MA. ANTONETTE LOZANO, V. JOCELYN K. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 212979.

February 18, 2019, J. REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Antonette Lozano executed a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights over the
subject property in favor of Fernandez. After the execution of the document, Fernandez
continued to tolerate Lozano's possession over the property. On July 15, 2009, she sent a demand
letter to Lozano ordering her to vacate the premises. Because Lozano failed to leave the property,
Fernandez was constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer against her before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities.

According to the petition, since 1996, Lozano had owned and possessed the subject property.
She never recalled signing any Waiver in Fernandez's favor. Lozano explained that Fernandez
duped her into signing a blank document, which was later converted to a Waiver. She denied
having appeared before a notary public to notarize the said document. Lozano claimed that the
real contract between her and Fernandez was a loan with mortgage as evidenced by the fact that
she remained in possession of the property even after the execution of the said Waiver and that
she had issued checks in payment of the loan. She pointed out that Fernandez was engaged in the
business of lending imposing unconscionable interest and was in the practice of securing
collateral from the lendee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful detainer based on tolerance.

RULING:
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved. Bare
allegations of tolerance are insufficient and there must be acts indicative of tolerance.

For there to be tolerance, complainants in an unlawful detainer must prove that they had
consented to the possession over the property through positive acts. After all, tolerance signifies
permission and not merely silence or inaction as silence or inaction is negligence and not
tolerance.

In the present case, Fernandez's alleged tolerance was premised on the fact that she did not do
anything after the Waiver was executed. However, her inaction is insufficient to establish
tolerance as it indicates negligence, rather than tolerance, on her part. Inaction should not be
confused with tolerance as the latter transcends silence and connotes permission to possess the
property subject of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, even assuming the Waiver was valid and
binding, its execution and Fernandez's subsequent failure to assert her possessory rights do not
warrant the conclusion that she tolerated Lozano's continued possession of the property in
question, absent any other act signifying consent.

Fernandez cannot simply claim that she had tolerated Lozano's possession because she did not do
anything after the execution of the Waiver as silence does not equate to tolerance or permission.
In short, the execution of the Waiver alone is not tantamount to the tolerance contemplated in
unlawful detainer cases. The absence of an overt act indicative of tolerance or permission on the
part of the plaintiff is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer.
LEONORA RIVERA-AVANTE, VS. MILAGROS RIVERA AND THEIR HEIRS WITH THE
LATE ALEJANDRO RIVERA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO ARE DERIVING
CLAIM OR RIGHTS FROM THEM, G.R. NO. 224137. APRIL 03, 2019, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot. Respondent Milagros Rivera is her sister-in-
law, being the wife of her deceased brother, Alejandro. Petitioner claims that she and her
husband allowed respondents to stay in the disputed premises out of compassion for respondent
and in consideration of her deceased brother Alejandro. However, in 2005, petitioner and her
husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in view of their plan to distribute the
same to their children, demanded that respondents vacate the premises in question. However,
respondents refused the demand of petitioner and her husband, and even filed a case questioning
petitioner's ownership of the said property contending that they are, in fact, co-owners of the
subject property and that petitioner obtained title over the disputed lot through fraud, deceit and
falsification.

On May 22, 2006, petitioner sent a formal demand letter to respondents asking them to vacate
the disputed premises, but this remained unheeded. On September 3, 2007, petitioner sent
respondents another letter asking them to leave the subject property and to pay reasonable rent
from the date of receipt of the said letter until they have fully vacated the questioned premises,
but to no avail. Hence, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC of Manila on
March 12, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's action for unlawful detainer was timely filed.

Is it May 22, 2006, which is the date of the initial demand letter or September 3, 2007, which
was the latest demand letter prior to the filing of the unlawful detainer case against respondents?

RULING:
An action for unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in an
unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess.

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are present:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Moreover, the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

The one-year prescriptive period should be counted from May 22, 2006 on the ground that the
demand letter dated September 3, 2007 was merely in the nature of a reminder or reiteration of
the original demand made on May 22, 2006.

The established rule is that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the
original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an
ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original
demand. The letter of September 3, 2007, which is a mere reiteration of the original demand, will
not operate to renew the one-year period within which petitioner should file her unlawful
detainer case because the said period will still be counted from the date of the original demand
which was made on May 22, 2006.
THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO, NAMELY LOLITA CULLADO, DOMINADOR
CULLADO, ROMEO CULLADO, NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY
JANE BAUTISTA AND JIMMY CULLADO, V. DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO.
212938. JULY 30, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
On May 10, 1995, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-61499 which covered a parcel of land
was issued in Dominic Gutierrez's favor.

On May 5, 1997, Dominic's father, Dominador L. Gutierrez, representing Dominic who was then
still a minor, filed before the Regional Trial Court, an action for recovery of ownership,
possession with damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order against Alfredo Cullado.

In the action for recovery of ownership, Dominic maintained that Cullado had been squatting on
the subject land as early as 1977, and that despite repeated demands, Cullado refused to vacate
the said lot.

Cullado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposed the special and affirmative defenses
of his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open, adverse and
continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property, considering that
Dominic and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in Dominic's name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners’ counterclaims where the complaint
involves an accion publiciana.

RULING:
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
SPOUSES BELINDA LIU AND HSI PIN LIU, V. MARCELINA ESPINOSA, MARY ANN
M. ESTRADA, ARCHIE ASUMBRADO, INESITA ASUMBRADO, LORETO TUTOR,
ELIAS PENAS, BENITA ABANTAO, BASILIZA MARTIZANO, ARMAN PARAS,
MIGUELITO M. ANTEGA, JOVENTINO CAHULOGAN, AND TITO TUBAC, G.R. NO.
238513. JULY 31, 2019, HERNANDO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Belinda Y. Liu owns a parcel of land. Petitioner Hsi Pin Liu is her husband. They
acquired said land from their predecessor-in-interest who, in turn, merely tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents Marcelina Espinosa, Mary Ann M. Estrada, Archie
Asumbrado, Inesita Asumbrado, Loreta Tutor, Elias Penas, Benita Abantao, Basiliza Martizano,
Arman Paras, Miguelito M. Antega, Joventino Cahulogan, and Tito Tubac. The latter are the
present occupants of the land.

After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the
respondents upon the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners'
need to use the same arises. When petitioners' demands to vacate the property were made,
however, the latest of which was on February 12, 2013, the respondents refused to comply.

Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against them in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a case for unlawful detainer for they merely tolerated the possession of
the property by respondents.

RULING:
The petitioners' action for unlawful detainer must be sustained.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant
vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their
contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer will stand if the following requisites are present:
a. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
 c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
d. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

The foregoing requisites have been sufficiently established in the case at bar.

The petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. 146-
2010008891, and that the respondents' occupation of the subject property was merely tolerated
by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest and the petitioners themselves based on the
understanding that the said respondents will peacefully vacate the same once the need to use the
land by the petitioners arises.

Subsequently, this occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed petitioners'
express and clear demands to vacate the subject property, the last of which was dated February
12, 2013. It is evidently clear that the complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013,
was made within one year from the time the last formal demand to vacate was made.

Further, respondents would not have made an offer to purchase the subject land from petitioners
had they been truly in possession of the property in the concept of an owner. Their claim is thus
negated by the fact that the subject land is registered in the name of the petitioners. It is settled
that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose
name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. Hence, petitioners as the titleholders are entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
 CLAIRE ANNE CHANSUYCO, RONALD ALLAN CHANSUYCO AND ABRAHAM
CHANSUYCO II, VS. SPOUSES LOPE AND JOCELYN CERVERA PALTEP, AND ALL
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, G.R. NOS. 208733-34. AUGUST 19,
2019, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners' father Abraham Chansuyco acquired a residential lot in the name of Abraham
Chansuyco, married to Elvira Rubio. Abraham Chansuyco died, leaving as heirs his wife Elvira
and their children petitioners Claire Ann, Ronald Allan, and Abraham II.
Petitioners claimed that the subject property was their family home. They had been estranged
from their mother Elvira since 2003. They learned that Elvira had turned over the possession of
the property to respondents Spouses Lope and Jocelyn Cervera Paltep. Petitioners attempted to
take it back but Spouses Paltep refused, asserting Elvira had already sold it to them.

Petitioners bought back from respondents 52 square meters of the property through an Absolute
Deed of Sale. They did so out of desperation to go back and stay in the only place they called
home. Subsequently, petitioners demanded that Spouses Paltep vacate the property. They averred
that the property was their parents' conjugal asset. Elvira sold it to Spouses Paltep prior to
liquidation of the conjugal partnership allegedly in violation of Article 130 of the Family Code.

Consequently, petitioners initiated a complaint with the barangay but the parties failed to
amicably resolve the matter there. Under letter, petitioners demanded that Spouses Paltep vacate
the property. But Spouses Paltep continued to refuse.

As for the respondents, they claim that they acquired the property from petitioners' mother Elvira
through a Deed of Sale dated February 2, 2004 for a consideration of P500,000.00. Petitioners
later questioned their possession and demanded that they vacate the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

RULING:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it indicates the
following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of
the termination of the right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Accordingly, these aforesaid jurisdictional facts must be alleged in the complaint itself for
unlawful detainer. Failure to do so divests the first level court of jurisdiction over the case.
Here, one jurisdictional allegation is conspicuously lacking, i.e. defendants' possession of the
property was initially lawful or legal; or defendants' possession of the property was by mere
tolerance.

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same", would show that
respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's
consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the
MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's
ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
 SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, VS. EDA
BONTILAO, PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN, G.R. NO.
238892. SEPTEMBER 04, 2019, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and attorney's fees against
respondents Eda Bontilao, Pablita Bontilao, and Maricel Dayandayan (respondents) as well as
several others before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Lapu-Lapu City (MTCC), alleging that
respondents had constructed their houses on the subject property and had been occupying the
same by petitioners' mere tolerance, with the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the
premises upon proper demand.

Unfortunately, when petitioners informed respondents of their need of the subject property and
requested them to voluntarily vacate the same, respondents refused. Petitioners' formal
demand for them to do so likewise went unheeded. Thus, after efforts for an amicable settlement
before the barangay similarly failed, petitioners instituted the present complaint for unlawful
detainer.

In defense, respondents claimed that petitioners had no cause of action against them, not being
the real owners of the subject property. They averred that petitioners obtained their title through
fraud, having bought the subject property from one Gerardo Dungog despite full knowledge that
it was their predecessor, Mariano Ybañez, who owned the same as evidenced by a tax
declaration issued under his name. As the legitimate heirs of Mariano, respondents claimed to be
the true owners of the subject property who were in continuous possession thereof since their
youth. Consequently, they could not have been occupying the subject property by the mere
tolerance of petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful detainer based on tolerance in this case.

RULING:
In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved; bare
allegations are insufficient. For tolerance to exist, the complainants in an unlawful detainer must
prove that they had consented to the possession over the property through positive acts. After all,
tolerance signifies permission and not merely silence or inaction as silence or inaction is
negligence and not tolerance.
The fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful detainer. Without proof
that the possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the defendant's
possession of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for which, the
action for unlawful detainer shall be dismissed. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer fails in the
absence of proof of tolerance, coupled with evidence of how the entry of the respondents was
effected, or how and when the dispossession started.

Here, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' occupation of the
subject property was actually effected through their tolerance or permission. There is dearth of
evidence to show how and when the respondents entered the subject lot, as well as how and
when the permission to occupy was purportedly given by petitioners. Hence, there was no basis
for the MTCC and RTC to conclude that respondents' occupation of the subject property was by
mere tolerance of petitioners.

Finally, there is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property
thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the fact alone that petitioners have a
title over the subject property does not give them unbridled authority to immediately wrest
possession from its current possessor in the absence of evidence proving the allegations in their
unlawful detainer claim. Indeed, even the legal owner of the property cannot conveniently usurp
possession against a possessor, through a summary action for ejectment, without proving the
essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an action for unlawful
detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the occupation was based on
his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would be in a better position by
pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies.