The Construction of Literary Character: A View from Cognitive Psychology

Author(s): Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

Source: Style , Fall 1990, Vol. 24, No. 3, Literary Character (Fall 1990), pp. 380-391
Published by: Penn State University Press

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 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

The Construction of Literary Character:

A View from Cognitive Psychology

With these words, Ian Fleming introduced one of fiction's most enduring
characters:

James Bond suddenly knew that he was tired. He always knew when his body or his mind
had had enough, and he always acted on the knowledge. This helped him to avoid staleness
and the sensual bluntness that breeds mistakes. ( Casino Royale 9)

These three brief sentences provide a remarkably rich portrait of Bond. Som
of this richness is due no doubt to Fleming's skill as an author. What we w
focus on, however, are the ways in which the actual cognitive processes th
readers bring to the experience of literature contribute to the appreciation
literary character. Our goal will be to demonstrate the way that authors (p
haps unwittingly) avail themselves of inherent properties of our cognitive struc-
tures to create some striking effects.
We will also attempt to set out what is special to the experience of litera
characters. The very act, for example, of creating new personages in our he
is preeminently ««special. In a variety of circumstances we are called upon
create mental representations for individuals for whom we have no dir
evidence. We expect to find equivalent cognitive processes operating when
hear a story about a colleague's distant cousin, read a biography of a histori
figure, or encounter a new character in a novel. Our program, thus, will be
locate the specialness of literary characters not in the cognitive processes t
act upon our experience of literature, but within the works of literature th
selves. Since cognitive processes evolved in response to the informatio
constraints provided by nonliterary life, we will illustrate what transpires w
literary information interacts with these nonliterary processes. Our discuss
will incorporate the view that readers actively participate in the constructi
of literary worlds, and, thus, literary characters. Rather than being passi
recipients of information, readers venture beyond the text to explain and p
dict aspects of the unfolding story.
Our final aim is to expand the repertoire of psychological theory tha
may be applied in the process of textual analysis. Traditional applications
for example, Freudian or Jungian accounts of personality processes have b
marred by nagging uncertainties both about what aspects of those theorie
accurately reflect psychological universais and about what constitute "prope
readings within the boundaries of the theories (Felman). By importing on

380 Style: Volume 24, No. 3, Fall 1990

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Literary Character and Cognitive Psychology 381

easily recognizable and adequately documented psychological pro

hope to motivate a new dialogue between the disciplines of psychol
literary criticism.
Our remarks will be centered around three issues. First, we cons
authors' theories of causality with respect to character interact with the
everyday preconceptions. Next, we describe how the reader's impre
literary characters are formed with respect to categories and indiv
nally, we suggest with the example of immersion how the study o
worlds may enhance the study of cognitive psychology and vice
illustrate the effects in each section with examples culled from tw
Fleming's novels about James Bond: his first, Casino Royale, and h
Man with the Golden Gun. Although acknowledging that Bond, as a
is on the borderline of what some might call literary, we think he n
provides us with excellent examples (and enjoyable reading). In all h
splendor, Bond unflinchingly bears the brunt of our cognitive psy
analysis.

Characters and Causality

In almost every work of literature, "something happens": and

of whatever takes place is attributed to either human or nonhuman
inventing antecedents and consequences, authors display their pers
ories of causality.1 Some do so by explicit comment: Tolstoy used W
Peace to illustrate that situational forces outweigh human actors as th
craftsmen of historical events. The causal theories of most authors,
are only implicit in their texts. Even so, literary characters are spe
domain because authors have total control over causality. We c
psychological evidence to suggest how authors' implicit theories of
tribution may interact with the attributional predilections of their
we will see, those predilections are well documented.
The causes of observed behavior may be either internal, found
the person performing it, or external, constrained by the situatio
the behavior takes place. In general, both kinds of determinants ar
in producing most people's actions. At times internal factors, such
sitions, are the primary causes of behavior; at other times people's a
for the most part constrained by features of the social situation.
perception of causality would require observers to sort carefully am
types of circumstances. Instead, people are prey to what Lee Ross en
Fundamental Attribution Error, when performing causal analysis of
observers evidence a strong tendency to make dispositional rather
ational attributions.

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382 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

Confirmation of the Fundamental Attribution Error has tw

First, researchers must show that some situations can, in fact
dispositional variation in bringing about behavior. Second, re
show that- even so- observers will locate the causes of behavior within the
individual.
If we were ever to doubt the power of situations to constrain behavior,
we need only turn to the experiments of Stanley Milgram in the 1960s on
obedience to authority. Milgram's subjects were told that they were partici-
pating in a study of the effects of punishment on learning and memory. Each
subject was assigned the role of "teacher" and told to deliver electric shocks
of increasing voltages to the "learner" (who was actually a confederate of the
experimenter) whenever an incorrect response was given to a question. Armed
only with a lab coat and a clipboard, the experimenter's authority was sufficient
to cause all forty subjects to continue delivering shocks even when the victim
was crying out in agony and begging them to stop. Sixty-five percent of the
subjects continued obediently all the way to the final, 450-volt shock. Despite
wide replication of this finding across great variation in the "dispositions" of
the subjects, the standard response among students upon learning of the ex-
periment is that they never would have gone "all the way." That is the Fun-
damental Attribution Error.
Ross termed the error "fundamental" because it survives even in highly
transparent circumstances. In an early demonstration of this phenomenon,
Edward Jones and Victor Harris found that subjects who heard a debater's
pro-Castro arguments tended to attribute pro-Castro attitudes to him, even
when the subjects were told that the position had been assigned by the debate
coach. Individuals are also liable to make misattributions about their own
behavior. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard gave participants in one experiment
false feedback about their performance on a task. One group of subjects was
arbitrarily told they had done quite well while a second was told they had don
quite poorly. Somewhat later, the subjects were given full information about
the random nature of the feedback. They were nonetheless asked to predict
how they might perform on a similar task in the future. Despite the straight
forward undermining of the earlier feedback, subjects who had received pos-
itive feedback predicted they would do substantially better in the future than
those who had received negative feedback.
We have no reason to doubt that readers bring the same type of biased
analysis encoded in the Fundamental Attribution Error to the appraisal o
literary characters. The ubiquity of this bias, for example, may add consid-
erably to an author's ability to create the illusion that even the most formulaic
outcomes are brought about- afresh- by the internal properties of characters.
In James Bond, we find an ideal instantiation of this force at work. As Meir
Sternberg puts it (building upon an analysis by Umberto Eco):

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Literary Character and Cognitive Psychology 383

[T]he Bond stories are characterized by a formulaic patterning of events: startin

disclosure of the assignment in M's office; passing through the stages of explor
and clash, which usually result in Bond's being captured by his adversary; and
miraculous escape and counterattack, where the battered hero fights his way to
sexual reward. Indeed, one can say of Fleming- what is true of most writer
popular writers, only at a higher level of abstraction- that he produced a sing
about a dozen variations. (145)

The puzzle is how the reader i

the same basic plot: why doesn'
within the genre undermine an
readers are so solidly predisposed
rather than in the circumstance
role in their immediate experien
satisfactorily with recourse to
where. Fleming, fortunately, g
character, and recourse to char
the most awkward moments in
ment from The Man with the G
quite a good opportunity early
killer named Scaramanga. Wit
note that this is simply much t
to die. Within the novel, howev

A mixture of reasons prevented [Bo

curiosity, an inbuilt dislike of cold m
moment, the likelihood that he would
with the softness of the night and the
recording of one of his favourites, "Af
the lignum vitae tree, said "No". But
towards the bright mercury of the se
orders, or at best dodging them, he was also being a bloody fool. (90-91)

The Fundamental Attribution Error ensures that readers will treat this causal
analysis with minimal cynicism. It is possible that an author could overwhelm
even such a well-ensconced bias- we suspect that some have tried- but within
normal limits, authors can count on considerable assistance from their readers
in rejuvenating old plots through new characters.
There is some recourse, nonetheless, for authors who wish to exercise
theories of causality that are at odds with readers' predilections.2 Attributions
of causality can be made somewhat malleable through manipulations of the
focus of attention. Michael Storms, for example, videotaped an interaction
between two people from the perspective of one of the participants and also
from the perspective of an observer. Ordinarily, the observer tended to make
more dispositional attributions for the participant's actions than did the par-
ticipant himself. However, when the participant and observer were shown the
videotapes filmed from the other's perspective, the observer's attributions were

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384 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

now less dispositional than those of the participant. Apparent

made internal attributions when their attention was focused o
observer's point of view) and external attributions when the
focused on the situation (the participant's point of view). Wh
control with very little effort is the way in which readers foc
on a particular set of circumstances. Through choices of narra
view, authors can potentially bring readers' causal analyses in
own- and potentially make the case for the potency of parti
tecedents and consequences. Even so, authors must take care
appreciation of carefully crafted interrelationships among ch
cumstances is not undermined by the most ordinary of cogn

Category- and Person-Based Expectations

Consider, once again, our introduction to James Bond:

James Bond suddenly knew that he was tired. He always knew when his body or
had had enough, and he always acted on the knowledge. This helped him to avoi
and the sensual bluntness that breeds mistakes.

One sense in which this brief description is rich is that we feel as though we
have learned enough about Bond to make predictions about his future behav-
ior: "He always knew . . ., he always acted . . . ." With even this brief descrip-
tion, readers can initiate a process that is surely one of the most central ac-
tivities of reading a novel: they can begin to use the accumulating information
to generate expectations about what is to come. If we discover Bond in a
situation that falls into the appropriate category, we can predict exactly how
he should act (and note discrepancies to our prediction).
Expectations generated by virtue of information obtained in literary
worlds are special instances of the more general processes through which we
employ what we already know to prepare our way for the future. We make
intensive use of prior knowledge and generate detailed expectations with scanty
provocation. In Casino Royale (56-67), for example, Fleming advances his plot
by having Bond and a character named Vesper Lynd engage in conversation
over a lengthy meal. The various aspects of ordering and eating a meal in the
elegant restaurant are a framework around which Fleming structures the con-
versation. Fleming apparently presupposes that the coherence of this scene
will arise from readers' prior experiences in restaurants. In fact, researchers
have shown readers to be in possession of a memory structure called a script
which encodes information about the typical progress of a restaurant meal
(Bower, Black, and Turner; Schank and Abelson). Once Fleming invokes this
script, he need only allude to it from time to time to suggest coherent activity
apart from the static conversation:

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Literary Character and Cognitive Psychology 385

Bond beckoned to the sommelier.

The maitre d'hotel bowed.
She took a sip of vodka.
The caviar was heaped on to their plates, and they ate for a time in silence.
The maitre d'hotel supervised the serving of the second course.

Fleming is able to indicate the passage of time by engaging the readers' rec-
ollections of the progress of this sort of meal. The readers' active participation
is, thus, essential to the success of the scene.
When generating expectations about the behavior of people rather than
events, we can make use of either category-based or person-based represen-
tations (Brewer). The major distinction is whether we conceptualize some
individual as a member of some well-defined category- and generate expec-
tations based on the norms of that category- or if we take the individual to
be a unique instance- and generate expectations based on our history of ob-
servation of the individual. We will illustrate how both types of representations
could influence our experience, in this case, of James Bond.
Experience in the real world provides readers with the categories they
need to begin to generate predictions with respect to literary characters. In real
life, this process of categorization, impression-formation, acts swiftly and is
resistant to correction. When we interact with other individuals, we follow the
generally useful strategy of using our first impression as a foothold for later
encounters. If, in fact, all brief samples were equally representative of indi-
viduals' behavior, this strategy would pose no difficulty. Trouble arises when
the first impression becomes a "self-fulfilling prophecy" and distorts interpre-
tation of subsequent behavior (Darley and Fazio). First impressions, for ex-
ample, can help determine which aspects of situations will draw perceivers'
attention (McArthur). Consequently, when a perceiver has generated expec-
tations about an actor's intentions, memory will be better for actions relevant
to that intention (Zadny and Gehard). Differential attention and memory go
a long way toward explaining why different people develop mutually exclusive
impressions of the same individuals. We color objectively neutral information
to fit our initial hypotheses.
Often, we are able to maintain these impressions despite interactions
with the actual people (who incorporate the truth about themselves). If we
believe, for example, that some individual is shy, we know how to confirm
that expectation: We might, for example, ask someone to enumerate situations
in which he or she feels ill at ease and, thus, find evidence for introversion-
in any individual (Snyder and Swann). Having observed an individual's be-
havior in one instance (or having received summary information about that
individual), we are inclined to structure future interactions so that they elicit
the behavior we expect. The processing bias toward assimilating new behavior
to the impression formed through initial interactions makes it important (for
most purposes) that the first impression be an accurate one.

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386 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

We can imagine, thus, that the reader's act of constructi

character is initially one of trying to assimilate the characte
known category. For example, at quite a high level of abstract
of Bond's world into "good guys" and "bad guys" strongly sh
pretations of events. In particular, we know much about the
in which these types of characters operate. Consider this pr

I intend to continue attacking the sensitive parts of your body until you a
I am without mercy, and there will be no relenting. . . . Casin

When Fleming puts this into the mouth of his villain, Le Chi
doubt that the villain will do as he says. By contrast, we cou
ourselves for Bond to act in a similarly bloodthirsty fashion
guys do not employ torture.3 There would be little tension
Chiffre's threat if we believed it to be empty; there would b
brought about by Bond's predicament if we did not believe h
damentally different type of individual. By fleshing out the scen
of category-based information, readers contribute solidly to
rience of the novel.
We have suggested that one of the dangers of anchoring our processing
in first impressions is that it causes us to overlook the import of evidence that
is inconsistent with that impression. The facile division into good guys and
bad guys provides more than adequate evidence of the inherent danger. Bond
(and the reader) discover at the very end of Casino Royale that Vesper Lynd
has been a double agent, working both for the Russians (in the M. W. D.) and
the British. This revelation enables Bond (and perhaps less so, the reader) to
reinterpret large tracts of her behavior. Vesper, herself, provides such a rean-
alysis in her suicide note:

Then I was told not to stand behind you in the Casino, and to see that neither Mathis nor
Leiter did. That was why the gunman was nearly able to shoot you. Then I had to stage
that kidnapping. You may have wondered why I was so quiet in the night club. They didn't
hurt me because I was working for M. W. D. (172)

After reading this note, we are obliged to appreciate

guided the way we encoded Vesper's earlier actions (but
was taken in, it is hard for us to feel chastened). Now t
have become so well established, it is difficult to read
without some wariness about the proper distribution of c
egories of good and evil. Nonetheless, our appraisal of th
given time will be colored by our leading hypothesis.
"Good guy" and "bad guy" are only a first level at w
be differentiated. James Bond, of course, is more than
a secret agent and, thus, we are prepared to see him p

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Literary Character and Cognitive Psychology 387

activities that would otherwise be inexplicable. For example, Bond re

his room and goes through a ritual that is distinctly on type:

[H]e bent down and inspected one of his own black hairs which still lay undisturb
he had left it before dinner, wedged into the drawer of the writing-desk.
Next he examined a faint trace of talcum powder on the inner rim of the porcelain
of the clothes cupboard. It appeared immaculate. He went into the bathroom, l
cover of the lavatory cistern and verified the level of the water against a small s
the copper ball-cock.
Doing all this, inspecting these minute burglar-alarms, did not make him feel f
self-conscious. He was a secret agent, and still alive thanks to his exact attenti
detail of his profession. ( Casino Royale 14-15)

Arguably, many of our expectations for how secret age

in our long experience with James Bond. Nonetheless
type of behavior is genre bound, more closely tied, t
"secret agent" than to the literary character "James
We would like, thus, to delineate in what way Jam
a unique identity- and how it is that we use that ident
adventures. Analysis based on category membership i
and efficient- for many of the circumstances in whic
ments or generate expectations about other individua
special motivation to expend the extra effort to form
tation of an individual: special involvement is necessa
individual as more than a token of some category (Br
shift from a category-based to a person-based represe
in which we attend to information about the individ
on categories, we determine that someone is a good guy
note variations in behavior from those norms. Our
future behavior of such individuals are based on a rout
someone good or evil would likely act. It is possible t
find it unnecessary to view James Bond as anything m
categories: "good guy"; "secret agent."
For readers who become more deeply involved, t
based representation requires a reorganization of mem
James Bond as a member of a small number of catego
ships become only a small part of the information ass
memory organization, we start to have specific recolle
of specific individuals- and these dictate our generat
may, for example, examine the situation in which we
and try to locate a similar past experience. In our me
perience, we should find fuel for our expectations.
Some expectations follow straightforwardly from
the character's behavior. For example, in Casino Royale
generalization from Bond himself when he justifies h

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388 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

maidish" attention to the minutiae of his meals: " 'You must

said. 'I take a ridiculous pleasure in what I eat and drink. It co
being a bachelor, but mostly from a habit of taking a lot of tr
. . .'" (58-59). Here, Bond has tipped us off to one of the m
aspects of his character. We also come to count on Bond's
sistency with respect to women: "Women were for recreatio
got in the way and fogged things up with sex and hurt feel
emotional baggage they carried around. One had to look out f
care of them" ( Casino Royale 34). Because the reader brings
to the continuing experience of Bond, Fleming need only allu
of connoisseurship or misogyny to keep his plot in motion.
that readers would make a regular practice of tracking the b
sistency of literary characters.
Readers may also be able to track the consistency of more
chological aspects of literary characters because of direct
thoughts, through the variety of techniques of interior mono
we are not privy to the thoughts of others and can judge th
inner motivations only by the evidence of their words and a
assessments of those actions are shaped in accordance with o
Fundamental Attribution Error) to ignore the exigencies of
literary worlds, we have a virtually unique opportunity to "li
acters work their ways from problems to responses. We belie
that we learn most about Bond when he has resigned himsel

Well, if he had to die anyway, he might as well try it the hard way. H
Mathis or Leiter would get to him in time, but at least there was a chan
catch up with Le Chiffre before he could get away. ... It was a choic
longer Le Chiffre continued the torture the more likely he would be re
(Casino Royale 1 1 8)

Through such moments, we are able to construct a psychologic

of the unique James Bond.

Immersion

We have documented so far some of the ways in which knowledge o

cognitive psychological theory can influence our analyses of the experience of
literary character. It is equally important to acknowledge that the study of
character can expand the range of phenomena for which such theories must
be accountable. Consider, for example, a phenomenon described by Kenda
Walton:

[S]uspense may remain a crucial element in our response to a work almost no matter how
familiar we are with it. One may "worry" just as intensely about Tom and Becky while

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Literary Character and Cognitive Psychology 389

rereading The Adventures of Tom Sawyer , despite one's knowledge of the out
a person reading it for the first time. A child listening to Jack and the Be
umpteenth time, long after she has memorized it word for word, may feel
excitement when the giant discovers Jack and goes after him, the same gri
that she felt when she first heard the story. (26)

We find an immediate parallel in our experience of Ja

a requirement of all the novels that Bond be captu
impossible situation. Any shrewd reader should imme
regularity and find it impossible to be concerned o
much as we " 'worry' about Tom and Becky," we "wor

Bond again felt puny and impotent. Nobody but an expert in

him with the Corsican's economy and lack of fuss. The cold pre
man had paid him back in his own coin had been equally unhur
As he preceded the thin man over the threshold he knew that he
in their power. ( Casino Royale 109)

When Le Chiffre begins shortly to tortu

will not pull through.4
This phenomenon of anomalous suspen
"Suspense") suggests how the experience
feedback into cognitive psychological mo
of how we become immersed in literary
formation remain excluded from our ap
pense motivates a strict demarcation bet
within the literary world and informatio
it, a phenomenon that psychological the
one among many- analysis of literary w
psychological research.

Conclusions

We have suggested that several ordinary cognitive processes pla

role in the construction of literary character: the Fundamental A
Error, category- and person-based representations, and immersion
nitive psychological theory of literary character, such processes clai
role. These processes are, nonetheless, not unique to the experience o
and, thus, cannot account for what is special about literary charact
to the world of literature are the types of information authors provide
processes to act upon. The distinctive aspects of a cognitive theory
character reside not in special psychological structures, but in the
of ordinary processes on extraordinary literary input.

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390 Richard J. Gerrig and David W. Allbritton

Notes

1 Throughout this paper we will commit what has been called "the intentional
fallacy" (Wimsatt and Beardsley). Our primary interest in cognitive psychology prompts
us to do so with little remorse.

2 Once again, we have in mind theories that are left implicit in the text. Such
theories may often, in fact, be more consistent with the causal structure of real-world
events, as exemplified by Milgram's results.
3 What is curious is that under most circumstances good guys can kill their foes-
they're just not allowed to enjoy the process.
4 This is even truer of the Bond movies in which film conventions allow the
viewer to become even more deeply immersed in the fictional world than is the reader.

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