My Economist

Leaders
Anger in China
Ominous noises came this week from the world’s two would-be superpowers. China,
understandably angry at the mistaken bombing of its embassy in Belgrade, exhibited the power
of the mob and the strength of its suspicion of the West. Russia suddenly sowed confusion when
President Boris Yeltsin sacked his government, putting the country’s international stance in
doubt. The consequences of either event—or both—could prove dangerous
May 13th 1999|

MORE than a building was blown apart by NATO's blunder in bombing the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade last Friday. This careless folly has set back the efforts to end the war in Yugoslavia,
knocked NATO's credibility and further damaged America's already difficult relations with China.
Meanwhile China's violent reaction to what it still refuses to accept as an error could yet put
much more at risk: the drive for economic reform at home, China's wealth-creating opening to
the outside world and its aspirations to be taken as a responsible power by its neighbours.
Among the rubble can also be counted a much-cherished Chinese myth: that the world's most
populous country could remain its least engaged power.

NATO's military planners have some rethinking to do. But so does China. Before the three bombs
struck, the Chinese public had been told nothing of the plight of the 1m or more Kosovars driven
from their homes by their Serb tormentors—and cared even less. NATO's bombing campaign in
Yugoslavia, in an attempt to end the Serb atrocities there, had been portrayed by China as simply
the mad maraudings of the neo-imperialist West. Little wonder, then, that many Chinese saw the
attack on their embassy as a deliberate attempt to humiliate their country (see article). China's
first reaction—to demand a full apology and explanation from NATO and from the United States,
whose faulty intelligence was behind the bombing mistake—was justified. Its second, a refusal to
co-operate in finding a diplomatic way to bring peace to Kosovo unless NATO stopped its
bombing, was not.

NATO is right to carry on its military campaign (however inadequate a bombing-only strategy may
be) until the Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, accepts the demands set out by the West and
Russia last week: a halt to the violence in Kosovo, a withdrawal of Serb forces, the deployment of
an international military force, the return of all refugees, and negotiations on a political
settlement that should lead to substantial autonomy for Kosovo. As a veto-wielding member of
the UN Security Council, China's acquiesence will be needed if these conditions are to be
translated into enforceable Security Council resolutions. Russia is equally unhappy at NATO's
bombing of Serb military targets, but acknowledges that the atrocities in Kosovo must end too.
The quickest way to halt both is to tighten the screws on Mr Milosevic: not, as China was doing
this week, to encourage his defiance.

Now that events have drawn China, willy-nilly, into the Kosovo problem, how will it react? It
usually takes little part in Security Council deliberations, except where its narrow interests are at
stake. Recently, as the other four veto-wielding powers—America, Russia, Britain and France—
were struggling to find a diplomatic deal that would have avoided military action against
Yugoslavia, China cast a bloody-minded veto against further money for a small, much-needed UN
peacekeeping force in next-door Macedonia. The reason was that country's ties with Taiwan,
which China regards as a renegade province. None of the Security Council's top five is guiltless of
veto-abuse, but were China to do this again, its standing with the West could only suffer.

Nor does breaking off its dialogue with America over human rights and the proliferation of
weapons serve China well. Observing the treaties China has signed is an obligation, not a
concession to be withdrawn at will. Many Chinese who are proud of their country despite its
flaws, and perhaps who were even among the stone-throwers outside foreign embassies this
week, also recognise that if it is to become a richer, more stable place it needs to respect human
rights, uphold the rule of law, and develop checks and balances that prevent the abuse of power.
Similarly, it is not just the West but also China's neighbours that are threatened by its failure to
stem the sale of dangerous weapons technologies. Tweaking America's nose by turning a blinder
eye to this trade would undercut China's pretensions to leadership in East Asia.

Make the best, not the worst, of events

Until now China has justified its reluctance to shoulder broader responsibilities around the world
by the need to work on reform at home. But its economy cannnot thrive in isolation. Though it
will now try to wring more concessions out of America in its quest to join the World Trade
Organisation, they should be resisted. The barriers to China's early membership in the WTO—
prejudice against foreign investors, protectionist rules and tariffs, import quotas, competition-
stifling subsidies and poor contract enforcement—are restrictions that hurt China's economy as
well as others'. And China needs America to take its exports if it is to grow fast enough to avoid
social unrest at home.

Though the mobs have now left the streets—taking their party-issued slogans with them—the
repercussions of China's display of ugly nationalism and anti-westernism may be harder to
dismiss. Next month marks the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre when
Chinese troops killed unarmed civilians demonstrating in favour of democracy. This week's
“patriotic” violence may have been an effort to let off steam in advance. But it will have
encouraged China's grievance-cherishers, who see its future through the prism of its past
humiliation at the hands of foreigners and who resent the foreign influences that economic
reform brings.

Yet there are also more progressive forces at work. Many of the young people bused in to hurl
abuse at NATO embassies in Beijing this week are just as likely to be back soon queuing for visas.
Within the leadership there are more open-minded folk who recognise that the narrow role
China has chosen to play often works against its better interests. What happened in Belgrade was
a tragedy. China may compound it by turning inward and growing more hostile. Or it could take
the bombing as a reason for deeper engagement with a world that neither starts nor ends at
China's borders.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Anger in
China"

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