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Consequences of Social Comparison

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-4237-7_13

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 13
of SocialComparison
Consequences
Selective Accessibilitv. Assimilation. and Contrast

THOMAS MUSSWEILER INO FRITZ STRACK

Almost all our achievements are relative, in that their merit dependson the achievementsof
others.This becomesespecially clear in situations that are competitive in nature. For example,
SammySosamay be proud of the fact that he hit 66 homerunsin 1998,and thus surpassedthe
old record by a margin of 5. However, it may be difficult for him not to compare his 66 to the
70 home runs hit by Mark McGuire in the very same season.Similarly, you may be fairly
contentwith your own athletic achievements,but still, after signing up for a competitive sports
event,will probably start to compare your abilities to those of your rivals. What do you think
would be the consequencesof such comparisons?Would they make you feel better or worse?
Would they changeyour own evaluation of your qualities? Would they boost or sabotageyour
performance?
Although it often has been lamented that social comparison research has traditionally
focused too little attention on such questions (Wood, 1989), in recent years numerous studies
haveinvestigatedthe consequences social comparisonshave for self-evaluations(e.g.,Brewer
& Weber,1994;Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards,L99Z;Lockwood & Kunda,1997, Pelham
& Wachsmuth,1995), affect (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van-
Yperen,& Dakof, 1990; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Reis, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1993; Tesser,
Millar, & Moore, 1988),and behavior (e.g., Seta, 1982;Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996).
These studies have demonstrated that social comparisons sometimes produce assimilation
(e.g., more positive evaluations after an upward comparison), and at other times produce
contrast (e.g., more negative evaluations after an upward comparison). Which of these two
opposingeffectsoccurs dependson a host of moderatingvariablessuch as self-esteem(e.g.,
Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Buunk et al., 1990; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989) psychological
closeness(e.g., Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown et al., 1992: Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995;
Tesser et a1., 1988), the relevance of the comparison dimension (Tesser,1988), and the

THOMAS MUSSWEILER .c.NoFRITZ STRACK . Universitaet Wuerzburg, Psychologie Il, 97070 Wuerzburg,
Germany.

Handbook of Social Comparison: Theory and Research, edited by Suls and Wheeler. Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Pubiishers. New York. 2000.

253
 254 THOMAS MUSSWEILER aNo FRITZ STRACK

attainability of the comparison standard(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) (for a discussionof

additional moderating variables, see Taylor et al., 1996).
In spite of these insights, our understandingof the consequencesof social comparison
remains incomplete. In particular, little is known about the judgmental processesthat underlie
the effects of social comparisons (see Wills & Suls, 1991; Wood, 1939). To remedy this
shortcoming, it may be fruitful to invoke conceptualizationsof assimilation and contrast that
were developedin other researchparadigms.One paradigmin which the underlying processes
of assimilationand contrasthave beenintensivelyinvestigatedis social cognition research.In
the present chapter, we will attempt to apply some of the basic notions of this researchin order
to allow for a more complete understandingof the consequencesof social comparison.

A SOCIAL COGNITION PERSPECTIVE ON ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST:

THE SELECTTVE ACCESSIBILITY MODEL

One of the most fundamentalprinciples of social cognition researchis the accessibility

principle (for recentreviews, seeHiggins, 1989,1996;Sedikides& Skowronski, 1991;wyer ai
Srull, 1989),which holds that when making any kind ofjudgment, peoplefocus on knowledge
that comes to mind easily. Recently, we have suggestedthat this basic principle may be
fruitfully invoked to understand the consequencesof making a comparison. Specifically, we
proposed a selectiveaccessibilitymodel (Mussweiler,1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a,b,
2000a; Mussweiler, Förster, & Strack, 1997; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997)that assumesthat
making a comparison alters the accessibility of knowledge about the comparison target. In
particular, we suppose that judges compare a target to a given standard by selectively
generating knowledge that is consistent with the notion that the target is similar to the standard
(the selectivity hypothesis).Generatingsuch knowledge increasesits accessibility,so that it
influences subsequentevaluations of the target (the accessibility hypothesis) (for a detailed
description of the selective accessibilitymodel, see Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b).
In social comparisons, the self typically constitutes the target of the comparison and a
salient other constitutes the comparison standard.From a selective accessibility perspective, a
person would thus compare himself or herself to a given standard by generating evidence
indicating that he or she is similar to the standard.Doing so increasesthe accessibility of this
evidence, which is likely to influences subsequentself-evaluations.

The Selectivity Hypothesis

In order to compare a target to a given standard,participants have to relate their stored

knowledge about the target to this task. Such active retrieval ofjudgment-relevant knowledge
is accomplished through hypothesis testing (Trope & Liberman, 1996), which is typically
basedon diagnosticevidence(i.e., evidencethat helps decidewhetherthe testedhypothesisis
true or false) (e.g.,Trope & Bassok,1982).In many cases,evidenceis most diagnostrcif it is
consistent with the tested hypothesis (Trope & Liberman,1996). Specifically, adopting a
positive test strategy (i.e., examining casesin which the target characteristicis present) is often
the most critical test when a single hypothesisis under consideration(Klayman &Ha, 1981).
In linking this notion to the process of making a comparison, we (Mussweller, 1997;
Mussweiler & strack, 1999a,b;Strack & Mussweiler, lggT) suggestedthat judges comparea
target to a given standard by testing the hypothesis that the target's value on the judgmental
dimension is, in fact, equal to the standard.To do so, judges engage in a "positive test
 CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL COMPARISON ts<

strategy" and selectivelyretrieveknowledge from memory that is consistentwith this assump-

tion. In other words, judges considerthe possibility that the targetand the standard*" "quul
(see also Koehler, 1991)by initiating a selective searchfor evidenceabout the target thal is
consistent with this assumption (for empirical evidence supporting this assumption, see
Mussweiler & Strack, 199pa, 2000a).
Take the following example as an illustration of this mechanism:Assumeyou have just
signed up for a local tennis tournament. You are a pretty good player and you are vain enough
to care about winning the trophy. However, you know that your neighbor Donald who is also
going to competeis an excellentplayer as well. In fact, Donald won the last threetournaments.
In this situation,you will have to compareyour tennis skills to thoseof Donald in order to find
out whetheryou have a realisticchanceto win the trophy. Specifically,you will have to decide
whetheryou play betteror worse than Donald. The selectiveaccessibilitymodel holds that in
this situation,you would assumeto be similar to the comparisonstandard.Specifically,you
would make the critical comparison, by testing the hypothesis that you do in fact play as well
as Donald. To do so, you would try to retrieveknowledge from memory that is consistentwith
this assumption.That is, you would selectively generateinformation indicating that you are
as good a player as your standardof comparison.For example,you may recall that you have
recently improved your backhandconsiderably,that your serveand volley is irresistible,that
your new racquet helps a lot, and so forth.

The Accessibility Hypothesis

How does testing the hypothesis that the target is similar to the standard influence
subsequentevaluationsof the target?How does testing the hypothesisthat you are as good a
tennisplayer as Donald changeyour evaluationof your own tennisskills?Within the selective
accessibilitymodel, we assumethat this influence is mediated by knowledge accessibility.
Researchon this topic hasrepeatedlydemonstratedthat activatingknowledge(e.g.,by using a
priming task) may influence subsequentevaluations (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones,r9j7;
Srull & Wyer' 1979). Generating knowledge in the course of making a comparison may exert
an influencein a similar way. Specifically,generatingknowledgeincreasesits accessibility,so
that it is more likely to be used for a subsequentjudgment. However, in adoptinga positive
test strategy,judges do not generatea representativeset of knowledge about the target.Rather,
they recall it selectively. Thus, making a comparison selectively increasesthe accessibility of
standard-consistentknowledge about the target. This easily accessible knowledge is then
primarily used for subsequentevaluations of the target, so that these evaluations
are based on
standard-consistent knowledge (for empirical support of this assumption,see Mussweiler &
strack, 1999a,2000a; Strack & Mussweiler, r99i.).In our exampte,comparing yourself to
Donald selectively increasesthe accessibility of knowledge indicating that you are good
a
player (e'g', your serveand volley is irresistible).As a consequence,you are likely
to use this
knowledge for subsequentevaluationsof your tennis skills.

consequences of selective Accessibility: The Role of Applicability and

Representativeness

Researchon the determinants of knowledge accessibiliry effects further suggeststhat the

influencethis easily accessiblestandard-consistent
knowledge has on later evaluationsof the
targetdependson its applicability and representativeness.Specifically, the extent to which
accessibleknowledge influencesa given judgment dependson its applicabiliry
(e.g.,Higgins
 256 THOMASMUSSWEILERaNo FRITZ STRACK

& Brendl, 1995;Higgins et al., 1977).Thatis, the more relevantthe implications

of accessible
knowledge are for the judgment at hand, the more likely it is to be used in the judgment
pr;-
cess'Thus, the more applicableaccessibleknowledgeis, the strongerits effecÄ
oi3uagÄ"nt
will be. For example, accessibleknowledge indicating that you are a gooa
tennis pller is
likely to have the strongest effects on evaluations of your tennis skills because
it is rright
relevant for this evaluation. The same klowledge, however, is likely to have
less influenÄ on
judgments of your soccer skills. Although both activities require
similar abilities to some
extent, they also are different in important aspects,so that knowledge about one's
tennis skills
is of limited relevancefor evaluationsof one's soccerskills. Finally, this knowledge
is untikely
to have any influence on evaluations of your cooking skills, becauseplaying
tennis anä
cooking have very little in corrunon, so that knowledge about the first is
irrelevant for
evaluationsof the latter (for experimentalevidenceexamining the role of knowledge
appli-
cability in comparisons,see Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).
How applicableknowledgeis usedin thejudgment processis determined
by its represen-
tativeness.It hasbeen suggested(e.g.,Martin & Achee, 1992;Strack, l9g2) that people
do not
invariably use knowledge that is accessibleand applicable to the current judgment.
Rather,
they engage in a representativenesscheck (Strack,lgg2) and determine whether
using easily
accessibleknowledge is appropriate to reach an accuratejudgment. To the
extent thai acces-
sible knowledge is similar to the judgmental target or pertains to the same
overall category or
time period (Strack, 1992),itis likely to be seenas representativefor thejudgment.
Represen-
tative knowledge is usedas a judgmental basis,which leadsto an assimilation
of the juägment
toward the implications of this knowledge. Nonreptbsentativeknowledge,
howevei, may be
excluded from the judgment (Martin, 19g6; schwarz & Bless, 1992)or used
a comparison
standard (Schwarz & Bless, 1992) in evaluations of the target. This leads
to contrasi of the
judgment away from the implications of accessibleknowledse.
For example, accessibleknowledge about your present te-nnisskills is representative
for
evaluations of your present tennis skills, becauseit pertains to the same target
and the same
time period as the evaluation. In this case, your evaluation is likely to
be based on and be
consistent with the implications of this knowledge, which produ"", *
assimilation effect.
The sameknowledge, however, is nonrepresentativefor evaluätion of your
tennis skills in your
first year of playing tennis, becausepresumably you played much wtrse
as a beginner. As a
consequence,this knowledge is unlikely to be used as a judgmental basis.
Instead, it mav
function as a comparison standard,which is likely to yield u "orrt.urt effect:
In .o-p#ro" iä
your excellent present play, your skills as a beginner appeareven more
dilettante. Näte that in
the latter case, although accessibleknowledge is nonrepresentativefor the judgment,
it is still
applicable. Specifically, it pertains to the same domain, and thus entails relevant
information
for your evaluation by providing a comparison standard.Consequently, it
is likely to be used
to make the evaluation.

SELECTIVE ACCESSIBILITY IN SOCIAL COMPARISON

According to the selective accessibilitymodel, engaging in a comparison

involves a
selectivesearchfor evidenceindicating that the comparisontarget(i.e.,
the self) is similar to
the comparison standard.This notion is in line with the literature on social
comparison. In fact,
the selectiveaccessibilitymodel is in accord with the two core notions
of Feitinger's (1954)
original theory, namely the assumption that people engage in social comparison
in order to
obtain diagnostic feedback about their abilities and that in order to
do so, they compare
primarily with similar others.
 OF SOCIALCOMPARISON 2s7
CONSEQUENCES

piagnosticity in Social Comparison

As we have pointed out before, selectivelysearchingfor hypothesis-consistent evidence

to provide judges with the most diagnostic evidence for the critical comparison
is likely
1987; Trope & Liberman, 1996).Thus, hypothesis-consistent testing may
lKiuy,oun &Ha,
a quest for diagnostic information. Similarly, Festinger (1954)assumedthat people
.onriitu,"
information abouttheir abilities.He
"ngug"in social comparisonin order to obtain diagnostic
dü that such diagnostic information is important because people require realistic ap-
level of competence.As
oärds of their skills in order to select activities that match their
" ... holding ... inaccurateappraisalsof one's abilities can be punishing or
iestinger put it,
that people are
evenfatal" (1954,p. 117).In line with this reasoning,it hasbeendemonstrated
motivated to obtain diagnostic information about their abilities: When given the oppor-
often
the most
tunity to choosebetween different tasks,they often opt for the task that promises to be
about their abilities (for a review, see Trope, 1986). In fact, they may even do so
diagnostic
whJn this choice is likely to entail unfavorable feedback. This suggests that veridical self-
assessment is an important motive in social comparison (for a discussion of different motives
in socialcomparison,see,for example,Taylor et al., 1996;Wood, 1989;Wood & Taylor, 1991)'
Thus, social comparisons are at least partly motivated by the same quest for diagnostic evi-
dencethat is assumedto underlie the judgmental processesspecifiedin the selectiveacces-
sibility model.

Similarity in Social ComParison

This motive to assessone's veridical standingrelativeto the comparisonstandardmay be

best achieved by considering the possibility that one's own standing on the judgmental
dimensionis equal to that of the comparisonstandard(Wheeler,1966; Collins,1996). To see
the diagnostic advantagesof testing this similarity hypothesis, take our introductory example
as an illustration. Imagine that you want to find out whether you have a realistic chanceto beat
Donald in your prestigious local tennis toumament and win the trophy. To do so, you are likely
to compare your own athletic achievementswith those of Donald. The most diagnostic way to
make this comparison appearsto be that you first find some critical features that are indicative
of your competitor's abilities and then test whether you possessthese features as well. For
example, you may know that Donald is regarded as one of the top three players in town and
may test the possibility that you do belong to the top three as well. To make this test, you may
assumefor a while that you are, in fact, one of the top three and try to muster evidence that
supportsthis assumption. In this casethe presenceas well as the absenceof the critical feature
(i.e., belonging to the top three) is diagnostic for the judgment to be made. Specifically, no
matter what the result of this hypothesis test, you have obtained valuable information to make
the critical judgment. If the feature is present, this suggeststhat you may indeed be equally
skilled as your competitor, if the feature is not present, you may not be quite as good. Thus,
becauseyou explicitly tested whether you possessthe feature that characterizesthe standard,
the evidencethat was generatedto test this possibility allows you to judge how your abilities
measureup to those of the comparison standard.
This, however, is not true for hypothesis tests that involve features that do not represent
the standard'sstanding on the judgmental dimension. For example, supposeyou found the idea
of belonging to the top three too farfetched, and thus would test a more modest alternative
hypothesis.For example, you may test the possibility that you belong to the top 10. NoW in
contrastto testing the critical hypothesisitself (i.e., you belong to the top 3), the resultsof this
test are not necessarily informative with respectto the critical judgment. For example, if you
 258 THOMASMUSSWEILER
eNoFRITZ STRACK

come to the conclusion that you are probably betterthan top

10, it is difficult to derive direct
implications for the critical judgment. In this case,you
still do not know how yo,r. u.hi*.-
ments measure up to those of your competitor.
This example suggeststhat testing whether a critical feafure
that is indicative of the
standard'sposition on the judgmental dimension also characterizes
the .o-p*iron t*g"t
provides the most diagnostic information for the
critical comparison. That is, t".ting ii"
possibility that the comparisontargetis equalto the standard
upp"*, ro be the most diagÄstic
way to assessthe target's standing in comparisonto the
standard.
Consistent with this assumption that testing for similarity
between the target and the
standardconstitutesthe most diagnosticway to make a comparison,
social comparisontheory
traditionally has stressedthe importanceof similarity in the process
of ,.r..ting u "o.rJä;
standard'In fact, Festinger's original formulation already acLowledges
the diagnostic advan-
tages of comparing with similar others. Specifically,he
statesthat "if some äther persont
ability is too far from his own ... it is not possibleto evaluate
his own ability accuÄtely by
comparisonwith this other person" (Festinger,1954,p.120).
Similarly, Goethalsuna o-r"y
(1977) have argued that a comparison with a standard
that is similar to oneself on dimensions
that are related to the critical ability allows for the clearest
evaluation of one,s ability (cf.
Wheeler, Martin, & Suls, 1997). In support of this notion,
research has demonstrated that
people often select similar others as comparisonstandards
(e.g., Wheeler, 1966).Extending
these original formulations we assume that a quest for
simiiarity not only influences the
selectionprocess'In addition to selectingsimilarothers
as comparisonstandards,judges also
may focus on the ways in ühich they are similar to a given
cämpariro., standard.
Empirical evidence also exists that is suggestiveof the
assumedfocus on sirnilarity in
social comparison (e.g., Develris et ar., 1991;Lockwood
& Kunda, 1997;Miyake & Zucker_
man, 1993; Nosanchuk & Erickson, 1995). For example,
Nosanchuk and Erickson (19g5)
demonstratedthat bridge players who were given a choice
of comparison standardschose to
compare with others who were objectively superior to
themselves. Subjectively, however,
participants perceived the selected standards to be at
a similar level of competence. This
suggeststhat participants did in fact construethemselves
to be similar to the standard (Collins,
1996)' More direct evidence in support of this possibility
is provided by Lockwood and Kunda
(1997)' These researchershad students read
Jescriptions o1 an outstanding graduate student
before they asked them to evaluate themselveson a number
of dimensions that were related to
generalcareer success.S-ubsequently,they rated how
relevant this student was as a comparison
standard and then justified these ratings in an open-ended
statement. An analysis of tlese
statementsrevealed that participants focused primarily
on features that they had in common
with the comparison standard. For example,they stated
to be similar to the standard with
respect to preferred hobbies, social activities, academic
aspirations, and so on.
Taken together, this evidence demonstratesthat similarity
is an rmportant factor in the
socialcomparisonprocess.Furthermore,it suggeststhat-consistent
with the selectiveacces-
sibility model-social comparisons may inuoine testing
the hypothesis that the comparison
target (i.e., oneself) is similar to the given standard.

Testing for Selective Accessibility in Social Comparison

The selectiveaccessibilitymodel predictsthat testingthis

similarity hypothesisincreases
the accessibility of evidence that implies actual similariiy
with the standard of comparison.
Thus, comparing oneself to an upward standardshould
increasethe accessibility of knowledge
about the self that indicates that one also is high on the critical
dimension. tsy the same token.
 CONSEQUENCESOF SOCIAL COMPARISON 259

comparing oneself to a downward standardshould increasethe accessibilityof knowledge

indicating that one is low on the critical dimension.
We testedthesepredictionsin a recent study (Mussweiler& Strack,2000b) in which we
useda lexical decision task (seeNeely, 1991,for a review) to assessthe accessibilityof self-
related knowledge (see Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). Specifically,we had participantscompare
themselves with either a moderately athletic (the former race car driver Nicki Lauda) or a
moderately unathletic (Bill Clinton) celebrity.l In particular, participants were instructed to
indicate whether they thought they were more or less athletic than the respectivecomparison
standard. After making this comparison, they received a lexical decision task that included
words associatedwith being athletic (e.g., dynamic, athletic), words associatedwith being
unathletic(e.g., weak, heavy), neutral words (e.g., postcard,jacket), and nonwords.For each
of the presentedwords, the participants' task was to determine whether these words do or do
not constitute a German word. In order to distinguish between the accessibility of semantic
knowledge in general and the accessibility of self-related knowledge, we followed a procedure
developedby Dijksterhuis et al. (1998).Specifically,halfthe lexical decisionswere preceded
by the subliminal presentationof a word that is closely associatedwith the self-concept(I, my,
me). The other half was preceded by a word unrelated to the self (and, or, when). Subliminal
presentationof self-related words has been demonstrated to activate the self-concept, so that
lexical decision trials that are precededby such primes assessthe specific accessibility of self-
related knowledge (Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).
Our results demonstrate that after a comparison with Nicki Lauda (i.e., the mo{erately
athletic standard),participants were faster in recognizing words associatedwith being athletic
than words associatedwith being unathletic. In contrast, after comparing with Bill Clinton (the
moderately unathletic standard), they were faster in recognizing words associatedwith being
unathletic. This relation, however, only held for those trials that were preceded by the
subliminal presentationof self-related primes. Thus, comparing with a given standardappears
to have increased the accessibility of standard-consistentknowledge about the self (i.e.,
knowledge suggesting that one is similar to the standard on the judgmental dimension).

Limits of Selective Accessibility

From the current perspective,a social comparison increasesthe accessibility of standard-

consistent knowledge about the target because judges assume that they are similar to the
standard of comparison and selectively search for evidence that is consistent with this
assumption.However, judges are only likely to engage in this process if being similar to the
standard of comparison constitutes a realistic possibility. For instance, in our introductory
example, you may well consider the possibility that you play tennis as well as your neighbor
Donald, becauseboth of you are at similar levels of excellence. For more extreme standards
(e.g.,Pete Sampras),however, you are unlikely to engagein this similarity test. In this case,in
which it is obvious that the target (i.e., the self) is dissimilar from the standard,judges are more
likely to make the comparison using categorical knowledge about the target and the standard
(seeMussweiler & Strack, 2000a). Specifically, if you were to compare your
tennis skills with
those of Grand Slam champion Pete Sampras, you would most likely acknowledge
that he
belongsto a specificsubcategoryof tennisplayers (i.e.,professionals)and make the compari-
son by excluding yourself from this category. In particular, you may ascribe yourself
tÄ the
LPretesting
revealed that our research participants saw Nicki Lauda and Bill Clinton as moderately hish and low
standardsin the domain of athletics.
 260 THOMASMUSSWEILER
aro FRITZ STRACK
negation of the standard'scategory (e.g., hobby tennis
players) and make the comparison
basedon the attributesassociatedwith both categories.
Thus, ratherthan testingtt " porrititity
that you play as welr as pete Sampras,you may concrude
right away that you play worse,
becausetennis professionalsare fypically better than hobby
ilayers. As a consequence,the
evaluation of your tennis skills is likely to be based youi-...rbership
on in an inferior group
(i'e'' hobby players). conceivably, this leads to
less iavorable evaluations (i.e., a contrasr
effect).
Thus judges may not always be inclined to engage
in the presumed similarity test. under
specific circumstances (e.g., when the standard is
tÄ "xt.e-"; tir"y *uy resort to different
judgmental strategies(e.g.,categorical
differentiation).Notably, assimilationis only likely
be the result of social comparison, if similariry between to
the target and the standardis assumed.
If this is not the case, contrast is the more likely
outcomefsee Collins, 1996, for a more
elaboratediscussion).
This perspective on assimilation and contrast is consistent
with the factors that have been
found to moderate the effccts of social comparison.
one central moderator is psychological
closeness'Ifjudges feel close to the comparison
standard,they tend to assimilate.Ifcloseness
is low, however,contrastis the more likery outcome(e.g.,
Brewer & weber, 1994;Brown et al.,
1992;Pelham & wachsmuth, 1995;Tesseret al.,
19ggj. This may be the casebecausejudges
only test the hypothesis that they are similar to the
standardwhen the other is close to them,
similarly' attainability of the standard'sstafusmay
lead to assimilation (e.g., Buunk et al.,
1990; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997;Taylor etal.,
1996)becauseit allows fbr inclusion in the
category of the standard and thus facilitates testing
the similarity hypothesis.
Thus' social comparisons may not always involve
testing trreiypott esis that the target is
similar to the standard.However, there is ."uron
to believe trrat trre simitarity test is the more
likely alternative' Specifically, becausejudges typically
select similar others as comparison
standards (wheeler, 1966), they are likely io entertain
the possibility that rhey a.", in ra"t,
similar to these standards.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL COMPARISON

The evidence that we have presentedso far indicates

that social comparisons increase the
accessibility of standard-coasistentknowledge,
which is then likely to be used for later
judgments about the comparison target.
From tlis perspective,,rr" "rr""u that are produced
social comparison can be conceptualizedas tnowtlage-accessibility by
effects. Doing so enables
us to apply the basic principles of knowledge accessibility
(seeHiggins, 1996, fora review) to
the realm of social comparison. This approachpromises
to shed n"rv tigrrt on the judgmental
processesthat underlie social comparison.

Applicability in Social Comparison

current concepfualizationsof knowledge accessibility

. effects(e.g.,Higgins, 1996; Mar_
tin & Achee, 1992; Schwarz & Bress, 1992; Strack,
r992)iypicany uriu-" thar the effects of
accessibleknowledge dependon how this knowledge
is used ln ttre luag-ent process.As
outlined before, the first determinantof knowledge
use is its applicabilrty.Specificalty,it has
been demonstratedthat accessibleknowledge will
only be used for a judgment if it is
applicable(e.g.,Higgins et al., 1977).As u "onr"qu"n"e,
applicability determinesthe magni_
tude of knowledge accessibilityeffects.
CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL COMPARISON

Applying this principle to social comparisonssuggeststhat the magnitudeof the influ-

encethat a comparisonwill have on subsequentself-evaluationsdependson how applicable
the knowledge that has been renderedeasily accessiblein the comparisonprocessis to this
evaluation.In particular, a comparisonwill have no influenceif accessibleknowledge is not
applicable.Consistentwith this reasoning,it has been demonstratedthat the consequences of
socialcomparisons depend on how self-relevant
the comparison dimension is (e.g.,Lockwood
& Kunda, 1997; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Tesser,1988).For example, self-evaluationswere
only affectedby a comparisonwith an upward standard,if the standard'sdomain of excellence
is relevant to the self. If it is irrelevant, however, self-evaluationsremained unchanged
(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).For instance,studentswho were planning to become teachers
evaluatedtheir own qualities to be better after reading about an excellentteacher.However,
readingabout an excellent accountantdid not influence these evaluations.
From the current perspective, one possible interpretation for these results is that compar-
ing oneselfto an upward standardincreasesthe accessibiliryof standard-consistent knowledge
about the self. To the extent that this comparison is carried out for self-relevant as well as
irrelevantdimensions (e.g., becauseit is explicitly asked for), such increased accessibility
shouldresult regardlessof the relevanceof the comparisondimension.However, relevanceis
likely to determine whether the accessible knowledge is used to make the self-evaluative
judgment.Becauseself-evaluationsare likely to be basedonly on self-relevantknowledge,
increasingaccessibility on an irrelevant dimension is unlikely to have an effect. Thus, a
comparisonon an irrelevantdimensionmay not influenceseif-evaluationsbecausethe knowl-
edgethat is renderedeasily accessibleis not applicableto lheseevaluations.l

Representativeness in Social Comparison

The secondmoderatorof knowledge accessibilityeffectsis representativeness. If acces-

sible knowledge is representative for the current judgment, it will be used as a judgmental
basis,so that assimilationwill result. If, however,accessibleknowledge is not representative,
it may be excludedfrom thejudgment (Martin & Achee, 1992;Schwarz& Bless,1992)or used
asa standardof comparison(Schwarz& Bless, 1992;Strack,1992),which is likely to produce
contrast.
From the current perspective the effects of social comparison are mediated by the
increasedaccessibilityof standard-consistent knowledge about the self. Thus, in the social
comparisonparadigm, accessibleknowledge typically pertains to the sametarget as the critical
evaluation. Because representativenessis determined by similarity (Kahneman & Tversky,
1972),knowledge that pertains to the judgmental target itself is likely to be representativefor
judgments about this target. Consequently, accessible knowledge is likely to be used as a
judgmental basis, so that assimilation occurs (e.g., Hen, 1986).
In some cases,however, accessibleknowledge may be nonrepresentativefor the critical
judgment, although both pertain to the self. For example, if easily accessible knowledge
pertainsto a different period of life, it may be nomepresentativefor the critical evaluation. As
was demonstratedby Strack, Schwarz,and Gschneidinger(1985),increasingthe accessibility
of self-related knowledge that pertains to the past yields contrast effects on judgments about
the present.Specifically, listing positive past life eventsinduced participantsto judge their
2Note that unlike much of the social comparison literature (Wood, 1989) this reasoning does not focus on how self-
relevance influences the selection of a comparison standard. Rather, it concentrates on the consequencesa given
comparison will have, presupposing that this comparison was in fact carried out. This, of course, is not to say that
self-relevancedoes not influence the selection orocessas well.
262 THOMASMUSSWEILER
eNoFRITZ STRACK

current well-being to be lower. This suggeststhat increasingthe accessibilityof self-related

knowledge during a social comparison that pertains to a different time period as the critical
evaluation may lead to similar contrast effects. For example, comparing one's present athletic
abilities to those of Bill Clinton may producea contrasteffect on evaluationsof one's athletic
abilities in college. Specifically,in order to comparewith Bill Clinton (i.e., a low standardof
comparison) one may selectively searchfor evidence indicating that one is fairly unathletic at
the moment. One's current level of fitness,however,is likely to be nonrepresentativeof one's
fitnessin college. As a consequence,one may excludethis information from the judgment or
use it as a standardof comparison,which is likely to produce a contrast effect (Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997).
Becausein most casesthe critical judgment pertainsto the sametime period as accessible
knowledge, however, representativeness is likely to constitutethe default in social compari-
son. As a consequence,judgments may typically be assimilatedto the implications of acces-
sible knowledge.

Affective Consequences of Accessible Knowledge

Another intriguing implication of the presentframework pertains to the affective conse-

quencesof social comparison.Recent conceptualizations(e.g., Buunk et al., 1990) typically
assumethat affect is determined by the target's relative standing on the comparison dimension.
Specifically, "learning that another is better off than yourself provides at least two pieces of
information: (a) that you are not as well off as everyone and (b) that it is possible for you to be
better than you are at present" (Buunk et a1., 1990, p. 1239). From this perspective, the
affective consequencesof a comparison dependon which piece of information one focuses on.
Specifically, a person may feel worse if he or she focuses on the fact that the comparison
standardis better off, and this person may feel better if he or she focuses on the fact that the
superior state of the standard may be obtained. Consistent with this assumption, it has been
demonstratedthat people who are able to focus on the possibility of self-improvement (e.g.,
due to their high self-esteem) are more likely to experience positive affect after an upward
comparison (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990).
From a selective accessibility perspective,however, an additional mechanism appearsto
contribute to the affective consequencesof social comparison. Specifically, independent of the
implications a specific comparison has for one's relative standing on the comparison dimen-
sion, self-related knowledge that is generatedin order to make this comparison has its own
affective qualities. For example, thinking about one's athletic achievementswhen comparing
to Nicki Lauda is likely to elicit more positive affect than thinking about one's failures when
comparing to Bill Clinton. Consequently, more positive affect is likely'to be elicited by an
upward than by a downward comparison. The affective consequencesof the implications
concerning one's relative standing on the judgmental dimension, however, are likely to go in
the opposite direction. Specifically, realizing that one is less athletic than Nicki Lauda pro-
ducesmore negative affect than realizing that one is better than Bill Clinton. This suggeststhat
generating standard-consistentknowledge about the self and assessingone's position along
the judgmental dimension relative to the comparison standardmay yield opposing affective
consequences.
Which of both tendencies is more influential depends on their relative intensity. One
factor that influences how intensive the affective consequencesof generating knowledge are is
CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL COMPARISON 263

the vividness of this knowledge. For example, it has been demonstratedthat thinking about
negativeor positive pasteventsmay yield an assimilationeffect on judgmentsof current well-
being ifparticipants focus on how this event occurred,ratherthan on why it happened(Strack
et al., 1985).Presumably,focusing on how the event occurredinducesparticipantsto draw a
more vivid image, which is likely to elicit event-congruent affect. That is, vividly thinking
about a positive life event is likely to elicit positive affect, whereasthinking about a negative
life event is likely to produce negative affect. This affect then may be used as a judgmental
basis for judgments about current well-being (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) so that assimilation
results.In contrast,the causalanalysis("why") of the eventsis unlikely to elicit congruent
affect, so that here the contrast effect described before is more likely to persist. Similarly,
vividly thinking about standard-consistent knowledge about the self is likely to have strong
affective consequencesthat may offset the opposing effects that result from assessingone's
relative standingon the judgmental dimension (for an experimentalillustration of this possi-
bility in the realm of counterfactualthinking, see McMullen, 1997).

Automatic Behavior Activation

Finally, conceptualizingsocialcomparisonin a selectiveaccessibilityframework affords

a new perspective on the behavioral consequencesof comparisons. Recent research (Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Carver,Ganellen,Froming, & Chambers,1983;Chartrand& Bargh,
1996;Chen & Bargh, 1997;Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,1998;
Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) has demonstratedthat the effects of accessibleknowledge are not
limited to socialjudgment. Rather,increasingthe accessibilityof knowledge also may "acti-
vate particular feelings and even specific action tendencies" (Berkowitz,1984,p. al\. That is,
becausebehavior corresponds to mental representationsthat obey the same laws as purely
semanticconcepts (seeCarlston,1994;Pinz,1990), they may be activated in a similar fashion
(for a more elaboratediscussionof this point, seeBargh, 1997;Barghetal.,1996:Dijksterhuis
& van Knippenberg,1998).
In line with this assumption,it has been demonstratedthat increasing the accessibility of a
specific concept leads participants to behave in a manner that is consistent with this concept
(e.g.,Bargh et al.,1996;Carver et al., 1983;Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).For example,increasing
the accessibility of the aggressivenessconcept by having participants unscramble sentences
(Srull & Wyer, 1979) with aggressivecontent induced them to administer stronger shocks to a
confederatewho failed to solve a learning task (i.e., to behave more aggressively) (Carver et
a l . ,1 9 8 3 ) .
Applying this insight to the realm of social comparison suggeststhat comparing oneself
with a given standardmay automatically trigger behavior that is consistentwith the knowledge
that has been rendered easily accessibleduring the comparison process.Direct support for this
assumption stems from a recent study by Dijksterhuis et al. (1998). Here, participants were
instructed to imagine Albert Einstein (a high standardof comparison for intelligence) and list
all the attributes about his typical behaviors,lifestyle, and appearancethat came to their minds.
The authors assumedthat doing so would trigger an implicit comparisonprocess.Because
Albert Einstein constitutes a maximally extreme standard of intelligence, participants who
comparethemselveswith Einstein are unlikely to test the hypothesis that they are as intelligent
as he is (i.e., they will not engagein a similarity test). Rather, this comparisonis likely to
producea contrast effect on self-evaluationsand induce participants to seethemselvesas fairly
 THOMAS MUSSWEILER eno FRITZ STR{CK

anintelligent.Consistentwith this assumptionDijksterhuiset al. (1998)demonstratedthat the

accessibilityof self-relatedknowledgethat indicatedlow levels of intelligencewas increased.3
More importantly, participants also were found to behaveless intelligently. Specifically, given
a trivial pursuit test,they answeredfewer questionscorrectly than a group that had previously
thought about a low standardof comparison (i.e., Claudia Schiffer, who as a supermodelis
stereotypcially seen as unintelligent). This finding suggeststhat social comparisons may
directly trigger behavior that is consistent with the implications of self-relatedknowledge that
has been renderedeasily accessibleduring the comparisonprocess.
In summary, conceptualizingsocial comparisonwithin a selectiveaccessibilityframe-
work affords a number of intriguing implications.First, the consequences of social comparison
are likely to depend on the applicability and the representativenessof the self-related knowl-
edge that was generatedduring the comparison process.Second,this knowledge has affective
implications, which may influence affective reactionsto a given comparison.Finally, selec-
tively increasing the accessibility of self-related knowledge not only may influence judgments
about the self but also may trigger corresponding behavior.

SELECTIVE ACCESSIBILITY AND REFERENCE POINT USE:

SIMULTANEOUS ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST

So far, we have focused our analysis on the consequencesthat making a comparison has
for the accessibilityof self-relatedknowledge.Becausein most casescomparingincreasesthe
accessibility of standard-consistentknowledge, the described selective accessibility mecha-
nism typically leads to assimilation. The evidence we have reviewed demonstrates that
selectiveaccessibilityis one consequenceof social comparison.It is, however, not the only
consequence.Specifically, a social comparison not only increases the accessibility of
standard-consistentknowledge. It also provides a reference point against which the implica-
tions of this knowledge can be evaluated. For example, comparing with Nicki Lauda not only
leads one to considerthe ways in which one is athletic,it also suggestsa referencepoint (i.e.,
Nicki Lauda) against which to evaluate the implications of this knowledge.
Researchin psychophysics(Brown, 1953;Helson, 1964)and socialjudgment (ostrom &
Upshaw, 1968) repeatedly has demonstrated that the latter mechanism typically produces
contrast effects (for a detailed discussion, see Wyer & SrulI, 1989). For example, a target
stimulus is typically judged to be lighter in the context of a heavy stimulus than in the context
of a light stimulus (e.g., Helson,1964). Applied to the context of social comparison, this
suggeststhat one should judge oneself to be lower on the critical dimension after a comparison
with a high standardthan after a comparison with a low standard.In fact, such contrast effects
have been found in a host of studies(e.g., Brown et al., l99z; cash, cash, & Butters, i9g3;
Morse & Gergen, 1970; Thornton & Moore, 1993).
Although the two mechanisms of selective accessibility and reference point use are
clearly dissociable becausethey are mediated by different judgmental processes,they both are

3Thus, Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) found the accessibility

of standard-inconsistentknowledge to be increased after a
social comparison, whereas our own research (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b) found increased accessibility of
standard-consistentknowledge. This difference may be due to the use of differentially extreme comparison standards
in both studies. Whereas Dijksterhuis and co-workers used the most extreme standard availabie (i.e.. Albert Einstein
for intelligent), we deliberately selected moderate standards (l.{icki Lauda and Bill Clinton for athletic). As outiined
before, it may be difficult to test the hypothesis that one is equal to a maximally extreme standard.Consequently, the
accessibility of standard-inconsistent knowledge may be increased as a result of the comparison.
 OF SOCIAL COMPARISON
CONSEQUENCES

ükely to operatein parallel in most cases.Consequently,assimilationand contrast may be

simultaneouseffects of social comparison.This possibility is supportedby the results of a
recent study (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b) in which we used different judgment formats to
assessthe effectsof social comparison.It hasbeensuggested(Biernat,Manis, & Nelson, 1991;
Biernat, & Manis, 1994; Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 199'1)that the contrast effects that
result from reference point use are primarily apparcnt on dimensional judgments for which
participants may use a reference point to interpret the end point of the given scale. For
example,in order to indicate how large one's drug consumptionis on a scalefrom I ("not at all
large") to 9 ("very large") one first has to interpretthe given scalelabels.That is, one has to
determine what a drug consumption of 9 is supposedto stand for. In this situation, judges are
"anchor" the responsescale.Doing so typically yields a
likely to use salient standardsto
contrasteffect (seeWyer & Srull, 1989,for a more elaboratediscussion).For example,using
an extreme upward standard(e.g., the musician Frank Zappa) to anchor the responsescale may
leadjudges to assumethat this upward standardrepresentsthe upper end of the responsescale
(e.g.,9 is equivalentto Zappa's drug consumption).Comparedto this high standard,judges
own standing on the judgmental dimension is likely to appear fairly low, so that they will
ascribea low value to themselves.In contrast,using an extremedownward standard(e.g., the
tennis professional Steffi Graf) to anchor the response scale (e.g., I is equivalent to Steffi
Graf's drug consumption) may lead them to ascribe a fairly high value to themselves.Thus,
different response scale anchoring is likely to produce a contrast effect.
Such response scale anchoring, however, is unlikely to influence absolute judgments
(e.g.,"How often do you use drugs per week?"). Becausethesejudgmentspertainto objective
numeric quantities, the underlying responsescale does not have to be interpreted by thejudge.
Consequently,the mechanismthat is responsiblefor contraston dimensionaljudgments is not
operating, so that contrast effects are unlikely to occur. Hence, absolutejudgments are likely to
be basedon the implications of accessibleknowledge. Consistentwith this assumption,our
research on judgmental anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) has demonstrated that
absolutejudgments reflect the consequencesof selective accessibility (see Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999b, for an overview).
This reasoning suggeststhat a social comparison may simultaneouslylead to assimilation
on an absolutejudgment and to contrast on a dimensional judgment. Our results are consistent
with this assumption. Specifically, we asked participants whether they used drugs (e.g.,
alcohol, marihuana) more or less frequently than a presumably high social standard (Frank
Zappa) or a presumably low social standard (Steffi Graf). Subsequently, we asked them to
indicate how often they use such drugs. Consistent with our previous researchin the anchoring
paradigm (for an overview, seeMussweiler & Strack, 1999b),participants who had compared
with the high standard indicated that they used drugs more often than participants who had
compared with the low standard. Thus, we found assimilation on the absolute judgment.
"not at all large";9 = "verY
Subsequently,participants indicated on a 9-point scale (1 =
large") how large their drug consumption is. For this dimensional judgment, we found a
contrasteffect. That is, participants judged their drug consumption to be lower after comparing
with the high standard than after comparing with the low standard (Mussweiler & Strack,
2000b).
Note, however, that in order for this contrast effect to occur, a given standardhas to be
seen as relevant for the current judgment. An irrelevant standard is unlikely to be used to
interpret the given response scale and should not exert an effect on a dimensional judgment.
This reasoningis consistentwith the resultsof a study on psychophysicaljudgment (Brown,
1953)in which participantswere askedto judge a seriesof testweightsthat were precededby a
266 THOMAS MUSSWEILER INTT FRITZ STRACK
ru
'-g

,iä
.:{
:j
+;
context weight (a tray of weights). The context weight was either introduced as a part of the
,j
stimulus set by explicitly askedparticipantsto judge its weight or participantswere made to I

l
believe that it is not part of the stimulus set by asking them to hold the tray as a favor for the
i
experimenter.Results showed that contrast effects only occurred if the context stimulus is seen i

as a part of the stimulus set, and thus was relevant for the critical judgment. If this was not the j
,i
case,however, the very same context stimulus did not influence judgments of the target (for 3 I
more elaboratediscussion,see Wyer & Sru1l,1989).
This suggeststhat a comparison with a social standardwill only produce a contrast effect
if it is seenas relevantfor the critical judgment. To explorethis possibility, we (Mussweiler& rj
Strack, 2000c) manipulated the relevance of the given standard.In particular, we did or did not
explicitly ask participants to compa-rethemselveswith the standard.Explicitly asking partici-
:
pants to engagein a comparison is likely to increasethe relevance of the standard.Not asking
them to do so is likely to undermine relevance. In one study, we presentedparticipants with a
description of a student who either adjusted very well to college or who had problems in
adjusting. Half the participants were explicitly askedwhether they adjusted better or worse to
college than the given standard (relevant). In contrast, the other half was simply asked to rate
the quality of the description of the standard (irrelevant). Following the logic of our previous
experiment, we then askedparticipants to judge their own adjustmentto college using absolute
(e.g., "How many weeks did it take you to adjust to college?") and dimensionaljudgment
"How well did you adjust to college?" I = not at all well; 9 = verY well). Our
formats (e.g.,
results demonstrate that absolute judgments were assimilated to the comparison standard
regardlessof its relevance. That is, reading about the standard that adjusted well to college
induced participantsto see themselvesas also adjusting well. Similarly, reading about the
standardthat adjustedbadly induced them to seethemselvesas adjusting badly too. In contrast,
the dimensional judgment was influenced by the relevancemanipulation. The typical contrast
effect only occurred if the standard appearedrelevant for the critical judgment because an
explicit comparison was asked for. If this was not the case, the contrast effect did not hold.
The implications of thesefindings are twofold. First, they indicate that in order to be used
as a reference point, a given standard has to be seen as relevant for the current judgment.
Second, they demonstrate that the mechanisms of selective accessibility and reference point
use are moderated by different variables. This suggeststhat although both mechanisms occur
in parallel, they are clearly dissociable.
In contrast to the existing literature on social comparison, these findings indicate that
assimilation and contrast may be simultaneousrather than mutually exclusive consequencesof
social comparison(for a discussionof simultaneousassimilationand contrasteffects in social
judgment, see Manis & Paskewitz, 1984). Presumably,the absolute and the dimensional
judgment tappedtwo differentjudgmental processes.Selectiveaccessibilityis apparenton the
absolute judgment, whereas reference point use is apparent on the dimensional judgment.
Thus, although both effects occur simultaneously, they appear to be caused by different
underlying mechanisms.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter,we have attemptedto conceptualizethe consequencesof social compari-

son as knowledge accessibilityeffects.The basic assumptionof this conceptualizationis that
comparing with a social standardinvolves a selectiveincreasein the accessibilityof knowl-
edge about the comparison target. This knowledge then mediatesthe judgmental, affective,
r
OF SOCIAL COMPARISON 267
CONSEQTIENCES

perspective,the effectsof a
arndbehavioralconsequencesof the social comparison.From this
specificcomparison depend on (1) which knowledge about the comparison target is rendered
accessibleduring the comparison process, and (2) how this knowledge is used for subsequent
self-evaluations'
ln most cases,judges appearto make a comparison by testing the hypothesisthat they are
simrlar to the comparison standard.Consequently, a social comparison typically increasesthe
accessibilityof standard-consistentknowledge about the self. How accessibleknowledge
influencessubsequentself-evaluationsdependson how this knowledge is used.Specifically,
the direction ofthe effect dependson whether or not accessibleknowledge is representativefor
the critical judgment. Because the knowledge that was generated during the comparison
pertainsto the target ofthe subsequentjudgment itself, it is likely to be representativefor this
judgment in most of the cases.As a consequence,evaluations will be assimilatedto the
implicationsof easily accessibleknowledge. How strong this influenceis, however,depends
on the degree to which this knowledge is applicable to the critical evaluation.
Selectively increasing the accessibility of knowledge about the comparison target, how-
ever,not only influences judgments about the target, but is also likely to have direct affective
and behavioralconsequences.Specifically,becauseaccessibleknowledge also has affective
implications, affective responsesto social comparisons will be assimilated to these implica-
tions.Similarly, behaviorthat is consistentwith accessibleknowledgeis likely to be triggered.
The present analysis demonstrates that to reach a complete understanding of social
comparisons, it is necessary to examine their underlying cognitive mechanisms. As our
researchsuggests,such insights are particularly important to understandthe effects of social
comparisonson cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions.

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