
This article also highlights what Miley and Read (2013: 447) aptly refer to as “the complex
dance” between evidence and theory, and illustrates the usefulness of evidence as a basis for theory
building.

Acknowledgements
I acknowledge the generous support of the librarians at Archives NZ, the Napier Public Library and the
Hastings District Library, and the useful comments of participants at the seventh Accounting History
International Conference, Seville, 2013.

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Vosslamber 531

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit
sectors.

Notes
1. In its list of worst post-1840 natural disasters, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage records only five
earthquakes that resulted in a loss of life: Wairarapa, 1855 (between five and nine deaths); Murchison,
1929 (17 deaths); Hawke’s Bay, 1931 (256 or 258 deaths); Inangahua, 1968 (three deaths); and
Christchurch, 2011 (185 deaths) (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2014).
2. Weber (1949) made a similar distinction between subject matter specialists and interpretive specialists.
A range of binaries has been coined to describe contrasting approaches to accounting historical study:
narrative vs interpretational (Previts et al., 1990), intellectual vs utilitarian (Napier, 1989), or historian vs
social scientist (Fleischman et al., 1996). Related distinctions include traditional accounting history vs
genealogies of calculations (Miller and Napier, 1993) and traditional vs new accounting history (Miller
et al., 1991). This distinction is not unique to recent (accounting) history: Gaffikin (2011: 239) traced it
to Thucydides and Herodotus, whom he characterized as presaging objective modernist and postmodern-
ist approaches to history.
3. Recent articles published in Accounting History illustrate the breadth of what may be considered
accounting data: a single tally list of articles given to an American Indian chief (Francis and Samkin,
2014); letters and audit reports (Dattin, 2014); protocols of general meetings and a member’s private
records (Schaeffer et al., 2014); bankruptcy archives of the Paris Court of Commerce (Lebardin, 2013);
annual reports, committee minute books and media commentaries (Halabi et al., 2012); national census
records (Bisman, 2010); and the minutes of the Annual General Meetings of a university ladies’ tea soci-
ety (Jeacle, 2008).
4. Chapple (1997: 7) attempted to measure the total cost of the 1931 earthquake, given published estimates
of between £3,750,000 and £16,000,000. He calculated a figure for the total capital losses for house-
holds, businesses and local and central government (in 1931 pounds) of £3,400,000 (Chapple, 1997: 25).
5. Despite insurance policies totalling approximately £5,000,000 and damage estimated at £2,500,000, the
amount actually paid by insurance companies was approximately £250,000 (Department of Scientific
and Industrial Research, 1933: 37).
6. Meetings for which minutes were located were held on 24 March 1931 (second), 6 November 1931
(third), 9 March 1932 (fourth). No minutes of the first meeting have been located.
7. For example, in a letter of 2 November 1931 the Minister made five changes to the Committee’s recom-
mendations, including changing a grant of £250 into a loan, and rejecting a recommendation for loans
of £10,000 and £10,350 on the grounds that the applicants should be able to procure funds privately or
from their own resources (Mitchell, 1931). This reflects the micromanagement that McKinnon (2003)
suggests was typical of New Zealand government at the time.
8. The Government Advances to Settlers Act 1894 established the first of a number of such schemes, and
provided mortgages to settlers at a fixed rate of 5 per cent per annum over a 36½ year term. The State
Advances Corporation, formed in 1936 by the first Labour Government, continued to provide finance for
private urban and suburban dwellings on a similar basis.
9. The ability of local bodies to borrow was tightly controlled by central government under the provisions
of the Local Body Loans Act 1926.
10. Miley and Read (2013: 460) comment that “Christchurch City Council was subjected to public ire for
rebuilding delays when the delays were beyond the Council’s control”. In fact, some of the delay was
due to council inefficiency; for example, the Council failed a building consent accreditation audit, caus-
ing delays in processing building consents (van Beynen, 2013). Moreover, rebuild activity in Canterbury
is still in its early stages and is not expected to peak until 2017 (Rutherford, 2014). Although central
government is involved heavily in coordinating and funding the rebuild, it is not the case that “all real
estate in the central business district of Christchurch will be government owned” (Miley and Read, 2013:
459). The Christchurch City Council is not “solely responsible for planning, spending and supervising all

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aspects of a plan once CERA approves it” (Miley and Read, 2013: 455). There is no “standard package
arrangement” under which the national government provides certain response and recovery costs (Miley
and Read, 2013: 458). Moreover (and mercifully), New Zealand does not suffer over 250 earthquakes
each year that are significant in terms of economic impact or loss of life (Miley and Read, 2013: 449, see
also footnote 1).

References
Acts of the New Zealand Parliament
Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944
Government Advances to Settlers Act 1894
Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Act 1931
Hawke’s Bay Earthquake Relief Funds Act 1931
Local Body Loans Act 1926
Social Security Act 1938

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