JOHN STUART MILL On Politics and Society Selected and edited by GERAINT L, WILLIAMS International Publications ServicePublished in the U.S.A. 1976 by International Publications Service Td East 32m Street, New York, N.Y. 10016 ‘By agreement with Fontana ohn Stuart Mil on Politics ond Society This edition frst published in 1976 by The Harvester ress Limited By agreement with Fontana ‘copyright © in editor's introduction and ‘notes and this selection Geraint Le Williams 1976 Lisary of Congres Cataloging in Puiieation Daa i, John Star, 18061873. "Js Start hil on polite nd soley Tost den oe nce-Cotieted woes L Tle ychasitenes iot6 $208 35e43i09 HSan 08002-01698 Printed in Greet Britain by Redwood Burn Limited Trowbridge, Wilshire Er cof am fy nhad Allright reserved. Contents Preface Introduction paw x Method 1 Of the Inverse Deductive, or Historieal Method 2 Of the Logie of Practice or Art 3. Michelets History of France pant a Pospose ‘4. Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy 5. Whet Utlitaiiniam i ‘rant mi Democracy and Freedom ‘Law of Libel and Liberty of the ress ‘The Spirit of the Age Democracy and Government 1M, de Tocqueville on Democracy in America Of Individuality, a2 One of the Elements of ‘Well-Being arr 1v The Working Clase 11) Claims of Labour 12 Thornton on Lebour and its Claims 13. Chapters on Socialism vant v Appendix ‘Macaulay ~ ‘Mill on Government? "Textual Notes 55 90 7 6 us or 386 248 eal 33 335 360 41, In the preceding chapters we have endesvoured to characterise the present state of those among the branches fof knowledge ead Moral which are sciences in the only proper sense of the term, that is, inquiries into the course of nature. Tt ie 7 however, t inelude under the term Moral Knowledge, and even (though improperly) under that of Moral Science, an inquiry the reslis of which do not express themselves in the indiative, but in the impera- tive mood, oF in periphrases equivalent to it; what is called the knowledge of duties, practical ethics, or morality. [Now, the imperative mood is the charactaritic of art, = distinguished from science. Whatever speals in rules or precepts, not in assertions respecting matters of fact is fart; and ethics or morality is properly « portion of the art ‘the sciences of human nature and coiey.” ‘The Method, therefore, of Ethie, ean be no other than that of Art, of Practice, in general: and the portion yet un- completed, of the task which we proposed to oursalves in the ‘concluding Book is to charaeterie the general Method of ‘Art, a8 distinguished from Science, 2 In all branches of practical business, there are eates in ‘hich individvals are Bound to conform their practice t9 2 1 fs almoct superfuous to observe, that chee Se another seaming of the word Art, ia which may bo sold to denote {he peatical dapurtmeat o¢ arpect of thing ia general, ia com ltattinction tothe scenic. Inthe text, the Word fused in iis ‘der, and, T hope, aot yee obsolete seme. Of the Logie of Practice or Art p pre-established role, while there are others in which it i part of their tak to find or construct the rule by which they are to govern their conduct. The fist, for example, is the care of a judge under a definite writen code. The judge is not caled upon to determine what course would b ttinscally the most advisable in the particular case in hand, but only within what rule of law it flls; what the legis- lature hs ordained to be done in the kind of case, and rust therefore be presumed to have intended in the indi- vidual case, ‘The method must here be wholly and ex Clusively one of ratiocination or eyllogism; and the process is obviourly what ia our analyse of the syllogism we showed that all ritocination ig, namely, the interpretation of & formula, Tn order that our illustration of the opposite case may be taken from the same clase of subjects as the formes, we will suppoes, in contrast with the situation of the judge, the position of the legislator, As the judge has laws for is guidance, a0 the lepilator hae rules and maxims of policy; Dut it wold be a manifest error to suppose thatthe legislator is bound by these maxims in the same manner as the judge is bound by the laws, and that all he has to do is to argue dlown from them to the perticlar case, as the judge docs from the laws. ‘The legislator is bound to take into con- fideraton the restone of grounds of the maxim; the judge hhas nothing to do with those of the law, except wo far 28 a consideration of them may throw light upon the intention of the lawmaker, where hie words have left it doubtful. To the jitdge, the rule, once positively ascertained, is final; but the legislator, of other practitioner, who gove by rules rather than by their reasons, like the old-fashioned German tac- ticane who were vanquished by Napoleon, or the physician who preferred that hie patien’s should die by rule rather than recover contrary to it, is rightly judged to be @ mere pedont, and the sleve of his formulas. ‘Now, the retsone of = maxim of policy, or of any other role of ar, can be no other than the theorems of the eorees- ponding science,8 Method ‘The relation in which rales of art stand to doctrines of science may be thus characterised. The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The ecience receives it, considers it as a pheno- enon or effect to be studied, and having investigated ite causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theos ‘of the combination of circumstances by which it could be produced, Art then examines these combinations of circum tances, and socording as any of them ate oF are not ia human’ power, pronotines the end attainable of not. ‘The only one of the premise, therefore, which Art supplies is the original major premise, which asserts that the attsin- ‘ment of the given end is desirable. Sclence then leads to Art the proposition (obtzined by a series of inductions or of Seductions) thet the performance of certain actions wil stain the end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding tt also practicable, converts the theorem into # rule or precept 4. It deserves particular notice that the theorem or speculae tive truth is not ripe for being tuned into a precept until the whole, and not « part merely, of the operation which belongs 10 science hat been performed. Suppose that we hhave completed the scientific process only up to 2 certain point; have discovered that a particular cause will produce the desired effect, but have not escertained all the negative conditions which are necessary, that is all the circumstances ‘which, if present, would prevent ite production. If, in this imperfect state of the scientific theory, we attempt fo frame ‘rule of art, wo perform that operation prematurely. When- fever any counteracting eause, overlooked by the theorem, takes place, the rule will be at fault; we shall employ the ‘means, end the end will not follow. No arguing from ar about the rule itself will ten help ue through the dificult; there ia nothing for it but to turn heck and finish the scientific process which should have preceded the formation of the rule, We must reopen the investigation to inquire into the remainder of the conditions on which the effect depends; and Of the Logic of Practice or Art ae only after me have atcerttined the whole of these ere we prepared to transform the completed Taw of the effect into 4 precept, in which those circumstances or combinations of circumstances which the geience exhibits as conditions are prescribed a means. Tt is true tha, for the sake of convenience, rules must be formed from something lees than this ideally perfect theocy; in the first place, because the theory ean celdom be made ideally perfest; and nest, because, i all the counteracting contingencies, whether of frequent or of rare occurrence, ‘were included, the rulee would be to0 eumbrous to be ap prehended and remembered by ordinary capactis, on the ‘common occasions of life. ‘The rules of art do not attempt to comprise more conditions than require to be attended to in ordinary cases; and are therefore always imperfect Tn the manual arts, where the requisite conditions are not rumerous, and where those which the rules do not specify tre generally either plain to common abservation or speedily Ieamt from practice, rules may often be safely acted on by persons who know nothing more chan the rule. But in the Complicated affairs of life, and still more in those of states find societies, rules cannot be reied on, without constantly feferring back to the scientife lawe on which they are Founded, To know what ate the practical contingencies ‘which require a modification of the rule, o which are alto~ tether exceptions to it, a to know what combinations of Sreumstances would interfere with, or enticely counteract, the consequences of those laws; and this ean only be learnt by a reference to the theoretic grounds of the rule, ‘By a wise practioner, therefore, rules of conduct will only be considered az provisional. Being made for the most ‘numerous cases, or for those of most ordinary occurrence, they point out the manner in which i will be least perilous to act, where time or means do not east for analysing the sctual’ciroamstances of the case, or where we cannot trust four judgment in estimating them. But they do not at all ‘supersede the propriety of going through (when elreumstancas permit) the scientific process requisite for framing a rule& Method from the data of the particular ease before us. At the sume time, the common rule may very properly sarve 2s an admeni- sion that a certain mode of aetion has been found by our- selves and others t be well adapted to the cates of ‘most common eccurrence; so that if it be inevitable to the case in hand, the reason of itt being so wil be likely to favise from some unusual circumstance. 4 The ercor is therefore apparent of those who would Aeduce the Tine of eonduct proper to particular cases from ‘supposed universal practical maxims, overlooking the neces- Sly of constantly referring back to the principles of the “speculative sclence, in order to be ture of attsning even the specific end which the roles have in view. How much greater sil, then, must the error be of aeting up such un- ‘bending principles, not merely ax univereal rules fr atsining a given ead, but ax rules of conduct generally; without regard to the possibilty, nt only that some modifying eause may prevent the attainment of the given end by the meant Which the rule prescribes, but that success itself may eon flit with some other end which may possibly chance to be ‘more. desirable. ‘This isthe habitual error of many of the political specu lators whom T have characterised as the geometrical school; especially in France, where ratiocintion from roles of Draetice forms the staple commodity of journaliem and politcal oratory; 2 misapprehension of the functions. of ‘Deduction which has brought much disredit, in the estima- tion of other countries, upon the spint of generalisation, <0 hhonourably characterise of the French mind. ‘The eommon- places of politics in France, re large and sweeping practical maxims, from which, a5 ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular applications, and this they call being logical and consistent. For instanes, they are. per petually arguing that suck and such a measure ought to bbe adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which the form of government ie founded; or the principle OF the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be an- Of the Loge of Practice or Art & tere, tha if thse be relly practical principles, they must fest on spective grounds; the sovereignty of the people for camp) mst bea right foundation for government, be= cas a government thus coated leads to produce crtin bbnefeal fects Tnaemuch, however, as to goverment produces all posible beefialeffect but al ate atended With more of fewer inconvenieners, and since dese cannot Sally be combed by means drown fom the very eases Which produce them, it would be often a much stonger reoommendiion of some practical arangenent thet it dese ot follow from what i called the genefal principle of the Brennan tht doa ‘Ubda a noomat of egitim, the prenimption iy far rather in favour of i stttions of popular origin; and inn denocracy, in favour of arangements tending to check the impetus of popula wil. ‘The ine of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for politcal philowopty tendo tothe praca! conclusion that we shoul exert our utmost eforts to aggravse, instead of alleviating, whatever re the chaaceroue imperfections Of the ast of insatons which we prefer, or under wich wwe happen 00 live 4 ‘The grounds, then, of every rule of art are tobe found in theorems of scion. An ert, or a body of art, consists of the rules, tgether with as much of the speculative propos tions as comprises the justification of thove rules. The com- plete art of any mater includes a election of cuch ¢ portion from the scence as is neosteary to show on whit conditions the effects which the art aims at producing depend. And Art in general consists of the truths of science, arranged in the most convenient order for practice, instead of the order which is the most convenient for thought, Science groups and arranges its truth oo as to enable Us to take in at one view as much as possible ofthe general order ofthe universe. Act, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them only into such of their detailed consequences a8 have Jed to the formation of rules of conduc, and brings together from pats ofthe field of etience most remote from one an-% Methoa cher he truths eating to the proton ofthe diferent and fterogencous condition neceary to each effect which the ‘igentie of praca! rq to be prodcs® Sconor therfore, following one enne i vious eet, while et tac one elect ois mulled and dered hee nd conion there need of sto intermediate SSnstfe th ered ro the higher ener. of ‘Seen and deste to sce tthe gta or ft plo {Spee therusous at The sete operation of raning {Ele named pinpen, Mi Comte chars os one {hoe sen of Plenpy wish sve verve for fot. ‘The only complete example which be pein out a8 stay rel and hich san bed up ae ype tobe ied ove important mat athe genera heory of the at Deotiptve Geomsty, at conetned by BM Monge Tt Je fos however diff sndrstand what the nature of thse Intrmedate prints must general be Afr framing the ten sompetenseFomble cnception of th end te Enned at at hy of Ue eect to be produced, nd Sor. inning inthe sve comproenive tne the at of con {Eos em nih ht ofc cpt, te ean 0 be taken gental survey of the semures which can be come Iandet for rating tie et of cats, snd whe the ult ofthe survey hae been embod nthe fewest and Inout extensive propositions psn we proposidone wil pre the gener rutin betwen the avaible mere Si the end und wll coatits the gener! seni theory thar from whch pacal ethos wl fl a coro 6, But though the resonings which connect the end or pur- pose of evely ait with ite means belong to the domain OF Science, the definition of the end itself belongs exclusively to Art, and forms its peculiar province. Bvery art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed from Profesor Bain and others cal che section ftom the tthe of seine made for She purser af an ar a Praca Sens; Sh conise the ane Art to the atl rule Of the Logic of Practice or Art 8 felence;, that which enunciates the object aimed at, and afrms it to be a desirable object. The bul ‘that itis desirable to have buildings; architecture (as one of the fine arts), that itis desirable to have them beautiful oF imposing. The hygienic and medics! arts ssmame, the one that the preservation of health, the other that the eure of disease, are fitting and desirable ends. ‘These are not pro- positions of science. Propositions of science aesert a matter Of fact: an existence, a co-existence, @ sceesion, oF a resemblance, The propositions now spoken of do not aseert that anything is, But enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the predicate is expressed by the words ought or shouldbe, is generically different from one which is expressed by is or wil be, Te true that, inthe largest sense of the words, even these propesitions assert something as @ matter of fact. The fact allimed in them is, that the conduct recommended excites in the speaker's mind the fesling of approbation. This, however, does not go to the bottom of the matter, for the speaker's approbation is no euficient reason why otier people should approve; nor ought it to be a conclusive reason even with himeelf. For the purposes of practice, every one must be required to justify his appro: bation; and for this there is need of general premises, deter- ining what are the proper objects of approbation, and what the proper order of precedence among those objects. ‘These general premises, together with the principal con- clusions which may be deduced from them, form (or rather right form) a body of doctrine, which is properly the Art of Life, in its three departments, Morality, Prudence or Policy, and Aesthetics; the Right, the Expedient, ond the Beautiful or Noble, in human conduct and works. To thie ar (which, in the main is unforcupately stl to be created) all other arts are subordinate; since ite principles are those which must determine whether the special aim of any particular art is ‘worthy and desirable, and what is its place in the scale of| Sesirable things. Every ert is thug a joint resule of late oF nature disclosed by science, and of the general principles% Method of what has boon called Teleology, or the Doctrine of ‘Ends;* which, borrowing the language of the German meta- physicians, may also be termed, not improperly, the principles ‘of Practical Reason. ‘A sciemtife observer or ressoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain feonsequences follow from certain causes, and that t obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if 0, in what case end to how great a length, it is no part ‘of his business aba cultivator of science to decide, and Science alone will never qualify him for the decision, Tn purely physical science there is not muck temptation to fasume this ulterior office; but those who test of Auman nature and society invariably claim it; they always under= take to say, not merely what is, but what ovgit to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is Indispensable. A. scenic theory, however perfect, of the subject-matter, considered merely as part of the order of ‘nature, ean inno degree serve asa substitute. In this respect ‘the various subordinate ars afford a misleading analogy. In them there is seldom any visible necessity for justifying the end, since in general its desirableness in denied by nobody, and it is only when the question of precedence is to be Aecided between that end snd come other, that the goneral principles of Teleology have to be called in; but « writer fon Morals and Politics requires thoee principles at every ep. The most elaborate and well-digested expocition of the laws of succession and co-existence among. meatal or social phenomena, and of their relation to one another 0s ‘causes and effects, will be of no avail towards the art of Life or of Society, if the ends to be aimed at by that art ace left to the vague suggestions of the fntllectus sbi per- missus, or are taken for granted without analysis or question- The ord ‘Telelagy He also, but inconveninty ond _in= properly, ployed by some writer ab a pare forthe stemyt {Bieiplala the phenomena of the universe om Saal cause. Of he Lap of Paces bt plat aan haa eee ane Tarra gh Laas Bi De ort ot iaphcbint hostel be ae 2 el at cee eimai ot Cn nae cetera See Sea aha ner Saran st lt re aac Eines ia md oe Fase Se reenter ries tnne ps Seren cntrameaeneee nsmrensl oo feel ee es ee them. on moral philosophy have mostly fle —— a saa gy og ah re mat all judgments of praise and blame, to principles, but of ee scare age eb emis nd eee ae See de, ek ee eae ees er Salo as eas eet SS oy eng fe ole es Peete bearer Seu Romesee tee Pelee setae eee elie im ser > ati tren rot phe Bt se SETS a a ea ee eels eee cae Set ee Fine eaten tae ml oe Sin rea baw ie terres 2 le Sarge se gress oe goal mn ct Bur sean mi eee eh oe Iu tick phar aiations pie ee ee orc aman Os Pay om gin ace et ease8 Method to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the txt by which they should be tried, is thst of concdciveness > the happiness of mankind, or rather of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of heppiness is the ulti- rato principle of ‘Teleology.* T do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself the end of all actions, or even of all rules ff action, Tt is not itself the vole end. ‘There are many virtuous setions, and even virtuous modes of action (:hough the cases are, T'think, less Frequent than is often suppose), bby which happiness In the particular instance is sacrificed, smote pain being produced han pleasure. But conduct of Which this ean be truly asserted admits of justification ‘only beeause it an be shown that on the whole more happi- ness will exist in the world if feelings are cultivated which ‘will make people, in certain cases, regardless of happiness. T fully admit that this is true: that the cultivation of an deal nobleness of will and eonduct should be to individual Jmuman beings an end, to which the specitic pursuit either of their own happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in that idea) should, in any case of confiet, give ‘way. But I hold thatthe very question, what constitutes this tlevation of character, iste to be decided by a reference to hhappiness as the standard. The character itself should be, to the individual, a paramount end, simply because the exis twnce of this ideal nobleness of character, or of @ neat approach to it, in any abundance, would go further than all things else towards making human life happy, both in_ the comparatively humble cense of pleasure and freedom from pin, and in the higher meaning of rendering life, ot what ‘now is almost universally, puerile and insgnifican, but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can fate to have. 8. With these remarks we must close this summary view of the application of the general logic of scientific inquiry to ‘For an express dincsson and vindiation of eis pencil sce Uiiitaranen, Of the Logic of Practice or Art 8 the moral and social departments of science. Notwithstand~ ing the extreme generality of the principles of method which Thave laid down (a generality which, [trast i not in this instance synonymous with vagueness) T have indulged the hhope that to some of those on whom the task will devolve of Dringing those most important of all sciences into a more satisfactory tats these observations may be useful, both in removing ertancous and in clearing up the tue conceptions of the means by which, on subjects of so high 2 degree of complication, truth can be attained. Should this hope be realised, what is probably destined to be the great intelectual tchievement of the next ta or three generations of Buso- ‘pean thinkers will have been in some degree forwarded,4, Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy Appzniie B to Balmer ‘Bngland ond the English, London, 183.9 tion i ak mt ce ite eh Ml so tin a me ence ame Siemera ities ier Ec ay tn ~hragammtincin eer Sten mae mee os See EEE Sig Sete a pee Sreny dei @ thea. ts oe Sia Atmel hee pee ati reat Such cee eee So cea be eer eres =e Ses Sse» nly ly homme yar icing Se Soares aro Ppantrtere tet rer] Sa race goa fee cece Scant er ana ie obinetarnareste tice Sook Suna caer cine tie wissen is aaeecerae Satine aerate ete Tica tiga ca :8 Purpose these Mr Bentham regarded as mere covers for dogmatism; ‘excuses for seting up one's own ipee dist ae a rule to bind ‘other people. “They consist, all of them’ says he, ‘in 20 ‘many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external ttandard, and for preveling upon the reader to accept the authors sentiment or opinion as a season for ile? ‘This, however, is not fair treatment of the believers in other moral principles than that of utility. All modes of speech are employed ia an ignorant manner, by ignorant people; but no one who had thought deoply and eystematio- Ally enough 19 be entitled to the name of «philosopher, ever suppated that his orn private sentiments of approbation and disspprobation mast necessarily be well-founded, and, waled not to be compared with any external standard, ‘The answer of such persons to Mr Bentham would be, thet by an inductive and analytical examination of the human rind, they had satiofied themselves, that what we call our moral sentiments, (that ig, the feelings of complacency and aversion we experience when we compare actions of out lows of of other people with our standard of right and wrong.) 210 as much part ofthe original constitution of man’s nature fas the desire of happiness and the fear of suffering: That those sentiments do not indeed attach themselves to the same sctione under all circumstances, but neither do they, in atteching themselves 9 action, follow the lew of wilt, but certain other generel laws, which are the seme in all mankind naturally; though edvestion or external circum- stances may counteract them, by cresting artificial associa tions stronger than they. No proof indeed can be given. that we ought to abide by these laws; but nether ean aay proof be given, that we ought to regulate our conduct by ‘utility. All that can be said is, chat the pursuit of happi nese ie natural to us; and ao, it is contended, isthe rever~ fence for, and the inclination to equare aur actions by, certain general laws of morality. ‘Any one wi is coquainted with the ethical doctrines either of the Red and Stewart school, or of the German met Remarks on Benthan’s Philosophy 9 physicians (not t go further back), knows that such would be the answer of those philosophers to Mr Bentham; and it is an answer of which Mr Bentham's writings furnich no sufficient refutation, For it ie evident, that these views of the origin of moral distinctions are not, what he says all such views are, destitute of any precise and tangible ‘meaning; nor chargeable with setting up as a standard the feolings of the particular person. They eet up as a standard ‘what sce assumed (on grounds which are considered sull- tient) to be the instincts of the species, or principles of our ‘common nature a3 universal and inexplicable of instincts “To. pass judgment on these doctrines, belongs t a prom founder and subtler metaphysics than Mir Bentham possessed. apprehend it sill be the judgment of postecity, that in his views of what, in the felicitous expression of Hobbes, may be celled the philocophia prima, it has for the most part, ceven when he was most completely in the right, been re- served for others €9 prove him ao, The greatest of Mr Ben- ‘tham’s defeets, his inguffiient knowledge and appreciation fof the thoughts of other men, shows itself constantly in his grappling with some delusive shadow of an adversary’s ‘opinion, and Ieaving the actual eubstance unharmed. ‘After laying down the principle of Utility, Mr Bentham is ooeupied through the most voluminous and the most per- ‘manently valuable part of hie works, in constructing the ‘uilines of practical ethies and legislation, end filing up same portion® of the latter science (or rather art) in great detail; by the uniform and unllinehing application of his fowa greatesthappiners principle, from which the eminently ‘consistent and eyetematie character of his intellect prevented him from ever swerving. In the writings of no philosopher, probably, are to be detected so few contradictions ~ +0 fom" Instances of even momentary doviation from the principles he himself has lid down, It is perhaps fortunate that Mr Bentham devoted a much lasger share of his time and labour to the subject of legis- lation, chan to that of moral for the mode in which he understood and applied the principle of Usiity, appears to100 Purpore me far more conducive to the attainment of trae and valuable results jin the former, than in the later of these two branches ‘of inquiry. ‘The recognition of happiness as the only thing desirable in itself, and of the production of the state of things most favourable to happiness atthe only rational end both of morals and poli, by mo means neoestaily lads to the doctsine af expediency as professed by Paley; the ‘ethical eanon which judges of the morality of an act or @ clase of actions, solely by the probable consequences of that particular kindof act, eipposing it to be generally practised. "This is a very small part indeod of what a more enlarged understanding’ of the ‘greatest happiness principle would roquite up t0 take into the account, A certain kind of action, a3 for example, theft, or lying, would, if commonly prac ised, occasion’ certain evil consequences to society: but thote evil consequences are far from constituting the entire moral bearing of the vies of theft or lying. We shall have very imperfect view of the relation of those practices tw the general happiness, if we euppote them to exist singly, and insulated, All acts suppose certain dispositions, and habits of mind and heart, which may be in themselves states of enjoyment or of wretchedaess, and which must be fruit- Ful in other consequences, beeides. those particular acts [No person con be a thief or a liar without being much else and if our moral judgments and feelings with respect t @ person convicted of either vice, were grounded solely upon the pemicious tendency of thieving and of lying, they ‘would be partial and incomplete many considerations would be omitted, which are at least equally ‘germane to the ‘matter many whieh, by leaving them out of our general views, fe may indeed teach ourselves a habit of overlooking, but which it is impossible for any of us not to be in= fluenced by, in particular cases, in proportion as they are forced upon our attention. ‘Now, the great fault I have to find with Mr Bentham ‘ae a moral philosopher, andthe source of the chief part of the temporary mischief which in that characte, along with a vwestly gleater amount of permanent good, he must be Remarks om Benthan's Philosophy or allowed to have produced, i this: that he has prectically, fo a very great extent, confounded the principle of Utility with the principle of specifi consequences, and has habitually nade up his estimate of the apprebation or blame due to a particlar kind of action, from a calculation solely of the Consequences to which that very action, if practised gener- tly, would itself lend, He has largely exemplified, and con- tributed very widely to difute a tone of thinking, according. to which aay kind of action or any habit, whch in its own pectic consequences cannot be proved t0 be necessarily or probably productive of unhappiness to the agent himself or fo others, is supposed to be fully justified; and any dis approbation or aversion entertained towards the individual by reason of it, i set down from thet time forward as pre~ jitdice and superstition, Tt is not considered (at least, not habitually considered) whether the actor habit in question, though not in itself necrssally pernicious, may not form part of a character esentially pernicious, or at least osien- tially deficient in some quality eminently conducive to the ‘greatest happiness’ To epply such « standard as this, would indeed often require a much deeper insight into the for mation of character, and knowledge of the internal workings fof human nature, than Mr Bentham potsessed. But, in a areatar or leas degree, he, and every one cls, judges by this standard: even those who are warped, by some partial view, into the omission ofall such elements from their generl specalatons. ‘When the moralist thus overlooks the relation of an act to a certzin state of mind as its cause, and it connexion ‘through that common cause with large’ clawses and groups of actions apparently very little resembling ieclé, his et mation even of the consequences of the very act itelé, is rendered imperfect. For it may be affirmed with few excep tions, that any act whatever has @ tendency to fix end per~ petuste the state or charter of mind in which itself ‘has ‘originated. And if thet important clement in the moral rela ‘dons of the action be not taken into account by the moralis, as a cause, neither probably will it be taken into gccountre Purpose dmg Bentham is far frm having altogether overlooked this side ofthe ebjs. Indeed, ve oe oigia dinero, ‘Bough eI cone, fn th paral eres pte, on modoer sod on ipoiion, in hu ft ret wor, the Introduction to the Princo of Moras and Lage Ian, open up «diet and Broad path to thse moa nc porte topic Tes not the lew tue that Me Denham, and any ote, ling hie example, when they cnet disc parialar queon of sic, hve comely, athe tuperor tes wich they lid upon the spel’ cose- Genes of clan of st rca al contemplation of the Sation init general esis upon the enti oa bang of the agent; a ave, wey he et thrown tone connie tion ear int, the baclground, as co be almost oat of fight. And by ao dong they havent only mared the abe of imuny of thei petition, considered 4 mere pilwophisl cui, but hve alwaye ron the ik of ncusng, nd in feng coir have in ay opinion scully inoue, serous prac eo "his locmpltnca, however, in Me Benthan’s geet views, was not of nature mata to diminish the vale OF his specultons through the getter part of the Ald of Iegiston, Thoe of tae bearings ofa ston, upon which Mr Bestar berowed lost elie atenton, were to thove with which lost. alone lglton is conversa ‘Tae lepalstor enjoin or prohibits ston, with ey ile tern fo the gontral mom excellene or trpitade mhich i Impl, he lose to the coneaqumcss to socey of the ite eur Kind of sion his object not to fender people Incapable of desing a eine, bt fo dtr them from a5 commiting i Taking human beings x he finds them, Be hdcrous © supp such induces sa will conan ven perons of the gosons the ost at variance With the gncral Lappin, te practi at grea dope of rege to ifn tse Soul condos a can be etsned from thom by such means without preponderant incinveienes, A {Weory, eer, which considers Tile in am ation besides Remarks on Bextham's Philosophy 193 that acton’s cron consequences, will generally be sufikient to serve the purposes of a philosophy of legislation. Such 1 philosophy will be most apt to fail in the consideration of the greater tocial questions the theory of organic insta tions and general forms of polity; for those (unlike the details of legislation) to be duly estimated, must be viewed as the great instruments of forming the national character; of carrying forward the members of the community towards perfection, or preserving them from degeneracy. This, a5 might in tome measure be expected, is a point of view in ‘hich, except for some partial or limited purpose, Mir Ben- tham seldom contemplates these questions. And this signal omission is one of the greatest of the deficiencies by whi his speculations on the theory of government, though full of valuable ideas, are rendered, in my judgment, altogether inconclusive in their general results "To these we shall advert more fully hereafter. As yet T have not acquitted myself of the more agreeable task of setting forth some part of the eervicee which the philosophy of legislation owes to Me Bentham, ‘The greatest service of all, that for which posterity will ward most honour to hie name, is one that is his exclusively, fand can be shared by no one present or to come; itis the feevice which ean be performed only once for any science, that of pointing ovt by what method of investigation it may be made a science, What Bacon did for physea! knowledge, ‘Mr Benthem has done for philosophical legislation. Before Bacon's time, many physical facts had been ascertained; and previously to Mr Bentham, mankind were in possession of any just and valuable detached observations on the making fof laws, But he was the fist who attempted regularly to deduce all the secondary and intermediate principles of law, by direct and systematic inference from the one great axiom ot principle of general utility, In all existing systems of ls, those eecondary principles or dicta in which the essence of the systems resided, had grown up in detail, and even when founded in views of wility, were not the result of any scien= tife and comprehensive course of enquiry; but more fre104 Purpose quently were pursy technical; that is, chey had grown out Of reumstnees purely storiza, and, not having. bern altered when those circumstances changed, had nothing left to rest upon but felis, and unmeaning forms. Take for instance the law of real propecty; the whole of yhich ‘continues to this very day t0 be founded on the doctrine ‘of feadal tenure when thee tenures have Tong ezated ‘exist except in the phrasology of Westminster Hill. Nor vas the theory of law in a beter state than the practical ‘sions, spectltive jurists having dated litle more than {0 retne somewhat upon the tctnial maim of the par tiealar body of jurisprudence which they happened to have studied. Mr Bentham sas the fst who had the ges end ‘courage to conesive the idea of bringing back the scence to frst principle. ‘This could rot be done, coud. scrcely ven he attempted, without, as « necesary consequence, ‘making obvioun the uter worthlesnes of many, and the ruity and want of preiion of almost ll, the maxine which ‘had previously passed everywhere for principles of la. ‘Me Bentham, moreover, has warsed aginst the rors of exiting systems of jurspradene in more erect mancer than by merely preening the contrary tubs. The force of fargiment with "wich he rent asunder the fantastic and iogieal maxin on which the various technical systems re founded, and expoaed the farant vila which they practice ally produce, i only equalled by the pungent serarm and exquisite hurour with which he has derided the absurdities, fnd the cloguent declamation which he continally poura forth agains them, sometimes inthe form offamentaton, and sometimes of invective “This then was the fist, end perhaps the grandest achiene- sent of Mr Bentham; the ene discrediting ofall tech- Deal systema; and the example which he act of treating law so pov mystery, but simple pice of practical bui- ‘ess wherein mesns vere to be adapted to ends, at any OF the other arts of ffs. 'To have accomplished thin supper ing hit to have dove nothing ele, isto have equaled the glory ofthe greatest scientific Bentacor ofthe human rae, Remarks on Bexthon's Philsothy 105 But Me Bentham, unlike Beco, didnot merely prophesy science; he made large sides towards the eration of one war the fa who coesived with anything epproasing predhion, the fden af = Cade, or complet bed of law #5 fhe distnetive characters of fs een pares ~ the iil Law, the Penal Law, and the Law of Procure, On the fit two of these thee deprtnents he rendered vaable fervicey the third he actualy created, Conformably tothe Ibis of his ming, he ct about investigating ob iio, © Diloeophy or since for each of the thet branche, He Tith the recived principle of cach, what 4 good ade Trold do ‘with th! laws. themalies; extirpated the Bad, Ibsstuting others reenacted the good, but ino mich, Sleaer and wore tathodical a form that those who were snow fal with them before, sare recognized them 33 the sme Bren upon old truth, when they passthrough Kis Inds he leaves to many of hie mar, tet often be soos tome to cam the discvery of wha be haa only sytem Steed. Tn crating the pilosophy of Civil Lem he proseded not meh beyond estublahing 2m the proper bas some of {host genre principle, and. cursolydiscuting some of the ment interesting of i deta Neary tho: whole of ‘hate hae plied on this branch of lr, contined Jn the rates de Ligiatin, eed by Mt. Dumont. To the mos difitt part and that whieh mot needed « mate hand t clear vey ite difialtes, the nomeneltare and trungencnt of the Chl Code, he sntibred tl, except far ab happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction From the benefit. But the bare ecunciation of such an ab- curdity ae this lst, renders refutation superfluous According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above ex- plained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake ff which all other thinge are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an tnistenee exempt as far a8 possible from pais, and as rich f= possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it Sgainet quantity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunites of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciovsness and self-observtion, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, sceording to the utilitarian opinion the end of human setion, 4 ncecesarly also the standard of snorality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human tconduct, By the observance of whieh an existence such as hhas bean desribed might be, to the greatest extent possible, seoured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admit, to the whole sentient creation. Agninst this doctrine, however, arses another class of ‘objectors who say that happiness, in any form, eannot be the tationel purpose of human life and action; Because, in the first place, itis unattainable: and they eontemptuousy ask, ‘What sight hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr Carlyle clenches by the addition, What tight, a short time ago, hadst thow even to be? Next, they say, that men can Go ‘without happiness; that all noble human boings ave {elt this, end covld not have become noble but by leaing the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation; which leson, thoroughly, arnt and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning andmy Purpose necessary condition ofall virtue "The fit of these objections would go to the root of the ‘matter were it well founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attsinent of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. ‘Though, ren in that case, something might still be safd for the ulitarian theory; sinee utility includes not solely the pursuit fof happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappi- nes; and if the former aim be chimerial, there wil be all, the greater scope and more imperative need for the later, #0 Tong at Teast es mankind think ft to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous set of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively aserted to be Impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, ig a leat an exaggeration. If by happiness be mennt a cou tinuity of highly pleasurable excitement, itis evident enous! that this is impossible, A state of exalted pleacure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, outs of days, and isthe oocssional brillant fash of enjoy- ment, aot its permanent and steady fame. Of this the philo- fophers who have taught that heppiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happi- ess whieh they meant was nota life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a desided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more fom life than itis capable Of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, hes always eppeared worthy of the name of happiness, And such an evistence is even row the lot of many, during some considerable portion of their lives. The present vweetched education, and wretched fncial serangements, are’ the only real hindrance to its Iicing attsinable by almost all. ‘The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end of life, would be tatistied with euch a moderate share of it, But great num= What Utilicrianiom 235 bers of mankind have been eatsfied with much fess. ‘The rain constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, ether fof which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquility, and excitement, With much tranquility, any find that they can be content with very litle pleasure: with much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a con Siderable quantity of pain, There is assuredly ao inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to tunite both; since the two are 0 far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either boeing a preperation for, and exciting a wish for, the other. eis only those in whom indolence amounts to a vies, that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose; itis ‘only thoce in whom the need of exeitoment is a disease that feel the tranquility which follows excitement dull and insipid, instead of pleasurable in direct proportion to the txeitement which preceded it, When people who are tlerably fortunate in their outward lot do aot find in life suficient fnjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally i caring for nobody but themselves. ‘To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life faze much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in velue as the time approsches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of per= sonal affection, and especially those who have also eultivated 2 fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, fetsin se lively an interest in Tife on the eve of death in the vigour of youth and health, Next to selfichness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want Ef meatal cultivation, A eultvated mind—I do not mem at of « philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains ff knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, fn any tolerble degtee to exereise its Faculties ~fnds sources fof inesheustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature the achioverents of art, the imaginations ‘Of poste, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past ‘ind prestnt, and their prospects in the future, It is possible, [indeed to become indifferent to allthis, and that too without236 Purpose having exhausted a thousandth part of it; but only when one 2 had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity. [Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of meatal culture sufficient to give an intelli gent intrest in theae objects of contemplation, abould not be the inheritance of every one born in a civilized country. AS Title ia there an inherent necessity that eny human being should be a selsh egoist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which centre in hie own maiserable individuality. ‘Something far euperior to this ie eufcently common even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may bbe made. Genuine private afections, and a incere interest in the public good, are possible, though in unequal degree, ta every tightly brought up homen being. Ina world in which there is #0 much to interest, so much to enjoy, and 0 much algo to correct and improve, everyone who has this ‘moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is ‘cspable of an existence which may he called enviable; and ‘unless such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the sill of others, is denied the liberty to use the aources of happiness within his reach, he will not fil to find this enviable existence, If he escape the positive evils of life, the great souree of physical and mental suffering such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthleeeness, oF premature Joss of abjects of affection, ‘The main stres of ‘the problem le, therefore, in the contert with these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape; ‘which, as things now are, eannot be obviated, and often cannot bein any material degree mitigated, Yet no ane whose pinion deserves a moments consideration ean doubt that rst of the greit positive evils of the world ere in them selves removable, and will, if human affare continue to Jmprove, be in'the end reduced within narrow nite, Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the ‘good sense and providence of individuale, Even that most What Utilitarianism is ny intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral edveation, and proper control of noxious. influences; while the progress Of science holds out a promite for the Future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction relieve us from some, not only of the chances which out short our own lives, but, what concerns tu till more, which deprive us of those in whom our happi- nese is wrapt up. As for vicimitudes of fortune, and other isoppointinents connected with worldly cireumetances, these fre principally the effect clther of ross imprudence, of -regulated desires, or of bad ot imperfect eocial institutions All the grand sources in short, of human suffering are in a great degres, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care nd effort; and though thei removal i grievously slowe=though a long succesion of generations will perch ‘the bresch before the conquest i completed, and. this world becomes all thet, if will nd knowledge were not want ing, it might easly be made—yet every mind sufciently fnteligent and generous to bear’a part, however small and ‘uncongpicuous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoy- ment from the contest itelf, which he would not for any babe in the form of selfch indulgence consent to be without. ‘And this leads to the true estimation of what is caid by the objectors concerning the poesibilty, and the obligation, fof learning to do without happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; i ie done involuntarily by inoten-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our prevent world which are least deep in barbarism; and it ‘often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which ho prizes more than bis individual happinees, But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happi- ness? It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's ‘own portion of happiness, or chanees off but, aftr all this fell-sacrifce must be for some end; i snot its own end; end if we are told that its end isnot happiness, but virtue, which fs better than happiness, I ask, would the stcrifee be18 Purpose made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would fen for others immunity” from similar sterifices? Would it be made, if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would prodace no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make ther lot ike his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? [All honour to those who ean abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of fife, when by such renunciation they Contribute worthy to increase the amount of happiness ia the world; but he who does it, or professes to do i, for any thee purpose, ino mote deserving of admiration than the fscetie mounted on his pillar. He may be en inspiring proof ‘of what men con do, but assuredly not an example of what they should “Though itis only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of ‘thers by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet 60 fong a8 the world ie in that impecfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to mate such 2 sacrifice Js the hi virtue which ean be found in man. I will add, that in this Condition of the world, paradoxial ae the assertion may be, the conccious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing auch happiness a6 is attainable. For hothing except that conselousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him: ‘hich, once felt frees him from excess of anxiety concerning. the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stole in the syorst times of the Roman Empire to enlivate in tranquility ‘the sources of satisfaction accesible to him, without cone cetning himself shout the uncertainty of their duration, any tore than about their inevitable ead. ‘Meanwhile, let utltariane never cease to claim the moral= ity of sclfdevotion an a posession which belongs by a5 good a right to them, as either to the Stoie or to the ‘Trans- fendentalist, The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of sterfcing ther own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the What Utlterianiom is 19 suerfice is iteelé « good. A sierfice which does not increase, for tend to increate the sum total of happiness, it eonsders 2 wasted, The only eelfenuncition which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the meas’ of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the eolective in- tereats of mankind. TT must agtin tepeat, what the assailants of utiliteraniam seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what ip right in Conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all ‘concerned, Aa betioen his own happiness and that of others, Utltarianism requires him to be se strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of| Jeaus of Nazareth, we read the complete epiit of the ethics of tilly. To do’ a2 you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal of perfection of utilitarian morality. As the meant of making the nearest fpptoach to this idel, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as ‘peaking practically 3t may be called) the interest, of every individual, a8 nearly as poasble in harmony with the interest ‘of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, ‘which have eo vast a power over human character, should 20 use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indisoluble asociation between his own happi ness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the prectice of such modes of conduct, nega tive and postive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibilty of happiness tp himself, consistently with ‘conduct opposed to the general good, but also that 2 direct Impulse to promote the general good may be in every indi- ‘vidual one of the habitual motives of action, end the eenti- ments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being’ sentient existence. Tf th Impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their sat 20 Purpose com minds in thin ts trae charstr, T know not what commendation possed hy anyother morality they cold onal alin to be wanting tof: what more bem oF Inore exalted developments of hirtan nate ay other ec ‘stem cam be supped to foster, or what springs of ton, Sot accesible tthe ultaran, euch systems fly on for ving effect to ther mandate "The ebjecere t ulteraniam cannot abvaye be charged vith representing i in a dcredtable light, On the cone Tiny, thw among them who entertain anything He jut ‘dee of is eiiterested eharacer,sometince Sd fale with su standard a beng to high for humanity. They say ix tctng to mich fo reguire that people shall abaya act from ihe indoceent of rosaing the genre intrest of society, Bot tient mae the very messing of a stand ff moral, tnd confound the ral of ston with the motive of it Tes the busines of ethics to tell ue what are oor Ghat or by what txt we sy on then But no sytem Sf ethics nein thatthe ele mote of ll we do tall be f feling of duty on the contrary, ninetynine hundedthe SF all ots ations are done from other motives, and ght So done, i the rule of duty doesnot condemn them. Te the move unjust to ttartnien that this. pray mi tpprebenson should be made s rod of abjeion 0 ‘tuemuch ar utietarian cnraiste Rave gone beyond almost all other in firming thatthe motive hay nothing to 0 with ‘he morality ofthe scion, though sch withthe worth of the gent He who saves a flow create from down ing does what is orally ight, whether his ative be day, forthe hope of bing pil for his troubles he who Beirars the fiend thet tants hi, in gui of img. even if Ki abject be to serve anothor frend to whom he is under {restr bligeionas But to speak only of sons done fom ested to this paosgs sping, ‘Surely the rightesa or wrongoess of saving 2 man Hom drowbing dow depend very mach Upon, What Uitarionom is Pa the motive of duty, and in dst obedicce to principe: it o' tnappebensica of the wliterian mode of thouht Some rpg at ole hu he mide Spon so wide agenraiy the world or eee at lg. “Re peat muy of good sts are itended, not for the Bent of he word! but for tat of individuals, of Which the god ofthe words made up; andthe thoughts of the mest vito man need not on thse occasions travel tnjond the parclar penons concerned except so far 38 i ocrnary fo soute esl that in benefiting them he ot ling heights that iy the oginate and authoriseda Purpote expectations ~of aay one ese. The multiplication of happi- nets is, according to the vtiltarian ethic, the object of viru: the ceeations on which any. person (except one in a thousand) fas it in his power t do thie on an extended scale, in other words, to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he ealed on t0 consider public utility; in every other care, private ult, the interest or happiness of some fer person, is ll he has to attend to, Those alone, the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themseives habit ally about so large sn object In the cate of abstinences indeed—of things which people forbear to do, from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular fesse might be benefiial—it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is ofa class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation t0 abstain from it, The amount of regard forthe public interest implied in this recognition, is no. greater than is demanded by every system of morale; for they all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pemisiows to society. ‘The same considerations dispose of another reproach sgainat the doctrine of uiility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of & standard of morality, and of the very mesning of the words right and wrong, Tt is ‘often firmed that ubitaranisen rendere men cold and un- sympathizing; that it chills their moral feelings towards individuals; that it makes them zepard only the dey and hhard consideration of the consequences of actions, not ting into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the assertion means that they donot allow their judgment respecting the rightness or wrongs of an action tobe influenced by their opinion of the qualities fof the person who docs it, this is «complaint not against vutltarianiem, Dut against having any stendard of morality at all; for certainly no Known ethical standard decides an ‘action to be good ar bad because itis done by a good or & bad man, still ess because done by an amisbie, a brave, of What Utltarianiom is 133 48 benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are relevant, not tothe estimation of actions, but of persons; land there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which interest us ia persons besides the rightness and wrongness of ther actions. ‘The Stoic, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they strove fo ‘se themselves above all concern about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has thet has everything; that he, and only he, is rich, ia beautiful, «king. But no claim of this description is made for the virtwous man by the utilitarian doctrine. Usiitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable poseeeions and qualitce besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their fall worth, They are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blameable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this ie apparent in any particular se it modifos their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. T grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run the bast proof of & good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental Aispecition a6 good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with ‘many people; but i a an unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards the distinction between right and ‘wrong in a serious light; and the reproach is not one which 4 conscientious utilitarian nesd be anxious to repel. {no more be meant by the objetion than that many utile turians look on the morality of aetiong, as measured by the utltarian standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sulfcient stress upon the other beauties of character hich go towards making « human being loveable or admir- able, this may be admitted. Usiiterians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their symptthies nor their artistic perceptions, do fll into this mistake; and oo do all ‘other morlists under the same conditions. What can be said ‘in exeute for other morlits is equally available for them,oy Purpose namely, that i there ip to be any error, itis beter that it ould be on that side. As a matter of fact, we may afin that mong wilitarans as among adherens of other systems, there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of their standard: ‘some are even puritanically gorous, while others are ax indulgent as can possibly be esired by sinner or by sentimentaist. But on the whole, @ Aoctzine sehich bringe prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the repression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law, is likely to be inferior to n0 other in turning the sanctions of opinion against such viola- tions, Te is true, the question, What does violste the moral Jaw? is one on which those who recognise diferent standards of morality are Hkely now end then to differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not fist introduced into the world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine does supply, i not always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelligible mode of deciding auch diferences. Te may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common mitapprehensions of utilitarian ethics, even thats Which are so obvious and gross that it might appear iin- posible for any person of eandour and intelligence to fall Into them: since persons, even of considerable mental en- dowments, often give thetssives oo litle trouble to under- stand the bearings of any epinion against which they enter- tain a prejudice, and men are in general so File conscious of thie voluntary ignorance ao a defect, that the vulgarestmis- understandings of ethical doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the grestest pre- tensions both to high principle and to philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of wlity iavelghed against te a godlore doctsine, If it be necessary to sty anything a all ageinst so more an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idew we have formed of the ‘moral character of the Deity. If it be true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, What Vtlteranism is 135 and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility i not only not « godless doctrine, but more profoundly religi- us than any other. fi be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed wil of God a the supreme law of morals, I answer, that an utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness ‘end wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought to reveal on the subject of| morals, oust full the requirements of utilty in a supreme degre. But others besides utitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revelation was intended, and ia fitted, fo inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit hich should enable them to find for themeclves whet is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather than to tall them, except in very general way, what it ist and that we need © doctrine of ethics, carefully followed out, to interpret to us the will of God. Whether this opinion is correct or mot, it is superfluous here to disussy since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to cthical investigation, ie ae open to the utilitarian moraist 3 to any other, He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given couree of action, by ab good a right as others can use it for the indication of 4 transcendental lav, having no connesion with usefulness fr with happiness Again, Utlity ie often eummarily stigmatized as en ime moral doctrine by giving it the name of Expediency, and ‘aking advantage of the popular use of that term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expadient, in the sense in which it is opposed to the Right, generally means that which is ‘expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself; os ‘when a minister saerifies the interest of his country to Keep himself in place. When it mesne anything better than this, it means that which is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whoee observance is oxpedient’ ine rauch higher degroe The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the same thing vith the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, it would