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DJIBASSO DEPARTMENTAL BURKINA FASO

HIGH SCHOOL UNITE-PROGRES-JUSTICE

SCHOOL YEAR : 2023/ 2024

ENGLISH PRESENTATION

CLASS: 2 nde A4

TEAM : 03

THEM: ECOWAS AND THE MILITARY COUP IN WEST


AFRICA

TEAM’S MEMBERS

CHIEF : 1. DEMBELÉ YVETTE

2. TRAORÉ SYLVIE

3. TRAORÉ SERACH

4. COULIBALY MARIA

5. ZOROMÉ ABDOUL

5. TRAORÉ ALKANA

TEACHER: M. KABORÉ
PLAN

INTRODUCTION

I. Causes and Consequences of the Coups (Burkina Faso,


Guinea, Mali and Niger)

II. ECOWAS Response to the Coups and its Challenges and


Opportunities
III. Prospects and Recommendations for the Future of the
Region and the Bloc

CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

ECOWAS, or the Economic Community of West African States, is a regional bloc of


fifteen countries that aims to promote economic integration, peace and stability in West
Africa. However, in recent years, ECOWAS has faced a series of challenges due to the
outbreak of military coups in some of its member states, such as Burkina Faso, Guinea,
Mali and Niger. These coups have threatened the democratic principles and institutions
that ECOWAS upholds, and have posed serious risks to the security and development of
the region. In this presentation, we will discuss the main causes and consequences of
these coups, how ECOWAS has responded to them, and what are the prospects and
recommendations for the future of the region and the bloc.

I. Causes and Consequences of the Coups (Burkina Faso,


Guinea, Mali and Niger)

West Africa has witnessed a surge of military coups in the past two years, affecting
four countries: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger. The causes and consequences of
these coups vary from country to country, but some common factors can be identified.
These include:

- The erosion of democratic norms and institutions, especially the respect for term
limits and the rule of law. In Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali, the ousted presidents had
amended or violated the constitution to extend their stay in power, sparking popular
protests and discontent. In Niger, the president had respected the term limit, but his
successor faced allegations of electoral fraud and a contested legitimacy.
- The deterioration of security and economic conditions, especially due to the rise
of violent extremism and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. All four countries have
faced increasing attacks by jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), which have exploited
the governance gaps and the social grievances in the region. The Covid-19 pandemic has
also worsened the humanitarian and development challenges, affecting the livelihoods
and the access to basic services of millions of people.
- The failure of regional and international actors to prevent or resolve the crises,
despite their rhetorical condemnation and sanctions. The Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have struggled to enforce their
protocols and principles on democracy and good governance, and to mediate effectively
between the coup leaders and the civilian opposition. The international partners, such as
France, the United States and the European Union, have also faced criticism for their
perceived interference or indifference, and for their limited support to the security and
development efforts in the region .

The consequences of these coups are manifold and uncertain, but they pose
serious risks to the stability and the prosperity of the region. Some of the potential
impacts are:

- The disruption of the democratic transition and the constitutional order, leading
to a loss of legitimacy and credibility for the civilian institutions and the electoral
processes. The coups have also created a power vacuum and a political uncertainty, which
could be exploited by opportunistic actors or violent groups.
- The escalation of the security and humanitarian crisis, due to the diversion of
resources and attention from the fight against terrorism and the provision of basic
services. The coups have also increased the tensions and the mistrust between the
defence and security forces and the civilian population, as well as among the regional and
international partners.
- The isolation and the impoverishment of the affected countries, due to the
suspension or the reduction of the regional and international cooperation and assistance.
The coups have also damaged the economic prospects and the investment climate of the
region, which is already facing the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate
change .

II. ECOWAS Response to the Coups and its Challenges and


Opportunities

ECOWAS, as the regional bloc of West Africa, has a mandate and a responsibility to
respond to the coups and to uphold its protocols and principles on democracy and good
governance. The bloc has adopted a range of measures to deal with the coup situations in
each country, such as:
- Condemning the coups and demanding the restoration of the constitutional order
and the release of the detained leaders.
- Suspending the membership and the participation of the coup countries in the
bloc's activities and organs.
- Imposing diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions on the coup leaders and
their allies, and threatening further actions if they do not comply with the bloc's demands.
- Engaging in mediation and dialogue with the coup leaders, the civilian opposition,
the civil society and other stakeholders to facilitate the transition to democracy and the
organization of credible elections.
- Providing humanitarian and security assistance to the affected countries and the
populations, especially in the areas of health, food, water and sanitation.

However, ECOWAS has also faced several challenges and limitations in its response
to the coups, such as:

- The lack of consensus and coherence among its member states and its leadership,
especially regarding the nature and the duration of the sanctions and the transition
periods.
- The resistance and the defiance of the coup leaders and their supporters, who
have often ignored or rejected the bloc's ultimatums and conditions.
- The dissatisfaction and the frustration of the people in the coup countries, who
have often perceived the bloc's interventions as intrusive, biased or ineffective.
- The interference and the influence of other regional and international actors, such
as the AU, the UN, France, China and Russia, who have sometimes contradicted or
undermined the bloc's positions and actions.

Despite these challenges, ECOWAS also has some opportunities and strengths in its
response to the coups, such as:

- The experience and the expertise of the bloc in dealing with previous coup
situations and political crises in the region, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau
and The Gambia.
- The solidarity and the support of the bloc's member states and its partners, who
have often expressed their commitment and their willingness to assist the coup countries
and the bloc's efforts.
- The legitimacy and the credibility of the bloc as the representative and the voice
of the West African people and their aspirations for democracy, peace and development.
- The potential and the capacity of the bloc to leverage its economic and political
integration and cooperation to foster stability and prosperity in the region.

III. Prospects and Recommendations for the Future of the


Region and the Bloc

The future of West Africa and ECOWAS depends largely on how the coup crisis and
its aftermath are handled by the regional and international actors. There are different
scenarios and outcomes that could emerge, ranging from the worst-case scenario of a
widespread instability and violence, to the best-case scenario of a successful democratic
transition and recovery. However, the most likely scenario is somewhere in between,
where the region and the bloc face a mix of challenges and opportunities, and where the
progress and the setbacks coexist. In order to achieve the best possible outcome and to
avoid the worst one, some prospects and recommendations can be suggested, such as:

- Strengthening the democratic norms and institutions in the region, especially the
respect for term limits and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights and civil
liberties. ECOWAS and its partners should support the constitutional reforms and the
electoral processes in the coup countries, and ensure that they are inclusive, transparent
and credible. They should also monitor and sanction any attempts to undermine or
manipulate the democratic order, and promote the participation and the empowerment of
the civil society and the youth.
- Enhancing the security and economic cooperation and integration in the region,
especially the fight against terrorism and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the
climate change. ECOWAS and its partners should reinforce the regional security
mechanisms and initiatives, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5
Sahel, and provide adequate resources and training to the defence and security forces.
They should also implement the regional economic programs and policies, such as the
ECOWAS Vision 2050 and the West Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP), and
mobilize the financial and technical assistance to address the humanitarian and
development needs .
- Fostering the solidarity and the dialogue among the regional and international
actors, especially the ECOWAS member states and its leadership, and the AU, the UN,
France, China and Russia. ECOWAS and its partners should maintain a common and
coherent position and action on the coup crisis and its resolution, and avoid any
interference or influence that could undermine the bloc's authority and unity. They should
also engage in constructive and respectful dialogue and consultation with the coup
leaders, the civilian opposition, and the other stakeholders, and seek to build trust and
confidence among them.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have discussed the main causes and consequences of the military
coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger, how ECOWAS has responded to them, and
what are the prospects and recommendations for the future of the region and the bloc.
We have seen that the coups pose serious challenges and risks to the stability and the
prosperity of West Africa, but also offer some opportunities and strengths for the regional
integration and cooperation. We have suggested that ECOWAS and its partners should
strengthen the democratic norms and institutions, enhance the security and economic
cooperation and integration, and foster the solidarity and dialogue among the regional
and international actors. We hope that this presentation has been informative and
interesting, and that it has stimulated your curiosity and interest in the topic. Thank you
for your attention.

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