THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Student Name: Major Juan Perez

Joint Special Operations Master of Arts Class of 2014

Thesis Title: China’s Rising Influence and Activity in Latin America

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies
      

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE

INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT

THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO

THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

      

ABSTRACT
China has steadily increased its presence and influence in Latin America, and this

is a reason for concern for U.S. policy makers. Over the last decade China has gone

from having an almost negligible economic presence to replacing the United States as

the most influential partner to a significant number of Latin American countries. This is

beginning to change the balance of power and influence in the region.

China has used all of the national tools at its disposal to strengthen its position in

the international system, as well as to ensure its sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

But, what is China’s intent in Latin America? Should the increase of Chinese military-

to-military contact with Latin American nations be a cause for concern for U.S. policy

makers? Is China destined to become a coercive force that is sure to clash against the

U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, or is it a cooperative force looking to further develop

its economy in order to benefit its “peaceful rise”?

This thesis uses an analysis of China’s past in order to provide its strategic and

historic contexts. This will draw the necessary political-cultural framework that has

contributed to China’s discursive practice of “peaceful development,” sovereignty and

territorial integrity, which have shaped China’s economic and military behavior in the

Latin American region. China’s intent can then be discerned through this analysis. This

thesis will involve a case study of China’s economic and military interaction with Brazil

and Venezuela through the established political-cultural framework, and discursive

practices.

 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT  ....................................................................................................................................  i  
CHAPTER  I    INTRODUCTION  ................................................................................................  1  
Intentions  –  Coercive  or  Cooperative  China?  ......................................................................................  1  
Deterrence  Through  Status,  Influence  And  Strength  .......................................................................  2  
Method  of  Analysis  .........................................................................................................................................  3  
CHAPTER  II    LITERATURE  REVIEW  ...................................................................................  4  
A  Coercive  Force  ..............................................................................................................................................  4  
Cooperative  Economic  Competitor  .........................................................................................................  9  
The  Balancing  Act  That  Is  China’s  Foreign  Policy  ..........................................................................  10  
CHAPTER  III    HISTORICAL  ANALYSIS  ..............................................................................  12  
China’s  History  and  its  Effect  on  its  Foreign  Policy  .......................................................................  12  
Conquest:  China  at  the  Hands  of  Foreign  Rulers  ............................................................................  13  
Loss  of  Economic  Sovereignty  ................................................................................................................  16  
Stumbling  Nationalism  ..............................................................................................................................  18  
Enter  The  Dragon:  Birth  of  a  New  China  ............................................................................................  20  
CHAPTER  IV    CHINA’S  ECONOMICS  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY  ......................................  22  
Resource  Driven:  China’s  Economic  Expansion  and  Foreign  Affairs  .....................................  22  
China’s  Antagonistic  Economic  Foreign  Policy  with  the  United  States  ................................  24  
CHAPTER  V    CHINA’S  SOVEREIGNTY  CONCERNS  .........................................................  27  
One  China  .........................................................................................................................................................  27  
The  PLA  Influences,  but  Does  Not  Drive  China’s  Foreign  Policy  .............................................  30  
Active  Defense  ...............................................................................................................................................  34  
CHAPTER  VI    COMPARATIVE  CASE  STUDIES  ................................................................  37  
Brazil  and  Venezuela  ..................................................................................................................................  37  
The  Federative  Republic  of  Brazil  .........................................................................................................  38  
The  Bolivarian  Republic  of  Venezuela  ................................................................................................  44  
CHAPTER  VII  ...........................................................................................................................  47  
Conclusion  .......................................................................................................................................................  47  
Policy  Recommendations  .........................................................................................................................  53  
Bibliography  ...........................................................................................................................  56  
 

 
      

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following individuals for their support during the writing

of this thesis. First, and foremost, to my wife, Natalia, and our daughters Mya and

Andrea, without whose love and support I would have not been able to complete this

challenging academic endeavor. To my instructor, mentor, and thesis advisor, Dr. Tony

Rivera, who taught me that “fear is the mind-killer”, and encouraged me to venture out

and explore new possibilities in my research. To Brigadier General Sean P. Mulholland,

for encouraging my participation in this program, and to Brigadier General James E.

Kraft, Jr., to whom I owe a great deal of my formation as a Special Forces officer.

Finally, I’d like to thank my fellow students, who taught me far more than I could have

possibly imparted upon them. De Oppresso Liber!

 
      

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

China has steadily increased its presence and influence in Latin America, and this

is a reason for concern for U.S. policy makers. Latin America’s countries provide China

with commodity resources for its growth, as well as a growing market for its

manufactured goods (Gallagher and Porzencanski 2010, 858). Over the last decade, and

in a significant number of Latin American countries, China “has gone from having an

almost negligible economic presence to replacing the United States as the number one or

number two trading partner” (Ellis 2011, iii). Thus, China’s increased interaction in

Latin America is beginning to change the balance of power and influence in the region.

Its growing focus in Latin America has included extensive military-to-military contact

with Latin American partners, and this may concern U.S. policy makers as to China’s

potential as a future military threat in the region (Ellis 2011, iv).

Intentions – Coercive or Cooperative China?

What is China’s intent in Latin America, and what does this intent mean for

United States national security in the region? There have been numerous attempts to

discern China’s global strategic intent—particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Although

few sources exist that focus the question on China’s intent specific to Latin America,

available literature on the subject of China’s intent generally arrives generally at two

conclusions: China is an existential threat to the United States, and China is a cooperative

economic competitor in global affairs. For the sake of brevity in the body of this work,

 
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the two categories will be referred to respectively as coercive China, and cooperative

China.

Because of its history, distance, culture, and language, deciphering China’s intent

is a complex task. As a potential coercive power, China, may in fact, attack the United

States when it feels that it has the military might to do so, and therefore cement its

domination of the Pacific, and assert its status as a world superpower, or attack pre-

emptively, as part of its “active defense” strategy in defense of its sovereignty (Freedberg

2013, Gertz 2000, Timperlake and Triplett 1999). However, China may also choose to

follow a path that would have it continue its peaceful rise as a cooperative and economic

competitor in the international system. This kind of China would embrace multi-polarity

and peaceful coexistence while creating a military capability to protect its immediate

interests, territorial integrity, and sovereignty without seeking extraterritorial expansion

(Vairon 2013, Bearsdon 2013, and Jacques 2009). In either case, China must be

examined within the rightful context of its history, the national character that evolved as a

result, and from the perspective of China’s leadership in order to understand its actions

from within a more accurate context that accounts for China’s perception, and

perspective, of the world.

Deterrence Through Status, Influence And Strength

Having examined China leads me to argue that China’s intent in Latin America is

to continue to grow its status and influence in the region, even in a military context, in

order to provide security for its economic interests, and to provide deterrence for a

potential U.S. move against China in the Pacific region. Therefore, is China a threat to

the United States? Yes. I treat this question more fully in the conclusion of this work. I

 
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further argue that China’s self image, and its foreign policy, has been largely shaped by

its tumultuous history and has created deep rooted sensitivities regarding sovereignty, and

equality within the international system. These particular sensitivities are the reasons

behind China’s embrace of multi-polarity, multilateralism, and its development of the

“Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” as a foreign policy (Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs 2000), and certainly play a major role for the focus on these themes in its

discourse practices.

Method of Analysis

To achieve these ends, I will proceed in the following manner: I will begin with a

literature review examining China’s strategic intent. Then, I will provide a background on

China’s strategic and historic contexts. From China’s history, I will draw the political-

cultural framework that has contributed to the discursive practice of peaceful

development, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and has shaped China’s economic and

military behavior. Having outlined China’s political-cultural framework, I will then use

this framework to analyze China’s economic and military activities as tools of foreign

policy. I will then proceed with two case studies of China’s activities in the Federative

Republic of Brazil, as well as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, respectively. These

case studies will show China’s application of its foreign policy within its historical

context, but applied to two diverse and influential partners in Latin America, and allow

for a more accurate analysis of its intentions in the region. A conclusion will synthesize

the findings and cover the salience of China’s potential as a coercive force in the future.

Finally, I will provide policy recommendations for the resetting of U.S. foreign policy in

Latin America that will help disarm ideology-based exclusionary foreign policies on the

 
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part of various countries in the region, as well as for increasing interaction with Chinese

military forces in Latin America such that we may find a more accurate understanding of

their capabilities and intent.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

A Coercive Force

As a matter of policy, in a highly interdependent world, the Monroe Doctrine is

no longer practical in the Western Hemisphere, thus China will likely continue to operate,

as it has, unabated by concerns of exclusionary U.S. military intervention. International

Relations’ (IR) classical realism tells us that once the balance-of-power is broken,

conflict is inevitable (Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation

2013, 84). China’s increased interaction in Latin America is beginning to change the

balance of power and influence in the region.

To some, like national security reporter, Bill Gertz, China’s threat to the United

States is “real and growing.” From this perspective, China has defined the United States

as its main barrier to world status and Pacific regional domination (Gertz 2000, xiv).

Other authors rest the assessment of China’s existential threat to the United States, on

China’s increasing military budget, it’s cyber warfare activities, it’s selling of military

equipment to countries like Syria and North Korea, contrary to United States foreign

policy goals and wishes, and the Taiwan crisis of 1996 (Timperlake and Triplett II 1999,

13-14).

 
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These assessments of China provide a lens where China is matching its economic

rise with growing military might, in an effort to successfully coerce, and eventually,

defeat the United States militarily through direct confrontation. Another lens that appears

to be rooted in classical IR realist theory is that “because China believes that it is much

weaker than the United States, they are more likely to launch a massive preemptive strike

in a crisis” (J. S. Freedberg 2013). In this case, although China is still framed as an

existential threat to the United States, its potential attack is derived from a feeling of

weakness, as opposed to the knowledge that it has the military might to subjugate its

opponent outright.

In order for one to see China as an existential threat, one must see China from the

framework of it being not only just another rising power in the international system. For

this view, it helps if one perceives China as an ambitious totalitarian regime, with

competing goals and ideologies that will ultimately bring conflict with democratic

powers, until one, or the other, prevails (Gertz, The China Threat 2000, xi). By focusing

on China’s highly centralized governing body, and the protection afforded it by the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one can look at China’s domestic policy with regards

to popular dissention, as one example, and draw conclusions regarding how far China

would go to safeguard the status quo, or modify it to its advantage.

In such an approach, the student-led demonstrations in 1989, and the resulting

lethal suppression by the PLA, serves as one example of China’s potential to react with

deadly violence – even against its own population – when it feels its system threatened.

China’s hostile actions in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969,

Vietnam in 1979, and the lethal suppression of students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 can

 
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serve to blunt any argument as to China’s “peaceful rise” (Timperlake and Triplett II

1999, 67). Those that embrace the China threat theory, believe that the PLA’s influence

in the PRC is so strong that it actually impacts China’s foreign policy by guiding it down

a coercive path. Thus, China is a threat because the PLA is a threat (Timperlake and

Triplett II 1999, 13). To emphasize the alleged position of prominence of the PLA within

the PRC, China threat theorists cite Mao’s famous quote that concludes that political

power “grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Gertz, The China Threat 2000, xiii). As I will

discuss later in this work, the PLA’s power is actually becoming less pivotal in directing

foreign policy as China’s leadership moves to professionalize the force and focus it on

national defense and away from public policy.

But, to see China as an existential threat, based solely on its actions during the

20th century denies the effect that its long history has had on its national culture, and

national interest. China experienced many years of conquest and exploitation at the

hands of neighbors, as well as Western powers. These events have had a profound

impact in China’s perception of, and sensitivity to, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While taking this into account, it is useful also to consider that those sensitivities may, in

fact, form the basis for framing China as an existential threat to its neighbors, and the

United States in particular, if fear and weakness become the catalyst for a Chinese pre-

emptive attack.

In its National Defense Policy Paper of 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Defense

makes reference to a military strategy of active defense (Chinese Ministry of Defense

2013). According to Larry Wortzel, at the Institute of World Politics, China’s “active

defense” strategy is born out of China’s deep sense of historical vulnerability dating back

 
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200 years. Thus, according to this theory, China tends to envision itself as militarily

inferior to the United States, whom they see as their most likely enemy (J. S. Freedberg

2013). In this view, China’s sensitivity to sovereignty may be the very trigger that

unleashes its military might in a preemptive attack – an active defense – to thwart a

potential infringement on its interests.

A belief that China poses an existential threat to the United States based on recent

history, or on certain aspects of its national culture that have been shaped by its long

history, still deny the fact that China has prioritized its economy first, and foremost in its

national policy. Yet, to the China threat adherents, China will use its burgeoning power

to destabilize regional security (Broomfield 2003, 266).

This perspective fails to account for the high probability that China understands

the implications of the catastrophic economic effects that would come from armed

conflict against the United States, which has the world’s most powerful military force,

along with formidable alliances in the Pacific with Japan and South Korea, the

Philippines, Taiwan, as well as Vietnam and India. Perhaps, these very alliances appear

as a strategic encirclement to China, further exacerbating its perception of being

threatened. Instead, the idea of China as a coercive antagonist sees China’s emerging

economic strength as a factor that put it in a position to threaten peace and security.

Specifically, this puts China in a position to challenge the United States (Broomfield

2003, 266).

The coercive China perspective focuses steadfastly on the loosening of United

States national security during the Clinton-Gore administration. Here, both Bill Gertz, as

well as Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett, in their books on the China threat,

 
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lament the opening of “floodgates” of national security information that they describe as

having given China a tremendous help in modernizing its own military (Gertz 2000, 61;

Timperlake and Triplett II 1999, 137). The China threat theory ultimately rests on seeing

China’s military modernization and preparedness, not as a natural act by a rising

economic power, but as the result of China’s perception of the United States as its

opponent in a future state of war (Broomfield 2003, 266).

On Thursday, October 11, 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, warned

that the United States faced the very real possibility of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor”, as he

assessed the “increased aggressiveness and technological advances” of “adversaries such

as China, Russia, Iran and military groups” (Bumiller and Shanker 2012). Although, one

can characterize such a strongly worded statement as being a call for general cyber

preparedness on the part of the United States, the framing of the threat as another “Pearl

Harbor” – where over 2,400 U.S. military and civilians were killed as a result of the

surprise attack by Imperial Japanese forces – may invite a comparison between Japan’s

attack and China’s potential to attack, but by means that are far different in scope, and

less easily characterized as open hostility leading to an armed exchange. Japan and

China share an early history, and both were subject to varying degrees of forced contact

to the West. Certainly, China’s recent revelation – via Chinese state-run media outlet

Global Times – regarding its nuclear submarine attack capability, on U.S. land-based

targets including “Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego”, with the capacity

to kill “5 million to 12 million Americans”, feeds the reasons for caution by United States

policy makers (Yu 2013). But, unlike mid-20th century Japan, China has a myriad of

 
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foreign policy options that were not available to Japan’s highly militarized imperial

structure of the time.

Cooperative Economic Competitor

However, it is undeniable that China’s rise has been most significant in its

growing economic power, and influence. If it acted mainly as an economic competitor,

in keeping with liberal IR theory, China would be more likely to define, and prioritize, its

national interests economically, thus, opting to distance itself from the possibility of

armed conflict, or some other military confrontation (Nye and Welch, Understanding

Global Conflict and Cooperation 2013, 64). China’s currently stated strategy rests atop

two priorities: economics, and security (Vairon 2013, 37). However, as of 1978, China’s

most pressing priority has been on economic development, regardless of the potential

ideological cost to the Communist legacy left by Mao Zedong (Vairon 2013, 12). Armed

conflict would seem to pose a threat to China’s existing economic rise, and would not

appear to be in its best interest. As a rising power, China has benefited from it having

adapted to existing international norms, and embracing multilateralism where it benefits

its interests. During its struggle for acceptance into the international community, China’s

leadership has come to realize the value of devoting its energies towards its economic

growth (Jacques 2009, 430).

China has been very adept at handling its relationship with the United States in

such a way that continues to promote the China brand symbolized by the ubiquitous

“Made in China” label seen throughout the world (Chellaney 2006, 25). The export of

cheap consumer goods, along with its trade surplus with the United States, has helped

finance the modernization of China’s military as well as deposited a tremendous amount

 
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of U.S. currency into China’s monetary reserves (Chellaney 2006, 26). Although, U.S.

policy makers may publicly decry the Chinese currency rates, or the inequitable trade

surplus with China, the fact is that nearly 60 percent of all of China’s exports are from

foreign funded ventures, many of which are actually managed by U.S. companies

(Beardson 2013, 270). Also, military cooperation with the United States helps to ensure

that the South China Sea, which is of strategic importance to China as well as the United

States, remains open to the passage of critical petroleum resources (Beardson 2013, 273).

Thus, through this lens we see a China that continues to operate as a global

economic competitor, preferring the benefits of trade, to the perils of armed conflict.

However, this perspective does not readily answer what China would intend to do with its

future military might, other than to secure its territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Even

as the United States freely, and openly, patrols the South China Sea, and along China’s

frontiers, to ensure safe international passage, would China someday choose to patrol

along U.S. frontiers, in the waters of the Caribbean sea in order to protect its economic

ventures in the area? If China has avoided projecting its military force across the oceans,

is it a matter of capability, or rational choice?

The Balancing Act That Is China’s Foreign Policy

The perspective of this thesis allows me to analyze both coercion and economic

competition with regards to China’s intent as a rising world power, and how it can impact

the international community, and, more significantly for the purposes of this work, the

United States in the Latin America region. China has to balance its foreign policy in

order to maintain, or increase, its status, promote its economic growth, and secure its

sovereignty wherever that may be threatened. India, like Japan, is unwilling to

 
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subordinate its interests to China, as the latter positions itself for dominance in the region

(Chellaney 2006, 46). At the same time, Japan is held to its alliance to the United States,

and this limits Japan’s freedom to shape its own approach to China (Pyle 2007, 314-315).

This perspective does not present China as a singularly belligerent military threat, or as a

mere economic competitor benefiting from free security – provided by the United States

– to continue its rise.

As the United States plays the role of the balancer of power and influences in a

multipolar Asia, China finds that it must therefore function in cooperation with the

United States in order to preserve the status quo and benefit from the peace dividends that

result, while developing a capability to deter U.S. aggression. This would require China

to continue to pursue military modernization, safeguard its sovereignty, and advance its

economic goals without fostering fears in its international partners, and competitors. This

thesis’ perspective is backed by China’s history, actions, and official discourse.

As we will find later, China has endeavored to shape its discourse practices in

such a way as to signal that their economic rise is in everyone’s best interest, and that its

military modernization and expansion serves to ensure, and secure, this rise. That is not

to say that the leadership of the PRC does not envision other potential options in their

national policy, which may include armed conflict. However, as we shall see, their

history and discursive practices have framed China’s current behavior in such a way that

will likely influence profoundly the decisions that the PRC leadership makes in the near

future.

 
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CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

China’s History and its Effect on its Foreign Policy

Because of its large population of an estimated 1,374,900,000, its vast landscape

encompassing 3,706,581 miles2, and the fact that it shares borders with 18 countries,

China is inevitably a major player in international relations (Vairon 2013, 11-12). Most

assessments of China’s foreign policy – especially where the United States is concerned –

are done via a Western perspective. As such, these assessments oftentimes highlight the

Western opening, and exploitation of China, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, as well as

the celebrated Nixon-Mao rapprochement of 1972.

Yet, the Chinese lens of foreign policy includes far more than the significant

events involving the West. China’s vast history offers tremendous insight into the

development of its foreign policy. Its long period as a conquered nation, as well as the

apportionment of its territory to foreign powers have led China down a particular foreign

policy approach that applies soft power, while zealously guarding its sovereignty, and

territorial integrity, backed by growing, and ambitious, military capability. China’s

transition from Maoist ideology to the current political hybrid that characterizes its

position as a global power today formed after a long history of subjugation to other

powers. But, China’s growth in economic and military strength has inspired concerns

among other nations as to China’s future ambitions.

 
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Conquest: China at the Hands of Foreign Rulers

China has spent several centuries conquered and ruled by foreign invaders, and

this fact has greatly impacted its foreign policy perspective today with regards to its

sovereignty, its concern for its territorial integrity, and its image and standing in the

international system. The weakness of ethnic Chinese governments was a systemic

theme for unified Han, or Tang regimes (Womack 2010, 65). The nomadic tribes of the

northern steppe territories were a major concern as far back as 210 BC, when emperor

Qin Shi Huang set out the massive project to build the iconic Great Wall in order to keep

the invaders out of China (Vairon 2013, 7).

Almost throughout its entire 319-year history, the Song dynasty accepted a

subordinate position to foreign rule, which allowed it brief periods of “purchased peace”

(Beardson 2013, 8). From 960 to 1279 AD, the Song dynasty ruled China. The Song

dynasty was largely composed of the Han ethnic race, which comprises the majority of

Chinese today. After several military defeats at the hands of the Kitan Empire, critical

territory comprising strategic passes that defended the northern frontiers of China was

ceded to the Kitan (Beardson 2013, 7-8). The Song dynasty also fell to the Tangut

people, possible descendants of either the Tibetans, or Mongols – also from the

northwestern frontiers – and later, fell to the Jin Empire. These defeats resulted in the

humiliation of not only losing land, but also having to submit compensation to the

conquerors (Womack 2010, 75).

Beijing was where the conquered Chinese governments traveled to in order to pay

their tribute to their conquerors (Beardson 2013, 9-10). During the Jin Empire rule,

Beijing became the center of governance. Beijing had previously served as a minor

 
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garrison center in the northern border region of China. But, from the Jin perspective, the

city had the advantage of not being located in the traditional heartland of China. Adding

to this, the location was close to the Jin’s homelands – in the north – across from the

Chinese borders (Womack 2010, 73).

The dynastic governments of China continued to be concerned with foreign

invasion, or to being supplanted by indigenous elements. The Song dynasty met its end

at the hands of Khubilai Khan. Grandson of the renowned Mongol leader Genghis Khan,

and founder of the Yuan dynasty, Khubilai Khan’s rule confined the Han people to a

limited role within the Yuan dynasty government. Nevertheless, the Yuan dynasty did

make efforts to create a multiracial empire by importing artists from all of West and

Central Asia. An ethnic Han who founded the Ming dynasty finally overthrew the Yuan

in 1368. The ever-present concern with foreign invasions caused the Ming dynasty to

revive the efforts to complete the Great Wall, an activity that weakened the Ming rule due

to its costs resulting in excessive taxation. The Ming dynasty ruled for 276 years before

the Manchus supplanted it. The Manchus were a foreign people originating from several

merged Jurchen tribes native to the north (Beardson 2013, 11).

The establishment of a ritualized tribute system constituted an expression of

Chinese foreign policy that delineated the hierarchy of the Chinese emperor at the top

with that of the subordinate neighboring states at the bottom. The Manchus ruled, as the

Qing dynasty, from 1644, and were in place at the time of the arrival of the Western

powers. Though, they were technically foreign to China, the Manchus adopted the

practices, laws, and structures previously established by the Ming dynasty. In the foreign

policy practiced by the Manchus, the hierarchical relationship between the empire, and its

 
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subordinate neighbor states held that the emperor, as the Son of Heaven, stood to rule all

that was to be found within the boundaries of the land, with the boundaries defined by the

oceans (Womack 2010, 20).

In essence, everything within reach of the Chinese empire was subordinate to the

emperor. This created a foreign policy relationship where proximity to the center of the

empire’s seat of government meant less autonomy, but more opportunity for standing and

influence. Conversely, distance, meant increased autonomy, but far less influence. Japan

for its part, benefited by the separation afforded to it by a vast sea between it and China.

Thus, while Japan respected the Confucian philosophy, and even adopted Chinese

writing, it did not participate in the tributary system. As a result, Japan became

somewhat divorced from the Chinese foreign relations of the time (Womack 2010, 21).

The fact that it had failed to keep pace with the industrial might of the West, due

to its self-imposed isolation from the outside world that had begun under the Ming

dynasty, China was unprepared to fend off foreign violation of its sovereignty. This was

a strategic error that China seems unwilling to repeat in the present day, but has repeated

multiple times in the past. By the 1800s, the Qing dynasty ruled over a weakened China.

Rapid population growth, after a period of falling birth rates, led to a population of

approximately 300 million (Beardson 2013, 14). Yet, with less than adequate

productivity, there was famine and female infanticide, leading to a population of

unmarried males. By the time the Europeans and North America focused their efforts on

opening up China, the Qing dynasty had been weakened by internal conflict (Beardson

2013, 14-15).

 
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Loss of Economic Sovereignty

The First Opium War, as well as the culmination of the Taiping Rebellion, opened

China to highly discriminatory economic commitments with the Europeans and the

Americans, and this stripped China from the ability to control its own economic resources

(Herring 2008, 210). The elements leading to the First Opium war began to surface

when, in the 1840s, the European powers wished for expanded trade in East Asia. Great

Britain made great efforts in opening China to inequitable trade conditions to the benefit

of the Europeans, and embarked on the lucrative opium trade. Opium, a highly addictive

narcotic, proved devastating to a significant segment of the Chinese population. United

States’ producers of cotton and tobacco, and other goods, assessed the possibility of

significantly large profit from access to the large population of China. The Treaty of

Nanking of 1842 followed the culmination of the First Opium War, and was

characterized by unfair economic conditions for China (Herring 2008, 210).

From the 1850s until the mid 1860s, the Qing dynasty also had to deal with what

developed into the world’s bloodiest civil war to date. The Taiping Rebellion,

characterized by its violence, with an estimated death toll of twenty to thirty million,

ended up further eroding Chinese sovereignty over its economy (Tanner 2010, 83). The

Taiping Rebellion had its roots in Protestant Christian teachings derived from extensive

contact with Western Christian missionaries as China was opened to Europe, and the

United States. This proselytizing by Western missionaries effectively influenced Chinese

adherents with European ideals of equality and democracy (Tanner 2010, 84-85).

Yet, just as with the First Opium War, the cessation of hostilities ended with

China opening even further to the point of losing its ability to raise its own tariffs above

 
16  
      

five percent (Herring 2008, 211). China also ceded Hong Kong to Britain at this time.

The Taiping Rebellion was not the only one during this period. The Qing dynasty was

also weakened by Muslim rebellions along the western part of the country, as well as a

rebellion by young males unable to find wives to marry (Beardson 2013, 15).

The Qing Dynasty’s weakness invited even further attacks on its sovereignty by

outside forces. In 1856, the Anglo-French forces also waged war on the Qing dynasty.

Upon achieving victory over the Chinese in 1860, the Treaty of Beijing awarded

significant land concessions to the British, French, and even the Russians. The

perception of weakness of the Qing dynasty, and China as a whole, was like an invitation

to outsiders to assail Chinese sovereignty with significant success. Thus, in 1879 Japan

took possession of the Ryukyu Islands (Beardson 2013, 16).

Japan exploited China’s weakened sovereignty in order to further its own desires

for power in the region. Japan’s growing industrial capacity, in which it invested

tremendously at the onset of the Meiji Era, was in need of viable and lucrative markets,

and those markets were logically located with Japan’s geographic neighbors. This led

Japan to venture into conquest of the Korean peninsula resulting in conflict with a much

weaker China. Japan was able to dominate China, culminating in the Treaty of

Shimonoseki of 1895. This treaty not only availed Taiwan to Japan, but also allowed

Japan to begin to have sway over southern Manchuria; a development not welcomed by

the Russians. This type of attack on China on the part of the Japanese continued during

World War Two and has long since remained within the collective memory of the

Chinese and continues to inspire significant challenges and difficulties in the region.

 
17  
      

Having been caught up in the competition of the international system, Japan saw

itself opposed by Russia, France, and Germany, in an incident known as the “Triple

Intervention” (Pyle 2007, 92-93). Isolated, and unable to resist the three powerful allies,

Japan had to capitulate to their demands and give up its control in Manchuria. By the end

of the century, Britain had expanded further into Hong Kong, China was heavily invested

in the southwest, and Russia had replaced Japan in Manchuria. The violent Boxer

Rebellion ended with China granting further concessions to Austria-Hungary, Italy, and

Belgium.

Stumbling Nationalism

Early efforts to bring China together, via Chinese nationalism, resulted in

fragmentation and failure, and left China at the mercy of local military strongmen and

foreign influence. By the start of the twentieth century, the Qing dynasty suffered from

dwindling authority over its own territory. Due to all of the foreign occupation, it found

itself seeking approval from its foreign occupiers. When the Qing dynasty fell in 1911, it

represented the end of two thousand years of dynastic government in China.

The republican government of Sun Yat-sen fared no better. His Nationalist Party

was weak, and did not have the loyalty of the military, which it needed to assert authority

over the land. Sun Yat-sen’s government struck a necessary alliance with China’s most

powerful military warlord. After a time, this delegitimized Sun Yat-sen’s authority, and

the true power to rule transferred over to the military warlords. From 1916 to 1928, the

destiny of China was dependent on various military rulers with the support of foreign

powers (Jacques 2009, 90-91).

 
18  
      

By the beginning of the twentieth century, China had not developed a robust

national identity. It is likely that the years of constant foreign rule, and outside influence,

made it difficult for the population to adhere their identity to a shared history. Sun Yat-

sen lamented this lack of nationalism as he struggled to cement a base for his ill-fated

republican government. The Chinese population had shown “the greatest loyalty to

family and clan with the result that in China there have been family-ism and clan-ism but

no real nationalism” (Vairon 2013, 23). According to Sun Yat-sen, nationalism was a

critical ingredient for progress and modernization. But, Sun Yat-sen’s failure to lead

China to a long-term republican form of government dampened the flames of fervent

Chinese nationalism as it gave way to Mao Zedong’s application of Marxism and

Leninism, which was comprised of “solidarity between peoples”, and “proletarian

internationalism” (Vairon 2013, 24).

Mao believed that the international system was fraught with a lack of equity and

fairness, and this shaped how he envisioned China’s priorities of foreign policy

engagement. He viewed international treaties as a means of the establishment of foreign

sovereignty over weaker, or developing, nation-states, such as China. The signing of the

Versailles Treaty at the end of World War One, for example, allowed for parts of China

to be handed to Japan. This kind of unequal treatment of China, during the fledgling

leadership of the Nationalist Party, created a necessity for isolation from the Western-

dominated international system during Mao’s time. Because of this self-imposed

prohibition on participation within the international system, China was unable to form the

framework of interaction through which it could potentially benefit from the multilateral

tools of the international system post-World War Two, including the General Agreement

 
19  
      

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lanteigne

2013, 61-62).

Mao’s revolution had plunged China into widespread famine, and almost

destroyed the Chinese economy. It was not until China began its departure from the

Soviet communist model, at the end of the 1970s, that its growth potential was given the

opportunity to become a catalyst for Chinese nationalism. Mao Zedong’s policies had

been disastrous. His policies were both directly, and indirectly, responsible for

approximately 70 million deaths (Chellaney 2006, 71).

A purification campaign known as the “Cultural Revolution” had deadly

consequences for a segment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but it likely allowed

the CCP to be in a position to reset when Mao passed in 1976 by creating the necessary

context for a reassessment of Mao’s policies. The Cultural Revolution, instituted in

1966, set out to purge the privileged classes, whether they were privileged due to familial

ties, or political standing in the CCP (Lanteigne 2013, 5). The purge was brutal in its

violence, and it set the CCP on an ideological tailspin, as some of the very founders of

the party were eliminated at Mao’s behest (Jacques 2009, 152-153).

Enter The Dragon: Birth of a New China

The immediate aftermath of the death of Mao led to a purge of any hint of

subversion by the destabilizing force of popular dissent. A group of demonstrators

critical of the ruling political elite was swiftly dealt with in the form of incarceration and

execution. Deng Xiaoping, a politician and reformist of the time, was labeled a counter-

revolutionary and stripped of his roles within the CCP. As change continued to

 
20  
      

irreversibly transform the CCP and China, Deng was reinstated among the key party

leaders (Beardson 2013, 37).

Post-Mao China faced difficult challenges. Its vastness and diversity made it

difficult for the government to affect an overarching policy of reform across the land.

Having been subjected to hundreds of years of turmoil, and occupation, as well as self-

imposed isolation, China was less developed than many of its neighbors in East Asia. A

moderate decentralization of the government system effectively cut inefficiency and

reduced costs in the government sector. From 1978 to 1992, China saw a growth rate of

9.5 percent (Jacques 2009, 154).

It is important to point out that it was during the period from 1972 to the 1980s

that China must have realized the importance of its relationship with the United States.

The rapprochement during the Nixon-Mao accord of 1972, the establishment of

diplomatic relationship with the United States in 1979, the unfreezing of Chinese assets,

and the granting of most favored nation status, allowed China to fully join the

international system by participation into multilateral institutions such as the Word Bank,

and the GATT (Jacques 2009, 156).

Though, China still operates through a centralized economy, characterized by

government supervision in the financial sector, it has made tremendous gains. Deng

Xiaoping, enacted a series of sweeping economic reforms that aimed at the revival of the

Chinese economy. Financial assistance and international investment allowed Chinese

firms to join the international market, and create foreign business partnerships. By the

twenty-first century, China had joined the World Trade Organization and engaged in

trade in markets beyond East Asia. By 2012, China had accumulated a staggering $3.3

 
21  
      

trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves (Lanteigne 2013, 5). This has given China

ever increasing influence in international investment.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA’S ECONOMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Resource Driven: China’s Economic Expansion and Foreign Affairs

Resources – commodity goods and raw materials – are essentially all finite. If the

Chinese were to seek exclusive relationships, or rights, to high-demand resources – such

as oil and gas supplies – it may become a reason for concern for the international

community (Lanteigne 2013, 39). As the demand for these resources grows and their

supply decreases, China’s growing appetite will likely lead it to create an environment

that will avail it of these resources over its competitors. As long as the economic

structure remains an open trading system, the opportunities for conflict are lessened

(Brzezinski 2008, 116).

China’s voracious appetite for commodity goods, has led it to the inevitable need

to expand its influence into regions previously dominated by the United States.

According to Professor Cynthia Arnson, Latin American Program Director of the

Woodrow Wilson Center, trade between China and Latin America has grown at an annual

rate of twenty-four percent since the early 1990s (Arnson 2009, 1). This is almost three

times the rate of growth for all trade in the region. Most of this increase is due to China’s

impressive GDP growth rates of between 7 percent and close to 10 percent per year, and

 
22  
      

the resulting demand for raw materials and agricultural imports, otherwise known as the

“commodities market” (Arnson 2009, 1).

In a country characterized by highly centralized government control, China has

been able to exploit its workforce in order to offset the cost of commodities with the

cheaper manufacture of consumer goods. Although, the lower cost of manufacture

created the phenomenon of “China Prices”, it had the equal, but opposite, reaction of

driving up the world’s commodity prices (Jacques 2009, 319). This surge in critical

commodities, such as oil and other raw goods, such as iron, boosted an economic

interdependence with emerging Latin American economies such as Brazil and Venezuela.

Due to China’s potential for cheap manufacture, and its necessity to exploit this

potential, it has embarked on the “Going Global” strategy that has resulted in stronger

ties with Latin American, and Caribbean countries (Jacques 2009, 162). Going Global is

a long-term relationship building effort that prioritizes both the political and economic

ties of countries bestowed with the wealth of critical resources necessary to fuel the

growing Chinese economy. This international strategy by the Chinese government has

impacted nearly every market in Latin America (Jacques 2009, 319-321).

In 2006, China’s trade with Latin America greatly benefited Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Argentina, and Brazil, each exported just over forty

percent of all crude petroleum from the Latin America region to China. Brazil exported

ninety percent of all Latin America exports of iron and eighty-eight percent of all meat to

China, while Argentina exported eighty-four percent of all soybean oil (Gallagher and

Porzencanski 2010, 364).

 
23  
      

Prior to the worldwide economic crisis of 2008, the price of critical raw materials

such as iron, copper, aluminum, zinc and platinum grew at an astounding rate. Copper

alone increased in price nearly five hundred percent. Aluminum – which showed the

most modest price rate increase – peaked at a significant two hundred percent (Jacques

2009, 320). These types of figures, when impacting the national economies of nascent

powers, such as those found in Latin America, led to stronger alliances with China as

they point to an important economic interdependence that has allowed for tremendous

mutual economic growth.

In less than ten years at the beginning of the 21st Century, China increased its

two-way trade with Latin America by six hundred and sixty percent, from $13 billion in

2000 to more than $120 billion in 2009 (Chellaney 2006, 91). Just about ninety six

percent of the world’s iron ore is produced in only fifteen countries, and Brazil has

membership in this group (Chellaney 2006, 103). As such, China’s investment in Latin

America increased to $11.3 billion in 2003, and continued to increase steadily (Chellaney

2006, 91). This represented a ten-fold increase between 2001 and 2008.

China’s Antagonistic Economic Foreign Policy with the United States

China’s rapid growth and expansion has created friction between it and the West,

particularly the United States, over several issues. China’s trade policies leading to

significant trade deficits, currency valuation, and its expanded economic interests beyond

East Asia, has fueled concerns about the threat that China may potentially present as it

aims to reach, or even surpass, economic superpower parity with the United States.

 
24  
      

China’s economic ventures into Latin America, and the Caribbean, for example,

may be of concern to United States policy makers. Yet, China’s expansion into the

Western Hemisphere is a fairly unsurprising development when one considers China’s

tremendous economic power, and requirement of resources as a result. Also, one could

take into account that China’s economic activity is inextricably tied to the United States.

As stated previously, during the first quarter of 2012, China held nearly $3.3

trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves. China likely maintains this reserve as a

mitigating measure to either domestic, or international economic crisis (Lanteigne 2013,

40). The fact that these reserves are held in U.S. dollars may point to a symbiotic

relationship that China must ensure to maintain for its own economic well-being. Still,

China’s economic activity in Europe, the Pacific, and Latin America has given energy to

the effort of a significant number of nation-states to cut the United States out of its

economic hegemony, and seems to run counter to the conclusion that China aims to

maintain a mutually beneficial balance of power with the United States.

The “Washington Consensus” model of development that acted as the cornerstone

of the loan and capital assistance policies of the 1990s has fallen out of favor with leftist,

or left-leaning Latin American countries. Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia, have increased

the role of the state over their respective economies. This is a practice that mirrors

Beijing’s government regulated economy (Lanteigne 2013, 43). This is not to say that

Latin American countries are attempting to emulate China’s economic system, hoping for

similar results. However, it is more likely that China’s success in maintaining its

economic integrity through close government control of its economy, has given

 
25  
      

legitimacy to the same practice among the leftist nation states that seek an alternative

world partner to the United States.

Nevertheless, it is very apparent that United States economic preeminence in

Latin America has diminished. In 2002, approximately fifty-five percent of the region’s

imports originated in the United States (Inter-American Dialogue 2012, 12). As of 2012,

the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports, while China’s

share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States (Inter-

American Dialogue 2012, 12).

China has also embarked in efforts to internationalize its own currency at the

expense of the dollar. On March 26, 2013, Brazil – a member of the BRICS multilateral

economic association, including Russia, India, China, and South Africa – signed an

economic agreement with China that would allow them to trade the equivalent of up to

$30 billion U.S. dollars (USD) per year in their own currencies, cutting out the use of the

dollar (Flak and Lopes 2013). During the same month, Australian Prime Minister Julia

Gillard headed for Beijing intending to strike a consensus for a trade deal that would

bypass the dollar in order to avoid the uncertainties of dollar fluctuations (Villarreal

2013). Also, on October 10, 2013, the European Central Bank, agreed on a currency

swap deal that could mean the transaction of the approximate equivalent of $61.1 billion

dollars, without having to convert to the U.S. currency (Petroff 2013).

If continued and expanded, these actions could work to decrease the international

demand for the dollar over the long term, and this would be detrimental to the U.S.

economy. These economic deals are designed to cut out the dollar, so as to allow for

more trade and investment without a need for conversion. Exporting nations that use the

 
26  
      

dollar for transactions lend that money back to the United States by buying U.S. Treasury

bonds at low interest rates, which affects lending rates across different U.S. domestic

markets, including mortgages. This activity maintains a high international demand for

the dollar, which is crucial to maintain a healthy U.S. economy (CMS FOREX 2013).

China’s efforts to hedge out the dollar are detrimental to this balance. If the international

demand for dollars falls significantly, domestic interest rates will inevitably rise, which

can be catastrophic to the United States economy. However, due to economic

interdependence, it would also come at a great economic cost to China because of its

holdings in the U.S. currency.

CHAPTER V

CHINA’S SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS

One China

China’s history reveals traumatic periods of sovereignty violations, as well as

subjugation to foreign rule of one form, or another. This has caused China’s government

leadership to be highly preoccupied with issues of territorial sovereignty and international

standing. These two concerns have had a significant effect in shaping China’s foreign

policy towards the United States, as well as its neighbors in East Asia and the rest of the

Pacific Rim. However, the Chinese military’s scope of responsibilities has moved

beyond the traditional border, and maritime security concerns. China’s security now

encompasses concerns over terrorism, trade security, access to resources and energy, and

trans-national crime (Lanteigne 2013, 80).

 
27  
      

The Japanese annexation of Taiwan in 1895 – via the Treaty of Shimonoseki –

has had a long-term effect on Chinese nationalism, and the potential threat of Japan, as

having ambitions of hegemonic power in East Asia, energizes Chinese nationalist fervor

(Vairon 2013, 25). Though, Japan was divested of Taiwan upon its defeat in World War

Two, Taiwan remains out of sovereign Chinese control to this day. Also, Japan’s slow

reassertion of its place in the East Asia region, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe aims at

reinstating the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ conventional military status, leading to a

defense sector increase, has exacerbated issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty

and maritime rights, as well as its interests in the region. China’s National Defense

Policy Paper of 2012 states that “Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu

Islands,” validating China’s sovereignty concerns.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forms an important component of China’s

foreign policy. As per the Chinese National Defense Policy Paper of 2012, the PLA’s

fundamental policies, and principles, include safeguarding “national sovereignty, security

and territorial integrity, and supporting the country's peaceful development” (Chinese

Ministry of Defense 2013). Specific to territorial integrity, China’s “One China” policy

succinctly lends clarity to China’s view on the current status of Taiwan. During the

rapprochement with the Vatican in 2005, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs stated

that there “is only one China in the world, Taiwan is part of China” (Vairon 2013, 138).

Given its past, it is not surprising then that the theme of national sovereignty

figures so prominently as the first principle for armed forces employment listed in

China’s strategic doctrine, as outlined in its National Defense Policy Paper of 2012.

Although, this strategic doctrine generally emphasizes the peaceful application of China’s

 
28  
      

armed forces, it also directs its naval component to strengthen overseas operational

capabilities such as providing “reliable security support for China's interests overseas”

(Chinese Ministry of Defense 2013). As China’s “peaceful development” necessarily

includes its far reaching economic ventures beyond its shores, providing “reliable

security support” for China’s interests in this area leads one to wonder what role China’s

naval forces will play as they grow more capable in the future, and how far beyond its

shores will this role be carried out.

Anchored within the Chinese national character is the conviction that the

preservation of China’s territorial unity is fundamental. The territories lost to the West,

and the Japanese, had to be brought back into the sovereign control of China. Though,

Hong Kong and Macao were reintegrated in 1997 and 1999, respectively, Taiwan

remains an outlier, and a future goal for overarching Chinese national strategy (Vairon

2013, 419). Appropriately, the recognition of China’s sovereignty position carries into

how it frames foreign policy. An official 2006 government document outlining China’s

foreign policy towards Africa, the PRC imposes the recognition of the One China policy

as a condition for normal relations (Vairon 2013, 64).

China’s colossal economic success has allowed it to modernize and

professionalize its military, especially its naval forces. Although, China has made it a

point to reassure the world that its military growth is solely for the guarantee of national

sovereignty and regional security, there is still concern as to how far sovereign Chinese

interests may extend in the future beyond China’s immediate shores, and into areas like

Latin America.

 
29  
      

The PLA Influences, but Does Not Drive China’s Foreign Policy

As derived from classical realist IR theory, it has become conventional wisdom in

some circles that China's rise, and the fear it is creating in the United States, could

generate a fate similar to that of ancient Athens and Sparta. This view assumes, therefore,

that China's rise cannot be peaceful (Nye, Unconventional Wisdom: China's Rise Doesn't

Mean War 2011). Like it was in the case of Sparta and Athens, a feeling of insecurity is

also shared by China. Some believe that this feeling of insecurity, as a result of China’s

military weakness relative to the United States, may lead China to be more likely to

launch a massive preemptive strike in a crisis, an action that Japan took in 1941 for

reasons of insecurity (J. S. Freedberg 2013).

However, China did not develop the same adherence to a warrior culture as part

of its national character as Japan had by the time it was opened to the West. Prior to the

founding of Mao’s Revolutionary Army of Workers and Peasants in 1928, and much

later, the People’s Liberation Army in 1978, the soldier’s profession was viewed with

contempt in China. An old Chinese proverb stated that “good iron is not used to make

nails, honest men do not become soldiers” (Vairon 2013, 146).

While Confucianism does not denigrate military service, it prioritizes it below

other requirements of good governance. In The Analects of Confucius, when he is asked

about the essentials of good governance, Confucius replies that there must be “sufficient

food to eat, sufficient arms for defense, and that the common people have confidence in

their leaders” (Ames and Rosemont 1998, 154). But, when asked which of these things

should be given up first, if circumstances required it, Confucius replied that one should

“give up the arms” (Ames and Rosemont 1998, 155). In 1979 Deng Xiaoping attained

 
30  
      

the political clout necessary to enact sweeping changes of the PLA, including retiring,

and removing, PLA leadership due to the dismal results of China’s Vietnam venture that

same year. Even though military capability remained a priority for Deng Xiaoping, it

ranked as the last priority, behind agriculture, industry, and science and technology.

(Lanteigne 2013, 82).

During the Qing Dynasty, the imperial army was oftentimes in the hands of local

warlords and was known for its abuses on the population. Rich and noble families did

not generally allow their children to join the profession of arms, preferring that they enter

Mandarin civil service (Vairon 2013, 147). Unlike the Samurai’s establishment of the

powerful shogun rule over the emperor, the Chinese military’s current tradition was

borne out of the requirements of Maoist control, and later, in order to ensure the

protection of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, the Chinese military has been

ideologically tied to the maintenance of national security, and sovereignty, and did not

enjoy the independence, power, and influence in government, that the Japanese warrior

culture possessed.

It is true that the PLA has had a tremendous amount of influence in the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) during Mao’s time, and certainly during Deng Xiaoping’s time.

In fact, by the time that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in 1949,

Deng Xiaoping had already spent more than twenty years as an officer in the PLA

(Timperlake and Triplett II 1999, 34). As an integral part of the PRC, the PLA has

always had the advantage of being one of the largest arms of the Chinese government,

and with that distinction comes political power. Although the PLA has dropped from

approximately 5 million in the 1950’s to about 2.28 million in 2012, it still has a

 
31  
      

significant influence in China’s foreign policy. However, when in 1979, Deng Xiaoping,

seemingly unhappy with what he reportedly saw as a “bloated, overly politicized military,

which was becoming ineffective against modern security threats” he enacted reforms that

cut the military budgets, and force strength. Thus, he turned the PLA towards a path of

gradual modernization. Shortly after the suppression of the protests in Tiananmen, the

budget was increased again during the 1990’s (Lanteigne 2013, 81).

The diversification of the PRC’s decision-making process continues to give the

power of influence in foreign policy to the PLA leadership. This diversification has

occurred as a result of the lessening of direct ties between PRC government officials and

the PLA, as it was during Deng Xiaoping’s time, when the PRC leadership oftentimes

transitioned to government policy-making positions from the ranks of the PLA. Thus,

PRC officials must often cultivate relations within the PLA leadership in order to support

their own positions (Lanteigne 2013, 85). This is very similar to U.S. Congressmen who

court U.S. military leadership in order to improve relationships, as well as to gain insight

into, and credibility in matters of national defense.

Also, the PLA has shifted away from a Maoist ideological thinking, and has

endeavored to improve in areas of increased professionalization and technical expertise.

In fact, this is a contributing factor in China’s increased military budget. As the PLA

suffered personnel cuts during its downsizing, it has received salary increases, developed

and purchased more technology, and spent more on training in these new technologies

(Lanteigne 2013, 85).

Also, the idea that the PLA holds decisive influence in the course of China’s

foreign policy is ignoring the fact that PLA leadership owes its ascendancy to the highly

 
32  
      

centralized “top-down system dominated by the nine civilian members of the Politburo

Standing Committee” and that those that challenge that system rarely succeed (Moss

2012). Even as the media emphasizes belligerent discourse attributed to any number of

high-ranking PLA leaders, the fact is that current PRC leader Xi Jinping would be unwise

to exacerbate China-US ties for reasons already discussed.

Even as the sovereignty of Senkaku/Diaoyu may be a contentious issue to Japan,

and China, the latter has been careful to ensure that the Chinese civilian maritime law

enforcement agencies, and not the PLA Navy, patrol the disputed waters (Jakobsen

2013). It could be the PRC’s view that a limited encounter or exchange with what would

be the Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Coast Guard is not tantamount to an act of war but

a matter of law enforcement. Although, it has been reported that PLA Major General

Luo Yuan spoke out publicly in favor of “decisive action” against the Philippines,

regarding sovereignty disagreements in the South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands, the

fact that such action has not been pursued as China’s foreign policy points to the fact that

the PLA may have a degree of influence in China’s foreign policy, but it does not drive it

(Moss 2012). Further evidence that the PRC is reigning in the PLA’s influence in order

to improve its effectiveness and professionalism is the recent push to purge corruption

even among the most powerful PLA leaders. On March 31, 2014, PRC prosecutors

charged Lieutenant General Gu Junshan – one of the most powerful leaders within the

PLA – with bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of power. Lieutenant General Junshan’s

assets were estimated at totaling anywhere from several hundred million up to a billion

dollars. His prosecution is not only a challenge to his own power, influence, and

 
33  
      

authority within the PLA, but also a challenge to his military mentors and political allies

(Ansfield 2014).

In a manner reflecting Confucius’ teachings on the priorities of an effective

government, China has focused more on the development of its economy, over its

military. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed two major foreign policy

concepts for China. These concepts were China’s “peaceful rise” and that of a

“harmonious world.” The first concept alludes to the desire to grow as a major power,

but not by the use of military force, whereas the second concept alludes to multilateralism

and global cooperation (Lanteigne 2013, 13).

At the start of the bipolar era, China’s self-imposed isolation, and the nature of its

political regime led to fears among its immediate neighbors. As a result of this, China

had difficult relations with the USSR, India, and Vietnam. Thus, at the time, China

prioritized to maintain a strategic balance for its own security. However, as of 1978, its

priority has been on economic development, regardless of the potential ideological cost

(Vairon 2013, 12). Because of its economic focus, and necessary reforms, China’s GDP

quadrupled from 1978 to 2004 (Lanteigne 2013, 20). This validated its prioritization of

economic health over military might.

Active Defense

In the 2012 National Defense Policy white paper, the Ministry of Defense makes

mention of an “active defense” military strategy designed to “guard against and resist

aggression, contain separatist forces” and protect territorial integrity, among other

concerns (Chinese Ministry of Defense 2013). This active defense military strategy was

 
34  
      

mentioned as early as the 2002 National Defense Policy white paper, and has appeared in

every one since that time.

An “active defense” policy, or strategy, is not new terminology to the United

States Department of Defense. The 1976 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations,

articulated a doctrine of “active defense” where NATO forces would fight defensively

against the Warsaw Pact forces long enough to be reinforced in order to launch a

counterattack. This defensive strategy was later replaced by the “AirLand Battle”

doctrine (Mahnken 2010, 128). One cannot assume a direct correlation between the use

of the term by the United States Department of Defense (DoD), and China’s Ministry of

Defense. However, the 1976 DoD active defense doctrine was shaped, in large part, by

the political imperative of not surrendering any NATO territory to the Warsaw Pact

(Mahnken 2010, 128). This mirrors China’s policy with regards to those areas it deems

part of its sovereign space.

To the Chinese Ministry of Defense, this desire is expressed as its strategic focus

of ensuring territorial integrity. China’s “active defense” military strategy may be a nod

to a former U.S. doctrine designed for the similar reasons. The significance of using this

language to describe its military strategy to the world, and particularly to the United

States, is unlikely to have been a coincidence and is quite possibly meant to convey very

clearly the defensive nature of China’s military growth and development.

Unlike Russia, China has chosen not to dock its naval vessels in any Latin

American country. This is interesting considering that China has expanded its maritime

intelligence collection operations into U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones in the Pacific

(Hsu and Murray 2013). However, such action is to be expected, as China sees the Asia-

 
35  
      

Pacific region as a major strategic element to its defense of Chinese national territory

(Vairon 2013, 65). As the United States patrols near China’s region, China sees it proper

to reciprocate the behavior. Therefore, China’s behavior represents one expression of its

“active defense” military strategy. Nevertheless, China has been careful to not extend

this behavior to the Western Hemisphere; an area the United States considers a strategic

element to the defense of its own national territory, lest it provoke security concerns of

the United States.

Present day China, faces a different context with regards to how it perceives its

threats versus how Japan may have perceived its own threats prior to World War II. This

different context explains why China has embraced, and will likely continue to embrace

multilateralism, and globalization, as opposed to opting for military confrontation. Mao

perceived the United States as China’s most dangerous potential opponent during his time

(Lanteigne 2013, 86). Certainly, the USSR may have also figured prominently into the

threat assessment, especially after relations between China and the Soviet Union soured.

But, today’s world is not as unconstrained as it was in the nineteenth, and early to

mid-twentieth century. A “great power” is no longer simply defined as one capable of

prevailing in an armed conflict (Nye, The Future of Power 2011, 4). According to Joseph

Nye, power is ultimately the capacity to get the desired outcomes. As Nye points out,

power cannot be merely measured by the size of the population, territory, economic

resources, or military capability; aspects that China possesses in great amounts. These

are mere vehicles that convey power. The key to power, and security, is to be able to

coerce, and reward other actors for preferred outcomes that are beneficial (Nye, The

Future of Power 2011, 8-10).

 
36  
      

Even as the United States likely represents its only real threat, China has been

careful to not enter into an arms race with the United States. Although, China’s defense

budget is increasing consistently, it still pales in comparison to the United States. As of

2010, China’s defense budget was just 2% of its GDP, as opposed to the United States

defense budget comprised of 4.8% of its GDP (Lanteigne 2013, 83). China’s choice to

use “active defense” consistently within its discourse seems to be a deliberate attempt to

convey its military intentions to the rest of the world, particularly the United States.

The fact that China does not patrol the waters of the Western Hemisphere, even

though it has significant economic interests in the region, while its naval vessels have

entered the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones in the Pacific, astutely reciprocates U.S.

naval activity in South Asia, while mitigating alarm in the U.S. mainland. These patterns

seem to betray a strategy of projecting power, without projecting coercive force. If

Joseph Nye is correct, and the key to power, and security, is to be able to coerce, and

reward other actors for preferred outcomes that are beneficial, then China is likely

attempting to coerce the U.S. to mirror its behavior in how it secures its interests while

respecting sovereignty (Nye, The Future of Power 2011, 8-10).

CHAPTER VI

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

Brazil and Venezuela

China’s behavior in Latin America demonstrates an astute balance of cooperative

economic activity with a slow and deliberate increase in military activity. While the

 
37  
      

military activity is not directly coercive, increased Chinese military presence and

influence in the region advances commercial and political objectives while it builds

China’s understanding of Latin American governments and their military affairs (Ellis

2011, iv). As it has already been demonstrated, China’s foreign policy, militarily and

economically, is an expression of its national goals.

This foreign policy is analogous to a bright beam of light whose color and

intensity is affected by whichever lens it happens to project itself through. A nation, as

influential as China, has the ability to regulate the intensity and focus of that light. Each

country that China interacts with offers a different lens, thereby affecting how Chinese

foreign policy is expressed, and perceived. In the case of Brazil, given its lofty foreign

policy goals, and matching economic focus, China’s foreign policy appears as an

economic venture centered on the extraction of commodities and the opening of

consumer markets. But, when China’s foreign policy shines through the lens of countries

like Venezuela and its leftist allies, it is expressed not only by economic deals but also by

high-level military contact, military sales, and training, as these are events that fit that

country’s discourse. China is certainly aware of such idiosyncrasies and the significance

of such knowledge is in how, and when, China chooses to engage certain partners in

Latin America.

The Federative Republic of Brazil

Because of its economic interdependence with Latin America, Chinese President

Hu Jintao visited Brazil in 2000. This trip paved the way for a series of deals that have

strengthened close economic links between China and its Latin American partners

(Jacques 2009, 320). As the United States continues to spend a great amount of blood

 
38  
      

and treasure in the battlefields of the Middle East and South West Asia, China has

continued to bombard Latin America with investment and this has had an enduring

positive economic benefit for China. China has moved aggressively to fill a vacuum left

by the United States (Tyler Bridges 2009).

Prior to the worldwide economic crisis of 2008, the price of critical raw materials

such as iron, copper, aluminum, zinc and platinum grew at an astounding rate. These

increases had tremendous positive impacts on the national economies of nascent powers

in Latin America and this led to stronger alliances for China. Just about 96% of the

world’s iron ore is produced in only 15 countries and Brazil has membership in this

group (Chellaney 2006, 103). China’s investment in Latin America has increased to

$11.3 billion and it is increasing steadily. This represents a ten-fold increase between

2001 and 2008 (Chellaney 2006, 91). In less than ten years at the beginning of the 21st

Century, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13

billion in 2000 century to more than $120 in 2009 (Bb).

As a result of China’s potential for manufacture, and its necessity to exploit this

potential, it has embarked on the Going Global strategy (Jacques 2009, 319). Going

Global is a long-term relationship building effort that prioritizes the political and

economic ties of countries bestowed with the wealth of critical resources necessary to

fuel the growing Chinese economy. This international strategy by the Chinese

government has impacted nearly every market in Latin America and has also worked to

hedge out United States’ influence in the region.

In April 14, 2010, China’s President Hu Jintao once again initiated a tour of Latin

American nations essential to the Chinese global economic strategy and its own internal

 
39  
      

growth potential. During this particular trip, the Chinese President visited Brazil,

Venezuela and Chile. In Brazil, Hu Jintao met with the members of the BRIC, an

economic quartet comprised of Brazil, Russia, India and China that meet periodically in

order to discuss matters that centered on economic ties and reforms (Chellaney 2006,

210). On December 24, 2010, Hu Jintao sent a formal letter to South African President

Jacob Zuma to inform him of the decision to invite South Africa into the BRIC

association. South Africa’s inclusion offers improved access to fellow BRIC members to

resources such as oil and platinum (Seria 2010). The economic association is now known

as BRICS, to include South Africa into the acronym.

China has been very proactive in increasing its power and influence in the

Western Hemisphere, particularly with regards to Brazil. On March 26, 2013, China and

Brazil signed a monumental trade deal just hours prior to the start of the 2013 BRICS

Summit in Durban, South Africa. This three-year trade deal would allow for China and

Brazil to conduct trade in their own currencies, up to $30 billion per year, and it will also

allow for these two large economies to make changes to a global trade system long

dominated by the United States and Europe (Flak and Lopes 2013). On November 20,

2013, the People’s Bank of China communicated its decision to stop amassing foreign-

exchange reserves, which include the dollar (Zhou 2013). Viewed in their proper scale

these are not events that, by themselves, will have immediate negative consequences on

the value of the dollar. But, they propose the possibility that China might be taking slow

and deliberate steps that can undermine the United States currency, with the cooperation

of partners in the Western Hemisphere.

 
40  
      

Alliances and treaties with China not only provide an opportunity for economic

growth for Latin American countries, but it also ties it in with a partner with existing, and

growing, international influence. China is a permanent member of the United Nations

Security Council. As such, China has the power to veto any UN sanctions proposal

against any one of its business partners. This is a characteristic that is most beneficial to

a country like Venezuela, which has recently been subject of much criticism for its

handling of student protests against the Maduro government (Penhaul, Esprit and Chelsea

2014).

But, such level of potential protection by association with China may also carry

substantial weight with all other regional partners as well. China’s inherent international

political cover is a tremendously significant perk for its trading partners in the Latin

American region (Chellaney 2006, 142). Of the five current permanent members of the

UN Security Council, none are Latin American countries. Yet, although close

partnership and coordination with China has been lucrative to Brazil, China’s sovereignty

concerns have, at times, maintained an asymmetry that is decidedly in its favor.

Though Brazil recognized China’s market economy status in 2004, China denied

Brazil’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2005 (Pereira and

De Castro Neves 2011, 7) (Dantas 2011). This was not necessarily a slight against Brazil

on the part of China. This was a deliberate move by China to protect its interests in its

own strategic area of interest as Brazil had launched its bid along with Germany, India

and Japan. Although, China and India have worked to develop and maintain positive

bilateral relations in spite of historic tensions, sovereignty disputes with Japan persist

 
41  
      

(Saran 2013). A permanent UN Security Council seat for either India or Japan has the

potential of becoming significantly problematic for China in the future.

China has continued to exploit its partnerships in order to ascend to higher

international status in multilateral organizations and forums. As part of his activities

during his 2009 tour of Latin America, President Hu Jintao issued a Joint Communiqué

referring to a “Joint Action Plan” between China and Brazil. One of the goals of the

agreement is to “strengthen communication and coordination in international

organizations and multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations and the World

Trade Organization” (Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2013). The Chinese Ministry of

Commerce published an updated reaffirmation of the Joint Action Plan on its official

website on April 15, 2013 (Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2013). The WTO voted for

its new director-general nearly a month later (Santos 2013). The new leader of the WTO

was a Brazilian official who wasted little time in assigning a Chinese official to one of

the highest offices in the organization. While correlation does not assume causality, the

timing of these events is hard to ignore.

The new director of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the former Brazilian

ambassador to that multilateral trade organization. Roberto Azevedo took the helm of the

WTO on September 1, 2013 (Rapoza 2013). On October 1, Azevedo appointed Yi

Xiaozhun, a key negotiator in China’s WTO accession process, as one of four Deputy

Directors-General (World Trade Organization 2013). This is the first time that China has

filled such a high-level position in the WTO. According to long-time Brazilian foreign

policy reporter, Jamil Chade, Brazil’s maneuvering to get the votes for Azevedo’s

appointment likely included giving China an important position within the WTO. China

 
42  
      

voted for Azevedo. Neither the United States, nor the European Union voted for the

Brazilian (Rapoza 2013). It is fairly logical to conclude that the appointments at the

WTO follow the strategic goals that China has set with regards to its partnership with

Brazil as outlined by the Joint Action Plan.

Although, China’s interests in Latin America seem to be purely economic, they

are also diplomatic. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America uses the One China policy as

“the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and

Latin American and Caribbean countries” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). In

this way, China uses its economic influence, and advantaged interdependence to strip

away Taiwan’s allies in the region (Erikson and Chen 2007). As the United States

upholds Taiwan’s current status, this also weakens the United States’ foreign policy

position in this regard.

For China, the partnership with Brazil avails the former with significant access to

commodity goods, a market for consumer goods, as well as the ability to coordinate

efforts in order to strengthen its position in the international system. Even though

Brazil’s current foreign policy is heavily influenced by the leftist Worker’s Party

ideology, and it openly supports anti-U.S. countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and

Cuba, it does not engage on the inflammatory rhetoric that is the norm for the likes of

Hugo Chavez, or Nicolas Maduro as the centerpiece of its foreign policy (The Economist

2013). Thus, China’s interaction with Brazil appears as pure economic intercourse

designed to facilitate China’s rise.

 
43  
      

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

What was emblematic of China’s growing necessity for influence and access in

Latin America was Hu Jintao’s visit to Venezuela. Not only was this President Hu

Jintao’s first visit to the Bolivarian Republic, but it also marked the beginning of a very

lucrative petroleum exploration and exploitation deal with Venezuela. This deal was

comprised of a $900 million payment by the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation

(CNPC) as a fee for the right to explore and exploit the oil rich territories of the Orinoco

Belt in southern Venezuela. The venture has the potential to yield the production of

approximately 400,000 barrels of crude per day. A sizeable portion of Venezuela’s

petroleum exports to China has been used to pay for billions of dollars of Chinese loans

to the Venezuelan government (Orozco and Cancel 2010).

The fact that President Hu Jintao visited Venezuela shortly after attending the

Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, just a day prior, is illustrative of

China’s flexible form of multilateral international politics and its penchant for

pragmatism over ideology (El Nacional 2010). But, this may be a message to the United

States that China will embrace its national interests, even when they may be contrary to

U.S. interests in the region. To the countries in the Latin American region, this is also a

message that China will not meddle in their domestic affairs, and that it will not base its

interactions on differences in ideology as long as these do not conflict with China’s

sovereignty and territorial integrity. Hugo Chavez’ legacy of politics in the region is well

known for its open disdain for U.S. hegemony. Economic deals with China afford

Venezuela an opportunity to further leftist ideology in the region while strengthening its

own standing.

 
44  
      

Signing deals with Latin American countries has not been limited to common

consumer goods. In fact, China has used the sales of arms in order to gain access to the

raw materials so essential to its economic growth (Chellaney 2006, 90). In the latter part

of the 1990’s Latin American countries collectively became China’s second largest

market for the sale of Chinese Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAM). These weapons systems

were most likely purchased to ameliorate general strategic concerns regarding the lack

overwhelming air superiority of emerging regional super-powers such as Brazil, Chile,

and Venezuela. Of course, it also addresses the air superiority threat that may be

perceived from United States and any regional country secured by it (Medeiros and Gill

2000, 12).

On December 28, 2013, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro expressed that

China had given the Andean nation $5 million in credits in a deal reached in September

2013. Venezuela has received approximately $36 billion from China, and it pays for it in

petroleum exports. Maduro indicated that the money would be used for infrastructure

projects, as well as for technology and the military (Associated Press 2013). According

to an official spokesman of the Venezuelan government, an earlier deal with Venezuela,

included $500 million worth in weapon systems, encrypted military communications

systems, tactical transport aircraft, amphibious tanks, and other armored vehicles (Ybarra

2013). China is also assisting the Venezuelan government to circumvent a military arms

embargo imposed by the United States in 2006 by assisting in the repair of U.S.-made

gas-turbine engines on Venezuelan navy frigates (Gertz, Rising Red Tide: China

encircles U.S. by sailing ships in American waters, arming neighbors 2013, United States

Department of State 2006).

 
45  
      

When China publicly released its first National Defense Policy white paper in

1999, its rhetoric emphasized that its foreign military contact was limited to dialogue and

cooperation without “interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and without

aiming at a third party” (The Central People's Government of the PRC 1999). Arguably,

to Venezuela, the “third party” is very possibly represented by the United States. From

an ideological standpoint, Cuba and Venezuela are Beijing’s closest allies in the region.

According to the BBC’s Chinese News Service correspondent Zhuang Chen, Hugo

Chavez’ self-professed struggle against the United States won him the admiration of

many Chinese who saw him compared to Mao Zedong (Chen 2013). But, China has

stayed true to its goal of increasing its influence globally, in order to grow its economy

and international standing, in such a way as to prevent any future assaults on its

sovereignty.

Therefore, the last time that President Xi Jinping traveled to Latin America in the

summer of 2013, he avoided any potentially troublesome meetings with the polarizing

leaders of Venezuela and Cuba. Instead, he visited nearby Trinidad and Tobago, Costa

Rica, and Mexico. This apparent diplomatic snub to its ideological, and economic allies

is part of China’s continued effort to open new opportunities in the Western Hemisphere

(Tricks 2013). Trinidad and Tobago’s relationship with China was valued at $627

million in 2011, largely as a result of petroleum and natural gas processing (Shasha

2013). Costa Rica signed a $2 billion agreement with China for the development of

petroleum refineries, which will enable them to process up to 65,000 barrels of crude oil

per day (Zhaokun 2013).

 
46  
      

This may be seen as China’s own pivot towards the Western Hemisphere (Tricks

2013). But, instead of patrolling the region with its naval vessels, China has limited itself

to high-level government meetings, and trade deals that promote China’s foreign policy

agenda while it also strengthens its influence in the region. But, what will a shift from a

cooperative to a coercive China look like? To what extent does an increase in the

presence of Chinese military activity in Latin America involve the first steps to a

significant, and potentially coercive presence? What should U.S. policy makers watch

for? I answer those questions below.

CHAPTER VII
Conclusion

China’s background reveals that they are driven primarily by concerns over their

national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic development. China’s history of

what it perceives as multiple attacks on its sovereignty have shaped its current discourse,

and the actions that are driven by the same. The theme of such discourse is so much a

part of the Chinese rhetoric that it can be found, nearly unchanged, in the Chinese

National Defense white papers of 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012, within the National

Defense Policy section (Government of PRC 2014). China uses its diplomatic and

economic influence to strip away Taiwan’s allies in Latin America by making countries

choose between Taiwanese recognition and the One China policy. Its rhetoric tells us

that it wishes a peaceful rise that is safeguarded by a strict respect for Chinese

sovereignty. This rhetoric is also present in most other forms of official government

communication, such as official foreign policy discourse by Chinese Heads of State.

 
47  
      

China’s active defense policy aims at projecting an image of non-aggression.

However, as China considers Taiwan, as well as other disputed areas, as an integral part

of its sovereign territory, an active defense also means that these areas may be defended

in some not-so-distant future as if they were within main land China. Yet, at this time it

does not appear that such intentions extend extraterritorially to Chinese economic

interests in far-flung areas of the world, like the Latin America region, as China clearly

understands that it is not in its best economic interest to alarm U.S. policy makers.

Part of the suspicions of China’s intentions may stem from the secretive

characteristics of its centralized government, as well as its military, as compared to the

relative openness of the United States in the same respect. Yet, in what appears to be its

attempt at mitigating such suspicions, China has recently taken the unprecedented step to

give U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel a tour of China’s first aircraft carrier; a Soviet-

era 60,000 ton vessel that China purchased from Ukraine and re-fitted for its entry into

naval aviation. The vessel is not fully operational, and Hagel and his entourage only got

to see a few of the spaces (Stewart 2014). Yet, the gesture is more significant in its

symbolism. Chinese military leadership gets frequent access to U.S. naval vessels during

official visits. This gesture by the Chinese aims to quell concerns of future coercion by

acting with a degree of openness that would have been unheard of just a few years ago

and this is congruent with the Chinese discourse of a peaceful rise. This last point is very

important. Although, discourse does not ensure that word and thought will equal deed, it

creates a framework through which China’s national leadership can validate their

message by matching it up with significant actions. Discourse is not always predictive,

but it is often indicative.

 
48  
      

Even as China sells military hardware to Brazil, Venezuela, and other Latin

American countries, it does not extend its military activity to deploying a Special Forces

company, or battalion into the region to conduct counter-terrorist training, or aid in

supplanting an insurgency. Yet, these are actions that the United States has taken openly

in Colombia, as well as in the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China’s military activities in Latin America,

outside of military sales, has been limited to long-term participation in UN peacekeeping

in Haiti, and events such as a humanitarian exercise in Peru, as well as frequent military-

to-military contact, at varying levels, and training activities (Ellis 2011, iv).

China has affected the influence that the United States has in Latin America. It is

Brazil’s number one trading partner and it is projected that by 2017 it will surpass the

United States as the largest trading partner in the region (Powell 2012). The engagement

strategy that China has embraced is one that not only avails it of access to some of the

most critical resources required for economic growth, but it also gives it the ability to

influence its most important partners in the region. China has not only signed high-

dollar-value deals with just about every economic power in Latin America, but it has also

engaged the population in a campaign of good will. China has donated soccer stadiums,

police and fire emergency vehicles, built schools that not only teach the Chinese

language, but culture as well. China, from the perspective of Latin American countries,

has yet to place a single soldier on the ground to conquer and retain terrain or territory, or

to kill and/or capture anyone inside of their countries.

China’s growing influence in Latin America has alarmed some in Washington,

but this is not as a result of any coercive actions on its part. This fear likely exists

 
49  
      

because policy makers fear that the U.S. will eventually find itself generally out of favor

in regional affairs and trade deals, as Brazil’s choice to establish lucrative petroleum

deals with China, as opposed to the U.S., has shown. As far as the Latin American

people are concerned, the Chinese are intent on building wealth, not military bases or

outposts. From a Latin American perspective, Chinese foreign policy in Latin America

seems, at best, benign and even charitable. At worst, the Chinese foreign policy may

seem competitively aggressive, but not threateningly intrusive.

China’s activity in Latin America can also serve as additional deterrence against

U.S. aggression in what China may consider its own backyard. China’s increased

influence in Latin America can provide a measure of deterrence in that a conflict in Asia-

Pacific would not only hurt the United States economy, but would have grave

repercussions for the developing Latin American countries that trade heavily with both

China, as well as the United States. The United States would be pressured away from

exacerbating a conflict that would hurt many regional allies and economic partners, many

of which might enact retaliatory policies further isolating the United States in the

international system. But, there exists the potential that China may exploit its growing

power and influence in Latin America when it has the capability to truly challenge the

United States militarily, and if it feels U.S. military action is imminent against its

interests in the South China Sea.

Some of the arms trading between China and Latin American partners inevitably

involve the presence of Chinese trainers and troops. To what extent does this activity

involve the first steps to a significant presence? There exists that possibility that

whenever China achieves the ability to deter the United States by projecting the

 
50  
      

necessary force far from the Chinese mainland, that it may be capable of holding the

United States at risk in its own hemisphere, as the United States is able to do today in

China’s geographic area of strategic interest. This would make it possible for China to

disrupt U.S. naval forces before they can reach the PRC (Ellis 2011, 9). This may

become another expression of China’s active defense.

An early indicator of a coercive Chinese military presence may be the

establishment of exclusive and long-term basing rights for Chinese naval vessels, attack

and surveillance aircraft for the apparent purpose of training their Latin American

partners. Also, basing for the persistent presence of training cadre composed of entire

maneuver ground elements, such as a company, or battalion may form the incipient phase

of such a coercive intent under the guise of military-to-military cooperation. China

already has the capability to influence the flow of vessels through Panama Canal, and is

working to increase that level of influence along with its effort to secure its access to

trade in the region.

Chinese developer Wang Jing, a telecom tycoon who has achieved a positive

relationship with past and current Chinese leadership and Politburo members, is currently

working final details for the construction of a canal across Nicaragua that will reportedly

exceed the capability of the U.S.-constructed Panama Canal. The Nicaraguan canal will

open a trade route to Latin America for Venezuelan crude oil, as well as other

commodities (Sydney Morning Herald 2014). The Panama Canal Ports Company, a

subsidiary of the Chinese-owned Hutchinson Port Holdings, has exclusive rights to the

management of both sides of the Panama Canal (Panama Port Company 2014). Thus,

 
51  
      

China has the ability to influence the access through the Panama Canal, as well as the

potential to do the same through the future Nicaraguan Canal.

According to Dr. Evan Ellis of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,

“nothing in the public discourse of Chinese leadership, policy papers, or debates” points

to Latin America being a potential base of PLA military operations (Ellis 2011, 9). All

of the evidence presented in this work, including China’s history, diplomatic,

informational, military, and economic activity, has shown China to be very consistent

with its current discourse. This is especially true in the post-Mao Zedong China, which

purposely moved away from the perils of external military ventures such as its

participation in the conflicts in Korea, India, the Soviet Union, and in Vietnam. Today,

China wishes to modernize and professionalize its military, and continue its economic

relationships throughout the world, in order to continue to facilitate its rise. However, the

possibility that those goals may change, and that China may go from cooperative to

coercive when it feels threatened in the South China Sea, is possible and must be

mitigated by U.S. policy makers.

Although, China has made efforts to open access to its official discourse via

various government-sanctioned websites, there is limited information as to the details of

their military-to-military contact in Latin America. What is the size of the current force

commitment in the various Latin American countries that it interacts with? What are the

trends of these deployments? Have these deployments become recurring relationship-

based visits, where the same units continue to exert a presence and gain expertise, in

specific areas of the region? Though, it seems that such information is elusive at this

time, further observation and research is required to continue to discern the dynamics of

 
52  
      

China’s discursive acts and its activities in the Western Hemisphere. Much of this

information may become available through the local media in the various Latin American

countries as these events occur. As China recently opened up to the U.S. Vice-President

about its first aircraft carrier, perhaps more openness is forthcoming.

Policy Recommendations

The United States strategy of isolating leftist governments in Latin America is

counterproductive to regional cooperation and fails to mitigate pushback from the

increased number of leftist governments in the region that follow the lead of more

established leftist governments such as Cuba and Venezuela. This policy must be re-

engineered in light of the current national security situation, and the realities of the global

market and the resulting economic interdependence.

While Cuba and Venezuela are but two countries in the region, their regional

leadership has influenced the domestic politics, and foreign policies of Bolivia, Ecuador,

Nicaragua, Argentina and Brazil to varying degrees. As has been discussed, China does

not predicate its degree of interaction with Latin American countries on similarity of

ideology, or method of governance, as long as these do not interfere with China’s

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic development. As the United States has a

difficult history with many Latin American countries, attempting at isolating any of those

sovereign nations further exacerbates the in-out group dynamic and this impacts the

dialogue in the region. This puts China in an advantageous position as the alternative to

U.S. hegemony.

 
53  
      

Daniel Griswold, Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato

Institute, suggests that the goal of isolating Cuba is a failed policy. During the bipolar era

that ended in 1991 there was a clear national security reason for the Cuban embargo,

especially, if one remembers the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But, the bipolar era

has ended long ago. If the United States’ goal for its policy of isolating Cuba was

designed to lead its people to freedom, then “the economic embargo has completely

failed. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse off by depriving them of

lower-cost food and other goods that could be bought from the United States” (Griswold

2005). This results in allowing the Castro government to continue its repression while

being able to blame the consequences of poverty and lack of opportunity on the United

States, and this furthers the narrative of victimization that muddles the intentions of the

U.S. in the region in the eyes of many Latin American countries.

The United States policy of isolation, based on an outmoded Cold War strategy,

runs counter to the basic character of many Latin American nation-states. Multilateral

instruments in Latin America have roots in leftist ideology. Argentina and Brazil have

embraced independent foreign policies, and leftist ideals, to the point of maintaining

diplomatic relations, and trade with the USSR, as far back as 1962 (Herring 2008, 717).

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted as much when she was asked about

United States relations with Venezuela on May 2009. On the issue of the policy of

isolation, she stated that when considers “a number of countries and leaders -- Chavez is

one of them but not the only one -- who, over the last eight years, has become more and

more negative and oppositional to the United States . . . the prior administration tried to

isolate them, tried to support opposition to them, tried to . . . turn them into international

 
54  
      

pariahs. It didn't work” (Weisbrot 2009). At this juncture, Cuba does not seem to pose

an existential strategic risk to United States national security in the region (Griswold

2005). Thus, the United States has a good reason to consider rescinding the embargo,

and isolation, of Cuba, and work to normalize relations, as it did with the PRC.

The emphasis of effective Latin American engagement should focus on

cooperation, conflict resolution, and move away from exclusionary ideology as the basis

for interstate relations within the Western Hemisphere. The United States will benefit

from a revolutionary shift from its isolation policy with regards to Cuba, and Venezuela.

This will serve to reset United States relations in the region, and will also minimize the

effective use of the historically antagonistic relations as the ideological touchstone that

inspires exclusion of the United States from regional dialogue outside of the Organization

of American States.

The U.S. Department of Defense also needs to work to further increase its

military interaction with the PLA, to include military-to-military exchanges, as well as

joint military exercises. This will not only begin to create substantive relationships

among military leaders from both nations, but will lend a better understanding of the

PLA, its true capabilities, and intent. These types of exchanges need not compromise

highly classified programs and can be achieved in a manner similar to how the United

States interacts with a number of Latin American countries on a daily basis.

 
55  
      

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 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAJOR JUAN PEREZ

MAJ Juan Perez was born and raised in Brooklyn, NY. He was commissioned

into the US Army Corps of Engineers as a 2nd Lieutenant on 4 June 1998. His

assignments include A Company, 41st Engineer Battalion, as Sapper Platoon Leader;

HSC, 41st Engineer Battalion, as Assault and Obstacle Platoon Leader; and 642nd

Engineer Company, as Support Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer. After

completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course he was assigned to Bravo

Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, as the SFODA 783 Commander, and

subsequently, as the Company Executive Officer. He also served as the Commander of

HSC, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group before attending WHINSEC ILE.

Upon returning to 7th Special Forces Group in 2009, Juan was immediately

assigned overseas as the CJSOTF-A Current Operations Chief in support of OEF. This

was followed by a temporary assignment to a unified combatant command as an

operations officer for an inter-agency effort abroad, and later as Commander of the

Operations Detachment, GSB, 7th Special Forces Group. In 2012, Juan returned to Bravo

Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group – where he previously served as a

detachment commander and executive officer – to serve as its company commander.

Juan’s overseas duty includes multiple deployments to USCENTCOM, USNORTHCOM

and USSOUTHCOM areas of responsibility. Juan is married to the former Ms. Natalia

Elizabeth Martinez from Luque, Paraguay. They have two daughters, Mya Elizabeth (5

yrs. old), and Andrea Elizabeth (5 mos. old).