Food

SUP kills the benefits of soil. UN 21:

[United Nations 21, "How plastic is infiltrating the world’s soils", December 3th, 2021,
https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/how-plastic-infiltrating-worlds-soils, RR]

Much of the plastic that finds its way into soil is of the single-use variety, says Pradhan. Frequent sources
include plastic mulch films, which are used around plants to keep the soil moist, and
plastic-encapsulated, slow-release fertilizers, he says. Other plastic products include films for greenhouses and silage, shade and protection
nets, and drip irrigation, says Lev Neretin, from the Office of Climate Change, Biodiversity and Environment at FAO. Many farmers are increasingly reliant on
agricultural plastics, which Neretin says extend growing seasons, reduce pesticide consumption, safeguard plants from inclement weather, improve water efficiency
and can boost yields up to 60 per cent. Several
of these plastics break down into particles smaller than 5mm in size,
known as microplastics, before disintegrating further into nanoparticles, which are less than 0.1
micrometre in size. These can then leech into the soil and groundwater systems. But the problem isn’t intractable,
says Kristina Thygesen, a Senior Expert at GRID Arendal working with UNEP to research plastics in agriculture.“The first step to solving this problem is to start growing
more crops that are a better fit for the climate,” she added.

Microplastics in plant stunt growth. Peterson 20:

[Teddie Kelly 21, "Could depletion of fertile soil trigger a bigger U.S. food crisis?", March 09, 2021, Workers World, https://www.workers.org/2021/03/54922/, RR]

Sixteen days into Kirkham's microplastics and cadmium experiment, her plastic-treated wheat plants began to yellow and wilt. Water had been pooling on the top of
the soil in the plastic treated plants, but to keep her experiment consistent, she had to give all the plants the same amount of water. "Theparticulate
plastic appeared to clog the soil pores, prevent aeration of the soil, and cause…the roots to die," said
Kirkham. Plants without microplastics, even the cadmium-contaminated ones, were in much better
shape. "It was the plastics that were controlling the growth more than the cadmium." Another team of researchers
reported similar results. They found that exposure to plastics resulted in reduced weight, height, chlorophyll content,

and root growth of Arabidopsis thaliana, a relative of cabbage and broccoli. In this study, the researchers used
nanoplastics, which are plastic pieces that are less than 100 nanometers in size. For scale, the novel coronavirus measures 60 to 140 nanometers. The full

impact of microplastics contamination in agricultural soils, particularly as concentrations increase with

time, is unknown. However, studies have shown that microplastics possess physical and chemical
characteristics that have the potential to alter soil bulk density, microbial communities, water holding
capacity, and other properties that influence plant development.

https://www.workers.org/2021/03/54922/

Food crises are devastating. WEF 23:

[World Economic Forum 23, 2-6-2023, "Soil health is crucial for food production," https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/02/soil-degradation-biodiversity-planet/,
RR]

Biodiversity loss is threatening the global economy and the world's food supply. We rely on the soil for
95% of food, globally, but a third of it has already degraded, according to the UN. Technological solutions to keep soil
healthy and monitor its quality can help combat land degradation. Biodiversity is crucial to the global economy. More than half (55%) of global GDP is dependent on
the healthy function of the natural world, equating to $41.7 trillion, according to the Swiss Re Institute. Its research found that one-fifth of countries are at risk of
their ecosystems collapsing due to biodiversity loss. Such changes to the environment are also threatening global food
security. More than 800 million people go to bed hungry each night. That’s almost one in 10 of the global population. By 2050,
we will need to produce 60% more food to feed a global population of more than 9 billion, UN estimates suggest.

Oil

Big Oil
The oil industry hinges on plastic consumption. Anderson 22:
[Stefan Anderson, "Plastics On Track To Account For 20% Of Oil And Gas Consumption By 2050", November 11, 2022, Health Policy Watch News,
https://healthpolicy-watch.news/plastics-account-for-20-oil-and-gas-2050/, RR]

HARM EL-SHEIKH, EGYPT – As global delegations fight to keep the dream of limiting warming to 1.5C within reach, plastic pollution contaminating aquatic life, soil
quality and the human body, is skyrocketing. The
relentless growth of demand for plastics driven by subsidies for fossil
fuels, coupled with the failure of recycling and waste management systems to keep pace, has set a
trajectory whereby plastics consumption will account for 20% of global oil and gas consumption by
2050. “One million plastic bottles are consumed every minute,” Ecuadorian Environment Minister Gustavo Manrique Miranda
told COP27 delegates at a United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development on Thursday. “By the end of our meeting, the world will have consumed 60
million bottles.”

Fossil fuel transitions mean plastic demand is Big Oil’s last straw. Ellinas 23:
[Charles Ellinas, "Rising demand for plastics to drive oil and gas use in 2023 [Gas in Transition]", March 06, 2023, Natural Gas World,
https://www.naturalgasworld.com/rising-demand-for-plastics-to-drive-oil-and-gas-use-in2023-gas-in-transition-104026, RR]

The demand for oil and gas continues to increase despite outlooks produced by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) that show it peaking over the next few years. A contributor to this is the rising demand for
plastics globally. Growing populations and rising GDP and prosperity are boosting demand for petrochemicals. But this is contributing to growing
environmental concerns that are driving major initiatives to curb plastics pollution, by improving recycling and reducing plastics production and consumption.
Plastics consumption by 2050 Plastics
consumption increased by 400% since the 1980s and it is still rising
exponentially. By 2025, plastic production is expected to exceed 600mn metric tons/year and then
double by 2050. Another staggering statistic is that more than half of all plastics produced so far were
made since the year 2000. This growing demand for plastics is driving global oil and gas demand and it
is expected to offset reductions due to the transition away from fossil fuels. IEA’s Future of Petrochemicals report in
2018 identified petrochemicals as the sector rapidly becoming the largest driver of global oi…

Banning SUPs ends the industry. Vaughan 18:

[Vaughan 18 [Adam Vaughan, "Plastic bans worldwide will dent oil demand growth, says BP", 02/20/2018, the Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/feb/20/plastic-bans-worldwide-will-dent-oil-demand-growth-says-bp] //DAO NIR //recut RR]

Bans around the world on single use plastic items such as carrier bags will dent growth in oil demand over the next two decades, according to
BP. However, the UK-headquartered oil and gas firm said it still expects the global hunger for crude to grow for years and not peak until the late 2030s. Spencer Dale,
the group’s chief economist, said: “Just around the world you see increasing awareness of the environmental damage associated with plastics and different types of
packaging of one form of another.

“About 8% to 10% of our total oil supply goes to making plastic”

Big Oil is praying for SUPs to continue to generate demand. Roberts 20:
[David Roberts, "Big Oil’s hopes are pinned on plastics. It won’t end well.", 10/28/2020, Vox,
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21419505/oil-gas-price-plastics-peak-climate-change, RR]

Big Oil’s hopes are pinned on plastics. It won’t end well. The industry’s only real source of growth
probably won’t grow much. By David Roberts@drvolts Updated Oct 28, 2020, 4:04pm EDT Share this story Share this on Facebook (opens in new
window) Share this on Twitter (opens in new window) SHARE All sharing options Residents bring plastic bottles to exchange for money or groceries in Semarang,
The fossil fuel industry has not been doing well lately. Even
Indonesia, in October 2020. WF Sihardian/NurPhoto via Getty Images

before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, growth in global demand had slowed to 1 percent annually. Now,
lockdowns and distancing to stop the spread of the coronavirus have decimated the industry. The International
Energy Agency (IEA) recently released projections of rapid short-term decline in global demand, to the tune of 9 percent for oil, 8 percent for coal, and 5 percent for
gas. Depending on how long and severe the economic crisis proves to be, it will take years for demand to
recover. Indeed, with electric vehicles cutting into oil demand by the end of the decade, it may never
fully recover. Industry analysts like Carbon Tracker’s Kingsmill Bond are speculating that 2019 may turn
out to be the peak of fossil fuel demand, and historically, in other industries, a peak in demand “tends to mark the beginning of a period of
low prices and poor returns,” says Bond. But the industry has a response to this dire forecast, and it can be summarized

in one word: plastics. Overall, plastics represent a fairly small sliver of oil demand. Annually, the world
consumes around 4,500 million tonnes (mt) of oil but only around 1,000mt of petrochemicals (oil and
natural gas used to make chemical products), and of that 1,000mt, only about 350mt are plastics. (A
tonne is a metric ton, about 1.1 US tons.) Nonetheless, plastics are commonly projected to be the
biggest source of new demand for oil over coming decades — in some projections, the only real source. It is these projections
that the industry is using to justify billions in new projects, as oil companies across the world shift investment toward petrochemicals. And Big Oil is

working its hardest to make the projections come true: The New York Times recently ran an investigative
piece revealing the industry’s plans to push more plastic, and plastic waste, into Kenya. Plastics are the thin reed upon
which the industry is placing all its hopes. But a new report released in September by Carbon Tracker throws a big bucket of cold water on these hopes. It argues
that, far from a reliable source of growth, plastics are uniquely vulnerable to disruption. They are coming under increasing scrutiny and regulation across the world.
And the public is turning against them. If existing solutions
Huge consumer product companies like Unilever are phasing them out.

are fully implemented, growth in plastics could fall to zero. And if that happens, then there is no
remaining source of net oil demand growth and 2019 will almost certainly prove to be the year of peak
fossil fuels. Let’s look at a few highlights from the report. Plastics are supposed to drive most oil demand
growth The report breaks down the projections of two widely respected sources of energy data and analysis, BP and the IEA. From 2020 to
2040, BP expects plastics to represent 95 percent of the net growth in demand for oil.

Past oil crises have incentivized switches to renewables. Warren 19:

[Warren K., "From oil crisis to energy revolution – how nations once before planned to kick the oil habit", 05/16/2019, Story of Change,
https://rapidtransition.org/stories/from-oil-crisis-to-energy-revolution-how-nations-oncebefore-planned-to-kick-the-oil-habit/, RR]

the energy taps were turned

Just as the modern oil and debt fuelled consumer age was building momentum in wealthy industrialised countries,

off by the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. As the world now gets to grips with the realities of making a rapid
transition away from fossil fuels in the next decade, is it time to look again at how quickly we moved
back then, when we had to? Great innovation can emerge as a direct result of crisis. The case of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis shows how government led energy conservation and a
whole new industry based on renewable energy can emerge as a result of crisis. In the early 1970s, fossil fuel
consumption was soaring and the industry was booming – until the supply tap was turned off in a shock manoeuvre by the Middle Eastern oil producers.
Overnight, national governments were forced to put in place measures to drastically reign-in
consumption – and people had to change their behaviour. Despite the deep recession this caused,
economies survived and industries adapted. Faced with a sudden lack of oil, energy conservation and
efficiency became a top priority. research into renewables also stepped up. The 1973 oil crisis, with its loud echo in 1979,
is a clear historical example of rapid transition and what people, communities and governments can do when mobilised to act.

Lowering oil demand is a prerequisite to lowering GHG emissions. Gross 18:

[Samantha Gross, "Reducing US oil demand, not production, is the way forward for the climate", 08/22/2018, Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reducing-us-oil-demand-not-production-is-the-way-forward-for-the-climate/] //DAO NIR //recut RR]

However, this
paper argues that the best way to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the oil
industry is to reduce oil demand, rather than focusing on reducing domestic oil production. This is a
more difficult task than protesting particular projects or companies; it involves changing the system through which we use
energy. In the case of oil, it primarily involves changing how we fuel our transportation system — moving from gasoline and diesel to electricity for most of our
on-road transport. It could also involve redesigning our cities and lifestyles, making more efficient forms of transport workable and attractive. While
this task
might be more challenging, changing our patterns of fuel demand will actually, permanently decrease
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Without these changes in our transport system, canceling specific
projects or limiting U.S. oil production will only move emissions elsewhere, rather than reducing them. The
United States is not the world’s marginal producer of oil, meaning that eliminating a project in the United States will not meaningfully reduce global oil production.
Oil is plentiful, fungible, and easy to transport, and other producers can easily step in to meet oil demand if the United States does not. U.S. energy security will also
suffer if the United States reduces domestic oil production faster than demand. This paper does not argue for unchecked oil production. Continuing

production must be accompanied by strong policies to reduce oil demand, as we see today in stringent
fuel economy standards established and proposed by the Biden administration, along with strict
regulation of domestic oil production. Climate change is a global problem, and policies that simply move
emissions outside the United States are not real solutions.

Low demand means lower oil prices. Murray 23:

[Cierra Murry, "How Do Supply and Demand Affect the Oil Industry?", 07/16/2023, Investopedia,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040915/how-does-law-supply-and-demand-affect-oil-industry.asp] //DAO NIR //recut RR]

In general, the law of supply and demand states that the price of any item will increase if demand for it increases or the supply for it decreases. Conversely, the law
states that the price of any item will decrease if the demand for it decreases or the supply for it increases. This is the same
with oil, and there are many factors that impact the supply and demand of oil.

Increased oil prices trigger global wars. Bunzel 18:

[Theodore; May 30; MA in Global Theory and International Economics, formerly in the Office of the Chief Economist of the Department of the Treasury and the U.S.
Embassy to Moscow; the American Interest, “Do High Oil Prices Mean More International Conflict?”
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/30/do-high-oil-prices-mean-more-international -conflict/, RR]

We may soon have more evidence for the proposition. Oil prices are brushing off 2016 lows and hitting three-year highs. Brent
crude has been
hovering above $70 a barrel since April, up from lows of around $30 in early 2016, fueled by OPEC
production cuts and rising geopolitical tensions (over issues like the Iran deal). Though nuances,
complications, and exceptions abound, the academic and historical evidence on balance tells us that, as
we transition from a lower to a higher oil price regime, we can generally expect a darker geopolitical
outlook. As rising oil revenues gives Russia, Saudi, Iran, and other oil-exporters an added sense of confidence, it may at least selectively inflame interstate
tensions and lead to more aggressive behavior. That possibility, alongside an increasingly hawkish U.S. national security team and a President who appears to feel
rather“unchained” of late, points to a potentially combustible mix just ahead. It is generally taken for granted that aspects of geopolitics can function as a key input
into oil prices. Trump’s mere threat of a U.S. strike in Syria, for example, caused oil to spike by 2 percent on April 11. In addition to short-term effects, geopolitical
competition can influence prices in other ways. To give just one general example, as Soviet power spread into parts of the Third World after the independence era,
some states felt safer nationalizing their oil industries to escape Western company control (Iraq in 1961, for example), and prices rose as a consequence. But the
relationship may also work the other way around: Oil
prices can also be a key input into geopolitics. Many studies have
demonstrated that oil prices have a direct effect on the domestic stability of petrostates. This makes
ample intuitive sense: Higher prices fill public coffers, allowing governments to palliate needy
populations and potential elite opposition groups by dispensing more largesse. Some regime elites may
reason that a firmer grip on power may free[s] themto carry out more assertive foreign policies without
fear of being undermined at home. There are, however, several complications to this general intuition. Some states already have sufficiently
buoyant revenues relative to their small populations to satisfy their publics and feed clientelistic networks. Providing largesse can also backfire if prices drop; taking
away something valuable that people have grown used to is a dangerous game, especially when elites aren’t ready to play it. And then of course there is the famed
“oil curse”: For all sorts of reasons, from “Dutch disease” economic distortions to the derangement of normal citizen-state relationships, oil riches can in time
undermine regimes, weakening and even destroying them. That said, a more recent body of research has empirically demonstrated the intuitive twin of this
conclusion:Higher prices cause greater interstate aggression by oil-producing countries. Why would this be the case? Greater oil revenue flushes petrostates with
confidence and also cash that they can put toward military spending or foreign adventures. To take one obvious example, we need only look to Iran’s using its oil
revenue to fund proxy groups such asHamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, military spending by one regional oil producer can
beget spending by others, fueling regional arms races that can make aggression and conflict by
miscalculation more likely. The onset of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 may be a prime example of
that dynamic. Most prominent among the empirical studies is Cullen S. Hendrix’s 2014 paper, which
shows a statistically significant relationship between higher oil prices and “dispute behavior” (military
actions short of actual war) by oil-exporters. (Hendrix also summed it up nicely in this Washington Post piece.) He found that “all things
being equal, a one standard deviation ($18.60) increase in the price per barrel of oil from the sample mean

($33.81) is associated with a 13 percent increase in the frequency of [dispute behavior]” in

oil-exporting states. He also found that, above $77 a barrel, oil-exporters are significantly more dispute prone than non-oil exporters. Hendrix also
explores the potential complication of reverse causality: Could dispute behavior by oil-exporting countries be driving prices higher, rather than the other way
around? A key analytical consideration here is timing. We can all agree that geopolitical activity affects prices in the short-term (such as the Syria example mentioned
above), but is this reverse causality true on a sustained basis? Parsing out long-term signal from short-term noise, Hendrix examines whether elevated aggregate
dispute behavior affects oil prices at the yearly—rather than daily or weekly—level, and finds that this relationship does not hold. His explanation here is that other
the strategic significance of oil
players typically step in to redress markets:“While dispute behavior may drive prices changes in the short term . . .

prices and oil-exporting states encourages major powers to act in ways that stabilize markets, either
through market intervention . . . or direct, armed intervention.” Jeff Colgan of Brown University has also
touched on this topic, finding through his research that oil has fueled—in some way—one quarter to
one half of interstate wars since 1973. He also notes that oil-producers are 50 percent more likely to
engage in conflict than non-oil producers. Colgan identifieseight, non-mutually exclusive causal mechanisms for how oil fuels international
conflict, most of which areimplicitly exacerbated by higher prices. They are: “(1) resource wars, in which states try to acquire oil reserves by force; (2)
petro-aggression, whereby oil insulates aggressive leaders such as Saddam Hussein or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from domestic opposition and therefore makes
them more willing to engage in risky foreign policy adventurism; (3) the externalization of civil wars in oil-producing states (“petrostates”); (4) financing for
insurgencies—for instance, Iran funneling oil money to Hezbollah; (5) conflicts triggered by the prospect of oil-market domination, such as the U.S. war with Iraq
over Kuwait in 1991; (6) clashes over control of oil transit routes, such as shipping lanes and pipelines; (7) oil-related grievances, whereby the presence of foreign
workers in petrostates helps extremist groups such as al-Qaeda recruit locals; and (8) oil-related obstacles to multilateral cooperation, such as when an importer’s
attempt to curry favor with a petrostate prevents multilateral cooperation on security issues.” Though he doesn’t substantiate statistically that higher prices lead to
more conflict through these channels, he implies it heavily. For example, he writes that, “the low oil prices of the 1990s have given way to higher and more volatile
prices, increasing the magnitude of the consequences one can expect from oil-conflict linkages.” While the emerging academic evidence may validate the claim that
higher oil prices lead to more aggression, the historical and anecdotal evidence is somewhat mixed, and understandably so. Oil price is clearly only one of many
inputs into foreign policy decision-making, and an indirect one at that. No
leader thinks, “Now that oil is at $X, I’m going to invade
my neighbor.” Context obviously matters, too: No one imagines that Ecuador or Norway is going to
invade or try to blackmail a neighbor just because spot prices rise 15 or 30 percent in a given six-month
period.Price levels seep into decision-making more subtly, affecting interlocking beliefs about strategic
behavior generally and specific cases more particularly; they may fuel self-confidence by shoring up
budget outlooks and funding the tools of more aggressive behavior in contexts where such behavior
could conceivably make sense. Moreover, there are many contravening (and occasionally countervailing) complications. Prominent among these is
the fact that low oil prices can incentivize states to “wave the flag” in order to distract from domestic difficulties—so the impact of low oil prices might lead to more
aggressive behavior in some cases. That suggests that neither high nor low prices per se may be the trigger affecting behavior, but rather notable changes in price
that become politically salient in one way or another. And there’s also the tricky issue of timing: Over what timeframe does increased oil revenue fuel aggression? Is
it in anticipation of higher prices, in direct response to the current pricing levels, or is there more of a lag in effect as oil revenue slowly shores up—or is expected to
shore up—budgets and military spending over time? The answer might depend on specific cases and leadership cadres. There is also a scaling problem. If a 20
percent rise in oil prices makes a more assertive foreign policy more likely in a given country, does a 40 percent rise make it twice as likely? Or put differently, how
much of a difference in price, and presumably in expected revenues, does it take to cross a threshold where it might have an impact on decision-making? Are there
multiple thresholds? Russia exemplifies these issues. Taking the same long view as George W. Bush in his interview, it seems self-evident thatrising oil prices and
higher government revenues over the course of the 2000s gave Putin confidence, funded military expansion and modernization, and helped enable Russia’s

most revanchist tendencies. Between 2003 and 2013, Russian military expenditure doubled as the price
of Brent crude rose from a low of around $20 a barrel in 2001 to a high of more than $140 a barrel in
2008. Russia, as the saying goes, is a gas station with nuclear weapons; a higher pump price thus means
more weapons, nuclear and otherwise. But when you cross reference this conclusion with specific acts of Russian aggression over the past
roughly twenty years, the picture gets much more complicated. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, oil was above $100 a barrel.Same with Russia’s
invasion of Crimea in 2014. But Russia also dramatically intervened in Syria in September 2015, when oil had dropped to around $50 a barrel and the economy was
sputtering due to both low energy prices and Western sanctions. Here, many analysts plausibly described these interventions as a way of rallying Russians to the flag
and distracting them from domestic hardship. More likely, Putin saw an emergency in Syria that simply had to be dealt with, no matter the cost or risk; the Assad
regime was in danger of collapsing, and Syria is Russia’s only ally offering ports and bases in the Mediterranean basin. So Russia is a bit of a mixed bag, but on
balance its behavior—especially over a long timeframe—appears to support the thesis. Saudi Arabia’s role in the 1973 Yom Kippur war also illustrates the tricky
question of timing. Saudi funding of the effort was enabled by a financial buffer created by a rise in revenues from the late 1960s, and was likely justified by an
expected rise in revenues due to an oil price increase that was anticipated, in part, because of the very war it was in the process of financing. Its reserves had already
grown so large that, for the first time, Saudi Arabia could ride out a supply (and revenue) disruption and still finance a war. But the Saudis helped finance a war that
they themselves did not participate in. So if rising oil prices led to greater interstate aggression, it did so in this case in a particularly indirect way. These are all
interesting and important nuances that attenuate any direct causal connection one might be tempted to draw between oil prices and conflict. So it would be nice to
know if historical studies have shown any significant statistical relationship between fluctuations in key sources of government revenue (and what memoirs and
archives tell us about how those situations were perceived) and interstate behavior. It would be even nicer to drill down into such studies to find cases where specific
lucrative commodities—for example, European colonial profits such as from British opium sales in China, or cotton grown in Egypt—made any difference in the
behavior of the relevant governments. Alas, such studies do not exist. Butregardless of the timeframe and mechanism, academic and historical studies alike do
suggest that higher oil prices have generally lead to more aggressive, or at least riskier, behavior in recent decades—whether in anticipation of higher prices,
immediately in their wake, or only after sufficient revenue stores are built up. So are we at a point in the energy price cycle where, all else equal, we should expect
greater interstate conflict?We’re close to Hendrix’s $77 a barrel threshold, above which oil-exporters are significantly more dispute-prone than non-oil exporters. But
given the nuances just described,this specific price threshold is probably too cute. The more realistic argument to make is about the effect of a higher-price vs.
lower-price paradigm over a multi-year horizon (particularly in light of the timing issue and potential lag). And if the period of the past two years (when Brent largely
hovered between $40 and $60) was a lower-price paradigm 18-19 is potentially gearing up to be a higher-price paradigm driven by continued supply cuts by OPEC,
tight global inventories, and—in a coincidental way—heightened geopolitical risks. We’ll see how these factors play out, but if oil prices remain elevated we may
begin to subtly feel their effects on behavior by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and perhaps others. None of this is to say that oil prices are the most important factor in
the geopolitical outlook over the near, medium, or long-term. The reputed hawkishness of Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, the effect of the upcoming mid-term
elections on Trump’s decision-making, and reactions to potential exogenous shocks (for example, a major clash in Syria between U.S. or Israeli and Iranian or Russian
forces) will play a much more direct and important role in shaping the geopolitical landscape. But a
higher oil price regime (if it holds) could
well make petrostates like Iran, Saudi, and Russia more aggressive—either in challenging
theUnitedStates and Europe in the case of Russia, or by exacerbating ongoing proxy conflicts in and
around the Middle East in the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Given these and other dynamics, we
shouldexpect a bumpy ride ahead.

Biden
Climate tips the scale for Biden’s 2024 re-election chances, even young Republicans
would flip. Gongloff 24:
[Mark Gongloff, "The 2024 Election Just Might Turn on … Climate Change?", 01/22/2024, Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-22/the-2024-election-just-might-turn-on-climate-change, RR]

If you were forced to guess the one political issue that will decide the 2024 US election based on sheer
volume of news coverage, you might pick inflation or immigration. Maybe plagiarism. Or Taylor Swift’s
Kansas City Chiefs fandom — almost anything, in fact, besides climate change. And yet a recent study
suggests anxiety about global warming might be what kept Donald Trump from a second term in the
White House in 2020, and it could deny him again this year. As far-fetched as that sounds, it’s a reminder,
at least, that support for the climate fight runs deeper in this country than many — especially Republican leaders —
might think. It is true that roughly two-thirds of Americans worry about and want solutions to an

increasingly chaotic climate. But those same Americans consistently rank that issue well below the economy, health care, crime and about a dozen
other anxieties. Just 2% of respondents in a recent Gallup poll considered climate change the biggest issue facing the US. But a new analysis of polling data by the

University of Colorado at Boulder’s Center for Social and Environmental Futures (C-SEF) suggests the
climate issue gave Democrats a 3% edge in the popular vote in 2020, more than enough to swing the
election to President Joe Biden. The researchers admit they’re “cautious and circumspect” about that specific number, which they call “unavoidably
speculative.” But evidence for some kind of political edge is compelling. Poll after poll reflect broad, if not deep, public concern about the climate and a desire for
action. And Democrats, as the only political party professing to even believe the problem exists, have a huge advantage over Republicans on the issue. They

topped the GOP by 26 points on climate in a recent ABC News/Ipsos poll, bigger than their advantage on
health care or abortion, and far bigger than the GOP’s edge on immigration or crime. How could this translate into
actual hard numbers on voting day, when all those other issues get so much more oxygen? The C-SEF researchers didn’t come up with any answers, but they
suggested a candidate’s views on climate could be a signal of basic competence: Voters “may question the broader judgment of a candidate who does not
acknowledge climate change as an issue, and they may assign such a candidate lower trust on other issues,” the researchers wrote. It’s also possible that voters

are starting to realize climate change has a growing impact on the economy, public health, immigration
and more. This will only grow more apparent, and more salient as a political issue, as the planet warms.
The world just ended the hottest year in human history, a record that may be broken in 2024,
threatening more heat waves, droughts, floods, wildfires and other disasters. Trump and his fellow Republicans,
meanwhile, just keep embracing the paleolithic “drill baby drill” denialism of a bygone age. In his first term, Trump pulled the US out of the 2015 Paris climate
agreement, rolled back environmental regulations, unleashed oil and gas drilling and more. He and his supporters apparently don’t think he went nearly far enough.
Politico reports his advisers have plans for “an all-out war on climate science and policies” if he retakes the White House. Even former South Carolina Governor Nikki
Haley, the GOP’s paragon of climate seriousness according to some, has called Biden’s massive climate bill, the Inflation Reduction Act, a “communist manifesto” and
vowed to “repeal Biden’s green energy handouts” — though most of those benefits go to Republican-run states. Two-thirds of Americans support the IRA, according
to a recent poll. Haley, in contrast, couldn’t crack 20% in Iowa’s caucuses. Denialist
rhetoric may turn on hard-core Republican
primary voters. But it risks turning off almost every other constituency in a general election, including
younger Republicans who increasingly want their party to get serious about the climate. It’s not just
good policy; it’s good politics to boot.
More projects are needed for Biden to appease environmentalists. Frazin 24:
[Rachel Frazin, "Biden seeks to appease progressives with climate moves", 01/25/2024, The Hill,
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/4429656-biden-progressives-natural-gas-climate-moves/, RR]

The Biden administration is looking to appease progressives who want it to block proposed expansions
of the nation’s natural gas exports. With the 2024 election looming and some left-wing voters souring
on President Biden, the administration appears poised to deliver at least a partial win to the Democratic
Party’s progressive wing by taking steps to elevate climate concerns on the matter and potentially delay
proposed projects. Left-wing lawmakers and voters have been pushing the administration to reject proposed terminals that would ship
American-produced natural gas abroad, citing their potential negative impacts on the climate. Now, the administration is reportedly set to
implement stricter climate reviews for the projects — and could slow them down. In deciding whether
to approve such projects, the administration is required under federal law to determine whether they
are in the “public interest.” It is expected to review the public interest criteria — and particularly whether climate considerations should be added,
Politico first reported this month. An announcement is expected soon, an environmental source told The Hill this week. And while the

administration is reviewing the criteria, it is also expected to pause any new approvals, the source said.
The New York Times reported Wednesday that the move would delay a major proposed gas terminal
known as CP2, which has come under particular fire from climate activists. A spokesperson for the White House declined
to comment. A spokesperson for the Energy Department did not respond to a request for comment. The expected announcement comes as

the administration faces disillusionment from some progressive voters — a concern for Biden ahead of
the coming election, as his reelection chances could hinge on whether or not the progressive wing of
the Democratic base turns out in November. A fall 2023 poll from Harvard found that young voters are
less likely to vote in 2024 than they were in 2020. Biden has particularly faced left-wing criticism over his handling of the war in Gaza
and scrutiny over his age. He also upset the environmentalist left, which includes a significant proportion of young voters, last year when he approved the Willow
Project, a massive oil-drilling project in Alaska. After the approval of that project, many climate activists turned their attention to the pending natural gas export
project applications, especially the CP2 project. Reports that Biden would seek to delay the CP2 project and require it to undergo a climate review drew praise from
“This is a huge win for the scientists, activists, and young people who
progressives and environmental organizations.

spoke out and made this possible,” Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) wrote in a post on X, the platform formerly
known as Twitter. Climate activist Bill McKibben wrote on X, ”Um, I think we all just won.” In a post on
Substack, he added that the expected move was also “vey very savvy,” since “Biden wants young people,
who care about climate above all, in his corner.” Shaylyn Hynes, a spokesperson for Venture Global, the company behind the CP2 project,
said in a written statement that it “appears that individuals within the White House are trying to force policymaking through leaks to the media.” She said that a
pause “would shock the global energy market … and send a devastating signal to our allies that they can no longer rely on the United States.” Natural gas, like other
fossil fuels oil and coal, contributes to climate change when it is burned. Burning gas releases fewer emissions than burning oil or coal, but environmental activists
have noted that the fuel’s production also produces emissions. Proponents of the fuel have pointed to its ability to replace oil and coal, and argue that getting more
natural gas online in the U.S. would, in the future, make countries less reliant on other producers like Russia. And while environmental activists broadly praised the
anticipated move from the Biden administration as a significant step in the right direction, some said that a pause and expanded climate review on the proposed
export expansion would not be enough on their own, and that the projects should be stopped. “Growing
national pressure from youth and
frontline communities to end fossil fuel expansion got us here. Now the administration needs to go the
full nine yards and reject CP2 and all new oil and gas projects,” Jean Su, director of the Center for Biological Diversity’s Energy
Justice program, said in a written statement.

Unchecked Trump agenda causes extinction

Nisbet 16 – Matthew Nisbet, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate
Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who Studies the Role of
Communication, Media, and Public Opinion in debates Over Science, Technology, and the
Environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump Would Deliver Fatal Blow To Fight Against Climate
Change,"
http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf)
Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight
against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his
hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised
to “cancel the Paris climate agreement“, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the
“stupid” Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often
defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech
yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary
Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to
capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his
appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American
energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton
is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential
threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a
wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in
the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working
to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet
even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive
targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few
years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy
policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past
comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax”
and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled
when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to
abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to
create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest
level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice.
He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and
“criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further
destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to
deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump’s bravado and reckless
unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions
with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict. In the midst of such dysfunction and
upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The
stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher.