O. Nilubol Thesis 2005

Development of a Combat Aircraft Operational and
Cost-Effectiveness Design Methodology
A Thesis
Presented
by
Flt. Lt. Otsin Nilubol
Supervisor : Prof. J. P. Fielding
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
wow "
Cranfield College of Aeronautics

School of Engineering
Cranfield University
February 2005
© Cranfield University 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced without the written permission of the copyright holder
ABSTRACT
This study set out to develop an aircraft design methodology, which gives com-
bat aircraft more operational and cost-effectiveness by considering these factors early in
the design process. In this methodology, an aircraft will be considered as a sub-system
of an overall system, representing an entire operation scenario. Measures of operational
and operational cost-effectiveness indicate the quality of, and relationships between, the
major design aspects; i. e. susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, and
operational cost. These measures are functions of aircraft measures of performance and
measures of effectiveness. A mission operation simulation was developed as the transfor-
mation tool, to performance and effectiveness measures.
The measures of aircraft performance developed in this methodology have been evalu-
ated by simple, yet sufficient, models because of the paucity of available data, information
and the appropriateness of such assessment methods during the early design stages. An
aircraft performance in susceptibility terms is measured both in the forms of probability
of detection, which is predicted through its radar cross section (RCS), and probability of
hit. The RCS prediction model in this study generally uses an aircraft's external shape,
and the probability of hit is also evaluated from the aircraft presented areas.
The probability of kill is a measure of aircraft performance used the vulnerability
design methods. This value relates directly to number and sizes of the critical components
installed in the aircraft, and their layout. The modification of the critical component
layout can directly affect the aircraft probability of kill. In this study, only two major
threat types are considered; i. e. contact and proximity warheads.
Manoeuvrability probability has been introduced, and been used together with the sus-
ceptibility and vulnerability probabilities to predict the overall operational survivability
probability in this study.
Aircraft reliability and some maintainability probabilities are predicted by using avail-
able unclassified data and fundamental aircraft design parameters and variables by dint
of statistical analysis and the Pareto principle.
Operational cost in this methodology is calculated throughout the aircraft Life Cycle
Cost (LCC) by averaging the total operation cost over the total number of operational
aircraft in one base and total number of flying hours for an aircraft fleet's entire life. The
average operation cost in conjunction with the number of aircraft lost and of weapons
released during the mission simulation gives the total operational cost for the overall
scenario.
An alternative method used to integrate all probabilities into the operation mission
simulation is by using the reliability block diagram technique in conjunction with an
event tree diagram. The Monte Carlo simulation technique has been used to generate
more accurate results by means of random value usage.
Most results from the operation mission simulation are in the form of integer num-
bers; therefore, the genetic algorithm optimisation method was mainly used in this study.
However, the gradient-based optimisation method can also be used to give approximate
predictions. The results from the optimisation can finally be used as examples of how to
design a combat aircraft for operational and cost-effectiveness.
11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been successfulfinished without the help of many people. The
author would like to sincerely thank to all of them, including:
My supervisor, Professor John P. Fielding for his great supervision and valuable
guidance.
The Royal Thai Air Force for sponsoring my research.
Dr. Craig Lawson for his patient and fast correction with English writing and great
advice on thesis writing.

Mr. Philip Pugh for his assistance,and advice on the estimation of Life Cycle Cost.
Professor Robert Ball for his advice on probability of detection prediction.
Mr. Paul Alonze for his advise on vulnerability assessment.
Mr. Georgios Dimitriadis and Mr. Rui Miguel Martins Pires for their assis-
tance on information assessmentfrom CATIA models.
Dr. Oswald for his assistancewith accessto a high performance computer.
Diane Boyles, Elizabeth James, Ramesh Wadher, and all staff at Cranfield University
for their supports in this research.
Finally, thanks to my Family and Friends for their unwavering support and love.
in
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
......................................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
....... .......... ........ ....
LIST OF TABLES ix
..................................
LIST OF FIGURES xii
.................................
NOMENCLATURE ..... xix
...... ......... ..............
1 INTRODUCTION 1
................................
2 DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL AND
COST-EFFECTIVENESS 4
........................ ...
2.1 Conventional Aircraft Design Methodology 4
.............. ...
2.1.1 Conceptual Design 4
........................ ...
2.1.2 Preliminary Design 5
...................... ....
2.1.3 Detail Design 5
......................... ....
2.2 System of Systems Design Methodology ............... 6
....
2.2.1 Vehicle Level of Design 7
.................... ....
2.2.2 Mission Level of Design 7
.................... ....
2.2.3 Theatre Level of Design 8
.................... ....
2.3 Design Methodology for Operational and Cost-Effectiveness ... ....
8
2.3.1 Aims & Development of Methodology 8

......... ... ....
2.3.2 Campaign Definition 11
..................... ....
2.3.3 Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness 11
.... ....
2.3.4 Measures of Operational Effectiveness 14
............ ....
2.3.5 Measures of Cost-Effectiveness 15
................ ....
2.4 Chapter Summary 16
........................... ....
3 SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 17
......... ..... .... ... .
3.1 Susceptibility Assessment 17
....................... ....
3.1.1 Radar Cross Section 19
...................... ....
3.1.2 Probability of Detection by Radar 23
.............. ....
3.1.3 Conditional Probability of Hit 24
................ ....
IV
3.2 Vulnerability Assessment 30
...........................
3.2.1 Kill Tree Diagram 30
...........................
3.2.2 Shotline Technique 30
..........................
3.2.3 Vulnerable Area given by a Single Hit 31
................
3.2.4 Aircraft Kill Probability by a Single Hit of a Nonexplosive Penetrator 36
3.2.5 Aircraft Kill Probability by Multiple Hits of Penetrators 36

......
3.2.6 Aircraft Kill Probability by Proximity Warhead 38
..........
3.2.7 Lethal Radius 39
.............................
3.3 Probability of Survivability 39
..........................
3.3.1 Probability of Manoeuvrability (Weighting Factors) 40
........
3.3.2 Probability of Encounter 40
.......................
...............................
4 RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY 44
..................
4.1 Reliability Assessment 44
.............................
4.1.1 Direct Linear Regression 44
.......................
4.1.2 Pareto Distribution 45
..........................
4.1.3 Empty Weight Functionality 46
.....................
4.1.4 Combination between Linear Regression and Pareto Distribution 47
.
4.2 Maintainability Assessment 49
......................... .
4.2.1 Mean Time To Repair 49
........................ .
4.2.2 Scheduled Maintenance 50
....................... .
4.2.3 Unscheduled Maintenance 51
...................... .
.............................. .
5 LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION 54
.............. .......
5.1 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Cost 55
....... .......
5.1.1 Airframe Development Cost 56
.............. .......
5.1.2 Engine Development Cost 56
................ .......
5.1.3 Avionics Development Cost 57
............... .......
5.2 Production Cost 57
......................... .......
5.3 Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares 57
........ .......
V
5.4 Operation and Support 58
.......................... ..
5.4.1 Personnel Cost 58
........................... ..
5.4.2 Unit Level Consumption 58
..................... ..
5.4.3 Contracts 59
............................. ...
5.4.4 Sustaining Support Cost and Installation Support Funds 59
.. ...
5.5 Disposal 59
................................. ...
5.6 Mission Operational Cost 60
........................ ...
5.6.1 Operational Cost during Peacetime Operations 60
........ ...
5.6.2 Operation Cost during Wartime Operations 60
.......... ...
5.6.3 Measure of Operational Cost 61
.................. ...
............................ ...
6 OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION 66
..................
6.1 Threat Analysis 66
.......... ......................
6.1.1 Nonexplosive Penetrator or Contacted Warhead 66
..........
6.1.2 Proximity Warhead 67
..........................
6.2 Mission Analysis 68
................................
6.3 Operation Simulation Concept 69
........................
6.4 Success Probability Assessment 72
........................
6.5 Monte Carlo Simulation Technique 74
......................
...............................
7 OPTIMISATION METHODS 78
.........................
7.1 Gradient-based Method 78
...... . ... . ....... ..........
7.2 Genetic Algorithms 79
..............................
7.2.1 GAlib Optimisation Tools 82
.......................
...............................
8 RESULTS 86
.....................................
8.1 Results from Susceptibility Assessment 86
...................
8.1.1 Radar Cross Section 86
..........................
8.1.2 Signal-To-Noise Ratio 88
.........................
8.1.3 Probability of Detection ........................ 89
V1
8.1.4 Probability of Hit 89
...........................
8.2 Results from Vulnerability Assessment 90
....................
8.2.1 Probability of Kill 90
...........................
8.3 Results from Reliability & Maintainability Assessment 91
...........
8.4 Results from Life Cycle Cost Estimation 94
...................
8.5 Operation Simulation Results 97
.........................
8.5.1 Results and Effects of an Individual Aircraft Measure of Perfor-
mance on Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effec-
tiveness 97
.................................
8.5.2 Results and Effects of Multiple Aircraft Measures of Performance
on the Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness 108
8.6 Results from Optimisation 115

..........................
8.6.1 Results from the Optimisation using the Gradient-Based Method .
116
8.6.2 Results from the Optimisation using Genetic Algorithms 116

.....
9 DISCUSSION 119
....... . ......... .... ........... .. .
9.1 Design Methodology for Aircraft Operational and Cost-Effectiveness 119
...
9.2 Validation and Discussion of Susceptibility Assessment
...........
121
9.2.1 RCS Validation 121

............................
9.2.2 Susceptibility Assessment 122
.......................
9.3 Discussion of Vulnerability Assessment 123
...................
9.4 Validation and Discussion of Reliability & Maintainability Assessment 124
..
9.5 Validation and Discussion of Life Cycle Cost Estimation 126
..........
9.6 Discussion of Operation Simulation 126
.....................
9.7 Discussion of Aircraft Measures of Performance on the Operational and
Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness 127
.................
9.8 Discussion of Optimisation Results Relative to the Operational and Cost-
Effectiveness 128
..................................
9.9 Future Work 129
..................................
10 CONCLUSIONS 131
.................................
11 RECOMMENDATIONS 134
........................... .
REFERENCES 135
.....................................
VI'
APPENDIX A- RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND EVENT
TREE CALCULATION METHODS 139
.....................
APPENDIX B- SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT MODULE 143
....
APPENDIX C- RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY ASSESS-
MENT MODULE 160
................................
APPENDIX D- LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION MODULE 172
...
APPENDIX E- OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION MODULE 190
APPENDIX F- MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS APPLICA-

TION 225
........................................
viii
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Example of transformation from aircraft design parameter into aircraft

MOPs for specific design aspect 10
........................
2.2 Example List of Measures of Performance and Effectiveness 15
.........
2.3 Measure of Effectiveness at the theatre level of design 15
............
3.1 Assumed default probability of kill of a component, given a hit on the
component Pk1j. ................................. 32
3.2 Aircraft component presented areas with overlapped critical components 34

.
3.3 Calculation of the kill probability of the Overlapped No. 2......... 35
3.4 State transition matrix [T] 38

...........................
3.5 Aircraft manoeuvrability probabilities 41
.....................
6.1 Predicted value per sortie from mission simulation module 71
.........
8.1 Comparison between selectedaircraft front view RCS from published source [18,
and calculated aircraft front view RCS from the susceptibility assessment
sub-module ................................... 87
8.2 Calculated U-99 RCS in six main views 87

....................
8.3 Calculated S/N of six main U-99 views for each flight phase [dBm2] 88
....
8.4 Calculated average RCS and S/N for each flight phase by using manoeu-
vrability probability option 2....... ...................
89
8.5 Average calculated S/N and PD in each flight phase predicted by using
manoeuvrability probability option 2..................... 89
8.6 PH1Dof three main U-99 views in each flight phase evaluated from 20 ran-
dom hits 90
.....................................
8.7 Calculated P,,/, of U-99 with redundant fuel systems 91
............
8.8 Calculated PK, of U-99 with non-redundant fuel systems 91
..........
8.9 Comparison between real aircraft failure rate and results of the combination
method and functionality method [per 1000 flying hours] 93
..........
8.10 Comparison between real aircraft defect man-hour rate and results of the
combination method and functionality method [per 1000 flying hours] ... 94
8.11 Results of U-99 from reliability & maintainability assessmentmodule 94

...
8.12 Results from life cycle cost estimation sub-module 95
..............
8.13 Comparison between U-99 LCC calculated from the LCC estimation mod-
ule and from FACET [25I 95
............................
ix
8.14 Comparison between LCC per one U-99 [IVI$]during wartime and peacetime
scenarios for 4 years and 20 years life time .................. 97
8.15 Effect of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on operational and operational

cost MOEs .................................... 108
8.16 Generic effects of increasing individual aircraft MOPs for survivability on

operational and operational cost MOEs .................... 111
8.17 Generic effects of increasing aircraft MOP within selected specific remain-
ing aircraft MOPs on operational and operational cost MOEs 115
.......
8.18 Results from the gradient-base method optimisation 116
............
8.19 Results from the genetic algorithm optimisation 117
...............
B. 1 Results of F-117 front view radar cross section calculation from suscepti-
bility assessment module 145
............................
B. 2 Results of B-2 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility
assessment module 146
...............................
B. 3 Results of U-99 front view radar crosssection calculation from susceptibility
assessment module 146
...............................
B. 4 Results of U-99 probability of detection in attack flight phase of manoeu-
vrability option 2 with P. = 3.72665 x 10-6 ................. 147
B. 5 U-99 critical components list 149

..........................
B. 6 U-99 overlapped critical components list 150
...................
B. 7 Lethal radius[m] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems 153
..
B. 8 Lethal radius[Grid] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems 153
.
B. 9 U-99 drawing grid factor in six main aircraft views 153
.............
C. 1 Linear equations to predict aircraft failure rate in each data set 161
......
C.2 Aircraft design variable from Serghides [38) 163
..................
C.3 Aircraft design variable from unpublished data N.............. 163
C.4 Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficients 166

..................
C.5 Compare results of failure rate prediction per 1000 flying hour 167
.......
C.6 Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficients 171
............
C.7 Compare results of defect man-hour rate prediction per 1000 flying hour 171
..
E. 1 Results from susceptibility and vulnerability assessmentsub-modules with
different manoeuvrability probability options 198
.................
E. 2 Results from mission simulation module with different manoeuvrability
probability options ............................... 200
X
E. 3 Total results from the gradient-based method optimisation 221
.........
E. 4 Total results from the genetic algorithms optimisation 223
...........
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Aircraft design aspects 1

.............................
2.1 Conventional Design Methodology 6
.......................
2.2 System of systems design methodology [431 7
..................
2.3 Flowchart of the operational and cost-effectivenessdesign methodology 9
..
2.4 Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness for Survivability 12
....
3.1 Plane wave scattering by a rectangular plate [271 20
...............
3.2 The finish-cone geometry [131 22
..........................
3.3 Conditional detection by threshold setting [6] 23
.................
3.4 Probability of detection vs signal-to-noise ratio and probability of false
[24] 25
alarm ....................................
3.5 Aircraft presented areas represented by Shoe Box and bivariate normal
miss distance distribution ...........................
27
3.6 Presented area represented by Shoe Box and Carlton methods 27

.......
3.7 Circular symmetric miss distance [61 28
......................
3.8 Warhead detonation and fragment spray 29
...................
3.9 Kill tree diagram for UAV 31
...........................
3.10 Identification of Overlapped area by shotline technique 32
...........
3.11 Presented and vulnerable areas of critical components and aircraft [6) 32
...
3.12 Overlapped areas from tank no. 1, tank no.2 and FCS 33
............
3.13 Aircraft manoeuvrability in attack flight phase 40
................
3.14 Block diagram for independent encounters survivability probability 41
....
4.1 Pareto distribution 46
...............................
4.2 Failure rate as a function of empty weight 47
..................
4.3 Failure rate distribution of aircraft P..................... 48
4.4 Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight 52

........
5.1 Consumer Price Index, 1983 = 1.00 55
......................
5.2 Results of U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario 63
............
5.3 Results of U-99 LCC estimation in wartime scenario 64
.............
6.1 Time clock for each aircraft I1] 69
.........................
6.2 Flowchart for Operation Mission Simulation Module 70
.............
xii
6.3 Reliability Block Diagram for Inbound phase successprobability calculation 74
6.4 Example of using Monte Carlo with Reliability Block Diagram 75
.......
6.5 Normal curve of successfulsorties after 20000 trials 75
.............
7.1 Flowchart of genetic algorithm 80
.........................
7.2 Example of mutation [50] 81
and crossover methods ...............
8.1 Results of U-99 radar cross section in dBm2 unit 88
...............
8.2 Comparison between the highest failure rate from the linear and exponen-
tial regression analysis 92
.............................
8.3 Comparison between the highest defect man-hour rate from linear and ex-
ponential regression analysis .......................... 92
8.4 Results from U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario for 4 years life time 96
8.5 Results from U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario for 20 years life
time 96
.......................................
8.6 Effect of the probability of detection on the operational and operational cost 98
8.7 Effect of the probability of hit on the operational and operational cost 100
...
8.8 Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with penetrators on the oper-
ational and operational cost .......................... 102
8.9 Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead on

the operational and operational cost 103
......................
8.10 Effect of the reliability probability on the operational and operational cost 104
8.11 Effect of the mean time to repair defect on the operational and operational
cost ....................................... 105
8.12 Effect of the mean time to repair damage on the operational and operational
cost ....................................... 105
8.13 Effect of the defect man-hour rate on the operational and operational cost
MOEs 107
......................................
8.14 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKExtand constant PN on the num-
ber of the total sorties flown 109
..........................
8.15 Effect of PD and PK, with increasing PE., and constant P11on the total
Non
operational cost ................................. 110
8.16 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate with increasing MTTRDefeCton numbers
of the total sorties flown and the total targets killed ............. 111
8.17 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PIýNon2
P1, and MTTRDefect with
Ext
a constant DMHR on the total number of sorties flown ........... 113
8.18 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PKNon,PKES:and MTTRDefect with
a constant DMHR on cost[$]/target ...................... 114
xiii
A. 1 Two components series system 140
.........................
A. 2 Two components parallel system 140
........................
A. 3 Reduced Event Tree Sample 141
........... ...............
B. 1 Flowchart of survivability assessmentmodule 143
.................
B. 2 Flowchart of probability of detection prediction 144
...............
B. 3 Susceptibility assessmentdialog 145
........................
B. 4 Graph for evaluation detection probability dialog 147
..............
B. 5 Flowchart of probability of hit determination 148
.................
B. 6 Application dialog for probability of hit determination 149
...........
B. 7 Flowchart of vulnerability assessment module 150
................
B. 8 Vulnerability assessmentmodule application dialog 151
........ .....
B. 9 Critical component overlapped area presented area tab dialog 151
.......
B. 10 Semi-automatic Grid counting 152
.........................
B. 11 Transition matric for U-99 top/bottom view without critical components
overlapping consideration ............................ 154
B. 12 Transition matric for U-99 right/left view without critical components over-
lapping consideration 155
..............................
B. 13 Transition matric for U-99 front/rear view without critical components
overlapping consideration .................... 155
........
B. 14 Transition matric for U-99 right/left view without shielding effect of critical
components overlapping consideration .................... 156
.
B. 15 Transition matric for U-99 right/left view with shielding effect of critical
components overlapping consideration .................... 156
.
B. 16 Transition matric for U-99 front/rear view without shielding effect of crit-
ical components overlapping consideration 157
................. .
B. 17 Transition matric for U-99 front view with shielding effect of critical com-
ponents overlapping consideration 158
...................... .
B. 18 Transition matric for U-99 rear view with shielding effect of critical com-
ponents overlapping consideration 158
...................... .
B. 19 Lethal radius estimation application dialog 159
.... ............. .
C. 1 Flowchart of reliability & maintainability assessmentmodule 161
....... .
C.2 Reliability & Maintainability assessmentapplication dialog ........ 162
.
C.3 Pareto distribution of real data in 1985,1993, and 1996 165
.......... .
xiv
C.4 Comparison between the highest failure rate from the real data and from
the Pareto distribution representative 165
.....................
C.5 Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog 166
......
C.6 Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog 167
C.7 Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight 168
........
C.8 Pareto distribution of real data in 1985 and 1993 170
..............
C. 9 Comparison between the highest defect man-hour rate from the real data
and from the Pareto distribution representative ............... 170
D. 1 Life Cycle Cost estimation application dialog 172
.................
D. 2 Flowchart of LCC estimation module 173
.....................
D. 3 Result of F-16 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario 186
............
D. 4 Result of F-16 LCC estimation in wartime scenario 187
.............
D. 5 Result of Eurofighter LCC estimation in peacetime scenario 188
........
D. 6 Result of Eurofighter LCC estimation in wartime scenario 189
..........
E. 1 Flowchart of entire application 190
.........................
E. 2 Flowchart of air superiority mission ...................... 191
E. 3 Flowchart of patrol mission 192

..........................
E. 4 Flowchart of long penetration mission (Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi) 193
............ .
E. 5 Flowchart of escort mission 194
.......................... .
E. 6 Flowchart of reconnaissance mission 195
..................... .
E. 7 Flowchart of reconnaissance mission (continue) 196
............... .
E. 8 Flowchart of bombing mission 197
........................ .
E. 9 Fives alternatives of manoeuvrability probability 199
.............. .
E. 10 Effect of probability of detection 200
....................... .
E. 11 Effect of probability of hit 201
.......................... .
E. 12 Effect of probability of kill on encounter with penetrators 201
......... .
E. 13 Effect of probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead 202
..... .
E. 14 Effect of defect arising rate 202
.......................... .
E. 15 Effect of mean time to repair defect 203
..................... .
E. 16 Effect of probability of mean time to repair damage 203
............ .
E. 17 Effect of probability of defect man-hour rate 204
................ .
xv
E. 18 Effect of PD and PKN with increasing PKE and Pt, = 0.5 on the total
on xt
number of sorties flown ............................. 204
E. 19 Effect of PD and PKN with increasing P, and PH = 0.75 on the total

on JE
2 t
number of sorties flown ............................. 205
E. 20 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKEyt and PH = 0.25 on the total
number of targets killed ............................
205
E. 21 Effect of PD and P, with increasing PKExt and Pt, = 0.5 on the total
CNon
number of targets killed ............................ 206
E. 22 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKExt and PH = 0.75 on the total
number of targets killed ............................ 206
E. 23 Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKEyt and PH = 0.5 on the total
E. 24 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKEX and PH = 0.75 on the total
E. 25 Effect of PD and P1{Nonwith increasing P, and P = 0.25 on the
tExt
cost [$] /sortie 208
..................................
E. 26 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKExtand P = 0.5 on the cost[$]/sortie208
E. 27 Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and P = 0.75 on the
cost [$] /sortie 209
..................................
E. 28 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PJ and P, = 0.25 on the
Ext f
cost [$]/target 209
..................................
E. 29 Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKExtand PH = 0.5 on the cost[$]/target210
E. 30 Effect of PD and PKNo, with increasing P, and Pf, = 0.75 on the
< Ext
cost[$]/target 210
..................................
E. 31 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefe,, on the total num-
ber of sorties flown with PKNon= P, 0.00 211
tExt = ................
E. 32 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeCton the total num-
ber of sorties flown with P, = P, = 0.25 211
<,an ýEx, ................
E. 33 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefec on the total num-
ber of sorties flown with PIN,, = P, 0.50 ,t 212
CEyt= ................
E. 34 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDeICC= on the total num-
ber of sorties flown with P, P,
= tExt = 0.75 212
CNon ................
E. 35 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefec on cost[$]/sortie
"
with PKNon= 1','CEx: = 0.25
...........................
213
E. 36 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefect on cost[$]/sortie
with P' Non= PKEst= 0.50 ................. ..........
213
xvi
E. 37 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefec on cost[$]/sortie
.t
with PKNon= PKESt= 0.75 ........................... 214
E. 38 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefCCton the total num-
ber of targets killed with PICNO,, = P,, = 0.00 214
E.t . ........ .......
E. 39 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefCCton the total num-
ber of targets killed with PKNon= P,, = 0.25 215
rExt ........... .....
E.40 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDef,,, on the total num-
ber of targets killed with P, = P, = 0.50 215
CNo tEyt ................
E. 41 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDerec on the total num-
ber of targets killed with P1 PI{Ext 0.75 ,t 216
No = = ........ .... ....
E.42 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDCJCcon cost[$]/target
,t
with PKNon= PKEzt= 0.00. .
216
E.43 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeCton cost[$]/target
with PKNon= PKE2t= 0.25 ........................... 217
E.44 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefe, on cost[$]/target
,t
with P,"Non=''KEat = 0.50 ........................... 217
E. 45 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefCCt on cost[$]/target
with P,CNo= P,tExt = 0.75 ........................... 218
E. 46 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefCCton the total op-
erational cost [$] with PKNon= PltExt = 0.00 ................. 219
E.47 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDerec on the total op-
t
erational cost [$] with PKNon= PKExt= 0.25 ................. 219
E. 48 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefe, on the total op-
t
erational cost [$] with PKNon= P"CExt= 0.50 220
E. 49 Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeýt on the total op-
erational cost[$] with PKNon= PKExt= 0.75 ................. .
220
E. 50 Development of the possible minimum cost[$]/target solution by using the
gradient-based method ............................ 221
.
E. 51 Development of the possible minimum cost[$]/sortie solution by using the
.
E. 52 Development of the possible maximum targets killed solution by using the
.
E. 53 Development of the possible maximum sorties flown solution by using the
.
E. 54 Improvement of minimum cost[$]/target solution populations optimised by
the genetic algorithms 222
............................ .
E. 55 Improvement of minimum cost[$]/sortie solution populations optimised by
............................ .
xvi'
E. 56 Improvement of maximum targets killed solution populations optimised by
.............................
E. 57 Improvement of maximum sorties flown solution populations optimised by
.............................
F. 1 Complete flow chart of mission effectiveness analysis application 226
......
F. 2 Operation mission simulation application dialog 227
...............
F. 3 Monte Carlo Simulation Dialog 228
........................
F. 4 Simple numerical graphical result display 229
...................
F. 5 Simple line graph result display 230
........................
F. 6 Simple semi-animate graphical result display 230
.................
F. 7 Results from an operation simulation with manoeuvrability probability op-
tion 2 232
......................................
F. 8 Data Management Dialog 233
...........................
F. 9 Vulnerability AssessmentDialog 233
................. .......
F. 10 Lethal Radius Assessment Dialog 234
................ .......
F. 11 Semi-Automatic Grid Counter Dialog 235
.............. .......
F. 12 Zooming and Moving Image Possibility 235
............ ........
F. 13 Susceptibility Assessment Dialog 236
............... ........
F. 14 Pre-Calculated Graph Display Dialog 237
............. ........
F. 15 Probability of Hit Assessment Tab Dialog 238
........... ........
F. 16 Reliability & Maintainability Assessment Dialog 239
....... ........
F. 17 Life Cycle Cost Estimation Dialog 240
............... ........
xviii
Nomenclature
al, a2 Leading and trailing fragment spray angles from the axis of the static
warhead detonation [Degree]
61 SZ Angle of leading and traling fragment spray [Degree]

i
17 Constant value = 1.781072
A Radar wavelength [m]
Ax, µy Mean value of x and y
0 Angle between incident wave and x axis of the target [Degree]
7r Constant value = 3.14159
'II Elevation angle of the missile [Degree]
p(x, y) Probability density function of miss distance
a Radar cross section [m2]
O'X,UV Standard deviation of x and y
9 Angle between incident wave and z axis of the target [Degree]
a, b, l Dimension of geometrical object in cartesian coordinated system [m]
Ap Presented area [m2]
Ai Vulnerable area [m2]
Alt Maximum altitude [m]
B,, Noise bandwidth [Hz]
Coperation Average operation & support cost per aircraft per flying hour [$]
CContract Total contract cost [$]
CDisposat Disposal cost [$]
CFII Flying hour cost [$]

CFtvaway
Flyaway cost [$]
CFuet Total fuel cost [$]
CGSE&IS Ground support equipment and initial spares cost
CInsta, Installation support funds [$]

t
CAlaintenance Average operational maintenance cost per aircraft per flying hour [$]
xix
Cnrission Total operation & support cost for entire fleet during mission simula-
tion [$]
COperation Operation and Support Cost [$]
CPersonnel Total personnel cost [$]
CProduction Production Cost [$]
CRDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost [$]
Csortie Sortie cost [$]
CSuccessfulSortieSuccessfulsortie cost [$]

CSustain Total sustaining support cost [$]
CTarget Target cost ('Bang per Buck') [$]
CTraining Service allowance, personnel support and training cost [$]
Cvnit Unit level consumption cost [$]
CwVeapon Weaponcost [$]

CFuel Cost of fuel per litre [$]
CDAirfran, Total cost of airframe development [$]

e
CDAvionics Total cost of avionics development
CPAvionics Total avionics production cost [$]
CPEngine Total cost of engine production [$]
DEF Deflated rate factor
DMHR(100) Highest aircraft's component defect man-hour rate [Hour/ 1000 flying
hours]
DMHR(70) Lowest aircraft's component defect man-hour rate [Hour/ 1000 flying
hours]
DR Defect rate [per 1000 flying hours]
Ei Expected number of encounters by ith threat type
El Threshold setting
FH Aircraft flying hours [Hour]
FHY The average annual flight time [Hour]
FR(100) Highest aircraft component's failure rate per 1000 FH
FR(70) Lowest aircraft component's failure rate per 1000 FH
xx
FT Effective temperature [K]
G Gain of transmitting antenna
H Aircraft height [m]
k The Boltzmann's constant = 1.3806503 x 10-23 [J/degree]
ki Constant = 2ir/A
L Loss factor
M Mach number
MA/G Aircraft mission mass [kg]
MAirframe Airframe-only mass [kg]
MFuel Aircraft fuel load [kg]
MATcomposite Percentage of composite materials in airframe
MTBF Mean time between failure [Hour]
MTTR Mean time to repair [Hour]
MTTR(100) Highest aircraft's component mean time to repair [Hour]
N Number of fragments in the warhead
n Number of fragment hits on aircraft
NE Number of engines per aircraft
NFH Number of flying hour
NKijz Number of target kill
NLARGE Number of largest single buy from the program
NLa3t Number of aircraft kill
NOperation Number of aircraft in operation
NNROD Number of production aircraft
NRDT&E Number of test aircraft
NSTAT Number of stationary test aircraft
NTake-off Number of take-off during the mission simulation

NSuccessfulSorties Number of successful sorties during the mission simulation
P Power of the transmitter radar [Watt]
Pn The false alarm probability

xxi
PA, Pa The probability of threat being active
PD/A
PD, The Probability of aircraft being detected
PF/D
PF/J, The probability that the proximity warhead fuses the aircraft
PH/I) rH/D The probability that threat propagator hits the aircraft
Pr/L, P; The probability that the threat weapon intercepts the aircraft
Pilo, PI The probability of threat weapon being launched
Pvtewi The Manoeuvrability Probability or Weighting Factor of i aircraft view

in a specific flight phase, i= Front, Rear, Left, Right, Top, Bottom
PH The probability of being hit
PKiH The probability kill, given a hit
PK The kill probability
Ps The survivability probability

PK/F The probability that aircraft is killed given fusing
R Distance between antenna and aircraft [m]
RED Economic discount rate [%]
ROAC Packing density of the fuselage [kg/m3]
s Distance between detonation to the fragment spray [m]
S/N The signal to noise ratio
SM Total aircraft schedule maintenance [Man-hout per flying hour]
SM2-Proputsion Schedulemaintenance for 2ndline schedule engine inspection and main-

tenance [Man-hour per flying hour]
SMAionics Schedule maintenance for 2n`ßline avionics maintenance [Man-hour per

flying hour]
SMpost-Flight
Schedule maintenance for post-flight [Man-hour per flying hour]
SMpre-Flight
Schedule maintenance for pre-flight [Man-hour per flying hour]
SMpropulsion Schedule maintenance for 1st line propulsion inspection and mainte-
nance [Man-hour per flying hour]
tJfaintenance
Time in maintenance occurrence [Hour]
TSLAfax Uninstalled engine maximum thrust at sea level [N]
Tsortie Sortie time [Hour]
Thrust Total thrust [kN]

xxii
TIF Technology improvement factor
TLIFE Operated aircraft life [Year]
TT4 Maximum turbine inlet temperature [°R]
Vf Average fragment speed respecting to a stationary warhead [m/s]
V. Missile speed [m/s]
V Target (aircraft) horizontal speed when encountered by proximity war-

head [m/s]
Vý, Maximum true airspeed [m/s]

ax
W. Aircraft wing area [m2]
We Aircraft empty weight [kg]
WV Uninstalled avionics mass [lb]
x, y Cartesian coordinate
YR52 Years from first flight year relative to 1952 [Years]
CDAE Engineering cost for development airframe [$]
CDDS Development support cost [$]
CDE Engine development cost [$]
CDEF Cost of engine fit for the development aircraft
CDFT Flight test cost [$]
CDMME Manufacturing material and equipment cost [$]
CDQL Quality control cost [$]
CDV Avionics development cost [$]
CDVF Cost of the avionics fit for the development aircraft [$]
CEP Circular Error Probable
CJA Disposal advanced material cost [$]
CJM Disposal labour effort cost [$]
CJIVIAT Disposal composite material cost [$]
CJT Disposal cost [`then-year' dollar]
CLE Engineering rate [$/hour]
CLM Manufacturing labour rate [$/hour]
xxiii
CLT Quality/tooling labour rate [$/hour]
COAC Mechanical contract cost [$]
COCS Supply contract cost [$]
CODLR Depot level reparable cost [$]
COEC Engine contract cost [$]
COF Cost of Fuel, other petroleum, oil, and lubricants [$]
COM Total operation personnel cost [$]
COMMAT Maintenance material cost [$]
COMSS Miscellaneous support supply cost [$]
COTAD Temporary additional duty cost [$]
COUTRN Transport cost [$]
COVC Avionics contract cost [$]
CPAE Production engineering cost for development airframe [$]
CPE Engine production cost [$]
CPI Consumer Price Index
CPMME Manufacturing material and equipment cost [$]
CPQL Quality control cost [$]
CPR Average annual civilian payment [$]
CSASTT Total service allowance, personnel support and training cost [$]
CSEK Replacement support equipment and modification kit procurement cost

[$]
CSEPCS Enlisted permanent change station cost [$]
CSET Enlisted training cost [$]
CSISF Installation support funds [$]
CSM Total support personnel cost [$]
CSOPCS Officer permanent change station cost [$]
CSOT Officer training cost [$]
CSSE Sustaining engineering support cost [$]
CSST Total sustaining support cost and installation support funds [$]
xxiv
CSTF Training fund [$]
DAR Depot arrival rate [Hour]
EDML Development manufacturing cost [$]
EDTP Tooling cost [$]
EPML Development manufacturing cost [$]
EPR Average annual enlisted payment [$]
EPTP Tooling cost [$]
ERM Unit cost for an engine repair [$]
ERO Unit cost for an engine overhaul [$]
FADT Advanced design tool factor
FAMA Advanced materials cost factor [$]
FATF Advanced technology factor
FATT Advanced technology testing factor
FCS Flight control system
FLO Low-observable features factor
FIvIOF Crew-ratio
FPROR Overhaul/repair ratio
FS Security factor
GALib Genetic Algorithm Library in C++ langauge
GSE&IS Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares
LCC Life Cycle Cost [M$]
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MOEs Measures of Effectiveness
MOP Measure of Performance
MOPs Measures of Performance
NOM Total number of operation personnel
NOMC Number of operation civilian
NOME Number of operation enlisted
NOMO Number of operation officer

xxv
NOMOF Number of active flight-crew member
NPART Number of partners
NSMC Number of support civilian
NSME Number of support enlisted personnel
NSMO Number of support office
O&S Operation and Support
OPR Average annual officer payment [$]
RAF Royal Air Force
RATE Production rate during manufacture [/month]
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle
YRACC Accounting year
xxvi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since end of the cold war, military budgets have been dramatically reduced; however, new
aircraft are still required to replace the old ones. To fulfil all possible military requirements
with few aircraft types, a new generation of combat aircraft is being developed. These
aircraft will be multi-role and also be more operationally and cost-effective. Thus, more
efficient design in the early stage which considers most possible design aspects has to be
done (see Fig. 1.1).
Susceptibility II Vulnerability II Supportability
Maintainability I>1 Design Methodology 1<I Reliability
Operational
Effectiveness
I Performance
Life Cycle Cost
Figure 1.1: Aircraft design aspects
Some of these aspects have been developed and integrated into either the conceptual
or preliminary design processes [1'38]; such as Reliability & Maintainability (R&M); Sup-
portability; Survivability and Life Cycle Cost (LCC). Some previous works have been also
developed methodologies, designed to integrate models of aircraft component effectiveness
and life cycle costs into either the conceptual or preliminary design processes E2,28,44,541
Due to restricted subject such the survivability, some developed methodology or assess-
ment model cannot be in details [23]. Nevertheless, all published previous works
published
took only one design aspect into account. One such methodology integrates operation sim-
ulation and cost estimation into the early design process at the same time as the other
design disciplines will be described in this thesis.
1
1. Introduction 2
This research aimed to develop a combat aircraft design methodology for operational
and cost-effectiveness mainly by considering the survivability, reliability & maintainability,
and life cycle cost. An approach to achieve this research objective is to develop a software
application using as a tool to measure the aircraft measures of performance and also to
measure the aircraft operational and operational cost measures of effectiveness.

To measure an aircraft performance for specific design aspect and integration all to-
gether with the mission simulation to measure aircraft operational and operational cost
effectiveness, the assessment methodologies for the specific design aspects have to be de-
veloped. An application with several pop-up dialog is programmed by using Microsoft
Develop Studio C++ as a compiler. This compiler offers graphic display, drag & drop
features, and also object oriented capacity. The main application name is `Mission Effec-
tiveness Analysis'.
To measure an aircraft operational effectiveness in the forms of the total number of
specific sorties, targets, and aircraft, the mission simulation has to be integrated within
the methodology. By using the reliability bock diagram in conjunction with the event
tree diagram, these operational measures of effectiveness in the required format can be
determined.
The aircraft life cycle cost estimation model used for this research is based on previous
work. With some validations, in some variables and sub-models, an aircraft life cycle cost
during both peacetime and wartime scenarios can be predicted. Through this cost, the
operational cost for an entire fleet in one base can be predicted. Together with the
weapons released expense and aircraft lost cost, which are calculated directly from the
mission simulation, the total operational cost for an entire mission operation can be thus
evaluated. `
By combination of all sub-modules with the mission simulation, the operational and
operational cost measuresof effectivenesscan be predicted. Used in conjunction with the

Monte Carlo simulation technique, this gives more accurate predicted values.
Two different optimisation methods have also been integrated within this methodology
to search for the optimum solution for combat aircraft operational and cost-effectiveness.
The Cranfield Unmanned Air Vehicle (U-99), which has been designed by MSc Stu-
dents at Cranfield University, has been chosen as a case study because of the design
performance requirements and data availability.

1. Introduction 3
The results from the optimisation can firstly be used as an indication to design the
U-99 for operational and/or operational cost effectiveness.
Additionally, by using the developed tool, trade-offs between aircraft measures of
performance can be perform to achieve or improve the objective values.

CHAPTER 2
DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONAL AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS
In this chapter, three different design methodologies are described. The first two methods,
developed and demonstrated by Raymer [36], Roskam [37] and Soban [42-44],use different
concepts of aircraft definition. The third methodology is a combination of the first two
methodologies, which also gives an opportunity to integrate several design aspects and
into the design [16,17,32] This

an operation simulation early process makes the third
design methodology, therefore, wider-ranging in that it assesses operationally and cost-
effectiveness.
2.1 Conventional Aircraft Design Methodology

This design methodology is commonly used as the fundamental process of aircraft design
in aeronautical engineering. An aircraft is defined as an object throughout the design
methodology. Three stages of aircraft design have been identified with different levels of
detail, i. e. conceptual design, preliminary design, and detail design [36,37]
Figure 2.1 shows that before the first design process can begin, the aircraft fundamen-
tal requirements and performance have to be defined. These requirements come mostly
from the customer; for example the government in the case of combat aircraft, and the
airline company in the case of commercial aircraft. Sometimes these requirements may
be modified during the design processes due to new customer specifications, updates of
technologies or decreases in budget. Thus, the design process has to be repeated. It leads
to increased expense and time consumption.
2.1.1 Conceptual Design
A combat aircraft conceptual design usually begins with a specific set of design require-
ments, established by the prospective customer, rather than a company-generated guess

as to what future customers may need. These design requirements include parameters
such as aircraft range and payload, take off and landing distance, manoeuvrability and
4
2. Design Methodology for Aircraft Operational and Cost-Effectiveness 5
speed requirements, and so on. With these specifications, the first conceptual sketch of
the entire aircraft, and some major components and systems can be characterised. There-
fore, all fundamental design parameters and variables can be estimated. The first look at
cost and manufacturing is also made at this time.
An initial layout is analysed to determine if it really will perform the required mis-
sion. Predicted aerodynamics, weights, and installed propulsion characteristics are also
analysed, and subsequently used to do detailed sizing calculations. Furthermore, the per-
formance capabities of the design are calculated and compared to the requirements. The
details of the configuration are therefore, subject to change. All of this work will be done
on paper, or on a computer.
2.1.2 Preliminary Design
Before this design stage can start, most of the major aspects of the conceptual design
have to be finalished, and also the configuration has to be frozen. Thus, the specialist
in particular areas will design and analyse their own portion of the aircraft. Testing is
initiated in areas such as aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, and stability and control.
Lofting, which is the mathematical modelling of the outside skin of the aircraft with
sufficient accuracy to insure proper fit between its different parts, is performed in this
design process. The objective of this design stage is to ready the company for the detail
design stage, also called full-scale development, and also to establish confidence that the
aircraft can be built on time and at the estimated cost.
2.1.3 Detail Design
This detail design begins with the actual pieces to be fabricated being designed. For
example, during conceptual and preliminary design the wing box will be designed and
analysed as a whole. During the detail design, that whole will be broken down into
individual ribs, spars, and skins, each of which must be separately designed and analysed.
This design stage also includes production design. Specialists determine how the aircraft
will be fabricated, starting with the smallest and simplest subassembliesand building up
to the final assembly process.
During the detail design, the testing effort intensifies. The actual structure of the
aircraft is fabricated and tested. Control laws for the flight control system are tested, and
a detailed working model of the actuators and flight control surfaces is produced. This
design stage ends with the fabrication of the aircraft.

Operation & System
............... Requirements -< ...................:
System
Conceptual Design Preliminary Design Details Design Fabrication
Study/Requirements
" Wing-Body-Tail " Major load, " Mechanism, joints,

configuration stresses,...
. Aspect ratio, ... " complete " Refinement as
" Gross weight, ... configuration results of test &
" " ... operation
...
Figure 2.1: Conventional Design Methodology
2.2 System of Systems Design Methodology

Soban [431presented an alterative design methodology, "system of systems", which inte-
grates survivability assessmentinto an aircraft design process. This method can show
the effect of this design aspect during the preliminary design process, earlier than in the
conventional design methodology. This allows for sufficient trade-offs and resource allo-
cations to be made by measuring the effectivenessof the aircraft at a high level of design,
i. e. theatre or campaign level. The theatre level is the highest of three levels in this design
methodology (see Fig. 2.2). In using this method, an aircraft is treated as a sub-system
of the overall system, which represents an operation or campaign. Various aspects of

each system are measured to indicate their qualities, which are dependent on the system's
level. The measures of each level are in the forms of Measure of Performance (MOP) or
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE), which have been described more detail in section 2.3.3.
Similar models have also been studied and presented by Simkins [311and by Kitowski [28].
The following are some examples for classifications of system level:
" Vehicle level: An aircraft A is more likely to be detected.
" Mission level: Number of aircraft available at the end of a sortie
9 Theatre level: Total number of targets destroyed

Theater Level --=

"' -' - SystemWE = fn(M PI, MoP2,MoP3,etc)
Mort become AtoPo
L
=Mission vel- _
MoP = fn( Y,,, X Xh
MoNs of rebick become variablen for nut level gn/tton, factors)
Vehic e LTege
l, _'_
Top End Vekide De go/Eeon Vers. Tecino1op kl clon
Regoinmew
Figure 2.2: System of systems design methodology [43]
2.2.1 Vehicle Level of Design
In this level of design, only an aircraft is defined as a system. With its Measures of
Performance (MOPs) in major design aspects, the "goodness" of the aircraft in these
design points of view can be indicated in the form of probability values. These values are
only functions of the aircraft design variables and parameters. For example, an aircraft
geometric dimension is used to calculate its probability of detection, which indicates how
easily the aircraft can be detected.
As an output of vehicle level of design, aircraft IVIOPs can be passed to the mission
level of design to measure the aircraft mission effectiveness.
2.2.2 Mission Level of Design
The objective function of this level of design is to link the vehicle level to the theatre level
of design. Mission level of design is required because the outputs from the vehicle level of
design are in the form of aircraft MOPs, and they do not usually map directly to be used
as the inputs to theatre level of design. The inputs to theatre level of design are in the
form of aircraft Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). Therefore, the MOPs of vehicle level
are transformed to be variables in mission level of design.

A short time-scale of operation model; such as sortie or operational day, is defined as
a system, in which an aircraft is referred to as a sub-system. The MOPS of the aircraft

are used to measure the aircraft effectiveness at the mission level of design. For instance,
an attack flight phase in a sortie during the entire operation is defined as a system. One
of the aircraft MOEs in the mission level of design is the aircraft probability of success
in this flight phase, which is a function of the aircraft MOPs in several different design
aspects, such as probability of detection, probability of kill, and probability of encounter

by a different threat.
Therefore, the output of the mission level of design is in the form of aircraft MOEs,
and will be treated as mission MOPS for the theatre level of design.
2.2.3 Theatre Level of Design
Finally, the theatre becomes the system, and the aircraft and short time-scale operation
(sortie or operational day) are relegated to be components of this new system. The theatre
thus becomes a system of systems and is a function of the vehicle and mission levels of
design. Therefore, the theatre level of design is a function of the components of the vehicle
and mission levels of design, including aircraft and sorties. In other words, mission MOEs
from the mission level of design become mission MOPs and are input variables for the
theatre level of design.
The campaign MOEs at the theatre level of design are used as a measure of the
aircraft "goodness" for the entire campaign. Tradeoffs can thus be made between vehicle
design and mission requirements in the lower levels of design. These requirements, when
optimised to fulfill theatre level goals and objectives, become the requirements to which
the vehicle is then designed.
2.3 Design Methodology for Operational and Cost-

Effectiveness
2.3.1 Aims & Development of Methodology
The design methodology aimed to combine conventional design and "system of systems"
design methods. This was to be achieved by integrating operation simulation, survivability
assessment,reliability & maintainability assessmentand life cycle cost estimation into a

methodology for use in the conceptual and preliminary design stages (see Fig. 2.3). The
aim was to measure aircraft operational and operational cost effectivenessas a function of
aircraft MOPS in several design aspects, such as survivability, reliability, and operational
cost. The final aim was to facilitate tradeoffs between aircraft MOPS using an optimiser
to fulfill the main theatre objective functions, such as maximum number of sorties flown,
maximum number of targets destroyed, sortie cost, target cost, and so on.
Conceptual
Design
.....
Vulnerability Suscephbilty
elssesri lent AssessnIeýýt
T wealand Reliability &

Survivability Cost
Aüssiott Operation Maneuverability MihitihiabiLty
Defuvtion Assessment Estimation
Assessment
NSSIOIN LEVEL
Operation Mission
Sümilation
(Monte Carlo Simulation)
Optimisation
NO Fulfills
Objective
1..........................................................................
YES
THFATERLEVEL
Preliminary
Design
Figure 2.3: Flowchart of the operational and cost-effectivenessdesign methodology
The aircraft performance aspects of this methodology was to be firstly measured in

three main design aspects, i. e. survivability, reliability & maintainability, and operation
cost. Integration of an operation simulation, tradeoffs between aircraft MOPs in these de-
sign aspects should be be executed directly after the conceptual design. With results of op-
timised aircraft MOPs in these three design aspects, the operational and cost-effectiveness
aircraft design parameters and variables should then be calculated. These include most
of the aircraft design parameters, aircraft performance, sketchy aircraft geometry, and
major internal critical components or systems layout. Examples of these are wing area,
aircraft empty weight, aircraft height, maximum altitude, and so on. The results of these
evaluations will be subsequently fed into more detailed design processes;i. e. preliminary
and detail design.
Within the operational and cost-effectivenessdesign methodology, the aircraft MOPs
in all the design aspects below are predicted directly from aircraft conceptual design
parameters and variables at the vehicle level of design, considering only aircraft hardware.
These MOPS are indicative of the quality in each design aspect the aircraft has.
The application namely `Mission Effectiveness Analysis' has been implemented based
on the flow chart, as illustrated in Fig. 2.3. This application comprises several pop-up
dialogs, which represent each design aspect studied in this research The purpose of
.
this application is to transform the aircraft design variable into aircraft MOPs, aircraft
operational and operational cost MOEs (details and rough user manual, see Appendix F).
Table 2.1 shows an example of the transformation from aircraft design parameter into
aircraft MOPS for specific design aspect.
Table 2.1: Example of transformation from aircraft design parameter into aircraft MOPS
for specific design aspect
Design Aspect Design parameters Measures of performance
(Inputs) (Outputs)
Susceptibility external geometry, and presented PD, PFIjorPH, J
areas
Vulnerability critical internal components and PK/H
systems, external presented areas
Reliability Height, Empty weight, Altitude, Defect arising rate per 1000
Thrust, Wing areas, Number of flying hours
engine
Maintainability Empty weight, Altitude, Height, DMHR, Scheduled mainte-
Thrust, Wing areas, Number of nance
engine
Manoeuvrability I- factor
One of the greatest difficulties in developing this methodology was the security and
commercial restrictions placed upon the data required. Another difficulty was the com-
plexity of the assessmentrequired for the design aspects involved, such as probability of
kill/hit of aircraft critical components, mean time to repair, and avionics development
costs. The result of this complexity was that either the assessmentcould not be per-
formed, or the timescales involved would be too long. Some constraints and assumptions,
therefore, had to be made in this methodology, as shown in later chapters and appendices.
The transformation methods from conceptual design parameters to Measures of Per-
formance (MOPs) value in survivability design are described in chapter 3. These include
susceptibility and vulnerability. The MOPS in reliability & maintainability are described
in chapter 4. The functionality of the survivability, reliability & maintainability, and
life cycle cost modules are explained in chapter 6. These are used to measure aircraft
operational and cost-effectiveness.

One approach to measure mission effectiveness was to use a Reliability Block Diagram
(RBD) in conjunction with an event tree diagram to combine many aircraft probability
values together (aircraft MOPs). This could give probability values in each flight phase
during a sortie (mission MOPs). The calculation and methods used are described in
chapter 6.
2.3.2 Campaign Definition
This methodology was designed to show how operationally effective a new design of com-
bat aircraft will be, by measuring its operational effectiveness at the theatre level. In
other words, the designed aircraft will be examined for its operational requirements in
computational simulation early during the design process. For example, the number of
aircraft lost in ten days of operation, exposed to high levels of opponent's defenses,can be
directly estimated after the first conceptual design. Therefore, an operational simulation
of the aircraft mission requirements has to be established early and then merged into the
design process. Additionally, some design aspect assessmentsrefer directly to campaign
definition. For example, an opponent's defensive systems affect the aircraft MOPS and
MOEs in terms of vulnerability.
An entire campaign includes both friendly and foe armaments, defenses,capabilities,
campaign duration, and so on. Therefore, it is not very easy to obtain this information
at the early design stage. Additionally, it is too complex to simulate and also it is not
necessary to consider all details. So, some constraints and assumptions have thus been
made (for details, see Chapter 6).
2.3.3 Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness
Through this methodology, the aircraft design variables and parameters become aircraft
MOPs for several design aspects through survivability assessment, reliability & maintain-
ability assessment, and life cycle cost estimation sub-modules. This section introduces
principles by which these variables and parameters are transformed into aircraft 1VIOPs
for major design aspects.

2.3.3.1 Measurement of Survivability
The aircraft MOP in the case of survivability design is a probability value of aircraft
survival, which is a function of two other aircraft MOPs, i. e. probability of aircraft being
hit (susceptibility) and probability of aircraft being killed by a given hit (vulnerability).
Both aircraft MOPs, which are outputs of the vehicle level of design, are functions of
fundamental aircraft design parameters and variables. With an integration of threat
analysis and aircraft manoeuvrability at the mission level of design, the aircraft Measure
of Effectiveness (MOE) for survivability design can be evaluated.
MOESurvivability (MOPSuaceptibility7 MOPVulnerability7 MOPXIanoeuvrability)

=f """)
In other words, the aircraft MOE for survivability design integrates an ordinary air-
craft MOP for survivability (Ps), and the aircraft MOP for manoeuvrability (Weighting
Factors). Aircraft manoeuvrability is simply represented in this study as a weighting

factor (for details, see chapter 3 and Fig. 3.13).
Aircraftgeometry
(E t vial shape) for Threat
Analysis
Measure
of performance
Susceptiölty design
usceptiibility aspect
(Pýý)
Assessment (ps)
Aircraft(scentedareas
Measure
of Performance
for
Survivability Sumvabibty
design
aspect
Measwe of Effectiveness
for
Assessment _ý, Survivablty
designaspect
(PI)
Aircraftcomponents
geometry
(Internat
layout)
Aircraftcomponent of Performance
Measure for
areas
presented Vulnerability design
Vulnerability AircraftManeuverability
(Pp) aspect
Assessment (Pes (WeightingFactors)
Aircraftpresented
areas
(Pro)
VehicleLevel MissionLevel Levd
Theatre
Figure 2.4: Aircraft Measures of Performance and Effectiveness for Survivability
2.3.3.1.1 Measurement of Susceptibility
The aircraft MOP for susceptibility can be represented as the probability of being hit
(P), which is mainly a function of another two aircraft MOPs, i. e. the probability of
detection (PD) and conditional probability of hit (PHI or PFUI).
The first aircraft MOP is the probability of detection (PD), which measureshow easily
an aircraft is detected by the opponent searching systems during the campaign. This
is
measure mainly a function of aircraft signatures. Ball I'] introduced three major aircraft
signatures with different characteristics and assessmentmethods; i. e. radar, infrared, and

visual signatures. Due to major threat types dominated in this study, the radar signature
in the form of radar cross section (v) had been chosen to evaluate an aircraft probability
of detection (for details, see Section 3.1.2).

On the other hand, the second aircraft MOP, the conditional probability of hit (PH/I
or PFUI), measures how likely the possibility is that the aircraft will be hit by threats. This
measure mainly depends on threat type (penetrator or external explosive) and specific
aircraft presented areas (for details, see Section 3.1.3).
2.3.3.1.2 Measurement of Vulnerability
The aircraft MOP for vulnerability can be expressedas the probability of a kill by a given
hit (PKIH). This value is a function of three aspects related to aircraft critical components,
namely; system presented areas, layout, and probability of a kill by a given hit (for details,
see Section 3.2).

The aircraft MOP for survivability from vehicle level of design refers directly to the
aircraft itself, but the mission MOP (or aircraft MOE) for survivability, from the mission
level of design refers to the nature of the environment in which the aircraft operates, and
aircraft behaviour during short-timescale operations (See Fig. 2.4).
2.3.3.2 Measurement of Reliability
For this design aspect, an aircraft failure rate can represent one of aircraft MOPs, by
characterising how reliable aircraft are per 1000 flying hours. This value is a function
of several conceptual design parameters and variables, such as maximum empty weight,
aircraft height, maximum altitude and so on. Details of MOE in reliability and reliability
assessmentmethodology are described in Chapter 4.

In mission level of design, aircraft MOP for reliability is one of the main direct effects on
aircraft IVIOE. For example, the aircraft operational defect arising rate, which is defined
as 10% of failure rate per flying hour, results in a direct impact on the probability of
successful flight phase, probability of aircraft availability for next sortie, and so on.
2.3.3.3 Measurement of Maintainability
There are numerous alternatives which represent aircraft MOPS for maintainability at
the vehicle level of design. Two of these are Defect Man-Hour Rate per 1000 flying hour
(DIVIHR) and Scheduled Maintenance (SM). The first value, DMHR, indicates how many
man-hours of maintenance the aircraft requires during 1000 flying hours. The second
aircraft MOP for maintainability shows how regularly the aircraft has to be inspected,
components replaced, and also repaired.

At the vehicle level of design, for this methodology, these two values have their own
measurement methods (see Section 4.2). However, both values are used at the mission
level of design to measure aircraft effectiveness in terms of operational cost per flying hour
(for details, see Chapter 5).
2.8.3.4 Measurement of Manoeuvrability
Several forms of aircraft MOP can represent aircraft ability to manoeuvre during a mis-
sion. One of these aircraft manoeuvrability-performance measures is predicted using a
weighting factor to indicate an average percentage of aircraft visible to the threat in
each mission flight phase. This MOP shows how quickly an aircraft changes its flight
characteristics in each flight phase, and thus its manoeuvrability.
2.3.4 Measures of Operational Effectiveness
Before aircraft operational effectiveness at the campaign level can be measured, the air-
craft effectiveness in a short operation timescale, or at a mission level of design, first

has to be evaluated. These aircraft MOEs are functions of aircraft MOPS and campaign
definition.
In other words, at the theatre level of design, aircraft MOEs become mission MOPS,
and are used as variables to measure operational effectiveness, through utilising a RBD.
In this way, aircraft MOPs become indirect variables for operational MOEs; therefore, an
aircraft can be measured for operational effectiveness.

It is very hard to give a general definition of operational effectiveness, because it
depends on overall mission, campaign, and organisation of operations. Table 2.2 shows
examples of MOPs and MOEs at all three levels.

Table 2.2: Example List of Measures of Performance and Effectiveness

Measure of Performance Measure of Effectiveness Measure of Effectiveness
(Vehicle level) (Mission level) (Theatre level)
Probability of detection Probability of successful Number of sorties flown
flight phase
Probability of kill/hit Probability of survival of Number of killed aircraft
aircraft
Weighting factors Probability of target de- Number of destroyed tar-
struction gets
Defect man-hour rate Probability of aircraft Number of aircraft in
being in maintenance maintenance
Defect arising rate Probability of availabil- Number of available air-
ity of aircraft for next craft
sortie
2.3.5 Measures of Cost-Effectiveness
This methodology also aims to measure operational cost-effectiveness,which can help to

integrate the best design alternatives [48]into an early design stage. However, the exact
spend during real missions cannot easily be estimated. One possibility is to evaluate
the operational cost through the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) at the vehicle level of design.
Operational cost-effectivenesstogether with operational MOEs can be measured at the
theatre level of design; for instance, sortie cost, weapon cost, aircraft loss cost. This
method has been used here, and is presented in chapter 5.

Finally, measuresof both operational and cost-effectivenesscan be evaluated together
at the theatre level of design. This activity completed the development of the overall
methodology.
Table 2.3 shows the aircraft measuresof both operational and cost-effectivenessat the
theatre level of design.
Table 2.3: Measure of Effectiveness at the theatre level of

Operational Effectiveness ess Operational and cost-
effectiveness
Total number of sorties Total operation cost tion cost per sortie
flown
Total number of destroyed Total weapon cost Cost per destroyed target
targets
Total number of available Total aircraft lost cost
aircraft
2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has:
" introduced a "system of systems" design methodology, which has defined an aircraft
as a subsystem of the overall system, namely the campaign [44]
" shown a newly developed design methodology for operational and cost effectiveness,
by merging the conventional design methodology and the "system of systems" design
methodology, together with cost-effectivenessmeasures.
9 clarified aircraft MOPs, and MOEs in terms of susceptibility, vulnerability, surviv-
ability, reliability, maintainability, manoeuvrability, and cost.
9 shown how missions and campaigns can be measured for operational and cost-
effectiveness.
" explained relationships between aircraft MOPs, aircraft MOEs, mission MOEs, and
campaign NIOEs, in selected design aspects.

CHAPTER 3
SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT
This design aspect is one of the most important for combat aircraft design. An impor-
tant issue is that most of the data and also the assessment methods are often military
classified. Therefore, simple models for predicting a survivability probability value have
been developed and introduced. This gives an opportunity to adequately evaluate aircraft
MOP in survivability during conceptual design.
Aircraft combat survivability is defined as capability to avoid and/or withstand a man-
made hostile environment. Firstly, the capacity to avoid guns, missiles, radars and all of
the other elements of opponent's defensethat make up the man-made hostile mission en-
vironment is referred to as the susceptibility. On the the other hand, the aircraft inability
to withstand the man-made hostile environment is referred to as the vulnerability [6].
Aircraft survivability can be measured by the parameter, called the probability of
survival (Ps), which in turn is related to the probability of kill (P,, ). The probability
of kill is the product of two survivability concepts: susceptibility (P) and vulnerability
(P,, Hence the survivability probability can be determined as:
I).
PS =1-Pic =1-PJ, P, (3.1)

c,H
In this chapter, the main concepts and models to evaluate aircraft survivability will
be explaining; the rest of the theory and models, including results are described and
illustrated in Appendix B.
3.1 Susceptibility Assessment

Susceptibility is the probability that the aircraft will be detected and be hit. This value
is a function of those things that would make the aircraft more difficult to be seen and
tracked, such as stealth, manoeuvrability, tactics, and avionics. The probability of hit
(P) can be divided into five categories with conditional probabilities as follows:
" The probability of the threat being active when the aircraft arrives (PA)
17
3. Survivability Assessment 18
" The probability of the aircraft being detected, given the threat is active (PD/A)
" The probability of the threat weapon being launched, given the threat is active and
detects the aircraft (PL/D)
" The probability that the threat weapon intercepts the aircraft, given that the threat
propagator was launched (PIlL)
9 The probability that the threat propagator hits the aircraft or the proximity warhead
fuses, given the propagator intercepts the aircraft. This is called the conditional
probability of hit (PH/I or PF/I).
In the operational and cost-effectiveness design methodology, the susceptibility assess-
ment has the function of transforming aircraft design parameters and/or variables into
aircraft MOP for susceptibility at the vehicle level of design; which means only PD/a, PF/I,
and Pp are measured directly from the susceptibility assessment. The rest of the con-
ditional probabilities can be defined as the opponent weapons, which are input into the
campaign definition for this methodology. Therefore, subscripts of these probabilities
have been redefied to indicate their source. This is done by using lowercase letters for
probabilities valued by the campaign definition (Pa, P,, P; ), and using uppercase letters
for probabilities valued by susceptibility assessment (PD, PH/D, PF/D)" The probability of
hit can be thus split into two groups and be calculated as follows:
PH PArD/APL/DPI/L(PH/I or
= rF/I)
PD}Susceptibility {j (3.2)
= {(PJf, or rF/D) Campaign
D
In this chapter, only the probability values evaluated by the susceptibility module
will be described. Aircraft signature is one of the susceptibility assessmentresults, which

leads to the calculation of the probability of detection, PD. An aircraft has many different
kinds of signature, such as the radar signature, the infrared signature, visual and the aural
signatures. All of the signatures, except for the aural signature, are electromagnetic in
origin. Due to the wide-ranging disciplines to be integrated into this design methodology,
only the radar signature has been chosen to evaluate the probability of detection. This
is because this kind of aircraft signature can be detected from a great distance, and
although radar is only one of several sensorsthat is considered in design of a low-observable

platform [27]. It is the dominant one.
3.1.1 Radar Cross Section
Hovanessian [24]has defined the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of a target as an equivalent
area producing the same amount of energy returned to the radar as would be produced
by target scatterer. The RCS of a target can represent the size of the target as well as
the geometric shape and discontinuities, "such as corners.
Radar Cross Section is then defined as a measurement value used to estimate the size
of the aircraft signature (a) by using the combination of transmitting and receiving radar
signals. The RCS depends strongly upon the direction from which the signal arrives, the
direction of the receiving antenna, and the size and shape of the object. The total cross
section of a complex object can be computed by an assembly of simpler shapes and by a
number of techniques of differing levels of complexity M.
The scattering characteristics of a target are strongly dependent upon the frequency
of the incident wave. At high-frequency regions, called the optical region, all dimensions
of the target are large compared to the wavelength, and thus the cross section can be
by the theory 151.
approximated of geometrical or ray optics and of physical or wave optics
Additionally, most long-range ballistic missile defense radars operate with frequencies
greater than 1 GHz (L band and above); therefore, simple shapes cross section approxi-
mation models are used in this region.
This methodology aims to integrate susceptibility assessmentinto an early design
stage to measure the aircraft performance in this design aspect. To calculate the exact
RCS, requires more details of aircraft design, complex calculation, and consideration of
the Radar Absorbing Material (RAMMBI),

which has been used in most of new generation
of combat aircraft; such design details are not available at the early design stage. They
have modest levels of accuracy, but can not be consistently for accurate comparison of
alternative configurations; therefore, some complex shape will be neglected; such as cavity
and joint edges. The following approximate predictions for simple shape cross section are
thus adequate for this methodology.
3.1.1.1 Sphere Cross Section
Spheres have a symmetrical shape, therefore their radar cross section is obviously inde-
pendent of aspect angle. For this reason spherical shapes can be used as a standard
target without concern for their exact orientation with respect to the radar. Also, if it
is in motion, its cross section will not fluctuate with change of aspect. The sphere cross
section can be approximately calculated as:
(T = 7T(Il
(3.3)
where a is a radius of the sphere.
3.1.1.2 Rectangular Flat Plate
To predict radar cross section of a flat plate is not easy due to the unsymmetrical shape.
However, Blake M divided flat plate cross section calculation into two categories; large
plane surface and general rectangular flat plate.
A-,-
,
Figure 3.1: Plane wave scattering by a rectangular plate [27]
In general terms a rectangular plate has a predefined edge dimension a in the x coor-
dinate and b in the y coordinate system, where the coordinate system is defined such that
the x-y plane coincides with the plane of the plate itself. So, the angle between an incident,
wave and the z axis of the plate, or normal vector of the plate, is defined as 0.0 is defined
as the angle between the incident wave and the x axis of the plate (see Fig. 3.1). If the
Incidlent, wave is asslune(l to be lying on the y-z plane of the plate coordinated system,
the radar cross section of the plate will he calculated with Egn. (3.4). If not lying on the
y-z plane, the flat plate cross section can he evaluated with the Egn. (3.5).
47A' sin(k1 a sin 0)

z
cos H (3.4)
a(H) = \2 kolasill 0
,
[
47rA2 sin(kia sin 0 cos 0) sin(kib sin 0 sin 5) ] 2
ý(B ' cost B (3.5)
A2 klasin0cos0 kibsinBsinq
where a, b are edge dimensions, A is the radar wavelength, A is the flat plate area, and
kl = 2ir/A.
However, if a plate is flat, with the conducting surface perpendicular to the direction
of radar line of sight, and only if the overall dimensions of the plate in any direction are
large compared to the wavelength, then this cross section can be shown as:
47rA2
(3.6)
3.1.1.3 Circular Cylinder
The cylinder has proved to be very useful in modeling portions of aircraft such as fuselage,
wing tanks, and engine nacelles. Very thin circular cylinders whose radii are very small in
comparison with the radar wavelength have been extremely useful in modeling the sharp
edges of some wing surfaces. Very thin cylinders are referred to here as thin wires.
Unlike the sphere, the cylinder is, in general, polarisation-sensitive. However, very
large cylinders (with all dimensions much larger than a wavelength) are polarisation-
insensitive. If the cylinder axis is perpendicular to the direction of propagation, the cross
section for a large cylinder is simply:

27ral2
(3.7)
A
where a is the cylinder radius and 1 is the cylinder length.
If the angle between the radar line of sight and the cylinder (0), is fairly large
((4ira sin 9)/A » 1), then the exact expression for the radar cross section is quite compli-
cated:
{ 2
aA sin 9 sin[(2irl/A) cosB] (3.8)
or =
27r cos 9}
Crispin [131derived a general equation to calculate the cross-section for a cylinder whose
dimensions are small in comparison to the wavelength, such as a wire, sharp leading edge
(thin wire). Eqn. (3.9) where the effective cross-section for 0 is not close to 90°:
A2 tan 20 cos4 q
[()2
(3.9)
167r
(in 2
+
ry7rsin 0)
J
where ry = 1.781072,0 is the angle between the wire and the direction of incidence, and
0 is the angle between the polarisation direction and the plane formed by the wire and
the direction of incidence.

In the case where 0= 90°, equation(3.9) can be reduced to:
7rl2cos4q5
171 z (3.10)
2a+
77ra
3.1.1.4 Finite Cone
The finite cone can be used to model wing surfaces and portions of a fuselage surface. If
the cone base is circular with radius a, and has a finite length of L, then the radar cross
section of this simple finite cone shape for 0= 90° is given by:
87rL3sin a
_ 9\ 3.11
cos4 a
where A is the radar wavelength, and a is the half cone angle (see Fig. 3.2).
And for the 0 90°, the cross-section can be calculated with Eqn. (3.12).
AL tan a
= tang(B - a) (3.12)
87rsin 9
To Radar
Iv.
11-1
A
e' " a
i L
14 10
_I
Figure 3.2: The finish-cone geometry [131
3.1.1.5 Large, Smooth, Curved Surfaces
For a very large surface, it can be assumed that the principal radii of curvature is very
large compared to the wavelength, but is finite. The simple calculation of cross-section
for this kind of shape is given by Eqn. (3.13):
a= 7rRlR2 (3.13)
where Rl and R2 are the principal radii of curvature of the surface at the point where the
radar wave front first strikes it.
3.1.1.6 Complex Targets
The electromagnetic problem of cross section calculation can become very complicated
for the above described simple geometric shapes, thus, necessitating the use of approx-
imation techniques. It is understandable that exact calculation of the cross sections of
more complicated targets is virtually impossible. However, techniques of approximate
calculation have been developed, yielding results that are in reasonable agreement with
M. This approximation, called the random phase method, simply averages the
experiment
contributions of all Q's of simple geometric shape assemblies of the target over all possible
phase angles. This leads to the formula:
(3.14)
k"=l
3.1.2 Probability of Detection by Radar
A detection by radar occurs when the total power level processed by the radar receiver,
Signal and Noise (S + N), is above a selected power level called the threshold (see
Fig. 3.3). The signal-to- noise ratio (S/N), when S+N is equal the threshold, is de-
fined as (SIN)__ M. Therefore, the probability of detection (Po) is then a function of
the signal to noise ratio (S/N) and the false alarm probability (P), and can also be
follows [24]:
calculated as
Threshold
Echo, S
-- ----------------------------
B ------------- -----------
Caz --------- -- -b ------------
Noise, N
Time
Figure 3.3: Conditional detection by threshold setting 161
{ (3.15)
PD =1- e-SAN I IOý 4(S/N)ln(u)} (lu
Pn
where
PG2A2v
S/N = (3.16)
(4ir)3R4FkTB,, L
u(Et) = P,, = exp {-Et /2} (3.17)
Where S/N is signal-to-noise ratio of the radar with G gain transmission power. R is
the distance between radar and aircraft. FT is the effective temperature, L is signal and
echo power loss factor. k is the Boltzmann's constant, and B,, is the noise power that lies
within the signal bandwidth of radar receiver.
Signal-to-noise ratio is a function of power processed by a radar receiver and is direct
proportional to aircraft cross section (v), as shown in equation (3.16). Additionally, S/N
is also the reciprocal to the distance between aircraft and radar receiver to the fourth
power. On the other hand, the probability of false alarm (Pa) can be determined directly
from the threshold setting of radar.
Hovanessian [24]showed some typical results from equation (3.15) - (3.17) in Fig. 3.4,
which can be used as a simple alternative to predict probability of detection by radar.
3.1.3 Conditional Probability of Hit
After an aircraft has been detected, the enemy then engages the aircraft with their weapon,
which generally can be divided into two main categories; contact warhead (penetrator)
and proximity warhead (blast and fragments). The contact warhead has to hit directly
to kill or damage the aircraft. On the other hand, the proximity-fused warhead detonates
outside the aircraft at a detonation distance. Its blast and fragments will then hit and kill
or damage the aircraft. It is not necessary for all shot penetrators and fragments from the
detonation to hit the aircraft. Some will hit and some may miss the aircraft. This matter
will also affect the conditional probability of hit. Additionally, the conditional probability
of hit depends on the threat weapon type which intercepts the aircraft; a contact warhead
(PH/D) or a proximity warhead (PFAD).
3.1.3.1 Miss Distance
The measure of the threat system's ability to position a warhead within the vicinity of
the aircraft is the closet point of approach of the propagator with respect to the aircraft.
This miss distance is essentially an error. In general, the miss distance is a function of the
9 1.90
PROBABILITY OF FALSE ALARM - Pn
9 1.50
9 1.00
9 1.00
9 5.00
1.00
z
W
U
W8
).00
6
2 ).00
0
ü
fi ).00
w
F` ).00
w
0 P 10'1
04 ).00
}
rJ 0.00
m 102
0.00
0 103
ü1
0.000 10
500 10
10
2.00
10$
1.00 10
10
0.50
10-1
1
10
0.10 1
0.05 0'20
.-
02468 10 12 14 16 18
SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO, dB
Figure 3.4: Probability of detection vs signal-to-noise ratio and probability of false

alarm [24]
three spatial coordinates (x, y, z) whose origin is centred at the aim point of the target
(normally the centre of gravity of the aircraft). However, in simple evaluations the two
spatial coordinates (x, y) and sometimes only one dimension (r) are used (see Fig. 3.7).
3.1.3.2 Conditional Probability of Hit by a Contact Warhead
The probability that the aircraft is hit, when it is detected (PI,ID), depends upon the
miss distance distribution and upon the physical size of the aircraft presented area to the
propagator. Assuming that an aircraft has been shot with N propagators at N different
locations of x, y pairs, the distance from the aircraft aim point to any x, y pair is the
miss distance for that shot, and the distances x and y are the coordinate errors. If the N
miss distances are independent from one another and there is no correlation between the
x and y components of the miss distance, the assumption is made that the probability
density function of the miss distance p(x, y) can be represented by two dimensional normal
distribution as:
1 (x ý . )2 (J 2y)2 1
P(x, y) = exp (3.18)
27rQ QJ 2JJ _ 2o
where v.,; and cx are the standard deviation of miss distances x and y respectively; µx
and p. are mean values of miss distance x and y.
If the two means (µ.,, µy) are found, or assumed, to be equal to zero, and if the two
standard deviations (o,.,,

vy) are found, or assumed, to be equal, the bivariate distribution
simplifies to the circular normal distribution given by:

1 r2
P(r) - exp - 2ýý (3.19)
2irv2
The presented area of the aircraft in the miss distance plane, which is defined as a
plane that contains the miss distance vector and is normal to the relative propagator path,
is given by:
AP = ffL(xY)dxdY
L
(3.20)
An aircraft is hit only when x and y define a location within the physical extent of the
aircraft; location of (x, y) pairs outside the aircraft boundary are misses. Consequently,
the probability of a propagator hit on the presented area of the aircraft is given by integral
of p(x, y) over the extent of the aircraft:
ffPx,
PH/D
= L
YdxdY (3.21)
Due to the complexity of evaluating for a general aircraft external shape, two alter-
native approximated aircraft shape representations can be used, i. e. the "Shoe Box" and
the "Carlton". The difference between the two methods is that the "Shoe Box" defines a
rectangular area with side lengths x,, and Yoas shown in Fig 3.5. Therefore, Ap = x0y0.
On the other hand, Carlton, or the diffused Gaussian method uses a function H(x, y),
which defines the probability that locations (x, y) lie on the aircraft presented area (see
Fig. 3.6). Aircraft presented area can be then evaluated as:
AP=J: H(x, y)dxdy (3.22)

J:
Then PH/D with N propagators becomes:
00
PxiD = P(x, J)H(x, J)dxdJ (3.23)
JoJ 00
Miss distance PDF =P(x" Y)

A shoe box
v P<
approximation to the
aircraft's shape
YO
X,
Figure 3.5: Aircraft presented areas represented by Shoe Box and bivariate normal miss
distance distribution
10
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0 0.5 1
-1 -0.5
X/X0
Figure 3.6: Presented area represented by Shoe Box and Carlton methods
If circular symmetry about the aiin point is assumed for the reiss distance distribution,
and if the aircraft presented area is taken as a circle of radius 7r0, and oý, _ or.
y = (r,..
Then the aircraft presented area can he determined as the circle area of this radius
(Al, = 7r7"), as illustrated in Fig. 3.7. Thus, the P, can he estimated from one of
1,
following equations [61:
(27 )
1- exp Shoe Box
1'io = (3.24)
A'' Carlton
2na? +Ap
0000
CF. P
_
0
S
40
0
Figure 3.7: Circular symmetric miss distance <<'l
3.1.3.3 Conditional Probability of Hit by Proximity Warhead
On the other hand, a propagator with a proximity warhead does not have to hit, the
aircraft to kill or damage it. Instead, the aircraft is killed when the proximity warhead
fuses in a location that causes one or more warhead fragments, discrete rod, continuous
rod, or penetrators to hit the aircraft. Additionally these hits inust he sufficient to kill the
aircraft. If the warhead detonates close enough, the blast effect may also daiiiage and/or
kill the aircraft. Most of the current air target warheads are designed to kill the target
with fragment spray, whose kill or damage mechanism is similar to the kill or daniage
mechanism inflicted by multiple hits of contact warheads or penetrators. Therefore, the
blast-fragment warhead is chosen to represent the proximity warhead.

From a susceptibility point of view, the miss distance of each fragment fron a prox-
imity warhead detonation and the number of fragments penetrating the target are the
major factor in the evaluation of this threat type. The number of fragments penetrating
the aircraft depends on the number of fragments in the proximity warhead, fragment im-
pact locations, and the terminal effects parameters; such as the fragment mass, impact
velocity, and detonation distance (see Fig. 3.8). In general, the fragments will he ran-
donily distributed throughout the fragment spray zone. Time expected number of hits on
the aircraft can be estimated by assuming that a presented area, of the aircraft is hit with
density fragment [5] This is expressed in Eqn. (3.25).

a uniform spray of .
NA,, (3.25)
ryt =
2irs2(cos S1 cos b2)
-
where N is the number of fragments in the warhead, and s is the detonation distance
between fragment spray and the warhead. bi and S2 are the leading and the trailing
fragment spray angles which are defined as:
V,,,,sinT +Vfsin(q, +ai)

arctan IV,,, cos W+ Vfcos(gf + (xi)
- Vt
T, i=1,2 (3.26)
Figure 3.8: Warhead detonation and fragment spray
where Vt is the target horizontal speed, V,,, is the speed of the missile, is the elevation
angle of the missile, Vf is the average fragment speed with respect to a stationary warhead,
and ai and a2 are the leading and trailing fragment spray angles from the axis of the
static warhead detonation, respectively.

The number of fragments, which supposedly directly hit the aircraft is dependent
upon detonation distance and the number of fragments along the aircraft length. In this
case, the probability of fuse (PF/D) becomes 1.0 for all 7),direct fragment hits, and the
probability of hit can be calculate as n hits by contact warhead (see Fig. 3.8). In other
words, a hit by a proximity warhead becomes n multiple hits by a contact warhead with
a PH,o of 1.00 for detonated fragments within aircraft presented area.

3.2 Vulnerability Assessment

Vulnerability is the probability that the aircraft will be killed if hit [61,and is a function
of aircraft critical component configurations, including specific armament, system loca-
tions and redundancies. An aircraft consists of many components, and each individual
component has a level of vulnerability; thus, each component vulnerability contributes in
some measures to the overall vulnerability of the aircraft. The aircraft vulnerability is
indicated by the probability of kill given a hit, PK1t,. This probability can be evaluated
using the following procedures:
" Identification of the critical components considering redundancy level
" Identification of each critical component Damage-Caused Failure Mode
" Calculation of each individual critical component vulnerability
" Identification of overlapped areas of these critical components
" Calculation of each overlapped area critical component vulnerability
" Summation of each individual critical component and each overlapped area of these
critical components vulnerability considering to their layout (Shielding Effect for
Overlapped Area)
3.2.1 Kill Tree Diagram
A kill tree diagram is a logic symbology, which shows a top-down approach that starts
with aircraft kill event and then determines what event or combination of events can cause
the aircraft kill event. The kill tree diagram can be illustrated by the generic fault tree as
shown in Fig. 3.9. At the bottom of each branch of the diagram, all critical components
is
resulting an aircraft kill event are shown. With the basic logic gates (AND, OR), critical
component redundancy can be illustrated.
3.2.2 Shotline Technique
This technique has been used to identify the overlapped area of critical components by
superimposing a planar grid over the aircraft model and then passing parallel shotlines or
ray towards the grid nodes N. A list of the penetrated components is then generated.
AttritionKill
Aircraftcannotfly II Aircraftcannotbecontrolled
Loss of lift Loss of thrust Loss of structural Loss of control unit Loss of power supply
integrity
1 LL1 L3
Figure 3.9: Kill tree diagram for UAV
In the vulnerability assessmentmodule used for this methodology, the overlapped area
of the critical components within the same shotline (see Fig. 3.10) can be examined in
two categories; i. e. shielding effect and non-shielding effect. For shielding effect, the front
critical component may be used as a shield for the critical components behind. On the
other hand, for non-shielding effect the overlapped areas of the critical component will be
redefined as an additional non-redundant critical component. The components behind are
automatically killed when the front component of the overlapped area is killed. Therefore,
the total number of critical components increases. The effect of these two definitions of
overlapped area will be discussed later.
3.2.3 Vulnerable Area given by a Single Hit
The vulnerable area technique is a theoretical threat-presented area that, if hit by a

damage mechanism, would result in an aircraft or components kill M. The vulnerable
area of the ith component (A,,;) depends on the presented area of the component in the
plane normal to the approach direction of the threat (Ap;) as illustrated in Fig. 3.11. The
probability of component kill, given a hit on the component (Pk/lt; ) is as follows:
A,, = Ap,Pry/, (3.27)

t;
The determination of the Pk/, of each component is a very difficult undertaking.

L
It requires a combination of complete analysis of critical data and sound engineering
judgment. There is no universal methodology for arriving at a numerical value for PkII, 161.
Overlapped area
fFCS
No. 2
. --Tank-
Tank No. 4
1,
bob
Shotline
Figure 3.10: Identification of Overlapped area by shotline technique
APe(engine) APf(fuel tank) APP(pilot)
Ap (Aircraft)
AVe(engine) Af(fuel tank) AvP(pilot)
Figure 3.11: Presented and vulnerable areas of critical components and aircraft Is]
Therefore, the assumed Pk-1hin Table 3.1 are chosen as guideline and/or default value in
vulnerability assessment. These values have been assumed by Ball [6]
Table Assumed default probability of kill

3.1: of a component, given a hit on the
component Pk1h
Critical component Pk1h
Pilot 1.0
Fuel system 0.3
Engine 0.6 - 0.7
Avionic 0.8 - 0.9
Before the vulnerable areas of the overlapped areas of the critical components can be
determined, the probability of kill given a hit, and presented area of overlapped critical
components both have to be defined and calculated depending on their redundancy. The
presented area of overlapped critical components is defined as the intersection of presented
areas of all overlapped critical components, arranged by the same shotline (seeFig. 3.12).
It is possible to acquire redundant overlapped areas if an aircraft has symmetrically re-
dundant critical components; unless overlapped critical components are always defined
and considered as non-redundant components.

No.1= TankNo.2 + No. 1
Tank No.2
Tank No. 1
OverlappedNo.2 = FCS + Tank No.2

FCS
+ Tank No. 1
No.3 = FCS+ TankNo. 2
Overlapped
Figure 3.12: Overlapped areas from tank no. 1, tank no.2 and FCS
The probability of a kill of an overlapped area, given a hit on the overlapped area,
has to be determined. This determination depends mainly on the redundancy level of the
overlapped critical components, which can be classified as follows.
3.2.3.1 Overlap of Non-Redundant Critical Components
A hit in this overlapped area can kill one or more of the components intersected by the
shotline. Thus, the component kills along the shotline are not mutually exclusive. Assume
there are C non-redundant critical components along all shotlines within the overlapped
area. This overlapped area, with its C components, can be considered to be a composite
non-redundant critical component. The probability that all C components survive the hit
(P81140)
is given by the joint probability that each of the C components survives the hit.
c
Ps/tic =
Ps/jto = PS/hiPs/h2Ps/IL3... rl(1 Pk/lit) (3.28)
-
i=l
Hence, the probability of kill of an overlapped area of non-redundant critical compo-
nents given a hit is given by:

c
Pk/hc) Pkllti) (3.29)
1 i=1
3.2.3.2 Overlap of Redundant Critical Components
If redundant critical components overlap each other, or another redundant component,
a single hit on the overlapped region can kill all redundant critical components. There-
fore, an overlapped area of redundant critical components becomes automatically non-
redundant, unless there is another identical overlapped redundant component onboard

the aircraft. The probability of kill of this kind of overlapped area can be evaluated as:
C
Pk/{to= Pk/h1Pk/h2Pk/j13... Pk//tc _ Pk/h; (3.30)
i=1
3.2.3.3 Overlap of Redundant and Non-Redundant Critical Components
In this case, an overlapped area comprises C1 non-redundant critical components and C2
redundant critical components. The overlapped region can be killed by killing one of the
C1 non-redundant critical components or by killing all C2 redundant critical components.
Hence, the probability of kill for such an area can be calculated as:
=1 ({fl(i Pkt/L;)}{1 -11

j=1
Pk/! })
L
(3.31)
Z=1 ,
Finally, the vulnerable areas of overlapped critical components can be evaluated ac-
cording to Eqn. (3.27), and their redundancy can be categorised as described above.
An effect on consider for overlapped area of critical components is the determination
of the vulnerable areas of the non-overlapped regions of the critical components. The
presented area of these critical components are deducted, or sometimes replaced by the
intersection of the presented areas. For instance, three intersection regions from fuel tank
1, 2,
no. no. and the flight control system, shown in Fig. 3.12, can therefore be evaluated.
The results are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Aircraft component presented areas with overlapped critical components
Component An [f t`] Pkth[-] A [f t`] Redundancy
Fuel Tank No. 1 20 (45-25) 0.3 6.0 redundant
Fuel Tank No.2 15 (45 - 25 - 5) 0.3 4.5 redundant
FCS 0 (20 - 15 - 5) 0.95 0.0 non-redundant
Overlapped No. 1 25 0.09 2.25 non-redundant
Overlapped No. 2 15 0.9545 14.181 non-redundant
Overlapped No.3 5 0.965 4.825 non-redundant
Total 80 - 21.256 -
3.2.3.4 Shielding Effect applied to Overlapped Critical Components
One possible to reduce the vulnerable areas of the critical component overlapped area
is to use the front critical component of the overlapped area as a shield for the behind
critical components. The assumed shield capability in this study is 10%. That means the
probability of kill of the behind critical components will be reduced by 10%. Additionally,
the reconfiguration of the critical component layout by moving the less critical component
to the front of the overlapped area is another method to supplementary reduction of kill
probability of the overlapped area. This effect is valid within the overlapped area only.
By this approach, the kill probability of the overlapped area reduces. Table 3.3 shows an
example of calculation of the kill probability of the Overlapped No. 2. In this example,
the FCS has been positioned between the fuel tank No. 1 and No. 2 for the reconfiguration
layout.
Table 3.3: Calculation of the kill probability of the Overlanned No. 2

Probability of kill
Component
Non-Shielding Effect
Original Layout Reconfigurated Layout
Fuel Tank No. 1 0.3 0.27 0.27
Fuel Tank No.2 0.3 0.27 0.3
FCS 0.95 0.95 0.855
Total 0.9545 0.953645 0.866745
The total aircraft vulnerable area calculated from a single hit is then the summation of
all non-redundant critical components and non-redundant overlapped critical components,
which can be more or less than the total aircraft vulnerable areas resulting from a single
hit without overlapped areas. This depends on the layout of the critical components and
the consideration of the shielding effect of the front component of the overlapped area.
For instance, if the aircraft designer rearranges these three critical components so that no
overlapped areas of critical components exists; its vulnerable areas will be 19 f t2, instead
of 21.256 f t2. In case that the front critical component in the overlapped area can be
used as a shield for the behind critical components, the aircraft vulnerable areas will be
reduced to 21.147475 ft2 for the original layout, and to 19.518 ft2 for the reconfiguration
layout.
3.2.4 Aircraft Kill Probability by a Single Hit of a Nonexplosive Penetrator
The aircraft kill probability, given a random single hit on the aircraft (PKIH), is the
summation of the kill probabilities of the non-redundant critical components, given a

random hit on the aircraft (PkIH;). This can be calculated as:
Pk/x, _ PltlHiPklhi = (AnilAn)(AilApt)
= A,: /An (3.32)
In the case that an aircraft has been hit by a single nonexplosive penetrator, it is
impossible to kill an aircraft by killing only one of the redundant critical components.
Hence, the kill probability given a random single hit on the aircraft with C non-redundant
critical components and overlapped areas is evaluated as:

CC A
vt (3.33)
PItIH PkIH'
i=1 i=1
Ap
3.2.5 Aircraft Kill Probability by Multiple Hits of Penetrators
It is assumed that the random distribution of hits by more than one penetrator or fragment
over the aircraft is uniform, and all hits are assumed to travel along parallel shotlines from
the same direction. Ball [6] offers five alternatives to estimate these probability values;
i. e. Binomial approach for N hits, Poisson approach for E expected hits, Tree diagram,
Markov chain, and Simplified approach. With the first two methods, the effects of critical
component redundancy cannot be considered in kill probability by multiple hits. The third
method, the tree diagram, examines kill expressions for each hit, considering redundant
and non-redundant critical components, and the sum of these values up to aircraft kill
probability by N hits. A disadvantage of tree diagram is that it is too detailed and time
consuming. The Markov chain or state matrix method offers an opportunity to determine
aircraft, kill probability by multiple hits of nonexplosive penetrators with consideration
of redundancy for less detailed calculation for each hit. The results of the tree diagram
and Markov chain will be identical because both methods use the same principle. The
last method is the simplified approach, which considers that more than one component
can be killed by one hit and that the kill of one component has no effect on the kills of the
other components, given N hits (or E expected hits). The aircraft kill probability by this
method is a logical summation of all redundant and non-redundant critical components

kill probabilities after N hits (or E expected hits), which can be calculated by either
binomial or poisson methods.
Ball has also shown that the results from the Markov chain, the simplified approach
by the binomial method, and the simplified approach by the poisson method are very
similar. Hence, the Markov chain method has been chosen to determine PKIH by multiple
hits of nonexplosive penetrators or fragments in this methodology because the matrix can
be simple constructed and be less complicated used.
Markov Chain or state matrix method defines the state vector {S}, which describes all
redundant critical component kill states and all possible aircraft kill states given a single
hit as:
" One or more of the non-redundant critical components or overlapped critical com-
ponents have been killed, resulting in an aircraft kill, denoted by Knrc.
" One of the redundant critical components Cm has been killed, denoted by Krc,,, in cl.
" All of the redundant critical components Cm have been killed, resulting in an aircraft
kill, denoted by Krcc,,,.
" None of the non-redundant critical components and none of the redundant critical
components are killed, denoted by NK.
Note that a summation of all state probability values in {S} must always be unity; or
in other words, the aircraft must exist in one of the possible states.
{S} = {Knrc Krcl Krc2 ;n cl Krccl NK}T (3.34)

;,, cl ...
The transition matrix of probability [T] specifies how the aircraft will translate from
one state to another as a result of a hit on the aircraft. The state vector after ith hits,
where i=0,1,2, N, is shown in Eqn. (3.35). For instance, if an aircraft includes three
...
non-redundant critical components and one set of two redundant critical components, the
transit matrix of probability [T] can be evaluated, as shown in Table 3.4.
where ADAC is an aircraft presented area; Ap,, is the total presented area of all
rc
non-redundant critical components. APKrcn in Cm represents the area of the nth critical
component of the mth redundant critical component set. APN,C is the total presented
area of all non-critical components. Therefore, the state vector {S}('+') can be given by:
{S}(2+1) = [T]{S}() (3.35)

Table 3.4: State transition matrix

Probability of transition from this state
1A PAC
Knrc Krc 1 ;,, cl Krcz ;,, Cl Ifrccl NK To this state
APac APKnrc APKnrc 0 APK Knrc
0 APNK + APKrc 0 0 APICr nrc
l I. Cl cl in Cl
Krcl ill cl
1/ADAC 0 0 APNK + APKrc 0 APKrc KrC2
111QI
2 in CI 2 I. C1
0 APKrc APKrc APAC
2 in C1 , in Cl
0 Krccl
0 0 0 0 APN,, NK
An aircraft kill is defined by those states that specify either a kill of any of non-
redundant components (Knrc) or a kill of the members of the m sets of redundant com-
ponents (Krcc, ). Hence, the probability the aircraft is killed after ith hits is given
by
BK/H = Knrc( + Krcgl + Krcgý2 + + Krcgz (3.36)
...
3.2.6 Aircraft Kill Probability by Proximity Warhead
The proximity-fused high explosive warhead produces primary damage from the blast
and high velocity fragments or penetrators generated by the detonation. An aircraft
vulnerability given by an external blast is usually expressed as an envelope about the
aircraft where the detonation of a specified charge weight high explosive will result in a
level damage kill M. Detonation
specified of or to the aircraft outside of these envelopes
will result in little or no damage to the aircraft or in a lesser kill level. Envelopes are
determined for a variety of encounter conditions that allow for variations in aircraft speed
and altitude, as well as aspect (aircraft view). Aircraft critical components vulnerable
to the external blast consist principally of portions of the structure and control surface,
which are out of scope of this design methodology. Therefore, the blast damage effect is
excluded from the vulnerability assessment module.

On the other hand, penetrators or fragments spray from warhead detonation can
directly damage the aircraft following the same principle as multiple hits by contacted
warheads or penetrators, as shown in Fig. 3.8. The measure of vulnerability on encounter

with this threat is the probability that the aircraft is killed given fusing, PJ IF . To
determine this value, the actual number or expected number of fragments that hit the
aircraft has to be calculated first (seeSection 3.1.3.3). Then, the aircraft kill probability by
those fragment hits can be evaluated using the same kill probability calculation principle
as the multiple hits by penetrators (see Section 3.2.5).

3.2.7 Lethal Radius
The lethal radius is an alternative measure of aircraft vulnerability. It is defined as the

detonation distance between the proximity warhead and an aircraft, where the aircraft
kill probability is 0.5, neglecting of the threat blast effect. The PF/D of proximity war-
heads can thus be described as a function of the number of fragments (N) depending on
detonation distance (s) (details see Section 3.2.6). Assuming that the threat proximity
warhead detonates within the lethal radius, the aircraft is then killed. Therefore, the
lethal radius can indicate only how good an aircraft is in terms of vulnerability, and will
not be considered in this design methodology.
PK/D(N (N(s)) (S) (3.37)

PF/D N
hits)
=J =f
3.3 Probability of Survivability

Aircraft survivability is measured as Ps, which is a function of P1 Ix, PKIF, PID, PFADand
PD depending on encounter threat types:
PDrH/DrK/H
- Penetrator
PS=1-PK= (3.38)
i1 -
PDrF/DrIC/F
Proximity warhead
Survivability depends upon the encounter threat type, aspect (or aircraft view), and
scenario. The survivability assessment for this methodology includes survivability on en-
counter with both nonexplosive penetrator and proximity warhead (external explosive)
in the six main aircraft i.
views; e. front, rear, right, left, top and bottom views. In
a real combat scenario, an aircraft cannot fly only in one attitude (appearance) (see
Fig. 3.13) and PD, PJ/H, PH/D, Px/F, PF/D also depend on the aircraft aspect facing the
threat. Therefore, an alternative way to consider this effect is to define the manoeuvra-
bility probability Piet11(or weighting factors) and to integrate this value into survivability
assessment as:
Top
Ps =1-E Pview;PDj(PH/DjPlt/Hi or PF/DiPK/F; ) (3.39)

i=Front
So, aircraft survivability of each aircraft view (appearance) facing the threat in each
flight phase can be determined. The average survivability in each flight phase can finally
be evaluated by the summation of the survivability values in each view.
3.3.1 Probability of Manoeuvrability (Weighting Factors)
Due to the real flying and mission specification, an aircraft has to change its aspect (view)
facing the threat encounter direction. Therefore, probability of a specific aspect facing the
threat (or weighting factors) has been defined and used to determine an average aircraft
aspect facing threat encounter direction during a specific flight phase. In this research,
this probability of a specific aspect is renamed to probability of manoeuvrability. The
probability of nianoeuvrability is therefore, defined as the probability of each of the six
aircraft views directly facing the threat encounter direction in a specific phase during a
sortie. By assuming that threat encounter directions are constant and uniform throughout
the mission, multiple aircraft views during each flight phase can be seen by threat weapons,
as illustrated in Fig. 3.13. Sometime in the real situation, an aircraft may use terrain to
reduce these probability of manoeuvrability in some specific flight phase. If in this case,
the total manoeuvrability probability may be less than unity. Unfortunately, this case
is out of scope of this research. Therefore, the total manoeuvrability probability in each
flight phase for this research has to always be unity.
Jýo
oý.
Tlu-eat Area
Figure 3.13: Aircraft nianoettvrability in attack flight phase
Table 3.5 shows an example of aircraft manoeuvrability probabilities during the mis-
sinn simulation. These values will be set up as default values and be used as option 2 of
the results shown in chapter 8.
3.3.2 Probability of Encounter
In real combat situations, not only the aircraft inanoeuvrability has to he takeln into
account, but the probability of single or multiple encounters by one or more different threat
types during the mission have to be examined. In this section, the effect of probability of
Table 3.5: Aircraft manoeuvrability probabilities

Aircraft views
Flight phase
Top Right Left Front Rear Bottom
Preflight 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00
Outbound 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.00 0.05
Attack 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.40 0.00 0.15
Inbound 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.05
Postflight 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00
encounter by two main weapon types after each other (cannot be at the same time) on
aircraft survivability is introduced.
In a flight phase during a sortie, an aircraft may be shot at several times by one or
more weapon types. It is assumed that each threat can encounter only one aircraft and is
independent of other threats. The aircraft mission survivability depends on the number
of encounters and types of weapon. An aircraft can survive the mission only when it
survives each encounter during the mission. The probability that the aircraft survives the
ith encounter refers to its (i - 1)th encounter survivability probability (see Fig. 3.14).
PiR Pa
3Eocouotc
Ral _ P. 7
7 Eacoiaaa
R0 po.
1 Eacouota
Rm_FLT
Pa +Rm - Pa +PoW -I Pa . pip _I
Figure 3.14: Block diagram for independent encounters survivability probability
In the other words, the aircraft can survive the encounters only when it survives all
shots. Therefore, an aircraft survivability probability given N encounters from the same
weapon type can be determined as follows:

N
Ps Psl Pst Psi PSN 11 Pi=1
= ... = Si
P, PK2)(1- PK3)... (1 - PKN)

Cl)(1-
(3.40)
i=1
where Pst is the probability of aircraft survivability given the ith encounter; and P1
is also the aircraft kill probability given the ith encounter.

If an aircraft encounters N weapon types; each type has an expected number Ei. The
aircraft mission survivability is hence calculated as follows:
PS(mission) PS(weapon
rS(weapon type 1)1 S(weapon type 2) *'' type N)
Pjýl)El(1 )EZ(1 PK3)E3 (1 PI'CN)EN

=(1 - -p - ... -
_ exp(-EEPK, ) (3.41)
Z-1
3.4 Chapter Summary

This survivability assessmentchapter has:
9 shown an overview of the survivability model.
9 presented a simple model to evaluate aircraft RCS by using simple geometric shapes
to represent an aircraft.
" shown the determination method of aircraft probability of detection through its
radar cross section and opponent radar performance.
" presented alternative simple methods to determine aircraft probability of being hit
by contact and proximity warheads.
" explained the vulnerability probability determination methods for the two main
threat weapon types.
9 introduced manoeuvrability probability and integrated this into the survivability
probability.
9 explained how aircraft mission survivability probability can be determined through
considering susceptibility, vulnerability, and manoeuvrability probabilities.

CHAPTER 4
RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY
Reliability & Maintainability (R&NI) is another important design aspect which has to
be considered during the combat aircraft design process, because the reliability & main-
tainability will directly affect to aircraft available for the next sortie, which is one of the
objective functions of this research.

Prediction of realistic R&M figures for a combat aircraft during the conceptual and/or
preliminary design phases is a continuing problem for both designers and operators. This
is primarily due to paucity of hardware details. Theses details are generally not available
for analysis and evaluation during the early design stage. A statistical approach is used
to estimate the aircraft reliability. On the other hand, aircraft maintainability can be
indirectly evaluated by a model used in aircraft life cycle cost estimation.

The main concepts and results will be shown in this chapter, and the rest of principles,
methods, models, and results are demonstrated in Appendix C.
4 Reliability Assessment
.1
Reliability can be quantified as the probability of successfully completing the mission
without failure. Due to the lack of system and component details during the concep-
tual and preliminary design stage, historical data were statistically analysed and used to
develop the reliability probability prediction techniques.
In this section, four reliability assessmentalternatives are examined and explained;
i. e. Direct linear regression, Pareto distribution, Combination between linear regression
and Pareto distribution, and Empty weight functionality.
4.1.1 Direct Linear Regression
Serghides [38]introduced a method to estimate the reliability and maintainability of each
aircraft component by using the historical data with statistical analysis. The main prin-
ciple of this method is to select the two best design parameters in the following criteria
to create a linear equation to estimate for both military and civilian aircraft thirteen
44
4. Reliability & Maintainability 45
component defect rates (DR).
1. Highest linear correlation between aircraft defect rate data with the aircraft design
parameter.
2. Engineering judgement basis, for example a design parameter which can indicate
size of a system, such as height or weight.
With the selected design parameters, the linear regression equation can be built in the
form:
DR, =bo+bl"Xl+b2"X2
,,,
where bo, bl, and b2 are constant equation coefficients, and Xland X2 are selected aircraft
design parameters for each particular system.

Serghides also developed a technology improvement factor (TIF) based on the year
1952 to validate his prediction method and multiply this value with the pre-calculated
system DR. Hence, the total aircraft DR can finally be calculated by summing all thirteen
aircraft components DR:
13
DRSystemi
DRAircraft =
Z=1
A newer model was required to ensure correct prediction for modern aircraft, the
development was undertaken by Whittle [52]. This model has been used by Woodford [53I
to predict total personnel and unit level consumption costs.
4.1.2 Pareto Distribution
Al-Ahmed [l] showed that finding a realistic relationship between the R&M and the con-
ceptual and/or preliminary design variables could be difficult for each system because
each aircraft consists of more than thirty different systems. Many of these system's R&M
figures are not directly related to the way the aircraft is designed.
Al-Ahmed also discovered that if the aircraft reliability data are sorted in a descending
order, this graph follows Pareto distribution regardless of the aircraft age. This means
that the whole aircraft reliability can be predicted by a few system reliabilities of aircraft
systems failure rate distribution, which contribute 80% of the total failure rate by using
Pareto principle [3°1
Figure 4.1: Pareto distribution
To approximate this failure rate distribution of aircraft main systems, Al-Ahmed had
developed equations to estimate the following parameters, which are necessaryto define
the Pareto curve, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
1. The highest failure rate figure, FR(1).
2. The lowest failure rate figure, FR(8).
3. Number of systems per aircraft, NoS
Hence, the rest of aircraft system failure rates can also be calculated by using the
Pareto distribution in the form:
FR(n) = FR(1) - n-ý' (4.1)
4.1.3 Empty Weight Functionality
An alternative to predict an aircraft failure rate is to develop a function of an aircraft
empty weight [31, unfortunately this method needs a large number of reliability data,
is to
which not easy collect due to restriction. However, four linear graphs from available
reliability data (1985,1987,1993,1996) are plotted; and show that aircraft failure rate
may be possible a function of aircraft empty weight as shown in Fig 4.2.
By using all available aircraft reliability data, an average linear equation for aircraft
failure rate evaluation has been discovered as:
FR = 0.0476 + 0.0666 " We (4.2)

1.2
F-104
F-106ºmA-7
ATRI YH
tio 0.8 F-d
r4 F1$ F-15
0.6 ATR2 - F-105
Trends forData (1985)_. -
ý. GAl tAte-. -
0.4 " GA7
y- 0.0666x+0.0476 ýF
0.2
Trends for Data (1987)
TrendsforData (1993_)_. j GAl Fatly

Data(1996)
-TTindfor
13579 11 13 15
Empty Weight [Ton]
f Aircraft Reliability Data (1993) Historical Data (1983) A Historical Data (1987) Aircraft Reliability Data (1996)
Figure 4.2: Failure rate as a function of empty weight
4.1.4 Combination between Linear Regression and Pareto Distribution
Both Serghides and Al-Ahmed had their own data to produce their models to predict
the aircraft reliability, and they are not comparable with each other due to the different
aircraft classifications and aircraft technologies used. Additionally, it was possible to
predict aircraft reliability by using a combination of the two above aircraft reliability
prediction methods with classified data A
Firstly, six aircraft design parameters, which relate to almost major aircraft systems,
are selected to investigate their linear and exponential correlation with the entire aircraft
failure rate. These parameters are
9 Aircraft empty weight, We
" Number of engines per aircraft, Ne
" Altitude, Alt
" Gross wing area, Wa
" Aircraft height, H
9 Total thrust, Thrust
Secondly, failure rate distributions of all available data have been plotted and analysed.
The 40: 70 portion has been found as shown in Fig. 4.3. In other words, 40% of major
aircraft systems give approximate 70% of the total aircraft failure rate; and also the
remaining 60% of the aircraft systems have an approximately constant failure rate, which
is approximate equal to the lowest FR from the critical 40% of aircraft systems.
Failure Rate for Aircraft P
800
09362
y= 7sl.a3x
U. 700 R?= 09492
C3 600
500
400
300
200
100
0
02468 10 12
No. of System
Figure 4.3: Failure rate distribution of aircraft P
The next step is to develop either exponential and/or linear regression equations to
predict the highest and the lowest failure rate from two almost complete available data
sets [4,381 The results from these analyses show that linear regression equations are the
best solution to predict the highest and the lowest failure rates by assuming that aircraft
consist of thirteen major systems (details see Appendix C). The aircraft system failure
rate distribution, which is evaluated from these two linear regression equations firmly
supports the 40:70 portion of the Pareto principle. The highest and the lowest failure
rate are given by:
FR(100) =122.245 - 61.126 "H+2.299 Thrust + 0.0149. We + 0.00166 " Alt
+125.517"NE-1.465"WQ, (4.3)
FR(70) =90.896 - 1.806 "H-4.9641 " Thrust 0.0197. We + 0.04018 " Alt
-
232.866 NE + 15.88 Wa, (4.4)
- " "
b=-0.8977117177 (log {FR(70)} log {FR(100)}) (4.5)
" -
where bis power variable in the Pareto distribution form. FR(100) is the predicted highest
failure rate, and FR(70) is the predicted lowest failure rate. Failure rate is assumed to
be constant for the remaining 60% of aircraft system.
Because the data used to develop the FR(100) and FR(70) were collected in 90's,
they are not quite appropriate with the new design technology used in present aircraft.
Therefore, a technology improvement factor has to be examined and be added into the
equations. Serghides 1381 the defect rate and the number of years
used predicted system
measured from a reference date (1952) to the first flight of a prototype to develop the
TIF for each aircraft system. But this method is too detailed and is not applicable to
this design methodology, which expects a simple method to predict whole aircraft failure
rate during the conceptual and/or preliminary design process.
With regard to the decreasing trends of the new generation of combat aircraft in
terms of both empty weight and failure rate (see Fig. 4.2), an alternative to the TIF
development with these relationship may be possible and found as follows:
We > 5000 kg, TIF = 1/3

Unmanned Aircraft
We < 5000 kg, TIF = 1/4
We > 12000 kg, TIF = 1/2

Manned Aircraft
We < 12000 kg, TIF = 1/3
The total aircraft failure rate collected after the year 1985 can thus be evaluated by the
summation of thirteen aircraft system failure rates, which are calculated from distribution
equations (see Eqn. (4.1) ):
13
FRA; = TIF FR(n) (4.6)

rcraft "E
n=1
4.2 Maintainability Assessment

Maintainability is defined as the inherent characteristic of an item related to its ability to
be restored when the specified maintenance task is performed as required 1291.There are
several possibilities to measure the maintainability; such as mean time to repair (MTTR),
defect man-hour rate (DMHR), scheduled maintenance (SM) and so on. In this section,
these major three maintainability measures, which relate directly to mission simulation,
are described.
4.2.1 Mean Time To Repair
Knezevic [29]introduced methods to measure MTTR by using probability theory. This
method can be used when aircraft maintainability function, which is a probability density
function of aircraft MTTR, is known. If the number of aircraft systems (N) is known,
the MTTR can be given by:
co
MTTR =
f(t x m(t))dt (4.7)
0
where m(t) is the probability density function of maintainability.
The only available maintainability data set N in the form of MTTR were examined
with the Pareto distribution approach; it was found that MTTR followed approximately
the 40:60 relationship. This method can provide a probability density function in a form
of a power expression. The possible methods to predict MTTRAjr... ft are:
1. Using Pareto distribution as a probability density function of maintainability:
N
MT2 R(100)
MTTRAircraft =J (n " (MTTR(100) " nb))dn = (N (2+b)_ 1)
i
2. Using direct integration on Pareto distribution curve:

N
MTT R(100)
MTTRAircraft =J (MTTR(100) " nb)dn = (N(1+b) _ 1)
i
3. Using Pareto principle 40:60 portion: This method is similar to the above aircraft
failure rate evaluation; the difference is that the portion of the total MTTR is given
by a small number of aircraft systems.
4. Using assumed value: Burleigh 1101calculated MTTR,, 1.53 hours from

f,,, =
HAWK data and MTTRDa,,, = 2.6 hours from A-10 data. These two values
o9e
are used as default assumed values throughout this research due to lack of main-
tainability data in the form of MTTR.
4.2.2 Scheduled Maintenance
Woodford [53)presented a scheduled maintenance requirement for aircraft with the model
taken from a paper by Harmon ["). The method predicts the scheduled inspection and
maintenance effort requirements based on a systematic approach, and can be split into
five discrete sections; pre-flight, post-flight, periodic (avionics), special (propulsion), and
periodic (shop-propulsion).
Pre-flight:
SMpre-Flight (0.3763+ 3.9462E -5" MA/C) 0.99YR52
X (4.8)
(1- MATCO,,,,,
o,it)
Post-Flight:
SMpost-Flight
(1.2556 + 1.807772E -5" MA/c)
X 0.99Yß52 (4.9)
-
V/-(l - MAT,
Posit)
Periodic (Avionics):
SMAv; 3. WV+2.41588E-3"ROAC)x0.98' 2 (4.10)

o,,;cs=(0.3266+2.06252E -
Special (Propulsion):
SMPropulsion
-- (0.344 + 1.04991E -5" TSLMax)x 0.985 'R52 (4.11)
Periodic (Shop-Propulsion):
SM2_Propu, _ (0.1603 + 4.968525E -6" Ts, )x0.985YR52 (4.12)

s;o 'lax
Total aircraft scheduled maintenance (SM):
SM S1VIpre-Flight SMPost-Flight SIVIAvionics + S1L1 + M2-Propulsion (4.13)

= + +
Propulsion "ý
These models are very simple because they are based mainly on mass and thrust.
Unfortunately, there are paucity data available for scheduled maintenance; therefore, it is
extremely difficult to the this j53]

check accuracy of model .
4.2.3 Unscheduled Maintenance
With the same principles as aircraft failure rate prediction, an aircraft defect-man hour
rate (DMHR) will be predicted. The 40:70 ratio described in section 4.1.4 was again been
observed. Due to the limited data avaiable [4,381

to develop models for DMHR(100),
DMHR(70) and TIF, only two possible alternatives are examined and shown in this
methodology, as follows:
1. Combination between linear regression and Pareto distribution: This method uses
the same principle, aircraft design parameters, and number of aircraft components
assumption as the model for FR calculation. By using historical data [4,381,the
DMHR equations can be given as:
DMHR(100) = 4615.4050 230.2682. H+ 24.0820 " Thrust 0.0501 " We

- -
0.2296 Alt + 696.7274 NE 9.7865. Wa (4.14)
- " " -
DMHR(70) = 518.5990 19.6558. H-3.7209 " Thrust 0.00054 " We
- -
0.02297 Alt + 59.4110 NE 1.8700. WQ (4.15)
- " " -
b=-0.8977117177 (log {DMHR(70)} log {DMHR(100)})
" -
(4.16)
13 13
DMHRAir. DMHR(n) DMHR(100) (4.17)

raft = = " nb
n=1 n=1
2. Functionality of aircraft empty weight: From available maintainability data, two
linear DMHR against aircraft empty weight traces were plotted. However, only
two data sets are available, but the both trends of DMHR against empty weight
can be clearly identified as shown in Fig. 4.4. Therefore, an average trend can be
also used to predict general aircraft DMHR as:
DMHR = 12.221 0.8009 " We (4.18)

-
18
ö
" F2
16 Trendsfoz[ate :
00
14 Al
F4
12 -"08009x+ 12221
a
b 1ý
O
" A-7
6 Tmrdsfor Data(1993) F-I 04
-............. " T1 GA2 OATR2
4 "
............ GAt Late
w2 ,ý GA3
A0
0 2468 10 12 14 16
Empty Weight [Ton]
" AucroftReliabilityData(1493) Histonca1Data(1985)
Figure 4.4: Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has
9 introduced a possible method to estimate aircraft reliability by using historical data

in
with statistical analysis the form of linear correlation and regression [38].
" shown a possible method to estimate aircraft reliability by using Pareto distribu-
tion [11
" presented a developed alternative model to predict aircraft failure rates by combining
the above mentioned two models with consideration of technology improvement
factors.
" shown a very simple model to estimate aircraft failure rate as a function of its empty
weight.
" presented three alternative measuresof maintainability; i. e. MTTR, Scheduled and

Unscheduled maintenance.
" shown alternative models to predict these three measures.

CHAPTER 5
LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION
This methodology attempts to integrate an operational cost analysis into the early design
stage by dint of using mission simulation, taking aircraft mission requirement into account.
However, there are some unpredictable parameters during aircraft design processes; such
as threat performance, military readiness requirement, and mission strategy and so on.
The accurate operation cost is therefore more difficult to predict. An alternative to
evaluate this value is reversed calculation from aircraft Life Cycle Cost (LCC).
There are numerous number of studies and bodies of research to model LCC, which
differ in the details that they consider [11,25,37,45,46,531However, LCC can generally be
.
split into five main sections; i. e. Research,Development, Test and Evaluation; Production;
Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares; Operation and Support; and Disposal
Costs.
LCC CRDT&E + + CGSE&IS + Coperation + CDisposat
= /Production `5.1)
The model used in this methodology is based on the model from Woodford [531,which
can predict aircraft LCC mainly during the peacetime operation. The operation cost in
LCC includes all costs, which can occur during aircraft life time. Therefore, the total
operational cost per flying hour, which include operation, personnel, support and main-
tenance cost per flying hour, can be evaluated. Additionally, an aircraft lost cost and
weapon expense during a mission from a mission simulation module will be added up to
estimate the total mission operational cost (details see section 5.6).
Because of variation in inflation and foreign currency values, price can fluctuate ac-
cording to local economic condition. Therefore, LCC will be simply represented as a

`then-year' value, which is defined as a constant base year dollar value including the ef-
fects of inflation or escalation, and/or reflect the price levels expected to prevail during
the year of issue [15,31].To include this inflation in the life cycle cost estimation, the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) is integrated into most equations. The CPI has been normalised
to 1983 dollars, with regard to the definition given by the U. S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of the Labor Statistics [").
54
5. Life Cycle Cost Estimation 55
2
1.8
9z
Ü 1.6
1.4 Iy=0.0434x-85.114
1.2 R2 = 0.9967
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
U
0.2
0 -1-
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Accomiting Year
Figure 5.1: Consumer Price Index, 1983 = 1.00
Fig. 5.1 shows the average CPI from 1978 to 2003 published monthly by the United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labour Statistics [491,which can be simply mod-
elled as a linear equation as:
CPI = 0.0434(YRACC - 1983) - 85.114 (5.2)
In this chapter, the principle method to predict an operational cost used in mission
simulation will be introduced. Complete calculation methods and results are described in
Appendix D.
5.1 Research, Development, Test 4 Evaluation Cost

The Research,Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) cost covers all areas of research
and development prior to full-scale production of the aircraft. This cost typically makes
up about 15-20% of the LCC of modern, low-production combat aircraft, and is obviously
affected by the number of aircraft over which this cost can be amortised.
The model of RDT&E cost estimation is based on Burns Lill and Birkler [8] with vali-
dation by Woodford [531.This method breaks the RDT&E cost into airframe development
cost, engine development cost, and avionics development cost. These procedures obtain
many different activities, and can thus be thought of as a Àctivity-Based Costing' pro-
cedure, which are calculated as an effort quantity (hours) and will be multiplied with the
labour rates to estimate these costs (for the full model see Appendix D).
5.1.1 Airframe Development Cost
There are several activities to complete an airframe development. Each activity cost
depends on its effort quantity (hours) and labour rate as follows:
1. Engineering cost for the airframe development can be estimated as a function of
airframe unit weight, maximum true velocity, number of developed aircraft, number
of partners, percentage of advanced material usage and also engineering labour rate.
2. During the airframe development, all development support attributed to engineering
cost can be evaluated as a function of airframe unit weight, maximum true velocity,
number of developed aircraft, consumer price index, security factor and number of
partner.
3. Flight testing cost includes all costs incurred by the aircraft manufacturer to com-
plete flight testing, except the cost of the production of the flight test aircraft. This
cost can be estimated as a function of airframe unit mass, maximum true velocity,
number of developed aircraft, consumer price index, security factor and advanced
technology testing factor.
4. Tooling cost mainly depends on the aircraft production rate, high production rates
result in higher tooling cost. This cost also depends on airframe unit mass, maximum
true velocity, number of developed aircraft, number of partners, and tooling labour
rate.
5. Development manufacturing labour cost includes all costs necessary for machin-
ing, fabricating, assembly of the major structure, installation of purchased parts,
government furnished equipment, and subcontractor assembliesand components.
6. Manufacturing material and equipment cost is based on the low-observable features
usages,this cost excludes engines and avionics.
5.1.2 Engine Development Cost
The engine development cost estimation methodology is based on the model developed
by Birkler [8) and validated by Woodford [53]. This model can estimate the engine devel-
opment cost before entry into service as a function of engine sea-level static gross thrust,
mach number for supersonic design, and the maximum turbine inlet temperature.
However the cost of the engines for the development aircraft can be estimated dif-
ferently. Mr. P. Pugh, formerly of the Directorate Project, Time, and Cost Analysis
(DPTCAn), a division of the Ministry of Defence, suggested that production engine cost
is an approximately 75% of the development engine cost. With the number of engines
purchased for the RDT&E, depending on the number of test aircraft and the number of
engines per aircraft, the total cost of engine for development aircraft can be found.
5.1.3 Avionics Development Cost
The avionics development cost estimation is contrary to the other development cost esti-
mation because development and production cost of individual avionics systems are more
dependent on the performance of that particular system, which is not measured in aircraft
design terms.
An alternative model to estimate avionics cost model is based on the uninstalled
is
avionics mass, which approximated 90% of the total avionics mass [11,461
5.2 Production Cost

Production cost is typically about 45-50% of the total LCC of modern combat aircraft,
and also includes production engineering design, production investment (manufacturing
facilities, tooling, jigs and fixtures), manufacturing labour, quality control, material and
equipment, profit, overheads, administration, and purchasing of engines and avionics sys-
tems. This cost per aircraft decreases with the number of aircraft built, as learning curve
theory and economies of scale are applied [541
Most estimation models for the production cost, except engine production cost, are
similar to the model of RDT&E cost estimation, only they use both total number of
developed aircraft and total number of production aircraft instead of number of just
developed aircraft.
5.3 Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares

The Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares (GSE&IS) cost is very difficult to esti-
mate, but with suggestions made by several members of the costing community, GSE&IS
cost is simply set to 10% of the aircraft recurring flyaway [53], which is equivalent to
cost
the total production cost divided by number of production aircraft. This gives approxi-
mately 5% of total LCC.
5.4 Operation and Support

The operation and support (0&S) cost is the biggest portion of the total LCC and the
most relevant to this design methodology. O&S costs for modern combat aircraft can be
split into several major parts as follows:
5.4.1 Personnel Cost
Personnel costs depends on the number of officers, enlisted staffs, and civilian personnel
in the first and second lines operation, and in support. The number of the first line
operation personnel depends mainly on the scheduled maintenance, number of operational
aircraft, and annual flying hours. On the other hand, the number of the second line
operation personnel, which consists of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel, depends
on unscheduled maintenance, DIvIHR (for details see chapter 4). This cost also includes
the personnel cost for the service allowances, personnel support and training
5.4.2 Unit Level Consumption
This cost attempts to include all costs for consumables used in maintaining the aircraft,
maintenance materials, miscellaneous support supplies, depot level repares, and tempo-
rary additional duty. The unit level consumption estimation model can be divided into
eight main categories as follows:
1. Annual used fuel cost.
2. The cost of other petroleum, oil and lubricants.
3. Maintenance material cost.
4. Miscellaneous support supply.
5. Depot level repares.
6. Temporary additional duty.
7. Transport.
8. Other.
5.4.3 Contracts
This cost has been modified to calculate an annual contract value, rather than using the
work-breakdown approach like the one for first and second line maintenance [531. This
cost consists of the three main aircraft systems; i. e. airframe, propulsion, and avionics
and supplies.
5.4.4 Sustaining Support Cost and Installation Support Funds
This cost includes the replacement support equipment cost; cost of modification kit pro-
curement; sustaining engineering support; and cost incurred by the personnel pay and
allowance, material, and utilities needed for the maintenance of the base.
Normally an aircraft will be operated for a life of approximately 20 30 years. However,
-
the summation of all of the previously calculated costs is an approximate expense only for
one year of operation and support in the form of `then year' dollars (or àccounting-year'
dollars). Therefore, the economic discount rate (RED) at 6% per annum has to be added
for each year of operation and support. This rate is used for the majority of government
projects [531
5.5 Disposal
The disposal cost consists of disassembly labour, disposal of non-reusable material, sale
of scrap material, and resale of on-board equipment. Depending on the relative values of
these different components, the total disposal figure could be positive (cost), or negative
(credit).
The chosen model used in this methodology, developed by Woodford L53Iis to add the
estimated cost of labour to dismantle the aircraft, the cost of disposing of the non-reusable
items, and subtract the value of the reusable items. The resale of systems is thought to
be unlikely for the moment, as technology in these areas changes so quickly; the value of
these items has been neglected.

Total aircraft LCC can be calculated as the summation of the above mentioned costs
as Eqn. 5.1 shows. Fig. 5.2 - 5.3 shows the results of LCC estimation of the U-99 aircraft
during peacetime and wartime operations.
5.6 Mission Operational Cost

The mission operational cost depends mainly on mission scenario, i. e. wartime or peace-
time. As described above, the model used to estimate aircraft LCC in this methodology is
based on peacetime operations; therefore, some maintenance costs will be deducted from
total O&S cost during wartime operations. The weapon expense and aircraft lost cost
will be included into the operation & support cost during wartime operations instead.
5.6.1 Operational Cost during Peacetime Operations
In peacetime operations, aircraft will be well maintained subject to high mission readiness.
In this case, the entire four maintenance lines in Woodford's [531model are included to
predict the total operation & support cost. But the predicted total cost is an approximate
operation & support expense for the entire aircraft life; therefore, an average O&S cost
per aircraft per flying hour can be given as:
COperation
COperation
= (5.3)
Nope, TLIFE FHY
ation" "
Hence, the total mission operational cost during peacetime operation in this method-
ology can be estimated as:

NOperation
CAlission FHt (5.4)

= Òperation
7=1
5.6.2 Operation Cost during Wartime Operations
On the other hand, for the calculation of 0&S cost during a wartime scenario in this
mission simulation, the third and the forth line maintenance (contract cost) will be omit-
ted. Additionally, expenseof weapons and aircraft lost will be taken into account instead.
Hence, an aircraft operation cost in LCC calculation has to be calculated as:
COperation + + + +
= vUnit vSustain vPeraonnel vlnatatl vTraining `5.5)
Therefore, the total mission operational cost in wartime scenario in mission simulation
can be given as:

NOperotion
CAfieaion + +C FHi (5.6)

-C ,N Veapon VFIVaway * =YLost
eapon Aeration
i=1
where CopCTaLjOT
is an average operational cost per aircraft per flying hour in wartime,
which can be estimated as shown in Eqn. (5.3). Ntiv,,, is the number of released
p,1,
weapons in a mission simulation and NLost is the number of aircraft lost during the same
simulation.
5.6.3 Measure of Operational Cost
As described above, an operational cost includes all expenses, which occur during mission
simulation. There is lots of information hidden in this cost, which can be linked and be
used in conjunction with aircraft MOPs for specified design aspects. For instance, the
total maintenance cost during the mission simulation can be linked with aircraft MOPs
in reliability & maintainability in the form of FR, DMHR, and SM. The explanation
is that FR directly affects the number of maintenance aircraft in a mission simulation;
and maintenance cost is also a function of aircraft DMHR and SM (for the complete
equation see Appendix C).
From the aircraft life cycle cost estimation, the following cost can be broken down and
may be used in this methodology to measure aircraft operational cost effectiveness.
1. Operational maintenance cost: This cost covers all consumablesused in maintaining

the operational aircraft throughout the simulation excluding fuel, petroleum, oil,
and lubricant. The operational maintenance cost per aircraft per flying hour can be
estimated from following equation:
(CUnit
- vFuet)(1- DEF)
C°'aintenanè (5.7)
RED " NOperation TLIFE " FHY
DEF =(1 + RED) -TLIFE (5.8)
2. Flyaway cost: This cost is used to indicate the average expense to build an aircraft,
which can be estimated as:

CPROD
CFlvaway
- (5.9)
NPROD
3. Mission operational cost: This cost includes all expenses occurring in the mission
simulation, which covers released weapon cost and aircraft lost cost.
4. Flying hour cost: This rate will indicate how much the flying hour cost is for each
aircraft.
CAfission
CFil - (5.10)
NFN '"Operation
5. Cost[$] / Target: This cost is one of the main objectives of this research, by cal-
culating a ratio between all expenses occurring in the mission simulation and the
number of targets killed (`Bang per Buck')
CAfission
CTarget
_ NiCitt
-
6. Cost[$] / Sortie: This cost can be used to indicate how much every take-off will
cost.
CAlission /C yrý
CSortie
= NTake-off
`J, 1G
7. Cost[$] / Successful Sortie: This cost shows an average cost for each sortie, in which
an aircraft releases a weapon and returns to base, regardless of whether the target
is damaged or destroyed.
Cdlisaion (5.13)
CSuccessfulSortie
_ NSuccesa
f ulSorties
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5.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has
" introduced a model to integrate the aircraft life cycle cost estimation into a concep-
tual/preliminary design process.
" shown an alternative to convert part of LCC to mission operational cost during an
early design stage.
" presented measures of aircraft operational-cost effectiveness in this design method-

ology.
CHAPTER 6
OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION
Due to the fact that the environment of a real mission is far too complex. Therefore,
a simulation is used as a tool to examine the relationships between aircraft design as-
pects and to predict mission and operation measures of performance and effectiveness in
the designed aircraft operational environments. Some constraints, assumptions and also
definitions of the simulation are described here in this chapter.
6.1 Threat Analysis

From statistical data from the Gulf War in 1991, only 14 aircraft from over 923 USAF
combat aircraft were lost. There were all lost to ground-based air defense, and none were
lost in air-to-air combat [20,351 Therefore, the two major weapon types examined and
considered within the mission operation simulation in this study are anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA), which are represented by nonexplosive penetrator or contacted warheads, and
surface to air missile (SAM), which are represented by proximity warheads.
6.1.1 Nonexplosive Penetrator or Contacted Warhead
In this study, the nonexplosive penetrator or contacted warhead represents the threat
posed by bullets or cannon sizes from 14.5 - 57.0 mm. These threat types can be
anti-aircraft self-propelled, towed and machine guns; such as ZPU-series 14.5-mm towed
anti-aircraft guns, ZSU-57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems, and ZSU 23-4 self-
propelled anti-aircraft guns. The maximum altitude of the shell when fired in the anti-air
role for these systems can be up to 15000 in depending on their [2Gj.
caliber size
Kill methodology for this threat type is to penetrate along the shotline through the
aircraft from one side to another side. Aircraft components, which are on this shotline, will
not be functional regardless of their kill level. But in this simulation, the contemplation
of timescale during a sortie is not a relevant issue; therefore, every kill level given to an
aircraft component will be considered as an immediate kill in that flight phase.
Because of high revolution rate of automatic machine guns installed in these systems,
66
6. Operation Mission Simulation 67
an aircraft will probably encounter several shots, even if the aircraft flies through this
defensesystem in a short period. By assuming that the shots keep constant direction and
parallel with each other, and attack perpendicular to aircraft view, the probability of kill
by this threat type will be estimated via Markov matrix with random numbers of hits.
6.1.2 Proximity Warhead
The surface to air missile represents a proximity warhead in this mission simulation.
This threat system can be deployed from fixed installations or mobile launchers, their
tracking and guidance system may use radar, infrared, or laser. High explosive warheads
with internally grooved fragmentation can be proximity, contact and also command fused.
Target initial detection range depends on the frequency of the installed radar system.
Kill mechanism for this kind of threat can be given as:
1. Explosion inside aircraft or on contact with aircraft: In this case, detonation occurs
immediately or shortly after warhead impacting target. The results are detonation
on or inside the aircraft with the accompanying blast and fragment spray in many
directions. To predict this kill method exceedsthe scope of this study.
2. Blast: The missile explodes its warhead outside the target within explosion distance.
In most externally detonating warheads the blast is a secondary damage mechanism,
which will be neglected in this study.
3. Fragments: After warhead detonation, internal fragments will spread around the
warhead within the fragment spray zone (see Chapter 3). Fragments can also be
treated as penetrators with the assumption of uniform constant direction and ve-
locity. The number of fragment hits depends on the detonation distance and target
presented area.
As described above, in this mission simulation, blast effect will be neglected and the
SAM is always assumed to be proximity fused with random detonation distance. The kill
methodology of this threat type can be converted into multiple hits by fragments, and its
kill probability can be also determined as the same principle using the multiple hits by
penetrators.
Probability of encounter by one threat type is a ratio of the number of single types
of weapon to the number of aircraft flying throughout the mission. In this mission simu-
lation the probability of encounter by penetrator (Epcnetrator)
and by proximity warhead
(Eprox;,,,; will be assumed as constant values of 0.05 and 0.02.
ý)
6.2 Mission Analysis

.
Military aircraft are designed to execute one or more roles; but each category needs
specific performance to complete every particular task during the mission. Generally,
military missions can be divided into two main categories: tactical and strategic combat;
and combat support mission.
Tactical and strategic combat mission has been chosen for this design methodology
concept with several alternative missions studied; such as combat patrol, air superiority,
and escort. Finally, bombing mission has been selected to be the primary mission due to
the case study aircraft (U-99) specification used. The flowcharts of studied missions are
shown in Appendix E.
The bombing mission used in this mission simulation using the U-99 specification [40,41)
can be described as:
" There are five main flight in

phases a sortie; Pre-Flight, Outbound, Attack or Pen-
etration, Inbound, and Post-Flight phase.
9 Outbound and Inbound phases include a cruise segment of 750 nm or 1389 km with
a cruise speed of Mach 0.78 at 40000 ft or 12192 m.
" U-99 releasesits weapon during the attack or penetration phase at 25000 ft or 7620
m with 1.5 turn.
9 Take-off and landing distance should be less than 3500 ft or 1066.8 m.
" The weapon carried is a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) which is installed
in the weapons bay above the main fuel tank. Its weight is approximately 454 kg.
Therefore, U-99 has to fly upside down before releasing its weapon during the attack
phase and turn back over afterwards.

6.3 Operation Simulation Concept

Burleigh [101showed a simple methodology to predict combat aircraft mission readiness by
using approximated default values of aircraft reliability, maintainability and survivability

in mission simulation. His method used all parameters as average constants throughout
the simulation. Number of sorties flown, aircraft kills and so on, can hence be calculated
by multiplying those values and the total number of aircraft, operation days, sorties per
day and so on.
For instance, the number of aircraft kills at the end of the operation day is a summation
of the total aircraft kills in each sortie, which is a result of the multiplication of the
probability of attrition and the number of available aircraft in that sortie as:
sorties per day

NAIC (PsiNAvailable
kill = in itli sortie)
i=1
where Psl is an average constant attrition probability.

From the above equation, the number of aircraft kills in ith sortie become a floating
point value, but his model need only the integer number. Hence, this number has to be
revalued by ignoring the floating point numbers.

An alternative to evaluate the number of available aircraft is to use separate time
clock for each aircraft and its system component to identify when the component and/or
aircraft obtains failure during the simulation 111.
By this method, each aircraft will
status
launch, be repaired, or be in maintenance separately depending on Mean Time To Repair
(MTTR) and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF).
SystcmI System2 Systcm3 .......... Systcmn
Figure 6.1: Time clock for each aircraft t'1

Another possible method used to evaluate the number of sorties flown during the
mission, is reliability block diagram analysis. This method will evaluate the event success
probability, such as the success probability of each flight phase, of maintenance, of aborting
the mission and of failure [17]. The number of aircraft, which can get through preflight
phase, is defined as the number of sorties flown by individual aircraft. At the end of
operational day, the total number of sorties flown in that operational day is the summation
of all the sorties flown in that operational day. The summation of the total sorties flown in
every operational day throughout the mission simulation gives the total number of sorties
flown in the mission simulation.
On the other hand, the number of complete sorties is defined as the number of aircraft
which returns to their own base after a sortie, in an operational day, or in the mission
simulation. Another measure related to sorties in this study is the successful sorties,
which has a similar definition to the complete sortie. The difference between complete
and successful sorties is that aircraft achieving a successful sortie have released their
weapons during the penetration phase and returned to their own base. Such numbers can
be used to measure an aircraft operational effectiveness.
Increase No. of
NO
Day
Dey <
Stop Missi on Misston Day
Output into File for each

Aircraft and Day
Information
Sortie <-
Increase No. of Sortie Per Day
Sortie NO
t auto File for each

craft and Sortie
Information Pre[Lght Phase
Outbound Phase
Attack Phase F<->-l Enemy Encounter
Inbound Phase
Postflight Phase
( Mainton nee Base )
Figure 6.2: Flowchart for Operation Mission Simulation Module

Because most aircraft measures of performance and effectiveness are in the form of
probability values, the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) with the event trees is an al-
ternative to predict such numbers of sorties flown, complete sorties, successful sorties,
targets killed and so on. The fundamental of RBD and event trees calculation has been
explained in Appendix A. This method decides that an event can occur if the occurrence
value is greater than or equal to the probability of the specific event, which can be added
and subtracted depending on its event tree diagram.

By using this method, each aircraft will obtain a different random value in each flight
phase to compare with the flight phase success probability, which will be explained in a
later section. Integer numbers which indicate how many aircraft have or have not achieved
an event are recorded and passed to the subsequent events. This procedure will continue
until the aircraft completes the sortie and the mission. A similar principle has been used
to predict the following values:
Table 6.1: Predicted value per sortie from mission simulation module
Value Calculation method
Number of sorties flown Number of aircraft which achieve pre-flight phase suc-
cessfully.
Number of complete sorties Number of aircraft which can approach post-flight phase
by following sortie route.
Number of successfulsorties Number of aircraft which achieve complete sortie and
release their weapon during attack phase.
Number aircraft in mainte- Number of aircraft which still remain in maintenance in
nance post-flight phase.
Number of killed aircraft Number of aircraft which obtains event probability
greater than or equal to kill event in flight phase.
Number of available aircraft Number of total aircraft deducted by Number of killed
aircraft.
Number of targets detected Number of weaponswhich are releasedduring the attack
phase due to assumption of using smart bomb.
Number of targets killed Number of targets which obtain random value greater
than the default target kill probability.
Table 6.1 shows the concept of how to predict an integer number of specific aircraft,
sorties, and targets in each sortie, which can be added up at the end of the operational
day and entire mission to obtain the total results for the operational days and the mission.
For instance, total number of sorties flown for the entire mission of m operational day,
and k sorties per day can be calculated as:

m operation day
NTotal
flown -)1 VTotal flown in i day
sorties sorties
i=1
m operation day k sortie per day
NTotat
sorties flown of j sortie in i day
i=1 j=1
6.4 Success Probability Assessment

To evaluate final successful event probability, every opportunity which can possibly occur
during this event has to be drawn and linked together regarding their logical consequence
(RBD), an example has been shown in Fig. 6.3. Together with the logical ÀND', ÒR' and
`NOT' combination (RBD) and the event trees diagram, the final successful probability
value can be evaluated. All possible occurrences, their definitions, and their logistical
combinations can be described as:
1. System failure: This can happen due to either defect arising rate in every flying hour,
which is assumed as 10% of total aircraft failure rate, or damage rate from being
attacked in previous flight phase. By using RBD parallel connection (logical ÒR'
combination), these two possible events can be combined together. The probability
calculation from the new combined event can be evaluated as Eqn. (6.1). If an
aircraft achieves this occurrence, mission abort status has to be called with the
consequence that the aircraft will be returning to the own base.
PSystem (1 (1 (6.1)
failure =1- -j Damage -+ Defect)
previous occurrence)
2. System not failure: This occasion is the opposite of system failure. The probability
value can be evaluate by using logical `NOT' combination.
1
System not failure
=1-1 Sy3tent failure (6.2)
3. Survive: This occasion can occur if an aircraft achieves the `system not failure'
occurrence. For survival probability itself, an aircraft has to survive all encounters
occurring during this flight phase, which includes several SAM and AAA threats
(details see chapter 3). The combination of more encounters and `system not fail-
ure' events can be linked together as the RBD series combination (logical ÀND'
combination). The survive event probability value can be thus calculated as:
PSurvive
-l System not failure
X 'Survive
all encounters
(6.3)
4. Not survive: This is the opposite from `survive' occurrence, and the number of
aircraft, which achieves this occurrence, will obtain status `KILL' and be added.to
the number of killed aircraft.
PNot
survive
=1 System not failure
X
`1 -j Survive) (6.4)
5. Damage: This occurrence will happen if the aircraft gets through `survive' occur-
rence; but it has been shot and obtains component damaged. The damage value
will be randomly generated and be added into the aircraft damage rate.
PDamage
=1 Survive
XP
Damage rate (6.5)
6. No damage: An aircraft achieves this either by not being hit or by being hit but
not being damaged.

PNone (1
damage =" Survive
X
-+ Dantage)
(6.6)
7. Mission abort: This will occurs if the aircraft gets damaged with a certain damage
rating, which causes the aircraft to return for repair. The probability of abort
mission in each event is assumed constant as 0.38% for this mission simulation.
'Mission
abort
=P Damage
XP
Abort (6.7)
8. Mission not aborted or Continue: This possibility is the second alternative to con-
tinue a sortie, even if an aircraft gets damaged but it is still functional and able to
complete the designed mission.

PJlfission (1
not abort
= l-Damage X -j ltfis ion abort) (6.8)
9. Maintenance: An aircraft will still stay in the `maintenance' event if the aircraft
needs to be repaired as a result of component damage or due to a mission abort

occurrence
tofnintrnnnrr
_ )
AtTTRDamage / (6.9)
PMaintenance against damage
=1 -e
tAtnintrnnnre
_ A'TTHDcfect (6.10)
P=1-
Afnintenance against mission abort eý
PAfaintenance PAtaintenancc (6.11)
PJlfaintenance
=
against damage
X
against mission abort
10. Successful flight phase: This probability value is a summation of all possibility
probable value that allow the mission to continue except for post-flight phase, which
concerns only the probability that an aircraft will be available for the next sortie.
(see an example in Fig. 6.3)
PSýicre"ssfv, PNnnr + PAfission (6.12)

l flight phase - Daaingr nnl ahmt
11. Unsuccessful flight phase: This is the opposite to the above occurrence.
P(lrrsurrr. +1 +"
flight -PS1j. trnr fnilinr 'Vni Afissinn short
c.cful ph"', .curuirr
PSLCfGC9ful (6.13)
=1 - flight pho. r
In every flight phase in this mission simulation, a similar sequence of occurrences is
obtained. Fig. 6.3 shows an example of the event tree diagram to evaluate the successful
inbound phase probability value.
InboundRate =I +1
. Damage -Abort
Figure 6.3: Reliability Block Diagram for Inbound phase success probability calcula.tioii
6.5 Monte Carlo Simulation Technique

Klonte Carlo simulation methods are stochastic techniques, which means that they are
based on the use of random numbers and probability statistics to investigate problems.
This method provides approximate solutions with tolerance errors ["I
There are several methods to use Monte Carlo simulation technique to predict solutions
to the problem, but one of these is to use a random value to compare with the event
probability to decide which event will occur. The number of occurring events will be
recorded and statistically analysed. After a certain number of trials, the probability
distribution of an event occurring can thus be plotted similar to the graph shown in
Fig. 6.5.
The principle of using Monte Carlo simulation technique with Reliability Block Dia-
gram is that every possible occurrence in each flight phase in this mission simulation has
to be examined and calculated regarding its event tree diagram. These values can be used
to compare with the generated random value to determine which event an aircraft will
achieve. For example every occurrence probability in outbound phase can be evaluated
and shown as in Fig. 6.4. If the generated random value is 0.123, an aircraft will be
killed. On the other hand, if the generated random value is 0.345, the aircraft will achieve
successful outbound phase and will continue to post-flight phase.

UnsuccessfulOccurrence Successful Occurrence
NOT SURVIVE SYSTEMFAILURE MISSIONABORT MISSIONNOT ABORT NONE DAMAGE
0.1443 0.147538 0.150776 4' 0.5751
0.00 1.00
Random Value - 0.123 Random Value . 0.345

Aircraft being killed Aircraft completeflight phase
Figure 6.4: Example of using Monte Carlo with Reliability Block Diagram
0.03
0.025
ý. 0.02
ä 0.015
0
0.01
0.005
0
'ýh N-b 0 f.a bo o. rip 9,- ) <tt
'g, tio$ titia tip, 1'ßa
Successful Sorties
Figure 6.5: Normal curve of successful sorties after 20000 trials
The number of specific aircraft, target, and sorties can be thus evaluated by summation
of the number of aircraft and targets in specific categories. For instance, the number of
aircraft which achieve successful pre-flight occurrence can be used as the number flown
in that sortie, and will give the total sorties flown in the operation day and the entire
mission.
With this principle, every flight phase will generate a random value to predict which
occurrence of event tree diagram will occur. The specific number of sorties, aircraft, and
targets can be calculated at the end of each simulation run. After a certain number of
simulation runs or trials, statistical analysis of specific integer objective values can be
processed as shown in Fig. 6.5. The mean and mode values from the analysis can be thus
[32J
represented as the result of mission simulation
6.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has
" analysed specific threats used in this mission simulation.
" examined and classified a bombing to

mission simulate mission model for this study.
" introduced a simple method to predict the total number of specific sorties, aircraft
and targets by using directly probability and separate clock time.
" described another alternative to predict the total number of specific sorties, aircraft,
and targets by using RBD with event trees.
" shown all possible occurrences in each flight phase in a sortie.
" examined the successful and unsuccessful flight phase probability values, which are
used to predict the numbers of specific sorties, aircraft, and targets.
9 introduced Monte Carlo simulation technique to predict integer number results for
this mission simulation.

CHAPTER 7
OPTIMISATION METHODS
This chapter introduces two major optimisation methods used in this research; Gradient-
based method and Genetic algorithms. The first method is commonly used to solve
engineering problems; but it is not perfectly appropriate with the problem in this research
due to the use of objective values in the form of integers. However, the gradient-based
method can be used to guide variable trends and approximate objective values. On the
other hand, the genetic algorithms do not use any gradient or partial differentials to
search for the local/global minimum/maximum, but instead uses the objective value of
a particular variable set to measure how good this variable is, compared to the other
variable set.
The first optimisation tool is an evaluation version of a commercial product, which can
be of limited use. However, this version is still sufficient for the problem in this research.
On the other hand, the second optimisation tool is freeware, and provides source code
for future development. Nevertheless, no development was performed on the optimisation
during this research, as the basic codes are sufficient.
7.1 Gradient-based Method

This method is commonly used to minimise or maximise the objective function in engi-
neering and science. The fundamental principle of the gradient-based approach is used to
predict the direction in which the search for the minimum/maximum objective function
should proceed by using the first derivatives of the objective function and constraints with
respect to the vector of the aircraft design variables.
Because some objective values in this study are integer numbers, the gradient-based
method can therefore cause particular problems or difficulties to find local and global
minimum/maximum as the differential of a function with respect to the relevant variable
will obtain a value constant of zero.

The Solver DLL from Frontline Systems Ltd. [21)has been chosen because of the
following reasons:
78
7. Optimisation Methods 79
1. The company also provides an evaluation version, which can be downloaded free
from the internet.
2. A limit of the evaluation version is the maximum of ten variables that can be used;
however, this number is sufficient to solve the problem in this study.
3. This program can handle almost all possible problems, such as linear, quadratic,
nonlinear, and nonsmooth.
7.2 Genetic Algorithms

Goldberg [221introduced simple genetic algorithms as a search for best fit algorithms based
on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. They combine survival of the
fittest among string structures with a structured yet randomised information exchange,
to form a search algorithm with some of the innovative flair of a human search. In every
generation, a new set of artificial creatures is created using bits and pieces of the fittest
of the old; an occasional new part is tried for good measure. While randomised, genetic
algorithms are no simple random walk. They efficiently exploit historical information to
speculate on new search points with expected improved performance. The principles of
this method are follows:
1. Defining a representation: A single solution of the problem has to be represented as
a single data structure (Genome). The population of solutions based on this data
structure will be created depending on representation type.
2. Defining genetic operator: The genetic algorithm will define how the population
evolution takes place.
3. Fitness scaling: An objective function will be used to determine how fit each genome
is for survival.
4. Selection/replacement: The genome operator uses selection/replacement strategies
to generate new individuals.
A typical genetic algorithm stop criteria is a number of generations, for which an
optimiser should run. However, there are alternative stop criteria, such as measure of
goodness of best solution, and convergenceof population [50]
NO
Initialise Select H We Individuals

Individuals to H Mutate H Insert
Offspring Stopping
Finish
Population formating Offspring
produce Offspring intoPopulation Criteria
Figure 7.1: Flowchart of genetic algorithm
Defining a Representation
It is necessaryto use a data structure which is appropriate for the problem because the
representation has to be able to represent any solution to the problem. The number of
possible representations is endless. These may be in purely numerical representation such
as an array of real numbers or in Goldberg style, of a string of bits that map to a real
number.
Genome Operators
Each genome has three primary operators: Initialisation, mutation, and crossover. With
these operators, the populations will be created and evolved throughout the optimisation
process as follows:
1. The initialisation operator determines how the genome is initialised by stuffing the
genomeswith the primordial genetic material from which all solutions will evolve.
2. The Mutation operators define the procedure for mutating each genome mutation,
which means here different things for different data types. These should be able to
introduce new genetic material as well as modify existing material. For example, a
typical mutation for a binary string genome is flipping the bits in the string with a
given probability.
3. The crossover operator defines the procedure for generating a child from two par-
ent genomes. Similar to mutation, crossover is specific to the data type, but it
involves multiple genomes. The traditional crossover generates two children from
two parents.
4. The objective function has to be defined, and is used to evaluate genoffnes.Therefore,

the genetic algorithm can determine which individuals are better than others.
ýs.
/N
C(0
treenodeswap mutat;on 00
znaý' une Voirl cInssurcr
trek one point crossover

Ualpig
tree sub-tree swap mutation
array two poim crossover
l ý"0 CT-0
list nodes%%
ap mutaton
list one point crossover list ordercrossover
list dc"structne mutation list genQraGýencitahnQ hst sequrnir swap mu61uun
Figure 7.2: Example of mutation [501

and crossover methods
The Population Object
The population object is a container of genonies, and each genonie object has its own
initialiser and evaluator for each individual in the population. It also keeps track of the
best, average, derivation, and so on for the population. In this object, mating method
and algorithm have to be defined.
Each population object has a scaling scheme objective associate with it. The scaling
scheme object converts the objective score of each genome to a fitness score that the
genetic algorithm uses for selection.
Objective Functions and Fitness Scaling
This is the major difference between genetic algorithms and gradient-based methods.
Genetic algoritlinis require only a single measure of how good a single individual is,
compared to the other individuals, which is provided by objective function. Gradient-
based methods use complicated differential equations or a smooth search score.

The objective score is the value calculated directly from the objective function; it
is raw performance evaluation of a genome. The fitness score, on the other hand, is
a possibly-transformed rating used by the genetic algorithm to determine the fitness of

individuals for mating. Typical fitness scores can be obtained by a linear scaling of the
raw objective scores.
7.2.1 GAlib Optimisation Tools
A freeware C++ library, named GAlib, has been chosen. This library has been developed
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1501.

Its source code can be downloaded directly
from the internet.
This library includes tools for using genetic algorithms to do optimisation in any C++
program by using any representation and any genetic operators. In this section, the major
classes and functions used in this research are described.
Class GAGeneticAlgorithm
This is a base class of genetic algorithms, which keep track of evolution statistics such as
number of mutations, number of crossovers,number of evaluations, best/mean/worst in

each generation, and initial/current population statistics. It also defines the terminator,
a number function that specifies the stopping criterion for the algorithm.
The èvolve' member function first calls ìnitialize', then calls the `step' member func-
tion until the `done' member function returns `gaTrue'.
Class GASimpleGA
This class is based on GAGeneticAlgorithm, and uses non-overlapping populations method

to clone the individuals for its own population. This simple genetic algorithm creates an
initial population by cloning the individual or population, which has been passed when
this is created. Each generation the algorithm creates an entirely new population of
individuals by selecting from the previous population then mating to produce the new
offspring for the new population. This process continues until the stopping criteria are
met.
Elitism is chosen by passing `gaTrue' value into èlitism' member function, so the best
individual from each generation is carried over to the next generation.
Function Terminators
The `done' member function simply calls the `completion' function to determine whether
or not the genetic algorithm should continue. The `completion' function returns `gaTrue'
when the genetic algorithm should finish, and `gaFalse' when the genetic algorithm should
continue.
The number of generation stopping criteria is set by default, in which the function
compares the current generation to the specified number of generations. If the current
generation is less than the requested number of generation, it returns `gaFalse'. Alter-
native of stopping criteria is convergence of best individual scores, in which the function
compares the population average to the score of the best individual in the population. If
the population average is within `pConvergence' of the best individual's score, it return
'gaTrue'.
Class GAGenome
The genome is a virtual base class. It defines a number of constants and function proto-
types specific to the genome and its derived classes.
The `score' member function returns the objective score of the genome using the
objective function assigned to the genome.
Class GABin2DecGenome
This genome class converts binary strings to decimal values. Before using this genome, a
mapping of bits to a decimal value has to be created by specifying how many bits will be
used to represent the designed bounded numbers.
The `phenotype' member function can get or set the mapping from binary to decimal
numbers.
Class GABin2DecPhenotype
This class defines the mapping from binary to decimal values by using àdd' member
function to create a mapping that tells the `phenotype' that n bits should be used to
represent a floating point number from given minimum and maximum values.
GAStatistics
The statistics object contains information about the current state of the genetic algorithm
objects. `BestIndividual' member function returns the best individual encountered by the
genetic algorithm, which can be used for future analysis.
7.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter has:
9 briefly introduced the gradient-base optimisation method.
" nominated an alternative tool to gradient-base method for integrating in the main
program.
9 presented an alternative method to optimise integer objective value, the genetic

algorithm.
41introduced an optimisation tool for the genetic algorithm optimisation.

CHAPTER 8
RESULTS
Some assumptions had to be made due to military restrictions and limited data and
information availability. This also applied to assessmentmethods in some parts of the
simulation (details see chapter 6). This chapter will show only general results generated
from the application `Mission Effectiveness Analysis' by using the case study aircraft,
U-99. The general results of individual sub-modules and their combination with the main
application will be described. The remaining results of individual sub-module in details

are shown separately in the relevant Appendices.
8.1 Results from Susceptibility Assessment

The susceptibility assessmentsub-module is one part of the survivability assessmentsub-
module; its objective is to measure aircraft susceptibility performance; i. e. probability of

being detected (PD), probability of being hit or fused when being detected (Ph/D or PFAD).
As described in section 3.1, the aircraft probability of detection (PD) depends on the
signal-to-noise ratio, which is a function of its RCS, threat's radar performance, and the
distance between an aircraft and the signal-receiving radar system. In this section, the
results of U-99's probability of detection are shown.
8.1.1 Radar Cross Section
RCS is commonly measured in the terms of dBm2 or m2 in many different angles. It is so

difficult to accessdata to validate this sub-module, due to the fact that only limited details
of aircraft front view RCS can be found in text books [18]. The B-2 and F-117 aircraft have
thus been chosen to calculate their RCS, aiming to validate this sub-module. Another
reason for choosing these aircraft is that their external shapes can be straightforwardly
represented by simple geometrical shapes (details see Appendix B).
Table 8.1 compares the calculated RCS generated from the susceptibility assessment
sub-module with the RCS data from an open source [18]. The discrepancy between the
86
8. Results 87
B-2 RCS predicted by this sub-module and the RCS value from the open source (ap-
proximately 26 %) is significantly higher than an discrepancy in the case of the F-117

RCS (approximate 0.28%). There are two reasons for this discrepancy in the case of
the B-2 compared to the case of the F-117. Firstly, the complexity of the shape of the
B-2 compared to the F-117 leads to a much higher discrepancy in calculation for the
B-2. Secondly, the B-2 has significantly better usage of RAMMthan the F-117, and the
sub-module ignores the effects of RANI. However, the discrepancy between the predicted
aircraft RCS by the susceptibility assessmentmodule and the aircraft RCS quoted from
published source may be less or more than the values shown in Table 8.1. It depends on
radar frequency used to calculate an aircraft RCS in the susceptibility assessmentmodule.
This assumed radar frequency used here may be not the same as used to predict in the
published source, because there is no such information about the radar frequency used to
predict aircraft RCS quoted from the published source.
Table 8.1: Comparison between selected aircraft front view RCS from published
[181
source and calculated aircraft front view RCS from the susceptibility assessment sub-
module
Aircraft RCS [m ] Calculated RCS [M2] Discrepancy [%]
B-2 0.1 0.12613468 26
F-117 0.025 0.02492856 0.28576
U-99 0.0061 -
-
The aircraft RCS depends primarily on the aircraft external geometrical shapes in
each aircraft view; therefore, each aircraft view RCS has to be separately calculated. The
results of U-99 RCS in the six main aircraft views can be shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Calculated U-99 RCS in six main views

View RCS [m2] RCS [dBm2]
Top 2807183.5 64.4827
Left 0.01133908 -19.4542
Right 0.01133908 -19.4542
Front 0.00610207 -22.1452
Rear 1.17095530 0.6854
Bottom 2807183.5 64.4827
An alternative way to present aircraft RCS is to plot these values in a concentric
manner, as shown in Fig. 8.1. This method can show the aircraft RCS in the four main
views compared, with each other.
8. Results 88
Frort
I,Cft Ri
Rmr
Figure 8.1: Results of U-99 radar cross section in dBm2 unit
8.1.2 Signal-To-Noise Ratio
As described in Chapter 3, the probability of detection cannot be predicted directly from
the aircraft RCS, but can be predicted from the aircraft S/N. The aircraft S/N depends
on several parameters, but most of them are assumed as constant throughout the mission
simulation; such as temperature (no weather change), radar receiving system. The aircraft
S/N in this research will thus vary only depending on aircraft RCS and distance between
aircraft and radar receiving system in each flight phase. Therefore, the S/N for each
aircraft view in each flight phase has to be independently evaluated. Table 8.3 shows the
S/N of all six main aircraft views in every flight phase in a sortie.
Table 8.3: Calculated S/N of six main U-99 views for each t phase [dBm2]
t Phase Left Right Front Rear Bottom
Pre-Flight 44.7216 -39.2153 -39.2153 -41.9063 -19.0757 44.7216
Outbound 52.5295 -31.4075 -31.4075 -34.0985 -11.2679 52.5295
Attack 79.1151 -4.8218 -4.8218 -7.5128 15.3178 79.1151
Inbound 52.5295 -31.4075 -31.4075 -34.0985 -11.2679 52.5295
Post-Flight 44.7216 -39.2153 -39.2153 -41.9063 -19.0757 44.7216
An average S/N in each flight phase can be calculated through Eqn. (3.16) by using
an average RCS, which is the result of the multiplication of each aircraft view RCS and
the manoeuvrability probability (weighting factors) for the particular aircraft view in the
particular flight phase. The manoeuvrability probability table option 2 (see Fig. E. 9) has
been chosen to generate the results in this study. Table 8.4 shows the average U-99 RCS
and S/N in each flight phase with manoeuvrability probability option 2.

8. Results 89
Table 8.4: Calculated average RCS and S/N for each flight phase by using manoeuvra-
bility probability option 2
Flight Phase RCS [dBm ] S/N [dBm ]
Pre-Flight 58.4621 38.9264
Outbound 54.4827 42.7058
Attack 59.2539 73.8863
Inbound 54.4827 42.7058
Post-Flight 58.4621 38.9264
8.1.3 Probability of Detection
With the assumed threshold setting default value of the receiveing radar system, the
probability of false alarm, P,,, can be thus evaluated as 3.72665 x 10-6. Together with
this Pr, value and the average S/N, the average probability of detection by the radar of
the U-99 in each flight phase can be simply discövered by dint of the pre-calculated graph
(see Fig. 3.4). Table 8.5 shows PD predicted by using average S/N in each flight phase
and a threshold setting default value.
Table 8.5: Average calculated S/N and PD in each flight phase predicted by using
manoeuvrability probability option 2
Pre- and Post-Flight Out- and Inbound Attack
View
S/N PD S/N PD S/N PD
Top & Bottom 44.7216 --0.95 52.5295 -- 0.95 79.1151 _-0.98
Left & Right 0.006
-39.2153 --0.001 -31.4075 _-0.001 -4.8218 --
Front -7.5128 -0.003
-41.9063 --0.001 -34.0985 _-0.001
Rear 15.3178 _-0.65
-19.0757 --0.001 -11.2679 --0.001
Average 38.701 42.5294 -0.95 73.8863 -0.98
-0.95
8.1.4 Probability of Hit
Table 8.6 shows the results of the probability of hit predicted from both `Carlton' and
`Shoe-Box' models used to represent the aircraft presented area (see Fig. 3.6). The miss
distance distribution, 0r, is calculated from an assumed 20 generated random hits, and
miss distances in conjunction with the `Carlton' and the `Shoe-Box' model illustrating
aircraft presented areas.
8. Results 90
Table 8.6: PH/D of three main U-99 views in each flight phase evaluated from 20 random
hits
Carlton Shoe-Box
Vi ew AP PHID
Ur
AP P
Qr HID
Top & Bottom 282.287 28.5571 0.578458 240.795 28.5571 0.799853

Left & Right 44.0028 11.8748 0.603518 60.6532 11.8748 0.668563
Front & Rear 33.5298 10.6451 0.61617 23.0322 10.6451 0.903382
8.2 Results from Vulnerability Assessment

In this methodology, only two main threat types have been considered; i. e. penetrator
(represented by AAA) and proximity warhead (represented by SAM). The principle kill
mechanism for the penetrator threat type is to destroy and/or damage aircraft compo-
nents, which are on the shotline (definition see Chapter 3). The measure of aircraft MOP
in vulnerability encountered by this threat type is probability of kill, P,

{.
On the other hand, the proximity warhead in this study is assumedto detonate outside
the aircraft and produce fragments, which directly hit the aircraft afterwards. The number
of fragments can be evaluated from the detonation distance. In this case, each fragment is
considered as an individual penetrator. Therefore, the probability of kill by all fragments
can be determined by using the same principle of multiple hits by penetrators. The lethal
radius can be discovered, and can be used to represent the P,, (details see Chapter 3).
Ext
8.2.1 Probability of Kill
The probability of kill is mainly a function of critical component vulnerable areas value
(A, ). This value can be calculated from the critical component presented areas, which
depend on the component layout, and kill probability by given hit on the component.
Three alternative critical component layouts have been examined; i. e. non-overlapped
area existence (non-overlapped), shielding effect of frontal critical component of the over-
lapped area (shielding overlapped), and non-shielding effect of frontal critical component
of the overlapped area (non-shielding overlapped). Redundancy is another consideration

effecting the kill probability calculations.
Table 8.7 shows the comparison of kill probability values of the U-99 in different critical
component layouts, with consideration of fuel system redundancy. On the other hand,
Table 8.8 shows the results of kill probability calculation without consideration of fuel
system redundancy. Due to the semi-automatic grid counter method used to predict the
8. Results 91
presented areas of both critical components and aircraft (see Appendix B), the vulnerable
areas will be thus calculated in Grid unit, which can be convert into the SI unit, metre,
by using factors shown in Table B. 9.
Table 8.7: Calculated PK/H of U-99 with redundant fuel systems

Top/Bottom Left/Right Front Rear
Av [Grid] [Grid] Px ii
Px Ef v [Grid] Px H Av Grid Px N v
Non-Overlapped 25.60 0.00999 22.40 0.05056 28.80 0.08090 22.80 0.08090
Non-Shielding Overlapped 25.60 0.00999 26.46 0.05972 30.48 0.08562 30.48 0.08562
Shielding Overlapped 25.60 0.00999 24.48 0.05526 30.31 0.08515 29.55 0.08301
In this methodology, the incendiary threat type has not been taken into account;
therefore, the redundancy of fuel system can reduce the aircraft P1

.
Table 8.8: Calculated P,,, of U-99 with non-redundant fuel systems

H
nV ["nu] rK FI -*IV wriu rK H nV "LIuj £K H nV 1--. 1 1. A/11
Non-Overlapped 149.80 0.05847 93.80 0.21174 93.00 0.26124 93.00 0.26124
8.3 Results from Reliability 4 Maintainability As-

sessment
The reliability & maintainability models used in this methodology are based on the combi-
nation method, or the functionality of empty weight method, both described in Chapter 4.
By using statistical analysis of historical data, both models can be thus developed and
produced the results shown in this section.

In the first method, the highest and the lowest values of reliability and maintainabil-
ity for use in the prediction model were firstly developed. Fig. 8.2 shows the comparison
between the actual highest failure rate and predicted highest failure rates from two devel-
oped models; i. e. linear and logarithm regressions. An average error for the highest FR
calculated by the linear is
regression model approximately 8.5%, whereas 12% was found
for the highest FR determined by the logarithmic regression model.
Fig. 8.3 shows the calculated highest DMHR from linear and logarithm regressions,
together with the actual data. An average error for the highest DMHR calculated from
the logarithm regression model is approximately 13%, and approximately 12% for the
value calculated from the linear regression model.

8. Results 92
Figure 8.2: Comparison between the highest failure rate from the linear and exponential
regression analysis
x ö000
ö 5000
ä4000
ä0
C4 3000
2000
1000
u
sO
;"
[::
OHighestDMHR fromteal data 10HighestDMHRfromhnearregiession HighestDMHRfromloganthmregression
Figure 8.3: Comparison

between the highest defect man-hour rate from linear and
exponential regression analysis
The linear regression model has, therefore, been chosen to predict the highest and the
lowest FR and DMHR in this methodology. The Pareto distribution b coefficient could
then be evaluated. At the final stage, aircraft FR and DMHR distribution over all 13
major systems were evaluated by dint of Pareto distribution coefficients. The total aircraft
FR and DMHR are simply a summation of all 13 major system FR and DMHR. Table 8.9
shows the total FR calculated by the combination method, with the assumption of thirteen
8. Results 93
major components with and without Technology Improvement Factor (TIF) compared
with the result's total FR calculated by the functionality method and the real data. An
average error of total aircraft FR calculated by the combination method with TIF is
approximately 13%, and approximately 16% error for the total aircraft FR predicted by
the functionality method.
Table 8.9: Comparison between real aircraft failure rate and results of the combination
method and functionality method [per 1000 flying hours]
Combination method
Aircraft R eal dat a F uncti onalit y method
Without TIF With TIF
F2* 1493.5 1873.319 624.439 276.97
A1* 1250.7 1149.294 383.098 285.029
A2* 1052.4 1043.67 347.890 289.278
ATR1* 832.8 803.302 267.767 472.974
ATR2* 547.4 661.507 220.502 513.8
F-104* 1147.2 1119.292 373.097 645.535
A-7* 958.5 882.449 294.149 772.634
GA1 Late 454.0 1270.121 423.373667 517.13
GA2 445.0 1030.723 343.574333 513.8
GA3 959.0 1494.386 747.193205 1013.433
F-16 420.0 1149.976 383.325333 505.142
F-18 700.0 1982.528 660.842667 743.237
F-4 850.0 1626.063 813.0315 963.816
F-15 710.0 1664.799 832.3995 863.117
F-105 680.0 1170.958 585.479 905.341
* Reliability data was collected in 1985
Note: All aircraft displayed in this table were renamed, and taken from the available data
[4,38] (except F-16, F-18, F-4, F-15, F-105, F-104)
sets
Table 8.10 shows the total aircraft DMHR calculated by the combination method com-
pared with the total aircraft DMHR predicted by the functionality method and the real
data. An average error for the combination method is approximately 57% and approxi-
mately 41% for the functionality method.

Table 8.11 shows the result of the U-99 FR and DMHR predicted by the combination
method and the functionality method. The Pareto 40:70 portion has been chosen to
predict the FR and DMHR in conjunction with TIF. The difference between these
predicted values from two prediction methods is approximately 11% for the FR, and
approximately 22% for the DMHR.
8. Results 94
Table 8.10: Comparison between real aircraft defect man-hour rate and results of the
combination method and functionality method [Der 1000 flying hoursl
Aircraft Real data Combination method Functionality method
F2 17029.7 17580.38 9462.7
Al 13405.5 14248.79 9365.792
A2 9584.4 10698.21 9314.694
ATR1 7459.6 5118.266 7105.652
ATR2 4990.7 4282.271 6614.7
F-104 6216.3 5711.828 5030.52
A-7 7810.6 7867.151 3502.082
GA1 Late 3430.0 10744.59 6574.655
GA2 4500 8384.919 6614.7
GA3 959.0 3283.273 606.348
Ti 5040.0 4383.341 9309.729
Note: All aircraft displayed in this table were renamed, and taken from the available
data sets [4,381 (except F-104)
Table 8.11: Results of U-99 from reliability & maintainability assessmentmodule

Method Variable Failure rate Defect man-hour rate
Highest (100) 401.7737 3368.80371
Lowest (70) 20.48245 406.2553
Combination method b coefficient
-1.160382 -0.824707
Aircraft with TIF 298.681 -
Aircraft without TIF 1194.726 12285.26
Functionality method Aircraft 265.315 9602.858
8.4 Results from Life Cycle Cost Estimation

The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimation model is based on Woodford's 153]model. This
predicts the total aircraft LCC for the entire aircraft life in peacetime, by using mostly
aircraft conceptual design parameters. The model has been partly validated and modified
to be able to predict the total aircraft LCC during wartime (see Chapter 5). However,
only operation cost and flyaway to

cost are used evaluate the total operational cost during
either peacetime or wartime in this study. The operation cost will be averaged out over
the total number of flying hours and over the total number of operational aircraft in one
base throughout the aircraft lifetime, as shown in Table 8.12. The Operation cost per
flying hour for U-99 is the highest due to only 500 flying hours for its entire life time.
The difference between the F-16 LCC during peacetime, calculated from Woodford's
model and from the LCC estimation model in this methodology is approximately 4%, and
approximately 3% for Eurofighter. Regarding the flyaway cost in FY92$M values quoted
8. Results 95
Table 8.12: Results from life cycle cost estimation sub-module

LCC [M$/AC] Flyaway Cost [M$] Operation Cost [$/FH/AC
Aircraft
Peacetime Wartime Peacetime Wartime Peacetime Wartime
U-99 18.556 17.129 5.201 5.201 12292.561 9437.881
F-16 57.701 43.621 20.095 20.095 5212.074 3011.974
Eurofighter 123.646 101.355 51.818 51.818 5932.708 2960.647
by Woodford [53], the flyaway cost for F-16 calcuated from the LCC estimation model
was apporximately 12% less than from the quoted price. Similar to the flyaway cost for
Eurofighter, the difference is approximately 4.5%.
An alternative method used to predict the aircraft LCC is to use the FACET [25I
commercial program. Mr. Pugh, formerly of the Directorate Project, Time, and Cost
Analysis (DPTCAn), a division of the Ministry of Defence, used this program to esti-
mate the U-99 LCC, as shown in Table 8.13. The difference between the U-99 flyway
cost calculated from the FACET program and from the LCC estimation model in this
methodology is approximately 4.4%. Regarding U-99 LCC predicted by FACET program,
receiving directly from Mr. Pugh, the development cost does not take the avionics soft-
ware development cost into account; therefore, the development cost discrepancy from
both methods is significant high (approximately 86%).
Table 8.13: Comparison between U-99 LCC calculated from the LCC estimation module
and from FACET [25I
Cost LCC estimation module [M$] FACET [M$]
Development 3377.511 1817.874
Production 2600.484 2717.604
Flyaway 5.201 5.4351
Fig. 8.4 shows the percentage of the operation cost over 4 years of peacetime scenario.
An average operation cost is approximately $49,000 /aircraft/flying hour.
In the case of the U-99 life being increased to 20 years, nearly a half of LCC has to
be spent on the operation cost, as illustrated in Fig. 8.5. The average operation cost per
aircraft per flying hour also increases to $461,000by assuming that the U-99 can be used
for a total of 500 flying hours, as in its design specification.
Table 8.14 shows an overall U-99 LCC per aircraft during peacetime and wartime sce-
nario comparing between 4 years and 20 years life time. The operation cost during the
wartime scenario calculated from the LCC estimation model still excludes the weapons
8. Results 96
Dispo sal
Operation 0%
11-
'&E
Ground Suý
3%
Froduction
28%
Figure 8.4: Results from U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario for 4 years life
time
RDT&E
23%
duction
22%
Op
)ort
Figure 8.5: Results from U-99 LCC estimation in peacetime scenario for 20 years life
time
released cost and the aircraft lost cost, which will be added later in the operation simula-
tion module. The sum over these three major costs will be defined as the total operational
cost
8. Results 97
Table 8.14: Comparison between LCC per one U-99 [M$] during wartime and peacetime
scenarios for 4 years and 20 years life time
Peacetime Wartime
4 Years 20 Years 4 Years 20 Years
RDT&E 6.688 6.688 6.688 6.688
Production 5.149 5.149 5.149 5.149
Ground support 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Operation 6.146 11.531 4.719 10.415
Disposal 0.052 0.021 0.052 0.021
18.087 23.909 17.128 22.793
8.5 Operation Simulation Results

In this mission simulation, there are some assumptions and constraints, as described in
Chapter 6, which can be concluded as follows:
1. The mission scenario takes 10 operation days with a maximum of 2 operation sorties
per day. The fleet size comprises 10 U-99 aircraft flying in the bomber role.
2. It is assumed that the threat defence system is fully functional, with the highest
level of defense. The encounter ratio (probability of encounter) by the AAA weapon
type is approximately 5% and by SAM is approximately 2%. The number of contact
warheads released and the detonation distance of the proximity warheads in each
flight phase are both randomly generated.
3. It is assumedthat the aircraft has the manoeuvrability probability following option

2 (details see Fig. E. 9).
4. The maintainability and supportability reach the maximum level, with an additional
12 hours of maintenance at the end of each operation day.
8.5.1 Results and Effects of an Individual Aircraft Measure of Performance

on Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness
The results from the operation simulation process, where only one specific aircraft MOP
becomes a constant value throughout the simulation, will be presented in this section.
With these results, the direct effect of an individual aircraft MOP on the operational and
cost MOEs can be identified. The major aircraft MOPs investigated in this study are
probability of detection (PD), probability of hit (P), probability of aircraft kill on en-
counter with penetrators (P' Non),probability of aircraft kill on encounter with proximity
8. Results 98
warhead, considering detonation distance (PKE,, ), defect arising rate or failure rate (FR),
mean time to repair defect (MTTRDefeet), mean time to repair damage (MTTRDamage),
and defect man-hour rate (DMHR).
To only evaluate the effect of aircraft probability of detection on the operational and
operational cost MOEs, without any interference of of the other aircraft MOPs, the prob-
ability of detection for every aircraft view in every flight phase will be held at the same
constant values. Fig. 8.6 shows the effect of the probability of detection on the entire op-
eration and operational cost. Best fit linear modelling of the number of sorties flown, of
complete sorties, of successful sorties, and of targets killed have been chosen to represent
the actual data from the mission simulation. High order polynomial curves are not used
to represent the data because, although the data is non-linear, it is every nearly linear
and therefore, a linear approximation is sufficient in most cases. The remaining linear
and polynomial curves representing the number of sorties flown, of complete sorties, and
of successful sorties have been shown in Appendix E.
200 y- -2700?7 48x+ 307801

1049
y=-134x+17629 y=-135x+15731 r 30000000
R`=09533 R'=09563
180 28000000
160 26000000
140 24000000
y.. "
: 0
120 22000000
.4
o loo 7= -1341175 34x + 24997765 82 20000000
-y--102x+12025
0 80 R2- 0,9327 18000000
60 16000000
40 14000000
20 12000000
U 10000000
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0° 09
Pr4ohahility of Detection
comes Flown Successful "orhes
" 2omplete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.6: Effect of the probability of detection on the operational and operational cost
The number of sorties flown, complete sorties, successful sorties and also targets killed
show decreases, of approximately 1.0 - 1.35 sortie reduction for every 10% increase in
PD. The target killed reduction is slightly less. The reduction of these operational MOEs
appear to be more likely to be linear, with constant inclination because of very low
percentage reduction (less than 1%). On the other hand, the reduction of the operational
8. Results 99
cost MOEs consist of bounds over certain PD regions. For example, the effects of PD
variation on the total operational cost can be divided into three PD regions.
1. PD between 0.0 - 0.65: In this region, the total operational cost reduces approxi-
mately $184,000 for every 0.1 PD increase.
2. PD between 0.65 - 0.75: The total operational cost fluctuates with a range of ap-
proximately 5 M$ over this PD region due to Klonte Carlo simulation effect.
3. PD between 0.75 - 1.0: The reduction ratio in this region is approximately $270,000
per 0.1 PD increase.
An explanation for the first and the third regions, where the total operational cost
reduces continuously, is that the number of U-99 flying hours decreases due to the higher
possibility of detection in an early sortie and/or in an early operational day. Consequently,

the U-99 is more likely to be hit, damaged, or defective in the early mission simulation
period. Hence, the number of U-99 take-offs decrease and the number of weapons released
also thus reduces. The total operational cost reduction ratio per PD 10% increase in the
third region gains nearly 50% from the reduction ratio in the first region. The main
reason is that a U-99 with a higher PD is more likely to be killed or damaged in the earlier
sorties and operational days; therefore, the total number of sorties flown, targets killed,
and weapons released are less than the U-99 with lower PD.
The PD in the second region, where the total operational cost varies for increased
PD, cannot accurately predict when an additional U-99 will be killed because some other
remaining U-99 MOPs are still randomly generated, and a small number of trials for
Monte Carlo simulation is used. This region can possibly be minimised, by increasing the
number of Monte Carlo simulation trials.

The effects of PD on the other operational cost MOEs (for example, cost[$]/sortie and
cost[$]/target) are quite similar to the effect on the total operational cost. These opera-
tional cost MOEs can be considered as constant throughout the first and the third regions.
For instance, cost[$]/target decreases by approximately $20 over a 0.1 PD increase in the
first region (see Fig. E. 10). Comparing this $20 decrease to the original cost[$]/target of
approximately $200,000, this reduction is only approximately 0.01%, which can be ne-
glected. The reason for the very small cost[$]/target reduction percentages is that the
reduced percentage over 10% increase in PD compared to the original value of number of
8. Results 100
targets killed (approximately 0.831%), and of the total operational cost (approximately
0.7365%) are both extremely small and close to each other.
Using a similar approach to present the effect of the probability of detection, the im-
pact of the aircraft probability of hit on the operational and operational cost has been
illustrated in Fig. 8.7. The discontinuities of operational cost appear in the specific re-
gions, where an additional aircraft is killed. Additionally, the slope of each discontinuity
increases, but are nearly constant, due to the substantial reductions in the amount of ser-
vice time and weapons released. This decrease operational cost, due to both service time
and weapons released reductions, is small. This leads to increases only in the reduction
inclination, and does not cause any step changes. The remaining effects of the probability
of hit (PH) are similar to the effects of the Po. The number of sorties flown, complete
sorties, successful sorties and targets killed are defined as the number of specific sorties
and targets. The number of specific sorties and targets, however, reduces more, and also
the total operational cost fluctuates in several PH regions.
200 y=-10376704.94+451566-, . 43000000

y = -318x + 175.6(R2= 0.9614)
180
r= _
QJc'<:
x+; ool_ý lvi 1 r,
160 38000000
rJ
J 140
/= 120 3,30000110
loo
80 28000000
60
1 ýý5=_.;+ )624d.),
40 23000000 2
20 IIQI+4>_47
0 18000000
0 01 0? 0 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probability of Hit
" , -rtes Flown Successful Sorties
f Complete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.7: Effect of the probability of hit on the operational and operational cost
The trends of the specific sorties and targets reduction appear to increase over the PH,
and may be plotted as exponential curves. The regions where the number of the specific
sortie inclination increases, are the same regions, where the total operational cost has a
step change. This shows that the increasing of the specific sorties inclinations relates to
the increasing number of aircraft lost. The same relationship for the change in gradient
8. Results 101
for number of targets killed against P,,, as shown in Appendix E.
In the high PH region, the number of specific sorties, targets killed, and the total
operational cost reduce much more than in the lower Pt1, due to aircraft being killed in
an earlier stage of the mission simulation (see Fig. 8.7). The reason for this is the high PD
value of the U-99 case study aircraft. The trend of the reduction of specific sorties and
targets killed in this region can be represented by an exponential curve. However, the
reduction for an overall PH range is still sufficiently represented by traces (see Fig. E. 11).
The effects of PH are different to these of Po for the remaining operational cost NIOEs;
such as cost[$]/sortie, cost[$]/target and cost[$] /successful sortie. These operational cost
MOEs increase with higher ratio within higher P regions, due to smaller numbers of
specific sorties and/or targets killed. Higher increasing cost ratios result from the oper-
ational cost MOEs definition (see Chapter 5), in conjuction with the higher precentage
reduction of the specific sorties and/or targets killed, compared to the reduced percentage
of total operational costs within the high PH region (see Fig. E. 11). For instance; in the
forth discontinuity area of the total operational cost, the reduction ratio in this region is
approximately 2.3%. Similarly, the reduction ratio of targets killed in the same region is
approximately 3.5%. Regarding the cost[$]/target definition, and both above described
reduction ratios, this operational cost MOE will increase due to a greater decrease in the
denominator, reduction of targets killed, in Eqn. (5.11).
The above explanations can also apply to the results from the remaining aircraft MOPs
on the operational and operational cost MOEs.

There are two alternative ways to measure the aircraft MOP for vulnerability on en-
counter with a proximity warhead, i. e. probability of kill, calculated through detonation
distance, and lethal radius. The aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter with a prox-
imity warhead in the form of lethal radius has units in metres. Therefore, the probability
of aircraft kill, which represents the aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter, with a
proximity warhead calculated through detonation distance, has been chosen so that both
two values (probability of aircraft kill on encounter with a proximity warhead and with
penetrator) can be directly compared. The effect of the aircraft vulnerability on encounter
with a non-explosive (penetrator) has been shown in Fig. 8.8, by keeping the aircraft kill
probability on encounter with penetrators value constant in every flight phase, throughout
the simulation, regardless the number of hits. The kill probability on encounter with a
8. Results 102
proximity warhead is also calculated through generated random detonation distances in
every flight phase.
11-04c:
71. - ii::
100 -90729 ~0000000
y= -9588785 59x + 5264.28424S
y= -8876607 ?2x + 47148_6 19 /
160
v= -10135042?-.. " 4-`, 51974 -.1' 50000000
--
f ]40
ö 40000000
120 y=-69.6x+15,
R2 - 0.9943
30000000
ä 100
20000000
30
y= -10702063 85x + 3259363196
rl= -9981845 64x + 27498533 48 10000000 '_

y= -nc. x+ 137 33 i Rý =0 99391
y--509x+10418 (-Z'-0993)
40 0
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probability of Kill Hit by Non Explosive
Sorties Flown " Successful Sorties
A Complete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.8: Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with penetrators on the oper-
ational and operational cost
Fig. 8.9 shows the effect of the aircraft kill probability on encounter with proximity
warheads on operational and operational cost-effectiveness. In this approach, the prob-
ability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead is set as a constant value instead.
The impact of both PK on encounter with penetrators and P,t on encounter with
proximity warheads, calculated through a random detonation distance, are quite similar to
the impact of the PH. The specific sorties and targets killed reduction ratios over increasing
P, on encounter with penetrators tend to be constant and higher than the reduction ratios
t
over PK on encounter with proximity warheads. However, the reduction ratios of specific
sorties and targets for increasing P,t on encounter with proximity warheads seem to reduce
(divergence). The causes of these phenomena are:
I. ) The probability of encounter by penetrators has been set higher than by proximity
warheads. Therefore, the reduction ratios of specific sorties and targets for in-
creasing PK on encounter with penetrators are higher than the reduction ratios for
increasing PK on encounter with proximity warheads.
II. ) The reduction ratio of specific sorties and targets for increasing PK on encounter
8. Results 103
Y-1 0854403 0 1x. 3908012269

200 y--66.6x+167.16 X0000000
R2 -0 .9722 =-4971C1 91,: "'. 1
y=
180 = c:1 x+1,,
ý_0 i-r. ]l K.- 4svva4v 1 45000000
FA
160 _?
I
140
Z
t =-Y-4-1t=09x+4t45LR1647
40000000
V/ 120 ANIIIIIIIIIII
10(i 31,000000
y
''Illililiiiiiilllll!
81) - -
-0 :; x i 14094E4
3000000u
)o 40
¢
z
14Y'9354 43x . 29641707 73 Y'- 492x+11173 Q
v-
40 &- 0%94 25000000
20
14'95795 43x * J4_ 35 74 79
0 20n00 (r i1ii
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probability of Kill / Hit by External Explosive (distance)
Sorties Flown Successful Sorties
" Con lote Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.9: Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead on the
operational and operational cost
with proximity warheads is reduced due to the lower probability of encounter by
proximity warheads. In this case the aircraft would be more likely to be killed in a
later sortie, and in a later operational day. Therefore, the total number of specific
sorties and targets would not reduce much, even if the number of aircraft killed
increased.
The trends of the total operational cost reduction ratio follow the trends of the total
number of sorties flown reduction ratio, for the same reason as described above. The
remaining operational cost MOEs are similar to that of Pt,, in that there is an increasing
ratio rise, yet in a different order, depending on the specific sorties, targets killed, and the
total operational cost reduction ratios over increasing PK on encounter with penetrators
and proximity warheads.

The reliability probability effect on the operational and operational cost has been
shown in Fig. 8.10. The maximum reliability probability value studied in this methodology
has been set as 0.1 due to the assumption that the operational reliability is approximately
10% of the aircraft reliability.
The effects of the aircraft MOP for reliability on the operational MOEs are quite
similar to the effects of the other aircraft MOPs, in which the specific sorties or targets
killed approximately decreases steadily with different inclinations. The effect of reliability
8. Results 104
200 40000000
y= -129äV 992 77x + 36100931 91
180
35000000
160 y-433x+17212
R' _0 ý4 30000000
140
°, 25000000
. 120
100 20000000
40 y= -97310577 45x + 3047510 S 41 O
4 80 i:
15000000
y = -"x+ 1e ;L
60
z 10000000
40 y=-571x+12341
R2-07
20 5000000
0 0
0 0.01 002 0.03 004 005 006 007 008 0.09
Defect Ani Ju st Rite
A Complete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.10: Effect of the reliability probability on the operational and operational cost
on the total operational cost fluctuated at the very low defect arising rate region. The
costs decrease continuously instead. This shows that the effect of this design aspect
directly affects the number of aircraft being killed, in the opposite way from the effects
of the other aircraft MOPs. In the case that an aircraft had a high defect arising rate,
this aircraft would be less likely to be killed. The main reason is that aircraft with high
defect arising rate would operate in the mission simulation for a shorter time due to more
maintenance being required. In the other words, for an aircraft frequently aborting a
sortie, there was less risk of being attacked. The total number of aircraft killed, the total
service time, and the total number of weapons released consequently reduced.
Due to the research time-scale and because of LCC estimation modelling, the main-
tenance cost was included within the total O&S cost, which was averaged over the total
number of operational aircraft in one base and the total flying hours for the entire aircraft
life.
The effects of the reliability on the remaining operational cost MOEs are quite similar
to the effects of the other aircraft MOPs. Trends of these operational cost MOEs de-
pend on the specific sorties or targets killed reduction proportion, compared to the total
operational cost reduction ratio, as discussed above.
On the other hand, the maximum maintainability probability values represented by
8. Results 105
mean time to repair defect and mean time to repair damage are both expanded to a maxi-
mum of 12 hours due to the additional extra maintenance 12 hours at the end of operation
day. Fig. 8.11 and Fig. 8.12 show the effect of each aircraft MOP for maintainability on
the operational and operational cost.
200 35100000
= 16 341 ": ": +1:.::? plc 19 Y-_ 195x+163.2
Ri =08955
180 30100000
r--
160 25100000
0 0
CIO 140 20100000 U
'a
120 15100000
.9
100 10100000
80 5100000
R' =0 8769
60 10000 0
0123456 789 10 11
MTTR Defect [Hour]
" Complete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.11: Effect of the mean time to repair defect on the operational and operational
cost
200 =_14-'6fl,, + 32 r 30100000
180 25100000
ti y--1015x+163.02
160 R2-0 8719 20100000
140 15100000
120 v=_0? 05z+tsý6 10100000

z
t
100 * y= -0 685x+ 109 5100000
R' = 08399
80 i----I F-ý--rte-- I-r 100000

013456789 10 11
MITIR I): inage [Hour]

" Complete Sorties " Operational Cost
Figure 8.12: Effect of the mean time to repair damage on the operational and operational
cost
8. Results 106
The effects of the MTTRDCfeCtand of the MTTRDa,,, on the operational and opera-
age
tional cost are very similar, shown by the traces and linear regression equations illustrated
in Fig. 8.11 - 8.12. Therefore, the effect of MTTRDefect represents the aircraft MOP for
maintainability in this study.

In this study, the effects of U-99 MOP for maintainability in the form of MTTR could
be divided into two main categories; i. e. U-99 with MTTR not present (MTTR = 0)
and MTTR present (MTTR > 0). In case of U-99 with MTTR present, the MTTR
value increasing had little influence on the operational MOEs, because they had no direct
relationships with operational reliability. In the other words, these values were used only
to estimate the maintainability probability, which is only a function of aircraft in mainte-

nance duration and MTTR. These values were used to indicate whether the aircraft had
finished their maintenance process, regardless of the aircraft defect arising rate, aircraft
failure rate, and aircraft damage probability value. If the aircraft finished their mainte-
nance, the probability of defect, failure, and/or abort mission were set as 0.0, or perfect
condition. The effects of this approach on the operational MOEs are discussed below:
I. ) The total service time and total number of weapons released decrease due to the
longer maintenance requirement and fewer sorties flown.
II. ) Due to the longer maintenance required, there were fewer aircraft operating in the
mission simulation. The aircraft probability values of a "KILL" event in the event
tree diagram in the sortie decreaseddue to their perfect condition (for details of
calculation see Chapter 6). This led to fewer aircraft being killed, with higher
MTTR values.
III. ) In the case that the defect arising rate increased, in conjunction with high MTTR,
this would increase the above effects. Therefore, aircraft would require maintenance
for longer and more often. This led to fewer aircraft operations in the mission
simulation. Consequently, the number of aircraft being killed were reduced, but
fewer missions were performed.
Consequently, all operational cost MOEs constantly slightly decreaseor increase, with-
out any bounds (step changes). Their inclinations depend on the specific sorties or targets
killed reduction ratio compared to the total operational cost reduction ratio.
8. Results 107
In the case of U-99 with MTTR not present, U-99 did not require any maintenance
after operational sorties. They were consequently in perfect condition and immediately
ready for the next operational sortie. Unlike the case of MTTR present, here the U-
99 could be ready, at the earliest for the operational sortie after the next immediately
operational sortie. Therefore, there were no significant effects of increasing MTTR values.
In this study, scheduled maintenance and DMHR were not taken into account during
the operation mission simulation. Hence, they only affect the operational cost, and do
not affect the number of sorties during the mission operation simulation, as illustrated
in Fig. 8.13. Therefore, the effect of scheduled maintenance will not be presented in this
study.
180 34000000
y=_o.o1x+1578
160 ,-,
°' 140
. 31500000
120 i11
- _x+1776
100
29000000 r'.
80 y0O1x+104b3
60
40 26500000
595497625
25
16 Q3 7- +25954976
y=11.
20
0 24000000
0 1.5 3 45 6 75 9 105 12 135
I)I\IHR [ Flying Hour]
SortiesFlown SuccessfulSorties
L Complete Sorties " OperationalCost
Figure 8.13: Effect of the defect man-hour rate on the operational and operational cost
MOEs
The DMHR had a direct impact on the total operational cost via an average oper-
ational cost per aircraft per flying hour (for details see Chapter 5). By increasing this
value, the operational cost MOPS would also rise.

The effects of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on the operational and operational
cost MOEs are summaried and shown in Table 8.15. This can be used to indicate the
approximate effects of this U-99 MOP on the number of specific sorties and targets, total
operational cost, cost [$]/specific sortie, and cost [$]/target.

8. Results 108
Table 8.15: Effect of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on operational and operational
cost MOEs
__
PD PH P, PEncounterDefect Arising MTTR DMHR
Effect on number of X
-+ - -- - -- -+
specific sorties and
targets
Effect on the total op- +- + + + +-
-- -+
erational cost
Effect on the remain- + +1- -}- - +-
-{- - -}- - -}--}-
ing operational cost
MOEs
X= No Effect +/- = May increase or decrease
Slight decrease +-= Slight increase
-+=
Decrease += Increase
-=
Significant decrease ++ = Significant increase
--=
8.5.2 Results and Effects of Multiple Aircraft Measures of Performance on

the Operational and Operational Cost Measures of Effectiveness
To investigate all the effects of, and relationships between, every aircraft MOP in this
study on the operational and operational cost MOEs is too complex and time-consuming.
Therefore, only the effects of and relationships between all aircraft l\'IOPs for survivability,
which is the major design aspect considered in this study, are examined in details. Then,
the effects of and the relationships between aircraft MOPS in different aircraft design
aspects will be briefly explored.

The aircraft MOPS for survivability design aspect are probability of detection, prob-
ability of hit, probability of kill on encounter with penetrators, and probability of kill on
encounter with proximity warheads, calculated through the detonation distance. Fig. 8.14
shows the effects of aircraft probability of detection and aircraft probability of kill on en-
counter with penetrators, by increasing aircraft probability of kill on encounter with a
proximity warhead, and constant aircraft probability of hit. Complete results and charts
of these effects and relationships have been shown in Appendix E.
Survivability is a combination of susceptibility (PD and P) and vulnerability (P,;,..
and PKExt). Therefore, the effects of, and relationships between, both design aspects can
be shown, and will be discussed here as follows:
I. ) In the casethat an aircraft has a low probability of detection, the reduction ratio of
the total number of specific sorties and targets slightly decreasedfor increasesin P,;
8. Results 109
-003"aß 1" Tý
lýsoý /y-
Iw P 11 u1'. Y k e'tu v'-ola. 120
- - R -000l3
1'1
G ýýý -
IGS " 1d
r
60 w
ISS : l]' , 11
, -,0
.ý. - - . pps .
- "
.0 IU
k--i:
45
y. -25 46x+16784
Y-. ä99a+1]52 D le - 09831
140 le -0 9857
135 ID
0 01 03 03 0,05 00 07 OS 09 0 01 02 0i 04 0'" 06 07 00 09
YIOt, Týv i of wr trv Yareftat« H ol, alý4h nt NY bv . Pmeh 401$
ý_ P_d-0 _. _. _ __.. _ _
" P_d-0. '. . P_d-05 " P_d. 077 d-0 P-4-02'. P_d-05 "P
"P " "
-d-075
ýLm. u tP_d-0 -L ... p d-0 -Lnw(P_d-051 -Laneu(P d-01 dý01 iP_d-035, -lnwýP d-OSi -I. nrr lP e
-Irw(P -L+aer
0 x=. 17413
y - u19.. 114m P h=u1ý. P k
1 P h P k eai=ut 13v -
rV=41 R'-olw
_ -15. -- Fi - 0 0113 -
175
' . . o: nu
rro /V
Idt " "r" 5"- f: 160
"" ý' "
I60 ýR", " """ " ""
v, " ""
150
r 155 aý"
Nz. 1 y 1
y 7
$ Iso Ido
"
-,/! lay .... .,. .
r y- ß78:. 1A
Im 13 _
y-2322x. 16091 "- R'-09704
133 R' -0 9739 110
M 0 01 OI 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
0 01 02 03 04 OS 06 07 03 09
Plobal>t4h. of hill by, Pamafas Piobalrbtc oI Kill bY Pmriatols
P_1-0 P_d-075 d-0 Pd-025 "P d-05 " Pd-075
" "P "P " "P "
_d-12-', -J-0, d-075
r, P_d-01 P d-025, P d-O1 -1-P
d-02'ßi -Ivi -, "1-U`. ---I m"e. iF' d-ýý? "i ýL-. -Lm.,. -Lm.
Figure 8.14: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKEyt and constant P on the
number of the total sorties flown
and PH. Additionally, reduction ratios seemed to decrease slightly with increasing
PK. The explanation of this matter is that additional aircraft were killed, but were
not killed earlier in the sortie and the operational day.
II. ) In the case that an aircraft has a high probability of detection, the reduction ratio
of the total number of specific sorties and targets dramatically increases, and signif-
icantly increases for high regions of PE, and Px. The main reason is that additional
aircraft were killed, and earlier in the sortie and in the operational day.
III. ) In the case that the aircraft probability of hit increases, but the remaining prob-
abilities are unchanged, then the relationships between the aircraft MOPs for sur-
vivability are also unchanged. The only effect of increasing probability of hit on the
operational MOEs is that the total number of specific sorties and targets reduces.
IV. ) In the case that the probability of threat encounter in the mission simulation in-
creases, the reduction of the total number of specific sorties and targets will slightly
increase due to the supplemental effect of increasing the probability of encounter.
The total operational cost, cost[$]/target, cost[$]/sortie and the other operational
cost MOEs generally vary over increasing aircraft MOPs for survivability in the form
of discontinuity curves, mainly due to increases in the numbers of aircraft being killed.
8. Results 110
The total operational costs decrease nearly constantly before and after the bounds mainly
because of the decrease in the total service time and weapons released. On the other hand,
the remaining operational cost MOEs increase with different inclinations, depending on
the specific sorties or target killed reduction ratios, compared to the total operational cost
reduction ratio. The effect of aircraft MOPs for survivability on the total operational cost
is also shown in Fig. 8.15.
38.500000
36700000
Ö 34VM
3370M
30100000
28700000
24500000
14700000
22500000
0 01 02 03 0.05 06 07 08 09
-P d. O -P a-ol -P_4 0$ -P d-075
45000000 Ph = 0.25. Pk ext = 0.75

4050DOM
32500000 p 40000000
0
U
p uoooaoo
IV
ýCýjyýooooo00
25000000
30000000 r----, - -'-.. -_ _.. -_. _. ,__... _. " ---T-ý

0 01 02 0 00ý 04 Un 09
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 os 09
0
Probabiiy of Kill by Penetrators
-C_d=0
0 3'" d-0} d-075 -P ý0z1 -F_d-00 -e aýo"i
-P-d- -P-4.0 -P -P _d
Figure 8.15: Effect of PD and PKNonwith increasing PKE. and constant P. on the total
t
operational cost
Survivability consists of susceptibility and vulnerability; therefore, the aircraft MOP

for survivability can be affected by increasing susceptibility or vulnerability, or by increas-
ing both values. This can be summerised and shown in Table 8.16.
Only the effects of reliability & maintainability will be examined in this study due
to research time scale and the paucity of information in this design aspect. Therefore,
each aircraft MOP for reliability & maintainability is considered separately, unlike aircraft
MOPS for survivability. However, simple relationships between aircraft defect arising rate
and the aircraft mean time to repair defect related to the operational and the operational
cost MOEs can be discovered. Fig. 8.16 shows the effect of, and the relationship between,
the aircraft MOP for reliability (defect arising rate) and aircraft MOP for maintainability
(MTTRDefect) on the operational MOE.
In the case that the MTTRDefeCt value is not equal to zero (aircraft with MTTRDeIect
8. Results 111
Table Generic effects of increasing individual

8.16: aircraft MOPs for survivability on
operational and operational cost MOEs
PD PH PK
Low High Low High Low High

Low x X
PD
High x X
Low X X
P
H High X X
Low -I/ X X
PK
High X X
Effect on specific sorties and targets -+ -- -- -+ - -+
Effect on total operational cost +- ++ ++ +- + +-
Effect on the remaining operational ++ ++ ++ +- + +-
cost MOEs
X: `No Effect' +/- : `May increase or decrease'
`Slight decrease' `Decrease' `Significant decrease'
-+: -: --:
+-: `Slight increase' +: Ìncrease' ++ : `Significant increase'
ion Y--140x. 1317 l.ý

130
R' -09aS?
My-y-. 3? ixýl3d v3
70 lp
160 110
177 04
IýY- -466x+ 100
R2-09937
"0
130
-.. ..., _
70
. 2o F". r ,_ (i -0 9944
60
uo
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
Dete. Dete. t Aiizrtp Rate
t i uwa Rate
MTTRO -MTTR2 --- -MiTR A5
LneatMTTR01 -L . (MTTR7) -L... l14TTR
Figure 8.16: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate with increasing MTT RDef,,, on numbers
of the total sorties flown and the total targets killed
present), the effects of this value on the total number of sorties flown and of targets
killed are more significant than the effect in case that MTTRDeIFCt value is equal to zero
(aircraft with MTTRDefeCt not present). On the other hand, the effect of increasing the
MTT RDe the MTT Roe Therefore, only 2

f,,, of aircraft with feCtpresent are quite small.
assumed MTTRDefeet values (2 and 4.5) have been integrated to investigate the effect of
aircraft MOP for maintainability, in conjunction with the other aircraft MOPs.
In the case that an aircraft was predicted to have 100% survival (PD =0 and/or PK =
0), the total number of specific sorties and targets continuously decreased, with increasing
inclinations resulting from the increase of the reliability and maintainability probability
values. The explanation is that aircraft stayed longer in maintenance, had earlier and
more frequently-aborted missions. Therefore, the total operational cost decreased. The
remaining operational cost MOEs, however, increased or decreased with approximately

8. Results 112
constant inclinations, depending on the total operational cost reduction ratio, compared to
specific sorties or targets killed reduction ratios. Some operational cost MOE inclinations
were nearly the same regardless of the variation in maintainability. This could be caused
by the fact that the reduction ratio of the total operational cost, compared to the reduction
ratio of the specific sorties or targets killed for each MTTR value, were very close to each
other. The physical explanation was that the survivability was not taken into account;
therefore, none of the operational aircraft were killed. The reduction of targets killed was
caused only by the aircraft abort frequency, and required longer maintenance duration,
as described above.
By combining all major aircraft MOPs in this study together, such as defect arising
rate, PD, PKNon,

PKEX MTTRD, and DMHR, the effects of all design aspects in this
. , f,,,
study on the operational and operational cost effectiveness can be shown, as illustrated
in Fig. 8.17.
In the caseswhere all survivability, reliability and maintainability aspects were mod-
elled, the effects of increasing PD and Px on the operational MOEs are discussed below:
I. ) In the casethat an aircraft with high survivability (low PH and low PK) was assumed
not to require maintenance, the total number of specific sorties and targets reduced
slightly due only to the effect of aircraft defect arising rate.
II. ) In the case that an aircraft with low survivability (high PH and high PK) was as-
sumed not to require maintenance, the total number of specific sorties and target
increased slightly over increasing defect arising rate. The reason is that aircraft
aborted their mission more often and in earlier sortie phase, and in earlier oper-
ational days, rather than being killed. This led to the fact that there were more
operational aircraft in later sorties and later operational days, which could increase
the number of take-offs (sorties flown). However, this did not guarantee that the
other specific sorties and targets would also increase.
III. ) In the case that an aircraft with high survivability was assumed to require mainte-
nance, the effects of aircraft with low MTTR present and aircraft with high MTTR
present on the total number of specific sorties and targets were quite small due
to there being no direct relationship between MTTR and defect arising rate, as
described above. The total number of specific sorties and targets decreaseresulted
8. Results 113
P_d(O. 25); P_k(0): DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.75): P_k(0); DMI-ß. (0.5)

210 210
200
_Y- 193 it " 197 97 200 Y- . 1921x" 19796
_ ---
R3=09958 Iap -- -- Rß. 09955
ý.,
ISO
w 1-70 170
y--5457k- 19213 Yý-5"(S h"19205
1ý ý
Rý=09956 60 Rýý0995ý
150 150
140
130 Hci- 0 130 h . uß.. 3.
120 120
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Arising Defect Arising
-MTTR0 -MITR2 -M7TR4 5 -MTTRO -M45 1 'IR

-MTTR1
beer (MTi'R 0) -Lx (MTrR 2) - lancer (M7TR 4 5) 4nexr (M7TR 0) IMlTR 2) 1: (. 45)
-Isýer
P_d(0.25); P_k(0.25); DMHR P_d(0.75): P_k(O. 25): DN4HR. (0.5)

(0.5) 170
190
ýý1JýA_. y°. 1500x"1835 y". 15 e. -1173.
180 160
R3 .0 9571 iý/ý
-. 'may. fnvý ýrtiJ`rýr
150 ý. /ý V"
160 140 Y ý'SeS 2x" 15176

y- X77 ft- 179 29 Rý -0 9d61
150 130
Re "0 9933
140 y 10
v=. '. ... ,.,
130 v... 71 110
...
...
120 100
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 OW 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Arse Defect Ar m

MTiR 0 FI
-MTTR2 -MTT1145 - M7TR0 - MTrR 2 -MTTR45
Uner(MTrRO) -L. . r(MTTR2) (M7'TR15) L. 0ea< (MTTR0) )MTYR 2) (MTTRýS)
-laox -Lx -liner
P_d(O. 25): Y k(O. S). L)MHR P 75); P k(O. 5); DMI-iR

Iao _
(O. S) 0] 6x " 170 63 110 _
ex(O.
_
(0.5)
v"1 2x - 128]?
V1
70
R' -0 8785 R' 0000?
ý'1rý`-w. I]0 wý ý /ý ý
yýw tiýr`'ýr, w-1'
160 . /Výýý"v `Y` ýb["12151
-ý-- ý
150
170 Yýý18VO
ý ix" 16] ]6
-111 Ii 09511
y
110 Ii09895 I10
170 aI: a:. aas LaYr

__'..: 00
170 ., Oe J
H'=0210
90
110
100 80
0 001 002 007 0a 00`1 000 007 008 009 0 001 002 00] 00 003 00e 007 008 009
Defect Defect Arising

Arising
-MTrRO -MTrR2 -MlTR45 -MTTR0 -MTrR2 -MTTRIS
Lner(MTTRO) -L- (MTTR 2) Lne. (MTTRO) (MTTR 2) (MTTR111
-Lner(MTTR45) -Dora -lane-
P_d(0.25). P_k(0.75): DMHR (0.5) P_d(O 75); P_k(O. 75); DMFt (0.5)
Lro Its
v -. s62, - 16149
ý'"ý. /ýý_výýý_^ Rý 08011
160 Ito At4
^ý _.
: 05
gy' ft'-Oi005
YýKB h"IS]2]
110 00
9902
170
20 'ýý0
00 74S
110 y913-ID412
Re -0 7683
100 so
0 001 002 003 001 00' 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 001 005 006 oo7 008 009
-MTPRO -MTrR2 -MTTR. 5 -MTTRO -MlTR2 -MTTR. 5

Lner(MTTRO) -Lne , (M-TR2) MTTR45) U. - (MTTRO) (MrTR21 I
-Lneu(, -L -laner(MTTR.?
Figure 8.17: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PKNon PKExt and MTT Roe with
, f,,,
a constant DMHR on the total number of sorties flown
mainly from the effect of defect arising rate.
The effects of these aircraft MOPS on the other remaining operational MOEs are quite
similar to the effect on the total number of sorties flown, as shown in Appendix E.
On the other hand, the effects of aircraft MOPs on the cost[$]/sortie and cost[$]/target
are slightly different from the effect on the operational cost. However, there is a similar
trend of increasing and/or decreasing of all three operational cost MOEs. For instance,
all cost decreasing or increasing traces have a constant gradient for every PD and P,t.
8. Results 114
P_d(0.25): P_k(0): DMHR (0.5) P_d(O. 75): P k(0); DMHR (O. S)

195000 195000
s 190000 190000
185000 135000
ýyý 2ý596x ý 1613.1 29570x+ 137015 90
y-
180000 Re -0 523 130000 R' -0 63
175000 nsooo
170000 170000
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
I I TR. 5
-MTTRO -M7rR2 -MTTR45 -Imet(M7TR3) -MTTRO -M1TR2 -MT -lner(MrrR2)
P_d(0.25); P_k(0.25). DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(0.25). DM HR (0.5)

300000 420000
tY
250000 )70000
200000
izoooo
150000
170000
! ý3 100000
0
V
Vq 2_'00,10
50000
0 170000
0 001 002 003 0 04 005 006 007 008 009 o 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 009 009
-MTTR0 -MTTR45 - MTTRO -MTrR2 -MrrR45

-MTTR2
P_d(O. 25): Y_k(O. S). DMHR (0.5) Y_d(0.75): P_k(0.5): llM1iK. (0.5)
330000 650000
310000 &t::: 600000
t ý la
290000
550000
270000 F
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230000 1! i 450000
210000
100000
190000
170000 350000
0 001 002 003 000 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
II 51 II- MTTR 0 2 45 1
-M7TR0 -MTrR2 -MTTR4 -MTTR -MrR
P_d(0.25); P_k(0.75); DMFÜt (0.5) P_d(0.75): P_I«0.75): DMHR (0.5)

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91 300000
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10000
0 001 002 003 0w 0 0'. 0 00 007 008 009 0 001 002 ool ow 005 006 oo7 Dos 009
II TTR 0 1 MTTR 0- MTTR 2-M TTR 451

-M -MTTR2 -MTTR05 -
Figure 8.18: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, P, PKExt and MTT RDefeetwith
KNon
,
a constant DMHR on cost[$]/target
Fig. 8.18 shows the effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD, PKNon PKE. and MTT RDQfett
, t
with a constant DMHR on cost[$]/target.
Table 8.17 shows a summary of the effects of increasing multiple aircraft MOPs on the
operational and operational cost MOEs. The `+' and `-' signs illustrated in the table are
used to indicate the effect of increasing aircraft MOP within selected specific remaining
aircraft MOP regions on operational and operational cost MOEs.

8. Results 115
Table 8.17: Generic effects of increasing aircraft MOP within selected specific remaining
aircraft MOPS on operational and operational cost MOEs
Susceptibility Vulnerability Reliability Maintainability
(PD) (PK) (Defect Arising) (MTTR)
Low High Low High Low High =0 >0
Low x X
P
D High x X
Low X X
PK
High x x
Low _I/ X X
D ef ectA r i si ng
High X X
=0 J x x
MTTR
>0 J J J x x
Effect on specific sorties -+ -- - -+ - -+ +- -+
and targets
Effect on total operational +- + ++ +- -+ -+ -+ -+
cost
Effect on the remaining op- +- ++ + +- +- +/- -+ +/-
erational cost MOEs
X: `No Effect' +/- : `May increase or decrease'
-+: `Slight decrease' `Decrease' --: `Significant decrease'
-:
+-: 'Slight increase' +: Ìncrease' ++ : 'Significant increase'
8.6 Results from Optimisation

In this study, two alternative optimisation methods have been introduced and used. The
results from these methods can be illustrated as examples of how to design a combat
aircraft in a specific operation, for operational or operational effectiveness.

Six aircraft MOPS have been investigated in this study to find the best solution to
design the U-99 case study aircraft for operational or operational cost effectiveness in 4
i.
categories; e. maximum number of sorties flown, maximum number of targets killed,
minimum cost[$]/sortie, and minimum cost[$]/target. The 6 MOPS are defect arising
rate, probability of detection, probability of aircraft kill on encounter with penetrators,

probability of aircraft kill on encounter with proximity warheads, mean time to repair
defect, and defect man-hour rate. The following are the fundamental constraints of these
variables:
1. Maximum and minimum values of aircraft defect arising rate are 0.0 and 0.1.
PI(Ex!
2. All aircraft probability ranges (PD, P, ) are 0.0 1.0.
ýNon, -
3. MTTRDefeCLhas the upper limit of 5 hours.
4. DMHR maximum value is 15.00 man-hours/flying hour.

8. Results 116
5. The number of Monte Carlo simulation trials is 200 runs in each iteration.
Due to non usage of multiobjective optimisation, and a wide range of variable con-
straints applied to the optimisation problems, the results from the optimisation are, there-
fore, part of several alternative solutions with the same constraints.
8.6.1 Results from the Optimisation using the Gradient-Based Method
As described in Chapter 7, the gradient-based method has been used to predict the
approximate optimum solution due to some objective functions being in the forms of
integer numbers.
Table 8.18 shows the major results from the gradient-base "Solver" optimisation [21]
The remaining results are shown in Appendix E.
Table 8.18: Results from the gradient-base method optimisation

Minimise Maximise
Cost[$]/Target Cost[$]/Sortie Targets Killed Sorties Flown
Defect Arising 0.029519 0.099899 0.00494 0.00
PD 0.062758 0.117555 0.29574 0.00
PKNo 0.371593 0.485130 0.007653 0.618059
PKExt 0.515784 0.216124 0.148098 0.330151
MTTRDefect 4.180827 6.534311 0.6544909 0.00
DMHR 0.00 5.374156 5.092504 4.074727
Objective Value 187454.6562 117821.8125 136 198
Ideal Value 200 200
Iterations 232 244 205 868
8.6.2 Results from the Optimisation using Genetic Algorithms
There are two main alternatives to stop the "GAlib" genetic algorithms optimisation [50)
i. e. convergenceof populations and number of generations. To show the difference between
the results from the optimisation using the gradient-based method and this optimisation
method, the number of generations termination mechanism has been chosen to produce
the results.
Table 8.19 shows the major results from the "GAlib" optimisation with a maximum of
100 generations of 100 populations. Another two parameters required for this optimisation
method are percentage of mutation and percentage of crossover, which are set up by
default as 10% for mutation and 60% for crossover (for details see Chapter 7). The rest
of the results from this method are shown in Appendix E

8. Results 117
Table 8.19: Results from the genetic algorithm optimisation

Minimise Maximise
Defect Arising 0.011719 0.098817 0.000194 0.000933
PD 0.0857886 0.169359 0.030381 0.002472
PKNo 0.927993 0.279011 0.048066 0.57612
PKEyt 0.138689 0.456199 0.000565 0.03917
.
MTTRDefect 1.505455 7.514457 0.408179 0.730907
DIVIHR 0.075532 4.2682538 2.873198 0.236438
Objective Value 185332.7812 113487.3984 146 193
Ideal Value 200 200
The results from the genetic algorithms were slightly better than from the gradient-
based method in the case of the integer objective function. The reason is that the gradient-
based method uses the derivatives of the objective function and constraints to directly
search for solutions and also to stop the optimisation. On the other hand, the results in
the form of floating points from the gradient-based method are much closer to the results
from the genetic algorithm. This shows how accurate the optimised solutions were from
both methods. The gradient-based optimisation method usually required fewer iterations
than was required by the genetic algorithms.
The genetic algorithms use the objective function to determine the quality of the so-
lution (population), which contains a set of all 6 variables (Genome). The stop criteria
for the optimisation used in this study was the maximum number of solution develop-
ments (generation). In each development, a specific number of the best fit populations
will survive for the next generation, the rest will be taken away. All genomes in these
populations will be mutated and/or exchange their parts relative to given values. This
method, however, requires enormous amounts of time to achieve the best optimum.
For this study, either optimised operational or operational cost MOEs can be achieved
by several solutions; therefore, the results from the optimisation can be used as a guideline
for the best solution. For instance, an alternative solution for maximum sorties flown is
gained from attempting to obtain the lowest values of defect arising rate and PD as the
primary condition, then followed by the P,CNon PIKExtMTTR, and DMHR in that order.
I I
Only one objective function can be considered for each optimisation run in this study,
due to the research time scale. Therefore, the results have to be investigated further to
see if they are reasonable. For example, the minimum cost[$]/sortie is approximately
CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION
One of the objectives of this study was to develop tools to simply, yet sufficiently, assess
aircraft measures of performance for three major design aspects; i. e. survivability includ-
ing susceptibility and vulnerability, reliability & maintainability, and life cycle cost. The
reasons for this were that the developed methodology could be published, and used by a
wide range of people. It was aimed to help aircraft designer and operational personnel
to make decisions quickly, without the need for access to restricted data, at a stage of
aircraft design that had been hitherto impossible. The results from using these tools were
to be used to contribute to aircraft design knowledge, as discussed in this chapter.
The results from the individual sub-modules and from the main module will be further
clarified and discussed. The effects of, and the relationships between, the individual
aircraft design aspects will be described and be discussed, relative to the results obtained
from the use of the operation simulation module, together with optimisation.
9.1 Design Methodology for Aircraft Operational and

Cost-Effectiveness
The design methodology developed in this research aimed to integrate all fundamental
aircraft design aspects into the early design process, with consideration of operational and
cost-effectiveness. This methodology was based mainly on two fundamental aircraft design
i.
methodologies; e. the conventional and the "system of systems" design methodologies.
The fundamental approach of the new design methodology was an integration of the
"system of systems" design methodology within the design processesof the conventional
design methodology. The best, and most appropriate, position in the design cycle was
between the conceptual and the preliminary design processes,because of the definition of
input at the vehicle level of design used in the "system of systems" design methodology.
The "system of systems" design methodology aimed to measure the performance and
effectiveness of the system by using the performance of sub-systems to indicate system
119
9. Discussion 120
effectiveness. An aircraft was defined as a sub-system of the system representing the en-
tire operation scenario; therefore, its performance, basic design parameters and variables
resulting from the conceptual design process could be used to measure performance of an
aircraft in the terms of susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability, manoeu-
vrability, and life cycle cost.

An entire mission, representing the overall system, in conjunction with the aircraft
measures of performance, therefore, could be used to measure aircraft operational and
cost-effectiveness. By this approach, the aircraft design parameters and variables could
directly show trends and be used to improve the aircraft effectiveness for operational and
operational-cost during the early design stage.
The aircraft measures of performance could be represented in the form of the prob-
ability values, which indicate the quality of an aircraft in a specific design aspect. On
the other hand, the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness could be expressed in
the form of numbers of specific sorties, targets, and aircraft. The aircraft life cycle cost
together with aircraft operational measures of effectiveness could then indicate the op-
erational cost measures of effectiveness in terms of cost per specific sortie, target, and
aircraft. Procedures to assess these measures of performance and effectiveness were then
developed, as follows:
I. ) Measures of aircraft performance assessment:The susceptibility, vulnerability, and
survivability design aspects could be individually predicted in the forms of proba-

bility values. On the other hand, the reliability and maintainability were predicted
in the forms of failure rate and defect man-hour rate per flying hour. However,
the aircraft measures of performance for reliability and maintainability could be
evaluated in the form of probability values during the evaluation of the aircraft
operational measures of effectiveness. The assessmentmethodologies in this study
were simplified due to restriction of data, information, assessmentmethods, and
research time-scale limits. However, the assessmentmethodologies were sufficient
to meet the project objectives.
II. ) Integration of the aircraft measures of performance: One method to combining
probability values was to use the reliability block diagram, together with the event
tree diagram. This process combines and evaluates the success probability of a
specific event in the mission simulation. However, the results from these methods
Discussion
were still in the form of probability values.
III. ) The aircraft operational and operational cost measures of effectivenessevaluation:

Mission simulation was used to measure the aircraft operational and operational
cost-effectivenessin the forms of the numbers of specific sorties, targets, and air-
craft. The simulation transforms the probability values into the required formats.
Additionally, with the results from both the modified life cycle cost and the mission
simulation, the aircraft operational cost-effectivenesscould also be expressedin the

appropriate forms. To accurately achieve the numbers of specific sorties, targets,
and aircraft, the Monte Carlo simulation technique was applied. This method can
a
evaluate number of aircraft in the specific events of the mission. This leads to the
evaluation of the remaining required numbers of sorties, targets, and aircraft.
Due to the research time-scale limits, only the aircraft measures of performance were
optimised, instead of the aircraft design parameters and variables. The results could
however, be used as guidelines for design of combat aircraft for operational and cost-
effectiveness. Further developments are also required and will be clarified later in this
chapter.
9.2 Validation and Discussion of Susceptibility As-

sessment
9.2.1 RCS Validation
One of the objectives in this study was to develop a simple susceptibility assessment tool
to help in the prediction of an aircraft probability of detection (PD) through the aircraft
RCS. The difference between the RCS predicted by this assessment sub-module and the
published RCS for the F-117 aircraft was extremely small, unlike that for the B-2 aircraft
(approximately 26% error). The reasons are:
1. The external shape of B-2 is more complicated to divide into simple geometrical
shapes than the external shape of F-117. This is due to the rounded edges and the
curvature of the top view of the B-2. These estimation and assumption for the B-2
were therefore, less accurate than for the F-117.
2. The effect of radar absorbing material (RAM) is also neglected in this study. There-
fore, the B-2 RCS predicted by the assessmentsub-module is approximately 25%
9. Discussion 122
higher than the published value.
3. There is no information about the radar system, or the specific radar wave frequency,
used to evaluate the published RCS values. The default radar wave frequency used
in this assessment sub-module was 5.6 GHz based on an average SAM acquisition
radar system, but this might be different from that used in the published B-2 and
F-117 RCS evaluation.
9.2.2 Susceptibility Assessment
Considering only the external geometrical shape, the U-99 RCS in the front view has the
lowest value, compared to the remaining 5 views, because the radar wave incident angles
coming from the front view are smaller than from the other aircraft views with the same
geometrical size and shape. Therefore, the radar signal reflecting from the front view
is less than the other aircraft views. On the other hand, the U-99 RCS in the top and
bottom views are the largest because of their geometrical shapes (assumed as flat plates)
and large incident angle (approximately 90°).
The manoeuvrability probability option 2 has been set as default becausethe percent-
ages of each aircraft view in every flight phase are more sensible and appropriate to the
U-99 case study aircraft specification (more details see Chapter 6), compared to options
1 and 5. Additionally, the differences of susceptibility results between using option 2,3,
and 4 are, on average, negligible in comparison to the results using option 1 or 5 (see
Table E. 1). The susceptibility assessmentresults corresponding to option 5 achieve the
optimum average RCS in this study because of the high percentage of front view and no
view appearance of the top and bottom views during the attack phase, so the attitudes
limit detection probability. This option may be applied in the case where the aircraft
exhibits high manoeuvrability, to reduce the probability of exposing vulnerable views.

The aircraft probability of detection (PD) for this study was predicted by using pre-
calculated signal-to-noise ratios (S/N), in conjunction with the default assumedprobabil-

ity of false alarm (Ps) to derive PD from one of the two available pre-calculated charts [24]
.
The probability of detection considering the scintillation effect against signal-to-noise ratio
with variations of P,, (see Fig. 3.4) has been chosen to predict the U-99 PD for this study.
The scintillation, or multiple continuous illuminations as seen by radar, is produced by
RCS variation with a period in the order of one second.
9. Discussion 123
The results predicted by using this method are inexact, yet adequate, because the
graph trends in the chart used for this study (with scintillation effect) appear to be con-
stant over the maximum and the minimum scales in the chart. Additionally, the PD
varies very little over the maximum and the minimum S/N regions. A further considera-
tion is that the methodology is to be used for consistent comparisons of different aircraft
configurations, where absolute accuracy is less important than relative accuracy.
9.3 Discussion of Vulnerability Assessment

Regarding threat analysis in this study, two major threat types have been used to en-
counter the U-99 in the mission simulation; i. e. penetrator or contact warhead, and
proximity warhead. An aircraft MOP for vulnerability on encounter with penetrators is

the probability of kill
The probability of aircraft kill on encounter with a single random penetrator varies
with the total aircraft vulnerable area, which is the sum of the vulnerable areas of Non-
Redundant critical components. Therefore, an aircraft P,t will be decreased by making
critical components redundant. For example, the U-99 P, in the top/bottom view reduces
by nearly 83% if all fuel tanks can be considered as redundant critical components.
A second possible P, reduction method has been discovered by using reconfiguration
t
of critical component layout. However, this method does not necessarily always reduce
an aircraft P1 depending upon how, and which critical components are reconfigured. In
,
the case that an overlapped area of more than one critical component exists, an aircraft
P, variations can occur as follows:
I. ) Overlapped area of redundant critical components: This overlapped area will in-
creasethe number of non-redundant critical components regardless of shielding and

non-shielding effects of the front redundant critical component of the overlapped
area. Consequently, the total vulnerable areas increase and also P,; respectively.
However, an aircraft P,,, using the front redundant critical component of the over-
lapped area as a shield (shielding effect) is still, yet slightly, less than the one
without the shielding effect. The shielding effect can decrease P« more if the front
critical component of the overlapped area increases its shielding capacity.
II. ) Overlapped area of non-redundant critical components with non-shielding effect:

An aircraft P1 usually decreasesbecause the total vulnerable areas also decreases,
9. Discussion 124
even if the number of non-redundant components increase. The main reason is that
the presented areas of the overlapped critical components reduce by the presented
areas of the intersection. This leads to a reduction of the vulnerable areas of one of
the intersected non-redundant critical components.
III. ) Overlapped area of non-redundant critical components with shielding-effect: The
shielding effect of the front critical component in the overlapped area reduced the
overlapped area PK by decreasing PK of the shielded critical components. This can
be made more efficient by reconfiguration of the critical component layout in the
overlapped area, in which the lower PK critical component is positioned in front of

the higher PIScritical component. This is an explanation of the fact that the U-99
PISin the rear view is lower than in the front view because of shielding effects.
IV. ) Overlapped area of redundant and non-redundant critical components: This kind
of overlapped area, either with or without the shielding effect, cannot be used to
directly judge whether the total vulnerable areas increase or decrease. It depends
on how many non-redundant critical components are involved, how large are the
intersections, and how the critical components are positioned. More details and full
investigation are required in this case.
The principle of the reduction of an aircraft lethal radius is to reduce the detonation
distance of the proximity warhead, where is delivers as P,, value of 0.5 to the aircraft.
An aircraft lethal radius can be thus reduced by the same way as described above (recon-
figuration of the critical component layout). More details about lethal radius have been
shown in Appendix E.
9.4 Validation and Discussion of Reliability &

Maintainability Assessment
The aircraft MOP for reliability used in this study is the total aircraft failure rate (FR),
which was predicted by the 2 different methods developed for this design methodology;
i. e. the combination and functionality methods.
During the development of the combination method, the best fitting mathematical
model was investigated to predict the highest and the lowest aircraft system failure rate.
The results in the previous chapter show that the highest and the lowest aircraft system FR
9. Discussion 125
could be predicted from available reliability data sets by using statistical linear regression
based on the 6 most major R&M related design parameters, and engineering judgement;
i. e. We, Ne, Alt, Wa, H, and Thrust.
The most complete reliability data sets available consisted of 13 - 15 major critical-
failure systems. Most aircraft of the available data sets have 13 systems. Considering the
failure rate distribution of each aircraft from the available reliability data sets, most air-
craft failure rates follow the Pareto distribution, with a portion of 40: 70 40: 80. Therefore,
-
the constant number of 13 major critical failure components and 40: 70 Pareto distribu-
tion portion were set as the default values used to predict the aircraft MOP for reliability
(total aircraft failure rate).
In conjunction with the available reliability data sets, based on aircraft empty weight, a
Technology Improvement Factor (TIF) was discovered. Most aircraft reliability predicted
by the combination method with this developed TIF are closer to the actual aircraft
FR, especially data collected after the year 1985. Unfortunately, there was very limited
reliability data for unmanned air vehicles (UAV); therefore, the TIF developed for this
type of aircraft was based the results of U-99 and U-3 I'71 FR predictions from
only on
both the combination and functionality methods.
Another simple FR prediction model was also developed, based on the last 2 available
reliability data in
sets, conjunction with the other 2 almost complete reliability data sets.
The failure rates predicted from this model were more approximate, yet less complicated
to use than the failure rates predicted from the combination method.
Using a similar approach, to an aircraft FR prediction, one of the aircraft MOPS for
maintainability, namely defect man-hour rate (DMHR), could also be predicted by using
the same principle as the highest and the lowest FR predictions. 6 major design para-
meters, in conjunction with assumed 13 major critical maintained systems, and also the
40:70 Pareto distribution portion were applied for the DMHR prediction. Unfortunately,
there were not sufficient maintainability data to develop the TIF, and a more accurate
functionality model. This meant that the average difference of DNIHR predicted from the
combination and the functionality methods was larger than the average difference of the
FR predictions.
9. Discussion 126
9.5 Validation and Discussion of Life Cycle Cost

Estimation
The aircraft LCC predicted by the LCC estimation sub-module in this study is quite
good becauseit has very small differences between the LCC predicted by this sub-module
and LCC quoted from both published sources and a commercial program, as shown in
Chapter 8. The LCC estimation model for this study was based on previous work with
validation in some parameters, and sub-modules based on restricted literature.

The aircraft LCC comprises several costs over the entire aircraft life time. One of these
costs is the total operational cost, which includes all necessary expense to operate and
support an aircraft fleet on one base for the entire aircraft life. This cost can therefore,
be averaged over both the total number of operational aircraft and total flying hours. By
this approach, the total operational cost per aircraft over a specific mission duration can
be thus calculated by multiplying the average operational cost per aircraft per flying hour
and the total aircraft flying hours. The summation of all operational aircraft operation
costs gives the total operational costs for the entire fleet on one base.
The operation cost predicted from the LCC estimation sub-module for the wartime sce-
nario is less than for peacetime scenario due to excluding additional costs during wartime.
These are aircraft lost cost, weapons releasedexpense,and auxiliary maintenance and sup-
port. In this methodology, only the aircraft lost cost and weapons releasedexpense, which
are evaluated directly in the mission simulation, are taken into account, and added into
the total operation cost. This makes the total operational cost in this study more sensible.
9.6 Discussion of Operation Simulation

Most of the aircraft MOPs are in the form of probability values; therefore, a reliability
block diagram was developed in conjunction with an event tree diagram to predict the
successprobability for each flight phase in a sortie. They considered all possible occurring
events in each flight phase. Some unpredictable or more complexly evaluated values in this
study were, however, randomly generated. The successprobability for each flight phase
was used to indicate to which event an aircraft would proceed; such as aircraft being
killed, the target being killed, and aircraft completing the flight phase. The number of
specific sorties, targets, and aircraft could therefore be precisely determined in the form of
realistic integer numbers. By this approach, the flying hours of every operational aircraft,
9. Discussion 127
or in service time, could be recorded and be used to predict the operational cost for the
entire mission simulation.

The Monte Carlo simulation technique was applied, with the aim of producing more
accurate prediction results. This technique was based on statistical analysis, and the
predicted result accuracy depends upon both the number of trials and the range of the
predicted results. This process was very time consuming and demanded high computa-
tional power and performance. A number of trials were thus investigated to discover the
optimum trial number to achieve sufficiently reliable predicted results. The number of
200 trials was found to be suitable and was used as the default in this study. This is the
main reason for the fluctuations, discontinuity curves, and overlapped intervals in some
of results shown in the previous chapter.
9.7 Discussion of Aircraft Measures of Performance

on the Operational and Operational Cost Mea-
sures of Effectiveness
As shown in Table 8.15 - 8.17 in previous chapter, increase aircraft individual and/or
several MOPs mostly leads to decrease total number of specific sorties and targets. The
main reason is that the total service time (flying hours) and total number of weapons
released for entire fleet during mission simulation reduce The reduction ratio of total
specific sorties and targets depends on the combination of aircraft MOPs, which leads to
earlier abort, additional aircraft lost, and/or aircraft lost in earlier sortie and operational
day. The followings show the major combinations of aircraft MOPs and their effects on
the total number of specific sorties and targets:
I. ) Aircraft with low vulnerability and susceptibility probabilities: The total number
of specific sorites and target slightly reduces.
II. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability probability and low susceptibility probability: The
total number of specific sorties and targets also sightly reduces due to that additional
aircraft being killed takes places in later sortie and/or operational day.
III. ) Aircraft with low vulnerability probability but high susceptibility probability: The
total number of specific sorties and target reduces due to that additional aircraft
being killed takes places in earlier sortie and/or operational day.
9. Discussion 128
IV. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability and susceptibility probabilities: The total number
of specific sorties and targets significant reduces due to that additional aircraft
being killed happens more and takes places in earlier sortie and/or operational day.
V. ) Aircraft with high defect arising rate, which represent reliability: The total number
of specific sorties and target mostly reduce due to that aircraft abort their mission
often and spend their most of the time in maintenance.
VI. ) Aircraft with high vulnerability and survivability probabilities associate with high
defect arising rate and mean time to repair: The total number of specific sorties
and targets significant reduces due to that aircraft abort their mission often and
additional aircraft lost also take place in earlier sortie and operational day.
The effect of the combinations of aircraft MOPS on the total operational cost, on the
other hand, increase or give in the opposite direction as the effects on the total number of
specific sorties and target due to mainly that additional lost significant increase the total
operational cost. Unfortunately, an average operation & support cost per flying hour per
aircraft calculated directly from the aircraft life cycle cost in this research includes also the
maintenance cost; therefore, reduction in total service time (flying hours) of entire fleet
due to longer maintenance requirement leads to reduction of operation & support cost
during the mission simulation. This reduction makes not much sense; therefore, further
study to separate the maintenance cost from average operation & support cost per flying
hour has to be performed in the future work.
9.8 Discussion of Optimisation Results Relative to

the Operational and Cost-Effectiveness
The optimisation results are used as examples of this design methodology, specifically
applied to the U-99 case study. Two alternative optimisation methods were shown in the
previous chapter.
The results from both optimisation methods show that the U-99 could achieve max-
imum sorties flown or targets killed if the U-99 obtains very low PD and defect arising
rate, as shown in Table 8.18 - 8.19. The total number of sorties flown and targets killed
could also increase if the U-99 vulnerability probability decreased.
9. Discussion 129
A similar approach to optimise the total number of specific sorties and targets, the
operational cost MOEs can also be minimised by using the same principle. Additionally,
these costs could supplementally reduce by decreasing MTTR and DMHR.

Regarding LCC results shown in Table 8.12, the operation cost from aircraft LCC was
averaged over the total operational aircraft in one base in conjunction with the number
of annual flying hours and the total number of aircraft life time. Therefore, the operation
cost of U-99, F-16 and Eurofighter could not be directly compared due to their difference
in number of operational aircraft in one base, annual flying hours, and total number of
entire aircraft life time.
9.9 Future Work

Due to the limited research time scale, restriction of data, information, and assessment
methodology, several assumptions had to be made. This leads to the development of

simple assessments. The results from these assessmentsare therefore approximate, but
sufficient, to show trends as discussed above. However, to increase the accuracy of this
design methodology, further developments are still required, and will be discussed below.
In this study, only the radar signature has been taken into account for the evaluation
of aircraft probability of detection. This can only be used for specific threat types. Other
aircraft signatures, namely the infrared signature and optics signature, should also be
taken into account to cover most threat types currently used.
The radar cross section prediction method in this study was based only on the aircraft
external shape. This method may not be sufficient to predict RCS of the new generation
of combat aircraft which use more radar absorbing material. Therefore, the effects of
the radar absorbing material has to be considered within the assessmentmethodology.
Additionally, the aircraft external shape partition method used in this study is quite
simple, but it may be improved with the assistanceof a CAD program.

The limited research time scale, and a wide-range of design aspect assessmentmethod-
ologies developed for this study, meant that the probability of detection was determined
directly from pre-calculated charts. To improve prediction accuracy, the probability of
detection could be calculated more quickly by using computational methods, which would
require an extra sub-module due to the complexity of the equations.

The manoeuvrability probability used in this study is quite a simple model, based
9. Discussion 130
on assumed and logical values. To assessthese values is quite difficult during the early
design stage. However, further research and investigation to assessthis value should be
continued.
The vulnerable area assessmentmodel developed for this study uses simple graphical
methods to predict the critical components and aircraft presented areas, by overlapping a
generated grid over a graphic image. A semi-automatic grid counter has been developed.
The values predicted by this method are approximate due to round edges and limited
detail in the graphic image. More detailed use of CAD is another possibility to improve
the accuracy of the presented areas predictions.

The maintainability assessmentmodel used in this study uses assumed default values,
due to the limited research time scale and restricted data. This assessmentmethodol-
ogy should be further researched and developed the relationship between reliability and
maintainability in the mission simulation.
To achieve more accurate prediction results using the Monte Carlo simulation tech-
nique, requires much computational time on high performance computers. An alternative

method to reduce time consumption is to use computational parallelisation, which allows
one application to use several processorssimultaneously.
In this study, either operational or operational cost-effectiveness can be optimised.
To extend the design methodology for combining optimisation of operational and cost-
effectiveness, further development in optimisation has to be performed. The multiobjec-
tive optimisation technique is one of the alternatives to be studied.
Expansion of optimisation feedback could also be improved. The feedback variables
used in this study are in the form of aircraft MOPs, which cannot be used directly at the
vehicle level of design. Therefore, further developments of every sub-module should allow
the conversion of the aircraft MOPs to fundamental aircraft design parameters. By this
approach, the results from optimisation can be used in the conceptual and/or preliminary
design stages.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
This combat aircraft design methodology for operational and cost effectiveness has been
developed with the aim of integrating all fundamental aircraft design aspects and the
operation simulation into the early design stage. The aircraft design aspects included
in this design methodology are susceptibility, vulnerability, reliability, maintainability,
manoeuvrability, and life cycle cost. An aircraft will be considered as a sub-system of
an overall system representing an entire operation scenario. By this approach, aircraft
measures of performance for an individual design aspect can be evaluated in the form
of probability values. Therefore, aircraft operational effectiveness can be measured in

the forms of number of specific sorties, targets, and aircraft remaining; such as total
number of successful sorties, number of targets killed, and number of aircraft killed. Due
to the aircraft life cycle cost prediction, aircraft operational cost-effectiveness can be
thus measured in the forms of both total cost of and cost per specific sortie, target, or
aircraft loss. The results in the form of either operational or operational cost measures of
effectiveness indicate which aircraft design aspects have to be considered further and/or
can be sacrificed to achieve the optimum objective function.

The method used to evaluate the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness from
the aircraft measuresof performance is through the use of the reliability block diagrams in
conjunction with the event tree diagram, in the mission simulation. With the assistanceof
the Monte Carlo simulation technique, the aircraft operational measures of effectiveness
can be more accurately predicted.

An aircraft measure of performance for susceptibility is represented by the aircraft
probability of detection. A simple aircraft probability of detection assessmentmethod,

developed in this research,is to use the pre-calculated aircraft radar crosssection indirectly
to determine the probability of detection value from published charts. An aircraft radar
cross section prediction method in this study is based only on the aircraft external shape.
The aircraft probability of kill represents an aircraft measure of performance for the
vulnerability design aspect. The principle assessmentof this value is to predict and sum
131
10. Conclusions 132
the vulnerable areas of non-redundant critical components. The influence of reconfigura-

tion of the non-redundant and redundant critical components layout has been discovered
and can be used to vary the probability of kill. An alternative measure of performance
for vulnerability on encounter with a proximity warhead is that the lethal radius can also
be varied by the same principle.
The measure of aircraft performance for manoeuvrability has been introduced as
weighting factors, defining the percentage of aircraft view appearing to the threat en-
counter direction. These values directly influence the aircraft performance in survivability
because each aircraft view obtains separate probabilities of kill and of detection value.
Alternative reliability and maintainability assessments developed in this research are
based on statistical analysis cooperating with the Pareto principle, by using historical,
published and unpublished data. This method predicts the aircraft reliability and main-
tainability using the fundamental aircraft design parameters, instead of details of all
aircraft components. Additionally, another possible method is to assess these values is by
using the relationship between both the reliability and maintainability and the aircraft
empty weight.
The operational cost during a wartime scenario throughout the mission simulation can
be estimated via aircraft life cycle cost. Finding the operation cost per aircraft per flying
hour is the main objective of this sub-module. This cost can be evaluated by averaging
the total operation cost over the number of operational aircraft in one base and total
flying hours for the aircraft entire life time. By considering the number of flying hours,
together with weapons released, and aircraft being killed during the mission simulation,
the total operational cost can be determined.
The optimisation methods used in this researchare the gradient-based method and the
genetic algorithms. Both methods have been used in this study, firstly to evaluate only
the optimum solutions either for operational effectivenessor operational cost-effectiveness.
Due to the optimisation feedback variables in the forms of aircraft MOPs, the solutions
from the optimisation can be usedjust to indicate the design direction to fulfill the selected
objective function.
By increasing an individual aircraft MOP, the operational MOEs mostly reduce in
different inclination depending on which aircraft MOP has been considered. However,
by combine several aircraft MOPs, the reduction inclination may increase or decrease
10. Conclusions 133
depending also on which and how the aircraft MOPS have been combined. On the other
hand, the effects on the operational cost MOEs are mostly opposite as the effect on the
operational MOEs.
For the unmanned air vehicle, U-99, used as a case study in this research, the prob-
ability of detection and defect arising rate are the most appropriate parameters to be
considered for both maximum operational MOEs and minimum operational cost MOEs.
The next most appropriate parameters are probability of kill, followed by probability of
hit. Additional appropriate parameters are MTTR and DIVIHR.
Additionally, some alternative trade-offs with the aircraft MOPs to improve the opera-
tional and operational cost MOEs can also be examined with these developed applications.
However, there are still some improvements, further development and research re-
quired to extend this design methodology, such as increased accuracy of aircraft MOPS
assessment,and application of multiobjective optimisation. It should be made possible
to use target values of aircraft MOPS to drive aircraft design parameters, such as span,
mass etc, to optimised aircraft configurations.

CHAPTER 11
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study, several assumptions, constraints, and simple models have been applied, due
to the researchtime scale, restricted data, and assessmentmethodology. The following are
some recommendations, which should be performed to improve this design methodology.
1. Improvement of RCS prediction models to consider the effect of the radar absorbing
material.
2. Development of the methodology to include the assessmentof an aircraft's infrared
signature in order to improve the aircraft's probability of detection assessment

methodology.
3. Development or improvement of the manoeuvrability probability assessmentmethod-
ology.
4. Improvement of the optimisation to consider more than one objective function.
5. Improvement on all sub-modules to convert the aircraft MMMIOPs

back to the funda-
mental aircraft design parameters.
134
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APPENDIX A
RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM AND EVENT
TREE CALCULATION METHODS
Due to several sub-events can be occur after each other or conditional in an event; there-
fore, the reliability block diagram (RBD) will be used to group those sub-events and the
event tree diagram will be applied to evaluate each sub-event and event probability values.
In this appendix, the probability concept will be firstly introduced, then the funda-
mental of the reliability block diagram and of the event trees will be briefly described.
A. Probability Concept
The probability has a strict technical meaning and is a scientific `measure of chance', i. e.,
the probability indicates quantitatively the likelihood of an event or events. It can be
indicated as a numerical value between zero, which defines an absolute impossibility, to
defines [71.
unity, which an absolute certainly
Each event or events will have at least two possible outcomes, one of which can be
consideredas the favourable outcome or successand the other as the unfavourable outcome
or failure. For an event that has more than two outcomes, it is possible to group together
those outcomes which can be called favourable or successesand those which can be called
unfavourable or failures.
A. 2 Reliability Block Diagram calculation

RBD is a diagrammatic representation of system in which each item is represented by a
box. The relationship between items is determined by the effect that the failure or success
of each one has on the functionality of the system as a whole. The total probability of
each system or each box is unity, which can be represented in numerical form as follows:
'success +1
Fellure -1 (A. 1)
There are two main principle to combine system with each others; i. e., series and
139
A. Reliability Block Diagram and Event Tree Calculation Methods 140
parallel. Additionally, some systems may contain a combination of more than one types.
A. 2.1 Series system
This type of combination has been shown in Fig. A. 1, which all sub-systems have to be
connected after each other. The consequence is that the system requirement for success
is so àll sub-systems' must be working. If one of sub-system in this type of combination
is failure, the entire system will be failure. The probability of system success can be thus
given as
PSystem PA 2)
= B success À.
success success'
AB
Figure A. 1: Two components series system
A. 2.2 Parallel system
Fig. A. 2 shows an example of this parallel combination system, in which all sub-systems
are connected parallel. In this case, the system requirement is that only one sub-system
needs to be working for system success. Or in other words, the entire system will be
failure, only if all sub-system are failure. The probability of system successcan be thus
obtained as the complement of the system failure or by using the expression of èither A
B
or or both' constitutes successto give
PSystem PA
-1- rSystein failure -1 failurerB failure
success
(1 PB (A. 3)
(1 - PAsuccess) -
-1- success)
Figure A. 2: Two components parallel system

A. 2.3 Series-parallel System
The general principle used is to reduce sequentially the complicated configuration by
combining appropriate series and parallel branches of the system until a single equivalent
sub-system remains. This equivalent sub-system then represents the entire system of the
original configuration.
A. 3 Event Trees
An event tree is a pictorial representation of all the events which can occur in a system.
It is defined as a tree because the pictorial representation gradually fans out like the
branches of a tree as an increasing number of events are considered [7].
With any system, in which the operation of a particular sub-system is dependent on
the successor failure of another sub-system, the sequenceof events must be considered
in the chronological order, in which they occur.
IcI°IE
ý'
-S
-S
-S
-S
-F
J-F
8-S
9-S
10. F
11-S
12. F
13-F
Figure A. 3: Reduced Event Tree Sample
Fig A. 3 shows a reduced event tree of a system of five components. This is deduced
by considering each sub-system or event with considering of outcome deduction, that
can be made before each new sub-system or event is considered. If, at each of these
deductions, it is known that a particular outcome is reached by a path irrespective whether
subsequentsub-systems or events are successfulor not, there is no need to consider further

development of this event path. The successprobability of this deduced system can be
evaluated as
PSystem PPath Ppath

= rPath I+ 2+ rPath 4+ 5+p path 8+p path 9+P path 11
success
PA + PA
success rB successrC success success rB success
rC failure rD
success
PA + PA 'B
rB failuref C success failure' C failure rD rE
success success success success
PA 41A PC
failure rB success rC success
rD
success failure rB success successf D failure-'E success T
PA
failure' B successrC failure' D success
APPENDIX B
SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT MODULE
This appendix will explain and show flowchart, algorithms, program dialogs and results
of survivability assessmentmodule, which can be split into two main sub-modules; sus-
ceptibility assessmentand vulnerability assessmentmodules.
In the real program procedure, the vulnerability assessment module has to be first
separately executed to determine presented areas of aircraft; therefore, the probability of

hit or of fuse, when aircraft is detected, can be consequently evaluated from the suscep-
tibility assessment module. With manoeuvrability probability, which is represented by
weighting factors for each flight phase in a sortie, and uniform random of hits or explosion
distance, an average survivability probability in each flight phase can be thus assessed as
shown in Fig. B. 1.
Non-Explosive E: wnal c plo.

rnm
av.
Calculw=
method
Random mmbc RG dthot. nam

of shots dufancao Shoe Box Catc al u.
method
Thanba of hgs II Mimb z of

6a`tnmu
---ý Av probabiLly Accnß loh probaDJUy

7 PrmWoWbýDt9
Dy n g", Pb'se in Ihsht plr e
! G¢=11Y 11 0
by
le Das
Probabday of ht
m &CM pIao.
Probab bty of
ddaUon m flight
A. C. A U Mc f loll
prob bAty n 1LgM p ob. bdny 5 04
lh- p0ase
Probablty of
Pwobabldy of cdemot
nuo-ccplozrvatlvmt ti et mcour4
eviouvo
encounter
Armft- vv bsbty
probabiLty m VgtA ph e
Figure B. 1: Flowchart of survivability assessmentmodule
143
B. Survivability AssessmentModule 144
B. 1 Susceptibility Assessment Module

In this module, the probability of detection and probability of hit or of fuse, when aircraft
get detected, are the main results. The probability of detection for each aircraft view
can immediately determined, but for the probability of hit or of fuse evaluation needs to
obtain aircraft presented areas from vulnerability assessmentmodule before the actual
determination can start. The flowchart of this module can be shown in Fig. B. 2.
Start
Separate external shape

NO Load
into several sunpte
Qe"
geometrical shapes
[ From view ] values
YES
/ý Open default Me
Ingot data for simple
geometrical al shapes /ý
[ Front view ]
Input radar
performance
-- ------ /// II[ lip z Weighting facto 2

Calculate s[ Preflight
Distance to target pknse ]
Radar Cross Sect im
[ Preflight phase] Front view ]
Ca1CuLrte CaICut]te
Sýsr. 1-To-Noise ratio Stgrýal-To-Nose ratio
( Front view J (Prell gLt Phase J
Load pre-calculated
gmpb
Select probabtbty of Select probabhty of

detection detection
[ Front v, ew [ Pref o) t phase ]
Figure B. 2: Flowchart of probability of detection prediction
Input variables for each aircraft view for this module can be loaded directly from
default files or be given direct in the program dialog.
B. 1.1 Radar Cross Section Prediction
This module mainly calculates the aircraft RCS and the false alarm probability and shows
these values in the dialog (Fig. B. 4). All simple shape data of the aircraft external
in
geometry all six aircraft views and radar performance can be either loaded from a data
B. Survivability Assessment Module 145
file or filled directly in this application dialog page. Consequently, the aircraft RCS in
each view can be thus determined.
oad Deafult atore Data RCS & Show Graphs Fxlt

;
Aircraft Radar Mission
Model U-99 Vie-Positron ' FRONT

,
[ Number of Parts :8 ------
Aircraft RCS -22 1452 dB
Arcraf RCS 0.00610207 m2
r dB
Part Number [ONE RCS -34.1629
RCS 1 0.000383448
Part Type m2
SPHERE .º
0 233 SHARP EDGE Area j
Length m m2
Rados I DIHEDRAL ---m Cone Angie [

0.09
Angle 32.88 Deg Angle 20-- Deg
Figure B. 3: Susceptibility assessment dialog
Table B. 1 B. 3 show the results of front view radar cross section calculation from three
-
different aircraft by using AN/FPS-16 radar system, which has approximate frequency of
5 GHz, to represent the general frequency of Hight Finder, Aircraft, SAM transportable,
and SAM mobile radar systems [51]
Table B. 1: Results of F-117 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility
assessment module
Part number Simple shape Duplication RCS [m`]
1 Flat plate 2 0.00007246
2 Flat plate 2 0.00004680
3 Flat plate 2 0.00000400
4 Flat plate 2 0.00003193
5 Flat plate 2 0.00000131
6 Flat plate 2 0.00006247
7 Flat plate 2 0.00000063
8 Flat plate 2 0.01224193
9 Flat plate 2 --0.00000000
10 Sharp edge 2 0.00000204
11 Sharp edge 2 0.00000072
Total 0.02492856
- -
Table B. 2: Results of B-2 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility
assessmentmodule
Part number Simple shape Duplication RCS [m ]
1 Ogive 1 0.04706017
2 Flat plate 2 0.00000557
3 Sharp edge 2 0.00001179
4 Blunt edge 2 0.02369229
5 Blunt edge 2 0.01579467
6 Sharp edge 2 0.000010057
7 Sharp edge 2 0.00001110
8 Sharp edge 2 0.00001179
Total - - 0.12613468
Table B. 3: Results of U-99 front view radar cross section calculation from susceptibility
assessment module
Fart number bimple shape L)uplication 1tub [m`]
.
1 Blunt edge 2 0.00038345
2 Blunt edge 2 0.00076690
3 Blunt edge 2 0.00051126
4 Blunt edge 2 0.00060282
5 Blunt edge 2 0.00076690
6 Sharp edge 2 0.00000967
7 Sharp edge 2 0.00000796
8 Sharp edge 2 0.00000208
Total - - 0.00610207
B. 1.2 Probability of Detection Estimation
As described in chapter 3, the PD is a function of S/N and P,,; therefore, the both necessary
parameters have to be firstly evaluated. The Pn is a direct function of radar threshold

from Eqn. (3.17). The threshold can be loaded from default file or be directly filled in
the dialog application. On the other hand, the S/N depends upon several parameters;
one of them is distance between aircraft and radar system, which is subject to flight
phase. Another influential parameter is aircraft RCS, which depends on the aircraft view.
With the aircraft being seen view probability (manoeuvrability probability) and distance
between aircraft and opponent radar system in each flight phase, an average S/N can be
thus evaluated.
Once, the necessary parameters for the average aircraft detection probability in each
flight phase in a mission sortie determination have been calculated, the user has to in-
terpolate value from the pre-calculated graph to receive the probability of detection (see
Grdph For [Vd[Udtion Probabilit y of Detection
. ýoauairv or sA M. UAM-P. Jeve Data close

rr
rr
w. " .- View
wr
rr Fhg1 Phase
rr
PREFLIGHT PHASE
-
ft. *
a »r 'y
Show Giaphl Show Gieph
r wdh Sc. wik i Sc.
Wa
ww Pn Value
ww iv ' 3 72665e-006
aw
Im SM V due n dB
- 30 -0 1
6D Pd Value
ar
_ 0
ý " it wvu. c u
ao"
i
syw-toww. . *+a.
Figure B. 4: Graph for evaluation detection probability dialog
Fig. B. 4). By using the same principle, the detection probability of each aircraft view in
each flight phase can therefore determined.
Table B. 4: Results of U-99 probability of detection in attack flight phase of manoeuvra-

bility option 2 with P = 3.72665 x 10-6
View RCS [dBm ] S/N [dBm ] Pv1ev, PD
Top 64.4827 79.1151 0.15 0.99
,:
Right -4.8218 0.15 --0.006
-19.4542
Left -4.8218 0.15 --0.006
-19.4542
Front -7.5128 0.40 --0.001
-22.1452
Rear 0.6854 15.3178 0.00 ,: 0.65
Bottom 64.4827 79.1151 0.15 --0.99
Total 59.2539 73.8863 - --0.98
B. 1.3 Probability of hit or of fuse Evaluation
This application dialog offers two models to evaluate the probability of hit or of fuse, when
aircraft is detected; i. e. Shoe-Box and Carlton (details see Chapter 3). Fig. B. 5 shows
the program procedure to evaluate this value by using uniform random miss distance and
statistical analysis.
The probability of hit or fuse, when aircraft is detected, depends on aircraft presented
area; therefore, PH, for each aircraft view has to be separately evaluate (see Fig. B. 6).
D
B. Survivability Assessment :Module I las
Presented area
[ Front view ]
Create random
miss distances
Probability of hit by Probability of hit by

Shoe Box method Carlton method
[ Front view ][ Front vnew ]
Weighting Factors
[ Preflight phase ]
Probability of hit by Iýýý Probability of hit by

Shoe Box method Carlton method
[ Preflight phase ][ JI Preflight phase ]
Figure B. 5: Flowchart of probability of hit (Ieteri»inatioii
On the other hand, PF7Dwill obtain value 1.0 because after the proxiiiiit. v warhead deto-
Hates, the fragments encounter directly aircraft, which can he treated as multiple hits by
penetrators (more details see Section 3.1.3).
B. 2 Vulnerability Assessment Module

This module calculates mainly the probability of aircraft kill given a single naiidoiii hit
and random multiple hits by contact warheads or penetrators. The flowchart, for the
vulnerability assessment module can he shown in Fig B. 7:

Input parameters have to be loaded frone stored files or directly given through the
dialog application; and also some condition for vulnerability estiiiiat. ioii have to be Selected
(sec Fig. B. 8)
B. 2.1 Critical and Overlapped Critical Components Definition
From the kill tree diagram, the critical components are identified; this ideiitificatioýiº ca»
be given by loading from default file or by completing in the application dialog. The
component redundancy can also obtain as the same way.

Load Deafult Store Data RCS & SIN calculation Show Graphs exit
Aircraft Radar I, Mission Miss Distance
Recalcuäho_
Number of Hits 20
Probability of Hit
FRONT CARLTON P 0644473
Aircraft Presented Area Radius 10.6451
Radius Sample Variance 29.6934
Radius Standard Deviation F- 31.2563
Figure B. 6: Application dialog for probability of hit determination
'l'abte ts. b: U-vv critical components list

Component Redundancy
Fuel system 5
Engine 2
Flight Control system (FCS) 2
Air Data (AD) 1
Control Unit (CU) 1
Global Positioning System (GPS) 1
With the shotline technique, overlapped critical components in each view can be iden-
tified as shown in Table B. 6.

With the definition as shown in Table B. 6, the presented areas, probability of kill of
these critical component overlapped area for each aircraft view can be evaluated as shown
in Fig. B. 9.
B. 2.2 Presented Area Prediction
In this module, there are three options to obtain aircraft, critical component, and over-
lapped presented areas; i. e. directly load from default file, directly input in the application
dialog, and semi-automatic grid counting.

Stet
4, YES No t<ea
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-
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CFtcdýt PýI
Figure B. 7: Flowchart of vulnerability assessmentmodule
Table B. 6: U-99 overlapped critical components list

No. Right/Left Front/Rear
1 FCSs + Tank No. 1 AD + Tank No. 1
2 Tank No. 1 + No.4 + No. 5 CU + Engine No. 1
3 Tank No.4 + No.5 GPS + Engine No. 2
4 Tank No.4 + No-5 + Engines FCS + Tank No. 3 + No. 5
5 Tank No. 1 + No.4 + No. 5 + Engines Tank No. 3 + No. 5
6 Tank No.2 + No. 3 + Engines FCS + Tank No. 2 + No.4
7 Tank No. 1 + No. 2 + No.3 Tank No. 2 + No.4
8 GPS + CU
9 Engine No. l + No.2
In the third option, information about aircraft and/or critical component presented
areas are not available either from default file or from drawing, a semi-automatic grid
counter option offers a simple alternative to count presented area of aircraft and/or critical
NewData LoadDef& Calculation ViewPosition Store Data ShowDrawrnq Exit

Aircraft I Moot ' Fu hic-idEffect Control System I Overlapped Component
v No ShieldEffect
Non Overlapped
Prepodefence
Model: U"99 Mission BOMBING Numberof HR r
PREFLIGHT_PHASE
CnaseSpeed
View in: TOP Tfieet: NON EXPLOSIVE "ý TOP 25 %
23016
CruiseAhude RIGHT 0
Seat: r0 - 0
Overlapped: 22192 LEFT 0
Tarn : ý- Prob.Of KA Aiaaft :I Attack Speed FRONT [ß%
241.5
En 2 TotalPresentArea 2562 Grid REAR !0%
. .j Attack Akihde
BOTTOM 04
ControlSystem: 5 TotalV rlnnable Area :0 Grid 7620
LethalRadius:j
NUM
Figure B. 8: Vulnerability assessment module application dialog
NewData LoadDefauk OverlappedArea Calculation Store Data ShowDrawnq Ext
Aircraft Pilot Fuel System Engine Coi TOP Overlapped Component

RIGHT
LEFT
FRONT
Overlapped. 9 VulerableAsea [ REAR m9 ßo. on Aircraft: 0.00249643
BOTTOM
OvedapedNunes : combine TOTAL Pk of TotalArea :0 13824
Area Pk
: IFCS
ManConponmd No: STARBOARD 8 08
1stComponent: FUEL SYSTEM No: ONE 027
2ndCompor FCS ZJ No: PORT 0.64

.
Id Component ZERO I I
w No: ZERO
4thComP
on:ºýº ZERO No. ZERO I0 I0
F0 0
: ZERO
5thComponert No: ZERO
Figure B. 9: Critical component overlapped area presented area tab dialog
components including overlapped areas in each aircraft view in Grid unit as shown in
Fig. B. 10. The generated grid can be resized; and the drawing can be moved and zoomed
to mark component and/or aircraft presented areas more precisely.

Araaf Model Resented

Area Vulnerable
Area UNIT PkA Hts se
u 99 no Gnd -ý J LoadDi&mg
G
i. - - .: TOP
IT0P Gnd
ýRCRAFT
-
Q GridSize
KKAL
Type
NmRe6x4&t
Figure B. 10: Semi-automatic Grid counting
B. 2.3 Transition Matrices Elaboration
In the vulnerability assessment module, transition matrix in each aircraft view is a very
importance functionality to evaluate the probability of kill by multiple hits of penetrators.
As described in Chapter 3, an aircraft can be examined in three main categories; i. e.
non-overlapped critical component, non-shielding effect overlapped critical component,
and shielding effect overlapped critical component. Fig. B. 11 B. 18 show the transition
-
matrices of case study aircraft U-99 in different views and categories.
B. 2.4 Lethal Radius Estimation
The lethal radius is one measure of aircraft vulnerability probability on encounter with a
proximity warhead. The expected number of fragments impacting on the aircraft depends
mainly on the detonation distance. It is assumed that all fragments (n) from the spray
zone, whose shotline are within the aircraft presented area (see Fig. 3.8), hit the aircraft.
The probability of kill given an encounter with this warhead is thus a function of the
detonation distance. If the detonation distance resulting enough fragments impacting on
the aircraft, such that the probability of kill is equal to 0.5. This distance will be defined
as lethal radius [s)
By using the same U-99 drawings as usual in the determination of the U-99 presented
areas for all 6 main aircraft views, the lethal radius of each U-99 view can be thus evaluated
firstly in grid units. Unfortunately, to display every U-99 view drawing in the same display
dialog, the drawings have to be either expanded or shrunk. Therefore, scale factors (see
Table B. 9) have to be applied to convert the grid units to metre units. Table B. 7 - B. 8
show the lethal radius of the U-99 in different critical component layouts, and also with
and without fuel system redundancy consideration.
Table B. 7: Lethal radius[m] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems
Table B. 8: Lethal radius[Grid] of U-99 with and without non-redundant fuel systems
The lethal radius can be read from graph between P,; and s as shown in Fig. B. 19.
Due to different scale of U-99 drawing in each view, the ratios of drawing grid in each
aircraft view to the actual size of U-99 have been investigate and shown, as in Table B. 9
Table B. 9: U-99 drawing *grid factor in six main aircraft views

Span Length
Grid Metre Factor Grid Metre Factor
Top/Bottom 57 7.8 0.136842 76 6.5 0.08552
Left/Right 82 7.8 0.095122 - - -
Front/Rear 75 6.5 0.08667
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Figure B. 19: Lethal radius estimation application dialog

APPENDIX C
RELIABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY
ASSESSMENT MODULE
This appendix shows and explains mainly how the reliability & maintainability assess-
ment module works. All regression equations and results from several models will be
additionally shown in this appendix.

Fig. C. 1 shows the flowchart of this module, which several prediction models for the
highest and the lowest reliability and maintainability measures can be chosen; such as
linear regression, exponential regression, Pareto distribution of 40:60 portion, of 40:70
portion, and direct linear equations.

The application offers two alternatives to initial variables; i. e. loading data from text
file or directly giving in the application dialog. Updating some data directly after loading
from default file is also another possibility to acquire the input data. Before an aircraft
reliability and maintainability are estimated, an aircraft type has to be chosen to select
an appropriate TIF for the combination method for reliability prediction (see chapter 4).
C. 1 Reliability Assessment Module

In this section, equations and prediction method of the third (functionality of aircraft
empty weight) and the fourth (combination method between linear regression and Pareto
distribution) reliability models are described. The fourth method has been used in this
design methodology, as shown in Reliability & Maintainability application dialog (see
Fig. C.2).
C. 1.1 Empty Weight Functionality Model
This model offers the simplest prediction method of aircraft reliability from four limit
data sets (1985,1987,1993, and 1996). Due to limit data and timescale to develop this
module, all data have been used to find an average failure rate prediction equation to
160
C. Reliability & Maintainability Assessment module 161
Start
NO Open Default File and

Load Default
Manual Input Data 16 Loaded Default Values
Values
Choose Desired > Defect Man-Hour Rate

Calculated Value
Choose Regression Choose Regression

Model Model
Choose Aircraft Choose Aircraft

Type Type
Show Show
Coefficients Coefficients
Calculate Highest Calculate Lowest Calculate Pareto's Calculate Highest Calculate Lowest Calculate Pazdo's
Value Value Distribution coefficient Value Value Distribution coefficient
b' 'b'
Develop Distnbution Develop Distribution
Summation Summation
Elements Elements
Figure C. 1: Flowchart of reliability & maintainability assessment module
cover all aircraft types and generations as shown in Table C. 1.
Table C. 1: Linear equations to predict aircraft failure rate in each data set
Data in Linear Equation
1985 FR(We) = 0.0726 " We + 0.268
1987 FR(We) = 0.0733 " We - 0.0844
1993 FR(We) = 0.0870 " We - 0.2776
1996 FR(WW) = 0.1372 " We - 0.7499
All sets FR(We) = 0.0666 " We + 0.0476
C. 1.2 Combination Model
As described in Chapter 4, this model contains following procedures (see Fig. C. 1):
1. Determination of the highest and the lowest FR via linear regression or exponential
Load Default Update Data calculate Store Qata lave ANData Exit
Variables & Equations' Details Reliability Assessment Maintainability Assessment
Model :; U 99 Unmanned_Awaatt _ý
No of Engines (Nei: [2 v Lnear Regression Logarithm Regression
EmptyWeight (We) : Pareto apply et - 100: 70% 60`:

3269 Kg
Coefficients
Total Thrust [TI: F--j§ 64 kN
bO- 518.6
Wing Area (Wa) : 2532 rn2 b1 - 19.656 b4 - -2 298e-002
b2 - 3.721 b5 - 59.411
Max Altitude (H(: 12192 m
b3 - -5.4422e-003 b6 - -1.87
Aircraft Hedgh (h) 1 55 m
Total FR/1000 FH Total DMHR/1000 FH Y. bO+ b1'h + b2'T + b3'We + b4'H . b5'Ne + b6'We
j- 298.679 123795
NUM
Figure C. 2: Reliability & Maintainability assessment application dialog
regression.
2. Evaluation of the Pareto distribution b coefficient.
3. Determine the FR distribution values of the rest 60% aircraft systems.
4. Sum all aircraft system FR
C. 1.2.1 Linear Regression Model
With this model, linear equations to evaluate the highest and the lowest failure rate from
several variables by using the linear regression analysis. The six aircraft design variables
are Thrust, We, H, Alt, NE, and W.

Only two full details data sets with anonymous aircraft name were available (data in
1985 and 1993). The first reliability data set was collected in middle of 90's and based on
the technology in that time, but the second data set was collected in early 20th century;
therefore, both data sets could not directly used with each other without any TIF. Due
to limit data and timescale, any development to integrate these two data sets could not
be done in this research.
The linear equations to predict the highest and the lowest aircraft component failure
rate can be here presented as follows:

1. Data from 1985: There were nine anonymous aircraft in this data set with design
variable data as shown in Table C. 2 and the highest and the lowest failure rate
linear regression equations are:
FR(100) =122.245 - 61.126 "H+2.299 Thrust + 0.0149 " VV + 0.00166. Alt

"
+125.517. NE-1.465" WQ (c.1)
FR(70) =90.896 - 1.806 "H-4.9641 " Thrust 0.0197. We + 0.04018 " Alt
-
-232.866"NE+15.88" WQ (C.2)
2. Data from 1993: Five anonymous aircraft, whose data have been shown in Table C. 3,
were given in unpublished data 141;therefore, the highest and the lowest linear
regression equations can be given:
FR(100) =49.442 + 76.511 "H- 30.247 " Thrust - 0.082 " WW+ 0.1962 " Alt
+1633.004"NE+89.427" Wa (C.3)
FR(70) =- 196.905- 16.280 "H-4.893 " Thrust - 0.0245. We + 0.0465 " Alt
211.153. NE + 17.958 " WQ (C.4)

-
Table C. 2: Aircraft design variable from Serahides L38I

A/C Thrust Empty Weight Height Altitude Engine Wing Area FR(100) FR(70)
B1 355.83 2540.2 8.28 19800 4 370 464.55 74.253
Fl 143.18 2650.0 5.97 18300 2 39 393.3 71.685
F2 186.82 3444.0 5.02 18300 2 49 471.48 57.394
Al 98.07 3565.0 4.95 12192 2 48 310.91 46.942
A2 64.94 3628.8 4.89 14000 2 24 248.86 38.251
ATR1 19.57 6387.0 2.69 14630 1 16 261.76 31.986
ATR2 24.03 7000.0 4.09 14630 1 17 99.048 20.455
F-104D 70.26 8978.0 4.11 17680 1 18.22 302.3 43.458
A-7D 63.40 10886.4 4.93 12192 1 34.83 236.95 37.868
Table C. 3: Aircraft design variable from unpublished data [41

A/C Thrust Empty Weight Height Altitude Engine Wing Area FR(100) FR(70)
GA1 Early 95.94 6139 3.63 15605 1 18.68 19.843 1.867
GA1 Late 95.6 7050 3.55 15240 1 21.37 117.98 13.767
Ti 23.13 3635 4 15240 1 16.9 2225.7 364.705
GA2 46.8 7000 4.89 14000 2 24.18 75.65 13.581
GA3 80.96 14502 5.95 21335 2 26.6 162.02 29.415
C.1.2.2 Exponential RegressionModel
This model is an alternative to predict the highest and the lowest failure rate by using
exponential regression analysis. The same six design variables have been used to evaluate
the FR(100) and FR(70), which can be given for two data sets as:
1. For data in 1985:
FR(100) =52.93115866.0.717544857H " 1.008068746Thrust" 1.000142602WW
. 1.000012logAlt " 3.132437067NE 0.991647611'° (C. 5)

"
FR(70) =8.87061032.0"994149478H " 1.004561319Tt""`st" 1.00005692We
Alt 1.625167302NE 0.994925813Wa
1.000017867 (C. 6)
. " "
2. For data in 1993:
FR(100) =9739866.727.0.913310811Thrust" 1.000980832W " 7.20193950811-
0.999151797Alt " 0.0000954549NE" 1.3005779011

va (C. 7)
FR(70) =11786500000.26.3778653H " 0.90033209Th`ru3t

" 1.0016021891v°
Alt 0.00000949137NE 1.078421347tiv°
0.998460316 (C. 8)
" " "
C.1.2.3 Pareto Distribution Model
Because the fourth method of aircraft failure rate prediction is using Pareto principle to
evaluate the whole aircraft failure rate; therefore, the real data of aircraft reliability has
to be investigated and proved that it follows this principle as shown in Fig. C.3.
Fig. C.4 shows that the comparison between the real highest failure rate and the one
from results of using Pareto distribution presentation. It shows that the Pareto distribu-
tion predicted highest failure rates are close to the original data. Hence, the highest and
the lowest aircraft component failure rate from evaluated from Pareto distribution will
represented the highest and the lowest failure rate of the real data to be used in develop-
ment the linear regression the highest and the lowest failure rate equations. Consequently,
Pareto distribution of each aircraft can be thus evaluated with the assumption that every
aircraft obtains constant thirteen aircraft components as shown in Fig. C.5.

With the highest and the lowest FR, calculated by linear or exponential regression
equations, the Pareto distribution b coefficient can be determined by using Eqn. (4.5). Ta-
ble C.4 shows the Pareto distribution coefficients from example aircraft based on available
Failure Rate for Aircraft P Far ue R1efor. Aju4 (iA
3w
y-7,1 43x--
R'09a9I Y-
°0 600
, Oo
700
60
200
100
0 z, 01
01a 10 12
N. of System No NSynro
Figure C. 3: Pareto distribution of real data in 1985,1993, and 1996
2500
x2000
w
0
0
0
1300
u
R
pl, low
u
w
7
ä
w 500
0
1p
C$' V
4COQ.
ýP
HighestFRfromreddata pHighest FRfromPereto
Figure C. 4: Comparison between the highest failure rate from the real data and from
the Pareto distribution representative
data.
Table C. 5 shows the comparison between calculated results from the third and the
forth failure rate prediction methods in this methodology and the real values.
Load Default date Da[a 4akilate Stae Qata have Al Data Exit
Ik Variables & Equations' Details Reliability Assessment Maintainability Assessment
Model
Max Fa" e Rate IFR(1)) 401 774 / 1000 FH Total A/C Flue Rate
Rate [FR(811 298679 / 1000 FH

Mn Feiue 20 4817 / 1000 FH
No. of Systems [NoS] 13 2d No of NoS(8) 00
No of No$(8) 5: of FR(8) 70
Paeto s Drstr &4on

-1 160397
FR(x) " 401.77 X
ý,ý.,
Figure C. 5: Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog
Table C. 4: Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficients

Pareto distribution coefficient
Ai rcra ft
FR(100) b
B1 465.2821473 -0.714627222
F1 350.5325186 -0.666972376
F2 506.191688 -0.802766808
Al 299.5143338 -0.749937326
A2 266.1150186 -0.718763674
ATR1 224.7953014 -0.85533625
ATR2 157.1861043 -0.621304266
F-104 295.1601972 -0.767448387
A-7 224.3806853 -0.714819826
GA1 Early 19.84300092 -0.872729379
GA1 Late 117.9800012 -0.793275107
T1 2225.7 -0.667910969
GA2 75.6500011 -0.634183602
GA3 162.0200032 -0.630053015
C. 2 Maintainability Assessment Module

Similar difficulties to an aircraft failure rate prediction, but there were much less avail-
able data to develop a certain prediction model; therefore, only a simple model as a
function of aircraft empty weight is firstly examined. And the DMHR equations from
linear and exponential regression analysis of six design variables with assumption that an
aircraft obtains thirteen component have been then developed, in which the combination
method can be examined. Fig. C. 6 shows the application tab dialog in this reliability &
maintainability assessment module.

Table C. 5: Compare results of failure rate prediction per 1000 flying hour
Combination method Functionality method
Ai rcra ft R eald at a
Average Original
40:80 40:70
F2 1493.5 1433.364 1873.319 276.97 521.744
Al 1250.7 875.968 1149.294 285.029 530.94
A2 1052.4 793.648 1043.67 289.278 535.7888
ATR1 832.8 617.122 808.302 472.974 745.4728
ATR2 547.4 499.349 661.507 513.8 792.00
F-104 1147.2 853.977 1119.292 645.535 942.328
A-7 958.5 670.828 882.449 772.634 1087.3664
GA1 Late 454.0 983.986 1270.121 517.73 335.75
GA2 445 787.591 1030.723 513.8 331.4
GA3 959 1145.412 1493.86 1013.433 984.074
F-16 420.0 873.134 1149.976 505.142 419.171
F-18 700 1532.18 1982.528 743.237 681.2185
F-4 850 1254.931 1626.063 968.716 923.9881
F-15 710 1278.09 1664.799 863.117 813.1585
F-105 680 887.399 1170.958 905.341 859.6307
C9 Reliability Fw-I
a Maintainability Assessment
Load Defauit Update Data Cakubte Store Data Save AY Data Et
Model U 99
Total A/C Defect Man+lo. a Rate

Max DMHR JDMHR(1(1 03%42 / 1000 FH
123795 / 1000 FH
Mn DMHR LDMHR(811 '. { 409.145 / 1000 FH
No of Systems (NoS) 13 : of No of NoS(8) 40
No of NoS(8) [5 %of FRI8i' 70
Pareto s DotoNs on
-08250111
FR(. ) - 3395.4 X
DMHR - Defect Man+losa Rate
Ready NUM
Figure C. 6: Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficient calculation tab dialog
C. 2.1 Functionality of Aircraft Empty Weight
There were very less maintainability data available than of reliability. Only two linear
equations can be investigated, and be shown as in Fig. C. 7.

Therefore, an average aircraft DMHR per 1000 flying hour linear equation can be
developed and shown as the following equations:
DMHRAircra = 12221 0.8009 We (C. 9)

ft - "
12
F2
16 Trends
forData.IQcs1
00
5,14 Al
14 "..
12 y-08009x+12221
a
10 A2
ö8 ATRI " A-7

' F-104
6 TnndsforData (1993) TR2
.........................! T1
GA2*
4
GA1Late
U
ü2 .....
................ GA3
A0 "GAIEarly .......
02468 10 12 14 16
EmptyWeight[Ton]
f AircraftReliability
Data(1993) Histonc
alData(1985)
Figure C. 7: Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight
C. 2.2 Combination Method
This method uses the same principle and variables as used for the FR combination method
(see Section C. 1.2). Firstly, the highest and the lowest aircraft system DMHR have to be
evaluated via linear or exponential regressions. The next step is to determine the Pareto
distribution b coefficient by assuming that aircraft contains thirteen major systems. Each
aircraft system DMHR can be thus predicted by dint of the Pareto principle. Finally, the
total aircraft DMHR can be summed from these thirteen major aircraft system DMHR.
C. 2.2.1 Linear Regression Model
Similar as the highest and the lowest failure rate predictions, the only two data sets could
not be used together due to different technology and aircraft types.

1. Linear regression analysis of data in 1985:
DMHR(100) =4615.405078 - 230.2682582"H

+ 24.08205537" Thrust - 0.050116816" We - 0.229619018" Alt
+ 696.7274414. NE - 9.78649894. Wa (C. 10)
DMHR(70) =518.5990642 - 19.65587772"H

+ 3.720986756" Thrust - 0.005442201" We - 0.022979769" Alt
+ 59.41102159" NE - 1.870040774" W. (C. 11)
2. Linear regression analysis of data in 1993:
DMHR(100) =4598.171944 + 989.3250555"H

20.55090072 Thrust + 0.441361581" We 0.392431133" Alt
- " -
2379.658742 NE 5.152069 W. (C. 12)
- " - "
DMHR(70) =855.1331753 + 209.8118117. H
3.350542173" Thrust + 0.080594332" We 0.082597689" Alt

- -
492.851663 NE + 0.372898482 W. (C. 13)
- " "
C.2.2.2 Exponential Regression Model
The exponential model can be also used to predicted the highest and the lowest DMHR
by using two available maintainability data sets as follows:
1. Exponential regression analysis of data in 1985:
DMHR(100) =8491.619193.0.935621878H " 1.010783441Thrust

" 0.999968623We
Alt 1.290320816NE 0.99448234x'°
0.999871213 (C. 14)
" " "
DMHR(70) Thrust
1.010921795 0.999976427w"
=1010.2661880.944147718H" ,
Alt 1.086936452NE 0.994702854w"
0.999899442 (C. 15)
" " "
2. Exponential regression analysis of data in 1993:
DMHR(100) =2147374.605.12.00683986" " 0.956821917Thrust, 1.000883348'°
" 0.998972826Aft 0.001303594NE 1.164114963'° (C. 16)

" "
DMHR(70) =293832.5362.15.86936996H " 0.947961121Thrust" 1.000966956We
0.99883298A1t 0.000284034NE 1.3554410310 (C. 17)
" " "
C. 2.2.3 Pareto Distribution Model
Similar to reliability prediction, the real data of aircraft maintainability has to be inves-
tigated and proved that it follows this principle as shown in Fig. C. 8.
D. f. ctMan+lour Ratefor Aircraft Al Dafact Man-HourRatefor Aircraft GA3
roro =500
6030
Q=o 5000 ,
6450.
uze:
a ýoo01
a: ýooo
3aoo
PLL -T, ý,oý,
-ooo z1
'o°o 5w
0
e
of0d63 -_ 10 I/ 16
o_aae io iz u
N.. N Syr.. N.. .1 Sy a.
Figure C. 8: Pareto distribution of real data in 1985 and 1993
As the same principle to predict aircraft failure rate, the highest defect man-hour
rates of the real data have to be examined to confirm that the aircraft system DMHR
distribution follows the Pareto distribution (see Fig. C. 8). From these two available data
sets, the 40: 70 portion has been discovered and be used as default in this methodology.
Figure C. 9: Comparison between the highest defect man-hour rate from the real data
and from the Pareto distribution representative
After the highest and the lowest aircraft system DMHR have been determined, the
Pareto distribution coefficients can be evaluated. Table C. 6 shows the defect man-hour
rate Pareto distribution coefficients of each aircraft. Finally, the total aircraft DMHR,
which is a summation of all assumed thirteen system DMHR calculated from the Pareto
distribution, can be calculated. Table C.7 shows the comparison between the total aircraft
DMHR calculated from the combination, functionality method and the two available real
data.
Table C. 6: Defect man-hour rate Pareto distribution coefficients

Pareto distribution coefficient
Airc r aft
FR(100) b
B1 5770.044 -0.791963
F1 3365.716 -0.70983
F2 4497.754 -0.723593
Al 3782.826 -0.77689
A2 2815.331 -0.76411
ATR1 1327.99 -7438
ATR2 1072.513 -0.69379
F-104 1396.812 -0.63395
A-7 2017.742 -0.7272
GA1 Early 2713.00 -0.7121
GA1 Late 2735.07 -0.7164
T1 1101.11 -0.6978
GA2 2207.76 -0.7648
GA3 702.41 -0.4843
Table C. 7: Compare results of defect man-hour rate prediction per 1000 flying hour
Combination method Funct ionality
Aircraft Real data
40:60 40:70 Average Original
BI 1893.6 1391.216 1830.471 10186.55 13288.41
F1 2118.3 1080.544 1426.933 10098.62 13176.865
F2 17029.7 23206.39 17580.38 9462.7 12370.24
Al 13405.5 18789.28 14289.28 9365.792 122473.165
A2 9584.4 14133.77 10695.21 9314.694 12182.502
ATR1 7459.6 6755.324 5118.266 7105.652 9380.4467
ATR2 4990.7 5697.414 4282.271 6614.7 8757.7
F-104 6216.3 7593.171 5711.828 5030.52 6748.2498
A-7 7810.6 10425.88 7867.151 3502.082 4809.50624
GA1 Late 3430 14183.74 10744.59 6574.655 3010.385
GA2 4500 11095.1 8384.3919 6614.7 3025.3
GA3 959 4435.54 3283.273 606.348 787.4534
T1 5040.0 5828.263 4383.341 9309.729 4029.0795
APPENDIX D
LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATION MODULE
This Appendix will show LCC estimation module and its model in details, which is based
Woodford [13] Birkler [$] Burns [11l. Some parts have been modified to make
mostly on and
this model more simple and to avoid restricted and/or unavailable data. Fig. D. 1 shows
the overall outlook of the LCC estimation application dialog, which contains another five
tap dialogs.
L0ad D. aI ult _alculaticm :. a, e Data E. it
Life Cycle Cost Cost Factor Research... ; Production... Operation... Disposal
Aircraft Model :r WARTIME

Average discount LCC / Aircraft
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation r3.37751e+009 Research, Development & 6 68814e. 006
Production 2.60048e+009 Production 5.14947e+006
Ground Support & Initial Spare : 2.60048e. 008 Ground Support S Initial Spare : 520097
Operation and Support 4.71894e+007 Operation and Support 4 71894e+006
Disposal: (2 63788e+007 Disposal 52235 3
Life Cycle Cost 6 28496e+009 L/e Cycle Cost 1 71289e. 007
Figure D. 1: Life Cycle Cost estimation application dialog
Similar to the other module, LCC estimation application dialog can load the default or
pre-data directly from stored file or be given directly through the application dialog. Ad-
ditionally, the pre-calculated unscheduled maintenance (DMHR) is automatically passed

direct from the reliability & maintainability assessment module.
The next importance step is to choose mission scenario, in which an aircraft LCC
will be evaluated. Then, the initial of the necessary parameter and variable can be done.
Finally, after total aircraft LCC has been estimated, and the average costs per aircraft per
172
D. Life Cycle Cost Estimation Module 173
Start
DMHR from R&M

assessment module
ýNO Open Default File and

Load Default
Manual Input Data Loaded Default Values
Values
Calculate General
Factors
Calculate RDT&E
Cost
Calculate
Production Cost
Calculate
Operation Cost
Calculate Disposal
Cost
Figure D. 2: Flowchart of LCC estimation module
flying hour will be evaluated; for instant, operation & support cost, personnel cost, and
unit level consumption. These values will be used for mission operational cost calculation
afterwards.
Fig. D. 2 shows an overall flowchart of LCC estimation module. During the 0&S cost
estimation process, the O&S cost for wartime and peacetime operation will be separate
calculated.
D. 1 Parameter Initiate
Before the LCC can be evaluated, some global variables and assumed values have to be
initiate. These values will be used in many different equations. These variables are:
1. Advanced technology factor: The advanced technology factor (FATE)

value can be
estimated from a single equation presented by Woodford [531 Unfortunately, his
model is too details in design which excess this methodology; therefore, this value
will be assumed as 1.275 throughout LCC estimation model.
2. Advanced design tool factor: This value is assumed as a constant value (FADT
= 1.3) and is integrated mainly in RDT&E and production cost due to increasing
usage of advanced composites and new technology.
3. Advanced technology testing factor: This factor is integrated aiming to cover flight
test engineering planning, data reduction, manufacturing support, flight test instru-
mentation, spares, fuel and oil, pilot's salary, facility rental, and insurance during
the flight test during the RDT&E process. This factor is assumed as constant
variable (FATT = 1.2).
4. Number of partners: The number of partners is defined as the ratio of number of
aircraft production to number of largest single buy from the program as:
NIR°D
NPART = (D. 1)
NLARGE
5. Airframe-only mass: This mass is equivalent to the airframe unit mass, and is
defined by MIL-STD-1374. The airframe-only mass (11ýIgirJrnme)
can be estimated as
aircraft empty mass minus wheels, tires, tubes & brakes, engines, rubber or nylon
fuel cells, starters and power unit, instruments, batteries & electrical power supply
and conversion, avionics equipment, air conditioning, anti-icing & pressurisation
units, cameras and other surveillance equipment, trapped fuel and oil.
6. Consumer Price index: This variable aims to include inflation within the cost of
is
aircraft, which a function of accounting year (YRACC) as shown in Eqn. (5.2).
7. Labour rates: The engineering (CLE), quality/tooling (CLT), and manufacturing

labour rate (CLIVI) are based on `then year' dollars, and can be given as following
equations, which have an extra security factor (FS) built in PI
CLE = (0.0191 x YRACC2 0.5432 x YRACC 37.964) x FS (D. 2)

- -
CLT = (0.0054 x YRACC2 + 1.0755 x YRACC 89.215) x FS (D. 3)
-
CLM = (0.0132 x YRACC2 0.5627 x YRACC 13.679) x FS (D. 4)
- -
8. Advanced materials factor: This cost factor considers for using advanced materials
(FAMA), which is a function of the percentage, by mass, of advanced materials used
for structural application. This factor can be given as a function of aircraft empty
mass.
FAMA =4.4028 x MATýo,,, 5.7025 x MATco,,, + 2.8658 x MATc.

ro,;te - no;;te , pa»ite
+ 0.3168 x MATCO,,, te+1 (D. 5)
po,;
9. Collaborative factor: Woodford [53Ideveloped a separate factor (FPART) to allow

for the collaboration nature of modern aircraft programs with suggestion of Mr. P.
Pugh, formerly of the Directorate of Project, Time, and Cost Analysis (DPTCAn),
a division of the Ministry of Defence as:
FPART = NPARTO. 33 (D. 6)
10. Pay rates: Officer (OPR), Enlisted (EPR), and Civilian pay rate (CPR) are approx-
imate average annual payment for U. S Air Force officer and engineer regarding to
information from the open sources [33,34]These rate have been set as default values
as:
41OPR = 50400 $
" EPR = 22200 $
" CPR = 42000 $
D. 2 Research, Development, Test,. & Evaluation Cost

This estimation model breaks the develop procedure into three major categories with
several different activities. The total RDT&E cost is a summation of the multiples between
the effort quantity in hours and its relevant labour rate.
D. 2.1 Airframe Development Cost
Cost of airframe development can be broken down into following activities:
1. Engineering cost for the airframe development (CDAE)

fax 8x
CDAE =0.066 x M°ir96amexV 1VRD183
T&E
x FATF x FAMA/FADT x FPART x CLE (D. 7)

2. Development support cost (CDDS)
N°TD&E
CDDS =0.0356 x M°i°°3amexV9x X CPI
x FATF x FS/FADT x FPART (D. 8)
3. Flight test cost (CDFT)
ýl
CDFT =0.00558 x MA;rframeXV fä x NR1.281
DT&E x CPI
FATT x FS (D. 9)
4. Tooling cost (EDTP)
EDTP =5.083 x M°768

Airframe X V°'899
Afaa x N°'18
RDT&E x RATE° °ss
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLT (D. 10)
5. Development manufacturing cost (EDML)
0 76 0 549 N' 554

EDML =43.61X MAir x VMax x NRDT&E
frame
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLM (D. 11)
6. Quality control cost (CDQL)
CDQL = 0.13 x CDML x CLT/CLM (D. 12)
7. Manufacturing material and equipment cost (CDMI\'IE)
ýax °X
CDMME M°; r J2af11eXV NTD&E
X CPI
=96.77 x
x FAMA x FLO (D. 13)
Total cost for development airframe (CDA; is a summation of above labour costs
rfra,,,e)
as:
CDAirframe=CDAE + CDDS + CDFT + CDTP
+ CDML + CDQL + CDMME (D. 14)

D. 2.2 Engine development cost
Woodford PI explained that the constant 0.833 and 1.0E6 are added into model from
Birkler I8] due to CPI value in 1980. Regarding to CPI value from The United States
Bureau of Labour Statistics web site [491,the constant value 0.833 has been replaced by
0.842.
-845.804 + 0.00002244 x Thrust + 249.838 xM+0.313 x TT4

CDE -_
0.6 x 0.8421 x FADT
x CPI x FPART x 1.0E6 (D. 15)
CDEF =0.77 x CPE x (NRDT&E- NSTAT)X (NE + 1) (D. 16)
CDE9iTLe=CDE + CDEF (D. 17)
where M become 1 if an aircraft is not designed for supersonic vehicle.
D. 2.3 Avionics development cost
This model to estimate avionics cost is based on the uninstalled avionics mass, which is
approximated 90% of the total avionics mass, as follows:
CDV =853820 x WV x FPART x CPI (D. 18)
CDVF =3950 x WV x (NRDT&E- NSTAT)X CPI (D. 19)
CDAvioniCS
=CDV + CDVF (D. 20)
Total RDT&E cost is a summation of these three development costs as:
CRDT&E DAirfrnme DEngine

=v +v +v
LAvionics (D. 21)
D. 3 Production Cost
Similar to RDT&E cost, the production can be split into three main groups; airframe,
engine, and avionics production. The summation of all three main component production
costs brings to the total aircraft production cost.
D. 3.1 Airframe Production Cost
During the production processes,the following activities and costs can be occurred. These
can be estimated as:

1. Production engineering cost for the airframe development (CPAE)
CPAE =[0.066 x M°; *f6a.. XV58X

(NRDT&E +
1'PROD)o. iss
x FATF x FAMA/FADT x FPART x CLE] - CDAE (D. 22)
2. Production tooling cost (EPTP)
[5.083 68ame Vý 8x 9X (NRDT&E +

RATEo. oso
EPTP = x M°i x 1YPROD)°'18
X
x FAMA/FADT°"5 x FPART x CLT] - EDTP (D. 23)
3. Production manufacturing cost (EPML)
[43.61 M°; 76rame V0 549 (NRDT&E + NPROD)0.554

EPML = x rf
X
ax
X
x FAMA/FADT0.5 x FPART] EDML (D. 24)

-
4. Production quality control cost (CPQL)
CDQL = 0.13 x CPML x CLT/CLM (D. 25)
5. Production manufacturing material and equipment cost (CPMME)
CPMME [96.77 f2671e (NRTD&E NPROD)o.

sosX CPI
= x M°i6 XVý6X +
x FAMA x FLO] - CDMME (D. 26)
D. 3.2 Engine Production Cost
The engine production cost (CPE) is based on the aircraft turbine engine production cost
developed by Birkler [81and multiply by the effect of CPI value of year 1980, when this
model has been developed, and CPI of aircraft design accounting year. Therefore, the
total engine production costs (CPE9;,, can be given as:
e)
(0.043 x Thrust + 243.25 xM+0.969 x TT4 - 2228
CPE -
0.8421
x CPI x 1E6 (D. 27)
CPE,, =CPE x NPRODx NE (D. 28)

9i,ze
D. 3.3 Avionics Production Cost
The avionics production cost (CPAV; is given as:

of;cs)
CPA=o,,,, = 3950 x WV x CPI x NPRQD (D. 29)

s
Total production cost (Cproduction)

is then a summation of these three total production
costs:
CProduction
=
CrAirframe +v
rEngine
+ CrAvionics
(D. 30)
To estimate the trade value of the design aircraft, flyaway (CF, and acquisition
yawaU)
cost (CAcquisitio)
will be evaluated as:
CProduction
CFiyaway -J (D. 31)
NPROD
+ CProduction
C_ `ýRDT&E (D32)
Acquisition \1J J
NRDT&E
T ýT
lY+ lYPROD
D. 4 Ground Support Equipment and Initial Spares
The GSE&IS cost is about 10% of the aircraft flyaway cost, as described in chapter 5.
CCSE&IS = 0.1 X CFlyaway (D. 33)
D. 5 Operation and Support
The operation and support cost (Coperat; breakdown follows the methods and structure
o)
by the US Office of the Secretary of Defense [12] This O&S cost is estimated for one
main operating base only; therefore, the cost for the individual aircraft contains the total
deflated O&S cost divided by the number of aircraft on the base.
D. 5.1 Personnel Cost
The personnel cost includes all expense for operation personnel, support personnel, and
also service allowances, personnel support and training.
D. 5.1.1 Operation Personnel Cost
Operation personnel cost (COM) is a summation of number of office, enlisted, and civilian
in the first and second line operation multiply with their relevant annual payment rate
as:
1. Number of active flight-crew member (NOMOF):
x Nopcration (D. 34)

NOMOF = 0.923 x FMOF
where FMOF is the `crew-ratio' (1.1 for fighter, 1.5 for bomber, 1.5 3.5 for trans-
-
port).
2. Number of operation officer (NOMO):
(0.40799
NOMO = + 0.923 x FMOF + FHY x DMHR x 6.708E - 5)
x N0peration
+ 3.0 (D. 35)
3. Number of operation enlisted (NOME):
(3.7246 FHY x SM FHY x DMHR1 XN

NOME = + + J Operation
301.5075 208.695622
4. Number of operation civilian (NOIVVIC):
CJ FHY x DMHRl
NOMC = 0.0577 x 1.67 + x Noperation (D. 37)
208.695622
5. Total number of operation personnel (NOM):
NOM = NOMO + NOME + NOMC (D. 38)
6. Total operation personnel cost (COM):
COM = NOMO x OPR + NOME x EPR + NOMC x CPR (D. 39)
D. 5.1.2 Support Personnel Cost
Support personnel cost (CSM) depends on number of operation aircraft and operation
personnel on the base.
1. Number of support office (NSMO):
NSMO = 7.0 + 0.6155 x N0peratio+ 0.0555 x NOMOF + 0.00837 x NOM (D. 40)
2. Number of support enlisted (NSME):
NSME 16.0 + 5.8974 x No,, + 0.0921 x NOM (D. 41)

= erat;
o
3. Number of support civilian (NSMC):
NSMC = 0.02222 x NOMOF + 0.0705 x NOM (D. 42)
4. Total support personnel cost (CSM):
CSM = NSMO x OPR + NSME x EPR + NSMC x CPR (D. 43)
D. 5.1.3 Service Allowance, Personnel Support and Training Cost
This service allowance, personnel support and training cost (CSASTT) model aims to
obtain all officer and enlisted training cost; training funds; and officer and enlisted per-
manent change of station.
1. Officer training cost (CSOT):
CSOT =(0.0643 x NOMO + 0.0028 x NOM + 0.0001 x NOME)
x OPR (D. 44)
2. Enlisted training cost (CSET):
CSET =(0.1294 x NOME + 0.0232 x NOM + 0.0077 x NOMO)
x EPR (D. 45)
3. Training funds (CSTF):
CSTF =(0.0042 x NOME + 0.052 x NOMO + 0.1128 x NOM) x

CPI
(D. 46)
0.739 x 10-4
4. Officer permanent change station cost (CSOPCS):
5884
CSOPCS = 1795 x x (NOMO + NSMO) (D. 47)
5. Enlisted permanent change station cost (CSEPCS):
5884
CSEPCS = 940 x x (NOME + NSME) (D. 48)
6. Total service allowance, personnel support and training cost (CSASTT):
CSASTT = CSOT + CSET + CSTF + CSOPCS + CSEPCS (D. 49)

D. 5.2 Unit level consumption
Woodford [53]modified this model from the US Navy 0&S cost estimating model FY-1979
with RAF Cost of support spreadsheet. This model can be split as follows:
1. Cost of Fuel, other petroleum, oil, and lubricants (COF):

FHY
COF = 1.213588X MF7ej X Ts-. -rt,,: X CF,LelX Noperation (D. 50)
2. Maintenance material cost (COMMAT):

F12Y
COMMAT =(6.9313 + 0.1028 x x (SM + DMHR) + 0.145 x V,,...)
x 1.27199 x FHY x CPI X Noperat; (D. 51)

on
3. Miscellaneous support supply cost (COMSS): This cost is about 53.19 % of main-
tenance material cost (COMMAT).
COMSS = 0.5319 x COMMAT (D. 52)
4. Depot level reparable cost (CODLR):
1.2234
CODLR = 5.751 x (SM + DMHR) X V°2486
x FHY x CPI (D. 53)
5. Temporary additional duty cost (COTAD):
COTAD = 6925.2077 x N0peratiox CPI (D. 54)
6. Transport cost (COUTRN): This cost is approximately 3.79 % of total above costs.
COUTRN =(COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR + COTAD)
x 0.0379 (D. 55)
7. Other cost (COUOTH): This cost can be approximately estimated as 25 % of total
unit level consumption cost until here.
COUTH =0.25 x (COUTRN + COF + COMMAT + COMSS+
CODLR + COTAD) (D. 56)
8. Total unit level consumption cost (Cu,,;,): The CU,,;, is simple a summation of all
above described costs;
Cu,,; =COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR+

t
COTAD + COUTRN + COUOTH (D. 57)
D. 5.3 Contracts
Model from Woodford PI defined this cost for the third and the forth line maintenance
following structure of RAF and can be split into four main costs as:
1. Mechanical contract cost (COAC):
[(-9.7977
COAC = + 0.52085 x (SM + DMHR) + 1.1902 x MA/c x 2.2046E - 3)
FHY
x 1000 x + (32.30965+ 7.688 x (SM + DMHR))
x NOperaìon
160
1 CPI
x FHY X Noperationx (D. 58)
0.793
2. Engine contract cost (COEC):
(FRROR x ERO) + ERM CPI

COEC =1.9(NE-1) x x 1000 x
(1 + FPROR) x DAR 0.793
x N0peratiox FHY (D. 59)
ERO =5.574 + 4.527 x Thrust + 70.71 x FD (D. 60)
ERM =8.9434 + 1.235 x Thrust + 11.321 x FD (D. 61)
where ERO is unit cost for an engine overhaul, ERI\'I is unit cost for engine repair,
FD =1 if engine bypass ratio > 0, unless FD = 0, FPROR is the overhaul/repair
ratio (here is assumed to be 0.4), and DAR. is the depot arrival rate in operating
hour (assumed to be 250 hours)
3. Avionics contract cost (COVC):
COVC = 0.5 x No,,, x WV x CPI x FHY (D. 62)

;o
4. Supply contract cost (COCT):
COOS =(COF + COMMAT + COMSS + CODLR + COAC + COEC)
x 0.5 (D. 63)
5. Total contract cost (Ccontract):
CControct COAC + COEC COVC COSC (D. 64)

= + +
D. 5.4 Sustaining Support Cost and Installation Support Funds
Woodford [53Ishowed that cost of replacement support equipment and modification kit
procurement (CSEK) are approximate 0.55% of total flyaway cost of operating base. But
the sustaining engineering support cost (CSSE) depends on labour, material and overhead
costs. Therefore, the installation support funds (CSISF) are incurred by the personnel
pay and allowances, material, and utilities needed for the maintenance of the base.
CSEK =0.0055
x CFLvaWQY
x 1YOperation (D. 65)
CSSE =0.2396 x CODLR + 0.098 x (COAC + COEC)
+ 0.123 x (COF + COMMAT + COMSS) - COSC - COUTRN (D. 66)

5884
CSISF =3565 x x NOSM (D. 67)
CSST =CSEK + CSSE + CSISF (D. 68)
Total 0&S cost for one year is simply a sum of all of the precious calculated costs.
As the aircraft will be operated for certain year; the `discounted' value must be added for
each year to reach the true total O&S cost.
COperation =COSM + CSASTT + COULCT + COCT + CSST (D. 69)

year
DEF
COperation
-COperation 1 year X1- (D. 70)
RED
where DEF can be calculated from Eqn. (5.8) and RED is economic discount rate (default
value as 6% details see chapter 5).
D. 6 Disposal
Woodford PI developed a model to estimate disposal cost (CJT) based on material price
in FY83 and validate with CPI factor; however, the final disposal cost is deflated following
aircraft life time. Hence the deflated disposal cost (CDiaposa!

) can be given as:
CJM =0.05 x EPML (D. 71)
CJA =-5x (NPROD+ NRDT&E)X (1 MATýo,,,,, x T'V,x CPI (D. 72)

o,;e)
CJMAT =(NPORD+ NRDT&E)x MATTanipo,; x WWx 27.86567 x CPI (D. 73)
te
CJT =CJM + CJMAT + CJA (D. 74)
CD;, x DEF (D. 75)

pa,al =CJT
D. 7 Life Cycle Cost
In this module, the total life cycle cost can be simply calculated as a summation of
the different cost phases already calculated, apportioned to different number of aircraft,
depending on the life cycle phase as:
CRDT&E + CGSE&IS
LCC `-'Production Òperation `Disposal (D. 76)
_ + + +
-l
NRDT&E + NPROD NPROD NOperation +
1YRDT&E 1VPROD
Figure D. 7 - D. 7 show the results of LCC estimation module for F-16 and Eurofighter
during wartime and peacetime operation by using most values from Woodford [531with
some validated value from open sources; such as payment rates, CPI factor.
D. Life Cycle Cost Estimation Module
186
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P.. E
APPENDIX E
OPERATION MISSION SIMULATION MODULE
This module is the core of the entire program, because it links every submodule, which
evaluate or measure aircraft performance and/or effectiveness, and apply these values to
measure aircraft operational and cost-effectiveness,as shown in Fig E. 1. Due to objective
of this design methodology aiming to integrate a mission simulation within the early
design stage, only general information and major conceptual design variables are available.
Therefore, this mission simulation has been developed with some assumptions and simple
models.
II Reliability&
Susceptibility
ýýbility
Assessment J
Assessment
Vulnerability
Operation
Mission
Assessment We CycleCost
Simulation
Estimation
(MonteCarlo)
Savein File Showin lineargraph Showin numeric mow in simplemini

animation
Figure E. 1: Flowchart of entire application
E. 1 Flowcharts of Alternative Studies Missions

The new generation of combat aircraft will be used as multi-roles air vehicle, but the
performance and specification for each role is not the same. Therefore, primary mission
for the designed aircraft has to be firstly established.
Finally, `bombing' mission is chosen to be a model to develop this simulation due to
specification of case study aircraft, U-99. Fig. E. 2 - E. 8 show all historical developed
flowcharts for tactical and strategic combat missions.
190
CONTAINS PULLOUTS
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II
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Descend Take Off
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NO NO
YES Abort YES Possible to

Post-Flight - Damaged? Mission? Climb
Turn Back Climb
YES
Maintenance NO
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Repair Defected? 10
CD
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Result of Mission Operation
r"
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0
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Number of Available Aircraft
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Mission Cost
Mission : Air Superiority Number of Sorties
-
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NO Number of failure Mission
Find
Target ?
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Target ?
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Operational Sortie Simulation Analysis :x:
i
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NO yy
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start
2issi n Openakn Smnuluiom Dau heut
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1Fuxber of AEaa4 in Ldafr¢rswnce

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Operational Sortie Simulation Analysis
Start (Descent)
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E. Operation Mission Simulation Module 195
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E. 2 Manoeuvrability Probability
In this methodology, a simple model called weighting factors has been chosen to repre-
sented the manoeuvrability probability (details see Chapter 3). These values will be used
as default values throughout the mission simulation. Fig. E. 9 show five alternatives of
manoeuvrability probability used in this study.
E. 3 General Results
Table E. 1 shows U-99 RCS, PD and PK predicted by susceptibility and vulnerability
assessmentsub-modules with different manoeuvrability probability options.
Table E. 1: Results from susceptibility and vulnerability assessmentsub-modules with

different manoeuvrability probability options
Manoeuvrability probability
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
RCS [dBm ] -22.1452 54.4621 61.4724 63.2333 644827
S/N [dBm2] -41.9063 38.701 41.7113 43.4723 44.7216
Pre-flight
PD 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
PK 0.085146 0.06635 0.047569 0.02878 0.00999
RCS [dBm ] 54.4827 54.4827 57.493 56.2436 58.46
S/N [dBm2] 42.5294 42.5294 45.5397 44.2904 46.5089
Outbound
PD 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
P1 0.06866 0.06866 0.06413 0.07088 0.06336
RCS [dBm ] 61.4724 59.2539 57.493 54.4827 -21.7876
S/N [dBm2] 76.1048 73.8863 72.1254 69.1151 -7.1552
Attack
PD 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.003
PK 0.0386 0.05363 0.06413 0.07464 0.082157
RCS [dBm ] 54.4827 54.4827 57.493 56.2436 58.4621
S/N [dBm2] 42.5295 42.5295 45.5398 44.2904 46.5089
Inbound
PD 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
PK 0.06738 0.06738 0.06285 0.06928 0.06198
RCS [dBm ] 0.6854 58.4621 61.4724 62.2333 64.4827
S/N [dBm2] -19.0757 38.701 41.7113 44.2904 44.7216
Post-Flight
PD 0.001 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
PK 0.08301 0.06475 0.0465 0.02824 0.00999
Table E. 2 shows general results from mission simulation module with different ma-
noeuvrability probability options.

Fig. E. 10 shows the effect of aircraft probability of detection in number of sorties flown,
successfulsorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
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Table E. 2: Results from mission simulation module with different manoeuvrability prob-
Manoeuvrability probability
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
Sorties Flown 130 156 151 152 175
Complete Sorties 106 136 133 135 157
Targets Killed 78 107 110 96 115
Aircraft lost cost [M$] 26.0048 15.6029 15.6029 15.6029 0.00
Operational Cost {M$] 11.0655 13.7995 13.2599 13.5429 15.7375
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Figure E. 10: Effect of probability of detection
Fig. E. 11 shows the effect of aircraft probability of hit in number of sorties flown,
successfulsorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
Fig. E. 12 shows the effect of aircraft probability of kill on encounter with penetrators
in number of sorties flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the
associated costs.
Fig. E. 13 shows the effect of aircraft probability of kill on encounter with proximity
warhead in number of sorties flown, successfulsorties, complete sorties, and targets killed
with the associated costs.
Fig. E. 14 shows the effect of aircraft defect arising rate in number of sorties flown,
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
Fig. E. 15 shows the effect of aircraft mean time to repair defect in number of sorties
flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
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Figure E. 12: Effect of probability of kill on encounter with penetrators
Fig. E. 16 shows the effect of aircraft mean time to repair damage in number of sorties
flown, successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
Fig. E. 17 shows the effect of aircraft defect man-hour rate in number of sorties flown,
successful sorties, complete sorties, and targets killed with the associated costs.
Fig. E. 18 E. 30 show the effects of, and the relationships between susceptibility and
-
vulnerability on the operational and operational cost MOEs.
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y
ý lvua, o ,P a4oooo
j. ao r aL1Y-lF. o4:. 3¢,m. ". acwl. 0 d. lm3.. lnlw 1ä00. h, '_ v ýiý "3609T "SLO. ý. ;°
Y'8F-Il "1L06. OIT- 61.. IXY =OOUO
a .i1 Rý-09981
40 2011000
60M0
20 20
130000 180000
0 140000 0 160000
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
t). hol ArIxuc Rate D<fýct Rae
.. o....
" Complex Soma " Co.. plerc Svee Con "= . : u Su .. "_. n. Wl So ron
-laser tComFleee Sane. l -- F-W 1--jle k. e.. l teer . 5uc<e. "00 ýolnen - -Cole ISI "IdI4 Suroe. l
Figure E. 14: Effect of defect arising rate

_41 1010000__. 150 : ]0000

y _... - _ .. . y, _
-V.... 13n000 140 ý. -.. " ..
18U
wýM 4 UUM
týýýn00 l iU
100 Y s'
1. J 1
tý,wou ä ü
_3-100
11
ýIUJ00
3
a'-o»ss : nno 9U Y 19J000 O
00 R. J[
20000 80
]0000
80 70
110000
60 100ooo 60 150000
013456789 10 11 0134789 10 11
! ITIR Defeat [Hau. ] A ITIR IXfed [H Hu]
" D<nroye4 T. ryen " Tryel Con
-LMr (I"eýroyed Trent - P. N (P-.,. J Tr
150 U00
200 0000
:.. .. ý \
14n y
1 _ ... a _ ii iii
"O00
-,.
_
, fl.
6n000
11 : 0000 X
a0 777
1 "...
Ir 000
100 210000 =
:o ay[. i it. a> .,
F ovl"
.. . nom ýs:. ýa. ýo
" .i
05h.
RýýOAW
lO J6
10000 ^ý 42 90
iE asp _ ,.., . i.,.. "a
_
W-.
19000U
-
12000U 170000
8o 7u
60 150000
60 100000
01234567S9 10 11
012x70 10 11
n1TM Defeat (Houuj A[TIR [xf«t [Haul
" Compl<4 So s"C. m L Scree
-LMýr (Cavp0 Sweep) -- Pop (Covpkrc Saweq
Figure E. 15: Effect of mean time to repair defect
_OU 190000 1äV Eýý'ý1ý0
180000 2F0000
80
1]OJUO 0000
1 1 ý
IGO 160010 14u .. 0000
7: 77
'n Z
{y 10000 200000
yyýý 140 Y l: u
01
Zy) 140000 180000
R'-0n19
G
rETi 1.0 130000 100 180000
_D 11 r
120000 R'-ot)]) 140000
100 9V
110000 120000
80 100000 60 10 0000
01245789 10 11 J12i450]89 10 II
1\rfTÄ I)1WIHYS CH0111I %ITTR C7tiKY
10111
So e. Flo o" 7
Some Co. t Den oyed T. an " Tro. l Con
-_ Lnrr ISo. Con) -Leer (Sonet Flown) -Laser fPrseý' 0101 -Lmeu (De moved Tr; - 1
200 M _20000
µ V " ' Vm __OOUn
r- . -`'0000
180 2o000U r 16"
_4000U',
ý,
r. 1R1ß E
180000 141
,. ý"000
14111 1 60000 120
ý 130000
ý
120 140000 100 100000 ýJ
-0 8A. la6S
d-os. J
ta 'a ass.. lre i 140000
100 120000 80 d-otHD
120000
80 100000 (. 0 100000
0123456789 10 11 018456709 10 It
Nrl'M [kVIIaae [How I MTIR [>atuatce [H. MIl ]

-s--4
ee <on<. . Cýbtt S«ee Cu swee . suc. <. dw sehe eon
- Ln<n , mpl<ý< .n -L .". (C0. pbte 8O 80. ) -I-- csv< .. dd So a) - la, er (suc .. d4 S 18 .)
Figure E. 16: Effect of probability of mean time to repair damage

180 250000 12u iovx 35000.

y-nog:. ýn r-aoa.
160 300000
"" "'" r" "ý r. "". 210000
140
25.0(, 00 t
750000
100 V _v. - iaa.oo
ýj
80 150000
100000
60 au 100000
u
40 50000
20 50.110
20
0 0 0
0 15 3 45 6 75 9 105 12 135 0 15 3 15 6 75 9 105 12 135
DAIHR ( Fl ,-g Hoar] URQüt [ Mum Hotu ]
Destroyed Tv. "T ,glC..

-- - L. -
-Leer (De. vovedTnns9 (T-, Co. )
120 ""
160
y.. nm.. ýn oe
250000 -. " ". "
.. " r-o o'.. el
0 1 1-IN 0
3ooooo x
p r o
140 Y _
10..
r 2uunuo R
120
50000
y-sao s'"" ýss4xi tp _
'i i V r i, na ýe.. iaýo
11
150000 y _ouoorý
E0
J L 15000(,
B 1000
60
b H 40
o ; nU inn
40
SOOJii E
20 50000
20
00 0 0
0 15 3 45 5 75 9 105 12 135 0 15 3 45 6 15 9 105 12 135
UAUIR [ Fl Boa Hour] DNIHR [ Fhui Ho(u)
" Con Ieb Sorge. " C'n Iet Some Co. " Succe. dW Swee " ce.. fW Swue Co.
-Irrer (Comokte Some. ) -Sorer (Cono00 Some Cot) -Lrer (Socce. t4 S.. rn) -Leer (Sýcce.. fW So. ee Con)
Figure E. 17: Effect of probability of defect man-hour rate
P_h=0. S, P_k_ect=0
"oln. 100 Ph = 0.5. P-k_cxt = 0.25 o x.. 0. sl
170 yýn+. "r\..... " 00'. Is0
R, "u 0ýt1
yýyý.
s lau
130 "ý
1ý y". 1'x. 1"149.'.

w ýý"Rý-09'166
".. 1': xýl"d ^ý,..
130 _ -'ý+. 'ý ýt
N-
120 47.. 175 52 ý yý ý605ý. 16001/
Y --SI 100
Rý -0 9900
110 RI-09913
00 80
07 09 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 39 03 08 09
0 01 02 03 04 05 06
Probab' ' of Kill by Psctruors Probabi' of K il by Prnattators
"P d-0 " P1-111 "P d-05 "P P9 0" Pdý0 9"1d. n". Pd-075
_d-075 " "
ýLnsuW d-Qi -LmerlP 0.051 -Larr(P d (F_d=0) K1 d-0211-lan9. (I_d-0? ) laner(P_d-075
-Lm<"P_d-0257 ýInc"t -Lner
r-oo2:. r Ph
P_h=0.5, P_k_c2d=Ot lao = 0.5, Pk, cKt=0.75 yý. oosY. IN.:
70 I70
60 160
tw 150
Q 1.0
uo
130 130
j
I20 r"-1705-1ö661 120
110 Rß"09315
-.; O csx, 1ý'ýL
00 Y--U32.. IC95 100 39 Na " 39 n
- ..:. H =Ga.,. y.
90 RI-09w "0 Rý =0 9818
80 80
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 0` 03 04 0,06 07 08 09
Prob. bility of Kill by Pmctraows

Probab of Kill by P_d-0'
P
P_-073
" P_d"0 " P_d-025 " P_d"05 " P_4-075 "P d=0 " P-4-02' " "
ýIm. Y3P_d-Oi -L- «& d-025 0.051 I Lo2 Pd=01 d-U15) J-001 d-0
-L-& -Lrrol(P -. -lanes(P -L4n-P -U-(P
Figure E. 18: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and P. = 0.5 on the total
number of sorties flown
ý°° Y li IIPk Y h=u -t. Y k eýY= U_t

ext =u 2010
---- r-. o13:. 17525 _ _ _ y.. 0 1e1v99
Sao R'-oo0n 11 . 02a
180
160 160
1b
120
1 y. :i::::.: 0]01
1CID ~e
^ !' "'-^ ý..
x. 7603[. 17503 df
y" .6373x. 13335 "
80
R, -0 9¢66 R' -09Da3
60
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 00 07 08 09
Pýobab. 4 of KaM by Pen<hatois
P. obab"hh- of Kim by Peu. b6m..
" P_d-0 " Pd-025 " PA-05 " P_d-075 " Pd-0 . Pd-02? "P d-05 " P_d-073
cP d-Qt « (P d-0251 d-03) x(P d-075 d"0) P_d-u25)-L... (P d-05)
-::. -L.. -L-«(P -Lne. -lrnuý -L. .. -t. n... (P d-07
200 P_11 =u -c. Pk_e%l =0S 200 P_11 =u -c. P__est =u -1

y-o 12=. 1vl47 ro 17- 17111
180 Fe -00m9 R, 0015.
180
-=i 6x.
160 1619.160 __ ". xý i". S 00
iý- R'
R'-O 0 9S
140
lm 130
Y-4I '1.1x14:: 3-""ý O
: Do
100 ý.. ,,.,x . 13? ".a
R' -r+lk , "_+
SID Y-. 539h133
80 - -- Y-ýI2zý119ýM
R 09977
Rý-09927
60
0 0.1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
0 111 03 03 01 0" 06 07 08 09
Aabab. Wv of Kdl by Pauh ata o Prol+al+dhv of Iii by paie01 dole
"p d-0 " Pd-035 " P_d-05 " Pd-075 " P_4.0 "P d-035 "P d-05 "P
-d-073
-L..., P d-71 -L.,., P_d-0: 51 -Lm. P d-O5, -L o.. P_d-075) IP d" 01 iP d. 0 i (P d-073
ýIýns"x -Un"riP_d-0751 _(r""f -L..
Figure E. 19: Effect of Po and PKNon with increasing PKExt and PH = 0.75 on the total
number of sorties flown
130 P_11=11: 5. P_1: v--002.124 ým Y 1ý=uZ5. P k eý1=u1ý y- DOS.-1 4V

_cl=11 Rý-7E-03 --- Rý "0 0017
23 `ý
20 "r Irr'Kyr..
ý,.. ýý"w"r'1.. ý""'riw
115 ".
ý' 110 "" ti w

Y'-n 41z. i¢o'100 110
103 '-'ý.: Ia
105 Y'
F'"ý'f'-ý 08730 "
y.. 1998.. 12414 lco
93 R-09189 Y". 1982x+11363
qs F'-iayy
90 R'-09756
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 go
Plobabdily of fiat ln* Pamhata 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
" P_d-0 " Pd-025 " Pd-05 " P_d-073 P1al.,., v cS Kill L w-Ph
aic ata
" P-4-0 .P fP . P4-075
-Lmra(P-d-01 P 4.025 (P_d-051 ., (P_d-075j -d-025 -d-05
-ýr" -Imru -L
130 P h=029. P-k-eaY=ilc y- 018.12333

P h=0 .25 . Pk a¢=0 73 r-on:. lnu
-
130 . Rý-001St
Rý - 0009 - -
135 125
130
130 y_. S Sh. 11
IIS
113 -O e60i
"" I10
I10 105
.ý_
"f y~
105 Y_. ý"I7a1o 3ýV
9S
100 y-. 1221-1107
Rß0 ", r-. 1759a. 11006
R, -0'
95 Y=-18>t"1130" 33 R' - 09636
W
=O%79
90 80
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
0 01 02 03 01 05 Od 07 O8 09
P, oballh o1} :i t". Prob '' of KM Pmeh. bn
"P d-0 fP "P " P_4073 P_d-0 d-07ý P_d-05 P_d-073
-d-025 -d-05 " "P " "
-L.... (P a-0) -L -. (P d-025 -Ln.. (P_d-05) -L.. Lnea(P 4-01 -Ln. " P d-O23 -L , P_d-051 -Lw.. (P_d-03
_d-073
Figure E. 20: Effect of Po and PKNon with increasing PKExt and PH = 0.25 on the total
number of targets killed
P h=0.5, P k et=0 Y-102=*12404 =ooz "1:. 1

130 133 P h=O 5 Pk oct=02t 00
_ R- . .
Ip
ý
Y 110 110
f
"
x 1oo 100
^'" ý"y 'ý
ý Y-1334x. 12393
y yý
90 R, 011 90 l]x 1201e
2692a. 121i y=_13
(ý-
R'-o9r7 AO a' -neue
8o 445
_ ....
Y-A062. -" 35 01- 112 16
70 -y-
70 Ill "09932
R'=0989
60 60
0 01 02 0 01 02 03 30 3'. nn 05 OA 09
03 04 05 06 07 08 09
ProbabWly of Kill by Pmeb*Drs Probabliry of KdI by Pmmaton
" P_d-0 " P_d-025 " P_d-0, " P_d-075 ---ý---
P =0 " P_d-0.5 " P- - 0 '" F_ d-0 ]t
_d _d
ýLn"rý d"0) -L-,. (P d-025) -Ln. u(P_d-0s, -L-., P 4-07 Is, er (P d=0? -Is- 1P_d=02'I -Luca P d00) --Ln<a (P_d=075
Ph=0.5 Y--0 0399 12375 Y 81=05. P k e\Y=O'S Y--013, -12322

130 , Pk e7#=0.5 RI-00018
130
R-
30 0
y-IZ'e.. u51a
110 f
110 R-09339
"
100 .: 00
iii ""
ý "
90 90
7""M
ij ý.... ,
Y-13z,. 11]SSý'`7rý. so
E- 80 R -09 an5 1;u 7 ,n
Y-. 2961. "96364
90 R'09737 Y- 3162x. 10283 70
°-09813
R'-09833
60 60
0 01 02 03 0e 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 03 06 07 08 09
Probability of KiM by P« etsk rs Piobab&y of KA by Pauh: tolx

" P_d-0 " P_d"025 " P_d-05 " P_d-075 " Pd"0 f P_e-075 fP d-05 fP d-075
_
ýIme"r (P tl-07 . (P_d-025) -Lm"a(P d-05, -Lner(P d-07 -L .. (P d-01 -Ln. a 1P 0 025, ýP d-0"ý Ln... ýP d-07<
-L -Lne.,
Figure E. 21: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and PH = 0.5 on the total
r--o l5s. lbb

130 Pk P1I=II -ý, P i: 2ý
eCt=u 130 iX1=ll Rý"OOOeI
-
Im 036x. 127442 120
y-.
itrý RI -0 0261
110 110
ýj " " ý "
:l 100 100
20,7x. 12>23 " M 90 ýti

R, 09803 JST" 117ýj
ºý"ýý
80 Y.
123 91 y-A77%+10597 1--Y""ý

y--5838x. 60
&09964 R- 0 9938
50
0 01 02 03 04 03 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probat v of Kim by Peueb sta .c PlobobiWv of K by PeueaatN
" P_d-0 " Pd-025 " P_d-05 " P_4 -075 " P_4-0 " Pd-025 "P d-05 " P_4-075
-I-.. (P-d-0')) -Ln"u(P_d-025) -L. -P_6-05) -Ln"u(P_6-075) -Lnru(P_d-0) -(mw(P_d-0251-1--(P d-05) -Lruu(P_d-07
y- 002x"12377 y. 12363
130 P_h'S. PA_eaY=uff I P_h=u-ý, P k_e! cto

-9u3
_ - oýel
Im Io20
r- 133os. 11383
I10 110 Y 1711x. 110?
ý(
i " R' 06
1ý Rs: 9oP
IUO
90 "
^ý vU
m t so
70
v It 17 . + 102 sa
60
/' "wr '
-0 E'.J3 . 91653 y
60 ýý"ýyýý
30 y- 3.03x. 80792/ ýý
' ý` r ' "^`
k-"f. 'ec Y-. _
Rý-9914
Fe- 0 30
Rs-09913
0 01 02 03 04 OS 06 07 08 09
0 01 02 03 0" 0' 06 01 02 09
IN obabdu of KAYb% Paget] A" , Prob+i, dt} of KIR be pa. eh4 OI,
" P4-0 " Pd-025 "P d-05 "P d-075 P_d-025 P_4-0. ', d--075
-__ "P 4-0 " " "P..,
_
-L-,., P d-ol -Ln. u1P d-0251 -1--t? d"05 74-075)
-Lrrr(P -L... "p e"0, -l, neu ýP_e-U2cý -Ln. r ýP_d"o'ý -1-..,? _d-073A
Figure E. 22: Effect of PD and PKN, with increasing PKExt and PH = 0.75 on the total
on
P_6 =0!. P_k_ext = 0I 52500000 P-11 P 1, Co -U -5

52500000
-
! 7500000 oJOOOOo
r""ý 'J (i 500000

37500000
9ý 1UT
37300000 17500000
31500000 13500000
27500000 27500000
2]700000 23500000
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 06 09 0 01 02 03 0.05 0e 07 08 09
P. obibdh' of Kill by, Pa. ehatas Probdnlh of Kill bN.Peuehwols

d-0 -P d"025 -P d"03 -P d-073
Pd"OS -P d-0 -P d-035 -P 0.05 -P d-077
--P-d-O -Pd"025 --- -P 1.075
Figure E. 23: Effect of Po and PKNon with increasing PHExt and PH = 0.5 on the total
operational cost
5750oao0 Y h= u -5. Pko t- u: 5
5750000/0
oc
42MWW
37500000
33500000
27
n5om
0 01 07 03 04 05 0e 07 03 D9
Psoba, i v of Kill by Pn*d salon

F----; 7d
-0 -P-d-025 -P d-05 - d-073
P_h =0 "ý. P_k_ext = lI lk P_h =u -c. P_k_ext' u -'

3750mm 57A0M
57500000 szwaroo
0500000 n5ooaoo
42: -00000 711: a7oooo0
,
37 30M 37-IOM
_jv
32?00000 32!00000
27500000 rwoaoo
n?0ooo0 usooooo
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 0,06 07 OB 09
Piobabi ofK by Peue6atoia Prob: bJv. of Bill by Paieh door,

-P d-0 -P d-075 -P d-07 -P d-07?
Figure E. 24: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKE. and PH = 0.75 on the total
t
operational cost
26°°°° P - lý 25. Pk oct -u 25

-h
ý7aooo
z000o
180000
NW
C.ý
i laooo
00000
0 01 02 03 04 0! 06 07 0Y 09
Piob: l, rdv of i iMby Paw io of
-P d-0 -P_40 35 -P-4 . 05 -P d-075
Figure E. 25: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and PH = 0.25 on the
cost[$]/sortie
F_h -0 5" P_k_cxl -05 Ph -o5, Pk ext-u'c

450000 600000
+00000 500OW
Y Y
350000
300000
700000
10000
moooo wN
]OpOpp
150000 100000
100000
0 01 02 03 04 03 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 00 09
Pi oh .Ih' of Nil by Penehod.ir

-P d. 0 -P_d-033 -P_d-03 -P d-075 e"o -P_e"o 75 -P 6.05 -P e"0ý5
-P
Figure E. 26: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and PE, = 0.5 on the
cost[$]/sortie
?rooooo P-11 = (I'ý. Yk ext = 11_c
eoomo
500000
x0000
300000
iuuooo
100000
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probabdh of KiM by Peadiolon

e-073
I -r d-0 -p-d. 025 -p-d-05 -r
P h=u-5. Pk_nt=u5 P_ý°0-' P_k ext=U-a

700000 aooom
600000 700000
tY S b0ý
500000
:/EtT11
1
500000
AD=
-jv ö
300000
moooo
100000 ioaooo
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 06 09
Piobabdh' of Kill by PeneIaol, Probabdh' of KA by Pci io*ar

0 1-023 -P-d-05 -P-d- 075
-P-d- -P-,
cost[$]/sortie
330000
100000
F
r., zýaooo
Iz 20=
ýsoooo
Ol 02 03 0A 05 06 07 00 09
0
h oWt Uy of Kill by Peuedata'
I -P e-0 -P-4-02-1 -F d. 03 -P d-075
. 70000 unooo P d- 0 . ý. Pk act - 0'5

. 00000 4omm
q1.370000 asoooo
3000Do
~... 25000D 2soaoo
. n
ö
yppnpp 200000
130000
150000
iooooo
100000
0 01 02 0l 0.0s 06 07 08 09
0 01 02 03 0.05 06 07 0 09
Prol kdjv, of KK by, Peue4atoaa
-P d-0 -P d-015 -e d-05 -P_ d-073 -p_a-o -P_a-025 -P -P_6-075

_d-03
Figure E. 28: Effect of PD and PKNon with increasing PKExt and P., = 0.25 on the
cost[$]/target
72aoo
P h=o'. P A etl-0 asoooo p ho 0. Pk ect °o -c
650000
X50000
9,. 650000
550M0
55x000
uaom
330000
350000
-ýJ
230000 350000
X30000 150000
0 01 02 03 04 01 06 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 0.0? 06 07 08 09
PInbabdh n! Kil be Penh, so Pitobabity of Ku bý Paiebta>;
I -P d"0 -P-d-025 -P d"03 -P_4073 -e d-0 -e e-025 -P e-05 -e e-075
cost[$]/target
113m
P_h=o-a, p =pc P_A -0 'i. P_k_ext -0 -5
115oom
1050000 loxooo
4 950000 4 95000D
ý' 810000 ý' 850000
I'" 750000 F i5aooo
67000Dý
M
ý, 65aaoo
170000
ssaooo
00000
350000 ýý
750000
110000 170000
Im 190000
0 01 02 03 0.01 0e 07 08 09 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Probabity of Ka Im Pe uft-Aoi PAobabkv' of II by Pnleio on

I
-9 e-o -P-d-025 -P_4-05 -e e-075
Figure E. 30: Effect of PD and PKNo, with increasing PKE, and PH = 0.75 on the
t
cost[$]/target
Fig. E. 31 - E. 49 show the results of the effect of all major aircraft MOPs predicted in
this study on the operation and operational cost MOEs.
210
P d1U1. Y klu 1. DDIHR W 31 P d(0.25): P k(0); DMHR (0.5)
_ _ _ _
200 y-. 1942. -19798 200 1972.19797
-- v-
-- -- - -- Re-09955 `_-
1w -`ýý.
__ ý-
130 - -- -ý--- -
r4 170 5138.. 19223 k" 1ý
y-. yýS15 h"1931I
160 Re -0 995 1.0 Rý s0 9956
ISO Ic0
140 42 140
130 Fý-0 N3'ß -36
120 30
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 0 04 005 006 007 000 009
Defect Aji<ul>s
MTTR45 -M rrRO -MTTR2 -MTTR45
-MTTR0 -MTTR2 -
L-.. r(MTTR1) (MTTR 7t L-.. (M7TR 4 S) Lner (M'rTR0) -L. (MTrR2) -Lneer(MTTR45)
-Lmeu -
P_d(O. 75); P_k(0); DMHR (0.5)

P_AIO 51. P_AW(l 1. DALHR it, 5) 310
210
y.. 1941a+19796 19790
200 . 1931X*
- _" - -ý R2 -0 9958 - R' .0 9955
190 "., 190 "_ -_
_
LL1.. 170 1ý 3x+ 19I 05

x . 541 1: + 193 1 yý N5
g 1
160 R3 -0 9956 1.0 Rý ý0 9¢5ý
ig,
O 150 150
. xý1, (, 71 110
130 S'-, 130
120 120
0 001 002 003 004 005 000 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 30 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Arse
Defect. ilsrta
0- MTTR 2 - M0TR 0- MTTR 2 -MTTRO5
-MTTR -M7TRa5
Ln"", (?.MR 0) (MTTR23 MTTR. 51 L. (MTIR 0) - laser (MTrR_) -Lneu (MTTR45)
ýLn". -Ln"a
Figure Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDt f,,, on the total
E. 31:
number of sorties flown with PKNon= PKExt = 0.00
P_d(0)-. P_k(O. 25); DMHR. (0-5) P_d(0.25). P_k(0.25): DMI-4R (0.5)

210
200 Is
y--1982x+199 ISO
L9I72 90
170
w Sýy
160
y- 4T ft- 119 39
150 9911
R3-09915 Rý -0
N)
1,0
1ý0 ^114xý1`JO nd
y_
.
1]o v- so da. 1'o 7-
130 I: -o-10
20 20
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 0 0¢ 0 001 002 003 0 00 005 006 007 003 009
2 II eri II
-MTTRO -MrrR
L (M'RRO) -L.. (MTTRS) -I+nerR(MTPRý5)
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.25); DMFR (0.5) P_d(0.75). P_k(O. 25): DWR (0.5)

ISO 170
1069xý 1]01 y fi54x"1 '. 730
N 160
Y-v wý"ý _ ýJýt_1ti" U61 nr Rý 0 o-N'/ý
160
ýýý_ _Y ý 1/ý rýrtiJ`! ýý ý"ýJý
Fd 150 V"
150
ly 110 yý-lIS 2x" IN ý6
1 Rýý09d61
IJO
I 30 yn<01
1- Rß'0 120
y4099- 166M
10 R 09911 110
100 100
0 001 002 003 00-4 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 000 009
11 M TT" II 11 ne: "MTTR4 11
L eei (MTTR0) rrRZ) (MT1R45) laM (MOTPRO) 1) -finer 11

-IrearR(M -T. -freu(MTTR
Figure E. 32:
Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefect on the total
P dw 1. P k(1 ! I. DMHR to P_d(0.25); P_k(0.5). DMFii

-- so (0.5)
y- . 1995x*19819 y--lo]6a" 1]062
100
_ -" , R, 0996
ftft -
wft __
.".,
ý. -ý "vh"'ý-tim
tý_ . ý, .. Y_
180 -. -_ ti. 160 _
..
19113 150
y--3339x.
-ý, R2-099M 140 R'-09895
v
14D y - g6a 6 x . W041 15 170 V= 4; 14 rý i /4 as
k'-uouiý N 120
120
110
100 100
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 0 04 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Al I. Mi¢
-MTTRO -MTTR I- MTrR45 MTTRO -MTFR2 -MTTRI5
L-... (MTTRO) r (MTTR 2- L.. (MTPR 45) Lner (MrTRO) I. er (MTTR') (MTTR45)
-Lm. - -liner
P_d(0.5): P_k(0.5); DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.75): P_k(0.5 ): DMilB. (0.5)

160 .0 ,=1 2x. 128 75
= .. x- 14817 rY-oooo5
150 130
110
ý
yý. za9 sxýýýs 3z eP -o9ziý
130 Diu
R'-o9u
uo Boa
yv=.. H __uc.,..
u.. . vo"
110 90
100 80
0 001 002 003 0 01 005 006 007 008 0 00 0 001 002 003 00.005 006 007 008 009
11 ýMrTR0 -MTTR2 -M'(TR45

Lner(MTTRO) -L . -(MtTR_) -U. earR(MTTRý5) LLner(MTTR0) -L. (M7TR2) -U. -(MTTR ý')
Figure E. 33:
Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT Roe on the total
fCCt
P_d4oi, Pkw 31. DDfliR 4u tl P_d(0.25): P_k(0.75): DMI-üt (0.5)

210 7o
y 66z: " 16149
IOU - -ý Y.. 20ý1aý19831 160 08011
90 _ - -' -- -_ _r `^r, i
- Ra-09961 "! ý. -ýý,. w
___ _ 150
80
ri 170 140 y -NS ]x " 157 27
191]6 Fe -0 9902
160 Y--3476x.
1? 0
RI -0 9948
150
120 Y =. }q' S;:. ý: "Jv
- Rý 14
130 110
N'. i....
121 100
0 001 002 003 004 003 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 0M 00,006 007 008 009
-MTTRO -MTTR 2 -MTTRA5 -MrrR0 -MTTR2 -MTTR45

1-.., (MTTR Ch -Lan. v MTTR 2 u (MTTR 45) Lne. (MTTR0) tMTrR 2) 5)
-lm. -lanes -laner(MTT
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.75); DA97ßt (0.5) P_d(0.75) P_k(0.75): DMI-

I4p Its . (0.5)ý
130 Ilo lly V--I
ý'V AjV/1 . ý11 iý
Y6 ýx"Il? 11 os
130 R, 0S665
Rý-OOIýa
ti ly 100
I10
.ý
100 k"=ý]"ýìl Y-306 ]x"ID 59
00
R' -0 9576 MS
t. -Ibx 91 h. Id/13
op v
85 R, =U rD?
0 7687
30 80
0 001 0 02 003 004 005 006 007 000 009 0 001 003 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
11 -MTTRO MT TR. 5 1111

-MTrR2 - -MTTRO -MTTR2 -MTfR15
Lner(MTrRO) -Lner(M7TR2) Lner(MTTR-S) Lner(MTrR0)
- -Lner(M7TR21 -Lner(MTTR45)
Figure E. 34:
Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT RDe on the total
feCt
number of sorties flown with PKNoý = PKExý= 0.75
P_d(0.25); P_k(0.25); DXM (0.5)

180000
160000
IýD000
.
130000
100000
80000
60000
V X0000
20000
0
0 001 002 003 0a 001 006 007 003 009
I 45
-MTfR0 -MTTR2 -MTi
P_d(0.5); P_k(O. 25); DMHR. (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(0.25); DM-IR (0.5)

50000 3oooaa
zoooou
ý,, p. Y 0000
_ý p
y
200000 VVYVVUVYI111
ý--.
. 150000
'-' 100000
T/1 100000
V UG
soooo soooo
0 001 002 003 004 005 0 06 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 001 0 0'" 006 007 008 009
II MTTR 0- M"rR 2 II M'rrR 0 2- MTTR 45 1

- -MTfR45 - -MTfR
Figure E. 35: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT RDe [$] /sortie
fect on cost
with PKNon= PKExt = 0.25
P_((O. 25): P_k(0.5): DMFQt(0.5)

220000
EEE ý: ýfffffflt:: 11
4
81 140000
120000
100000
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 006 009
Defect Ares
ýM7TR0 -M7TR2 -MTIR4 5
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.5); DMEüt (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(O. 5); DMHR (0.5)

nsoooo 450000
300000 . ooooo
ýSOOOO
vi 250000
_rh.
=. ýooooo
M_
'-' 200000
]50000
v
isoaoo 200000
100000 150000
0 001 002 003 0w 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 001 004 005 0 00 007 008 009
II - MTTR 0- MTTR 2 MTTR 0- MTTR 2

-MTTR/? - -M1TR45
Figure E. 36: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDPIPCt on cost[$]/sortie
P_d(O. 25). P_k(0.75); DMHR (0.5)

300000
230000
260000
240000
220000
200000
180000
160000
140000
120000
1uuuuu
0 001 002 003 001 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Ans
-M'lTRO -MTFR2 -MTTR45
P_d(O. 5). P_k(O. 75); DM1U P d(0.75); P_k(0.75); D MR (0.5)

450000 (0.5) 600000
E.00000
4aoooo zooooo ný
.2Y
ýooooo
NS
300000
250000
7ý7 gi 200000
200000
50000 tooooo
100000 0
0 001 002 003 0N 0 05 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 00.005 006 007 008 009
MTTR0 MTTR2 5 -MTTR0 TR2 -MT rR45

- -M=4 -MT
Figure E. 37: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDQ

fett on cost[$]/sortie
with PKNon= PKEzt = 0.75
P_doo. P_klul. DM11R 1u 3) P_d(0.25); P_k[0): DN4HR (0.5)

1ý 1e0
10
40 _ h. 11816
10 - Y--1003z. 1ýY ýý_ vý7e1
__
130 , 09969 IJO
130 120
110 ý-ý- 110
100 100
90 . 13 14
1- 14268
-9
SD Rý-. 11 Y--6W 80 ka-,, r., Yý-6051i. 11137
X
Re - 09913 R? .0 9935
70 70
60 60
0 001 002 003 001 003 006 007 008 009 0 001 003 003 004 001 006 007 008 009
t), 1t t As ii a¢ Defect Arising
-MTTRO -MTTR3 -MTTRIS -MTrRO -MTTR_2 -8/TTR15

L-(M7'TR0) -Lmer tUTTR l) MTTR 151 l. ner(MTTR0) -L- (MT)R 2) -hoer MTTR15)
-Lne..
P d10 91. P kin). DAIHR N !) P_d(O. 75); P_Ig0); DMHR. (0.5)

160 _ _ 160
ISO 150
1ý0 -- Y--393:. 14808 r- 198 1- 148 39
O _ ti
W0 9965 le -o 9965
130 ý JO
110 _ý
---
4.100 po loo
F 9o ot3-14, rn
-603 3z- I43 Yb0. ft- 4z 13
80 R, -0991x' 30 R, =o. ",
&-09920 W-0991
70 n
60 60
0 001 002 003 004 003 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 on, 006 007 008 009
Deihl. -U wiIY
-MTTR O -MTTR 2 -MTTR. S MTTR2 - MTTR45

-
L-- 0TTR 0) - Ln. r iMTTR 2) -L.... (MTTR 45) Lner (Ml'R0) .. f MITR1) -Lner IMTTR. 5)
-L
Figure E. 38: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeet on the total
number of targets killed with PKNan = PKExt = 0.00
P_d(0); P_k(0.25): DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.25); Pk(O. 25); DMHR (0.5)

160 so
Iso _ý--1 140
$ 130 °`ý_ý_
130 ` _ 4[M fixIda zs v=-3`34-13633
ý
W
1zo Y.
110
0N
.
100
ppypp
41
ao 80 ft'=C.
_ ýyý1132
70
y -611 Sx. 103 1 yý.
Re =0 9914 R'- 09915
60 60
0 001 0 03 003 004 005 006 007 009 009 0 001 002 003 000 005 006 007 008 009
11 R(MTrRO) R(M7TR2) ýMrrR0 -M7TR2 -MTTR

U. - (MTTR4 S) 4n<s (MTrRO) 2) (MTTR15)
-L -u- -In ., (M7TR -Lnar
P_d(O. 5); P_k(O. 25); DMI-Rt (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(0.25). DMEit (0.5)
130 120
110
Y- 3061XI 12548 =-1599xý 115
100 _ý
09558 0 9804
00 ..
L4
80 4N 7. I0E 3
80 v-rr rx-: i>>
R'=oý3's5 R'0980.4282.111281
70 y-A873a-12247 70
Rý- 0 9917 Re-09907
60 60
0 001 0.02 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 009 00'. 006 007 008 009
-MrrRO -MTTR2 -MITR. 5 -MTTR0 -M7TR2 -M7TR45

Un-(M7TRO) -Lnear(MTrR2) -Lner(MTTR45) 4new(MTrR0) -L.,. (MTrR2) -Uner(MTFR45)
Figure E. 39: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeCt on the total
number of targets killed with PKNon= PKEyt = 0.25
P dlol. Pkw 9). hr1HR (u 61 P_d(0.25); P_k(0.5): DMHR (0.5)

_ 130
150
Itl 043aý14816
C - Yý. 3106x-12633
3 1, Rý - 09918
o 9391
1A1 ._- -, Y loo
110
100 yn "0
v-a.., oaýicoa,
yoiv . Ial is IFt
so K' .O ýioo
R'-uvêvý
ý yý. 61l3xa 113lä -ýE6 Exý
70
70 R'-09915 Fe 0 9902
60 60
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 000 009 0 001 002 003 0M 005 006 007 000 009
Defect
_ý ISUkg_
-MTTR0 -MTTR 2 -MTTR45 MTTR 0- M7TR 2 -MTTR. 5
ün.., (MTTR 0) -. v 6MTTR 31 - (MTTR 4n L. (MTIR0) Lne. (MTrR 2) Lanett (MTiR. 5)
-{. -1, - - -
P_d(O. 5); P_k(0.5); DMiüt (0.5) P d(0.75); P k(0.5); DMHR

120 100 (0.5)
_ _
110 90 tirý(1ý 180 Ox- 92 979
_ f- JA- v=
100 y- 236 3x. 108 26 - R, -0 9505
80
aC oo .. - ý--wY-
70
ao
Fm a' =na, zýo

375011105] w =OýJI y--277 E><-"0"
y=.
.0 50
R'- 0997 Rý-09E61
50 40
0 001 002 003 001 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
11
ýMTTR0 -MTTR3 -MTTR45 MTTRO -MVrR2 -MTTR45
liner(M TTR0) ear(MTrR? ) (MTTR451 l, ner(MrTRO) 2)
-L -"new -Imeu(MiTR -Lne. (MTTR45)
Figure E. 40: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefect on the total
number of targets killed with P, t, = PKExt = 0.50
on
6o P_d(O). P_k(0.75): DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.25): P_k(0.75); DU- (0.5)

130
Is0
Ig
Ij _
R =J ý` 11662
R, =ýl ßa1'+ Y--6018x. 14171 Yýýý2elx.
10 60 R' -0 9928
-0 9922
6p
0 001 002 003 0N o0? 006 007 Cos 009 0 001 002 003 001 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Arising Defect Arica
-MTTRo -M7TR2 -MTPRO 5 -MTTRO -MTTR2 -MTTR15

Lne. (M7TR0) -L e. (MTTR2) -Lner(MTTR45) Lae. (MTTRO) (MTTR2) (MTTR45)
-1-1. -Lae.
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.75); DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(0.75): DMHR (0.5)

I00 80
9`. 7,
,ý V. II0 Sx"74732
90 8e3 ý"ý/ýýýýý
ý Y: 19ýSa"9? 4 70 /ý 0 9018
85
75 0
70 pq 55
F. 65 [. y= loo 1x"6£03.:
Rý=009£10 50
60 Rý=OaoA 7399
-29'1 3x. 92 7%
y yý-1915z.
55 Rý -0 9871 05 R' -0 9638

50 00
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
Defect Arising Defoct Ans
-MrTR0 -MTtR2 -MTTR45 -MTTR0 -MTTR2 -MTTR. 5
U. I. (MTFRO) -I-eu(MTTR_2) -Lnea(MTTR45) Imear(MTrRO) -Lnear(MTTR2) - Lner (M17RO 5)
Figure E. 41:
Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefect on the total
number of targets killed with PKNon= PKExt = 0.75
P_(NOI. P_kiul. I)? 1HR 4u SI P_d(0.25); P_k(0); DNUIR (0.5)

195000 o00
19r.
E 190000 {ýý1 190000

ý.Y TV"
Fz Issooo F- 185000
Y° 2759U1 I V7 1
y- 33197.. 151191
II &-0 150000 R' -0 523
0r 6237
O
193000 1]5000
170000 170000
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 005 009 007 008 009
Defect Aawum
DC&ct Arisne
-MTTRO -MTTR2 -MTTR45 -Ln.., (MTTR2) -MTrRO -M"ITR2 -MTTR4, -1mer(MTTR2)
P_MO S 1. P_Alu I. DAIHR 1(1 31 P_d(0.75); P_k(O); DG-Qt (0.5)

195000 195000
t9oooo 11110,1111 190000

yo
tasooo lasooo
r- z99oa:, tan9v My -29510x- 187045 90

taoooo R'-osss7 `--' 130000 R' .0 62
ns0oo 175000
170000 170000
0 001 007 003 004 005 006 007 006 009 0 001 002 003 0 04 005 006 007 005 009
Defect A11nY*II
-MTTRO -MTTR2 -MTTRA5 -Ln.. uiMTTRZ) -MTTR0 5

-MTnt2 -MiTR. -uner(Mrrn2)
Figure E. 42: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDC on cost[$]/target
PKExt 0.00
fr, t
with PKNon
P_d(0.25); P_k(0.25). DINEit (0.5)

00000
no000
200000
_ 150000
17 100000
O
50000
0
0 001 002 003 000 00` 000 007 008 009
Dcfect Aril
ýMTTR0 - MrrR 3 -MTrR45
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.25); DMHR (0.5) P_d(0.75); P_k(0.25); DMHR (0.5)

350000 420000
300000
770000
ýu 250000
200000 EAý" 320000
150000
270000
1S
O 100000
220000
00000
170000
0 001 002 003 001 005 006 007 000 0 09 0 001 002 003 001 0 0`. 006 007 008 009
-MTTR0 -MTrR2 -MTTR45 =R0

r. - MTtR2 - MTTR, 5
Figure E. 43: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT RDQ on cost [$] /target
fett
P_d(0.25): P_k(O. 5): DMEIR (0.5)

330000
310000
290000
!
Fw`ý z70000
250000
- 230000
210000
190000
170000
0 001 002 003 000 005 006 007 008 009
Dcfoct Arising
-MTI'R0 -M1TR2 -MTrR4 0
P_d(0.5). P_k(0.5): DMHE. (0.5) P_d(0.75): P_k(0.5); DMFÜt (0.5)

520000 esoooo
470000 50000
9) 420000
550000
ýýQ
E'
ýýgLL-ý
170000 F
500000
320000
450000
no000
U
220000 400000
170000 350000
0 001 002 003 0 01 005 006 007 008 000 0 001 002 003 0 01 005 006 007 009 009
II -MTTRO 1 II MTTR 0- M7TR45 1

-MTrR2 -MTTR45 - MTFR 2-
Figure E. 44: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeCt on cost[$]/target
with PKNon PKExt 0.50
P_d(O. 25 P_W0.75). DMHR 10.5)

420000 ..
noooo
pq
E. 7zoooo
270000
bS
220000
1]0000
0 001 002 003 0M 00s 006 007 008 009
Dcfcct Artsing
-M7"fR 0- MTTR 2- MTIR 45
P_d(0.5); P_k(0.75); DM1 (0.5) P_d(O. 75); P k(0.75); DMFQ. (0.5)

MOON . soo0oo
600000 800000
» ýnnnnn
pp 500000
("" 600000
400000 500000
r
300000 400000
e7 bf 300000
200000
C.ý 200000
100000 100000
0 0
0 001 002 003 0 04 005 006 007 008 009 0 001 002 003 004 0 00 006 007 008 009
-MTfR0 1 11 It0 5
-M7TR2 -MTTR45 -MT -M'iTR2 -MTrR.
Figure E. 45: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefCCt on cost[$]/target
P_d(O. 25): P_k10): DMFüt (0.5)

2850ooao
26500000 -- ja0 26500000
ý_ y-. 3O9 100x T169b6883
, _ OOVV8280x" 216'+8912 M00
34500000 _-OODUO
t
ý.
225000M
ms0oooo
lasooooo y--ll23b42O . zý".szm, ý Re' 0 -1/500000
16300000 RI-ow
Y - - 1105670O x ý36]ý06896A
ý 1'500000 d- o99
12300000 12500000
009 0 001 002 003 001 005 000 007 008 009
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 00] 002
Ilei. Ct 41L. Yig
.
43 RO -MTTR. 5
-MTTRO -TT" 3 -1ATTR -MT -MTTR3
L. w. (MTTR0) (M,. 7) L... 4MTTR 43) L- (M7TR0) -lrer(MTTR2) -L, -(MlTR45)
ýLn... -
P_d(O. 75); P_k(O): DMHR (0.5)

28500000
P_dw ! ý. P_km
.
LUTI (0 $1 28500000
26300000 ---`_r 26500000 Y-7ae3lo2o:. 2W%255 02
17670716 61
. T06m3o:.
14500000 24500000 R' I
R' - 100 -- ý-- -
22500000 (, 12500000
....
`_~
]0300000 2olooooo
18500000 t[io4tiluxý3n'. I? olýaý Islooooo 18114 11.

Y'-I
16'00000 R'-0
16300000 668770/ )0
ý 76'rt169ý6 i9 Y--; 10659280x.
JF Y- -I 1039360a
14500000 14500000 R'-099
RI-Ow
11500000 12500000
009 0 001 002 003 OW 005 006 007 008 009
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 001 008
Defect AIwra¢
.S -MTTR 0 -MTTR 2 -MTTR45

ýMTTRO -MTTR1 -MTTR
47, laer(MfR 0, U. -MT TR45)
laýýt7. fTTR Ot -L ..., MTTR 2, -Uw (M1TR
Figure E. 46: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDefeCt on the total
PKExt 0.00
operational cost [$1 with PKNon - =
P_d(O); P_k(O. 2. ); DMIW. (0S) P_d(0.25): P_k(O. 25): D? & (0.5)

2910NM 35000000 .
26700000 M 30000000
y- 7240aaA0:. 27nyS39 61
.
26! 00000 fl3 2'000000
Fw- 100
u 2umooo ''-___
20000000
15000000
IaJ00000
Pý -
X0000000
16500000
Yý1119a951Ia + 26619104 22
L7WWO
5000000
R. -099
12500000 0
0 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 004 009 0 001 002 003 000 005 006 007 008 009
-MTTRO -MTTRI -MTTRý) II

- MTTR 0- MTTR 2 -MTTR45
Lu(MTTRO) -Lor. (MTTR2) -Lm.. ýMttR4S)
d(O. S). P_k(O. 25); DNCHR (0.5) P_d(0.73); P_k(0.25); DMHR (0.5)
40000000 47500000
33000000 N 42500000
30000000 1ý1 37500000
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II 5 II R1 5
-Mann -MTtR' -MVTR, -MTTR0 -MV -MTrf.
Figure E. 47: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, Po and MTTRoe fett on the total
operational cost [$] with PKNon= PKExt = 0.25
P Mu 1. P k((. ! ). DmHP, (o 5) P_d(0.25); P_k(O. 5); DNGM (0.5)

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hefecf Au. -uf¢
-MTTRO -MTTRI -MTTR
- MTTR 0- MTTR 2- MTTR4
L-. r(MTTRO) 21 (MTTR 45)
-I--MTTR -L-..
P_d(O. 5): P_k(0.5): DMI{R (0.5) P d(0.75); P_A(0.5); DMÜR (0.5)

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- MTrR0 -MTrR.? MTTR0 - MTTR2 - MTTR45

-MTrR2
Figure E. 48:
Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTT RDe on the total
fCC,
operational cost [$] with PKNon= PKEzt = 0.50
P_d(0). P_k(0.75); DMHR. (0.5) P_d(0.25); P_k(0.75): DMHR (0.5)

30500000 "-x500000
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Loer (MTPRO) -L . (MTrR21 (MTTRý5)
-Unea
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II -MTfR0 1 11 M1TR MTTR 3- MTTR4'

-MTTRI -MrrR41 - 0-
Figure E. 49: Effect of aircraft defect arising rate, PD and MTTRDQ on the total
fett
operational cost[$] with PKNon= PKEx, = 0.75
Following are results from two alternative optimisation by using six aircraft MOPS to
find the possible optimum solution to design an operational and cost-effectiveness U-99,
case study aircraft. Table E. 3 shows the overall results from the gradient-based method
optimisation. Fig. E. 50 E. 53 show the developments of the optimised solution by using

-
the gradient-base method.
Table
E. 3: Total results from the gradient-based method optimi
Minimise Maximise
Defect Arising 0.029519 0.099899 0.00494 0.00
PD 0.062758 0.117555 0.29574 0.00
PKNon 0.371593 0.485130 0.007653 0.618059
PKE 0.515784 0.216124 0.148098 0.330151
xt
MTT RDef ect 4.180827 6.534311 0.6544909 0.00
DMHR 0.00 5.374156 5.092504 4.074727
Sorties Flown 171 128 185 198
Complete Sorties 151 90 177 193
Successful Sorties 116 68 134 148
Targets Killed 120 78 136 150
Aircraft Killed 1 1 1 0
Cost [$] /Sortie 131547.125 117821.8125 142369.2188 143275.9844
Cost [$] /Target 187454.6562 193348.6094 193664.0000 189124.2969
Iterations 232 244 205 868
1200000 160
140
1000000
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200000
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0 0
0 30 100 130 200 250 0 50 100 150 200 250
Itc7atious Ita it ion
Figure E. 50: Development of the possible minimum cost [$] /target solution by using the
gradient-based method
Table E. 4 show the overall results of the possible solutions optimised by the genetic
algorithms, and Fig. E. 54 - E. 57 show the improvements of populations during the opti-
misation process.
200
.,. 100
50
0 50 100 1') 200 250 300

Polnilatºoii
Figure E. 51: Development of the possible minimum cost[$]/sortie solution by using the
1400000
V 1200000
or
1000000
800000
"...
600000
ýýý
17 400000
rJ 200000 iý n~~ ý'
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0
0 50 100 150 a, IJ ,. l
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Figure E. 52: Development of the possible maximum targets killed solution by using the
Figure E. 53: Development of the possible maximum sorties flown solution by using the
leis
14 0
'i"
ý.
lOr
gn
dry
rIAOM
F 40
20
0
0 2000 4000 6000 3000 10000 12000
Popiilatioiºý
Figure E. 54: Improvement of minimum cost[$]/target solution populations optimised

by the genetic algorithms
Table E. 4: Total results from the genetic algorithms optimisation

Minimise Maximise
Defect Arising 0.011719 0.098817 0.000194 0.000092
PD 0.0857886 0.169359 0.030381 0.006378
PKNon 0.927993 0.279011 0.048066 0.452994
PKE 0.138689 0.456199 0.000565 0.245471
xt
MTTRDefeet 1.505455 7.514457 0.408179 1.979400
DMHR 0.075532 0.236438 2.873198 2.895339
Sorties Flown 179 125 194 193
Complete Sorties 168 87 189 187
Successful Sorties 129 66 144 142
Targets Killed 132 73 146 143
Aircraft Killed 1 1 1 1
Cost [$] /Sortie 136669.9844 113487.3984 142378.4375 141507.8594
Cost [$] /Target 185332.7812 191701.6875 189187.7813 190986.1406
900000 250
800000
F 700000 200
J{ 500000
40"
500000 0
s9 400000
10" -1
300000
200000
il
100000
0
0 2000 aüo0 6(0: BoGýý 1000(1 1200(1 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Popiilatiom PopulatiaL'
Figure E. 55: Improvement of minimum cost[$]/sortie solution populations optimised by

the genetic algorithms
1400000
1200000
ems. 10000 i0
8000iüi
600iI1111
400iu
d
ýJ ýý200i
ii
0 001i 4: 00 f(Il)l' 10000

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Figure E. 56: Improvement of maximum targets killed solution populations optimised

by the genetic algorithms
700000
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$OOOiin
40001iii
- 300ýýýý20000
10000ß
p
MbMM7777
0 2000 4000 6001 8000 10000
Population
Figure E. 57: Improvement of maximum sorties flown solution populations optimised by

the genetic algorithms
APPENDIX F
MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
APPLICATION
This application has been developed by using Microsoft Visual Studio C++ version 6
as compiler. The program bases on Windows operating system, which offers easy usage,
such as drag & drop, inter-active, and graphic display. The main application has been
implemented in the form of one main workspace, which comprises 8 main individual
projects. Each project can transfer data and be execute separately as pop-up windows
dialogs, such as vulnerability assessment, susceptibility assessment, and life cycle cost
estimation dialogs.
Fig. F. 1 shows the overall flow chart of mission effectiveness analysis workspace. Due
to some data exchange between pop-up dialogs, the following pop-up dialog execution
order has to be preformed.
1. Mission Effectiveness Analysis
2. Vulnerability Assessment
3. Susceptibility Assessment
4. Reliability & Maintainability Assessment
5. Life Cycle Cost Estimation
225
CONTAINS PULLOUTS
Start V
-7 UCq ý.
H p
Increase No. of CD
NO Day µ C
Day <_
MissionDay
o
Read Data from Default
Manual Data Inputs y
File Output into File for each b
YES Aircraft and Day
Information W
Sortie <=
Increase No of
. SortiePerDay 0
Sortie NO w
Vulnerability Reliability & Maintainability '
b
Assessment Module Assessment Module U)
0
YES CD
Output into File for each
Aircraft and Sortie
Susceptibility Life Cycle Cost
Information
Assessment Module Estimation Module CD
0
CD
Pre-Flight Phase
V U)
ro
Sortie Generation Monte Write Outputs in File Outbound Phase
Carlo Simulation
-a.
0
LJ
Friend Base
Attack Phase Enemy Encounter
(Quick Repair)
NO Fulfil objective
function
(Optimisation} Inbound Phase
YES
Post-Flight Phase
( Maintenance Base )
)I II Mission Animation II Numerical Result
Graphic Result
Stop Outputs Outputs
Outputs
F. Mission Effectiveness Analysis Application 227
F. 1 Mission Effectiveness Analysis

The first and main project is `Mission Effectiveness Analysis', which will be firstly executed
as the main application dialog, as shown in Fig. F. 2. This application comprises 5 tab
dialogs and several commands in the menu bar, which will load and run the remaining
pop-up dialogs (projects).
Start r ss4on load Default Opturx: atlon Display Result Su

Cost Estimation Data Collect, on Update AU Data Exit Fleip
Mission Fleet Aircraft Enemy Cost
situation ; w/ Morde Cerb Smulatan 500 runs
Day Run -_.

lp Satie Per Day 2 Total Salle Flown 0
Tad Con $&e Satie r
Sortie Duration 416106
Total Sucessti Satie j0
Mission Type: BOMBING Total Service Time IaIAC) 0
Phase Name [PREFLIGHTPHASE Number of Phases n Satie 5
TOP 1 = BOTTOM; 0%
-'S
LEFT r0 FRONT 7% Store New Data

fa showreg Fhght Phase
REAR 0% RIGHT 0%
%L"
Figure F. 2: Operation mission simulation application dialog
Firstly, the necessary variables have to be initialled by either loading directly from
a file or directly giving in the application dialog. By using `Load Default' command on
the menu bar, the stored data in file namely ìnput. dat' in the folder `... \input' will be
loaded. In case that the file ìnput. dat' does not exist or not locate in the folder `... \input',
the windows browse dialog will be display. Therefore, the correct location or file can be
indicated.
On the other hand, the threat and mission simulation information will be automatically
loaded directly from the default file namely `mission. dat', which is normally located in
the same folder as ìnput. dat'. On similar approach, if this file does not exist or locate in
the folder, the browse dialog will be also display.

The next step is to execute the individual pop-up dialogs, as shown above. The
vulnerability and susceptibility assessment pop-up dialogs will be shown by choosing

the `vulnerability' and `susceptibility' sub-menus, which locate under the `survivability'
menu. The reliability & maintainability assessment pop-up dialog will be displayed, if
the command `Reliability & Maintainability' has been chosen. By pressing command
`Cost Estimation', the life cycle cost estimation dialog will be popped up (details how to
operate the vulnerability pop-up dialogs see section F. 2, for susceptibility assessment see
section F. 3, for reliability & maintainability assessment see section F. 4, and for life cycle
cost estimation see section F. 5).

Before the mission simulation starts, the calculation method for vulnerability on en-
counter with proximity warheads has to be identified by choosing `By Detonation Range'
to calculate with generated random detonation distance and `By Lethal Radius' to calcu-
late with calculated lethal radius (details see Chapter 3).
By choosing `Start Mission' command, the mission simulation will start with or with-
out Monte Carlo Simulation technique depending on whether the option `Monte Carlo
Simulation' has been checked. In case that 'Monte Carlo Simulation' option has been
checked, the small dialog will be displayed to show the current number of trial runs, as
shown in Fig. F. 3.
Mission Fleet Aircraft Enemy Cost
Situation ZWAR TIME - ., Monte Carlo Srnutation i 500 runs
Day Run
Mission Operation Smuletion 1 Close

runs at step of
0 Monte Carlo Svnulatan 500

Mission Type
PhaseName iPREFLIGHT_PHASE
TOP 0% BOTTOM 0 Stole New Data

f« show" FYgt Phase
LEFT 0X FRONT r0
REAR j0% RIGHT Fp%
Figure F. 3: Monte Carlo Simulation Dialog
There are three results display possibilities; i. e. Numerical, Linear Graph, and Sim-
ple Graphic Simulation display dialogs. Additionally, the general results in each sortie
and operational day will be stored automatically into `sortie. dat' located in the folder
`... \output'. The details information of each aircraft will be also generated and stored
into the file name àircraftN. dat', where N is a number of aircraft. The information dur-
ing each flight phase will be stored into the file 'FlightPhase. dat', where FlightPhase
is the flight phase name in the sortie.
The first results display option is numerical display dialog, which appears as Fig. F. 4.
The information of each sortie and operational day will be display in specific pop-up
dialog, and by choosing `Previous' and `Next', the next and previous sortie or operational
day information will be displayed.
Day Amount of Arrcraf 10

A/C Floe 15 Numerical Result in each SORTIF
Success Sortie 8 Sortie Day Total Flown Complete Satte Success Satre
11 10 5 4
Into Maintenar '
Total Aircraft Available Aircraft Total Target Detected Destroy Damage
Killed Aircraft I r 10 5 200000 112 94 0
I
Abort Aircraft lrAo Maintenance Out from Maintenance Ener y
f-ý--- - Detected
Damage Aircraft Abort Aircraft
Killed Aircraft
8
Defect Aircraft: Abort Aircraft :3 Damage Aircraft : rp
Destroyed
Damage Aircraft 0 r0
Defect Astraft
Detect Aircraft 0 Damage
Next Sortie Close

- _.
Figure F. 4: Simple numerical graphical result display
The second opportunity to show an overall results throughout the mission simulation
is to display in the form of linear graph. In this pop-up dialog, the horizontal axis can be
chosen to scale in the forms of sortie or operational day. On the other hand, the vertical
axis can show several information types, such as number of available aircraft, number of
targets killed, and number of aircraft in maintenance. Due to different scale for both axes,
the details of each dot on the graph can be obtained by using mouse click on that point.
The results will be displayed in the edit boxes at the right bottom corner, as shown in
Fig. F. 5.
The last alternative to display the results is simple graphic simulation (semi-animate
graphical) display. This option simulates and displays the entire results in every flight
phases throughout the mission in motion. Aircraft status during the mission is represented
by different colour (red = READY, purple = ABORT, grey = KILLED). During the
simulation, if the encounters by threats or weapons release by the aircraft take place, dot
lines with different colour will also be display (red

= weapon released, green = threat
encounter). Fig. F. 6 shows one shot of entire simulation.
Mission I Fleet Enemy, Cost

1 Aircraft',
Day Avdable
10
-_
Artsaft
I Show Graph Close
H oozontel Axe
Sortie -- --
V ertrcal Axe
1Avaiable Awcraf
Data hom Giaph

Sorte
AvaSable AgcreN
6
0
1 Sane 20
Figure F. 5: Simple line graph result display
SortieNo 0 of 20 Own Fleet Enemy close

A_aaN Target
ýtöt
10 100000 Sf11Utd1011
44Qý0ý0 m Avadable Available

199887
Destr Detect
I', StetPhase
12g
Menlenance Destoy
0 109
ýý
ýýý Day Satie
aýtitiý
-'ý 10 F r
ATTACK PHASE
.ý_- m
Figure F. 6: Simple semi-animate graphical result display
Due to lots of information displayed in this pop-up dialog, an option to show only
the occurrence in specific flight phase, sortie and operational day has been offered by
pressing `Get Phase' command and giving the specific sortie and operational day. To
display the occurrence during the selected flight phase, sortie and operational day, the
command `Show Detail Phase' has to be chosen.

Fig. F. 7 shows example of general results from an operation simulation with following
constraints:
" Ten operational days with maximum two sorties per day
. Fleet size is maximum ten aircraft
" twelve additionally maintenance hours at the end of operational day
" Encounter from both penetrators and proximity warhead with probability of en-
counter of 0.05 and 0.02
" Mean time between repair for defect is

component assumed as 1.53 hours and for
damage is assumed as 2.6 hours
" 100% supportability and spare parts availability
is
" weapon accuracy randomly with probability of being launched is 1.0
The mission effectiveness analysis application offers also alternative to investigate effect
of, and relationship between an individual design aspect on mission simulation results
by using `Data Collection' or Òptimization' commands. The data management pop-up
dialog will firstly appear, as shown in Fig. F. 8. In this dialog, the necessary variable
can be initialed, such as total study variables, maximum and minimum values for each
variable. In case that an option `Collect Sortie Details' has been checked, all details for
each aircraft and flight phase will be stored in specific files. However, an overall results
from the mission simulation with given constraints and variables will be defaulted stored
into the file `DataCollection. txt' and `DetailsResults. txt'. These file names can be also
changed and located into specific folder by changing in the browse dialog, which appear
before the mission simulation actually starts.
On similar approach, the optimisation constraints and variables can be also set through-
out this pop-up dialog, such as minimise, maximise, and terminate with convergence. The
default file name for `GAlib' optimisation are `GALiblter. txt' and `GALibDetail. txt'. For
`Solver' optimisation, the `SolverIter.txt' is the only results collection file.
F. 2 Vulnerability Assessment
This application dialog can be executed by select command `Vulnerability', which is a
sub-menu in `Survivability' menu. Fig. F. 9 shows an application dialog.

By using the same principle as load default initial data from the specific file, the
default file for this application dialog is `vulnerinput. dat'.
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FunctKnType DataCciection
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F5 Iteration 100
Total Variable
[ONE Damage_Rate I1
Variable No.
Mrwrxm Value Maxirxm V ak e
F- CotlectSortieDetails
j
SetVariable Cancel Start
Figure F. 8: Data Management Dialog
NewData LoadDefauk Calculation ViewPosition Store Data ShowDravxp Exit
Aircraft pilot Ft `r eidErrecr Control System Overlapped Component

No Shield Effect
NonOverlapped
Preponderance
Model F- U"99 Mission BOMBING .. Numberof H4 KI:
'PREFLIGHT
LIGHT_PHASPHASE
Cnm Speed
',TOP j Theat: NONEXPLOSIVE TOP 25 %
Viewii 23016
seAUude RIGHT 0
Seat:0 Overlapped 0
12192 LEFT 0 %
Tank 5 Prob Of KA Aircraft I Attack Speed FRONT 75 '/.
241.5
Engine f2 Taal PresentArea: r 2562 Grid REAR 0 %
Attack Altitude
BOTTOM 0 '/.
ControlSystem: TotalVuherableArea ý- Grid X7620
5
LethalRadius 0
Figure F. 9: Vulnerability Assessment Dialog
Next step is to choose overlapped area category from the menu Òverlapped Area'. The
probability of overlapped area and aircraft kill for every aircraft view will be calculated by
pressing the command `Calculation'. The average probability of kill (view in `TOTAL')
will be also calculated in conjunction with the weighting factor for each flight phase.
However, by select specific aircraft view from the menu `View Position', the information
and probability of aircraft kill in selected aircraft view will be displayed.

In case that the threat type 'EXTERNAL has been selected, both prob-
-EXPLOSIVE'
ability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead calculated by random detonation
distance will be calculated and displayed in the form of curve, as shown in Fig. F. 10.
Therefore, the lethal radius for specific aircraft view can be determined and the user has
to give the value in the edit box `Lethal Radius'. To store this value, the command `Save
Data' has to be selected.
Figure F. 10: Lethal Radius Assessment Dialog
From this pop-up dialog application, 2 default files are automatically created and will
be saved into the current folder. The `matrix. dat' file obtains the Makrov matrix of each
aircraft view, and the full results will be saved into the 'vulnerability. day' file.
In case that information about critical component and aircraft presented area are not
available, these information can be created from the semi-automatic grid counter option.
However, the necessary information has to be initialed in the main application dialog,
such as number of fuel tank, number of pilot, and number of overlapped area. After the
command `New Data' has been chosen, the aircraft drawing dialog will appear, as shown
in Fig. F. 11.
By choosing `Load Drawing' command, the aircraft image in `BMP' format can be
loaded and displayed in the dialog. Regarding to the number of critical components,
which have been given in the main dialog, their details have to be future given by using
the scroll down menu and radio bottom, such as redundancy, position, and kill level. By
pressing `Save' for each critical component, its details will be stored into the memory.
Agci& Maki P e: led Ajea V ebbe Area UNIT P$1H Ht;
U.cý3 25v 01:; Gnd 0 oed Diewng

awe
TOP - GI.
4
AIRCRAFT GndSire
Type
": .. " 3E1 Redmiarr Non Reduidw
ý- "- POS+tion
ZOOMINI Up
Namd see, Left Ongn Rol
ZCCM OUT rcwn
Figure F. 11: Semi-Automatic Grid Counter Dialog
The `Grid' option will turn on and off the grid over the image. The size of grid can be
also resized by using the bottom `-' and `+', as shown in Fig. F. 12. The image can also
be zoomed and moved by using commands at the right bottom corner.
Aua401Model Pre-enled Ares VJnnede Agee UNIT RM Hp;
"5E2 ý- G"d U1 . uadDiewng

U"99
r } TOP
5, a
Saw
JACRAFT GIdSa. J
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i ýrasrm+caaý-
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aas
-itvý ref
Type
Redxxwt NonReÖ dar+
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PoAan
rr
ZOOMIN Up
See I
Nommal Left Ri-t
ZOOMOUTI 0o
Figure F. 12: Zooming and Moving Image Possibility
By pressing mouse right bottom, a small pop-up menu will be displayed. This menu
offers the selection of kill level for each critical component. And by pressing left mouse
bottom, the grid will be coloured mark depending on the kill level and automatically
counted for the selected critical component. To stop counting grid for the selected critical
component, the command `Save' has to be chosen to store to number of grid into the
memory of that component. These procedures have to be performed for every critical
component, aircraft, and aircraft view.
F. 3 Susceptibility Assessment
The susceptibility assessment pop-up dialog has to be executed after the vulnerability
assessment dialog due to aircraft presented area requirement. This application dialog
execution and variable initial use the same principle as for the vulnerability assessment
dialog. The default file name is `suscept-input. dat'. Fig F. 13 shows the overall outlook
of the susceptibility assessment application dialog.
Load Deafult Store Data RCS& SIN Calculation Show Graphs Exit
Aircraft Radar Mission
Model U-99 View Position FRONT
dB Number of Parts :[8

Ai craftRCS "22.1452
AircraftRCS 0.00610207 m2
Part Number ONE RCS "34.1629 dB
Part Type RCS 0.000383448 m2
SPHERE
r0 233 SHARP EDGE Area r
Length m m2
Radius DIHEDRAL `ý -m Cone Angle

009 z-r Deg
Angle j 32.88 Deg Angle 2i0 Deg
NUM
Figure F. 13: Susceptibility Assessment Dialog
The next step is to calculate radar cross section and signal-to-noise ratio of the external
aircraft shape by pressing command `RCS & S/N Calculation'. Unfortunately, the aircraft
probability of detection can not be calculated directly with this version; therefore, the pre-
calculated graph has to be display by choosing command `Show Graphs'. A new pop-up
dialog will appear, as shown in Fig. F. 14. There are 2 alternative of pre-calculated graph;
i. e. with and without scintillation effect. The selected graph will be displayed in the big
square edit box in the left hand side of the dialog. The user has to give the probability
of detection value in the `PD Value' edit box by using the S/N and P. values displayed in
the dialog. The PD value will be stored in memory for the selected flight phase or aircraft
view by pressing command `Save Data'. The process has to be repeated to determine PD
for every aircraft view and flight phase.
no
SaveData Close
es
NM
NM
View
i X60'
use Flght Phase
PREFLIGHTPHASE
nie
0
Show Graph':. Show Graph
ýwdhScn without Scn
x.m
Is. ' Pn Value
as 3 72665e"006
I.AO S/N Vakuin dB

0.0 38701
an Pd Value
C01
an 6 IO Cf f1 16 1{
$ A4TOWOi6 PAT10.
Figure F. 14: Pre-Calculated Graph Display Dialog
After terminate the pre-calculated graph display dialog, all PD values will be saved
into the default file `suscept. dat' by pressing command `Save All Data'.
At the same time as calculation aircraft external radar cross section and signal-to-
noise ratio, the probability of hit will be calculated by using 20 generated random miss
distance. In case that the model to represent an aircraft presented area (`Carlton' or
`Shoe Box') has been change, the new probability of hit can also be new calculated by
pressing command `Recalculation', as shown in Fig. F. 15.
Load Deaf ult 5tßire Data -iN =alculatior h.. E" it

.yphs
Aircraft Radar Mission Miss Distance
Numberof Hits 20 Recalcuation
Probabilityof Hit
ABOTO - ra 0.613184
Aircraft PresentedArea Radius 28.5571
Radius Sample Variance 244.363
Radius StandardDeviation 257.225
Figure F. 15: Probability of Hit Assessment Tab Dialog
F. 4 Reliability & Maintainability Assessment

This application dialog will be executed by pressing command `Reliability & Maintain-
ability' on the menu bar in the mission effectiveness analysis dialog. This application
dialog comprises 3 tab dialog, as shown in Fig. F. 16. By using the same approach to load
default initial values for necessary variables, the information has to be stored into the file
`rel-main dat'.
-input.
In case that the initial values are not correct or need to be changed, the new val-
ues can be given directly in the application dialog. These new values will replace in the
memory by pressing command Ùpdate Data', and can be also save into file by press-
ing command `Store Data'. The file containing new values will be created and named
ÀircraftModel-new dat', where AircraftModel is the same as shown in
_rel-main _data.
the dialog.
Before the aircraft failure rate and defect man-hour
rate can be calculated, the neces-
sary parameters have to be set by using pop-up menu and radio bottom in the application
Load Default Update Data Calculate Store Data =ave All Data E"t
Model: U"99 jUnmanned_Aircraft [IMMUNTIM

.
No. of Engines (Ne) :2 1 LinearRegression LogarithmRegression
EmptyWeight(We): 3269 Kg Paretoapplyat , 100% 70% 60%

Coefficients
TotalThrust(T): 39.64 kN
bO= 518.6
WingArea(Wa): 25.32 m2 b1= "19.656 b4 = "2.298e"002
b2 - 3.721 b5 = 59.411
Max.Altitude(H): 12192 m
b3 = "5.4422e"003 b6 = "1.87
AircraftHeitgh(h): 1.55 m
Total FR/1000FH Total DMHR/1000FH Y= bO+ bl"h + b2'T + b3We + b4`H + b5'Ne + b6"Wa
298.679 12379.5
NUM
Figure F. 16: Reliability & Maintainability Assessment Dialog
dialog. For example, the aircraft type can be selected from the pop-up menu positioning
in the middle of the dialog or statistical analysis model to calculate the highest and the
lowest failure rate or defect man-hour rate can be selected by using check box under the
aircraft type pop-up menu.

By pressing command `Calculation', the Pareto distribution coefficients, the remaining
value either of failure rate or defect man-hour rate will be calculated, depending on the
selected variable in the pop-up menu on right of aircraft type pop-up menu. Details of
calculation will be also shown in the specific tab dialog.
To save all results into file `reliability. dat', the command `Save All Data' has to be
chosen.
F. 5 Life Cycle Cost Estimation

This application dialog has to be executed after the reliability & maintainability assess-
ment dialog, and also cannot be terminated during the mission simulation runs. The
reasons are that defect man-hour rate is one of the necessary variable to estimate aircraft
life cycle cost, and the mission simulation need some values transferred directly from this
application dialog.
The application dialog will be executed by pressing the command `Cost Estimation'
on the menu bar of the main mission effectiveness analysis application dialog. This dialog
comprise 6 tab dialogs, as shown in Fig F. 17.
Load Deafuk calculation have Data Exit
Life Cycle Cost Cost Factor Research... Production... Operation... Disposal
Aradt Model'.I- ® WARTIME 7-1

Average discount LCC / Ai craft
TestandEvauation:3
Research,Development. 37751e+009 Research, Development S. 6 68814e+006
Production 2.60048e+009 Production:5 14947e+006
Ground Support & Initial Spare : 2.60048e+008 GroundSupport&InitialSpare: 520097
Operation and Support : 4.71894e+007 OperationandSupport: -471894+006-
Disposal: 2.637 88eß+007 Disposal 522353
Lie CycleCost:[6.28496e*009 LifeCycleCost:1 71289e+007
Figure F. 17: Life Cycle Cost Estimation Dialog
The default initial values will be loaded from the file `LCC_input. dat', when the com-
mand `Load Default' has been chosen. Before actual calculation is performed, the user
should also check the mission scenario in the pop-up manu because the application will
calculate an aircraft life cycle cost based on the displayed scenario in that menu. Finally,
the aircraft life cycle cost will be calculated by pressing command `Calculation', and the
results will be stored into the file `lifecyclecost. dat' when the command `Save Data' has
been chosen.

O. Nilubol Thesis 2005

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O. Nilubol Thesis 2005

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Development of a Combat Aircraft Operational and

Cost-Effectiveness Design Methodology

Flt. Lt. Otsin Nilubol

Supervisor : Prof. J. P. Fielding

Cranfield College of Aeronautics

author would like to sincerely thank to all of them, including:

advice on thesis writing.

Professor Robert Ball for his advice on probability of detection prediction.

Mr. Paul Alonze for his advise on vulnerability assessment.

tance on information assessmentfrom CATIA models.

Dr. Oswald for his assistancewith accessto a high performance computer.

for their supports in this research.

2.3.1 Aims & Development of Methodology 8

3.2.5 Aircraft Kill Probability by Multiple Hits of Penetrators 36

8.6 Results from Optimisation 115

8.6.2 Results from the Optimisation using Genetic Algorithms 116

9.2.1 RCS Validation 121

APPENDIX F- MISSION EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS APPLICA-

2.1 Example of transformation from aircraft design parameter into aircraft

3.2 Aircraft component presented areas with overlapped critical components 34

3.4 State transition matrix [T] 38

8.2 Calculated U-99 RCS in six main views 87

8.11 Results of U-99 from reliability & maintainability assessmentmodule 94

8.15 Effect of increasing an individual U-99 MOP on operational and operational

8.16 Generic effects of increasing individual aircraft MOPs for survivability on

B. 5 U-99 critical components list 149

C.4 Failure rate Pareto distribution coefficients 166

1.1 Aircraft design aspects 1

3.6 Presented area represented by Shoe Box and Carlton methods 27

4.4 Defect man-hour rate as a function of aircraft empty weight 52

8.9 Effect of the probability of kill on encounter with proximity warhead on

E. 3 Flowchart of patrol mission 192

E. 19 Effect of PD and PKN with increasing P, and PH = 0.75 on the total

61 SZ Angle of leading and traling fragment spray [Degree]

A Radar wavelength [m]

Ax, µy Mean value of x and y

0 Angle between incident wave and x axis of the target [Degree]

7r Constant value = 3.14159

'II Elevation angle of the missile [Degree]

p(x, y) Probability density function of miss distance

a Radar cross section [m2]

O'X,UV Standard deviation of x and y

9 Angle between incident wave and z axis of the target [Degree]

a, b, l Dimension of geometrical object in cartesian coordinated system [m]

Ap Presented area [m2]

Ai Vulnerable area [m2]

Alt Maximum altitude [m]

B,, Noise bandwidth [Hz]

CContract Total contract cost [$]

CDisposat Disposal cost [$]

CFII Flying hour cost [$]

CFuet Total fuel cost [$]

CGSE&IS Ground support equipment and initial spares cost

CInsta, Installation support funds [$]

COperation Operation and Support Cost [$]

CPersonnel Total personnel cost [$]

CProduction Production Cost [$]

CRDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost [$]

Csortie Sortie cost [$]

CSuccessfulSortieSuccessfulsortie cost [$]

CTarget Target cost ('Bang per Buck') [$]

CTraining Service allowance, personnel support and training cost [$]

Cvnit Unit level consumption cost [$]

CwVeapon Weaponcost [$]