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Violence, & Abuse

Cognition, Empathy, and Sexual Offending

Georgia D. Barnett and Ruth E. Mann
Trauma Violence Abuse 2013 14: 22
DOI: 10.1177/1524838012467857

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 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE
14(1) 22-33
Cognition, Empathy, and Sexual Offending ª The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1524838012467857
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Georgia D. Barnett1 and Ruth E. Mann1

Abstract
Most empathy research in the forensic context has assumed that empathy has two components. In this two-component model,
the cognitive component involves perspective taking, and the affective component involves experiencing appropriate emotion.
In this review, we identify how this assumption has both dominated and limited empathy research with offenders, nearly all of
which has been conducted with sexual offenders. We propose instead that five components are involved in the experience of
empathy: perspective taking, the ability to experience emotion, a belief that others are worthy of compassion and respect,
situational factors, and an ability to manage personal distress. We suggest that the non-situational factors that blocked empathy
for the victim at the time of a sexual offense are probably other dispositions known to be related to sexual offending, such as
sexual preoccupation, generalized hostility to others, implicit theories about children and sex, and/or poor coping with negative
emotions. We conclude with directions for practice and research, and urge greater caution in correctional policies on victim
empathy programs.

Keywords
empathy, victim empathy, cognition, sexual offending

Introduction Cotter, 2009; Levenson & Prescott, 2009; Wakeling, Webster,

The empirical, theoretical, and clinical forensic literatures
typically assume that there is a relationship between empathy
deficit and offending. Numerous reviews of this literature can
be found (e.g., Blake & Gannon, 2008; Brown & Walker,
2012, Joliffe & Farrington, 2004, Marshall, Hudson, Jones, &
Fernandez, 1995; Tierney & McCabe, 2001). To date, these
reviews have drawn few conclusions of use to practitioners,
mainly because the research is both contradictory and flawed.
In particular, Joliffe and Farrington’s (2006) systematic review
of empirical studies clearly demonstrated the inconsistencies of
empirical findings depending on the measure used or
population studied. Instead of carrying out further examination
of the empirical evidence for a relationship between empathy
and offending, we focus here on reviewing the relationship
between empathy and cognition in the forensic context, and
draw on the cognition literature to develop a more sophisticated
conceptualization of empathy in the hope of creating some new
directions for research and practice. In particular, we will
concern ourselves in this article with sexual offending, as this
type of offending has generated by far the largest literature
on empathy. (We cannot explain why empathy is seen as more
relevant to sexual offending than any other type of offending.)
While large-scale meta-analytic reviews have suggested no
relationship between sexual reoffending and victim empathy
deficits (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005), offenders
themselves often cite developing empathy for their past victims
as one of the most useful aspects of treatment designed to
reduce reoffending (e.g., Levenson, Macgowan, Morrin, &
& Mann, 2005). To date, these seemingly discrepant findings
have not been empirically resolved.
What Is Empathy?
Early theorists believed that empathy was primarily an
emotional response to another person. Gladstein (1984) has
provided an excellent review of the history of thinking about
the concept of empathy. This review noted that philosopher–
psychologist Theodore Lipps believed empathy to be an
affective unconscious experience resulting from observation
of someone’s physical appearance which leads to an immediate
and intuitive understanding of his or her thoughts and feelings.
Lipps proposed that the observer becomes ‘‘as one’’ with the
person being observed, creating a connection between the two,
and that this only becomes cognitive and conscious after the
empathic experience. He proposed that the observer projects
their own emotions and understanding onto the person being
observed. Conversely, Wundt, a physiologist–psychologist,
believed that it is the other person’s emotions that are experi-
enced by the empathizer or observer. Social psychologists like
1
National Offender Management Service, Petty France, London, England
Corresponding Author:
Georgia D. Barnett, National Offender Management Service, Clive House,
70 Petty France, London SW1P 9EX, UK
Email: georgia.barnett@noms.gsi.gov.uk

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Barnett and Mann
Allport and Heider labeled the ‘‘taking on’’ of someone else’s
emotional state as emotional contagion (Allport, 1924). It is
emotional contagion that distinguishes empathy from the
related concept of sympathy. Sympathy is characterized by
immediate feelings of pity and sorrow, while the affective
component of empathy is captured by experience of the emo-
tion (or imagined emotion) of the other, regardless of what that
emotion may be.
According to Gladstein (1984), George Mead was one of the
first to suggest that empathy (until then not differentiated from
sympathy) could be achieved through a deliberate, conscious,
and cognitive process. Later, developmental psychologist
Piaget (1975) proposed that if emotional contagion existed
without the understanding of why the observed is feeling that
way (which is only possible with the ability to take others’
perspectives) the resultant behavior would be self-serving
rather than empathic. That is, the function of any behavior
resulting from emotional contagion alone would be entirely
egocentric, serving to alleviate personal distress rather than
serving to help the other person (although the latter could occur
as a by-product). Hence, the idea of understanding empathy as
a combined cognitive and affective process was born.
One subsequent area of debate is whether empathy also
contains a behavioral component. Marshall, Hudson, Jones,
and Fernandez (1995), for example, asserted that empathy is
in part defined by the taking of action to ameliorate the others’
distress. Others have criticized the idea of defining empathy on
the basis of behavioral outcomes, arguing that whether or not
someone acts on an experience of empathy is determined by
multiple factors, such as competing interests and situational
determinants (e.g., Polaschek, 2003). Even if someone acts in
an empathic manner, this will not necessarily be motivated
by the experience of empathy but could be ethically driven, out
of a sense of duty. These arguments are convincing and so we
suggest that a definition of empathy should not incorporate a
behavioral component.
Most recently, Barnett and Mann (2013) defined empathy
as ‘‘a cognitive and emotional understanding of another
person’s experience, resulting in an emotional response for the
observer which is congruent with a view that others are worthy
of compassion and respect and have intrinsic worth.’’ They
proposed that the related but separate concept of victim
empathy occurs when the perpetrator of a criminal offense
experiences an appropriately matched and compassionate
response to the actual experience of the person they victimized.
Victim empathy is, they argued, contingent on the ability of an
individual who has committed an offense to accurately identify
and understand, free from their own biases, what the victim of
his or her offense is likely to have experienced (Barnett &
Mann, 2013).
The beliefs that empathy exists in separate forms of
‘‘general’’ and ‘‘victim’’ empathy, and that it involves two
components of ‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘affective’’ empathy, have
therefore persisted in the forensic literature. However, these
assumptions lack empirical validation. For example, in some
of the 42 studies reviewed by Joliffe and Farrington, offenders
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23
were found to be deficient in general empathy and in others
they were not. Where empathy has been subdivided into
‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘affective’’ empathy, cognitive but not
affective empathy was linked with offending in some cases but
in other studies the opposite was found. Furthermore, the
measurement of empathy and/or victim empathy has relied
on either self-report or clinical judgment. In the self-report
studies, empathy has usually been divided into its usual two
aspects: cognitive empathy and affective empathy, and studies
have often chosen to focus on one or the other alone. There are
also notable flaws with many of the popular self-report
measures used. For example, one commonly used measure, the
Hogan Empathy scale (Hogan, 1969), supposedly a measure of
cognitive empathy, contains items such as, ‘‘I would like to be a
journalist’’ and ‘‘I am a good mixer,’’ items which do not seem
particularly aligned with any coherent theory of the nature of
cognitive empathy.
In clinical judgment studies, victim empathy has usually
been treated as a dichotomous variable, with clinicians or
researchers rating it as present or absent (see Mann & Barnett,
2012, for more critique of these studies). The clinical judgment
research assumes that (a) empathy and victim empathy are
observable, (b) empathy and victim empathy either exist or
do not, and (c) clinical judgment is a valid, reliable, way of
measuring empathy and victim empathy. These assumptions
are either untested or unsupported by the existing evidence.
Add to this the fact that most studies have used differing and
often fuzzy definitions of the concept of empathy or victim
empathy, and it is little wonder that different studies report
apparently opposite findings. However, of particular concern
is the lack of critical discussion about the nature of empathy.
Because empathy research with offenders has been so
inconsistent and inconclusive, perhaps the fault lies with the
theoretical assumptions underlying the research. Is it possible
that empathic processing in relation to offending involves more
than two components?
Components of the Empathic Process:
A Rethink
As noted above, there is a consensus that an empathic
experience involves a combination of affective and cognitive
processes (Joliffe & Farrington, 2004), which are often referred
to as cognitive empathy and emotional empathy. Hilton (1993)
suggested that ‘‘the cognitive aspect requires being able to state
what another person might feel, while the emotional aspect
involves automatically feeling what the other person feels’’
(p. 290). However, we consider that this conceptualization may
oversimplify the processes involved in empathy, as well as
conflating behavioral (stating) with cognitive processes.
Furthermore, the empirical literature frequently does not treat
these components of empathy as connected, often focusing
on either one or the other component singly. For example, in
Joliffe and Farrington’s review of 42 empathy studies, 21 had
focused on cognitive empathy and 14 on affective empathy.
24
We propose instead that empathic processing involves not
two but five key factors that combine to enable an empathic
experience. These five factors are (1) perspective taking, (2) the
ability to experience emotion, (3) a belief that others are worthy
of compassion and respect, (4) the absence of situational
factors which could impair cognitive functioning or introduce
competing demands, and (5) an ability to manage the feelings
of personal distress arising from an understanding of others’
distress. It seems likely that the first three of these promote the
experience of empathy, while the fourth and fifth components
refer to an absence of potential inhibitory factors.
Ability to Perspective Take
Perspective taking can be defined as the ability to understand
another’s view, even if it is different from one’s own, by
cognitively ‘‘putting oneself in the place of’’ another person.
Broadly speaking, when the empathy research refers to
cognitive empathy, the term refers to perspective taking. At its
most basic level, perspective taking involves imagining
yourself in someone else’s situation, and anticipating how you
would think and feel if you were in that situation. A higher
level of perspective taking is described in symbolic
interactionism (Lauer & Boardman, 1971) as synesic role
taking, and in psychological literature as mentalizing
(e.g., Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). This process
involves constructing an internal imagined representation of
another’s attitudes and thoughts, which we can use to anticipate
their behavior. A related concept is theory of mind, which refers
to an individual’s knowledge of the mind, both their own and
others’, enabling mental state inferences (mentalization) and,
subsequently, appropriate action (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
Neurological studies provide support for the notion that
cognitive processes, specifically mentalization, affect empathic
ability, and that such processes are separate, but linked to,
affective empathic processes. For example, disorders of
empathy, such as autistic spectrum disorders, have been
associated with neural abnormalities in areas of the brain that
are thought to be involved in mentalizing, such as the medial
prefrontal cortex, the temporoparietal junction, and the
superior temporal sulcus (e.g., Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith,
2002; Moriguchi, Oshnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki,
2007). There is also evidence to suggest that midline structures
such as the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices
are separate but linked to those areas that deal with emotional
experiences associated with empathy (e.g., Olsson & Ochsner,
2008). Danziger, Faillenot, and Peyron (2009) examined the
brain activity of people with a congenital insensitivity to
physical pain (CIP) and found that previous experience of the
pain or emotion witnessed in others was not required in order
to experience emotional contagion. Rather, participants’
previous experience of any psychological distress allowed
them to understand what it meant to feel pain, and to therefore
have an immediate affective response to images of others in
physical pain. Furthermore, CIP participants’ scores on
measures of emotional empathy strongly predicted the
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TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 14(1)
responses of their midline structures (level of activity in these
areas) to the pictures of pain. Danziger hypothesized that this
could mean CIP patients rely on their perspective-taking ability
(with which these midline structures are associated) to imagine
the pain of others. This finding suggests that there is a natural
neural connection between the two brain areas associated with
perspective taking and emotional contagion and that cognitive
processes can influence the experience of affect.
People can arguably be deficient in cognitive perspective
taking in various ways. Trait deficits refer to generalized
problems with perspective taking, while group-specific deficits
in perspective taking could occur when perspective taking is
impaired for particular groups or types of people.
Perspective-taking deficits can also be person or situation
specific. There is limited evidence to suggest that sexual
offenders have deficits in their general perspective-taking
ability, but a growing body of research suggests deficits at the
group, person, and situational levels (e.g., Fernandez &
Marshall, 2003; Marshall, Hamilton, & Fernandez, 2001). For
example, using Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and
Plumb’s (2001) Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, and a related
test designed to assess theory of mind skills in relation to
children (the Mind in a Child’s Eye task) Elsegood and Duff
(2010) compared the theory of mind or ‘‘mentalizing’’ abilities
of 46 men on probation convicted of sexual offenses against
children, and 46 controls, matched on a variety of demographic
characteristics. The sexual offenders’ ability to infer the mental
states of adults from pictures of their eyes was significantly
worse than that of the control group, suggesting deficits in their
theory of mind. However, there were no differences between
the two groups in their ability to infer the mental states of
children. The latter finding may have resulted from
methodological problems (the measure used was newly
developed and its psychometric properties had not been
properly tested), but the authors suggested that their results
could indicate that the child molesters had difficulties
understanding adults, but had an emotional congruence with
children (Elsegood & Duff, 2010).
Ability to Experience Emotion
Broadly speaking, when the empathy literature refers to
‘‘emotional empathy,’’ this is defined as the ability to
experience other people’s emotions, not just recognize them.
According to the theory of embodied simulation, automatic
resonance with another’s emotional state creates implicit affect
sharing, a form of empathy (Gallese, 2007; Gallese, Keysers, &
Rizzolatti, 2004). Brain regions that have been linked to
automatic resonance include the anterior insular and the
anterior midcingulate cortex (e.g., Keysers & Gazzola, 2006).
In a review of the neurobiology of empathy and callousness,
Shirtcliff et al. (2009) concluded that the neurocircuitry
involved in emotional contagion is also involved in
experiencing and recognizing stress in oneself. Mirror neurons
are linked to the emotion-related neurocircuitry and are acti-
vated when stress/distress is experienced by the self or
Barnett and Mann
observed in others. That is, the same anatomic areas of the
brain are activated, regardless of whether it is the actor or the
observer experiencing distress. The only way to distinguish
whether someone is experiencing or observing stress is through
the degree to which relevant areas are activated; there is a
higher degree of activation when the experience is one’s own.
In other words, neurobiologically speaking, we process others’
experiences in the same way that we process our own, although
processing other’s experiences produces less intense brain
activity than processing our own. Shirtcliff et al.’s review also
suggested that individuals classed as callous or unemotional
have both blunted cortisol activity and diminished reactivity
to stress (i.e., a higher threshold for stress) and that those who
have deficits in recognizing emotions in others will also have
deficits in detecting or experiencing stress in themselves. They
hypothesized that ‘‘This stress threshold may be prohibitive for
a very small subset of individuals, but the stress threshold is
unique for different individuals and changes with experience
and context’’ (Shirtcliff et al., 2009, p. 160).
It therefore seems that the experience of emotion, and
particularly resonance with the emotions someone else is
experiencing, is an important part of the empathic process, and
that it is possible that in some people there could be a
neurological basis for deficits in this area. Indeed, adults with
psychopathy and children with psychopathic traits have shown
diminished amygdala reactivity and reduced autonomic
response when presented with stimuli that shows the distress
or sadness of others (e.g., Blair, 1999; Jones, Laurens, Herba,
Barker, & Viding, 2009; Marsh et al., 2008). Such neurological
deficits leading to a lack of emotional contagion could form the
basis for a lack of empathy for victims or potential victims in
those sexual offenders who have psychopathic traits.
Belief That Others Are Worthy of Compassion and
Respect
In Barnett and Mann’s (2013) definition of empathy,
understanding someone else’s experience only results in
empathy if the observer cares about that person’s experience.
We therefore propose that compassion is a necessary
component of empathy. As with perspective taking, we propose
that deficits in compassion can be general, group-specific, or
person-specific. A fundamental belief that humans are worthy
of respect and compassion (termed Menschenliebe by German
philosopher Max Scheler) may be an essential precursor to
experiencing compassion (Barnett & Mann, 2013). Menschen-
liebe presupposes that human beings deserve respect regardless
of their moral status. It is certainly possible to have compassion
for someone whom you deem morally reprehensible. However,
even those who hold generalized beliefs that humans have
intrinsic worth and deserve respect are still capable of lacking
compassion for particular groups of people or individuals.
Hanson (2003) suggested that a person’s relationships with
others can be characterized as either caring, indifferent, or
adversarial; a generally compassionate person could still lack
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25
compassion for people with whom they have an adversarial
or indifferent relationship.
As previously discussed, there is research evidence to
suggest that some sexual offenders have implicit theories or
schemas that could lead them to regard other people as
unworthy of compassion. For example, Beech, Fisher, and
Ward (2005) identified the presence of a ‘‘dangerous world’’
implicit theory in the accounts of sexual murderers, while
Mann and Hollin (2007) discovered that a general sense of
grievance toward others was one of the most common
explanations for offending cited by the rapists in their sample.
Beech, Ward, and Fisher (2006) examined 41 rapists’ accounts
of their offending and concluded that dangerous world and
entitlement were two of the five implicit theories that emerged.
This finding supported the theoretical inferences of
Polaschek and Ward (2002) who, following a review of the
literature on rapists’ cognitions, asserted that these schemas
were relevant to explaining sexual offenses against adult
women. A view of women as hostile or deceitful is another
schema or implicit theory that could interfere with the
cognitive processes of empathy and could encourage a view
of women as not worthy of respect or compassion. A dangerous
worldview has also been identified as relevant to some of
those that offend against children (e.g., Keenan & Ward,
2000), although this appears to be implicated in their
offending less commonly than intimacy deficits (Mann &
Hollin, 2007). We argue that the presence of hostile views
about others can erode the basic foundation of the empathic
process; the belief that other people should be treated
respectfully and compassionately. In other words, those who
lack Menschenliebe are likely to be deficient in the ability to
empathize with people generally, and those who hold a
suspicious view of women are likely to have specific deficits
in the ability to empathize with women. Whatever the cause
(person-specific, group-specific, or trait), we argue that a lack
of compassion and respect for someone inhibits empathy for
him or her.
Situational Influences
Polaschek (2003) argued that situational influences could
ultimately dictate whether the cognitive and affective
experience of empathy for someone culminates in empathic
behavior toward them. Many people consider themselves to
be generally empathic toward others, to be able to experience
emotional contagion and compassion, to have good
perspective-taking abilities, and to view others as worthy of
respect. However, most people have also experienced
situations in which they have not, in the moment, experienced
empathy for someone in distress. Extreme and intense emotions
such as fear or anger can lead to an increase in self-focus and a
concomitant decrease in ‘‘other’’ focus. Consumption of
alcohol or drugs can also impair our ability to recognize stress
or distress in others. The presence or absence of state or
situational factors can impair the cognitive processes
26
associated with empathy, and thus influence the experience of
empathy at any given time.
The possibility of situational or state influences on empathy
have been raised in relation to sexual offending, but the
relevance of situation has not received as much empirical
attention as the notions of cognitive and affective empathy.
This may be due to the general reluctance to acknowledge any
cause of sexual offending which might detract from the
offender taking personal responsibility (Ware & Mann,
2012). However, research has not found that sexual offenders
are generally unempathic people, which seems to indicate that
empathy varies according to situation. For instance, Pithers
(1999) argued that most sexual abusers do not generally lack
empathic understanding about the consequences of their
actions for others, and suggested that risk of sexual offending
is elevated in the presence of specific precursors such as
emotional states, which can impair the ability to empathize at
that time. Keenan and Ward (2000) also proposed that in some
cases, sexual offenders would have an adequate theory of mind
and no deficits that could impact their ability to perspective
take, but simply fail to apply this skill in a given situation.
They, like Pithers, suggested that empathy failure could be a
result of situational factors such as strong negative emotional
states; lack of motivation, caused, for example, by strong
sexual desire, or as a result of external influences such as
alcohol or drugs.
Ward, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) suggested that
situational deficits in empathy occur as a result of cognitive
deconstruction; a cognitive process that enables escape from
self-scrutiny and self-regulation. Cognitive deconstruction
occurs in situations of particular stress and is often triggered
by intensely negative mood states. In order to manage the
subjective experience of stress or distress, individuals narrow
their attentional focus, become concrete in their thinking, and
attend only to present-oriented goals and instant gratification
of needs (Covell & Scalora, 2002). Normal self-evaluative
processes are suspended as the individual becomes fully
focused on achieving pleasurable, concrete, sensations. The
suspension of self-evaluation and of attention to the welfare
of others allows the offender to continue with behavior that
they would otherwise recognize as wrong. If this theory is
correct, then we should find that some sexual offenders do not
demonstrate deficits in either general perspective taking or
affective empathy, but instead have deficits in their empathic
understanding of their specific victim (victim empathy). We
should also find that for such individuals, sexual offenses are
committed in the context of a stressful or painful life situation,
which caused the state of cognitive deconstruction to occur.
Certainly, some research has found that many sexual
offenders do not suffer from general or victim group specific
perspective-taking deficits, but instead fail to express empathy
only for their specific victims. In a small-scale study Marshall
and Moulden (2001) discovered that rapists had lower levels of
empathy for their victims than for other rape survivors or for
women who had been subject to another harmful incident.
Fernandez and Marshall (2003) replicated this finding with
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TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 14(1)
another small sample of rapists. Marshall, Hamilton, and
Fernandez (2001) found a similar pattern among child abusers,
who as well as displaying greater deficits in cognitive empathy
(measured by ability to identify harm caused to the victim)
in relation to victims of child sexual abuse than nonsexual
offenders and nonoffenders, also displayed the most profound
deficits (both in identifying possible harm to victims, and in
their own feelings toward the suffering of the victims) toward
their own victims. Marshall and colleagues concluded,
therefore, that empathy should be viewed not as a trait but as
situation-specific and person-specific.
In summary, it is likely that situation-specific deficits in
empathy can take a number of forms. These include the
presence of strong negative emotional states, which could lead
to cognitive deconstruction associated with an increased
‘‘self-focus’’ and inhibition of usual self-regulatory processes.
Failure to apply empathic processes may also result from a lack
of motivation or the presence of disinhibitory influences
such as drugs or alcohol. Finally, situational deficits in
empathy could reflect attempts to protect fragile self-esteem
or occur because the victim is perceived to be a villain, or
unworthy of empathy. Although these hypotheses need
considerable further empirical testing, they offer plausible
explanations for the failure of generally empathic individuals
to apply their abilities to certain people on specific occasions.
Ability to Manage Emotions in Face of Others’ Distress
Hanson (2003) included the notion of personal distress in his
conceptualization of empathy deficit, proposing that people
who are poorly equipped to deal with the emotions of others
will be less likely to be empathic. Cognitive style contributes
to this process. For example, those who manage knowledge
of another’s suffering by making defensive attributions or by
avoiding acknowledgment of their pain are less likely to
experience empathy for the sufferer. They are more likely to
attempt to cope with the observed distress by minimizing or
justifying it, to help ameliorate the negative feelings caused
by witnessing that distress. Bumby, Marshall, and Langton
(1999) stated that the self-focused nature of shame is likely
to lead to a concomitant decrease in the ability to empathize
with others, partly because the experience of self-oriented
distress can impede other-oriented emotional recognition, and
partly because shame makes an individual more prone to
defensive externalization (Bumby, 2000). Ward and Salmon
also argued that an inability to manage other people’s distress
is likely to stem from problems in tolerating self-referring
emotions, such as shame (Ward & Salmon, 2011). It seems
therefore, that ability to manage the distressing feelings that
can arise as a result of perspective taking and emotional
contagion is fundamental to the experience of empathy.
Problems in managing personal distress have also been
associated with sexual offending. Defensive externalization
in the form of victim blaming or minimization of victim harm
is frequently observed in sexual offenders, and both of these
Barnett and Mann
phenomena would appear as deficient empathy for the victim
(e.g., Marshall, Marshall, Serran, & O’Brien, 2009).
Marshall, Marshall, Serran, and O’Brien (2009) have
recently proposed a theoretical model of empathy which
suggests that personal distress (resulting from problems in
managing emotions in the face of other’s distress) inhibits
empathy for others, and is related to the concepts of shame,
guilt, self-esteem, and cognitive distortions. Empirical support
for these theoretical arguments is available. In sex offenders,
guilt has been found to positively correlate with both empathy
and perspective taking, while shame correlates negatively with
these variables (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney,
1991). Low self-esteem has been found to correlate with high
levels of shame (Tangney, 1990), and with poorer levels of
cognitive empathy (e.g., Marshall, Champagne, Sturgeon, &
Bryce, 1997). In addition, research indicates that shame
positively correlates with an externalization of blame for
transgressions (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow,
1992). However, the full model is yet to be explicitly tested
empirically. Furthermore, Marshall et al.’s model examines a
reactive process that follows an offense, rather than being
a theory of the (partial) causes of offending. However,
difficulty managing the emotions that occur when observing
others in distress appears to be one factor that leads to a lack
of empathy and this could reasonably be the case in some
sexual offenses.
Summary: Cognitive Structures and Processes in the
Empathic Process
We have argued that cognitive structures and processes are
integral to the experience of empathy, and in particular, that
problems with or deficits in cognitive structures or cognitive
processing can block or interfere with the ability to empathize
with others. We have reviewed five key components of the
experience of empathy. Table 1 summarizes the components
of empathy and their associated cognitive structures and
processes. We propose that for empathy to prevent someone
from offending, all of the components involved in the empathic
process need to be present.
Disruptions to Empathy in the Offending
Context
We have conceptualized empathy as a complex cognitive and
affective process with multiple components. To understand the
role of empathy deficit in offending behavior, it may be helpful
to identify the processes that could block these components
(see Table 2). In the latest assessment of empirically supported
risk factors for recidivism, Mann, Hanson, and Thornton
(2010) identified relatively stable personal dispositions which
have strong empirical support as predictors of reoffending.
These included offense-supportive attitudes (beliefs that
condone sexual offending) and grievance/hostility.
Dispositions with ‘‘promising’’ empirical support as predictors
of reoffending included a lack of concern for others and poor
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27
coping with negative emotions. It could be argued that
grievance/hostility and lack of concern for others are
synonymous with deficits in compassion and respect for others
(Menschenliebe). It could also be argued that
offense-supportive attitudes are types of implicit theories
which limit or impair perspective taking, and poor coping with
negative emotions will impair the ability to cope with the
distress of others. Finally, it could be proposed that
cognitive deconstruction is more likely if someone has
difficulty coping with their emotions, or if they are
experiencing high levels of sexual preoccupation, another risk
factor for sexual recidivism. An examination of the
established risk factors for sexual recidivism therefore provides
some support for the hypothesis that deficits in the
empathic process are part of the explanation for sexual
offending. However, in this conceptualization, we argue that
empathy deficit should not be conceptualized as the cause of
offending but is better understood as a symptom of one or more
of the stable dispositions that have been established as risk
factors for offending.
To expand on this argument, we propose that the first
point at which the empathic process could be disrupted by
dynamic risk factors is in picking up the cues that someone is
distressed. The ability to identify such cues can be disrupted
if someone is experiencing intense emotion (either positive
or negative), including shame and/or cognitive deconstruction,
all of which reduce ‘‘other-focus.’’ As a result, the cues of
distress may not be noticed at all. Even if the cues are observed,
then theory of mind deficits for the group to which the victim
belongs could result in misinterpretation of the cues. For
example, an implicit theory that suggests children are not
harmed by sex or actively seek sex, as identified by Ward and
Keenan (1999), could lead to inaccurate interpretation of a
child’s behavior leading up to or during a sexual offense.
The second point at which the empathic process could be
disrupted is after indicators of distress have been identified and
interpreted as distress. Grievance or entitlement thinking could
permit the conclusion that the victim deserves to be distressed
or that the victim’s experience is unimportant. The presence of
these implicit theories/schema could even lead to a
counterempathic internal response, such as feeling powerful
or sexually aroused.
The final point at which an internal empathic response could
be blocked occurs when the offender has attended to the
distress of the victim and has accurately interpreted this distress
at both a cognitive and emotional level. At this stage, problems
with managing the personal distress that arises from such
knowledge might culminate in defensive externalization,
including victim blaming or minimization of harm, which then
inhibits an empathic, compassionate response.
There are therefore multiple points at which the empathic
process can be inhibited or disrupted, and there are multiple
causes of this inhibition/disruption.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the majority of research
examining the link between lack of empathy and sexual
offending has examined whether reconviction for such a crime
28
Table 1. Components of the Empathic Process and Associated Cognitive Processes/Structures
Component of Empathy
Perspective taking
The ability to take the perspective of others by imagining how the
other would feel in that situation or by imagining how you would feel
in that situation
Emotional response
The capacity to be emotionally affected by others’ experiences/
distress
Compassion and respect
A view of others as worthy of respect and compassion
(Menschenliebe)
Situational factors
Application of the above cognitive or affective processes to a specific
situation in which another is distressed
Ability to manage emotional distress
The ability to manage emotions rather than to become consumed by
them
Table 2. Factors Involved in Empathy and Associated Inhibitory or Disruptive Risk Factors for Sexual Offending
Factor Necessary For the Experience of Empathy
The ability to take the perspective of others by imagining how they would feel in that
situation (synesic role-taking/perspective taking) or by imagining how you would
feel in that situation
A view of others that is respectful and compassionate (Menschenliebe)
The capacity for an emotional response
The ability to manage personal distress
Application of these cognitive or affective processes to specific situation in which
another is distressed
is related to whether or not an individual is able to experience
empathy for previous victims as measured after the event.
Typically, studies have measured or rated victim empathy
during treatment intake, or following an intervention, once the
offender has been convicted and is undergoing rehabilitation.
However, we propose that it is those deficits/problems that led
to a lack of empathy at the time of offending that should have a
relationship with reconviction; and that the continued presence
of these factors, rather than an absence of victim empathy
postoffense, would predict reconviction. This is an important
distinction, because theoretically it should be possible to
increase (or apparently increase) empathy for past victims
without affecting the deficits that prevented an empathic
experience at the time of the offense. If this is so, then some
well-meaning attempts to develop ‘‘victim empathy’’ in
treatment programs may be futile. For example, an offender
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TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 14(1)
Associated Cognitive Structures or Processes
Inaccuracies in perspective taking lead to distorted view of the victim’s
experience, in which harm is minimized, or the abuse is construed as
beneficial. Perspective taking can be rendered inaccurate as a result
of implicit theories about other people or groups that minimize
their experience of harm
Restricted ability to experience other people’s emotions/callousness,
which can be mediated by perspective taking ability
A view of others that is hostile and aggressive, or indifference to/lack
of concern for others’ experiences. May leave the offender feel
justified in harming others, or simply not caring about the harm
caused. Can occur as a result of implicit theories or associated
attitudes that suggest others do not deserve respect or that others’
needs are less important than your own
Specific failures of any of the above in a given situation, allowing focus
on self and pursuit of pleasure, co-occurring with a decrease in
‘‘other’’ focus, as a result of cognitive deconstruction. This can result
from stress, intoxication, or intense sexual arousal
Inability to manage emotional distress, e.g., becoming egocentrically
consumed by own feelings/experiencing shame which leads to self-
focus and reduces other-focus, as a result of low self-esteem
Inhibitory/Disruptive Dynamic Risk
Factor For Sexual Offending
Offence-supportive beliefs/implicit theories
Grievance thinking/hostility
Grievance thinking/hostility
Offence-supportive beliefs (beliefs that women are
deceitful/sexual entitlement beliefs)
Lack of concern for others
Psychopathy/lack of concern for others
Problems with self-regulation (poor emotional control,
poor problem solving, impulsivity)
Sexual preoccupation
Poor problem solving
who is poor at perspective taking may still be able to learn in
therapy that his victim was harmed. However, in learning this,
he has not necessarily developed the (general) skill of
perspective taking that he can apply in novel future situations.
Arguably, his greater victim empathy may motivate him to
acquire this skill but it does not necessarily ensure this is the
case. If his ability to perspective take was diminished in a
particular situation where he was sexually aroused, or angry,
or drunk, he may be able to adopt his victim’s perspective with
hindsight in therapy. But this does not guarantee that he will
be able to experience empathy when he is sexually aroused,
angry, or drunk again. Rather than focusing on a particular
target of the empathic response, such as the victim, treatment
should focus on the constituent parts of empathy as described
above, thus increasing the likelihood of generalized empathic
responding in the future.
Barnett and Mann
Table 3. Critical Findings
 Inconsistent findings in research into empathy and offending are
likely to be a result of problems in the definition and
operationalization of the concept of both empathy and victim
empathy
 There are five key processes involved in the experience of
empathy; perspective taking, the experience of emotion, the
experience of compassion and respect for the observed,
situational determinants, and management of personal distress
 Cognition and cognitive processes play a role in impairing or
disrupting the experience of empathy in the lead up to or during an
offense, by interfering with one or more of these five factors
 Empirically supported risk factors for sexual offending work as
cognitive ‘‘blocks’’ to empathy
 Determining the type and nature of deficits that impaired the
experience of empathy at the time of the offense is important in
determining where to intervene to reduce risk of reoffending
Implications for Research, Practice, and
Policy
Implications for Research
We noted at the outset of this article that the empirical research
into empathy and offending has been flawed both by its
conceptualizations of empathy and by the measures used.
Measurement has relied almost exclusively on one of two
methodologies: self-report, usually focusing either on cognitive
or emotional empathy (only two of the five components in
our cognitive model of empathy), or on mainly dichotomous
observer ratings aligned with clinical assessment or treatment
programs. The value of these approaches, in our view, is
compromised by weak theoretical models and corruption of the
concept of empathy with other constructs such as remorse or
regret, which are probably not fully synonymous with empathy.
Furthermore, the recidivism prediction research has particularly
focused on measuring specific victim empathy (see e.g., Hanson
& Morton-Bourgon, 2006). Other components of the empathic
process set out above have also been found to predict offending,
but these have not been conceptualized as empathy.
We therefore propose that the measurement of empathy in
offenders should be more theoretically informed and should
move forward from the two-component model of
cognitive/affective to a more detailed model such as that which
we have proposed above.
Implications for Practice
We suggest that instead of focusing on the target of the
empathy deficit (i.e., the victim) through ‘‘victim empathy’’
programs, the constituents of the empathic process should
become the targets for treatment designed to reduce sexual
reoffending. In line with the Risk–Needs–Responsivity (RNR)
model (Andrews & Bonta, 2010), we suggest that criminogenic
needs—that is, known risk factors for sexual offending—
should be the focus of intervention, and that therefore the prac-
titioner must determine the role of these factors in impairing
empathy in the lead up to and/or during the offense.
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29
These factors, therefore, remain the targets of intervention,
and treatment will differ depending on the exact nature of each
individual’s deficits. We propose that any empathy-enhancing
procedure with sexual offenders should follow an assessment
of which of the five components proposed in this review, listed
in Table 1, are relevant to the offender’s abusive behavior. It
may be pertinent to determine with the offender the point at
which empathy for the victim was impaired (i.e., when
interpreting cues, when responding to the cognitive
understanding that the victim was distressed, or when
managing the emotional response arising from the cognitive
and affective understanding of the victim’s distress), in order
to identify the blocks to empathy at that time. It would certainly
be useful to help the offender to identify patterns in his or her
problems with empathic concern across situations in his or her
life, to establish the main blocks for empathy which require
priority in treatment. Treatment approaches would then vary
depending on the nature of the deficit that an individual
presents with (see Table 2).
For example, someone with a deficit in general ability to
perspective take would need different treatment to someone
who has particular situations in which they cognitively decon-
struct. For some, work on managing strong negative emotional
states, or medication for high levels of sexual preoccupation,
may be a way to avoid cognitive deconstruction. For others,
it may be that general work on developing poor perspective-
taking skills will take priority. For other offenders, work on
challenging offense-supportive implicit schemas should take
precedence. This approach is different to current approaches,
which generally aim to increase offenders’ understanding of
their victims’ experiences. Rather than spending a proportion
of a treatment program on achieving this aim, we suggest that
offenders spend time working on those risk factors that
inhibited or impaired their ability to empathize with others
at the time of the offense. Programs would therefore cease to
have specific ‘‘victim empathy’’ components, and offenders
would instead focus on identifying which risk factors have his-
torically impaired their ability to empathize, and subsequently
on addressing their individual deficits through a variety of
treatment methods, as described above.
Current Approaches in Practice
Would traditional empathy techniques, such as role-playing the
victim at the time of the offense, writing an account of the
offense from the victim’s perspective, and watching videoed
accounts of survivors of abuse, address any of these problems?
Williams (1996) wrote, ‘‘Much of cognitive therapy aims at
dealing with [the] fact memory aspect of psychopathology.
The client and therapist spend time discovering what self-
referential facts are believed and what assumptions he or she
is making’’ (p. 102). Role-playing past traumatic experiences
to uncover contemporaneous irrational thoughts is a commonly
used cognitive therapy technique (e.g., Beck, 1995). In victim
empathy role-plays (see Mann, Daniels, & Marshall, 2002), the
purpose of the role-play is to uncover self-serving biases, rather
30
Table 4. Implications for Practice, Policy, and Research
 The measurement of empathy should be more theoretically
informed and should move away from the two component
‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘affective’’ definition
 Victim empathy-enhancing activities should be replaced with
treatment strategies designed to overcome the obstacles to
empathy relevant to each individual
 Offenders who hold offense-supportive attitudes may respond
well to some victim empathy-enhancing activities but these should
be reframed accordingly
 Investment in victim empathy interventions for offenders is not
recommended given that such interventions seem inconsistent
with the Risk–Need–Responsivity model.
than self-damaging biases, but the principle is the same: Revi-
siting memories of past events in the context of cognitive ther-
apy enables the client to reassess the extent to which their
beliefs at the time were mistaken, which in turn assists the cli-
ent to choose different courses of behavior, should similar
events occur. It could be argued, therefore, that revisiting a past
sexual offense with a focus on the victim’s perspective enables
an offender to see the situation differently and that the more
accurate perspective taking achieved through hindsight devel-
ops a skill that will generalize to other, future situations. On the
other hand, it must be stressed that there is no empirical evi-
dence that developing empathy for past victims generalizes
to future situations. In order to explore this possibility, we need,
for example, the findings from qualitative studies of desistance
after treatment; to our knowledge no such studies have been
conducted.
Psychoeducational lessons about the experience of sexual
abuse victims are often intended to address offense-
supportive beliefs by providing evidence that beliefs such as
‘‘sexual abuse does not cause lasting damage’’ are erroneous.
Commonly, such lessons involve use of written or filmed
survivor accounts as discussion points in offender groups. In
our view, the risk factor on which this type of exercise would
impact is offense-supportive attitudes. In fact, we suspect that
this is true of the majority of victim empathy-enhancing
activities. While such activities may address some of the
deficits implicated in a lack of empathy for victims at the time
of offending, they are unlikely to be necessary for all sexual
offenders. In addition, in order to protect offenders against
future failures in empathic responding, we urge practitioners
to recognize and respond to the need to better target the other
risk factors that could have blocked empathy at the time of the
offense. It is only through proper assessment and treatment of
those deficits that led to a failure in empathic responding at the
time of the offense that we will maximize the chances that
intervention will lead to a reduction in sexual reoffending.
Implications for Policy
It is generally recognized in the field of correctional
rehabilitation that the RNR model produces the best impact
on recidivism (e.g., Hollin, 1999; Landenberger & Lipsey,
2005). The RNR model (Andrews & Bonta, 2010) suggests
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TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 14(1)
that higher risk offenders require more intensive treatment
than lower risk offenders (the risk principle), that treatment
should focus on those factors known to impact on recidivism
(the criminogenic need principle), and that treatment should
be delivered in a way that makes sense to the offender
being treated (the responsivity principle). Proponents of the
RNR model and other popular models of offender
rehabilitation such as the Good Lives model Ward and Stewart
(2003) agree that treatment should be inherently future
focused; these models emphasize the need to build new skills
and enhance protective factors. Despite the lack of evidence
that hindsight-focused therapeutic activities (like those that aim
to increase empathy for past victims) achieve this aim, they
continue to be popular, possibly more so with sexual offenders
than any other type of offender. The popularity of such
approaches may be the result of ‘‘correctional quackery’’
(designing interventions based on intuition rather than science;
Gendreau, Smith, & Theriault, 2009)—at the very least, this
possibility must always be robustly examined (Table 4).
With sexual offenders—a group who tend to provoke the
strongest emotional reactions in the general public, not to
mention politicians—the danger of correctional quackery is
particularly strong (Mann & Barnett, 2012). In this review,
we have suggested that ‘‘victim empathy deficit’’ is simply a
label used to describe the effect of one or more of the
dispositional traits already known to be related, probably
causally, to sexual offending (as set out by Mann, Hanson, &
Thornton, 2010). Hence, the concept of victim empathy
deficit does not add meaningfully to a formulation of
sexual offending based on known risk factors. Indeed, it may
distract from such a formulation by introducing intuitive
notions of punishment and remorse, which can distract from
taking an evidence-based treatment approach (see Mann &
Barnett, 2012).
The implications for policy makers, therefore, are suggested
to be a strong need for caution in investing in interventions
aimed at developing empathy for the victims of past crimes.
Instead, and consistent with all major rehabilitation models,
interventions should focus on developing the skills necessary
to overcome obstacles to empathy in the future.
Conclusion
Empathy deficits have long been assumed to be an important
cause of offending, particularly sexual offending, and therefore
a key target for treatment programs aiming to reduce reoffend-
ing. However, the evidence base for this widely held belief is
weak and inconsistent. There are problems with the definition
and measurement of empathy in relation to offending. We have
proposed that it may be too simplistic to view empathy as com-
prising cognitive and affective components as this conceptuali-
zation omits to acknowledge the situational context of empathy
as well as the condition that to experience empathy, one must
first believe that others are worthy of compassion and respect.
There is a lack of evidence that traditional victim empathy
interventions impact reoffending, and we suggest that the
Barnett and Mann
emphasis on this type of intervention may be disproportionate
and better replaced with an emphasis on established dynamic
risk factors for sexual recidivism, many of which will act as
blocks to empathy. The five-factor model proposed would
provide one way of understanding which ‘‘blocks’’ to
empathy should be prioritized and targeted in treatment.
Unless or until research establishes that victim empathy
interventions reduce recidivism, they should not receive
significant policy investment.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
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Bio
Ruth E Mann, PhD, is a chartered and registered forensic psycholo-
gist employed by the National Offender Management Service. Her
particular area of expertise is the assessment and treatment of sexual
offending.
Georgia D Barnett, MSc, is a chartered and registered forensic psy-
chologist employed by the National Offender Management Service in
a research and clinical development role supporting the national sex
offending treatment programme.