MICROSOFT CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO D.

MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA

G.R. No. 166391, OCTOBER 21, 2015
Justice Bersamin; First Division

DOCTRINE/S:

According to the rule of statutory construction, legislation should be construed in a manner that
avoids absurdity or unreasonableness.

“A literal reading of a legislative act that could give rise to absurdity is to be avoided if the
language thereof can be given a reasonable application consistent with the legislative purpose.”

FACTS:

Microsoft Corporation, the plaintiff, is the owner of all the Microsoft software. On another hand,
Manansala, the respondent runs the Dataman Trading Company and/or Comic Alley located in University
Mall building, Tail Avc, Manila.

Manansala without permission from the Microsoft Corporation distributed and sold computer
software programs. The activity was investigated and a test-purchase operation was later held, obtaining
(6) six CD-ROMs with computer programs originally owned by the Microsoft Corporation. Respectively,
a search warrant was issued resulting in the surrender of illegally copied Microsoft programs.

The counsel of Microsoft immediately filed a complaint against Manansala, however, was denied
and dismissed by the Department of Justice for lack of evidence through a Resolution which asserts that
no proof had been presented establishing that the respondent printed and copied the software programs.

The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals asserting that as the word “and” is a “joiner”,
therefore the commission of all the acts under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49 is necessary to
pronounce copyright infringement. Dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Hence, an appeal was initiated to
overturn the previous decision.

ISSUE:

I. Whether mere selling of pirated computer software constitutes copyright infringement.

II. Whether the Court of appeals erred on its interpretation of the word “and”.

RULING:

I.

Yes. The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show the
existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. The petitioner was not required to prove who
copied, replicated, or reproduced the software.

II.

Yes. The court further held that the Court of Appeals erred in its reading and interpretation of
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49. Under the rules on syntax, the conjunctive word "and" denotes a
"joinder or union" of words, phrases, or clause; it is different from the disjunctive word "or" that signals
disassociation or independence. However, a more important rule of statutory construction dictates that laws
should be construed in a manner that avoids absurdity or unreasonableness.

The conjunctive "and" should not be taken in its ordinary acceptance, but should be construed like the
disjunctive "or" if the literal interpretation of the law would pervert or obscure the legislative intent. A literal
reading of a legislative act that could give rise to absurdity is to be avoided if the language thereof can be
given a reasonable application consistent with the legislative purpose

Moreover, the court recognized the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Public Prosecutor
and the Department of Justice, as they unilaterally ignored established jurisprudential principles on
determining the presence of probable cause to charge the respondents in court.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. It also directed the Department of Justice to render
the proper resolution to charge the respondent for its violation.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION &

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011
Justice Sereno; Second Division

DOCTRINE:

Under the rule of Pari Materia, statutes relating to the same subject matter or general purpose
should be read and construed and harmonized together as if one law.
 "Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so
constructed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

FACTS:
The Philippine Economic Zone Authority and Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation signed a contract for a road network/storm drainage. The respondent was awarded by the
project with the contract price of ₱130,595,337.40. The said contract’s Article 3 and 6 has stipulations
that includes contract price, mode of payment, advance payment, and progress payment.
Later, Green Asia sent a letter to PEZA regarding the price escalation in the amount
of ₱9680,169.58, however, it was denied by PEZA asserting that in accordance with the Section 8 of PD
1594, such increase or decrease is needed to be proved as direct acts of the government. In this case, it
was not proven.
Several letters were still sent by Green Asia to PEZA despite its denial to grant the request.
Consequently, a copy of the final demand letter, including a claim for the unpaid price increase, was
given to the Office of the President. Therein, Green Asia argued that it was impossible and unrealistic to
have the original budgeted price, having varying and changing work order in the construction. The basis
of its claim is the CI 12.1 of the IRR of PD 1594.
Eventually, a letter with a title of "Appeal for the Settlement of Unpaid Claims for Price
Escalation Under Project of the Philippines Economic Zone Authority" was sent to Former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo asking her to intervene in the issue and to have an affirmative decision favoring
Green Asia.
The Office of the President acknowledged the appeal and rendered a decision holding PEZA
liable and directing them to pay P12,360,526.70 with legal interest of 6% per annum. This decision was
based on Cl 12.1 of the IRR of PD 1594 and supplemented by the PD 454 which holds that it is not
necessary to demonstrate that the government's direct actions contributed to the increase in the price.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, holding that the
established connection between PD 1594 and PD 454 is proper. However, the amount to be awarded was
modified.

Issue:
I. Whether the act of PEZA denying the claim of Green Asia is proper.
II. Whether the court erred on its decision on affirming the connection between the PD 1594 and
PD 454.
RULING:

I.

No. PEZA’s denial to the claims of price escalation is unjust.

The court held that the contract between PEZA and Green Asia did not incorporate provisions
prohibiting price escalation or any clause that may be interpreted as a waiver of the price escalation.
It was therefore wrong for PEZA to disregard PD 454 by automatically denying the claim of
Green Asia for price escalation and to require the latter to prove that the increase in the construction cost
was due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454 actually bridges the gap between PD 1594 and its
IRR. PD 1594 no longer explains the provision on price adjustment, because it is already found in PD 454
and in older laws.
 II.

No. The court did not err on its affirmation on the connection between PD 1594 and PD 454.
It is held that the Office of the President correctly construed PD 1594 as being in pari materia to
PD 454. Since the two presidential decrees are in pari materia, there is a need to construe them together.
In Honasan v. The Department of Justice Investigating Prosecutors Panel, the Court stated:
“Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent
with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so constructed and harmonized with other statutes as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.”
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. A copy of this Decision will
be served on the Office of the President, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. SO ORDERED.

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 185969, November 19, 2014
Justice Perez, FIRST DIVISION
DOCTRINE:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule in statutory construction.
FACTS:
A Service Agreement and two (2) Assignment Agreement was entered by the petitioner, AT&T
Communications Services Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation non-resident foreign corporation with
the AT&T Communications Services International, Inc., MasterCard Inc. and Lexmark International, Inc.
(non-resident foreign corporations).
In 2004, AT&T Philippines filed their Quarterly VAT Return to the CIR (herein respondent) for
the year 2003. Application for refund and tax credit of its unutilized VAT input taxes was also initiated by
the petitioner. However, due to inaction of the CIR, a Petition for Review was filed before the Court of
Tax Appeal to put on hold the 2 years prescriptive period, in accordance to NIRC section 229. Further, to
support their claim, VAT invoices are presented as evidence.
The CTA dismissed the claim for refund on the ground that AT&A must present valid official
receipts and not mere sales invoices. Otherwise, it will not qualify for zero-rating for VAT purposes as
required by Section 112(A) of the NIRC of 1997.
 Motion for Reconsideration was denied. A petition for review was filed before the CTA En banc
where it was ruled that the contention had no merit. A sales invoice cannot be used in place of an official
receipt.
An instant Petition for Certiorari for alteration was filed. The Petition asserts that NIRC 1997 as
amended does not limit the requirement to a single document and mere weighty evidence is sufficient.
ISSUE:
Whether the official receipt and the sales invoice can be used interchangeably.
RULING:
No. The court held that neither does the law intend the two to be used interchangeably.
Although Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997, provides “invoice or receipt” as requirements, as a
general provision, the court therefore cannot conclude that the invoice and official receipt can be used for
either sale of goods or services, because there are specific provisions of the Tax Code which delineates
the difference between the two transactions.
Thus, Section 108 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides
“SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties.-
(C) Determination of the Tax - The tax shall be computed by multiplying the total amount
indicated in the official receipt by one-eleventh (1/11).”
Comparatively, Section 106 of the same Code covers the sale of goods, thus:
“SEC. 106. Value-added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties,-
(D) Determination of the Tax. - The tax shall be computed by multiplying the total amount
indicated in the invoice by one-eleventh (1/11).”
The legislature separately categorized VAT on the sale of goods from VAT on sale of services,
not only by its treatment with regard to tax but also with respect to substantiation requirements.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule in statutory construction. Taken in the
abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended
and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an
apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with the other provisions.
Settled is the rule that every part of the statute must be considered with the other parts.
Accordingly, the whole of Section 108 should be read in conjunction with Sections 113 and 237 to give
life to all the provisions intended for the sale of services. There is no conflict between the provisions of
the law that cover the sale of services that are subject to zero-rated sales; thus, it should be read altogether
to reveal the true legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.