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    55 views178 pages

    British Secret Projects Jet Fighters Since 1950

    Uploaded by

    Peter Pan
    British Secret Projects Jet Fighters Since 1950, many images. English language

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    DRITISH , SECREP PROJECTS JET FIGHTERS SINCE 1950 TONY BUTTLER BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS JET FIGHTERS SINCE 1950 Tomy dear parents ‘Len and Betty British Seeret Projects ~ Jet Fighters since 1950 © Anthony Leonard Butler, 2000, IBN 185780 095 8 First published in 2000 by Mian Publishing 24 The Hollow, Fa Shiton, Lelcester, LE9 7NA, England. Tel: 01455 847 815. Fax: 01455 841 505 Midland Publishing isan impeint of lan Allan Publishing Limited Worldwide distibution (except North America): Midland Counties Publications Unit3 Maizefild, Hinckley Fields Hinekley, Lees LEIO IF, England "Tel: O1455 258747 Fax: 01455 233737 E-mail: milandlbooks@#compuserve.com ‘North America tade distribution by: Speealty Press Publishers & Wholesalers Ine 11605 Kost Dam Road ‘Not Branch, BIW 55056, USA Tel: 651 583 3239 Fax: 651 588.2023, Toll ee telephone: 800 895 4585, Allnights reserved. No part of this publication ‘may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means, lectronic, mechanical or photo-copied, recorded for otherwise, without the wtten pertission of, the copyright owners Design concept and editorial layout © Midland Publishing, Printed by lan Allan Printing Limited Riverdene Business Park, Molesey Road Hersham, Surrey, KT12 ARG, England Photograph on previous page: Lovely view of ovely aeroplane — the pale green Hater Hunter prototype WEISS com an cary teat Might. de Faber Photograph oni page, opposite: Amati’ impression ofthe Saunders Rae P.165 proposed supersonic research alrrat to ER134T, from May 1953. The design was developed Ino the 17%, amined power interceptor, which in tart came the S77 and was ordered forthe RAF ‘and Royal Nay before Deng canceled in sages between Apel and December 1957. GK Westand BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS JET FIGHTERS SINCE 1950 TONY BUTTLER an Midland Publishing Contents Inwoduetion 3 ‘Acknowledgements 4 Chapter One A Long Haul Naval All Weather Fighter Development 1945 to 1957 7 Chapter Two _ Ship-borne Supermarines [Naval Day Interceptors: 1945 to 1957 Ey Chapter Three Day Fighters for the RAF Land-based Fighter Progress: 1946 to the mid-1950s - part 1 2% Chapter Four Night Fighters for the RAF Land:-based Fighter Progress: 1946 to the mid-1950s ~ part 2 29 Chapter Five Advanced Versions Developments of the S Chapter Six Transonie Research undard Fighters: 1950 to 1956 46 Breaking through the Sound Barrier: 1943 o 1957 56 Chapter Seven Progression to Mach 2 High Speed Research 1952 to 1962 70 Chapter Fight The Ultimate Interceptor High Altitude Fighters: 1958 to 1959 80 Chapter Nine Fist Steps to Tornado ‘The Fist Fighters with Variable Sweepback: 1948 to 1952 9 Chapter Ten Rocket Fighters Rocket and Mixed Power Fighters: 1952 to 1957 103, Chapter Eleven A Quiet Period. No More Fighters and a Reorganised Industry: 1957 to 1974 4 Chapter Twehe Nonconformists Ideas Outside the General Trend 123 Chapter Thiteen Trails t Typhoon The Return to Real Fighters: 1975 to 2000 131 Chapter Fourteen Hawker Siddeley's Fighter Family Steps beyond Harrier: 1975 to the 1980s a3 Chapter Fifteen Future Directions? Possibilies for the Next Decades 149 Glossary 152 British Seeret Fighter Colour Chronology 153, Appendix One Post War British Fighter Projects Summary 161 Appendix Two Post-War British Fighter Project Specifications 173 Bibliography and Source Notes 174 Index 175, 4 British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Many books have been written about the lighters designed and built in Britain since the ar, ether collectively or featuring individual pes, so one imagines that this offering may ‘wellprovoke the comment ‘not again! Well hope the reader looks a litle more deeply hecause this work makes extensive use of previously unpublished primary source mat ‘tialheldby museums and record offices and Incompany and private collections, much of ‘recently declassified. Examination of these Papers has given the opportunity to describe | more detail the Ministy’s side of events and give an insight into a secret world where ‘he public had litle idea of what was going on, while al the samme time presenting some: thing of a coherent nationwide picture of ‘ghter development and evolution. Particular ‘emphasis is placed on the tender design ‘compettions between companies ancl thelr Projects, an important driving force and anas- Dect often ignored, and some of the events that ed to certain acral either being can. Eeled or chosen for production and service Unil the Second World War, fighters were ‘heap and could be built relatively quickly and anew specification often brought forth a Selection of prototypes fora yf, with the best chosen for production. Jet engines and rodkels, swept and delta wings, guided ‘weapons, advanced materials and sophisi= fated avionies changed that situation 50 that by he 1950s, fighters had became an expen- ‘Sve commodity (hough stl cheap by today’s Mandards). The diving force behind this progress was the types of threat posed by the Soviet Union and the methods and effort ete to deal with ther; the state ofthe at ‘noving swity. Now fighter competitions look place with ‘paper-planes’ where com Danie submitted detailed brochures of their proposals which included full information on Construction methods, performance est ‘als from tunnel testing and equipment. ‘A huge number of fighter projects have been drawn by British companies over the lis 50 yeas, in particular prior to the 1957 ‘White Paper, but with few turned into hard ‘war, litle has been published about most of them. One reason was that all_ilitary brochures remained classified once a winner vas chosen and many copies were destroyed as secret waste. Any survivors could not be Bish Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Introduction released for public scrutiny until at least 30 ‘years had passed. Further to this, the amalga- mation of fms into British Aerospace with the consequent closure of a number of facto- ries brought the destruction of great quant ties of recotds, This book brings together ‘many ite known projects within a fll arr tive of fighter development, but some designs are still missing and are probably los! forever. There are other gaps too, of course, as the ‘complete story would take a dozen volumes, but many aspects previously ignored are revealed for the frst time. Fighter design is constantly evolving —look at the difference in capability between the Meteor and Eurofighter. But individual pro- jects can be developed markedly and there are many examples where production fight- fers wore quite cfferent from their prototypes, and where the F Mk.G was far superior tothe F MA. Atthe earliest stages, there were often ‘many dissimilar layouts under the same pro- ject number so parameters have tobe set for, ‘what can be included here, otherwise draw: ings would be queuing by the thousand to get in, The main criterion for acceptance Is that any project must have an ‘official’ number and be in its ultimate form(s). In other words, projects actually submited tothe Ministry for Consideration become automatic entries; pri- vate venture designs appear in final form when work stopped, usually after consuming ‘reasonable amount of ime and effort, ‘This isa general rule; there are exceptions land occasionally the chance is taken to illus: trate a line of development in full (Hawker’s .1103 /P.1116 / P.1121 series for example). (One dificulty comes from strike fighters and rmuli-zole types whose dual role might not necessarily represent real fighter capabiliy. Here a demareation line for qualification is dificult and judgement is made as we go along. Only products from recognised fms ‘and design teams are included; ideas such as the Grnifith supersonic fighter of 1846 are ‘omitted, Many projects had short lives and drawings were often part of an experiment, ‘even a training exercise for a new draughts: man (boy racer 3.views). Picking the important ones has at times been dificult, many of the Kingston P and HS series have little significance except to show fan Idea under consideration at a specific {ime. A good proportion ofthe arrangements, drawn would be tunnel tested, but i is im possible to ay from the evidence avallable if they would work. Few that did not at least reach wind tunnel testing are worthy of his- torical attention, Some projects are what if" firm is following a main line of advance but needs to cast 10 either side just in case. “Paper aircraft, of course, commit no sin and ‘conceal theit weaknesses, Lis worth remem> bering also that fighter development work ‘was usually so secret that relatively ew mem- bers of a fim’ staff would know anything ‘about new designs-untl the hardware stage, ‘One senses that working with Ministry and, ‘Treasury officials must at times have been hell for those in the industy and many polit cians were clearly uncomfortable with, and Incapable of making, the big decisions nec- essay in military aviation. But these were the folk who dished out the orders and the cash, so thei opinions are important. Few publica- tions even reveal the names of ‘the Men from the Ministry’ whereas the careers of such as Sydney Camm are well documented. Con- trary to popular belief, there were some out standing people in Whitehall and. St Giles? Court, especially those with the ability to see ‘weaknesses in a design, and a design team, ‘quicker than the firms themselves. Project data throughout is manufacturer's estimates, IF submitted to the Ministry, the figures would normally be reassessed by specialists and often changed; weights in particular would regularly increase, But using ‘company data as much as possible provides. ‘common factorin presenting figures. Ihave Jong been fascinated hhow and why designers ‘working tothe same specification could pro duce such different projects, yet often cover the same ground or invent or use the same feature. This data wil allow others to make ‘comparative judgements on designs that are now maybe 40 oF 50 years ol. ‘An accurate substle was a problem but 1950 was chosen because none of the types Featured in depth in the main text lew in the 1940s, despite so much design work being completed before the new decade. ‘Twenty-five years ago, Derek Wood's book Project Cancelled was published and provid eda big stimulant in discovering the history of British aviation, Lam lucky tohave had access to many declassified documents denied to Me Wood in 1975, Many records have been lost or destroyed, but it is amazing how much material has sunvved or been saved by determined ineli- Viduals, Researchers like myself are so much, in their debt. It is also pleasing to see the es- ‘ablishment of Heriage Centres at several British Aerospace sites for cataloguing and protecting their archives and I hope very ‘much that they flourish ‘The RAF Museum has long been major soutce of information but other museums like Brooklands have also assembled large and important archives. ‘To produce such a work such as this, to find ‘so much new material and to access the ‘opinions and memories of experts requires the assistance of many kind and helpful peo- ple. To begin I must thank the authors of the Putnam series of books on British Aircraft Manufacturers, and selected othertites listed in the bibliography, who included in their ‘works alist of unbuilt projects. In doing this they gave me a framework from which to Degin my ovn research, a task that otherwise ‘would have been quite impossible ‘wish to express my sincere thanks tothe Following for their help in dealing with count less requests for information, drawings and photographs, and for permission to publish, ‘material. hope Ihave not left anyone out Wing Commander Ron Allen; Peter Amos. (Folland archive); Fred Ballamn and David Gibbings (GKN Westland Yeowi); Wing Com- mander Roland 'Bee’ Beamont; Ken Best and Joan Grenville (Shon Bros.);TerryBlacow and Colin Chamley (BAe Warton), and Andrew Bunce (BAe Warton) for clearance to publish the Eurofighter text; Pete Bishop; Roy Boot; Phil Bowden (BAe Dunsfold) Michael J FBow- yer; Alec Brew (Boulton Paul Association); Derek G Brown; Phil Butler, lan Butcher (MoD): David Chariton, Mike Fish & Duncan Greenman (BAe Airbus, Filo); Bob Coles ‘The fighter is one of man’s most spectacu lar and glamorous creations. Perhaps itis ‘wrong lo describe in sucks terms what is in essence a killing machine, but one considers them more defensive than offensive in nae ture. Fach design possessesits own character and [hope [never lose the tl of seeing and hearing such machines as they cavort around the sky. It has been immensely enjoyable to write about some of my favourite aireraft, even more to uncover previously unknown designs and information, When an original document contradiets information that has been published previously, one knows what journalists feel ike when they have a scoop and [ urge any readers who may have any Contribution, great or small, to add tothe in- formation inthis book, to write to me via the Publisher, so that any further knowledge can be published in due course. Photographs and other information will be gratefully received, acknowledged and retured on request Finally, [hope that these of you reading this work, either experts, enthusiasts or general readers, will ind the result enjoyable. British Fighter development has been, and sill is, a long, complex and often tortuous story, but hhete goes Tony Butller ma. aurses. amit July 1999 Acknowledgements Poter Eliot, Ray Funnel, Ken Hunter & Anna Mellwaine (RAF Nuscum)}; Bob Fairclough, lan Lawrenson and colleagues of the North West Heritage Group (BAe Warton); Peter Green; Mike Goodall, Jlian Temple and the late Nike Hares ofthe Brooklands Museum (who also. gave permission to photograph some 1/24th scale models on toan from BAe Military Arcratt, Dunsfold) Stan Feld, Steve Gillard and the staff ofthe BAe Brough Heritage Centre; Jim Fletcher; the late Dr John Fozard; Pam and Barry Guess, Barry Pegram and John Strange (BAe Famborough); Bll Gunston; John Harringlon (Cranfield University); Bil Hartson (Fairey archive); Roy C Holschneider; Barry Hygate; Detek James; Peter G.Jelery; George Jenks (BAe Woodford); Rott Jones, Tim Kershaw and Don Tombs ofthe Gloucestershire Avia- tion Collection's Jet Age Museum Midland ‘Air Museum, Baginton; Arnold Nayler & Brian Riddle (Royal Aeronautical Society); Ann O'Brien (Loughborough University) Sir Fred die Page; Peter Pavey (Rolls Royce Bristol): ‘Ashok and Gita Prema; Public Record Office: ‘Tony Roden (Westland Cowes); Charles Ross (Lightning Association); Mike Salisbury; Ray Sturtvant (Air-Britain; Peter A Ward: Ray Whe ler; Les Whitehouse; Ray Willams (Arm strong Whitworth archive) and Derek Wood. | am particularly grateful to: Chris Farara (Brooklands Museum) and Ralph Hooper for fling gaps and checking the accuracy ofthe Kingston story for 1975 onwards, and David Walley forhis similar weatment of the Warton text forthe samme period; Brian Kervel for let ting me tap into his huge knowledge of British ‘aeronautical history; my old mate Clive Richards whose knowledge of the archives held in the RAF Museums and MoD Air Histor. ieal Branch alerted me to aneedotes, articles, and one or two ‘scoops’ which filed in the story so much better than it ight have been dear Eric Morgan who made available his archives and realised I'm as daft about the subject as he is; and Ken Elis wh, besides seeing a book in all ofthis and encouraging me to write it, gave me the opportunity to de velop a new career, Thanks to Keith Wood- cock fora marvellous cover painting and Pete West for his splendid colour artwork also ‘wish to thank Chris Salter and the production team at Midland Publishing for their help in bringing this book to fruition. inally, must add tha in 1995 Ai Enthusi- 4st published two of my articles on fighter projects and received a very lage mail bagin response. This proved to be a bis factorin the book going ahead and I thank all of those readers who took the trouble to writ in, British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters ke Naval All-Weather Fighter Development: 1945 to 1957 Bythe time the Second World War ended in 1845, Britain had made great progress in the evelopment of jet engines and jet lighters. Three aireraft types had flown. The first was the round breaking Gloster E.28/39 research rer that took the Allies’ opening steps into Fe fight on 15th May 1941, George Canter's team at Gioster followed with its Meteor win jet Oghter, a conventional machine but the tight choice with which to begin wartime ser- tice experience. De Havilland flew the single fgined Vampire on 20th September 1943 but this type did not enter squadron service Uni ater the armistice, These were allnew aeroplanes but others in the pipeline such as Supermarine's Attacker could trace their of fins back to earlier piston engined fighters. Oficial specifications were writen. around eich ofthese craft, but they were all ‘one-off designs without competition Bran Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Chapter One A Long Haul ‘The jet was to revolutionise aireraft design and it was only to be expected thatthe fighter ‘would benefit est, This new source of power ‘was relatively simple compared tothe hightv complicated mechanics within the piston en: ne and the instant removal of the propeller suddenly brought the prospect of previoustv unheard of speeds. Britain's wartime jets were of the centsfugal type with aluminium impellers in the compressor that utilised known technology from supercharged piston tengines, but they were inefficient. The fist axials had many rows or stages of blades and ‘were heavy and bulky and poor performers [Not until the Avon and Sapphire were per fected after long developments di top « tvaxials become available, so the centrifugal jet engine had a vital role to play for some years beyond the war. The desperately dif ‘cult development problems ofthe Avon were, toaneatent, unexpected and many early pro- jects specified the engine. Early jets lacked acceleration and, fora period, rockets were ‘added anywhere and everywhere, particulary NG was the ntevin prototype Sea Veen FAW M2, rebuilt from FAW Mt standard wit ‘extended tall boom and four Red Top aleto-le fnalles, This aera frst lew 9 Is ane fd the ptr, taken om 6th September 1963, ‘lows comparison with te D110 (on page 18) In terms of structure change and weapon load Be Farnborough tohelp rate of climb, a vital property for mast fighters The Navy's quest for a radar equipped all weather fighter was to become a very drawn ‘ut affair. Ten years were to pass from the earliest requirement tothe fist ight ofa pro duction Sea Vixen (yet today we would be delighted with such a timescale). The firs jet to land ancl take-off from a carier had been the second Vampire prototype on 3rd De- ccember 1945. The Navy’ first jt fighter was the Attacker which served for just a short pe fiod inthe 1950s but gave vial experience in jet operation. It was followed by Hawker’s Sea Hawk, an altogether better and more successful machine that was to lead directly to the Hunter, In September 1946 the fist ‘draft of Naval Staff Requirement NRVA.I4 was written and, under specification N.40/46, issued for design studies to Blackbur, Gloster, Hawker and Westland on the last day of auary 197. Ne0/46 (and Operational Requirement OR.246) This requested atwin jet naval night fighter to replace the Sea Homet with a top speed at least $00 knots (575mplv927knvh) from sea level to 20,000f (6,096m), and a maximum allup-weight of 30,0001 (13,6083). Span limit was 55% (168m) (18Mt [5.5m} folded) and length 43! (13.1m). The best possible ‘manoeuvrability was needed and the airerat, had to be able to land and take-off from cart: cers by day oF night. It was accepted some form of take-off assistance might be needed and the armament was tobe 30mm eannon. ‘Allbar Hawker submitted agement of Blackburn 8.67 t0 ote the wacked emo i the wing (G27) Bae Brow Hentage Conve (Gloster P.251 vo 4046 (2.47). Blackburn B.67 ‘This swept-wing swept Vail project had de rated Avons of only 5,0001D (22.2KN) thrust mounted in the lower wing roots. Outside them were a palr of cannon, the wing being so thick that they could be stacked one above the other. Sea level rate of climb 5,200fvmin (1,585mAmin); 7.0 minutes to 25,0008 (76201); practical ceiling 41,0008 (12,497m). Gloster P.231 ‘One of many projects derived by Gloster from the successful Meteor, here with a swept ‘wing and Vaal It was really based on the two-seat P.228 to F.HVA6 (Chapter 4) which had a conventional tail, Three cannon in lower fuselage; sea level rale of climb 10,7000/min (3,26Im/min); 3.4 minutes to 25,000N; practical celing 45,8000 (13, 960m). Westland N.40/46 (Drawing PID. 129), Possibly the firs jet Fight- cer design to have two stacked engines, a for- ‘mat duly made fasnous by the Lightning, this project was a fying wing reminiscent of de Havilland’s DH.108 research aireraft ut hav: ing wingtip fins and rudders like Armstrong Whitworth’s AW.52, The second crewman faced rearwards and the three cannon were ‘mounted undemeath the cockpit. Sea level rate of climb 5,300fVinin (1,615m/min); 60 ‘minutes to 25,000; practical ceiling 51,000 (15,545m). During the Tender Design Conference held at Thames House (MoS) on 4th March 1947 it became clear that the need for manoeua: bility ina pursuit curve interception could not be fully met for four to five years and would probably involve the use of suction applied to the wings, iselfa major tem of research and development. It was recommended that the requirement should be reviewed by the Ad- ly and CNR, and a revised issue was sent in June to the three firms plus de Havilland and Fairey, Fairey was included thanks tothe cancellation of its N.16/45 turboprop strike alreraft competitor to the Westland Wavern, Maximum allupweight was reduced 10 28,0001 (12,701kg) but new arrestor gear \was being designed for 30,0001 (13,6053) so this was nota rigid init, The guns were re Placed by 20mm Hispano cannon. As a Consequence, new studies from Faley, de Havilland and Westland were forthcoming, Blackburn did not submit new proposals but instead offered an idea for an approximate seale model to study the problems before ‘embarking on a full scale project. As its orig ral brochure was, however, nol unsuited to the new requirements, it remained under consideration. All proposals canted eight rocket projectiles (RPs); none were classed. as oficial tenders ‘Blackburn B.67 Although proposed with derated AJ.65s, RAE scaled up the aircraft and its Figures to the fll Avon rating of 65001 (28.9kN). Sea level ate of climb became 8,6001Vmin (262Invimin}; crical Mach number 0.88, De Havilland DH.110 An adaplation of the night fighter to F.44746, submitted the previous March, The fist elues thatthe DH.110 existed eame when a mot fled DH.108 wing tunnel model fitted with twin fins and rudders and inverted V-shaped tall was tested at Farnborough. Initial engine choice was two Metropolitan Vickers F's butby Conference time the Rolls-Royce ‘Avon! ‘A165 had become the preferred engine. DH's ‘Vampire and DH.108 experience had led to the conclusion that wing sweepback was es- senllal to achieve the required Mach 0.87 of British Secret Projects: et Fighters the F446 Night Fighter and so a 40° sweep angle would easily cover the Mach 0.82 of 4046 with ample margin. A small span, Which was 5f (1.5m) less than the Mosquito, combined with power boost ailerons and low wing loading (41 Sif [202.6kg/m'] at normal all-up take-off weight) were expected to give an extremely manoeuvrable aero- plane. The twin fil boom layout was chosen for the following reasons: 1. Ona relatively small arerat lke this with wo powerful engines it was necessary to Fit them as close tothe aircraft's it coefficient as possible for good single engine control; 2.The ta-less format was abandoned because of cffcuties in achieving slow Janding speeds and possible vices at high Mach numbers; 3.Alayout with partially buried engines in ‘conventional fuselage had been investi ‘gated Dut resulted in an extremely dificult structure and very bad access Dilty to the engines; 4.ALzil boom layout removed these dlficuties and resulted in a straight forward structure. Engine change was simple as they were not hemmed in by stressed structutes The fim considered the tall boom arrange ment to have been entirely successful on the ‘Vampire with no penalty in weight and drag and with this experience, plus the knowledge ‘ined from the sweptback wing of the H.108, fet it should be possible to produce this aeroplane without a long period of te search and development. Adapting the night fighter would save development effort and ‘expenditure The two crew sat side-by-side and slightly Saggered with the four Hispanos under the cabin lor, The night fighter hac four 30mm, dens and de Havilland suggested using two dens in the N40/46, Provision was made for to 10001 (454kg) bombs or eight 61D (27g) RPs mounted near the wing root, plus ‘op tanks, An ALOD radar with 28in (Tem) seanner was in the nose; a 40in (102cm) scanner would require a much bigger aero Plane. Stowage ofthe Red Hawk AAM had not been investigated because litle was known about the weapon, The wing had a single fod and used a sin: ale spar to take the main bending loads a the ‘oot, the spar dying aut along the span until the whole bending load was taken by thick skin and stringers. It was proposed to it full span slots with a. possible development to boundary layer suction later on. Fowler type high lt Maps and short span, large chord Naval All-Weather Fighter Development ailerons with power boost were used. A tri. ‘ming lallplane was mounted in tail booms ‘ery similar to the Vampire and the posstbi ty ofan all moving tailplane was tobe inve gated in high speed tunnel tests. The fins ‘were but integral with the booms and the aircraft was all-metal. Sea level rate of climb ‘was 8,5001Vmin (2,590m);ertieal Mach num ber 0.4; total internal fuel 1050 (4,773) plus drop tanks 300gal (1,364, Falrey N.40/46 No drawing is available at the ime of writing for this project, but the wing was swept 25° Rate of climb at sea level §600fvmin (23621mv/min; ertical Mach number 0835; total fuel 1,140gal (5, 18380. Westland N.40/46 Westland produiced three drawings to the modified specification: PID. M2, 143 and 14. The main offering, PID.I44 was similar to the ‘eauller PID. 129 with stacked engines and tip Fins but the wings had greater chord towards the tip thanks to a reduced leading edge sweep from 45 to 38° Fin tip area was also in- creased, The other dravvings were similar and used the same wing but side-by-side en: ‘gines; PID.142 with a centre fin but no hori- zontal tal surfaces, 143 a Tall, As before, Westland quoted two 48601 (21.6KN) en- gines but to keep things on the same level, RAE recalculated using AL65 Avons. Rate of ‘climb became 8,800fUmin (2,682m/min) at ‘sea level; erical Mach number 0.85. 950gal it) of fuel were cared internally. West- had looked closely at blown Naps having ‘done a good deal of early work on boundary layer conttol for Supermarines, ‘tian main 84046 tender, PIb.ta4 (1.47). GAN Westand As none ofthe projects were offical tenders, ‘Design Study Conference was held on 15th, December 1947 chaired by Stuart Scott Hall, porp(n),ILwas noted that Hawker, although reminded frequently, had not expressed in- terest in the project, and it was also agreed that six years would be a realistic date for introduction into service due to the time needed to develop Al equipment, The West- land design was discarded on the grounds that it showed badly on performance, was likely to have a high approach speed and be subject to all the uncertainties associated ‘with developing a tales layout, the lack of ata being citiesed. Low approach speed was more important than allaup-weight because ofthe night fighter role. RAE had comumented that although one ‘dravving did show atail it had not been given serious thought and ifthe correct tal volume ‘were provided, the weight and drag advan- tages ofthe taiFtess design would disappear. JE Serby, DMARD, explained how Westland ‘was wamed after the earlier conference of the hazards ofthe ail-lesslayout but itappeared they stil preferred this feature. Tip stalling could well be a problem The performance ofthe survivors wascom- pated on the basis of the Avon engine. The 1DH.110falled to reach the required approach speed in present form but the RAE were sure could be achieved by increasing wing area by 10%, Blackburn's B.67 offered less perfor- ‘mance than the DH.110 for about the same development risk; Faiey’s project was more ‘conventional so hadi less risk and, although ff lower performance, met all the stated requirements, The B.67 was inferior in all respects except top speed atsea level and the ‘proposal to build 10,0001 (1,536kg) mode! ‘of 28,0001 (12,701 kg) aircraft was not juste fied. Test results would be needed before de- sign work on the full scale machine could ‘commence and consequently this would not star for another two or three years, The B.O7 was thus eliminated, Choosing between de Havilland and Fairey rested on an acceptable development risk ‘bearing in mind the difering sweep angles of, 40 and 25° The greater sweep of the DH.110 gave a speed advantage which reached mph (74.1knvh) at altitude, atop speed of, Mach 0.93 placing itonaparwith shore based, aeroplanes when the Avon stil had some thnust in hand. Farey's Mach 0.86 might be a Dit ow in six years and this aireraft would be tunable to take advantage of engine thrust de velopments, but the lower sweep angle re Auited less attention to tip stalling, stability and control, On past experience, de Havilland ‘was the more likely to meet the estimated performance, but while Fairey’ project could lake both the 40in (102em) scanner and the small search scanner, the DH.110 could not handle the bigger dish (OH had made al- lowance for a larger fuselage if required). From the catapulting aspect, Fairey’s design was the most attractive De Havilland had the most design work on hand ofthe two but could sill take on the ad- ditional commitment and do the work as quickly as Fairey. Its production amange- ments were, however, tending to become ‘overloaded but the scheme to make the type fn F-4446 variant showed overall economy of productive efor. twas agreed that the de Westiand FID.148 to N4046 (11.47. Version wilt Tall and wide-by side engines, Spa 53 (16.8), lng 6750 (42m). CK Westand Havilland design with 10% extra wing area ‘was preferred on technical grounds and that DMARD would approach the firm and advise tem to adopt Uuis modification. |Ater some give and take with de Havilland, aa contract was placed in October 1948 for a DHLN0 prototype programme that would equally serve N.40/46 and F.4/48 (previously F.44/46). Altemative versions from Fairey were still being examined. In March 1948 [NRVA.14 was brought up to date under a new Specification N.749 and then almost imme- diately N.14/49, agreement having been reached to rewrite N.40/46 and call for the same factors and speeds as F.4/48. Four ‘months later three naval DH.110 prototypes \were ordered (Iwo night fighter, one strike} to boring the total DH.110 order to 13 alreraft. A dovertal rials programme for the Royal Navy land RAF was agreed but in November the naval aircraft were dropped through eco- nomic pressure on the research and develop- ment (R&D) programme. The CNR had intended to et the RAF cary the weight with de Havilland while the Navy supported Falrey'saireraft. De Havilland had also expe- rienced difficulty in converting the aitcralt to fold within the box dimensions ofthe speei- cation so Faitey was lft in possession ofthe 1.14/49 fee. Fairey N.14/49 twin engine Astrke derivative ofthe N.40/46 was submit- ted in September 1948 and then, resuling from discussions with Messrs Cohen and Ross of MoS, the N.40/46 fighter was updated on 16th November to include new equipment and information on increased engine weights Alhup-weight rose by 4,3001b (1,950kg) and the aircraft's dimensions were increased to ‘compensate, The likellhood of a change in ‘maximum level speed was assessed as negl- sible since this was limited by the rise in com- pressibiliy drag In January 1949, OARD advised Fairey that certain items of equipment and armament ‘may be deleted in order to effect a reduction jin weight to get the machine below a new top limit of 28,0001) (12,701kg). For example the Avon's weight could now be assumed as 2,130Ib (966kg) instead of the 2,400 (1,089Ks) previously calculated. Faitey ‘observed this could reduce span to Sat (15.9) and area to 526M: (48.9m)), but eon- sidered that a better all-ound aircraft would result by leaving the original dimensions to lake advantage of the gain in climb, ceiling and crise performance. The changes did allow areductionin fuselage depth and width for a useful saving in cross sectional area, Final all-up.weight was given as 28,0001, sea level rate of climb 8 280fUmin (2,324my/min), time to 25,0008 (7,620m) 4.1 minutes, ceiling 46,008 (14,112m), 1,195gal (5.43481) of fuel was cared bul top speed remained un: changed, Soon afterwards the project was renumbered N.14/49, During the two year period 1947/48, Air Sta thinking on the subject remained some- What fluid and a short term emphasis on siitke as the primary function reverted back to the fighter role (N.8/49 and NRVA.18 called for an N.14/49 strike variant) Following the changes to Fairey’s original design, agree- iment was slowly reached with the Admiralty fn the aircraft's final form and an Advisory Design Conference was held on 5th Apri. By now Fairey had many staff occupied on the project yet it was 10th August before an off- ial letler arrived stating prototypes were to be ordered. Design work was stepped up in anticipation of a three aircraft order, but the ‘economy drive duly had its effect on this programme as well. Fairey was informed on 2nd November that work should be held up ‘on the N.14/49 asa result of economies being imposed by the Treasury. It was hoped the ‘embargo would only be temporay. TESerby, who wrote the embargo leter, ‘was extremely worried about the whole post tion and most anxious that a gap should net be left in the Navy's development pro- samme, He argued with Fairey that, as econ- omy was likely fo be the watchword for several years, It might be possible to get the whole programme moving again ifthe fm, put forward an acceptable design based on a, single Avon instead of two (a feature in fact of British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters all Falrey’s previous work). Such an aircraft might be cheaper and lighter an thus solvea !nurnber of carer instalation problems. Two alternative single engine designs were, there- fore, prepared by the end ofthe year. Fairey N.1449 single engine DL. Holis Williams sent his fir’s brie pre- liinary investigation fora single-seat F.14/49 ‘on 23rd December stressing this was not yet serious design effort due to a lack of time, To make the version more attractive, Fairey based it on some preliminary and unofficial figures for an improved Avon known as the RAS; the Sapphire was an altemative. There ‘were two layouts, Schemes Aand B, one with Doral fuselage construction and long tail pipe, the other with tall booms and short tall pipe. The firm thought it would most likely persevere with the long pipe version as this ‘gue the possibilty of using afterburing later ‘on. The disposition of radar, crew and arma :ment, wing plan and the low wing remained 8 proposed for the twin since Fairey con dided no advantage could be gained by ‘hanging any of ther, Scheme A used a tricycle undercariage andallfuel was caried internally. Reheat was notenvisagee! yet since the increase inalF-up weight was unjustified compared to the per formance improvement achieved. For engine ‘removal, the rear portion ofthe fuselage was swung laterally and the engine wheeled aft through the open end, Scheme B introduced twin fil booms each with fin and rudder. The tailplane was of the allmoving constant chord type without sweep back and pivotally attached to the twin fins. The wing and wing fold mechanism, wieycle chassis, uel and armament were all similar to Scheme A's, and engine withdrawal was flected by removal of cowling panels over the at portion ofthe fuselage. Anintial comparison ofthe wo by their de- signers indicated that the increase in struc lute weight of Scheme B from the booms would be mote than compensated for by feetion of the long jet tail pipe necessary in Scheme A. Further weight saving was achieved by the reduction in total aircraft ‘rag and consequently the investigation sug sgesled Scheme B was about 2001b (91k) lighter. This was prior toa detailed structural investigation but the Twin Boom Scheme vas clearly feasible. Performance was sub> stantially similar but B ad slightly the better cimb and @ sea level speed about Smph (L45krvh) more. A’srate of elimb at sea level was 6,100(Vmin (0,859mvimin) and G80gal {M211 fuel were cared. Ceiling was about 420008 (12,802). Noval All Weather Fighter Development January 1950 brought a suggestion whether the Navy’s fighter projects were realy needed ‘and the Naval Staf had to prepare ajustiica tion paper. Fairey’s single engine design had received support but the Naval Staff seized on the hold up as an opportunity to make further “drastic revisions to the requirement and, de= clding to drop the strike alternative altogeth- ‘er, concentrate on aday and night all-weather fighter of greatly improved performance. Work began on a new specification but the need for one or two engines and installation of the radar seanner was a source of argu- ment, N-14/49 had called for a minimum top speed of 500kts (575mph/927kmvh) but this was now raised to 540kts (622mpl1 001 srr) at 30,0008 (9, 144mm), Fairey 8.1049 single engine Sere A whieh ‘robubly shared a similar appearance tothe arr twin ergne arrangement (20.1249). Fare .1449 ttn boom single rine Scheme B (18.1249) ‘The naval projects to N.1449 and N97 (Supermarine day fighter, Chapter 2) were ‘examined at Thames House on 3rd April, the discussion conducted in ight ofthe vital need {or economy except when the compeling in- terests of defence demanded expenditure The win engine Fairey N.14/49 wasnow seen to be incapable of producing the 540Kts ‘demanded and the introduction of reheat or ‘scaled down single engined version would sil fal to reach the limit. The single or twin showed litle diference in probable perfor ‘mance except the latter would have a beter rate of climb, The main flaw was the 25° swveep 12% thick wing which aerodynamical- ly limited top speed and no inerease could be expected without increased sweep as Mm provided on de Haviland’s fighter. Ahigh rate ‘of climb was not so important here. All Fairey’s N.14/49 studies had an ALOC radar bul now it was desired to use the ALIG. and itwas realised that neither vin nor single tengine could accommodate its 35in (89cm) scanner, This observation brought surprise ‘and significantly influenced the subsequent decision. As no Fairey project was under construction, revised design studies could be ‘made economically on both engine arrange- ‘ments and it was agreed the firm should be told that none ofits designs were acceptable and anew study be requested based on asin fle engine, There was concer that the same large expenditure was being devoted to the N.14/49 ast the N.9/47, but for much smaller requirements. The Mos asked the Admiralty if developing the camtierbome N.9/47 and N.14/89 day and ‘The Mikoyan MIG-15 that inuenced British fighter design so much during this period. night fighters was necessary since both were expensive high performance types designed to specifications comparable to the most ad. vanced land-based fighters intended for UK airdefence. twas explained they were based ‘onthe need to maintain sea communications, through the Mediterranean in the face of at tacks from captured airfields by the types of ‘enemy aitcrat expected in service by 1957, ‘The Naval Stalf felt the Venom would be an. adequate day/night fighter for trade protec- tion on ocean routes for some time yet; twas ‘also sultabe for the service's smaller carriers And relatively cheap. It was convinced, how ever, that nothing buta ship-bomne fighter of the highest quality would effectively protect shipping in the restricted waters of the Mediterranean once the enemy could threat nr fen with modem advanced shote-based alt forces. Unfortunately, the F/48 and Fas fighters (Hunter and Javelin, Chapters 3 & 4) ‘were, for technical reasons, unsulled for car Fier operation, but the Admiralty wished to see them fully developed for the RAF The Ministry doubted whether any future carter force would atalltimes be able to sus lain protracted air operations within range of powerful and numerous enemy shore-based Air forces, either in the Mediterranean or any where else. But ifthe Royal Navy was ealled ‘nto undettake this formidable task (history indicating that it may well be necessary), i was essential that they had the best possible equipment. Assuming the strategic require- ‘ment for the defence of Britain's sea commu: nications through the Mediterranean would remain frm, the Ministry felt bound to support the requirement forthe N.9 and N14 fighters, also considered the naval strike aircraft situation because the turboprop Wyvern was about to come into serce. This would be ‘outclassed by 1957 and development of suit able variants of the NO and N.14 appeared essential maritime strike was to continue as 4 naval aviation role. It was debatable ‘whether the abilty to operate either shore- based or ship-borne maritime strike forces ‘was an essential requirement forthe defen: sive strategy that would almost certainly be adopted during the opening phase of a future ‘war against Soviet Russa, despite a definite need in some areas, To abandon naval strike aircraft development would permanently te lieve naval aviation of the strike role since fighters could not carry a torpedo and anti: submarine airraft lacked the necessary per: formance. This was a vital decision for the future, Breaking into the sequence of events for a moment, is it fascinating to see how situ tions develop. Here we have one of the armed forces tying loget the best equipment In spite of a Treasury policy for economy, a ‘common situation throughout Bist military history but compounded on this occasion by the eost ofthe big advances in weapons tech nology. Justa few months later came the oul- break ofthe Korean War which was toast for three years, reveal the latest Soviet weaponry such as the MiG-15 and heavily involve the Navy, often with just piston aircraft In truth, these latest navy fighters would not have been ready in time, but the drive for economy ‘went out ofthe window and the MiG-15 was to influence British fighter design for along time, Panic stations became the order ofthe ay al the Ministry of Supply (MoS), but the ‘Admiralty appeared unmoved, progressing with their advanced fighter plans at, so it would appear, the same steady pace, Falrey'sC H Chichester Smith wrote to Serby fn 10th February demanding to know what ‘was going on and why all he delay. Iwas ex- plained that the main faults of Faiey's project ‘were the 25° sweep wing and a fuselage that ‘was not big enough for the radar. The Ministry asked for the revised project to rectify these points two days after the naval aireaft meet Ing. Fairey expressed much disquiet abor the technical uncertainties surrounding the project but was told to keep quiet while the ‘alter was with the Chiefs of Sta. In September a Staff Requirement was stated fora navalised version ofthe de Kavi: land Venom fighter under NRVA.30 and spec- IMication N.107. The Navy had decided it ‘wanted the Sea Venom as soon as possible to fl the unacceptably wide gap between the Sea Homet and the N. 14/49 that threatened to leave the leet without an efficient night fght- er for many years. The usefulness of the Venomasa general purpose trade route ight- cr would outlive its role as a night fighter hile production of the naval variant would sive the Australian Navy something to replace its Sea Furies. A production order for Sea Ven- ‘oms was given in January 1951 and, in the ‘event, Australia ordered 39 as well N.14/49 as originally concelved was with ‘drawn entirely on 19th July 1950 as a new specific pared. There was indecision as to whether to ‘put this document direct to Fairey or fully out to tender again, but it was agreed in October that a three to six month delay could be ae: ‘cepted and the latter option taken. Prompted by the fresh start and likely resendering, a srongly worded letter from Fairey on 14th September revealed the pent-up frustration generated by the ‘non’ go-ahead ofits fighter It described in depth the firm's heavy naval fighter and stike design effort since 1944, starting with the Spearfish prototype torpedo tion and requirement were pre: British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters bomber to 0.5/43, which had not been re- ‘warded with any production orders. The Spearfish was tured ino the losing competi- tor to the Westland Wywem strike alrerat Under N.IG/45. before the long series of 40/46 and N.14/49 studies began. Fairey had spent $53,000 on design work to the two jet fighter specifications anc the absence of other programmes’, terminate work in their drawing office on the twin Avon N, 14/99 until 19th May. The fir ob- sened ‘As this company has devoted so ‘yeh effort and thought to the Nawy’s fighter a srke lrerft, thas become very fami ih the multiplicity of problems involved. It ‘would seem the best way of securing an economy of time and public money would be 10 capitalise allthis previous thinking into a ew design to meet the latest Naval Air Staff Tequrements, If the whole matter is pul to ‘pen tender, there Is no reason to suppose tha a repetition ofthe previous long periods of indecision will not recur before a start is fray made’. This assumption was to prove conect. NAIT (and NRIA.I4) InJanuary 1951 the new specification was Is ‘ved officially to de Haviland, Vickers, Gloster, Falrey Blackburn and Westland: the last three us Saunders Roe and Shorts submitting de- signs in July. The specication covered day ant ight fighting and requested a two-seat machine with AL18 radar. Top speed in clean fndtion was 54Okts (622mpv1,001 knvh) ‘minimum at 30,000 (9,144), minimum ‘cling 40,0008 (12,192), sea level rate of climb 10,000%vmin (3,049rvmin) and maxi- mum albup-weight 28,0005 (12,701kg). Re- ‘red patrol time was 15 hours and power “wasto come from Sapphire or RA.7 Avon en- fines with reheat to 1,500K although other oposals would be welcome. Armament mix was four 30mm Aden cannon, two Aden ‘pls an air-to-air rocket battery or two Aden os four Blue Sky AAMs. Red Deans were aided ater, Before tendering, the rms were ‘formed cartiage of Blue Sky or Red Hawk ilssles was to be disregarded for the time ‘eng, but some brochures did include guid ‘dweapons. Concem was expressed in March by MrEvans, the Director of Naval Air Warfas aboutthe ever growing gapsin the naval ight fr programme with no swept fighter likely Int 1957. Both the N.9/47 (Chapter 2) and 1449 were unlikely to be available before then when the current performance of th Dedecessors, Sea Hawk and Sea Venom, ‘was inadequate to allow them to remain in sence for so long, As a consequence, suit Noval AU- Weather Fighter Development ‘Brooklands Museum “The Mlackium 9 to NILAT (6251). Be Brough Heritage Cente able interim day and night fighters were sug gested for service entay in 1955 but, to save time, without the prototyping and evaluation procedure. Prospective day fighters included ‘4 modified Sea Hawk, a hooked Swift and Hunter, ani the P.1087 (navalised P1081 with four cannon under the cockpit). ‘Supermarine's Swaift was seen as the best ‘day fighter candidate ancl NR/A.34 and N.105 ‘were written around a hooked Swift P1087 ‘was ruled out on grounds of risk, but RAE felt the Swift was an equally risky developmeat. An allaveather night fighter was mote of a problem as the Sea Venom had reached its limits and was beyond development. No in- term fighter was ordered. These discussions ‘were concurrent with N.114T towhich the fol- lowing were submited, all conventional con- struction with aluminium alloy spars and skins Blackburn and General B.89 Anaitcralt with Tail, root intakes and double ‘wing fold and developed from the ealierbrief B.82 company study to N.14/49. The wing had ‘compound sweep (sweep al different an gles), then a feature of much interest at Brough for giving the desired aerodynamics, ‘and thus had a varlable Y¢ ratio of 1010 6.5%. ‘The Aden cannon were placed below the ‘cockpit floor and the rocket batteries caried imterally. Atemative engines were the Avon. A Pletured tn this book, in wood to 128th ‘were made by the manfactrers specify for Tender tothe Ministry alongside thee brochures Only the most important projects enjoyed the heciyof being modelled. He Brough Herage Centre lin of development opened bythe B89. This ew RA.12R or Bristol Olympus O13. Sea level rate of climb with reheat 10,320?Vmin (3.1469 min); celling over 45,000f (13,716in) (955i) fuel internally, maximum capaci 1,1 7ogal (531911). Prototype first ight was expected 35 years after ITP, Falrey N14 AA mic-wing cantilever monoplane powered by a single unreheated Olympus OLS. Wing root intakes, double wing folding and a tcy cle undercaniage were employed and two Adens were housed in each inner wing lead ing edge. Sea level rate of climb 7,250 min (2:210mvmin); citing 44,5508 (13,5795 in ternal fuel 700gal (31821, masimum with overload tanks 1,076gal (4,892), Prototype frst ight to be three years after ITP. RAF felt that Faley had overestimated by some mar gin the aircraft's weights So for the Tender Conference i also prepared new figures with 2a reheated Sapphire 4 (12,2001b/54.24N) to ‘ease comparison. Sea level top speed be. ‘came 712mph (1,1451/h) and rate of climb S,630Ymin (2935m/min); ceiling 42,850 (13,061). Saunders-Roe P.148 This had a shoulder-high wing with the Avoa. mounted in a stright duet above andl behing the wing, with a Tal above that. Single fold ing and tricycle undercaniage. The crew ymodated side-by-side with the raised plo’ canopy on the port side but the navigator’ neatly fash with the fuselage in an arrangement very similar to the eventual Sea Vixen. The four Adens were underneath the eaekpit the two batteries of 36 racket pro jectiles on doors in the lower fuselage. Inter nal fuel was T6Dgal (3 455i) with 390 (I more in two outboard tanks, Fits ght vyeats from ITP. Noperformance data survives forthe Avons, Dut thanks to the RAB, comparative figures are available with a reheated Sapphire 4 at sea level maximum speed was 70Imph (1,L42knw/h) and rate of climb 10,420 nin (11 76avmin; ceiling 42,350 (12,908). British Secret Projects: Jet Fighters Short PDS {An alreraf capable of conventional deck or exible deck landing, the P.D.5 had a low a ect ratio thin wing set mid-position on the luselage witha single fod. The tailplane was allmoving without an orthedox rudder and radar scanners were mounted bath in the nose and on top ofthe fin. Tricycle undercar- age; four Adens in lower fore-body of fuse lage; 52 rocket projectiles in fuselage and four Bue Sky or two Red Dean AAMs on under- ‘wing pylons. Sea level ate of elimb 9 910/Ummin (Gozimvmin); ceiling 42,850R (13,061); Interaltankage 850gal (3.8691) but hwo rigid ‘overload tanks could be carried, First ight 2.5, years from ITP. Westland W.37 ‘his had a compound sweep single fold wing, of near delta formation with bifurcated lead ing edge intakes, Tail and tricycle under catiage. A completely detachable nose con: taining the entire radar installation, not just the scanner, was felt practical as the set was sill in a state of development, The cannon were mounted below the pilot outside the main structural members while the rocket baleries and airto-air missles were carried extemally under each wing joint outboard of the undercarriage legs. Rate of climb (Avon / Sapphire) 10,800/ 10,500fvmin (3,292 /3,200m min); Ceiling (Sapphire) 43,4008 (13,228), The high internal fuel load of 950gal (4,31918) avoiding the need for external tanks, but a ‘gal (4091) ventral drop tank could be fitted ‘Trequited. First Right two years four months from ITP. Westland built a mock-up of the WT and offered the aferburning Avon RA12 as the main engine, but the Sapphire 4 could be fied without major strictural change. The firm considered the machine conventional but still up-to-date having the heavy sweepback necessary to achieve max imum speed. A two-seat operational trainer as projected. The Tender Design Conference was held at Thames House on 9th October 1951, but, Dior to this, the weights were re-calculated bythe Ministry and eamme out slightly higher. ‘This was significant or, inthe overload all-up ‘weight condition, each project was over: weight by 4,000 to 6 0001) (1,814 to 2,722kg). Shorts and Saro were unsatisfactory due to high approach speeds; Faiey’s was poor be ‘cause of very high structure weight which rased the question why such an established fim with a good reputation should be so ser ‘usi astray with this estimate. Blackbur and Westland both met the performance despite excess weight and, hence, a preference lay Naval AULWeather Fighter Devetopment ‘The Saro F148 to NIMAT 51), Short PD to NATIT CZ. Sons “The Westland WT wo NAIST (20250). GK Westland between either intemal or external cartiage of the rocket batteries, Clean, the W.3? was ‘Quickest, but the slower with extemal rockets. Faleey's project was considered worse than Westland’s jn all respects, worse than Blackburn's in all respects bar top speed, for its fairly high walling edge sweepback was an ‘expensive structural method of geting the re quired high Mach number characteristics. Both Blackburn and Westland had made a ‘more careful choice of wing design parame. ters, the former by spanwise variation of max- imum thickness postion, the latter by using high sweepback on the root leading edge and smal sweepback on the trailing edge. Shor's P.DS might be improved by fting more ef fective aps butit would stil be inferior tothe 18.89 Little could be done for Saro's P.148be cause ofits high wing loading while the en gine position high to the rear might adversely ‘affect directional control in the approach, This, coupled with the narrow wheel rack, Would make deck-landing more dificult No preference was expressed for choice of engine. The Avon was more likely to be avail able than the Olympus which was belng con sidered as an alternative on two current bomber projects but so far without a firm de cision to use it, The RAE representative ‘thought the Olympus woul! be a yood pow explant for a high-altitude fighter but any of the engines selected coull! be put in any of the submitted designs. The importance at in terception altitude ofa small turing circle as fa performance requirement was empha: sised, This was primarily a function of wing loading and, from this point of view, the B.89 ‘was best and the P.148 worst 1 was doubted if Blackburn could recruit the extra staff needed to achieve a frst Might inthree and a half years because designing a new version of the Beverley freighter would Impression of Westlands Javelin’ the W357 ‘ould be mltaken for Gloster fier fous some angles. GRN Westland clash withthe N.114 if both were required: a freighter production order would seriously affect delivery rates at Brough. An order for Short's would distur the Canberra pro- gramme while Fairey’s capacity would be fully occupied with the Gannet for some time to come, The Blackburn B.89 and Westland W.37 appeared to be the best in all echnical respects withthe B.89 narrowly rate first but afinal outcome could not be decided due to ‘other considerations. Saunders-Roe’s efor was considered particularly fine for a firm new to this ype of design, (On Sth Novernberthe PDTD(A),S Scott Hall, reported that the Admiralty had serious doubis whether it wanted an aircraft to NIH. Inany event they would like one pro ‘duced by one of the leading fighter firms as they had little confidence in either of those ‘who came top at the Conference, Woodward Nutt, DARD, confirmed this stating how the Admiralty doubted whether it could deal wih ‘an aeroplane of such size and weight He re ferred to the ‘interim’ fighter above and the ‘putting off of N.ALAT" until something much better canbe presented, but stressed how the ‘Admiralty had no clear idea of what this something’ could be. By now, de Havilland hhad aroused interest in is Super Venom de: scribed shortly, but Woodward Nutt ell that ‘machine could not be in service before 1957 Choosing this was an unwise move for its availabilty was tle diferent to N.114T ise However, the willingness to consider the Super Venom implied that the Admiralty was ready o reduce ils requirements. A final notice on 21st January 1952, stated all submissions fell short of N.114T so the Ad. Imiraly would not proceed with the project and no further work was tobe undertaken. I ‘was impractical to produce an aircraft to meet these stringent limits to an acceptable ‘weight and, in December, NAMIT was de

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