Construction Management and Economics

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An advanced decision-support system for ranking

unbalanced bids

Firat Dogu Akin, Atilla Damci, David Arditi & Sevilay Demirkesen

To cite this article: Firat Dogu Akin, Atilla Damci, David Arditi & Sevilay Demirkesen (18 Jan
2024): An advanced decision-support system for ranking unbalanced bids, Construction
Management and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2024.2303158

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2024.2303158

Published online: 18 Jan 2024.

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CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2024.2303158

An advanced decision-support system for ranking unbalanced bids

Firat Dogu Akina, Atilla Damcia, David Arditib and Sevilay Demirkesenc
a
Department of Civil Engineering, Istanbul Technical University, Maslak, Istanbul, Turkey; bDepartment of Civil, Architectural and
Environmental Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois, Turkey; cDepartment of Civil Engineering, Gebze
Technical University, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Awarding a contract to a bidder who has unbalanced the bid may cost more money to the Received 1 August 2023
owner. An owner who determines that a bid has been unbalanced has the legal right to reject Accepted 3 January 2024
the bid. Although several models have been developed to detect unbalanced bids, some
KEYWORDS
researchers still assert that the number of cases in which owners mistakenly identify balanced
Bidding; bid evaluation;
bids as unbalanced is too great to ignore. One of the reasons of this failure is the use of an unbalanced bidding;
inappropriate benchmark against which the offered unit prices are compared. In this paper it is decision-making;
argued that the use of the geometric mean of the unit prices provided by the bidders as a Information Entropy; VIKOR
benchmark helps to obtain robust solutions and an advanced decision-making model is pro­
posed in which the Information Entropy and VIKOR methods are used to detect unbalanced
bids. The results obtained from an example project drawn from the literature demonstrate how
owners may be misled if they use an inappropriate benchmark in detecting unbalanced bids.
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by highlighting the negative impacts of using
flawed benchmarks in this process, an area of research that is mostly ignored in the unbalanced
bidding literature.

Introduction the unit prices of line items that will be performed

Awarding a contract to a bidder who has unbalanced
the bid constitutes a crucial problem for owners in the
construction industry. In an unbalanced bid, the bid­
der has manipulated the unit prices of some line items
rather than using the unit prices that should reflect
the costs, the bidder’s anticipated profit, the over­
heads, and other indirect costs (FHWA 1988, Hyari
et al. 2016, Hyari 2017a). The intention behind this
manipulation is to achieve an advantage over rivals
who do not unbalance their bids (An et al. 2018, Hyari
and Alamayreh, 2023). This competitive advantage can
be achieved regardless of the method used to unbal­
ance a bid. There are two main ways to unbalance
bids, namely quantity error exploitation and front-
loading (Cattell et al. 2008). In quantity error exploit­
ation, the bidder increases the unit prices of line items
that are suspected to have underestimated quantities
and decreases the unit prices of other line items while
keeping the total offer the same as the offer had they
not unbalanced the bid. In front-loading, the bidder
increases the unit prices of line items that will be per­
formed at the beginning of the project and decreases
at the end of the project while keeping the total offer
the same as the offer had they not unbalanced the
bid (Cattell et al. 2007). In both quantity error exploit­
ation and front loading, if the bidder who submits an
unbalanced bid wins and is awarded the contract, the
manipulation in the unit prices will result in higher
revenues for the bidder over the course of the project.
Alternatively, because the bidder knows that the rev­
enue will be higher if the bid is unbalanced, the bid­
der may be tempted to forfeit some of this extra
revenue and instead lower the offer (Hyari 2017b),
almost guaranteeing that the bidder will win and be
awarded the job, hence creating an undeserved
advantage over the other interested contractors who
are bidding the same project. In sum, even if submit­
ting unbalanced bids may seem advantageous to bid­
ders, it may cause various problems for both owners
and bidders in the construction industry (Yin et al.
2010, Hyari 2016). From the contractor’s perspective,
regardless of which unbalancing method the bidder
uses (i.e. quantity error exploitation or front-loading),
if the owner detects an unbalanced bid, it is the

CONTACT Atilla Damci damcia@itu.edu.tr Department of Civil Engineering, Istanbul Technical University, Maslak, Istanbul, Turkey
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
� 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 F. D. AKIN ET AL.
owner’s legal prerogative to reject the bid, in which
case the bidder cannot undertake the project and con­
sequently loses potential profit in addition to absorb­
ing the cost of bid preparation. In addition, having a
bid rejected for unbalancing is likely to have a nega­
tive effect on the bidder’s reputation, a major problem
in future biddings. On the other hand, from the own­
er’s perspective, if a contract is awarded to a contrac­
tor who has unbalanced the bid, the final cost of the
project may end up being much higher than had the
bidder not unbalanced the bid (Arditi and
Chotibhongs 2009). These outcomes are not consistent
with an owner’s objective to select the most appropri­
ate contractor who can complete the construction
project on schedule, within budget, and at the desired
quality (Mehta et al. 2009). For that reason, unbal­
anced bids are not welcome by owners in the con­
struction industry.
In a bid evaluation process, detecting unbalanced
bids is not an easy task. Indeed, Skitmore and Cattell
(2013) assert that the number of cases in which own­
ers mistakenly identify balanced bids as unbalanced
bids is too great to ignore. More recent studies (e.g. Li
et al. 2021, 2023) in the unbalanced bidding literature
agree that it is still challenging to identify unbalanced
bids accurately. After reviewing the extant literature
thoroughly, Li et al. (2023) state that two critical issues
are quite challenging in detecting unbalanced bids.
The first issue they cite is the inadequacy of the proc­
esses used so far to set an evaluation benchmark for
the unit price of line items. Li et al. (2023) assert that
the nature of the benchmark used to detect unbal­
anced bids is still a major problem that should be
resolved to improve the existing unbalanced bidding
detection models. As a solution to this problem, they
suggest a benchmark that is based on a simple mov­
ing average of the unit prices collected from previous
projects, even though collecting data from previous
projects is not an easy task for owners. Actually, even
if such a database exists, moving averages may not
reflect the most recent unit prices at the time of ana­
lysis, especially in times of economic turbulence. In
addition, according to a number of studies (e.g.
Stramarcos and Cattell 2013, Cattell et al. 2007,
Skitmore and Cattell 2013), using a benchmark based
on a moving average can mislead the decision-maker
because the benchmark itself can be unbalanced
when the majority of bids in the database are unbal­
anced. In other words, unbalanced bids may appear to
be balanced and vice versa when the database is not
representative of balanced bids. Some of the existing
unbalanced bid detection models prefer to use the
engineer’s estimate or the average line-item prices
quoted by all bidders in the project as benchmarks.
However, Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009) assert that
considering only the engineer’s estimated prices as a
benchmark may mislead the decision-maker because
engineers can make inaccurate predictions. Arditi and
Chotibhongs (2009) also claim that even if an owner
uses the average line item prices as a benchmark,
more than one unbalanced bid in the same procure­
ment process may cause these prices to be skewed.
In sum, the aforementioned studies reveal that the
benchmark used to detect unbalanced bids greatly
affects the performance of unbalanced bid detection
models. However, these researchers also cite the many
drawbacks of using the existing benchmarks, which
implies that there is still a critical need for a bench­
mark that improves the performance of unbalanced
bidding detection models.
The second challenging issue cited by Li et al.
(2023) in unbalanced bid detection is the extent to
which the bidder manipulated the unit prices of the
line items. They claim that since the detection of
unbalanced bids is solely based on comparing the bid­
ders’ offers against a benchmark, using a method that
can assess how much a bidder has manipulated the
unit prices of the line items can help owners to decide
which bid is more desirable than the others. In other
words, the bidders can be ranked by the extent to
which they manipulated their unit prices, a high score
(e.g. VIKOR Index Qi ) prompting the owner’s engineer
to examine the bid in detail to ensure a fair competi­
tive environment. So far, construction researchers did
not take full advantage of decision-making methods
such as TOPSIS and VIKOR that can provide owners
with more robust solutions. This may be caused by
the scarcity of studies that use sophisticated and
advanced decision-making models in studies that
investigate bidding practices (e.g. Su et al. 2020a, Wu
and Xu 2021, Li et al. 2023). Another reason can be
that the traditional decision-making methods are
designed to determine the superior alternative (i.e. the
alternative that represents the solution that is closest
to the positive ideal value), whereas detecting unbal­
anced bids requires the determination of the inferior
alternative (i.e. the alternative that represents the solu­
tion that is farthest from the positive ideal value). To
put a finer point on it, in unbalanced bidding, the
inferior alternative represents the bid that the highest
likelihood of being unbalanced, whereas the superior
alternative represents the bid that has the lowest like­
lihood of being unbalanced.

In sum, the literature indicates that there is a need
for unbalanced bid detection models that make use of
advanced decision-making methods to see how much
bidders manipulated the unit prices of the line items
in their offer. Modifying the traditional decision-mak­
ing methods for use in such models can create a
more robust model and can allow construction owners
to use these models with more confidence. Therefore,
there is still a need for further research for the devel­
opment of unbalanced bid detection models including
the ones based on advanced decision-making meth­
ods. The study presented in this paper is initiated in
response to not only the lack of modified advanced
decision-making methods developed over the years
for use in unbalanced bid detection models but also
to propose an approach to overcome the limitation
related to the selection of a benchmark. This study’s
main objective is to develop an advanced decision-
making model that overcomes the aforementioned
shortcomings. The model proposed in this study uti­
lizes the geometric mean of the unit prices provided
by all the bidders for each line item as a benchmark,
and an advanced decision-making model that involves
the combined use of the Information Entropy and the
Modified VIKOR methods to rank the bids relative to
the likelihood that a bid has been unbalanced. The
proposed model shows that the detection of unbal­
anced bids can be efficiently performed using the pro­
posed method. Armed with such an advanced tool, it
may be easier for owners to prevent unbalanced bids.
Indeed, the results of this research reveal that the pro­
posed model can be used as an effective tool to
detect unbalanced bids, create a fair competitive
environment, and prevent future losses to construc­
tion owners.
Literature review
The review of the literature indicates that bids are first
reviewed to see whether they are mathematically
unbalanced, and later to see whether they are materi­
ally unbalanced too. The Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) guidelines (FHWA 1988, page
A-113) define a mathematically unbalanced bid as “A
mathematically unbalanced bid is one containing
lump sum or unit line items which do not reflect rea­
sonable actual costs plus a reasonable proportionate
share of the bidder’s anticipated profit, overhead
costs, and other indirect costs, which he/she antici­
pates for the performance of the items in question.”
To put a finer point on it, if an owner detects that the
unit prices of some line items are exceptionally high
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 3
or low compared to the owner’s or other bidders’ unit
prices, then the bid can be considered to be mathem­
atically unbalanced.
An owner should be aware of that a mathematically
unbalanced bid may or may not increase the cost to
the owner. Therefore, an owner must examine a math­
ematically unbalanced bid to see whether or not it is
also materially unbalanced. The FHWA guidelines
(page A-113, 1988) define a materially unbalanced bid
as, “A bid is materially unbalanced if there is a reason­
able doubt that award to the bidder submitting the
mathematically unbalanced bid will result in the low­
est ultimate cost to the Government.” If the detailed
examination of the mathematically unbalanced bid
uncovers that it may increase the cost to the owner,
then the owner can conclude that it is materially
unbalanced. On the other hand, it should be noted
that mathematically unbalanced bids are not always
materially unbalanced.
An example is provided below to explain the mean­
ing of mathematically and materially unbalanced bids,
and to describe how bids are tested to see whether
they are mathematically and materially unbalanced.
Table 1 shows the information about the offers sub­
mitted by three bidders in a project that involves six
line items. Even though Bidder 1’s total offer is the
lowest one among the submitted offers, when the
owner compares Bidder 1’s unit prices to the unit pri­
ces submitted by Bidders 2 and 3, the owner sees that
the unit prices of some line items (i.e. line items A, B,
C, and E) submitted by Bidder 1 are significantly differ­
ent from the unit prices offered by Bidders 2 and 3.
The owner concludes that Bidder 1’s offer is mathem­
atically unbalanced. However, the owner does not
know at this stage whether awarding the contract to
Bidder 1 will cost the owner more (or less) than
awarding the contract to another bidder. Therefore,
the owner examines Bidder 1’s offer in detail to see
whether Bidder 1’s unit prices reflect reasonable costs,
anticipated profit, overheads, and other indirect costs.
If the owner finds that Bidder 1’s unit prices do not
reflect reality and if for this reason a contract awarded
to Bidder 1 is likely to be completed at an overall cost
Table 1. The data for the example.
Unit prices ($)
Line item Quantity Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
A 61 days $2100/day $510/day $505/day
B 11 days $1,250/day $810/day $815/day
C 423 yards $35/yard $16/yard $18/yard
D 12,100 feet2 $10/feet2 $13/feet2 $13/feet2
E 655 yard3 $155/yard3 $255/yard3 $245/yard3
F 10,100 feet2 $13/feet2 $14/feet2 $15/feet2
Total Project Cost $510,480 $512,513 $516,659
4 F. D. AKIN ET AL.
to the owner that is higher compared to the other
bidders’ overall costs, then the owner makes the
determination that Bidder 1’s offer is not only math­
ematically by also materially unbalanced, in which
case the owner has the legal right to reject Bidder 1’s
offer.
If, on the other hand, the owner finds that Bidder
1’s unit prices do not reflect reality and yet a contract
awarded to Bidder 1 is likely to be completed at the
lowest possible overall cost to the owner compared to
the cost of the other bidders, then the owner makes
the determination that Bidder 1’s offer is not materi­
ally unbalanced and the owner concludes that award­
ing the contract to Bidder 1 is the best alternative.
Previous studies on detection and prevention
models of unbalanced bids
Unbalanced bidding in the construction industry has
been a focus of debate since the 1960s. Unbalanced
bids are not prohibited in the construction industry
and are often used as a legitimate business practice,
but studies exist (e.g. Stramarcos and Cattell 2013,
Doran 2004) that claim that most researchers and pro­
fessionals in the construction industry identify unbal­
anced bidding as an unethical activity. Even though
some research aimed to improve a contractor’s cash
flow by using unbalanced bidding, the use of unbal­
anced bidding leads to serious problems for construc­
tion owners (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009). Since the
purpose of this study is to develop a model that can
detect unbalanced bids, the goal of this literature
review is to outline the efforts to prevent it, rather
than to summarize the studies about how to unbal­
ance a bid without getting caught.
A person who evaluates the bids received by the
owner needs guidelines to figure out the acceptable
difference between the unit prices proposed by the
bidder for any line item and a benchmark. Wang
(2004) presents an “electronic-facilitated bid evaluation
model” to detect unbalanced bids. This model speeds
up the process because the unit prices are obtained
from all the bidders electronically. Wang et al. (2006)
uses a ratio to measure the deviation between the
unit prices considered by the owner and submitted by
the lowest bidder. This ratio helps to highlight the
unreasonable unit prices and to decide whether or
not the bid is unbalanced. Even though Wang et al.’s
(2006) approach provides great value in detecting
unbalanced bids, the time value of money has not
been considered in this study. Arditi and Chotibhongs’
study (2009) fills this gap as they developed a model
that checks whether the bid is mathematically unbal­
anced and if it is, they added a second step to the
process where they calculate the present worth of all
payments using an appropriate discount rate and a
simple work schedule developed with the limited
information available at the time the bidding takes
place. It should be noted that these NPV calculations
are based on an approximate schedule that may dras­
tically change along the project. It should also be
noted that the time value of money is significant only
if the duration of the project is several years long and
if the discount rate is rather high. For example, con­
tractors who undertake highway construction projects
for State Departments of Transportation are tempted
to unbalance their bid because most of these projects
involve unit-price contracts that are only 8–12 months
long, in which case NPV calculations are quite redun­
dant. In addition, if the interest rate is around 2%–3%
as it has been for many years in the U.S., the impact
of the interest rate on NPV calculations is trivial. If the
duration of the project and the discount rate are both
low, there is no need to perform NPV analysis.
Unlike other studies that recommend rejecting
unbalanced bids, Hyari (2016) suggests a model that
rebalances unbalanced bids as an alternative to reject­
ing them. The main objective of Hyari’s (2016) model
is to readjust all unit prices without changing the pro­
vided bid prices in order to provide fair competition.
To improve Hyari’s (2016) model, Hyari et al. (2016)
add a feature that utilizes the divergences from the
estimated quantities in previous projects to evaluate
each bid’s likelihood of being the truly lowest bid.
The aforementioned studies ignore the use of a vis­
ual way to detect unbalanced bids. To fill this gap,
Nikpour et al. (2017) propose an approach that uses
graphs generated using the Bid Markup Distribution
Index. The assertion of the authors is that using these
graphs makes it easier to detect unbalanced bids.
Another approach that detects unbalanced bids via a
different point of view is proposed by Polat et al.
(2019, 2020) who developed a model that uses several
grading systems. The decision of identifying a bid as
an unbalanced bid is based on its score computed by
these grading systems. The model has also a feature
that allows owners to assign different weights to these
grading systems while computing each bid’s final
score. Even though having these models is an advan­
tage for owners in detecting unbalanced bids, the
results of Skitmore and Cattell’s (2013) study reveal
that users of these models should be aware that if the
majority of the bids used as a database are

unbalanced then balanced bids may appear to be
unbalanced and vice versa.
Su et al. (2020a) propose an unbalanced bid detec­
tion model using VIKOR, one of the popular decision-
making methods. Their model uses the engineer’s
estimated prices as the evaluation criterion for compari­
son. However, Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009) assert
that considering only the engineer’s estimated prices as
an evaluation benchmark might mislead the decision-
maker because engineers can also make inaccurate pre­
dictions. On the other hand, they also state that even if
an owner uses average line item prices for comparison,
more than one unbalanced bid in the same procure­
ment process may cause the distribution to be skewed.
Su et al. (2020b) improve their previous model by utiliz­
ing Grey rational analysis theory and fuzzy set theory
to determine unbalanced bids. The Grey rational theory
is used to determine the deviation between the engi­
neer’s estimate and the unit price provided by the bid­
der. Fuzzy set theory is utilized to rank the bids
according to their level of being unbalanced. Wu and
Xu (2021) utilize unascertained measurement theory
and analytic hierarchy process-fuzzy comprehensive
evaluation method to detect quantity error exploitation
type of unbalanced bidding in railway construction
projects. Thus, their model is different in the sense that
it does not consider only the risk of deviation in unit
prices and quantities.
In sum, the literature review on unbalanced bidding
shows that most researchers do not take full advan­
tage of decision-making methods when researching
how to detect unbalanced bids. In other words, the
models that use rigorous decision-making methods
are very rare in the unbalanced bidding literature, the
only examples being Su et al.’s (2020a), Wu and Xu’s
(2021) and Li et al.’s (2023) models. Nevertheless,
researchers and professionals in the construction
industry are familiar with these methods. These most
important advantage of these methods is their help in
selecting the most appropriate alternative among a
set of a large number of alternatives while considering
several criteria regardless of whether these criteria are
contradictory or not. These methods make it easier to
deal with the complexity of decision-making and the
tedious computational problems. Since the detection
of unbalanced bids is solely based on the selection of
an alternative among a set of alternatives, using
advanced decision-making methods can indeed make
it easier to deal with the challenge of detecting the
unbalanced bid accurately.
The number of studies where decision-making
methods are used to detect unbalanced bids can go
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 5
up if researchers have a better understanding of the
barriers that cause such resistance. One of the reasons
for not preferring the traditional decision-making
methods is the fact that decision-making methods are
designed to determine the superior alternative (i.e. the
alternative that represents the solution that is closer
to the ideal values) rather than determining the infer­
ior alternative (i.e. the alternative that represents the
solution that is farthest from the ideal values). It
should be noted that detecting unbalanced bids
requires the determination of the undesirable alterna­
tives. Therefore, the traditional decision-making meth­
ods should be modified to make they fit the problem
at hand, i.e. the detection of unbalanced bids.
Unfortunately, even though these studies attempt to
detect unbalanced bids by comparing the engineer’s
estimated prices against the prices specified by the
bidder, they ignore the fact that engineers can make
inaccurate predictions. When studies compare the
average line item prices against the prices specified by
the bidder, they ignore the fact that more than one
unbalanced bid in the same procurement process may
cause average line item prices to be skewed (Arditi
and Chotibhongs 2009). Indeed, Li et al. (2023) also
assert that the accuracy of the benchmark used in
detecting unbalanced bids is still a problem that
should be resolved. Therefore, the objective of the
study presented in this paper is to modify a traditional
decision-making model to overcome the limitation
related to benchmark issues and the shortcomings of
existing models. Only then can the complexity of
detecting unbalanced bids be overcome.
Research methodology
Detecting unbalanced bids is most important in creat­
ing a fair and competitive bidding process. Therefore,
this study intends to develop a decision-making model
that allows owners to detect unbalanced bids effi­
ciently and rapidly. To achieve this goal, an unbal­
anced bid detection model is proposed that makes
combined use of the Information Entropy and VIKOR
methods described in the following sections.
Information entropy weight method
The information entropy theory was introduced by
Shannon in 1948 to measure knowledge uncertainty
by using probability principles. This theory can be
used to calculate the weights of the criteria used in a
decision-making problem. The most important aspect
of this theory is that, unlike methods such as expert
6 F. D. AKIN ET AL.
surveys and the analytic hierarchy process, it elimi­
nates the influence of subjective factors in calculating
the weights of the criteria (Taheriyoun et al. 2010,
Ding et al. 2017). Some advanced decision-making
methods, such as AHP, are subjective, relying on the
judgment of individuals to assign weights to the crite­
ria and to rank the alternatives. On the other hand,
Information Entropy is less likely to be affected by the
biases of individuals. Zhu et al. (2020) noted that the
Information Entropy method is preferred over other
methods due to its ability to eliminate the influence
of human factors on the weights of the criteria used
in decision-making.
The Information Entropy weight method is widely
used to measure value dispersion in decision-making
research. A higher degree of dispersion indicates a
greater level of differentiation, indicating the availabil­
ity of more extractable data (Zhu et al. 2020). Using
Information Entropy, an evaluation of a decision
matrix can determine the importance of an informa­
tion system. Consequently, the application of this
method enables the calculation of indices that corres­
pond to the information’s utility. Higher utility corre­
sponds to greater importance in the evaluation
process (Zhang et al. 2014). The steps for calculating
the weights of the criteria using the Information
Entropy method are as follows (Shemshadi et al. 2011,
Lan et al. 2017, Wu et al. 2017):
Step 1: Normalization of the values in the decision
matrix. Assume a decision matrix of A ¼ ðdij Þmxn with
i alternatives (i ¼ 1, … ., m) and j criteria (j ¼ 1, … ., n)
is available.
dij
gij ¼ Pm (1)
i¼1 di
where gij is the normalized value for the ith alterna­
tive’s jth criterion.
Step 2: Calculation of the Information Entropy ðEj Þ for
the jth criterion:
1 Xm
Ej ¼ − g ln ðgij Þ, j ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n (2)
ln m i¼1 ij
assuming that when gij ¼ 0, gij lngij ¼ 0:
Step 3: Calculating the deviation of essential informa­
tion ðGj Þ for each jth criterion:
Gj ¼ 1 − Ej , j ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n (3)
Step 4: Calculation of the Information Entropy weight
of the jth criterion ðwj Þ:
Gj
wj ¼ Pn (4)
j¼1 Gj
Pn
with 0 � wj � 1 and j¼1 wj ¼ 1:
Vise kriterijumska optimizacija I kompromisno
resenje (VIKOR) method
VIKOR is a decision-making method that deals with
complex decision-making problems (Opricovic and
Tzeng 2004). It can provide appropriate solutions even
when the decision-maker is unsure of his/her preferen­
ces at the beginning of the system design process
(Polat et al. 2018). The VIKOR method is primarily
based on identifying the positive and negative ideal
points within the solution space. The positive ideal
point represents the best or most desirable value for
each attribute, while the negative ideal point repre­
sents the worst or least desirable value. The objective
of this process is to rank the alternatives and to select
the most desired alternative from a finite set of feas­
ible alternatives, considering conflicting and non-
commensurable criteria. This method involves the
development of a multi-criteria ranking index that
assesses proximity to the ideal solution and picks the
alternative that is closest to the positive ideal solution
and farthest from the negative ideal solution
(Chatterjee and Chakraborty 2016). In other words, the
VIKOR method considers the highest group utility and
the least individual regret. Decision-makers are nor­
mally comfortable with the obtained compromise
solution (Opricovic and Tzeng 2007).
The VIKOR method was selected for use in this
study due to its ability to identify unbalanced bidding
scenarios by considering the quotes submitted by all
bidders and by considering individual bids simultan­
eously, resulting in effective outcomes for the owner
(Su et al. 2020a). Additionally, the method facilitates
the generation of compromise rankings and the selec­
tion of the best alternative by evaluating alternatives’
proximity to the ideal solutions (Dong et al. 2017, Lan
et al. 2017). By considering both group utility and indi­
vidual regret, the VIKOR method enables a reevalua­
tion of individual bids based on owners’ attitudes
toward significantly unbalanced bids (Su et al. 2020a).
In addition, the selection of the VIKOR method in this
study was motivated by its previously demonstrated
advantages. For instance, in Ghaleb et al.’s (2020)
research, the VIKOR method outperformed other
advanced decision-making methods such as the
Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and analytical hierarchy pro­
cess (AHP) in terms of computational complexity.
 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 7

The five steps of the VIKOR method are presented the distance between alternative i and the positive
below (Opricovic and Tzeng 2004): ideal solution a�j ) and Ri represents the minimum indi­
vidual regret for each alternative i (i.e. the distance
Step 1: Development of the decision matrix A with n between alternative i and the negative ideal solu­
alternatives ði ¼ 1, : . . . , nÞ and m criteria tion a−j ).
ðj ¼ 1, : . . . , mÞ:
2 3
a11 a21 � � � an1 Step 5: Calculation of the VIKOR index Qi for the ith
6 a12 a22 � � � an2 7 alternative.
6 7
A ¼ ðaij Þnxm ¼ 6 .. .. .. .. 7 (5) � � � �
4 . . . . 5 Si − Sþ Ri − Rþ
a1m a2m � � � anm Qi ¼ v − þ ð1 − v Þ − (10)
S − Sþ R − Rþ
where aij represents the value of the ith alternative’s
where Sþ ¼ min Si , S− ¼ max Si , Rþ ¼ min Ri , R− ¼
jth criterion.
max Ri and v corresponds to a subjective assessment
Step 2: Identification of the positive and negative of the ratio of the weights of group utility divided by
ideal solutions of n alternatives with respect to each individual regret. The practical range of v is between 0
criterion j: If A ¼ ðaij Þnxm is considered as the deci­ and 1, where “0” signifies a complete focus on individ­
sion matrix, then the positive (a�j Þ and negative ða−j Þ ual regret, “1” signifies a complete focus on group util­
solutions for beneficial criteria are: ity, and “0.5” signifies an equal emphasis on both
(Anvari et al. 2014). The selection of v should be deter­
a�j ¼ maxi faij g (6)
mined by the context of the decision, the decision-
a−j ¼ mini faij g maker’s preferences, and the specific requirements of
the positive (a�j Þ and negative ða−j Þ solutions for non- the problem under consideration (Opricovic and
beneficial (i.e. cost) criteria are: Tzeng 2007).
a�j ¼ mini faij g (7)
a−j ¼ maxi faij g Step 6: Rank the alternatives in ascending order based
on their VIKOR indices Qi :

Propose the alternative with the minimum Qi value

Step 3: Normalization of the elements in the decision
ðA1 Þ as a compromise solution, if all of the following
matrix refers to the process of transforming the raw
conditions are met:
data, i.e. values in the matrix, to a common scale.
This operation aims to eliminate any inherent differ­
Condition 1. “Acceptable advantage rate”
ences in magnitude or units between the elements,
allowing for meaningful comparisons and analysis. 1
QðA2 Þ − QðA1 Þ � (11)
Normalization ensures that all criteria or attributes n−1
receive equal weight in the decision-making process,
where QðA1 Þ is the lowest VIKOR Index for the first
regardless of their original scales or units of measure­
ment. It helps prevent any bias or disproportionate alternative on the list, QðA2 Þ is the second lowest
influence that could arise from differences in the VIKOR Index for the second alternative on the list, and
ranges or units of the data. The VIKOR method uses n is the number of alternatives.
linear normalization to achieve the optimal solution.
Step 4: Computation of the maximum group utility Si Condition 2. “Acceptable stability in decision making”
and the minimum individual regret Ri for each alter­
native i. A1 must also be the first ranked alternative with
! respect to the maximum group utility Si for each alter­
Xn a�j − aij native i, and the minimum individual regret Ri for
Si ¼ wj � (8)
i¼1
aj − a−j each alternative i.
!
a�j − aij In a decision-making process, this compromise solu­
Ri ¼ max wj � (9) tion is considered to be stable if ðv > 0:5Þ in “the
aj − a−j
maximum group utility approach”, or ðv ¼ 0:5Þ “by
where wj is the weight of the criterion j, Si represents consensus”, or ðv < 0:5Þ in ‘‘the minimum individual
the maximum group utility for each alternative i (i.e. regret approach”.
8 F. D. AKIN ET AL.
If any of these conditions are not met, then a list of
compromise solutions is proposed, which includes the
following:
� If Condition 1 is not met, then Condition 2 is not
met either due to the nature of the calculations of
the VIKOR method. Therefore, the compromise
solution consists of A1 , A2 , A3 . . . AK : AK for max­
imum K is calculated using Equation 12.
1 competitive advantage over the other bidders. At the
QðAK Þ − QðA1 Þ � (12)
n−1
If only Condition 2 is not met, the compromise solu­
tion consists of A1 and A2 :
The alternative with the lowest VIKOR Index Qi value
is regarded as the best alternative.
Proposed unbalanced bidding detection model. The
proposed unbalanced bid detection model consists of
two modules. The first module calculates the weights
of the line items via the Information Entropy method.
To calculate the weights, the owner’s engineer first
identifies the line items and the quantity of each line
item. Then, the unit prices provided by the bidders
and the engineer’s estimated unit price for each line
item are input into the module. In this module, xij rep­
resents the ith bid’s unit price for the jth line item, xej
represents the engineer’s estimated unit price for the
jth line item. In this module, the unit price of a line
item provided by a bidder is compared to the geo­
metric mean of all bidders’ unit prices for the same
line item (xij Þgeomean (Equation (13)). There is a reason
why the geometric mean is used in this comparison
rather than the engineer’s estimated unit prices or the
arithmetic mean of the bidders’ unit prices for each
line item. Considering only the engineer’s estimated
prices as an evaluation benchmark might mislead the
decision-maker because engineers can make inaccur­
ate predictions (Beeston 1975). On the other hand,
using only the arithmetic mean of the unit prices pro­
vided by the bidders for each line item may also mis­
lead the decision-maker because these unit prices may
be skewed by several unbalanced bids in the same
batch (Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009). Using the geo­
metric mean of the unit prices provided by the bid­
ders as a benchmark for each line item may help to
overcome these shortcomings because the geometric
mean is less affected by extreme values in a skewed
distribution (Clark-Carter 2010). Indeed, some of the
bidders may unbalance their bids by jacking up the
unit price of some line items and reducing the unit
price of other line items, hence creating a distribution
that includes some outlier unit prices. It is well known
that mathematically unbalanced bids are not always
materially unbalanced. For example, a bidder may
plan to use a low-cost solution in a line item that was
developed over the years as a company-initiated nov­
elty. Typically, the low unit price in this line item
would be used by the bidder to create a legitimate
sight of the unusually low unit price in this line item,
the owner’s engineer may suspect an unbalanced bid,
but the owner always performs a detailed examination
to determine whether the bid is materially unbalanced
or not.
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Y n
n
ðxij Þgeomean ¼ xij (13)
i¼1
When the required information is input, the module
automatically calculates the weights of the line items.
The weight of a line item indicates the likelihood that
its unit price is unbalanced. The steps of calculating
the weights of the line items are explained in detail
below.
Step 1: In the first step, the normalization process is
applied to the values �in the decision matrix using
�
Equation (1). dij (dij ¼ �xij − ðxij Þave �) in the decision
matrix represents the difference between the bench­
mark calculated in Equation (13) (ðxij Þgeomean ) and the
unit price in Bid i for line item j (xij ).
Step 2: Then the “information entropy” Ej for the jth
line item is calculated using Equation (2). When gij ¼
0, it is assumed that gij lngij ¼ 0:
Step 3: The deviation of the essential information ðGj Þ
for the jth line item is calculated using Equation (3).
Step 4: The Information Entropy weight wj of the jth
line item is calculated using Equation (4) as a final
step.
The model’s second module deals with the ranking
of the bids. First, a decision matrix containing the unit
prices provided by the bidders and the unit prices
estimated by the owner’s engineer for each line item
is constructed. Then, the bids’ VIKOR Indices Qi are
computed using the VIKOR method. In the traditional
VIKOR method, the alternatives are ranked in ascend­
ing order based on their VIKOR Indices Qi : In the trad­
itional VIKOR method, the compromise solution is the
one with the lowest VIKOR Index Qi if the aforemen­
tioned conditions are met. However, in this study, the

proposed model intends to detect unbalanced bids,
and therefore the inferior alternative should be deter­
mined rather than the superior alternative. In other
words, while the lowest VIKOR Index Qi is used to
identify the superior alternative, the largest VIKOR
Index Qi is preferred to identify the inferior alternative.
Thus, in this study, the alternatives are ranked in
descending order of their VIKOR Indices Qi and the
alternative with the largest VIKOR Index Qi is reviewed
to see if it meets the two fundamental conditions of
the VIKOR method. The steps to perform the VIKOR
method are as follows:
Step 1: The decision matrix constructed in the first
module is also used in this step. The values in the
decision matrix are normalized before being pre­
sented in matrix form,
jxij − ðxij Þ j
where aij ¼ ðxij Þ geomean , where aij represents the nor­
geomean
malized value of the unit price in the ith bid for the jth
line item, xij represents the unit price in the ith bid for
the jth line item, and ðxij Þgeomean represents the bench­
mark for the jth line item. During the normalization
process, positive and negative ideal solutions are iden­
tified in the matrix using Equations (6) and (7).
Step 2: The maximum group utility Si and the min­
imum individual regret Ri are calculated for each
alternative i using Equations (8) and (9), respectively.
Step 3: The VIKOR Indices Qi are calculated for each
alternative i using Equation (10).
Step 4: The alternatives are ranked in descending
order of their VIKOR Indices Qi when v ¼ 0:5:
The alternative ðA1 Þ with the largest VIKOR Index Qi
is the worst solution if all of the following conditions
are met:
Condition 1. “Acceptable advantage rate”
1 between the unit prices submitted by bidders for a
QðA1 Þ − QðA2 Þ � (14)
n−1
where QðA1 Þ is the largest VIKOR Index for the bid
alternative on the list, QðA2 Þ is the second largest
VIKOR Index for the bid alternative on the list, and n is
the number of alternatives.
Condition 2. “Acceptable stability in decision making”
A1 must also be the first ranked alternative
with respect to the maximum group utility Si and the
minimum individual regret Ri for each alternative i.
This solution is considered to be stable if ðv > 0:5Þ
in “the maximum group utility approach”, or
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 9
ðv ¼ 0:5Þ in the “consensus’’ approach, or ðv < 0:5Þ
in the “minimum individual regret” approach.
If any of these conditions are not met, then a set of
solutions is proposed, which includes the following:
� If Condition 1 is not met, the solutions consist of
A1 , A2 , A3 . . . AK , where. AK is calculated using
Equation (12) for maximum K defined as the num­
ber of alternatives n minus the alternative that
does not meet Condition 1.
� If only Condition 2 is not met, the solutions con­
sist of A1 and A2 :
The bid alternative with the largest VIKOR Index Qi
is regarded as the worst alternative.
Implementation of the model. The usefulness of the
model proposed in this study can be best shown
through a case example. The example that was used
by Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009) is considered for
this purpose. It consists of five bids submitted by five
qualified bidders (i ¼ 1,2,.,5; where i represents the bid
submitted by each individual bidder), each bid con­
taining 17 line items (j ¼ 1,2,.,17; where j represents
each line item included in the bid). The information
for each line item is presented in Table 2 and involves
ID number, quantity, bidders’ unit prices, bidders’ total
bid prices, and the engineer’s estimated unit prices.
These values are input into the model by the owner’s
engineer.
It can be seen in Table 2 that even though many of
the prices provided by bidders for a line item are rela­
tively close to each other, the unit prices of some line
items may differ significantly from each other. For
example, in Bid 1 the price of line item 104 is
$600,000, whereas in Bid 5 it is $300,000, i.e. half of
Bidder 1’s offer. The difference reveals that there is a
reasonable doubt that Bid 1 may be unbalanced. It
should be noted that the greater the difference
line item, the more likely it is that the unit prices have
been manipulated unless the bidders have legitimate
explanations for overpriced or underpriced line items
such as using different markups for different line items
in line with the different levels of risk associated with
different line items or having developed novel low-
cost solutions relative to some line items. Once the
owner suspects that a bid is mathematically unbal­
anced, it is in the owner’s interest to run the model to
determine whether the bids are materially unbalanced
or not.
When the first module of the proposed model is
run, it automatically calculates the benchmark price
10 F. D. AKIN ET AL.

Table 2. The data for the illustrative example.

Unit prices ($)
Line item Quantity (xej ) ðxij Þgeomean Bid 1 (x1j ) Bid 2 (x2j ) Bid 3 (x3j ) Bid 4 (x4j ) Bid 5 (x5j )
100 29 15,000 13,109 5,000 16,394 16,217 16,554 17,589
101 14 35,000 22,967 34,538 5,000 32,326 34,240 33,431
102 12 20,000 19,326 18,552 18,704 19,609 20,335 19,486
103 30 80,000 73,420 90,000 69,923 67,827 72,040 69,380
104 6 300,000 381,380 600,000 450,000 324,964 306,527 300,000
105 12 1200 1028 1132 1059 1006 946 1006
106 30 89,000 68,529 40,000 50,000 96,949 87,769 88,806
107 14 4500 4522 4760 4515 4313 4533 4501
108 25 62,000 68,595 61,587 67,031 71,043 70,689 73,251
109 25 100,000 113,706 98,816 140,000 113,937 110,383 109,241
110 7 5000 4618 4957 4894 4487 4433 4350
111 30 3400 3547 3674 3759 3501 3505 3313
112 2 150,000 109,748 20,000 172,000 165,000 170,000 165,000
113 16 2800 3008 2979 3114 3212 3005 2751
114 18 7200 8273 7851 8510 8780 8178 8078
115 5 3600 3207 3485 3278 3153 3005 3134
116 32 9800 10,199 9131 9573 10,217 11,170 11,064
Total Project Cost 13,105,400 13,011,170 13,124,973 13,336,015 13,766,763 13,482,422 13,413,891
xej is the engineer’s estimated unit price for the jth line item; (xij Þgeomean is the geometric mean of the unit price provided by bidders for each line item j
which represents the benchmark for the jth line item; and xij is the unit price in the ith bid for the jth bid item.
Adapted from Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009)

Table 3. The normalized values in the ith bid for the jth line Table 4. The result matrix of the entropy method.
item.
Information Deviation of
Bidi entropy for the essential information Entropy weight
jth criterion for the jth criterion of the jth criterion
Line itemj Bid1 Bid2 Bid3 Bid4 Bid5 Line item Ej Gj wj
100 0.3615 0.1465 0.1386 0.1536 0.1998 100 0.0477 0.9523 0.0223
101 0.1908 0.2963 0.1544 0.1859 0.1726 101 0.0177 0.9823 0.0083
102 0.2719 0.2185 0.0993 0.3542 0.0561 102 0.1022 0.8978 0.0477
103 0.5333 0.1125 0.1799 0.0444 0.1299 103 0.1966 0.8034 0.0918
104 0.4373 0.1373 0.1129 0.1497 0.1628 104 0.0926 0.9074 0.0433
105 0.3988 0.1191 0.0841 0.3140 0.0841 105 0.1301 0.8699 0.0608
106 0.2481 0.1611 0.2471 0.1673 0.1763 106 0.0117 0.9883 0.0055
107 0.4892 0.0148 0.4303 0.0223 0.0436 107 0.3811 0.6189 0.1780
108 0.3943 0.0880 0.1378 0.1179 0.2620 108 0.0948 0.9052 0.0443
109 0.3026 0.5344 0.0047 0.0675 0.0907 109 0.3032 0.6968 0.1416
110 0.2833 0.2307 0.1089 0.1539 0.2232 110 0.0308 0.9692 0.0144
111 0.1921 0.3207 0.0696 0.0636 0.3540 111 0.1240 0.8760 0.0579
112 0.2781 0.1929 0.1712 0.1867 0.1712 112 0.0115 0.9885 0.0054
113 0.0487 0.1767 0.3402 0.0053 0.4292 113 0.2477 0.7523 0.1157
114 0.2898 0.1628 0.3483 0.0652 0.1339 114 0.0872 0.9128 0.0407
115 0.4101 0.1048 0.0796 0.2979 0.1076 115 0.1276 0.8724 0.0596
116 0.3011 0.1765 0.0050 0.2736 0.2437 116 0.1347 0.8653 0.0629

for each line item using Equation (13) and the bidders’
total bid prices. Then, the proposed model plots the
matrix of normalized values (Table 3) to implement
the Information Entropy method (Table 4). The results
are used to calculate the weights of the line items.
The weight of a line item indicates the likelihood that
its unit price is unbalanced.
After calculating the weights of the line items, the
second module of the proposed model should be run
by the owner’s engineer. The decision matrix (see
Table 2) constructed in the first module is also used in
the second module of the proposed model. However,
in this module, the normalization process of the deci­
sion matrix (Figure 1) also includes determining posi­
tive and negative ideal solutions (Table 5). Then the
module automatically calculates the maximum group
utility Si (Equation (8)), the minimum individual regret
Ri (Equation (9)), and the VIKOR Index Qi (Equation
(10)) for each alternative i to rank the alternatives (see
Table 6). It should be noted that due to the nature of
the problem of detecting unbalanced bids, all criteria
(i.e. 17 line items) should be evaluated as non-benefi­
cial criteria, where lower values are always preferred.
When all the required calculations are performed, the
second module automatically ranks the bids in
descending order according to their VIKOR Indices Qi
scores. The bids are ranked in the following descend­
ing order: Bid 1, Bid 3, Bid 2, Bid 5, and Bid 4. The
higher the VIKOR Index Qi score, the more likely it is
that the bid is unbalanced. A high VIKOR Index Qi
score prompts the owner’s engineer to examine the
bid in detail to see whether it is also materially
 CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 11

Figure 1. The normalized decision matrix (aij represents the normalized value of the unit price in the ith bid for the jth line item).

Table 5. The positive and negative ideal solutions from the think that Bid 1 (i.e. the lowest bid) is the most advan­
matrix. tageous choice. However, the proposed model shows
Positive solutions for Negative solutions for that the significant difference between the unit prices
non-beneficial criteria non-beneficial criteria
Line item a�j ¼ mini faij g a−j ¼ maxi faij g of some line items in Bid 1 and the unit prices of the
100 0.2371 0.6186 same line items in other bids supports the earlier
101 0.4075 0.7823
102 0.0083 0.0522
assertion that Bid 1 is mathematically unbalanced and
103 0.0188 0.2258 it should be inspected to see whether or not it is also
104 0.1479 0.5732
105 0.0213 0.1012
materially unbalanced.
106 0.2704 0.4163 The example presented in Arditi and Chotibhongs’s
107 0.0016 0.0526 (2009) study is also used by Su et al. (2020a). Su
108 0.0228 0.1022
109 0.0020 0.2313 et al.’s model (2020a) considers the engineer’s esti­
110 0.0283 0.0735 mates of the unit prices of each line item in their ana­
111 0.0118 0.0660
112 0.5034 0.8178 lysis. However, using the geometric mean of the unit
113 0.0010 0.0855 prices offered by the bidders for a line item may be a
114 0.0115 0.0613
115 0.0168 0.0867 more realistic approach than using the engineer’s esti­
116 0.0017 0.1047 mate for that line item particularly because this pro­
cedure eliminates the effect of extreme variations in
unbalanced, which should result in an early detection the distributions (i.e. the effect of unbalanced line
of unbalanced bids, hence ensuring a fair competitive items that some of the bidders may have used) while
environment. doing away with the inaccuracies that are known to
be in the engineer’s estimates (Beeston 1975, Clark-
Carter 2010). In addition, Arditi and Chotibhongs
Findings and discussion
(2009) also state that considering the engineer’s esti­
The results in Table 6 show that Bid 1 has the highest mates as an evaluation benchmark might mislead the
VIKOR Index Qi score which means that Bid 1 is math­ decision-maker because according to Beeston (1975),
ematically unbalanced. If one evaluates the bids by engineers can sometimes make inaccurate predictions.
considering their total bid prices without paying any While Su et al. (2020a) identified Bid 2 as mathematic­
attention to the unit prices of the line items, one may ally unbalanced (using the engineer’s estimates), the
12 F. D. AKIN ET AL.
Table 6. The result matrix of the modified VIKOR method.
Maximum group utility for Minimum individual regret for
alternative i alternative i
Alternatives Si Ri
Bid 1 0.7742 0.1780
Bid 2 0.3636 0.1416
Bid 3 0.3342 0.1559
Bid 4 0.2256 0.0570
Bid 5 0.3385 0.1157
model developed in our study identified Bid 1 as
mathematically unbalanced (using the geometric
means of the unit prices for each line item).
Furthermore, the information in Table 2 shows that
the unit prices of line items 100, 103, 104, and 112 in
Bid 1 identified by Su et al. (2020a) as an unbalanced
bid differ significantly from the unit prices offered by
other bidders, creating major variations in the distribu­
tion of the unit prices for the said line items in Bid 1.
The fact that the effect of these variations was elimi­
nated by the geometric means used in our study is
strong evidence that using the geometric means of
the unit prices in the analysis is superior to simply
using the engineer’s estimates. Because the actual
cost of the project is not known at the time bidding is
taking place, there is no way to observe the effect of
awarding the contract to a bidder who has unbal­
anced his/her bid. However, the studies on unbal­
anced bidding (e.g. Arditi and Chotibhongs 2009,
Hyari 2016, Li et al. 2023) commonly acknowledge
that the final cost of the project may end up being
much higher than the one estimated by the owner’s
engineer.
In sum, this study makes researchers, construction
professionals and owners aware of the fact that unbal­
anced bids may not be accurately detected when
owners consider only the engineer’s estimated unit
prices or the arithmetic mean of the unit prices pro­
vided by bidders for each line item. The results of this
study also reveal that, when there is a doubt that unit
prices may be skewed by several unbalanced bids in
the same batch, the owner should consider using the
geometric mean of the unit prices provided by all the
bidders for each line item as a benchmark to detect
the unbalanced bids accurately. However, it should be
also pointed out that owners may need to consider
different benchmarks in different cases due to the fact
that the detection of unbalanced bids is significantly
sensitive to the benchmark preferred by the owners.
Exploring the impact of a model that detects unbal­
anced bids by using different benchmark options sim­
ultaneously could be a potential improvement of this
study.
VIKOR Index for
alternative i Checking
Qi Ranking the conditions
1.0000 1 C1. 0.4924 > 0.25 ✓
0.4753 3 C2. B1(Ri) ¼ max(Ri) ✓
0.5076 2
0.0000 5
0.3453 4
Conclusion
Detecting and preventing unbalanced bids during the
bid evaluation process is in the interest of owners
since it helps them create a fair competitive environ­
ment, and prevent future losses. However, there is
only a limited number of studies in the literature that
focus on highlighting the negative impacts of using
flawed benchmarks in detecting unbalanced bids. This
research attempts to fill this gap by developing an
advanced decision-making model that makes use of
(1) the geometric mean of bidders’ unit prices of line
items as a benchmark and (2) the Information Entropy
method to calculate the weights of the line items, and
(3) the modified VIKOR method to rank the bids
according to their likelihood of being unbalanced.
An illustrative example borrowed from Arditi and
Chotibhongs’s (2009) study was used to demonstrate
the applicability of the proposed model while high­
lighting the negative impacts of using flawed bench­
marks in detecting unbalanced bids. Based on the
findings of this study, it was found that the proposed
model could effectively detect unbalanced bids in a
short period of time. The findings of this study also
revealed that the lowest bid (Bid 1) that appeared to
be the best alternative at the beginning of the bid
evaluation process actually was an unbalanced bid.
Moreover, it was observed that the detection of unbal­
anced bids is quite sensitive to the benchmark used
by the owner. It was found in this study that if the
owner doubts that the unit prices are skewed by sev­
eral unbalanced bids in the same batch, then the geo­
metric mean of the unit prices provided by all the
bidders for each line item should be considered as a
benchmark to detect unbalanced bids accurately.
According to the findings of this study, it is strongly
recommended that owners evaluate the bids they
receive by taking the geometric mean of bidders’ unit
prices as a benchmark for each line item, rather than
the engineer’s estimated unit prices or the arithmetic
mean of the unit prices provided by bidders for each
line item. In addition, it is strongly recommended that
owners make use of the Information Entropy method

to calculate the weights of the line items and the
VIKOR method to rank the bids according to their like­
lihood of being unbalanced. The proposed advanced
model is a robust tool that may help owners to detect
unbalanced bids with much confidence. It is also
anticipated that the model will encourage construc­
tion owners to be more sensitive and reactive to
unbalanced bidding, and will motivate researchers to
conduct more research about detecting and prevent­
ing unbalanced bids. This research can also help con­
tractors to revisit and revise their bidding strategies in
response to owners who may be more cognizant and
knowledgeable about the detection and prevention of
unbalanced bids.
Not considering the time value of money in the
detection of unbalanced bids is a limitation of the pro­
posed model. In addition, not using a real life project
for demonstration purposes is also a limitation of the
study. In future studies, developing a sufficiently reli­
able work schedule at the bidding phase of a project
can be explored that allows the owner to perform a
realistic NPV analysis, hence allowing the owner to
detect unbalanced bids with more confidence. Also,
the performance of decision-making methods other
than VIKOR (e.g. TOPSIS) can be explored. The imple­
mentation of a model that considers multiple bench­
marks simultaneously would be a potential
improvement to this study.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the
author(s).
Data availability statement
The authors confirm that the data supporting the findings of
this study are available within the article and its supplemen­
tary materials.
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