India and Inner Asia_ Commerce, Culture and Connectivity

INDIA AND INNER ASIA
This book studies India’s historical, socio-cultural and trade linkages with
Inner Asia. Inner Asia includes the landlocked regions within East Asia and
North Asia that are part of today’s Western China, Mongolia, the Russian
Far East and Siberia. The book examines issues of geopolitics, geo-economics,
climate change and regional cooperation and discusses the importance of
the fabled Silk Road for the countries of Inner Asia. It also analyses the
impact India has wielded upon the region through its cultural traits and
how Buddhism has remained a binding force between the people of the two
regions.
Lucid and topical, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of
Asian studies, Central Asian studies, area studies, geopolitics, international
trade, international relations, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and
foreign policy, and political studies. It will also be of interest to policymakers,
bureaucrats, diplomats and think tanks.
Mahesh Ranjan Debata, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner Asian Studies,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
India
Selbi Hanova, Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan

INDIA AND INNER ASIA
Commerce, Culture and
Connectivity
Edited by Mahesh Ranjan Debata

and Selbi Hanova
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-367-75288-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-77471-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-17156-0 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560
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CONTENTS
List of Contributors viii

Acknowledgements x
List of Abbreviations xi
1 Introduction 1
Asoke Kumar Mukerji
PART I
Inner Asian Issues 13
2 Buddhist Heart of Asia in the Works of Nicholas

Roerich: A Study 15
Jojan Job
3 Harmonizing Ethnicity at the Contested Borderlands:

A Case Study of Uyghurs of Xinjiang 28
Veena Ramachandran
4 Inner Asia in the “Geopolitical Game” of the Early

20th Century: Impact on the Trajectory of Mongol-
Seeking Independence 44
Sharad K. Soni
vi Contents
5 Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change:

Experience From Inner Asia 57
Vikash Kumar
PART II
Geopolitics and Geo-Economics 71
6 Contemporary Geopolitical and Geo-Economic

Signifcance of Inner Asia 73
G. M. Shah
7 The Region and Ideational Security: The Geopolitical

Belonging of Central Asia in Inner Asia 86
Selbi Hanova
8 Regional Cooperation and Sustainable Stability

in Central Asia 97
Ajay K. Patnaik
9 New Foreign Policy Discourse on Silk Road in

the Post–Cold War Period 111
Ramakrushna Pradhan and Atanu Kumar Mohapatra
10 Silk Road Shenanigans 124

P. L. Dash
11 Afghanistan as the Belt and Road Pivot for Asia 136

Satyam
PART III
Indian Connection 153
12 India and Its Inner Asian Neighbourhood in the

Post–Cold War Era 155
Mahesh Ranjan Debata
13 India’s Connectivity With Eurasia: INSTC and

India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport
and Transit Corridor 169
Gatikrushna Mahanta
Contents vii
14 Indian Trade Along Afghan Routes From 6th Century

BCE to 19th Century CE 184
Sunita Dwivedi
15 India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia: Analysing the

First India-Central Asia Summit 197
Manish S. Dabhade
16 Conclusion 210
Selbi Hanova and Mahesh Ranjan Debata
Index 213
CONTRIBUTORS
Manish S. Dabhade is Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Poli-

tics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawa-
harlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
P. L. Dash is former Professor and Director, Centre for Central Eurasian Stud-
ies, University of Mumbai and ICCR Chair Professor of International Rela-
tions at UWED, Tashkent
Mahesh Ranjan Debata is Associate Professor at the Centre for Inner Asian
Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, India
Sunita Dwivedi is a Silk Road Traveller, Independent Writer and Researcher,

Delhi, India
Selbi Hanova is Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan.
Jojan Job is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Madras

Christian College, Chennai, India
Vikash Kumar is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Research in Rural and
Industrial Development (CRRID), Chandigarh, India
Gatikrushna Mahanta is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics,

Zakir Hussain College, Delhi University, New Delhi, India
Contributors ix
Atanu Kumar Mohapatra is Professor at the Centre for Studies and Research
in Diaspora, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India
Asoke Kumar Mukerji is former Permanent Representative of India at the

United Nations and Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foun-
dation, New Delhi, India
Ajay K. Patnaik is former Professor and Dean, School of International Studies,

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Ramakrushna Pradhan is Professor at the Department of Political Science,

School of Social Sciences, Guru Ghasidas University, Bilaspur, Chhatishgarh,
India
Veena Ramachandran is Assistant Professor at the Department of Humanities

and Social Sciences, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani Cam-
pus, Rajasthan, India
Satyam is a Doctoral Research Scholar, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
G. M. Shah is Professor and Honorary Director at the MMAJ Academy of

International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India
Sharad K. Soni is Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for Inner Asian
Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, India
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the UGC Area Studies Programme, Centre for Inner Asian
Studies (CIAS), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-
sity, New Delhi, India and the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) for
the generous support. We owe a debt of gratitude to the Chairperson, all the
faculty members, staf and students of Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School
of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for their constant sup-
port. We are thankful to all the esteemed contributors for their valued and
thoroughly researched chapters for this edited book. The views and opinions
provided here are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily rep-
resent the views of their institutions or editors.
We record our sincere gratitude to the Publisher, Routledge Taylor and
Francis Group, Mr. Peter Sowden, Dr. Shashank S. Sinha, Ms. Antara Ray
Chaudhry and Ms. Anvitaa Bajaj for helping in publishing this edited book.
Selbi Hanova
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB Asian Development Bank

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
B3W Build Back Better World
BHEL Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
BPO Business process outsourcing
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil Russia India China and South Asia
BSF Border Security Force
CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization
CAEC Central Asian Economic Community
CARs Central Asian Republics
CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
CASAREM Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market
CAU Central Asian Union
CBTA Cross-Border Transport Accord
CCAP Connect Central Asia Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
EAEU Eurasian Economic Union
ETIM East Turkistan Islamic Movement
EURASEC Eurasian Economic Community
FFFAI Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India
FSG Frontier Services Group
GABP General Authority of Border Protection (of Mongolia)
GCM General Circulation Model
GDP Gross domestic product
xii Abbreviations
GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HPS Hydro Power Station
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICABC India-Central Asia Business Council
ICCR Indian Council for Cultural Relations
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
INSTC International North-South Transport Corridor
IPGCFZ India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone
IPGL India Ports Global Limited
ISL Iran Shipping Lines
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JWG Joint Working Group
MCC Metallurgical Group Corporation (of China)
MPP Mongolian People’s Party
MPRP Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
OBOR One Belt One Road
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PGII Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
RATS Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RECCA Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEZ Special Economic Zones
SPAs Strategic Partnership Agreements
SREB Silk Road Economic Belt
SRES Special Report on Emission Scenarios
TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TUTAP Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
WHO World Health Organization
XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
1
INTRODUCTION*
Asoke Kumar Mukerji
India’s connection with Inner Asia, which constitutes the fve republics of
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbek-
istan), Mongolia, three regions of China (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and
Tibet) and Afghanistan, is as old as Methuselah. The foundation stone of this
linkage was laid by overland trade that witnessed regular contacts between
traders/merchants from India and the Inner Asian region. The knowledge,
intellect and wisdom of India had percolated into the hearts and minds of
people in Inner Asia, which has been refected in the writings, discoveries and
explorations of scholars across the globe. The civilizational linkage between
the two regions not only blossomed with the infux of religion and philoso-
phy, arts and culture from India but also thrived for centuries in the form of
cross-cultural exchanges. The reproduction of Ajanta in Dun Huang, replica
of Kailasa Monolith on the Khullam or the work of Indian scholars/monks
in Tibet, the overhaul of Kushan antiquities and so on demonstrate India’s
academic pursuits as well as exemplify India’s age-old linkage with the people
of Inner Asia. Sanskrit words, such as Ratna, Mani and Guru in Tibet and
Mongolia, and the transformation of the word Vihara into Bukhara in Cen-
tral Asia or of Sartha into Sart in western Turkestan are symbols of Indian
culture in the entire Inner Asian region. In contemporary times, Nobel lau-
reate Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore and several other Indian scholars and
historians continued to highlight the role of Inner Asia in the life, culture
* This chapter is the revised and updated version of the valedictory address delivered by the
author at the International Seminar on “Ganga to Volga: India’s Connectivity with Inner
Asia” on 6–7 March 2019, at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Stud-
ies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-1
2 Asoke Kumar Mukerji
and civilizations of India, and narrated how races from Inner Asia had found
their permanent habitat in India as well.
In the past three decades, India’s relationship with the Inner Asian region/
people (with individual countries or group of countries of Inner Asia) has
been revived, renewed and reoriented at bilateral, trilateral and multilateral
levels through socio-cultural partnership, strategic partnership, economic
cooperation and re-establishment of connectivity. India’s relations with Inner
Asia (including Eurasia) have a rich history, as illustrated by people-to-peo-
ple contacts over the centuries. This sense of a shared journey was captured
in the collection of 20 historical short stories in Hindi, published in 1943
as Volga Se Ganga by Indian scholar and intellectual Rahul Sankrityayan,
which were based on the dialogues of common citizens.
The natural movement of people, ideas and trade between India and Inner
Asia came to a sudden halt following the agreement between the British and
Russian Empires in 1895, when they agreed to create the Wakhan Corridor
as a bufer between the two empires. While this bufer, which was territorially
part of the kingdom of Afghanistan, formalized two imperial spheres of infu-
ence, it did not prevent the movement of intrepid explorers and revolutionar-
ies across the space of Inner Asia.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing the India-Russia
Business Summit 2018 (New Delhi) on 5 October 2018, said:
We are fortunate that the Ganga and Volga of Harmony and Friendship
were always there, are there and will remain so. Our relations are expand-
ing in almost every feld. Its cornerstone is mutual trust and understanding
between the two countries.
(Ministry of External Afairs 2018b)
It is important to describe herewith the main facets of India’s interaction

with Inner Asia through seven broad themes: (1) ethnicity, religion and cul-
ture; (2) India’s policy towards Central Asia; (3) Afghanistan and Central
Asia; (4) trade; (5) connectivity; (6) energy; (7) environment; and (8) geopoli-
tics and geostrategy.
Ethnicity, Religion and Culture

The attention given by Indian scholars (Rahul Sankrityayan and Sadhu Ram
Udhar Das) to the specifcs of the Altai region and Uyghur ethnicity is rele-
vant to any wider discussion on the need for a civilizational dialogue between
India and Inner Asia, including Eurasia. This includes the religious and cul-
tural impact of Buddhism and Jadidism in this broader region. UNESCO’s
major project to bring the civilizational aspect of Inner Asia to the wider
Introduction 3
public, through its monumental History of Civilizations of Central Asia,

published in 2003 in fve volumes, was strongly supported by India.
The interaction during the Buddhist and early Islamic period is preserved
in the communities, writings, monuments and routes across a vast landmass
starting from India and stretching all the way to Tibet, Central Asia, Sibe-
ria, Mongolia, China, the Korean peninsula and Japan. We are fortunate in
having the record of this phenomenon in the form of primary sources such
as diaries and memoirs, which document the vibrant human-centric interac-
tion that has sustained relations between our two regions. A signifcant body
of academic research has developed around this shared pool of knowledge,
which represents a lasting legacy of the contribution of these pioneers to
India-Inner Asia relations.
Looking to the future, special mention deserves to be made of movements
like Jadidism in the social and political evolution of the Turkic societies of
Tsarist Russia and Central Asia, and the Suf traditions in joining individual
and collective awareness of people from India to Inner Asia. Such move-
ments, with their common quest for harmony and cooperation, as opposed
to violent extremism and discord, represent a living tradition on the ground
to sustain our relations in the years to come.
The World Suf Conference hosted by India in New Delhi in March 2016
launched an important process on one aspect of this, which must be carried
further at a time the world is convulsed by violent conficts and the global
humanitarian crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and its efects. These
setbacks impact on the national eforts of people across the world for a bet-
ter future. It is useful to recall the words of India’s Prime Minister Narendra
Modi (2016) while inaugurating this Conference. Modi said:
At the beginning of a new century, we are at yet another point of transfor-

mation on a scale rarely seen in human history.
In many parts of the world, there is uncertainty about the future, and
how to deal with it as nations and societies.
These are precisely the times that the world is most vulnerable to vio-
lence and conficts.
The global community must be more vigilant than ever before and
counter the forces of darkness with the radiant light of human values.
India’s Policy Towards Central Asia

This is a subject that India’s premier university Jawaharlal Nehru University
at New Delhi (along with other educational institutes working in this area of
studies) has taken a special role in propagating, through the active encour-
agement of its eminent scholars and academics who have sought to create
a network of Central Asian scholars across India. The time is ripe for their
students/scholars to contribute to creating a vision of restoring connections
between India and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). This will assist the
operation of both “pro-active” and “new” diplomacy and the move from
soft to hard power.
India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy, articulated in 2012, and the path-
breaking visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all the fve CARs in July
2015 that gave this policy a strategic dimension, have been carried forward by
the frst India-Central Asia Dialogue in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on 13 Janu-
ary 2019 (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). The combining of soft and hard
power of Indian diplomacy is now becoming more visible, and its impact on
the ground will help give substance to the expectations that the society and
people of Central and Inner Asia have of India. Of course, the availability of
new information and communication technologies using the easily available
platform of modern smartphones and mobile telephony can play a major role
in catalysing this vision.
India has intensifed its structured interaction with the fve Central
Asian states during the past year, emphasizing the four priorities of com-
merce, capacity enhancement, connectivity and contacts at the third Dia-
logue held in New Delhi in December 2021. The focus of this interaction is
within the broader Inner Asian framework, including the evolving situation
in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and Central Asia

It has often been conceptualized that Central Asia and Afghanistan are an
integral part of the Inner Asian region, whose combined population is close
to 100 million people. In some aspects ethnicity, religion and culture link
Central Asia with Afghanistan. So do the ancient trade routes being revived
by modern connectivity proposals to integrate Afghanistan and Central Asia
with the outside world, and vice versa. These bonds must be acknowledged
and used to take this process forward. Into this process is thrown the role
of the Taliban, who were brought back to power in Kabul by the precipitate
withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in August 2021.
Earlier, analysts underlined the widespread support of the Pakistani mili-
tary and intelligence structures for the Taliban when they frst took power in
Kabul in 1996 (Rashid 2000). There are several important questions facing
well-wishers of Inner Asia today that emanate from the current situation in
Afghanistan: (1) Have the Taliban who captured power in Kabul in 2021
become forward looking, sharing the aspirations of younger generations else-
where in Inner Asia? (2) Will the Taliban be able to overcome their previous
doctrinaire approach that erected huge barriers for inclusive socio-economic
progress, including for women, children and minorities who form the bulk of
Introduction 5
Afghanistan’s population? (3) How will the ideological orientation of the

Taliban afect the expectation of the international community for an efective
response to counter terrorism emanating from the Af-Pak region? (4) Have
the umbilical cords that connected the Taliban to Pakistan’s security agen-
cies since the 1990s been cut completely? (5) How will the Taliban become
adept at international diplomacy, to ensure Afghanistan’s rightful place as an
integral part of, and not an obstacle to, regional integration in Inner Asia?
Trade
Central Asia is historically known for hosting the trade of the fabled Silk
Road. During Soviet times, this region was integrated into the overall Soviet
economy primarily as a source for raw materials, with very few processing
and manufacturing facilities. After their independence in December 1991 fol-
lowing the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Central Asian
countries have attempted to attract investment to establish manufacturing
and generate employment using their natural resources. Some progress has
been made in this direction, but the consequences of being located next to
the “manufacturing centre of the world”–China – has meant that products
made in the region are not competitive, especially for export. Consequently,
Central Asia continues to be considered a raw materials exporter, and an
importer of fnished products, by the trading community. The silver lining
for the region is its demographic dividend with a growing and vibrant young
population, and the focus across the world on trade in services.
It is here that India, considered as a major trading nation in services trade,
has attracted the attention of Central Asia. This opens the possibility for the
development of skilled human resources, using the existing skilled labour
in the region, and investments in services trade and eventually the digital
economy. Due to the constraints of geography, this region will rely on new
technologies to realize this potential, giving India a substantial role based on
its own use of new technologies for socio-economic development through the
Digital India platform.
Connectivity
The other constraint for the region is the fact that it is land-locked and
depends on viable and efective connectivity to access the international mar-
kets. Uzbekistan is a doubly land-locked country, which requires greater efort
to overcome. The priority on regional integration announced by Uzbekistan
in November 2017 may be seen in this context. This includes the current pri-
ority of Uzbekistan for constructing a railway link to connect Uzbekistan to
the Arabian Sea port of Karachi in Pakistan. This requires overcoming major
physical, political, technological and fnancial hurdles. However, attempts
to overcome these have been initiated with the recent agreement between
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to construct a 573-kilometre route
from Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan to Peshawar in Pakistan via
Kabul, to be fnanced by the World Bank.
Four initiatives deserve special mention in the broader context. The frst
is the impact of the Silk Road, on which the UNESCO initiated signifcant
work since 1988, which helped generate awareness of the civilizational herit-
age of Central and Inner Asia. The second is the attempt to create a Digital
Silk Road, in which one can conceptualize the cooperative contributions for
creation of digital infrastructure as well as digital content. The third is the
International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which has been held
hostage by the “hesitations of history” (to use this phrase in another set-
ting) for far too long (Ministry of External Afairs 2018a). This is signifcant
considering the impact the INSTC will have not only on Central Asia but
also on Iran. The fourth is the potential of the connectivity project sym-
bolized by Chabahar, which has already seen the movement of goods and
ideas in both directions, to and from India to Iran, Afghanistan and Central
Asia. However, an intriguing question remains on whether China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), which focuses on providing connectivity infrastructure
(both terrestrial and digital) for Inner Asia, will support or obstruct these
initiatives.
Energy
In terms of natural resources, conventional wisdom looks at the signifcance
of this region from the perspective of two major natural resources: frst, its
huge deposits of oil in and around the Caspian Sea, as well as signifcant
deposits of natural gas in the deserts of Turkmenistan and the harsh topog-
raphy of Siberia and the Arctic; second, the fow of water from the glaciers
of the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and Himalayas that feeds into all the major river
systems of Asia, including those originating in the Tibetan plateau.
There are, however, other resources in Inner Asia connected with energy
as well, including uranium for nuclear energy and the sun, for renewable
solar power. As these dimensions of Central Asia become part of the global
energy landscape, issues arise regarding the politics of oil; the role of water
in agriculture, especially for growing cotton; safeguards on trade in uranium;
and efective cooperation, including in manufacture of equipment to harness
and use solar energy.
Recent developments regarding the use of unilateral economic measures
such as sanctions imposed on trade in oil and gas from Iran, and now Russia,
illustrate the external challenges that can be inserted into a purely supply-
demand market-driven growth of this sector, with a major economic fallout
on socio-economic growth and investments in Inner Asia including Eurasia.
Introduction 7
Each country in this region is placed to contribute to the regional and

global discussion on these issues, whether through organizations like the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations or the International Solar
Alliance, headquartered in New Delhi. The challenge will be to ensure that
the voices of Inner Asia are heard and included in the global decisions taken
on the use of energy for development.
Environment
Climate change issues have been raised with relation to Central and Inner
Asia ever since this region became the preferred testing ground for the nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union and China. Perhaps the most well-
known popular movements during the Cold War on this issue concerned the
Semipalatinsk Polygon, where the Soviet Union conducted over 450 nuclear
tests, including about 300 underground tests. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk
movement, linking the main nuclear testing grounds of the United States and
Soviet Union, gathered momentum as the Cold War ended, and contributed
to raising awareness among the local populations of the adverse impact of
nuclear tests on both human health and the environment.
The other major environmental issue raised since Soviet times concerns the
use of water from the region’s Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Predomi-
nantly exploited for growing cotton in large collective farms, the debate on
the use of water sometimes overlooks the fact that the cotton of Central Asia
is also a valuable cash-crop in world markets due to its quality. There have
been two aspects of environmental concerns on this use of water.
The frst concerns the depletion of the water resources of the region, sym-
bolized by the Aral Sea problem, which has reduced the fourth-largest lake
in the world in the mid-20th century to less than 10 per cent of its original
size. The silver lining worth emulating in this area is Kazakhstan’s success in
replenishing the waters of the North Aral Sea through a joint project between
the government of Kazakhstan and the World Bank, which included the con-
struction of the Kokaral Dam in 2005. Besides its major impact on the envi-
ronment, the Aral Sea problem has signifcant socio-economic dimensions,
which can contribute to social instability as demonstrated by recent events in
the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan.
The second aspect is the impact of the use of chemical fertilizers for cotton
cultivation, which has adversely impacted the topsoil of the arable land of the
region, making it less productive. Related to both these natural issues is the
impact on human health, which has been well documented. Today, water has
become a major issue on the agenda of Central Asian states, and in June 2018,
the UN General Assembly adopted a historic resolution moved by Uzbekistan
on behalf of the other Central Asian states on strengthening cooperation in
Central Asia, in which the importance of developing and strengthening bilat-

eral and regional cooperation in the rational and integrated use of water and
energy resources in Central Asia was highlighted (United Nations Regional
Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 2018).
Geopolitics and Geostrategy

India and the broad Central Asian and Inner Asian regions are in the middle
of current upheavals in international relations in the wider Eurasian land-
mass. At least four processes deserve to be looked at in this context.
The frst is the process in which India is playing an active role, for integrat-
ing the region through ambitious connectivity proposals. Apart from boost-
ing economic interaction and integration, the objective of this process is to
revive the civilizational links that connect the millions of ordinary people
living in this space.
The second process is the increasing use of this region by the major pow-
ers for their own strategic advantage. These relate to using the Inner Asian
region as a bufer against violent extremism from the south, or as a major
transit space for trade and energy infrastructure, or as an area for adventur-
ous expansionism.
The third process is the revival of ethnicity and language, and particularly
the role of these factors in the socio-political status of minorities in Inner
Asia. The approach of the states of the region towards national minorities
plays a critical role in this context. While historical analysis of the status of
ethnic minorities across the borders of Inner Asia’s states has focused on tra-
ditional areas such as the situation of Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang province
or the situation of the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities in the politically
contested and densely populated Fergana Valley, there is need to expand our
focus to simmering issues that can add to instability in this region if not
addressed in a cooperative manner through dialogue and diplomacy. Such
issues include the status of the Tajik minorities in Afghanistan and Uzbeki-
stan, and the status of the ethnic Russian minorities across several Eurasian
states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The fourth process is the role of this region in the eventual creation of an
Asian Century. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2011) has projected
that by “nearly doubling its share of global gross domestic product (GDP)
to 52 per cent by 2050, Asia would regain the dominant economic position
it held some 300 years ago, before the industrial revolution”. The stability,
growth and integration of Inner Asia will be of critical importance for meet-
ing this goal in the face of major challenges enumerated so far.
In all these four processes, the role of China and India, home to three bil-
lion people today, will be signifcant for the future of Inner Asia/Eurasia. It
is relevant to conclude by reminding ourselves that fve centuries ago, China
Introduction 9
and India accounted for close to half of global output in economic terms.
Current trends indicate that by 2050, China and India will again be among
the top three economies of the world, positioning themselves in the process to
play a major role in bringing peace and prosperity to Inner Asia.
Themes and Perspectives

For India, the Inner Asian neighbourhood assumes great importance, where
there is a potential enemy (Pakistan) with whom India has fought four wars
in the past seven decades or so; there is a ferce competitor–an economi-
cally and militarily superior power (China) – that continues to pose seri-
ous challenges to India every here and there, the recent Chinese attack on
India in Ladakh (in June 2020) being an example; there are resource-rich
regions-cum-friendly nations such as Central Asia and Mongolia; and also
there is a war-torn shattered security zone (Afghanistan). This edited book
comprising 16 chapters (along with introduction and conclusion) is themati-
cally structured and divided into three parts: (1) Inner Asian issues; (2) geo-
politics and geo-economics and (3) Indian connection. In Part I, there are
four chapters discussing various issues related to Inner Asia, from Buddhism
and its thorough study and spread by Nicholas Roerich, ethnic groups in the
contested borderlands, the geopolitical ballgame in Inner Asia in the 20th
century that had impacted the Mongol-seeking independence and a burning
issue like climate change. Culture matters the most while analysing issues
related to Inner Asia. Buddhism has been the fagbearer of Indian culture
that has remained the binding force between the people of the two regions
and that is the main objective of Chapter 2, which discusses Nicholas Roer-
ich’s observations on the enriching elements of Buddhism set against the
backdrop of history, culture and geography of Asia, employing the research
method of content analysis. It is interesting to see how Xinjiang, the lynch-
pin of China’s BRI and a contested borderland of the Inner Asian region,
has become a witness to Chinese State project of “harmonizing” the Uyghur
Muslims by redefning the role and demarcating the space of ethnicity, as
elaborated in Chapter 3. The subsequent chapter (Chapter 4) aims at dealing
with the geopolitical ballgame played by Russia and China in Mongolia, par-
ticularly during the early 20th century, which raises quite a few questions in
which the issue of Mongolian independence is of paramount importance to
the realities of today. Chapter 5 delineates key issues of climate change and
studies its following socio-economic and environmental impact in the region:
(1) nature and the pattern of environmental degradation; (2) loss of livelihood
and forced migration of people; and (3) impact on health and food security.
Part II consists of half a dozen chapters covering a whole of gamut of
issues such geopolitics, geo-economics, regional cooperation, importance of
the fabled Silk Road for the countries of the region and so forth. Chapter 6
is an endeavour to study the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic

signifcance of Inner Asia, with special reference to Central Asia. The chap-
ter is divided into fve broad sections. While the frst section deals with the
defnition of key concepts and the framework of the study, the second, third
and fourth sections narrate the geopolitical and geo-economic discourse sur-
rounding Inner Asia in general and Central Asia in particular. The fnal sec-
tion summarizes the main conclusions of the present study. The importance
of regionalism and regional cooperation in Central Asia is ironically felt
and in this context, Chapter 7 provides food for thought for touching upon
regionalism in post–Soviet Central Asia as well as inter-state cooperation to
understand how the states in the region identify themselves geographically,
geopolitically and culturally, in addition to their collective response to secu-
rity challenges. Since Central Asia remains at the heart of the Inner Asian
region and the hub of many activities in recent years, cooperation among
the states of the region will be the key, as Chapter 8 dilates upon. It broadly
looks at the trends of regional cooperation in the region and how it has
moved forward in past few years. It discusses how this cooperation could
bring about stability in the broader Central Asia-Afghanistan region. A dis-
cussion on any issue related to Inner Asia will not be complete without dis-
cussing the fabled Silk Route, which was virtually the lifeline of the region in
the ancient times and is a centre of debate and discussion in the modern and
contemporary times. Chapter 9 gives new discourses/narratives on the Silk
Route that has become the cynosure of all eyes, be it United States through
its New Silk Road Initiative, or China with its 21st-century signature strat-
egy BRI, or Russia opening up its Eurasian Economic Union gambit. Chap-
ter 10 moves one step further, elucidating three factors that have catapulted
the old Silk Road concepts to debates and discussions in post-Soviet years:
(1) emergence of independent countries in Eurasia; (2) China’s rising thirst
for business, commerce and energy; and (3) the proliferating markets from
Turkey on the one hand, China on the other and Russia from the north and
an entirely new network of communication links in Eurasia in the last quar-
ter century. Chapter 11 establishes how Afghanistan, an important centre for
trade along the ancient Silk Road, which brought a long period of prosperity
to the region for almost 2 millennia lying at the centre of South Asia, Central
Asia, East Asia and West Asia can form the Asian pivot of the BRI.
Part III is a conglomeration of fve chapters (including the conclusion)
completely devoted to the Indian connection with the Inner Asian region.
Chapter 12 argues that India has been considering the Inner Asian region
as key to maximizing its national interests and international goals in this
region, and has thus been trying to forge meaningful relationship with the
key countries (CARs, Afghanistan and Mongolia) through strategic partner-
ship, defence and military agreements, economic cooperation and people-
to-people contact. Lack of a direct geographical boundary with the Inner
Introduction 11
Asian region has been India’s Achilles Hill. However, the opening of Iran’s
Chabahar as a port of promise and other routes through Iran, Chapter 13
argues, could give India access to the Eurasian region, thereby improving
India’s connectivity with the region. Chapter 14 discusses Indian trade along
the routes (Uttarapath, western routes to the Mediterranean, Wakhan Corri-
dor route, Lapis Lazuli route, Sulaiman passes etc.) in the South-Central Asia
region since ancient times. Chapter 15 shows that the frst India-Central Asia
Dialogue, an important Indian foreign policy initiative in 2019 to boost its
ties with the CARs, was a culmination of “new” diplomacy emerging in the
past few years, especially the bilateral visits to all CARs by Narendra Modi in
2015, coupled with the growing geopolitical and geo-economic signifcance
of Central Asia in Indian strategic calculus. The concluding chapter (Chapter
16) wraps up with the major fndings of this study.
References
Asian Development Bank. 2011. “Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century.”
Executive Summary. Accessed April 10, 2020. www.adb.org/sites/default/fles/
publication/28608/asia2050-executive-summary.pdf
Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2018a. “Prime Minister’s Key-
note Address at Shangri La Dialogue.” Accessed June 1, 2018. www.mea.gov.in/
Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shan
gri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018
Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2018b. “Prime Minister’s Address
at India–Russia Business Summit.” Accessed October 5, 2018. https://mea.gov.in/
Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30472/Prime+Ministers+address+at+India+Russia+
Business+Summit+October+05+2018
Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2019. “Press Statement by EAM
after First India-Central Asia Dialogue.” Accessed January 13, 2019. www.
mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30907/Press_Statement_by_EAM_
After_1st_IndiaCentral_Asia_Dialogue
Modi, Narendra. 2016. “Sufsm is the Voice of Peace, Co-Existence, Compassion, and
Equality; a Call to Universal Brotherhood: PM Modi.” March 17. Accessed March
20, 2020. www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-at-the-world-islamic-suf-conference-
in-new-delhi-428276
Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and
Beyond. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA).
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Central Asia.” June 25. Accessed June 30, 2020. https://unrcca.unmissions.org/
general-assembly-adopts-resolution-strengthening-cooperation-central-asia
PART I
Inner Asian Issues

2
BUDDHIST HEART OF ASIA IN
THE WORKS OF NICHOLAS ROERICH
A Study
Jojan Job
Introduction
Nicholas Konstantinovich Roerich (1874–1947), one of the greatest paint-
ers and writers of the 20th century, was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, in
October 1874. He was also an accomplished archaeologist, philosopher, the-
osophist, scientist, traveller and explorer. Even from his childhood, he was
curious to know about the mystic lands of the mountains across the globe,
especially in the Himalayas. He visited those lands and learned the meta-
physical aspects of the spiritual world. Roerich’s spiritually oriented works
are best understood by setting them against geographical, historical, cultural
and religious contexts.
As a prolifc author, he published 64 poems under the title Flowers of
Morya between 1916 and 1919. Besides, he had written masterpieces such
as Adamant (1923), Altai-Himalaya (1929), Heart of Asia (1929), Flame in
Chalice (1930), Shambhala (1930), Realm of Light (1931), The Invincible
(1936), Himavat – Diary of Leaves (1946) and Himalayas – Abode of Light
(1947). His works took readers to the sublime philosophical and aesthetic
world of purity. The Himalayan ranges in Tibet (Brock 1926) and India are
also portrayed beautifully in his works. Roerich makes particular note of the
famous Silk Road in the Himalayan ranges. His expeditions made him to
cross Karakoram, where he met hermits and visited Buddhist monasteries.
Roerich yearned to acquire Buddhist wisdom, which led him to explore and
understand deeply various facets of Buddhism. His journeys through vari-
ous geographical areas of the fabled Silk Road enabled him to unearth and
study some of the original scriptures of Buddhism, which are refected in his
visual and literary works. Roerich was an enthusiastic observer of various
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-3
16 Jojan Job
aspects of Buddhist cultures in the Asiatic Himalayan mountain ranges. His

observations found artistic expression in his paintings, while his essays and
books recorded them philosophically. Roerich’s paintings are visual records
of geographical, anthropological, social and cultural details of an era of Bud-
dhism set against the geographical landscape of Asia. He discusses Buddhism
in his works such as Himavat – Diary of Leaves and in Himalayas – the
Abode of Light. In Himavat, Roerich dwells upon peace, beauty and knowl-
edge. Because of these achievements, the famous Russian poet Maxim Gorki
dubbed Roerich as “one of the greatest inductive minds of the age”. India’s
frst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1964) pays tribute to Roerich thus:
When I think of Nicholas Roerich I am astounded at the scope and abun-

dance of his activities and creative genius. A great artist, a great scholar
and writer, archaeologist and explorer, he touched and lighted up so many
aspects of human endeavour. The very quantity is stupendous – thousands
of paintings and each one of them a great work of art. When you look at
these paintings, so many of them of the Himalayas, you seem to catch the
spirit of those great mountains which have towered over the Indian plain
and been our sentinels for ages past. They remind us of so much in our his-
tory, our thought, our cultural and spiritual heritage so much not merely of
the India of the past but of something that is permanent and eternal about
India, that we cannot help feeling a great sense of indebtedness to Nicholas
Roerich who has enshrined that spirit in these magnifcent canvases.
It is against this background this chapter throws light on Nicholas Roerich’s

observations on the enriching elements of Buddhism set against the backdrop
of the history, culture and geography of Asia, employing the research method
of content analysis. This chapter analyses some of Roerich’s famous literary
works for the aforesaid purpose. This chapter is divided into sub-themes such
as (1) Roerich’s international expeditions; (2) Roerich’s interests in human-
ism, culture and religion; (3) impact of the noble gospels of Buddhism on
Roerich; and (4) conclusion.
Roerich’s International Expeditions

Roerich undertook his expedition of the Inner Asian region during 1924–
1928. During his four-year expedition, he covered more than 25,000 kilo-
metres. He has neatly recorded his visits to places such as Kashmir, Ladakh,
Sikkim, Gangtok, Darjeeling, Kullu Valley, Karakoram, Taklamakan desert,
Sin-tsian, Tianshan, Urumchi, Soviet Middle Asia, China, Siberia, Altai,
Mongolia, the Gobi desert and the trans-Himalayan regions. His expedition
helped him narrow down the focus of his search to the mythological land,
Shangri-La. The long journey gave him clarity and invaluable insights for
Buddhist Heart of Asia in the Works of Nicholas Roerich 17
his philosophical concepts on life, nature and religions. The journey also
kindled in him the enthusiasm to know about various cultures, ethnicities
and humanity in general. Roerich was convinced that the narrow and limited
practical approaches based on science and technology will only hasten the
destruction of nature. He thought that only a philosophical understanding
with a holistic perspective, which includes an open mind and respect for each
and everything in nature, could save our planet. Roerich’s journeys through
the Himalayan ranges and the interior regions of Inner Asia let him under-
stand the relevance of human values and the need to have a compassionate
approach to all living beings and nature in general.
Roerich was keen to understand the human evolution. As an architect,
he studied diferent styles of Russian architecture through diferent periods.
The study of this architectural evolution urged Roerich’s philosophical mind
to travel insightfully to the history of mankind. He left Russia at the age of
43 and by that time he had made his name as an author and painter. He was
equally enthusiastic about philosophy and religion. Roerich was also inter-
ested in various cultures and wanted to know the role of human beings in
this universe. The spiritual quest is unmistakable in Roerich’s works. In this
context, Burns and Smith (1973) opine:
To produce a pictorial record of lands and peoples of Inner Asia, Nicholas

Roerich executed over 500 paintings during this single expedition. During
these visits to Central Asia, he acquired a strong taste for Oriental mysti-
cism and a considerable collection of Asian art treasures.
In the chapter “Light in the Desert” (Roerich 1947), one can see many Chi-
nese locations and read about the Mongols, caravans and Ghengis Khan.
Roerich writes about the Tibetan sacred dance, the colourful Tibetan songs
and the possession. He argues that the gorgeous display of colour and the
trumpets with their victorious sound refect high quality.
To save the planet and humanity, peace has to prevail across the world.
Otherwise, human beings will make their life futile in the name of geographic
boundaries and ethnic diferences. The tragic developments happening in
recent times in countries like Afghanistan, Ukraine, Israel and Palestine
remind us of the relevance of the words and works of Nicholas Roerich. The
philosophy of peace is the very essence of his paintings. Thousands of his
paintings found in museums and private collections portray the mountain
peaks, people set against their ethnic backgrounds as well as mythological
and spiritual characters. All these vivid pictures exhibit the quest for peace
and spiritual elevation. As Shaposhnikova (2013) observes:
The 20th century witnessed such a process in the lives of both Helena and
Nicholas Roerich. They accomplished this by establishing contact with
18 Jojan Job
their Teacher, a Cosmic Hierarch, and maintaining the closest spiritual

collaboration which resulted in the creation of the treatises of Living Eth-
ics, a philosophy of cosmic reality. This philosophy of the Roerichs syn-
thesized science and meta-science, and proposed a system of cognition
necessary for forming a new cosmic mentality.” His works demonstrate
the energy of human consciousness and the unity of everything. Roerich
always believed that Russian culture has its roots in Indian philosophical
traditions and in all his creative works one can see and feel the presence of
this important aspect.
According to Golodnikova (2009), Roerich had understood well that the

Inner Asian region gives unique possibilities to study the past. The purpose
behind Roerich’s expedition to Inner Asia (especially Central Asia) has been
depicted by Golodnikova in the following words:
The main purpose of the expedition was to create a pictorial panorama of

lands and nations of Central Asia. The second purpose was to study the
possibilities of new archaeological investigations and future expeditions in
this region. The third purpose was to study the languages and dialects of
Central Asia and to collect pieces of culture in these regions.
Roerich produced 7,000 art works, which include wall paintings and mural
paintings. In his work, Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary, Roerich describes
various religions practised in and around Central Asia. He gives valuable
insights about the lives of the people of this region and its adjacent areas. In
his work Shambhala, one can fnd Roerich’s travel narratives on Tibet and
the Central Asian countries and the philosophical and religious practices of
these regions in 20th century. It is interesting to read the legends and para-
bles which indicate the mystic land of Shambhala. In many of the Eastern
prophesies, one can observe the appearance of Shambhala as a place where
enlightenment and consciousness are projected. Roerich (2017a) reveals that
through his journeys in Central Asia and Tibet, he was able to see the signs
of Shambhala in the rock paintings and the popular legends in the country-
side. According to Roerich, Shambhala is a place one can attain only through
noble actions and deeds.
In addition to the Inner Asian region, Roerich travelled to other countries
as well. His visit to America proved productive, because during his stay in
America in the 1920s, he planned his journey to India. Roerich’s visit to New
York as a painter gave him the opportunity to exhibit his paintings, which
received appreciation from the scholars, art critics and laymen. His interest in
Buddhism made him embark upon the journey to the East. He reached India
in 1923. After coming here, he started meeting intellectuals, painters, writers
and scientists of India. At the end of 1923, he travelled in the mountainous
region of the Himalayas, where he crossed more than 30 mountain passes,

as described in his travel accounts. He studied the customs and religions of
the people in that region, which helped him to reinforce his faith in the qual-
ity of human lives and humanity. It was in the year 1928 that the Roerich
family settled in Kullu Valley and established a research centre. In Kullu, he
discussed the outcome of his explorations as well as the study of botany,
ethnology, archaeology and linguistics. His children collected a number of
medicinal plants for detailed study in the context of Chinese and Tibetan
medicinal tradition. Roerich died on 13 December 1947 in Kullu.
Roerich’s Interests in Humanism, Culture and Religion

Roerich was a true believer in humanism and thought culture as an impor-
tant part of human life. In Himavat – Diary Leaves, Roerich discusses the
evolution, peace, aesthetics and the idea of culture. He considers culture as
the love of humanity and the moving force. In his work, Flame in Chalice,
Roerich’s prowess as a poet comes to the fore. The poems are simple and
direct and reveal the mind of a universal citizen. George Gordan is quoted in
the foreword of Himavat, (Roerich 2017b) who praises Roerich as “one of
the greatest leaders of history”. According to Gordan:
Nicholas Roerich is unquestionably one of the greatest leaders of history.

Combined with his extraordinary breadth of mind, there is a sublime sym-
pathy with the opinions of, and tolerance for, the prejudices of others. He
has a marvelous equipment to be the leader of an international movement.
He has power not only to plan but to act. He can translate his dreams into
action.
In the book The Invincible, Roerich’s dedication to spread sublime ideas to

create a new consciousness for the human beings with a spiritual foundation
has found prominent place. Further, in Beautiful Unity, Roerich (1946) says:
Humanity is facing the coming events of cosmic greatness. Humanity

already realizes that all occurrences are not accidental. The time for the
construction of future culture is at hand. Before our eyes the revaluation of
values is being witnessed. Amidst ruins of valueless banknotes, mankind
has found the real value of the world’s signifcance.
The Theosophical Society, which was founded in 1875, instilled in Roerich

a keen interest to study the essence of Eastern religions. It was during 1909–
1915 that Roerich became a part of the Theosophical Society, which con-
structed a Buddhist temple dedicated to the Kalachakra tradition of Tibetan
Buddhism in St. Petersburg. He was an avid reader of Rebus, especially the
20 Jojan Job
insightful pieces contributed by the celebrated Russian mystic and theosophist

Helena Petrovna Blavatsky. The Theosophical Society’s motto satyat nasti
paro dharmah (no religion higher than truth) inspired Roerich to explore the
possibilities of Eastern religions, especially Buddhism. In his poems, articles
and paintings, one can discern the refection of this infuence.
Roerich was equally interested in history and archaeology. Roerich held
that one cannot think of the future without the past. He was able to fnd
various elements from the past to make the future better. He visited numer-
ous temples and monasteries belonging to the Buddhist and Hindu faiths.
Roerich was also wellversed in a number of books related to these religions.
He had great respect for the Indian culture, geography, history, society and
above all its people.
In addition, Roerich was a missionary of peace and beauty. Bernardi
(2013) sums up Roerich’s philosophy: “his philosophy set man inside a dense
network of relationships: with himself, with his mentor or Guide, with other
human beings, with other kingdoms, both subhuman and a super human”.
According to Bernardi, the core of Roerich’s approach is giving value for the
existence of the oriental philosophy which can create an ethical vision. It is
important to highlight Abanindranath Tagore’s foreword to Roerich’s Beau-
tiful Unity (1946). Tagore wrote:
Nicholas Roerich has a place all his own in the world of Art. His pen too
has carved out a niche for itself in the world of letters. The brush has a
wider appeal no doubt, but the pen has a distinct function of its own; and
in the hands of Nicholas Roerich it has for long exerted an infuence which
is at once elevating and instructive.
Indian scholar Chandra (2013) narrates the paintings of Roerich in the fol-
lowing words:
The Himalayan paintings of Roerich are a hymn to the vital strength of

Life and Nature, a dynamic potential for the biosphere and psycho sphere.
Like Lord Buddha, Roerich sees with his “divine vision” (divya-chakshus)
that every stone, every drop of water, every cell of the body is an endlessly
fowing river of deep consciousness that enriches Homo sapiens in trans-
utilitarian values.
Roerich was a keen observer of religions, monuments, customs and the great
migrations of people in Central Asia. Roerich interacted extensively with
Lamas and sages, poets, philosophers and monks in places he visited, not
to mention his in-depth study of the scriptures, mythologies and legacies.
The journeys of Roerich helped in mapping mountain paths which has not
been mentioned anywhere else. He also documented the great religious and
cultural monuments, besides collecting and studying the folklores of places

he visited. Roerich considered the Himalayas as the treasure trove of the
world. His admiration for India stemmed from the fact that Buddhist phi-
losophy helped the world become a better, peaceful place to live. He was fas-
cinated by the Bhagavad-Gita, sayings and teachings of the Sri Ramakrishna
Paramahamsa, Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore’s Gitanjali.
Impact of the Noble Gospels of Buddhism on Roerich

Roerich was attached to all the great philosophical, poetic and humanistic
values linked to peace and the conservation of culture of his era. As a highly
enthusiastic kid, he was interested in archaeology, paintings, human culture
and philosophy right from childhood. He always held the view that one can
make the world a happier place through the pursuit of the beautiful. He was
always keen to understand the ancient roots of human wisdom. This orienta-
tion and involvement led him to think and study more about Eastern culture
as well as Buddhism and the Himalayas.
Roerich was able to understand the mystic and mysterious nature of Asian
Buddhism. He became a master of mysticism. He was able to see the heart of
Asia. While describing Roerich’s expeditions of the Himalayas, Decter (1989)
narrates the personality and sensitivity of Roerich in the following words:
Once, in conversation, the artist (Roerich) compared himself to a fower

that cannot tolerate being touched. The slightest touch and it closes. This is
a very accurate analogy. Though he is as trusting and tolerant . . . as a child,
he will hide in his shell if approached by anyone in the least indelicate way.
Later on, Roerich’s expedition in the Inner Asian region (1925–1928) helped
him seek the higher world of mysticism and spirituality in art. In his work
Altai-Himalaya, he describes his journey in the Himalayas (Roerich 2017a).
Roerich’s search for Shambala made him travel to various lands of Himala-
yas. Roerich has written extensively on the lives of Lamas and the Tibetan
monasteries. He was not only an avid student of Buddhism but also a col-
lector of books, artefacts and manuscripts related to the religion. It was in
1924 that Roerich started his series on Himalayas, staying in the countryside
of Darjeeling. Roerich learned the Tibetan language and was able to engage
in debates with the Lamas on the noble gospels of Buddhism. He was keen
to understand the common source of the long heritage of Russian and Indian
cultures. He marvelled at various aspects of the historical phenomena which
integrate people living in diferent geographical, cultural, religious, social,
economic, political, national, linguistic and regional contexts. In short, he
was in search of the underlying philosophy of various cultures with special
reference to Asia.
22 Jojan Job
According to Roerich, the Himalayan mountain ranges personify the ele-

ment of sacredness that connects the countries in the Asian continent. In
Himavat, he admires the Himalayas wholeheartedly. He wrote: “Even in
the dark middle ages, remote countries dreamed of beautiful India, which
was epitomized in the imagination of people by the mysterious sacred snowy
giants” (www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.php). In Himavat, Roer-
ich brings us various visuals from the Himalayan context such as (1) the
sage who sings about the beauty of Himalayas, (2) the healing powers of
musk which the rishis (saints) possess, (3) a Banaras sadhu who sits in sacred
posture on the waters of the Ganges and (4) a Lama who levitates. Based on
the Tibetan books which are preserved in the Gandola monastery, Roerich
mentioned about the place in which the famous Buddhist teacher Padma
Sambava meditated. He also shows the caves where Jetsun Milarepa, the
Tibetan siddha, meditated. He says that life will be meaningless sans the con-
cept of beauty. In Himavat, he also discusses the collection of Buddhist texts,
especially the yellow manuscripts of Xinjiang’s Turpan region.
McCannon (2003) talks about the artist Roerich’s passion for various
forms of alternative spirituality in the following words:
Curiosity about Russia’s cultural ties with Eurasia grew into a full-fedged
fascination with Asia. Simultaneously, Roerich became enthralled by vari-
ous forms of alternative spirituality. In this, he was spurred on by his wife,
Helena, whom he met in 1899 and married in 1901. Together, the two
of them pored over the writings of Vivekananda and Ramakrishna, read
widely about Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and plunged deeply into the Theo-
sophical arcana preached by Helena Blavatsky.
McCannon (2003) notes how Roerich gave up his earlier Russian particular-
ism for universalism by the year 1910: small wonder, universal themes and
the geographical areas like the Himalayas started appearing in his paintings
and articles. Philosophical and religious quest became the staple of his works.
Metaphors and symbols of Buddhism, which lead to spiritual elevation and
insight to the mysterious nature of cosmos, metaphysics, pantheism and pro-
phetic nature – all these became part of his art. Roerich’s universal approach
became more and more visible when he uses the iconography of the Buddhist
religion. He discusses the deep involvement of Roerich and his wife Helena in
theosophy and Buddhism. When he was in Russia, he continuously thought
of visiting India for spiritual edifcation.
The Himalayan world of Tibet, Sikkim and Kashmir, where popularity
and prevalence of Buddhism was witnessed, was of immense interest to Roer-
ich. Brock (1926) has rightly observed:
These are notes of landscapes powerfully and poetically pictured in words,

of sights and sounds in the mountains and habitations of Sikkim and
Kashmir – the tremendous sounds of religious ceremonial trumpets, the

chiming of silver bells, notes of color and design in costume, sculptor’s
and painter’s notes of faces and fgures. All these are of extraordinary
vividness.
After crossing Tibet and Ladakh, the expedition continues to Lahaul. Roer-
ich writes: “The snowy peaks, colorful shrubs, fragrant juniper, and brightly
tinted wild roses are not inferior to those of the most fertile plains of Tibet.
Many of the sanctuaries, stupas, caves of hermits are not poorer than in
Ladakh” (www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.php).
Another masterpiece Heart of Asia – Memories of Himalayas (Roerich
2007), as the title indicates, is a collection of articles based on his journeys
in the Himalayas. The work notes that Roerich visited more than 50 Bud-
dhist monasteries and several Buddhist teachers who resided in remote areas.
One also witnesses the philosophical insights of Buddhist culture which
were given by various Lamas. Roerich is enthusiastic more about the same
because he can share it with the rest of the world. As noted in the aforemen-
tioned book, Roerich was believed to have crossed 35 mountain passes of
the Himalayas through various geographical areas. Whereever he went, he
learnt the culture, the language and the painting tradition of those regions,
which helped him to paint the Himalayas with great insight. Roerich in his
diary had maintained the precious moments and minute details which he had
cherished in the Himalayas. No wonder, Roerich expressed through poetic
words in his work, Himalayas – Abode of Light (1947):
The majestic grandeur of the Himalayas has furnished a mine of precious

lore for all the nations. Every country speaks of them in its own way, as
the Sacred Land or the Abode of Wisdom. And India, which is the moth-
erland of the Blessed One, knows that the ancient Rishis (saints) strength-
ened their spirit amid these marvelous regions.
In Himalayas – Abode of Light, Roerich (1947) wrote more about the

lives in the Himalayas. In Realm of life and Himavat – Diary Leaves one
can relive the same spirit. In Himavat – Diary Leaves, he talks about the
real arrival of Shambhala. The presence of Lamas is a common theme in
his works. His philosophical quest made him interact with many monks in
monasteries as well as in various geographical regions of Asia. The Mongo-
lian Lama who appears in Holy Guardian in Himavat tells him about the
holy keepers. Roerich admires the gifts of the East in the same work. Here,
he discusses agricultural products like tea, rice, indigo and so forth. Roerich
was not happy with the way the Western countries portrayed the East. He
is surprised to see the way Mongols love their country and their capacity to
endure hardships like going without drinking water and food for days. In
the continuation of the travel narratives, one can see his journey through the
24 Jojan Job
Rohtang Pass. Roerich’s description of snowy mountains, peaks and caves

appeals to our minds as pure poetry. In Maitreya, Roerich (1932) opined:
How beautifully India speaks of the end of the Black Age of Kali Yuga
and the glorious beginning of the White Age of Satya Yuga. How majestic
is the image of the Kalki Avatar upon the white steed! With equal hearti-
ness the far-of Oirots await the White Burkhan. Our Old Believers who
heroically go in quest of the “White Waters” in the Himalayas, make this
difcult journey only in the name of the future.
Roerich is happy to see here the abundant collection of Tibetan Buddhist

literature. Roerich’s visit to the monasteries compelled him to write in detail
about the hermits and the medicinal plants. He cared about the dances of the
Lamas too. He has great respect for the Tibetan system of medicine. Roerich
makes a note of cancer patients who were cured by the medicine given by
Buddhist Lamas. Buddhism is one of the major religions which originated in
ancient India and spread all over the world. Even though Buddha was a man,
he was respected and accepted in most of the Asian countries as an awakened
and enlightened human being. Scriptures, relics, monuments, concepts and
temples connected to Buddhism are visible almost in all the Asian countries.
As a physician, Buddha diagnoses the plight of human beings and gave solu-
tions with eight-fold paths as prescriptions. In the last century, it was quite
common for scholars and Indologists from various parts of the world to come
to places connected to the Buddha and his philosophy. As an archaeologist,
painter and traveller, Roerich also wanted to visit this Asian land in search of
truth as well as to learn more about the concept of Shambhala. Travellers and
scholars like Itsing and Xuanzhang had visited this land in the earlier times.
Roerich is diferent from other travellers because he was not only a scientist
and archaeologist but also a great painter. His expeditions in the Buddhist
land were fruitful because he was able to gain insights into the philosophy
of Buddha from the perspective of an artist. Roerich was able to convey the
message of enthusiasm and faith to millions of people in India and abroad.
Buddhism dwells upon the doctrine of the middle path. Most of the Bud-
dhist monasteries and temples in Tibet, Mongolia and China belong to
Mahayana Buddhism. Four Noble Truths and Eight-Fold Path are the basic
ingredients of the Buddhist philosophy. Roerich was also inspired by the
sublime aspect of the religion. In The Heart of Asia, he refers to the mountain
ranges of Tibet and India. Roerich writes about the Buddhist presence in Sik-
kim in the following words:
This blessed country, full of reminiscences of the illumined leaders

of religions, leaves an impression of great calmness. Here lived Padma
Sambhava, the founder of the Red Cap sect. Atisha, who proclaimed the
teaching of Kalachakra, crossed this country on his way to Tibet. Here, in

the caves, dwelt many ascetics, flling space with their powerful thoughts.
(Roerich 2007)
The reference to monasteries in Sikkim, the teaching of Padma Sambhava

and the deep religious nature of people, the historical details of Buddhism in
this geographical land, the miraculous power of Lamas – all are mentioned
here. He also gives reference from various Buddhist sources. The reference
of great patrons of Buddhism such as Nagarjuna, Asvaghosha, Shantha Rak-
shita and King Ashoka has also been given by Roerich. The declining mon-
astery in Maulbeck and the gigantic image of Maitreya are referred here.
The concept of Shambhala appears many times in the Heart of Asia as well
as in Himalayas-Abode of Light; Roerich (1947), quotes the words of local
people:
There, behind that mountain, live holy men. They left the world in order
to save humanity through wisdom. Many tried to go into their land, but
few ever reached it. They know that one has to go behind that mountain.
But as soon as they cross the ridge, they lose their way.
In Mysteries, Roerich brings to our notice the ruins of Buddhist monaster-

ies and temples. In Himalayan Prophesies, he refers again to the prophe-
cies of Shambhala and Maitreya. In another article on Shambala, he quotes
the scholars about the monasteries of Mongolia, Tibet and China. In Abode
of Light, one can get insightful discussions on Shambhala, where a humble
Roerich asks the Lama about Shambhala. During the long discussion, the
Lama tells Roerich that they are guarded by Shambhala. The discussion con-
tinues in the next chapter, “The Knowledge of Experience”, where they talk
about the great keepers of mystery on Shambhala. In the chapter,“Frontiers
of Shambhala”, Roerich writes about the indications and legends about
Shambhala. Here, Roerich also gives directions about the places where the
hermit Milerapa meditated. He summarizes the teaching of Shambhala here:
“The Teaching of Shambhala is a Teaching of Life. As in Hindu Yogas, this
Teaching shows how to use the fnest energies, flling the macrocosms, which
energies can as mightily be manifested in our microcosms” (Roerich 1947).
Conclusion
In the introduction of the frst edition of Roerich’s Adamant (1923), Serge
Whitman mentioned that “Roerich’s spirit has prophesied visions of a new
world, where rife and discords are no more, and where the power of Beauty
in Action flls mankind with inefable Love and understanding”. In the same
edition, M. Highlander summarizes: “The world of Roerich is the World
26 Jojan Job
of Truth. His works link mortal souls with the world of unearthly revela-
tions”. While discussing the implications of Buddhist alliance and Buddhist
framework in the larger context of Roerich’s narratives and Eurasian future,
Chatterjee (2013) sums up:
Inner Asia’s cosmopolitan image has reappeared indicating it’s span across
territories belonging to at least three time zones of Russia, China, Mongo-
lia, Tibet and India. This re-conceptualization of Inner Asia has brought
back to life Nicholas Roerich’s ideas about difused Eurasian cultures. So,
we are faced with multiple hypotheses about the space that Inner Asia
represents – a pan-Mongolian space, a colonial space depicted in the travel
narratives of Nicholas Roerich and a Buddhist space of the lamaist tradi-
tion and a Buryat space. The unusual Buddhist locales visited by Roerich
indicate the prominence of those sacred sites in a large Buddhist space.
Roerich’s account refects the Transnationality of Buddhism and pan-
Mongolism on the one hand and hybrid local sentiments of inner Asia on
the other.
Nicholas Roerich was truly a cultural ambassador, whose harmonizing and

synthesizing approach is discernible in his paintings that portray the Bud-
dhist elements in the heart of Asia. As a teacher, scholar, explorer and painter,
Roerich excelled with the purpose to build the new humanity. He built insti-
tutions to spread the language of beauty.
References
Bernardi, Marina. 2013. “Living Ethics: An Aspect of AgniYoga.” In Nicholas Roer-
ich: A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 167–171. New Delhi: Niyogi Books.
Brock, H. I. 1926. “Roerich Seeks a Composite Messiah in Tibet.” The New York
Times. July 4.
Burns, Richard Dean and Charyl L. Smith. 1973. “Nicholas Roerich, Henry A. Wal-
lace and the ‘Peace Banner’: A Study in Idealism, Egocentrism, and Anguish.”
Peace and Change 1 (2): 41.
Chandra, Lokesh. 2013. “A Caravan in Time and Space.” In Nicholas Roerich:
A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 185–193. New Delhi: Niyogi Books.
Chatterjee, Suchandana. 2013. “Glimpses of Inner Asia.” In Nicholas Roerich:
A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 43–56. New Delhi: Niyogi Books.
Decter, Jacqueline. 1989. Nicholas Roerich: The Life and Art of a Russian Master, 27.
Rochester: Park Street Press.
Golodnikova, I. Yu. 2009. “The Final Version of Roerich Expedition Map in Central
Asia.” Moscow State University for Geodesy and Cartography. Moscow. Accessed
March 20, 2020. https://icaci.org/fles/documents/ICC_proceedings/ICC2009/
html/nonref/7_6.pdf
McCannon, John. 2003. “Apocalypse and Tranquillity: The World War I Paintings of
Nicholas Roerich.” Russian History 30 (3): 301–321.
Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1964. “Tribute to Roerich.” In Nicholas Roerich by His Contem-

poraries, 2–3. Bangalore: W. Q. Press.
Roerich, Nicholas. 1923. Adamant. New York: Corona Mundi.
Roerich, Nicholas. 1930. Shambhala. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company.
Roerich, Nicholas. 1932. Maitreya. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum.
Roerich, Nicholas. 1946. Beautiful Unity. Bombay: The Youths’ Art & Culture Circle.
Roerich, Nicholas. 1947. Himalayas – Abode of Light. Bombay: Nalanda Publications.
Roerich, Nicholas. 2007. Heart of Asia. Varanasi: Pilgrims Publishing.
Roerich, Nicholas. 2017a. Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary. New York: Nicholas
Roerich Museum.
Roerich, Nicholas. 2017b. Himavat: Diary Leaves. New York: Nicholas Roerich
Museum. www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.phpv.
Shaposhnikova, L.V. 2013. “A Caravan in Time and Space.” In Nicholas Roerich: A
Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 57–72. New Delhi: Niyogi Books.
Tagore, Abanindranath. 1946. “Foreword.” In ‘Beautiful Unity’ by Nicholas Roerich.
Bombay: The Youths’ Art & culture Circle.
3
HARMONIZING ETHNICITY AT
THE CONTESTED BORDERLANDS
A Case Study of Uyghurs of Xinjiang
Veena Ramachandran
Introduction
Xinjiang represents contested borderlands in China’s political history. Once
the centre of Buddhist culture, Xinjiang was inhabited by Indo-European peo-
ple, followed by the Xiongnu empire (a confederation of nomads centered on
current Mongolia). However, the imperial Chinese State could only control
the region episodically. In 60 BCE, the Han dynasty drove the Xiongnu out
of Tarim Basin to secure the Silk Road that passed through the area (Whit-
feld and Williams 2004). Turks, Tibetans and Tang often fought for control
of Xinjiang, but the Turkic Muslim Kara Khanid prevailed and later initiated
the Islamization of Xinjiang (Mackerras 1998; Sinor 1998). Though the 13th
century witnessed Mongol rule in Xinjiang for a brief period, Uyghurs, the
Turkic Muslim people, prevailed again.
In 1759, the Qing conquered the whole of Xinjiang. Even after the Qing’s
conquest of Xinjiang, the cultural barrier was consistent. The Qing intel-
lectuals believed that Xinjiang was too far and diferent from China proper,
and it was too difcult to control Xinjiang. The Qing intellectuals’ imagin-
ing of the region also signifcantly crystallized modern China’s boundaries
(Jia 2011). The Qing’s fall and subsequent Republican rule witnessed the
Soviet Union–supported East Turkistan Republic (during the Ili Rebellion)
from 1944 to 1949. However, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incorpo-
rated Xinjiang into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.
The incorporation, however, tried to deal with cultural diversity through
Hanifcation of Xinjiang (Liu and Peters 2017), a strategy which was not
unique to the PRC, as the Qing too encouraged the migration of Han peas-
ants and Manchu bannermen to Xinjiang for the same purpose (Tyler 2004).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-4
Harmonizing Ethnicity at the Contested Borderlands 29
Defning or redefning ethnicity in Xinjiang depends on the interaction

between religious identity, Chinese highhandedness and brutality (Mukher-
jee 2015). More signifcantly, while religion is perceived as subversive in the
Chinese political system, the State perceives a solid Muslim identity as chal-
lenging to maintaining stability. Therefore, in the ancient and contemporary
contexts, Xinjiang represents the pivotal theatre of a non-inclusive Uyghur
ethnicity with its Islamic orientations that constitute an existential challenge
to the Han civilizational empire.
The spatiality of Xinjiang, which is associated with China’s periphery,
generates confusion regarding the historiography of Uyghurs; therefore, the
Uyghurs are represented diferently in the historiographies of several coun-
tries. The PRC is uncomfortable with the expression “East Turkestan” as it
implies contestation over the Chinese territoriality. The Chinese historiog-
raphy represents Uyghurs as migrants in their homeland, citing the migra-
tion of Uyghur nomads from Mongolia in 840 CE establishing Han settlers’
presence much earlier. Chinese historiography is based on the construction
of the long history of the “Chinese nation”, claiming that all the people
populating the country have constituted one Chinese nation since ancient
times. Thus, it denies the indigenousness of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. On the
contrary, the Uyghur ethnocentric vision argues that Uyghurs are the indig-
enous population of Xinjiang, belonging to Turkic nationalities of Central
Asian origin and having a more extended history than the Han Chinese in
Xinjiang (Kamalov 2021).
Uyghurs as China’s Ethno-Religious Challenge

Apart from the contestation over the historiography of Uyghurs, what cre-
ates political tension and a threat perception for the Chinese is Uyghurs’
ethno-religious complexity with strong Islamic identity and religiosity. China
has a long history of dealing with ethnic minorities, while its ethnic policy
combines Confucian and Communist traditions (He 2005). China’s nation-
making had the challenge of transitioning a multi-polar empire into a mod-
ern nation-state with a myth of historical continuity as a unitary state.
Contemporary China, while making a grand unifed history, employs an
(internal) imperial relationship with the Uyghurs because it is based on the
narrative of people’s liberation of Xinjiang in the recent past: the subjugation
of Uyghurs through appropriation of their history, identity, life and death,
and more signifcantly, their religion; power asymmetry between the Chi-
nese State and the Uyghurs managed through coercion and consent (Anand
2012). There is “little new about today’s pattern of relations between the
State and religion in China. Government registration and monitoring of reli-
gious activities . . . have been a constant reality of organized religious life
in both traditional and modern times only in varying degrees” (Bays 2004).
30 Veena Ramachandran
This process has been identifed as “Sinicization” of organized religions. It

involves aligning religious practices and faith with China’s culture, political
ideology and legal system.
The Nationalists and Communists followed the same pattern in the cul-
tural construction of the identity between the Hans and the non-Hans. The
domestic and imperial concerns of 20th-century China facilitated the pro-
cess as all the non-Han ethnicities were categorized as one of the subgroups
of the Han (Dikotter 2002). “The cultural construction of Han-non-Han
moral hierarchical order was legitimized through the Marxist-Leninist theory
of human social evolution by drawing on the evolution of human beings
through primitive, slave, feudal and capitalist societies” (Morgan cited in
Varutti 2010). Throughout Chinese history, ethnic minorities have been sub-
ordinated both culturally and politically by the Han. Moreover, within the
hierarchical moral ladder, they were ranked in the order of their proximity
to the “civilized and culturally superior” Han (Gladney 1994; Varutti 2010).
Consequently, it led to the alienation of ethnic minorities and derailed the
integration of those on the periphery, especially Tibetans and Uyghurs (Saut-
man 1997).
In response to such contention, China employs civilizational rhetoric to
integrate the borderland. Consequently, China ascribes the political usage of
the cultural discourse of harmony to engage with the unequal and patronizing
relation of power between the majoritarian civilizational-national core and
the peripheral identities that render China imperial. Moreover, the reform era
prioritized the preservation of stability and unity in Xinjiang and other ethnic
minority peripheries. The quest for the same generated a socio-political con-
sensus on harmonizing Uyghurs, diluting ethno-cultural identities to create
loyal Uyghur citizens, who embrace Chinese identity as an aspirational one.
Harmonization: A State Project in Xinjiang

Harmonization can be defned as a process that creates cultural and insti-
tutional hierarchies between the Chinese State and ethnic minorities. This
process is geared to the objective of creating loyal ethnic minority citizens.
In Chinese philosophical traditions, both Daoism and Confucianism present
their notions of harmony. Daoism teaches harmony between humanity and
the natural world, promoting passive harmonization by being more accom-
modating to the world. Confucianism ofers space for individual harmony –
harmony between mind and body, ofering prominence to self-cultivation
(Rekowski 2007). Confucian harmony is proactive and intends to generate
harmonization where it does not exist. To be precise, Confucianism does not
shy away from transforming society and the world to attain harmony. Dao-
ism harmonizes with the world, while Confucianism harmonizes the world
(Li 2008a).
Harmony or harmonization is rooted in traditional Chinese culture,

which proposes the founding of a utopia known as Datong (Great Unity or
Great Harmony), an ideal Chinese world based on universal humanity and
harmony. Tong in datong means sameness. It has also been called Taiping
(太平, the State of Eternal Peace) (Guo and Guo 2008). Datong was also
known as “One World Philosophy”. He or hexie (和, harmony, 和谐, har-
monious) represents harmony with diversity, and datong means Great Unity.
Harmony 和(he) makes its presence felt as a socio-political construct in the
Chinese philosophical tradition since the pre-Qing period. He stands for a
happy state, and the State of harmony has been compared to mixing diferent
sounds to make music and various favours to make a soup.
China exemplifes a harmonious state-society relationship based on ritual
propriety (li) along with hierarchical moral order. China’s ethnic geography
refects a “core-periphery (xia-yi)1 structure” with a hierarchical moral order
insisting on compassion (ren) as a tool to engage with minorities (Fravel
2008). The assumption is that xia embodies this principle of ren and believes
that everything under heaven will be peaceful if minorities too adhere to this
moral principle (Liu 1999, 98–102).
“Harmony” or “harmonizing”, from its classical to modern engagements,
has become an inevitable political project of imperialism and nation-building
in contemporary times. Harmony is thus part of the national unifcation pro-
ject and hence is limited to the politics of the nation-state (Callahan 2015). It
demands social behaviour that values loyalty to the regime irrespective of the
nature of governance (Xiaohong and Qingyuan 2013). Harmonization, as a
dynamic process, acknowledges strife as a constructive move towards greater
harmony (Li 2006). While Confucian harmony does not have a problem
accepting diferences, the challenge with Confucian harmony in contempo-
rary times is that harmony exhibits holistic value orientation. Consequently,
in the harmonization process, collective good prevails over individual good
in the family, society and the State (Li 2008b).
Indeed, the course of China’s ethnic management becomes signifcant,
particularly as it moves towards new statism that combines socialism and
Chinese civilization. This socialist-civilization dynamic essentially results
in the combination of equality and hierarchy, and its infuence on ethnic
management seems substantial (Callahan 2015). Harmony is reintroduced to
emphasize order and stability, which intends to minimize and ignore social
disparities and conficts in ethnic minority regions. Instead of emphasizing
tolerance toward diversity (Chan 2010), harmony, being an ethnic manage-
ment tool, translates to the stability and unity of the Chinese State being a
priority in managing ethnic diferences. China’s attempts at invoking Con-
fucianism legitimize the discourse of harmony as an efective statist tool
to ensure social order and political stability in its nation-building process
(Li 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Rosker 2013; Wang 2011; Xiaohong and Qingyuan
2013) and national identity construction. China’s priorities of unity, stability

and security choose “harmonization” as the preferred strategy for smooth
Uyghur management and the creation of loyal Uyghur citizens.
Uyghur Loyalty and the Islam Factor

Out of 55 ethnic minority groups designated by China, 10 are Muslims total-
ling 40 million people comprising less than 2 per cent of the country’s total
population. These Muslim groups follow in descending order of their popu-
lation size as the Huis, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Salars, Tajiks, Uzbeks,
Bonans and Tatars. Huis account for nearly half of China’s Muslim pop-
ulation, who were till recently considered as China’s “preferred Muslims”
because, throughout the modern era, the Chinese imams, scholars and pil-
grims travelled to Muslim heartlands, imbibing knowledge and expertise that
would help their fellow Muslims in China to adapt to the modern Chinese
nation-state. Yihewani Muslim brotherhood was one such initiative that
combined scriptural sensitivities of Islam with the political loyalty of the
nation-state (Cieciura 2018). Some sympathizers of the Yihewani movement
even extended their loyalty to the Communists during the civil war (Alle et
al. 2003). Therefore, the political loyalty of the Muslims has been a decisive
factor in Chinese political system. However, with the territoriality involved,
Uyghurs were perceived as people at higher risk, while the Huis relatively
have been on safe side.
Islam was introduced to China by the Middle Eastern merchants during
the Tang dynasty. During Yuan rule, Muslims came into China to serve as
the administrators for Mongols, who married Han women and converted
them to Islam. Muslims embraced adaptation and acculturation as a means
to reconciling Islam with Confucianism. Reconciliation of Islam with Confu-
cianism has always been a signifcant concern for the Muslim intellectuals in
China. The dynamics between the Chinese emperor and Muslim minorities
deteriorated with the Qing as they were territorially ambitious and wanted
the hitherto borderlands with relative autonomy, such as Xinjiang, under the
direct imperial purview. Consequently, Muslim-led revolts against the Qing
were frequent. As the State met such rebellions with violent suppression, it
ended a long accommodation period for the Muslims.
The primary concern about Islam in China in the modern period is based
on the hypotheses regarding Islam’s adaptation and integration into the
mainstream Chinese social and political system. While the frst one suggests
that Muslim groups reconcile the dictates of Islamic culture with the host cul-
ture, that is Chinese (Gladney 1990), the second hypothesis argues that Islam
is not just resistant to adhering to Chinese border, but as minorities, Muslims
are inherently problematic to a non-Muslim host state (Israeli 1978; Dillon
1997). Both hypotheses leave ample space for invoking the loyalty questions
for Uyghurs. Subsequently, the question of Uyghurs’ loyalty towards China

has evolved as a crucial political debate, particularly after the Urumqi riots
(5 July 2009). Furthermore, the State reserves its role in defning Islam’s per-
mitted space and scope as a religion in Xinjiang.
The State identifes the moderate version of Islam with the notion that
love for the Chinese nation should be more signifcant and above the love for
Islam. With this categorization, the State conceives Uyghurs’ Islamic identity
as a relatively more signifcant threat than the Islamic religiosity of the Huis.
The general assumption is that Uyghurs are more assertive and informed
about their ethno-religious identity and geopolitical tension, adding to the
“security threat” perception. Chinese penetration into Islamic afairs of
Uyghurs and its control over them suggests the strength of the preserved
hierarchy between Islam and the State.
Chinese-ness and Islam are considered incompatible because Islam dis-
regards flial piety (xiao or li) and does not appreciate the locale of Chinese
political sensitivity. Besides, the Muslim community (chose to) remain out-
side the Chinese virtue and refnement (Israeli 1978). In 2001, the Chinese
Islamic Association initiated a project to reinterpret Islamic scriptures with
the objective to curb misleading or extremist elements from infltrating the
Muslim population. Its framework of interpretation was based on the prin-
ciples of loving one’s country and religion (Doyon 2014). The project rein-
forces predominance of the State in defning terms and conditions and space
of Islam and thereby enforcing political and ideological loyalty to the State.
The state project of reinterpreting Islamic scriptures defes “three evil
forces” (terrorism, separatism and extremism). The political connotations
of the project led to the identifcation or defnition of two versions of Islam:
moderate (the state-approved) and extremist (threat to stability) (Lipman
2004). The space of Muslim minorities under China is defned through fve
phases based on the religious/cultural freedom enjoyed by the community:
1 Pre-Cultural revolution period, when the minorities enjoyed religious

freedom.
2 The Cultural Revolution, when the Muslim minorities, along with others,
were suppressed and tortured for their belief systems.
3 In the post-Mao era, the Communists adopted more fexible policies
towards religious practices, including Islam.
4 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led global war on terror.
5 Post-Urumqi riot period.
The fourth and the ffth phases of China’s Uyghur management shaped the
space and purpose of Islam after that within the Chinese social and political
order. With 9/11 the United States started the Global War on Terror and sup-
ported eforts in other countries to dismantle terrorist organizations. Taking
advantage of this, the Chinese government defned Uyghur resistance as part

of global Islamic terrorism and not an ethnic separatist issue as it used to
be in the past (Chung 2002). The Urumqi riot adopted the stability-security
paradigm to engage with the Uyghurs and launched “the peoples’ war on ter-
ror”, reiterating the need to reform ethnic and religious management, institu-
tionally imparting patriotism.
China interlinked stability maintenance in Xinjiang with national secu-
rity discourse legitimizing the authorities’ surveillance measures (Xie and
Liu 2021; Ramachandran 2017; Millward and Peterson 2020). It resulted
in accelerating the public security budget (Famularo 2015), facilitating the
pace of security initiatives. The State defned its objective to maintain a
stable Xinjiang with harmonized Uyghurs to reassure the signifcance of
the stability in China’s domestic politics and refects the stability-security
conundrum in Xinjiang. Through the stability-security paradigm, the
State re-engineers the space and meaning of ethno-religious complexity in
Xinjiang. The signifcant consequences include China’s attempt to defne
Uyghur-ness, which eventually resulted in the othering of Muslims by de-
ethnicizing them.
Defning Uyghur-ness and Othering of Muslims

The Chinese State in 2014 resorted to the strategy of re-engineering the
Uyghur society. The re-engineering implies reinstating the indigenous attrib-
utes of the Uyghur ethnic minority to erase the Wahabi infuence in Uyghur
society. The State thereby intervenes in the personal and cultural spheres of
Uyghur lives, from dictating the physical appearance of the Uyghur men and
women to managing their religious and educational practices.
The Chinese State has prescribed traditional Uyghur attire for the Uyghurs
so that it indicates their identity. The intention is to proscribe the conventional
Islamic (Arabic) dressing style. For example, men are asked to wear doppa,
the traditional prayer hat, but not to grow a beard (Shepherd and Blanchard
2017). Women are expected to embrace the “Atlas dress” and the doppa cap
as standard symbols of Uyghur femininity instead of the Islamic veil (Lei-
bold and Grose 2016). Project Beauty has been initiated as an extension of a
re-engineering programme encouraging women to embrace their traditional
attire instead of the Arabic importation, that is burqa (Grose 2020). Here,
the State defnes progress and modernity as an absolute rejection of Islamic
symbolism and embrace of traditional indigeneity. The State has implemented
a few policies calling for a complete departure from the Arab infuence in
the Islamic symbolism of Uyghurs. The State interprets certain Islamic prac-
tices rooted in Uyghur culture as approved and those imported from the Arab
world as unapproved. The regulation bans over a dozen behaviours that
authorities deemed “abnormal”.
Unapproved Islamic teachings have been banned during ceremonies such

as weddings and promote celebrations with patriotic “healthy” dance parties.
It has violated the general reluctance of Uyghurs to convert their weddings
into a festive occasion (Hoshur 2020). Besides, such gatherings are highly
monitored by local ofcials. The Islamic divorce procedures were also out-
lawed, with the Uyghurs having to follow Chinese law in the case of divorce.
As a natural outcome, the Chinese State has emerged as more oppressive
in its surveillance tactics (Ramzy and Buckley 2019). The categorization of
“involvement in ‘unlawful’ religion” in the context of Xinjiang not only reas-
serts the ethno-religious complexity of Uyghurs but also accentuates the Chi-
nese State’s right to determine the defnitions of ethnicity and extremism by
dictating the spatial boundaries of Islamic faith.
Ofcially, the Chinese government has acknowledged the presence of
internment camps, but has claimed they are re-education camps. Nevertheless,
these camps, meant for de-extremifcation through political indoctrination,
suggest how the Chinese State perceives these camps. Though the authorities
acknowledge them as vocational training centres for criminals, there exists
another interpretation as hospitals that treat Islam as an illness. They are
meant to cure extremist thinking by locking them in extra-judicial custody for
months in harmful conditions. The Chinese State has always treated religion
as an addiction (Falun Gong could be an example) and used medical analogies
like mental illness, tumour and so forth to suppress Uyghurs. As Sean Roberts
(2018) argues, the Chinese State portrays the Uyghurs with strong Islamic
religiosity as a biological threat to the Chinese society, and hence the physi-
cal separation, surveillance, detention and so forth are justifed. These camps
force Uyghur inmates to memorize patriotic texts, confess their “faults”, criti-
cize their religious traditions and denounce fellow internees (Shih 2018).
The re-education camps are reminiscent of the Mao era, exemplifying the
coercive shift of the Chinese State’s stability-security-secularization paradigm
and the consistent push for an open declaration of loyalty to the Party-State
by Muslim minorities from Xinjiang. The rationale or justifcation for these
camps by the Chinese State has been the People’s War on Terror (which
ensures civilian participation in counter-terrorism measures) and legitimizes
various strategies of surveillance and suppression that execute indiscriminate
use of de-extremifcation strategy enduring pervasive discrimination, reli-
gious repression and even cultural genocide.
As per the Article 4 of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regula-
tion on De-extremifcation (China Law Translate 2017),
de-extremifcation shall persist in the basic directives of the party’s work

on religion, persist in an orientation of making religion more Chinese and
under the law, and actively guide religions to become compatible with
socialist society.
Since the Chinese government confates extremism and Islam in the context
of Xinjiang, de-extremifcation seems to erase the Islamic identity of the
Uyghurs, citing doubts regarding their political loyalty. It feeds into the polit-
ical conception that the Uyghurs are incorrect in their spiritual and political
spheres. It was natural that as the People’s War on Terror replaced the “Strike
Hard” campaign, the Chinese State did not shy away from directly targeting
Islam, suggesting its Sinicization, formulating de-Islamization in Xinjiang.
A Global Times report not only glorifes the de-extremifcation camps as a
means to normalizing Uyghurs who are afected by the tumour of Islamic
fundamentalism but highlights the same as an inevitable part of Xinjiang’s
comprehensive development plan (Ai 2018). China proposes to expand the
stability-security paradigm to the Hui majority province like Ningxia stress-
ing the success of the Xinjiang stability-security model (Ai 2018). As a natural
consequence the Huis are also reportedly incarcerated in de-extremifcation
camps (Bunin 2020).
Although the state diferentiates Islam and ethnicity, there has always
been a fear of Muslims as the other. However, this apprehension has taken
on a distinctly anti-religious (anti-Islam) tone. A few religiously motivated
attacks, especially in Kunming, known as China’s 9/11, signifcantly started
shaping the trajectory of the Han attitude towards Muslims in general, irre-
spective of their ethnicity (Trédaniel and Lee 2018). Moreover, the attempt
of the State Ethnic Afairs Commission to push hard the Halal law received
a backlash from the public and party intellectuals who argued that it would
violate the separation of the state and church framework of the Chinese state
(Erie 2016a, 2018). It fnally led Xi Jinping to reiterate that the Chinese
state “must persist in the separation of church and state, persist in prevent-
ing religion from interfering with administration, judiciary, education, and
other such state functions” (Erie 2016b). Apart from this clear position,
Wang Zhengwei, who pushed for Halal legislation, was removed from his
post (Hernéndez and Wu 2016). While the othering of the Uyghurs slowly
spread to regions where the Huis are dominant, Islamophobia became the
new normal. The death threats to the Imam of the Nangang mosque are clear
evidence of how China is gradually treading the path of hatred towards Islam
in general, irrespective of the respective ethnicity its proponents belong to
(Shih 2018).
The Han perceived both ethnic groups as potential threats and addressed
Islam as a dangerous religion, integrating the Hui and the Uyghur under
Islam’s umbrella, representing local and global concerns. The lack of trans-
parency in mainstream media reports on Muslims in China conspires, in part,
to add to the online hatred of Muslims. It is mainly because the govern-
ment propaganda plays up pieces purporting to show how much Chinese
Muslims have benefted from the government’s preferential policies. Also,
the reportage on preferential policies damages the relationship between the
Han and the Muslim ethnicities, as the Han tend to view these policies as
unfair, especially in cases like the one-child policy, where China has ofered
Muslims exemption. Apart from this, there is increased media reportage of
domestic and international terrorism. A gradual de-ethnicization of Muslims
has accompanied these concerted eforts to have Muslims categorized as a
dangerous community to bring them under the monolithic umbrella of Islam.
Besides, the rapid shift in geopolitics overwhelmingly ignored the cultural
genocide and human rights abuses which were rather normalized in the re-
education camps.
Changing Geopolitics and the Trajectory of Xinjiang’s

Ignored Crisis
Beijing’s assertiveness at home and abroad during the COVID-19 pandemic,
from zero-COVID-19 to mask diplomacy, has surprised the world. Even 3
years since the outbreak of the pandemic, the lockdowns are still spreading
in China. In case of Xinjiang, much before the pandemic, millions of Uyghurs
and other ethnic minorities were reported to be detained in internment camps.
Nevertheless, reports suggest they were not spared during the pandemic as
the Chinese State pushed them to the COVID-19 frontlines (Wani 2020).
From forced organ harvesting of Uyghurs to save the lives of COVID-19-
infected Han population to the sending of thousands of Uyghurs to main-
land China’s manufacturing hubs at Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang to
keep their factories running amidst lockdown exemplify the persecution of
Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The heat-sensing cameras and face recognition systems
to fght COVID-19 in China were employed in the high-tech oppression of
Uyghurs. It can be said herewith that the COVID-19 technology is intimately
tied to China’s surveillance state (Byler 2022).
Beijing stayed on the sidelines during Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia
and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when China was ready to play a
constructive role in mitigating the crisis, envisioning itself as a responsible
global power. Unlike in the past, in 2022, China did not show any signs of
doubling down the narrative that Russia is defending itself against NATO’s
expansionism and spreading disinformation about Russia in the Global
South, facilitating the consolidation of non-liberal regimes (Oertel 2022).
Most importantly, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war since February
2022, there are many similarities between Ukraine and Xinjiang in their rela-
tionship with Russia and China, respectively. For instance, Russia and China
consider Ukraine and Xinjiang as part of Russian or Chinese kinship based on
their defnition of its long history and civilizational glory. Both these states,
in their eforts to reclaim their past glory, employed the kinship theories to
claim legitimacy over the Ukrainian and Uyghur populations respectively,
who have distinct social and political identities diferent from those of their
totalitarian aggressors (Bayraq 2022). Unlike in the past, solidarity from the
liberal regime for such human rights violations is deteriorating.
The U.S. Congress has approved the Uyghur Bill-2020 that authorizes the
U.S. administration to identify the Chinese ofcials responsible for the mass
incarceration, and to freeze their assets on U.S. soil and to deny their entry into
the country (The Statesman 2020). At this moment, the silence of many Mus-
lim nations is strange, with Turkey (Sudworth 2019) and Qatar (Fattah 2019)
being the exceptions. Otherwise vocal about the rights of Muslim populations
in other parts of the world, countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have
prioritized their economic and strategic interests over human rights abuses of
Uyghurs. Even they appreciated China’s developmental works and counter-ter-
rorism eforts in Xinjiang. The on-going as well as expected investments under
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) played an inevitable role in manifesting this
silence in the Muslim world. Besides, since the inception of the BRI, China has
recognized the strategic signifcance of the Islamic world, which includes the
Central Asian region and the Arab world, predominantly because of the vast
natural (oil) resources and the links they could ofer to international markets.
In this context, the role of the Chinese Islamic Association in crafting the Xin-
jiang narrative for the Arabic-speaking audience is widely discussed too. The
Chinese Islamic Association has adopted a three-pronged strategy to create the
Xinjiang narrative: (1) enlightening the Arab audience about the uniqueness of
Chinese Islam and warning about foreign infuence; (2) China’s proactive Haj
diplomacy; (3) continuous engagement and interactions with the Islamic insti-
tutions and prominent Muslim leaders (Greer and Jardine 2020).
The involvement of Frontier Services Group (FSG) in Xinjiang and their
decision to open a training camp in Xinjiang indicates the transnational pri-
vatization of mass detention camps that will have long-term strategic impli-
cations (Roche 2019). The FSG is currently ofering security to BRI projects
abroad. Every ofcial action in Xinjiang convinces us that China defeats the
West at its own game. China’s attempt to identify Uyghur dissent with terror-
ism, extremism and separatism is nothing but the skilful usage of the post-
9/11 scenario in its favour. Furthermore, today China is prominent among
the countries that engage in a state project of harmonization that, in practice,
intends to dilute Uyghurs’ cultural identity. It sows the seeds of Islamophobia
in China and has implications for other Muslim minorities (Hui). A global
silence on the Uyghur issue legitimizes the Chinese model of ethnic minor-
ity management as harmonization as a project of redefning Uyghur identity
poses challenges to the normative foundations of state-minority engagement.
Conclusion
Harmonizing the non-Han ethnicities to the mainstream Chinese-ness
emerges as a political strategy, diluting all other identities. The creation of
a loyal minority population in the frontiers has continued as the primary

objective of the Chinese State in Xinjiang as well as in other ethnic minority
regions. However, the allegiance of ethnic minorities has attained its transi-
tion from loyalty to socialist values in the pre-reform era to loyalty towards
a strong and stable Chinese State in the post-reform scenario.
In the post–Urumqi riot scenario, though the Chinese State acknowledges
the need to redefne the ethnic policy, there is no ofcial endorsement for a
change in ethnic policy. However, China’s ofcial ethnic policy position por-
trays its preference for gradual ethnic policy reform. The debate on the need
to de-politicize ethnic minorities in the post–Urumqi riot scenario, given the
spectrum of scholarly debate, has adopted the course of de-ethnicization of
Uyghurs and the Hui. Moreover, the Xinjiang issue and the security discourse
chiefy preoccupy China’s engagement with Islam, and the de-ethnicization
process has emerged as the remedy for ethnic confict in general, specifcally,
the Uyghur discontent.
China does have genuine apprehension towards religious extremism and
terrorism, but it is limited by its apprehension towards securing and legiti-
mizing Chinese rule over Xinjiang. Consequently, socio-political stability
and domestic security dominate the de-extremifcation both as a discourse
and as a political strategy. While China claims its policies in Xinjiang pro-
tect the region from becoming “China’s Syria” or “China’s Libya”, it is
signifcant to revisit the Chinese state’s assurance of promoting and pre-
serving ethnic unity as a post–Urumqi riot panacea. The trajectory of eth-
nic policy reform in the context of de-extremifcation and loyalty question
confrms that it has not taken any positive cue from the much-discussed
ethnic policy reform. In the process of containing political Islam, China’s
continuous eforts to make Islam a monolith backfres and de-ethnicizes
the Uyghurs, who constitute a signifcant part of China’s diverse (Muslim)
ethnic population.
Note
1 In the Confucian order, Xia (Han Chinese, or Zhongyuan) are the rulers while Yi
(barbarians, outsiders or minorities) are the subjects; Xia is the centre, while Yi is
the periphery; Xia consists of insiders and fellow countrymen, while Yi consists of
outsiders and strangers; and Xia is superior while Yi is subordinate. The idea of
Yi-Xia presupposes the Middle Kingdom and the central power of China.
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4
INNER ASIA IN THE “GEOPOLITICAL
GAME” OF THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY
Impact on the Trajectory of Mongol-Seeking
Independence
Sharad K. Soni
Introduction
The magnitude and complexity of a few dramatic episodes of the geopolitical
game that unfolded in Inner Asian region in early 20th century were mark-
edly greater for the Mongols, who had little options but to bear the brunt in
seeking independence for present-day Mongolia. At that point of time, Mon-
golia was no diferent from other Inner Asian societies, most of which were
overshadowed either by Russian or by Chinese overlords in terms of politi-
cal powers. Chinese overlordship converted Mongolia into a vassal state of
Manchu-controlled China (Qing dynasty) after Mongol leaders submitted to
the Manchu emperor in the rite known as ketou in 1691 (Avery 2003). But
Mongolia’s unique location at the heart of Inner Asia contributed much to
have an edge over others in serving as the key site for development of most
of the polities. This was more so because of its being not just an inner hin-
terland to Russia and China but by itself constituting a sphere which has its
own unambiguous historical dynamics. Such historical dynamics of a geo-
political dimension saw the involvement of Russia, China and even Japan to
some extent in the “geopolitical game” played in this part of Inner Asia. As
a result, what came to the fore was a dramatic turn of events largely infu-
enced by Sino-Russian geopolitics in the early phase of the 20th century or
more precisely between 1911 and 1921 that by no means can be described
as favourable to Mongolia in securing the recognition of its independence. It
was a “confused” decade, as Bawden (1991) describes, during which “Mon-
golia’s political status changed more than once”.
The Revolution (October 1911) encouraged the Mongols to reassert their
independence. The seeds of this revolution, however, were sown a few years
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-5
Inner Asia in the “Geopolitical Game” of the Early 20th Century 45
ago in reaction to the advent of the New Policies launched in 1901 in the
name of reforms by the Qings, which aimed not only to integrate the Inner
Asian frontiers into China proper on the pretext of border-defence but also
to turn traditional nomadic Mongols into modernizing Chinese. Atwood
(2002) argues that “these factors played a major role, and were a good deal
of the reason why the opposition to New Policies was so violent in Inner
Asia”. Within China, the New Policies challenged the Qing authorities.
The combination of the enforcement of the New Policies and the Chinese
Revolution which followed, thus, caused the Mongolian Revolution (1911)
that culminated at the end of 1911 into the proclamation of an independent
Mongolia in Urga (the then capital of Mongolia) under the “theocratic” rule
of a “charismatic” Buddhist leader, the eighth Jebsundamba Khutagt (Bogd
Gegeen), popularly known as the Bogd Khan (Bulag 1998; Morozova 2009;
Soni 2022). Afterwards, a sequence of events denying recognition of Mongo-
lia’s independence appeared on the scene; this chapter argues that it was due
to the impact of a geopolitical game played by Russia and China that the tra-
jectory of the Mongol-seeking independence became an arduous task. This
chapter recounts how the Mongolian quest for de facto independence had
been fraught with insecurity and anxiety during a decade-long Mongol strug-
gle for independence as stretched out between 1911 when they “proclaimed”
independence and 1921 when they achieved “actual” independence.
The idea of this chapter originated from the author’s previous works
(2002, 2006), in which Mongolia’s struggle for independence was explored.
In the following paragraphs, one may fnd similarities of events and related
issues consistent with the earlier published work, but this chapter approaches
the problem from a completely diferent perspective. On this count, a few
fundamental questions concerning the very issue of Mongols seeking their
independence need to be addressed as a framework before proceeding to dis-
cuss the Sino-Russian geopolitical game that pushed Mongolia into a delicate
situation until it achieved actual independence:
1 Whether the proclamation of independence by the Mongols in 1911 can

be termed as the “frst revolution for national independence”
2 Whether Russia engineered this revolution for independence of Mongolia
3 Whether it was a direct and univocal reply to an attack by the Manchu-
Chinese on the very survival of the Mongols of Mongolia
4 Whether the difcult trajectory of Mongol-seeking independence at last
resulted in turning the tide in its favour to ensure statehood for Mongolia
Contrary to the traditional viewpoints, a number of hitherto inaccessible doc-

uments published by the Mongolian press during the democratic changes in
Mongolia in 1990–1991 provide some grounds to investigate the aforemen-
tioned issues. As L. Jamsran noted in an article “Zag Zagaaraabaidaggui”
46 Sharad K. Soni
(The Time Is Changing) published in Mongolian newspaper Ünen on 25 May

1991, the proclamation of independence following the Mongolian revolution
was the result of an historical process that encouraged the outbreak of an
indigenous nationalist movement, often referred to as the “frst revolution for
national independence”. Another article “1911 Revolution: An Important
Event” published in The Mongol Messenger on 10–16 December 1991 pro-
vides a clear picture of agreement with this proposition on the part of Mon-
golian historians, who argue that “the events of the 1911, by their nature and
signifcance, were a national liberation revolution and not a movement, as
was interpreted over many years”. Campi and Baasan (2009) acknowledge
that “the frst [Mongolian Revolution] was an anti-Manchu, nationalist one
aimed at achieving self-determination”. There is merit in all such arguments
because strict implementation of the Qing’s New Policies in 1910 led to the
growth of anti-Manchu feelings among the Mongols, which eventually devel-
oped into a national movement to resist Chinese domination in Mongolia
(Soni 2002). However, to Lattimore (1935), the Mongolian Revolution “was
not in reality either a rebellion or a revolution”, but “merely an assertion of
the historical principle that Mongolia is not part of China”.
Some scholars contend that although Russian help was sought in the Mon-
golian revolution, the Mongols themselves had to take action on it, as “Russia
was not interested in seeing Mongolia become independent” (Baabar 1999).
The proclamation of independence had indeed thwarted the Russian attempt
to impose its intentions on Outer Mongolia (the present-day Mongolia).
Bogd Khan soon realised that without Russian recognition Mongolia’s inde-
pendence would remain meaningless, and what followed then was a clash of
interests among Russia, China and Mongolia, though Mongolian desire was
nothing more than a dejected subject often ignored by both the neighbours.
Nevertheless, the 1911 proclamation of independence, as scholars believe,
was not a scheme that was manipulated by Russians, but “was a direct and
unambiguous reply to an attack [by the Chinese in the name of reforms] on
the very survival of the Mongolian people” (Ewing 1980). Others describe the
1911 revolution as “the forerunner of the 1921 revolution”, as evident from
the article published in The Mongol Messenger on 10–16 December 1991.
In 1912, following the downfall of the Manchu-Qing dynasty, monarchy in
China was abolished and a Republican government was established. How-
ever, the Republic of China obtained a renewed right to deny recognition of
Mongolia’s independence (Bumochir 2018), thus starting the real geopolitical
game between Russia and China on the self-proclaimed status of Mongolia.
The Geopolitical Game Over Mongolian Status

The geopolitical game that historically emerged in Inner Asia points to the
fact that Mongolia was the hotspot for dominance of both the Russians and
Chinese due to its geostrategic location. While the Russians regarded Mon-
golia as a classic bufer state, the Chinese considered Mongolia as their part
(Hyer 1997). Both Russians and Chinese played their own game in which
the Mongols fell victims so much so that they became a Manchu subject and
their independent status went into oblivion. The opportune time, however,
came in 1911 when Mongolia asserted and proclaimed its independence.
This changed status of Mongolia was a serious matter for the image of the
Republican China considering that the latter had no control over a terri-
tory the inhabitants of which had until recently remained loyal to the Qing
empire. The legal justifcation was that since Mongolia was part of the Qing
empire, it should remain an integral part of the territory of the successive
Chinese government (Friters 1949). The Presidential mandate of 1912 issued
by the new Chinese government refused to recognize Mongolia’s independ-
ence and incorporated Mongolia as China’s integral part (Weigh 1928). Such
an approach, however, failed to generate any favourable results.
The proclamation of Mongolian independence was initially contemplated
by the Chinese as “a mere child’s play which could be frustrated as easily as
turning the palm of the hand” (Weigh 1928). But soon they realised that Rus-
sia might be playing a game on the issue of Mongol-seeking independence for
its own advantage vis-à-vis China and Japan. At this juncture, Bogd Khan
had little option but to seek Russian support (Hyer 1997). Despite immense
contribution of the Mongolian revolution to Tsarist policy of expansion,
Russia exhibited little or no eagerness to support the recognition of inde-
pendence. Perhaps Russia preferred to “protecting and strengthening their
economic and strategic interests in Mongolia” (Batsaikhan 2009; Soni 2022).
When China issued a mandate declaring its fve races as Han, Manchu, Mon-
gol, Hui and Tibetan, the Russian policy took an activist shape and “the fate
of Mongolia fell into the hands of the Tsarist diplomats” (Tang 1959). On
the other side, having failed to dissuade Bogd Khan, China was puzzled as to
whether to resort to arms or to diplomatic persuasion. The Russian Minister
of Foreign Afairs stated in the Diet on 26 April 1912 that “Russia would
see to it that China should henceforth cease to colonize Outer Mongolia, or
to station troops there, or to interfere in its government” (Hsu 1926). For
China, it was precarious to go for direct military action against Mongolia.
In the meantime, a Russo-Japanese treaty of 8 July 1912 recognizing Rus-
sian and Japanese spheres of infuence over Mongolia and its adjoining areas
encouraged Russia to play its wishful role in the on-going geopolitical game.
Russia, therefore, became frm in its dealings with China on the Mongolian
issue (Soni 2006).
In the Sino-Russian geopolitics, Russia was well positioned to be the pro-
tector of Mongolia against China, though not being in favour of recognizing
Mongolia’s full independence. Instead of trying to resolve the issue of Mon-
golian independence, Russia found out a two-stage solution: (1) to have an
48 Sharad K. Soni
agreement with Mongolia and (2) then to deal with China (Tatsuo 1999).
Russia decided to legalize independently the existence of Mongolia’s autonomy
since Russia was not sure of reaching an agreement with China. On 3 Novem-
ber 1912, a Russo-Mongolian Agreement was concluded endorsing inter alia
Outer Mongolia’s “autonomy” and its “right” to have its own national Army,
besides an attached protocol defning Russia’s trade rights (Mac Murray 1921).
The agreement, however, did not meet the expectations of the Mongol-seeking
full independence, that is total separation from China apart from having a full
control of its own foreign relations and inclusion of all Mongolia under its
administration in order to unite all the Mongols (Soni 2002). Even the term
“Mongolia” instead of “Outer Mongolia” was used in this agreement, but later
the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913 clearly defned the terms “Autonomy”
and “Mongolia”. The Russo-Mongolian Agreement came as a big disappoint-
ment for Mongolians because instead of gaining “autonomy” and continua-
tion of Chinese “sovereignty”, they intended to create a really sovereign state
independent of both China and Russia.
As a reaction to this agreement, China resisted and made a formal protest
with Russian on the pretext that Outer Mongolia was “absolutely incapable”
of concluding agreements with foreign powers. But it was not the issue that
could have been resolved by protest; rather it was an issue that arguably
pointed to “whether China was ready to fght the Russians or do the best it
could on the basis the latter might choose to dictate” (Hsu 1926). Yet what
could have been the best solution in the eyes of Russian and Chinese was
opted by them, a turning point in their geopolitical game, which can aptly
be described as real politicking on the Mongolian status. Both sides took
steps to settle the Mongolian question in a manner, which substantially suited
their purposes. In efect, China had to accept a compromise over Mongo-
lia’s status. After difcult negotiations, the Russo-Chinese Declaration was
signed on 5 November 1913, which granted autonomy to Mongolia under
China’s suzerainty (Mac Murray 1921). In this Declaration, “Autonomy”
meant Russian recognition of Chinese suzerainty and Chinese recognition
of Mongol’s right to run their own “internal administration” and to control
their commerce and industry as well as Chinese agreement not to deploy
troops in Mongolia and abstain from colonizing it. Russia, on its part, bound
itself not to keep troops in Mongolia with the exception of Consulate guards,
not to interfere in any branch of the country’s administration whatsoever and
to abstain from colonizing it. According to the Declaration, the government
of autonomous Mongolia was given the right to conduct negotiations, even
with other states, on economic matters, but was not allowed to negotiate
with other states on the question of a political nature or to conclude political
treaties (Mac Murray 1921).
Bogd Khan, however, objected to the Russo-Chinese Declaration, saying,
“it would not recognize any condition of dependency determined without its
consent” (Clubb 1971). Although the objection was justifable, Clubb (1971)
observes, “Outer Mongolia [Mongolia] was put in the position of a joint pro-
tectorate, with reduction of China’s authority indeed, but also with specifc
reference to its suzerain authority, which made that country a vassal once
more”. Even so, the Mongols had to remain contented only for the pledge
in the Declaration that in the negotiations soon to follow, they could take a
share on the basis of perfect equality with China and Russia and that their
best interests would be given due consideration (Weigh 1928). The Declara-
tion not only ofcially recognized Russian dominance over Outer Mongo-
lia but also allowed the area to become a “Russian protectorate” (Ho-t’ien
1949). China, having failed to secure outright possession of the territory it
claimed, had to set forth for counting on Russia’s good ofces to be used to
ascertain its relations with Mongolia in subsequent negotiations.
Russia-Mongolia-China Tripartite Agreement

Despite high hopes, China had to beneft in terms of re-establishing contacts
with the Mongols following the Russo-Chinese Declaration; developments in
Mongolia were hardly encouraging for them. Not only did the Mongols post-
pone the commencement of Russian-Mongolian-Chinese tripartite negotia-
tions which China had proposed but also they opposed the entry of Chinese
goods into Outer Mongolia (Friters 1949). Yet whatever the situation might
have been, it was reported in June 1914 that the infow of Chinese settlers
into (Outer) Mongolia had again set in motion, capitalizing on the fact that
its exact boundaries were not yet settled (Friters 1949). At the same time,
anxieties over early convening of a tripartite meeting also went up high in
China, especially “when rumours spread that Russia had fortifed her posi-
tion by several agreements with Outer Mongolia, of which one on railways
was made public after its conclusion in September 1914” (Friters 1949).
Eventually, a tripartite meeting of Russian, Chinese and Mongol representa-
tives was convened on 8 September 1914 at Kiakhta, which continued until
the latter part of May 1915 (Soni 2002).
During the negotiations, all three parties had their own individual propos-
als. But Mongols did not get what they were asking for, and in spite of their
resistance, they were forced to compromise on the status of autonomy and
to recognize Chinese suzerainty over there. Arguments then followed over
the interpretation of the concept of suzerainty and autonomy: the Chinese
described suzerainty as power to rule, the Russians as self-autocracy and the
Mongols as autocracy (Baabar 1999). Finally, the term “autonomous suze-
rainty” was used for Mongolia. The “Tripartite Agreement” with regard to
Outer Mongolia was signed on 7 June 1915 (Mac Murray 1921). Combin-
ing the documents of the Russo-Mongolian and Russo-Chinese agreements,
the Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement encompassed all the major provisions of
50 Sharad K. Soni
Mongolia’s relations with China, Russia and other countries to be followed

as mentioned in the following (Ho-t’ien 1949; Soni 2006):
(i) Mongolia recognized China’s suzerainty over its territory, while China
and Russia recognized autonomy of [Outer] Mongolia constituting part
of Chinese territory;
(ii) The title Bogd Khan for Jebsundamba Khutagt as the religious head of
[Outer] Mongolia was to be conferred by President of the Republic of
China;
(iii) China was allowed to have its representative posted in [Outer] Mongo-
lia; and
(iv) Russia secured extra-territorial rights in [Outer] Mongolia.
The impact of the Kiakhta treaty was severe on the Mongols as they became a
party to a document that recognized that “no political treaties could be made
concerning their country without China’s approval” (Ballis 1956). Russia, on
the other hand, practically retained all its wishful rights in Outer Mongolia,
including the right of free trade. The agreement also recognized once for
all the bifurcation of Mongolia into Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia.
It recognized Inner Mongolia adjoining China as part of China and Outer
Mongolia farther from China an autonomous territory under Chinese suze-
rainty. It was done to refrain the Mongols from reclaiming Inner Mongolia
in future, which had been continuing as part of China since 1636. However,
the Mongols had no option but to be disgruntled not only because they lost
the independence that they had proclaimed in 1911 but also due to their
failure to get back Inner Mongolia, Barga (Hulunbuir) and Uriankhai (Tannu
Tuva) in the sphere of autonomous right they had secured (Baabar 1999).
While Inner Mongolia and Barga were placed under the control of China,
Uriankhai was turned into a protectorate of Russia, which was incorporated
into former Soviet Union in 1940s (Batbayar and Soni 2007). The outcome
of the tripartite agreement has been analysed by various quarters in very
many ways, but one point which remains clear is that “the legal framework
was completed for an Outer Mongolia dominated by Russia, but nominally
part of China” (Schwartz 1964). Meanwhile, the Kiakhta agreement contin-
ued to remain a keystone of maintaining the status quo of relations among
the three signatories until shortly after the Russian Revolution (1917). Tak-
ing advantage of the unrest in Russia, China succeeded in bringing about a
“voluntary” cancellation of Mongolian autonomy (Weigh 1928).
Abrogation of Tripartite Agreement on Mongolian Autonomy

World War I was followed by the Russian Revolution, allied intervention in
Siberia and a Civil War in China. Geopolitics in the region witnessed changes
in attitudes and deeds on the part of powers involved, which impacted the
future of existing treaties and agreements, including the Kiakhta agreement.
The terms of the treaties and agreements were reverted to as they best suited
the interests of the parties concerned. During the period from the 1911 proc-
lamation of Mongolia’s independence until the Russian Revolution, Russian
policy towards (Outer) Mongolia was positioned “on the arrangement of the
situation in such a manner that Mongolia and Russia together were too much
for China, while China and Russia together were too much for Mongolia”
(Friters 1937). In other words, “by manoeuvring in such a manner as to
prevent coalition between Chinese and Mongols”, Friters (1937) underlines
that “Russia was able to rule Mongolia by pretending that the Mongols were
free, and also to keep the rest of the world away from interfering with its
monopoly, by allowing it to be inferred that the Mongols were not free”.
Russia’s involvement in World War I resulted in debilitating its Far Eastern
policies only to become worse after the fall of Tsarist rule.
In the wake of the Russian Revolution, Russia became embroiled in a Civil
War and was not in a position to defend its protectorate, particularly Mongo-
lia. During the Civil War, much of Russian-controlled Asiatic land was either
reclaimed by China or taken over by anti-Bolshevik elements. The ideology
of the Russian Revolution spread among the Mongolian masses, which fur-
ther paved the way for various reactionaries to consolidate their command. A
new geopolitical game henceforth began in the Mongolian part of Inner Asia.
This time around, two new factors preponderated in Mongolia, that is the
anti-Bolshevik or White Russian movements and the involvement of Japan
(Tang 1959). As the Civil War in Russia reached its peak, it also spilled over
near Mongolia’s borders. As a result, a handful of White Russian leaders,
particularly Cossack Grigorii Mikailovich Semenov, began to play with the
idea of a “Pan-Mongol movement” for creating a single Greater Mongolian
State (Valliant 1972). Semenov planned to include the territories of Outer
and Inner Mongolia, Buryat region of Siberia and the territories of the Tibet-
ans, Kyrgyzs and Kalmyks of Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Lake Bai-
kal (Dallin 1950). However, the plan failed when Semenov was ousted from
Siberia and Mongolia by the Red Army. The idea of a pan-Mongolian state
continued for some time to be exploited by a small White army until it was
fattened completely. So far as Japanese intervention is concerned, they pre-
ferred to support the White Russians, which infuenced tremendously both
the regional and the central authorities in China (Rupen 1979).
Taking advantage of the advance of White Russian forces in eastern Sibe-
ria, China decided arbitrarily to abrogate the tripartite agreement and abol-
ish Mongolian autonomy (Rupen 1979). In March 1919, China reformulated
its frontier policy to strengthen the guards of Chinese residents in Mongolia.
The move was in contradiction with the Tripartite Agreement (1915), which
disallowed stationing of both Chinese and Russian troops in Mongolia.
52 Sharad K. Soni
The end of World War I and declaration of peace in Europe (1919) encour-
aged the Chinese to transform the so-called War Participation Bureau in
China into the North Western Frontier Defence Force. Consequently, Gen-
eral Hsu Shu-cheng was appointed as Defence Commissioner for the North
Western Frontier as well as Commander-in-Chief of the North Western Fron-
tier Defence Force (Ho-t’ien 1949). One of the frst things Hsu did was to dis-
patch more troops to Mongolia, thereby increasing the number of soldiers in
the Chinese Brigade at Urga. Upon his request to the Chinese authorities for
giving him a free hand in dealing on the Mongolian subject, he was allowed
to do so and soon became more or less the “Uncrowned King” of Mongolia
(Weigh 1928).
The frst ever meeting between the representatives of the governments of
the United States and Mongolia took place for the sole purpose of Washing-
ton’s help to liberate the Mongols from Hsu’s oppression (Campi 1991). It
is evident from the November 1919 episode, when a letter from Bogd Khan
was handed over secretly to an American representative in Peking by a Mon-
golian delegation negotiating with China. The time coincided with America’s
plan to open a consulate in Urga, though it was postponed only to establish
such a consulate in Kalgan with Samuel Sokobin taking charge as frst Ameri-
can Consul on 1 April 1921 (Campi 1991). Unaware of the meeting between
the American and Mongolian representatives, the Chinese President issued
a decree on 22 November 1919 endorsing the “request” made by the Urga
government to cancel their autonomy (Nemzer 1939). Mongolia’s autonomy
was, thus, abolished together with the abrogation of the Tripartite Agree-
ment (1915). An immediate Russian reaction to the Chinese decision came
to the fore, but with the fall of Tsarist regime and the ensuing turmoil in
Russia, it was not taken up seriously. The Mongol-seeking independence got
another jolt, when China formally took over the authority of Mongolia at a
ceremony in Urga in February 1920 (Bawden 1968). The treaties or agree-
ments concluded previously on Mongolia’s status turned out to be practically
insignifcant.
The Final Show Down of Mongol-Seeking Independence

Undeniably, China had the upper hand in the geopolitical game that helped
bring Mongolia into Chinese sphere, though majorly it was due to the fall
of the Tsardom and the emergent situation thereof. But the question is: For
how long Mongolia remained under Chinese sphere of infuence? General
Hsu did everything he could do to use Mongolia as a base to pursue his
own ambitions. In the meantime, Mongolia saw the emergence of revolution-
ary or more precisely resistance groups largely infuenced by the Bolshevik
Revolution. These groups had their background in forming two small under-
ground revolutionary groups in 1918 (Dashpurev and Soni 1992). Initially
operated independently without having any organized form or programme,

these two groups were known as the Urga group and the Consul’s group.
But gradually, both the groups realized the need for establishing links with
the Soviet Russia for their struggle to ensure national independence. Their
joint eforts frst resulted in combining the two separate revolutionary groups
into a single entity under the banner of Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) at a
meeting on 25 June 1920. Later on, under the infuence of Bolsheviks, a more
organized Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) came into being.
In August 1920, the MPP sought support and assistance from the Soviet
Russia in restoring Mongolian Autonomy. The next step was to take meas-
ures that could help strengthen revolutionary passion among the Mongolian
masses besides providing a push to organize armed forces in Mongolia (Soni
2002). Sukhbaatar, popularly known as the father of Mongolian revolution,
was able to enrol enough recruits within a short span of time following his
appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Notwithstanding the Mongolian revolutionaries becoming more and more
active in challenging Chinese occupation, the situation in Mongolia took a
serious turn when Japanese-backed Baron Von Ungern-Sternberg entered
into Mongolia posing himself as Urga’s saviour. Ungern-Sternberg along with
his band of White Russian guards took over Urga in October 1920, after
which independence of (Outer) Mongolia was proclaimed under the nominal
leadership of Bogd Khan with Ungern-Sternberg himself assuming the title of
Commander-in-Chief of armed forces (Soni 2002). However, Ungern-Stern-
berg’s reign of terror by introducing oppressive measures afected the situa-
tion of Mongolia and the Mongols badly. Amidst this crucial moment, the
frst Party Congress was being initiated by the Mongolian revolutionaries to
have guiding instruments, such as a political platform, a provisional govern-
ment and an army, for their future course of action. The Congress was held
in Kiakhta on 1–3 March 1921 in which the Party platform, known as the
“Kiakhta Platform”, bore the ofcial title “Proclamation of the Mongolian
People’s Party, constituting the political platform of the Mongolian Revolu-
tion” (Rupen 1964). With the intent of expelling the Chinese militarists and
Russian White guards led by Ungern-Sternberg, the MPP again convened
in Kiakhta on 13 March 1921 and proclaimed a Mongolian People’s Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government that called for the formation of a Consti-
tutional government under the leadership of Bogd Khan (Ho-t’ien 1949, 99).
The provisional government planned to release Kiakhta Maimaicheng
(then a Chinese trading settlement on the Mongolian side of the border with
Russia) from Chinese Army occupation. On 18 March 1921, the Mongolian
People’s Army launched an ofensive against the Chinese troops and after
their complete victory captured the town, which was subsequently renamed as
Altan Bulag. This victory created a conducive atmosphere for a joint incursion
of the Mongolian-Soviet forces against Ungern-Sternberg. On 10 April 1921,
54 Sharad K. Soni
the People’s Provisional Government made an appeal to Soviet Russia for

military aid to fght the White Russian Guards, their common enemy. How-
ever, “the Red Army did not enter Mongolia until Ungern actually attacked
Russian Kiakhta” (Isono 1979). On 6 July 1921, a series of battles with the
White Russian Guards the joint Soviet-Mongolian forces stormed Urga. On 8
July 1921, the key forces of both the Armies and the ofcials of the MPP and
the Provisional Government entered Urga, signifying the independence of
Mongolia. The fnal showdown of Mongol-seeking independence thus came
with the capture of Urga, which brought the country under the command
of Mongolian revolutionaries. The decade-long struggle for independence
was achieved and Mongolia emerged as an independent state, but soon this
small Inner Asian country began witnessing Soviet penetration that in essence
proved to be a geopolitical move to restrict the Chinese from exercising any
control over what it calls as its “lost territory” (Soni 2006).
Conclusion
A series of developments that unfolded between 1911 and 1921 in the Mon-
gol region of Inner Asia was essentially a part of the geopolitical game played
by Russia and China. The impact of such developments was most visible
on the trajectory of the Mongol-seeking independence that loomed large in
the decade-long struggle for an independent statehood of Mongolia. At the
outset, it was the Chinese revolution of 1911 that paved the way for (Outer)
Mongolia to proclaim its independence. But soon Mongolia became a hot-
spot of Russia-China geopolitics, which tells the story of Mongolian inse-
curity towards its independent status. Whatever negotiations on the part of
Russia and China that took place with or without Mongolia, they were all
concentrated on denying the de facto Mongolian independence in favour of
Mongolian autonomy under the suzerainty of China. Russia too was a gainer
as it secured extra-territorial rights in Mongolia. However, Mongol-seeking
independence got a jolt following the Russian revolution (1917), which
inspired Mongolian revolutionaries to take their struggle to the fnal show-
down. Finally, it was in 1921 that Mongolia with Russian/Soviet assistance
achieved its “actual” independence from China after what is known as the
second revolution, which was more organized in comparison to the 1911 rev-
olution. At this point, one could surmise as Bulag (2012) argues: “Mongolian
independence was not a Russian plot against China, but a Mongol exercise
of subjectivity”. On the other hand, “Chinese failure to protect Mongolian
independence by minding its own business risked losing Mongolia to Rus-
sia” (Bulag 2012). In the post-1921 period, Mongolia’s relations with Russia
became too cosy so much so that it turned out to be a major irritant in the
Sino-Soviet relations until the Soviet collapse in 1991. Today, a century-old
independent Mongolia has been marching ahead along democratic lines with
its geopolitically relevant foreign policy that emphasizes maintaining a bal-

anced relationship with its two powerful neighbours – Russia and China.
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versity Prints and Reprints.
5
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Experience From Inner Asia
Vikash Kumar
Introduction
Climate change has been a fact throughout the history of creation and devel-
opment of our planet. However, what makes the present case of climate
change worthy of attention, acceptance and deep deliberation for mitigation
of its negative impacts on human lives is the extent and variability asso-
ciated with it. Climate change and its impact have not been homogenous
in the geological history of earth, and nor would they be homogenous for-
ever. Its impact on the entirety of our planet is unquestionable. Where the
earlier phases of climate change have been natural, the current phase is a
consequence of anthropogenic actions, results of which are visible in the
form of highly erratic and extreme environmental and weather conditions
observable as foods, droughts and so forth, posing a grave threat to the
livelihood of people, particularly amongst the vulnerable sections of society
with political, economic and social implications. The variability of impact
of climate change on diferent regions is not a result of geography and geol-
ogy alone, but also an efect of unequal access or exploitation of natural
resources for economic growth. The Inner Asian region, comprising Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Mongolia, three
regions of China – Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and Afghanistan,
is one such region, which has been highly susceptible to consequences of
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2015). Further,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019 has emphasized the
high vulnerability of Central Asia to climate change (Vakulchuk et al. 2022).
Industrialisation, deforestation, excessive use of fossil fuels, rampant exploi-
tation of natural resources including land and water as well as unprecedented
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-6
58 Vikash Kumar
focus on economic development have been a global phenomenon and these

have created a situation of high vulnerability in the Inner Asian region as
well. The repercussions of these processes have led to accentuated efects
of climate change for the people of the region with inter-regional as well as
intra-regional impact. Climate change is not contained by national borders
and thus the contiguity of this region as a whole stands susceptible to it. It
is against this background that this chapter argues that though the countries
of Inner Asian region have followed diferent development trajectories, they
are collectively, as a region, facing issues of water security, loss of liveli-
hood, health and food insecurity, protracted borders conficts, environmental
degradation and large scale migration. The primary focus of this chapter is
on the fve countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan, which form a large part of Central Asian region and delves
on three major themes that have had socio-economic, political and environ-
mental impacts on these countries individually as well as collectively. These
themes emerge from thorough delineation of country-specifc studies and
reports on impact of climate change. What requires further deliberation is the
collective impact on the Inner Asian region. The chapter presents a synoptic
discussion on the following:
• Nature and pattern of environmental degradation

• Impact on health and food security
• Loss of livelihood and forced migration of people
Nature and Pattern of Environmental Degradation

Since the breakup of the erstwhile Soviet Union into separate Central Asian
countries, each country followed an overtly diferent development route. Of
the fve Central Asian countries (part of the larger Inner Asian region), the level
of development has been diferent in each. Consequently, there have been
stark inter-regional diferences in terms of respective responses towards rapid
growth of population; food and nutritional insecurity; agrarian challenges;
rampant poverty and illiteracy; gender inequality; occasional yet persistent civil
strife and political instability (Anderson and Pomfret 2004). Yet as a region,
in spite of structural and institutional variability, Central Asia is vulnerable
to adverse threats of climate change; rise in the number of climate refugees,
displacement and possible migration due to severe weather events. The impact
is visible in terms of economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities. This
will lead to growing tensions over already scarce water resources, severe strain
on the CARs, eco-migration, socio-economic inequalities and aggravation of
intra-state political tensions and so forth (Vakulchuk et al. 2022).
The current environmental issues of the region cannot be separated
from its Soviet past. The vast available natural resources of the region were
Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change 59
strenuously utilised for economic development. New land areas were iden-
tifed to make them arable and intense agriculture was practiced to feed a
growing demand of the new middle class. Industrialisation happened at an
unprecedented faster rate that caused over-exploitation of natural resources,
thus misbalancing the natural eco-system. The unexplored area of the region
became a feld of experimentation and exploitation to meet the needs and
requirements of emerging industrial centres. The historical inter-linking of
land and water rights in this region underwent change in the 1930s, delink-
ing the two and creating land and water as two separate commodities ripe
for over-usage and eventually exploitation (Strikeleva et al. 2018). As rightly
observed by some scholars, “large-scale irrigation systems led to large water
losses and consequently to secondary land salinization. For example, in Turk-
menistan approximately 50,000 hectares of land were abandoned annually
due to degradation by 1980” (Strikeleva et al. 2018).
From the pre-Soviet to post-Soviet era, laws related to land and water
use maximised the exploitation of these natural resources leading to their
degradation over time. Even the changes implemented in these laws during
diferent periods could not deal with the issue of their degradation. Land and
water degradation in Central Asia have reached their current level owing to
the historical baggage associated with it.
The green steppes and pastures of Inner Asia or in general Central Asia are
facing irreparable threat of ever-increasing land degradation. It is estimated
that degradation happened to various degrees of more than 8 million hec-
tares of irrigated land and more than half the pastures. The estimated annual
cost of this during 2001–2009 was “about $6 billion, most of which due
to land degradation ($4.6 billion), followed by desertifcation ($0.8 billion),
deforestation ($0.3 billion) and abandonment of croplands ($0.1 billion)”
(Strikeleva et al. 2018). This refers solely to the estimates of the economic
cost. The impact could be worse in terms of health and human survival.
These efects are refective of increasing infuence of climate change, which
can no longer be considered as an impending danger. According to a predic-
tion, based on calculated estimates, there will be a grave risk for the Central
Asia region for shortages in availability of food and water by the year 2050,
which would put at risk a large section of the populace already surviving on
the margins. The already inequitable distribution of resources would further
accentuate, leading to increased sufering for people of the region.
Land and water degradation is the major problem being faced by the
Central Asia region. Given the increasing demand for water for agricul-
tural, domestic and industrial purposes and rising erratic weather condi-
tions owing primarily to climate change, the situation would turn more
critical. This situation is visible in form of increased temperature, decrease
in precipitation in almost all the fve countries of the region leading to
decreased water levels and its ever increasing shortage (Lioubimtseva and
60 Vikash Kumar
Henebry 2009). With increasing population, demands for better stand-

ards of living including water, energy and food would increase the stress
on already limited resources. The region is also facing confict over water
resources between the countries with political, economic and humanitarian
overtones; therefore constructive water management becomes the need of
the hour in such a precarious scenario. The highly water-dependent econ-
omy of the republic of Uzbekistan, with almost 90 per cent dependence,
may have to face extreme problems related to climate change (Khaydarov
2015). Uzbekistan’s current water defcit could increase to 7 billion cubic
meters by the year 2030 and up to 15 billion cubic meters by the year 2050
given the decrease of water volumes in Syr Darya and Amu Darya (Asian
Development Bank 2022).
The Aral Sea, once the largest inland lake in the world, represents
another proof of the anthropogenic destruction of a natural large water
body. The Aral Sea, which is situated in the heart of Central Asia in Eura-
sian continent, is an inland sea sharing its body with two Central Asian
Republics (CARs), namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Aral Sea is the
fourth largest lake in the world covering 66,000 square kilometres with an
average depth of 16 metres and maximum depth of 68 metres. The northern
belt of the sea shares its coast with Kazakhstan and southern belt is located
in the Autonomous region of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Simultane-
ously, it is located approximately 600 kilometres away from the Caspian
Sea. The Aral Sea used to have 1,100 islands separated by lagoons and nar-
row straits, which defne its name. In Kazakhstan, Aral means “island”,
and is called “Kok Aral”, the largest among the islands. Although its loca-
tion is very peculiar geographically, it is a terminal lake fed by two major
rivers in Central Asia, namely Syr Darya and Amu Darya. There will be
an estimated 10 to 15 per cent drop in water volumes in both the rivers by
the year 2050. Even by 2050–2100, water volumes could decrease by up
to 30 per cent in Syr Darya basin and 40 per cent in Amu Darya (Asian
Development Bank 2022).
The degradation, desertifcation and salination of the large seas are also
a legacy of historical mismanagement. To cater to increased cotton produc-
tion in the region, the Aral Sea basin became the water reservoir. The riv-
ers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya that were feeding into the Aral Sea were
diverted for cotton production leading to the current state of desertifcation
of the sea. In the three decades from 1960 to 1990, the sea shrank to half
its original size. According to an observation, “the drying out of the Aral
Sea did not stop or decelerate during the decade of transition. Clearly, the
newly independent countries of former Soviet Central Asia were primarily
concerned with their own survival” (Spoor and Krutothe 2003). There has
been increased salinity in the area. Besides, increased windstorms have led to
decreased agricultural production and dying of fsh in the sea, thus having
severe impact on human health. Because of the above factors, grave climate
change impact for the entire region on the whole has become a glaring real-
ity. Another consequence of Aral Sea destruction has been forced migration
of the people to other places for better opportunities of survival. This forced
migration has created a new category of “environmental refugees” within the
region and beyond (Reuveny 2007).
Similarly, shrinking of glaciers at a global level due to climate change is an
established fact. Central Asia is no exception to this precarious trend. There
has been a 30 per cent decrease in glacier surface area in Central Asia over
the past fve or six decades. The melting of snowcaps combined with inten-
sifying weather events has triggered natural calamities such as foods and
landslides that are happening more frequently and severely (Asian Develop-
ment Bank 2022). According to a couple of scholars, who have been work-
ing on the shrinking of glaciers in Central Asia, by the end of 20th century
the size of glaciers in the region was 31,628 square kilometres, which has
been constantly decelerating. Rates of change between −0.05 per cent per
year and −0.76 per cent per year have been reported in the Altai and Tien
Shan and between −0.13 per cent per year and −0.30 per cent per year in the
Pamir (Barros and Field 2014). These rates depict regional variation, but
the overall impact of this would be observable in corresponding shrinkage
in availability of fresh water for survival. Glaciers are store houses of fresh
water, their increasing melting would further lead to a situation of shortage
of water (Sorg et al. 2012). Out of 8,492 glaciers in the republic of Tajikistan,
nearly 20 per cent have already retreated and around 30 per cent are at risk
of disappearing by 2050 (Sharifzoda 2019).
The individual impact of such large-scale land and water degradation on
each of the CARs could be gauged from the estimated economic losses in
their GDPs. Around 3 per cent of the GDP for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
4 per cent for Turkmenistan, 10 per cent for Tajikistan and 11 per cent for
Kyrgyzstan is the economic loss owing to these forms of natural resources
degradation. The republic of Kazakhstan, considered to be one of the most
developed countries of the Central Asia region, faces an estimated loss of its
land up to 66 per cent due to degradation, which measures up to 48 million
hectares of the area (Strikeleva et al. 2018). Though Kazakhstan’s economy
is largely oil based, the efects of climate change have started impacting it in
multiple ways, but not limited to increased intermittent periods of droughts,
conversely increasing foods and landslides, disrupting the normal fow of
activities for the people and impacting their livelihoods, survival, community
and society. Over-grazing is a serious issue as well. For example, Kyrgyzstan
faces up to 30 per cent pasture degradation due to over-grazing. Similarly,
in Tajikistan, over-grazing eats away 89 per cent summer pasture and 97 per
cent winter pasture. In Turkmenistan, 70 per cent land degradation is due to
over-grazing (Strikeleva et al. 2018).
62 Vikash Kumar
Impact on Food Security and Health

It is an established fact by now that impact of climate change has regional
variations not just between regions or countries but also within. With such
changes and variations, the issues of food security and food production
would have to be looked into according to the need and requirements of a
particular region. Owing to climate change, regional variation in food pro-
duction is increasing. Central Asian agriculture is largely based on irrigation
and forms an important contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP) of
the countries of the region; however, climate stressors have begun altering the
agro-production pattern. For instance, cotton production in the Republic of
Uzbekistan and wheat production in the Republic of Kazakhstan are under
threat due to adverse climatic conditions, such as heat waves, thus posing
serious challenge to the economy and food security of the region. This may
lead to high infation of food prices, further stressing already vulnerable pop-
ulations (Food and Agricultural Organisation 2016). One study by the WHO
(2022b) describes how heat waves have created havoc in a country with hot
summers and vast rural areas like Tajikistan. Most importantly, heat waves
have created difculties for breastfeeding of little children.
If some regions experience a decline in food productivity owing to cli-
mate change, others may experience an increase in production. In certain
regions of Asia, General Circulation Models (GCMs) and Special Report on
Emission Scenarios (SRES) depict a decline in rice productivity whereas some
other crops show an increase in production in certain regions. Further, it is
found that
in Central Asia, some areas could be winners (cereal production in north-

ern and eastern Kazakhstan could beneft from the longer growing sea-
son, warmer winters, and slight increase in winter precipitation), while
others could be losers (western Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where fre-
quent droughts could negatively afect cotton production, increase water
demand for irrigation, and exacerbate desertifcation).
This increases probability of malnutrition, impacting morbidity and mortal-

ity rates, especially among the children (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 2014).
As it has already been mentioned, increased desertifcation of the Aral
Sea basin and the geography of the region on the whole has led to increasing
incidents of dust storms in the region, resulting in increased hospital admis-
sions due to respiratory diseases and skin and eye infections (Barros and
Field 2014). Moreover, a rise in temperature and changes in rainfall pat-
tern could lead to “increased outbreaks of agricultural pests and diseases,
such as locusts and wheat blast, including those travelling across national
boundaries” (USAID 2018). Droughts already have afected the region

especially in Kazakhstan where 66 per cent of the total land has been badly
afected. Similarly, increasing desertifcation will engulf half the land in the
Republic of Kyrgyzstan in coming decades and potentially spread to large
areas of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan making them arid and saline land.
Nearly 40 per cent of the population of the region lacks access to clean water.
A rise in temperature and erratic rain pattern not only afect agriculture, but
also lead to outbreak of many diseases afecting both humans and animals
alike. For instance, having been eradicated in 1960s, malaria made a resur-
gence in the 1990s because of increasing temperature, which happens to be
favourable for vector- and water-borne diseases (USAID 2018).
The consequences of climate change could prove to be further devastating
in a situation of a sudden outbreak of a pandemic like COVID-19. Though
studies are still being conducted for a thorough estimate of economic losses
caused by the pandemic, its socio-psychological efects far outweigh and
would probably take a longer time to reconcile with. The health infrastruc-
ture in all these countries got severely strained and loss of lives with pro-
longed morbidity are abound (UNDP 2020).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) (2022a) has brought a Roadmap
for Health and Well Being in Central Asia, 2022–2025, that steps up to face
the major health challenges in the fve CARs. The Roadmap sets up a multi-
sectoral plan that will help these Central Asian countries to overcome major
obstacles for their health systems. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic,
climate change and the crisis in Ukraine, this has become an even more chal-
lenging task. According to the Roadmap, most of the countries experience
major or signifcant challenges on their way to reducing the health burden
of communicable diseases, trafc accidents and non-communicable diseases/
mental health. There is also room for improvement in other areas, such as
environmental hazards and tobacco control.
Loss of Livelihood and Forced Migration

The impact of climate change varies widely within the Central Asian region.
Socio-economic and political disparities get exacerbated and add to the
human vulnerability in the region, which are often transnational in nature.
As far as climate change–induced displacement and migration are concerned,
the region happens to be one of the most disaster-prone in the world, with
over 200,000 lives lost and several millions of people afected by storms and
foods alone between 2005 and 2014, while a heat wave in North and Cen-
tral Asia in 2010 killed 56,000 people (Disaster Risk Reduction Division of
UNESCAP 2020). Loss of livelihood and the resultant forced migration in
search of new employment are common repercussions of climate change. The
Central Asian region and its fragile eco-system are increasingly overburdened
64 Vikash Kumar
by the rising population. In addition to the detrimental efects of extreme

events, the vulnerability of livelihoods in agricultural societies also stems
from geographic environments, demographic trends, socio-economic fac-
tors, resource and market access, unsustainable water consumption, farming
methods and lack of adaptive capacity.
Khamza Sharifzoda (2019) summarises that climate change is increasing
the frequency and intensity of the following sudden and slow-onset disasters,
leading to mass displacement primarily relating to the following:
• Increased fooding in urban areas, rivers and glacial lake outburst foods:
for instance, hundreds of people have been killed and many more afected
so far due to outburst foods in the Shahimardan Valley, which Kyrgyzstan
shares with Uzbekistan as well as Shakhdara Valley in Tajikistan’s Pamir
mountains (Lochner 2014).
• Sea-level rise, contributing to more severe storm surges, inundation, salt-
water intrusion, salinisation of freshwater sources and soil, submergence,
loss of ecosystem services, loss of land mass and erosion. More than half of
the irrigated land has become saline in Uzbekistan. Similarly, the Aral Sea
has constantly been facing extinction of its available fsh due to increasing
salt concentration.
• Hydrological changes in major river basins: for example, Tajikistan has
8,492 glaciers, around 20 per cent of which have already retreated, with
up to 30 per cent at risk of disappearing by 2050. Disappearing glaciers
will ultimately signifcantly decrease water supply in the region. As such,
availability of water in the Amu Darya, one of the two main rivers in the
region, is expected to decrease by 40 per cent.
• Shifts in precipitation patterns and temperatures impacting agricultural
production: Central Asia shows faster warming trends than the global
average due its location in the arid mid-latitude region. Therefore, due
to annual total precipitation and related extreme precipitation, drying
trend has been found over the past decades in most parts of Central Asia,
especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have a higher risk of
drought that have serious impact on agricultural production (Liu et al.
2020).
• Increased droughts, resulting in water scarcity and food shortages, exac-
erbating livelihood stress and increasing malnutrition. For example, water
supply for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and regions of Syr Darya and Amu
Darya are facing signifcant water defciency, food shortage and increased
unemployment (Liu et al. 2020).
The efects of any natural calamities or cataclysmic events create critical

fnancial difculties for the governments in Central Asia. From 2000 to
2001, a territorial dry spell caused loss of more than $800 million because
of loss of agrarian production in fve nations in Central Asia and the Cauca-
sus. In Tajikistan, these losses were identical to 4.8 per cent of its GDP, and
increased this poor nation’s current account defcit. The World Bank reports
that the all-out yearly loss from quakes in the Kyrgyz Republic adds up to
about $ 200 million, with $60 million in loss from foods and $2.6 million in
harms from avalanches. Besides, roughly 25 per cent of Central Asia’s popu-
lace is employed in farming – which is one of the most vulnerable sections
of the society being exposed to the hydro-meteorological calamities such as
fooding or dry season (The World Bank 2018). Dangers, for example,
foods, avalanches, torrential slides and mudfows likewise compromise the
vocations and livelihood of more than 70 million people of the region. These
progressively successive risks, notwithstanding their erratic and irregular
efects, can also after some time drain out local and national spending plans,
harm fnancial advancement and drive defenceless populaces into despera-
tion (The World Bank 2018). Sudden weather changes due to global warm-
ing adversely afect local livelihood. For instance, the dry atmosphere forces
shepherds to graze their sheep to ever more elevated areas in the mountains,
where the grass is better than that of the lowland areas. On the other hand,
in 2015, a major food which spread in most parts of Tajikistan damaged
crops and infrastructural amenities including houses leaving 80 per cent of
the population in Pamir without electricity and food. Similarly, mud slides
damaged more than 1,500 houses in the south of Tajikistan the same year
(2015) (Sharifzoda 2019).
Trade is also routinely adversely impacted by natural disasters induced
by climate change. For instance, every year the main trade route (M41)
that passes through the region’s southern mountain regions is afected by
avalanches, mudfows, rock falls, landslides and torrential falls, cutting of
this signifcant path for communication and transportation. Environmental
change is worsening the efects, and compromises Central Asia’s ecologi-
cal stability, urban advancement and infrastructural trustworthiness. Such
efects regularly bring about extreme fnancial strain and employment crisis
in Central Asia (Caravanserai 2018).
In Asia, nearly 20 per cent of the urban population lives in large cities
while nearly half of the urban population dwells in small towns (The United
Nations 2013). North and Central Asia are the most urbanised regions with
over 63 per cent of the populace living in urban areas, except for Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan (UNESCAP 2011). It is expected that by the middle of the cen-
tury the Asian urban population will grow by nearly 1.4 billion, which would
amount to half of the world urban population. By the middle of this century,
Asia’s urban populace will increase by 1.4 billion and will represent over half
of the worldwide populace (The United Nations 2013). On the other hand,
the southern and south-western regions of Asia are least urbanised with
nearly 30 per cent people living in urban centres. Nevertheless, urbanisation
66 Vikash Kumar
is taking place at a higher rate within Asia with an average growth of 2.4 per
cent per annum during 2005–2010 (UNESCAP 2016).
There is a rapid change in the habitation pattern of the people in Central
Asia. Fast urbanisation, especially youth migrating to urban centres in large
numbers, has changed the livelihood pattern in the region. For instance, in
Kazakhstan around 61 per cent of the population is employed in service sec-
tor, whereas number of people engaged in agriculture in 2015 was around
18 per cent, down from 45 per cent in 1991. Decreasing and inconsistent
agricultural output caused largely by global warming is one of the root
causes. Similarly, though the absolute poverty rate decreased from 64 per
cent in 2001 to around 7 per cent in 2015, income inequalities are widening
at a faster rate and loss of traditional livelihood is one the major reasons.
As mentioned in the previous section, the cascading efects of COVID-19
had spilled over to afect income, employment and livelihood. A recent study
by UNDP (2020) summarised the impact of the pandemic in Central Asian
regions with at least three major ramifcations: “(i) a loss of wage income
and revenues from informal work; (ii) a loss of remittances; and (iii) price
infation, particularly food price infation”. The study further noted that
due to the loss of income and employment, households experienced increas-
ing levels of debt, inability to access afordable education and health care
services. Women and the elderly were afected more than their respective
counterparts.
The Way Forward

The repercussions of climate change are felt globally with high inter- and
intra-regional variations. The most vulnerable people would be further mar-
ginalised and would be the worst suferers of its impact. The inequitable
distribution of climate change impact needs to be mitigated in a manner that
is sustainable. The anthropogenic efects that have led to environmental and
ecological changes downgrading the overall health of the biosphere cannot
be reverted. However, its impact can be reduced by having better access to
technologies and resources that mitigates its negative impact.
Pressure on natural resources, particularly on land, water and energy
sources, is ever increasing for day-to-day survival and livelihood require-
ments. Central Asia as a region is also vulnerable to the vagaries of the chang-
ing climatic conditions led by human interventions. There is a veritable need
to develop their economies and ensuring public welfare in an environment of
limited resources, already threatened by climate change, which also increases
intra-regional confict. Despite being in an oil-rich region, the countries are
facing tough situations in terms of health issues and migration of their popu-
lations. The desertifcation of Aral Sea basin, ever increasing salinity of the
soil, excessive use of over-stressed water resources of the two rivers of Amu
and Syr Darya and over-use of natural hydrocarbon resources have collec-
tively impacted agricultural practices, health and thus survival and livelihood
of the people and food and energy security of the region.
In spite of international measures like the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change, not much could be achieved at a global level to mitigate the impact
of changing climate. The developed North, particularly United States of
America, has had a paternalistic attitude towards this issue. Its lack of concern
towards the Paris Agreement is a cause of concern and disappointment from
a nation that claims ethical and moral standing on issues concerning global
humanity and humanitarian causes. However, this development could be
seen as an opportunity for the countries of the region to bolster collabora-
tive eforts and establish a regional framework for climate change to further
raise a combined voice at the multinational platforms. For this to happen,
the CARs need to abide by the Paris Agreement. Central Asian countries that
have mostly identifed with the European region after their independent for-
mation can seek active collaborations in research and development not just
with Europe, but with other Asian countries which are facing similar threats
and issues.
There is a comparative dearth of scientifc as well as social science studies
on the overall impact of climate change on socio-economic indicators and
survival of people in the region. The impact is not a speculation anymore,
but a reality with observable consequences. This calls for a need to under-
take collaborative eforts to mitigate the efects of climate change as much as
possible. In this direction, the World Bank has initiated a fve-year Climate
and Environment (CLIENT) Programme to support Central Asian countries
to achieve cooperative, sustainable, resilient, and inclusive economic growth
with a focus on climate resilience, resilient landscape restoration, urban air
pollution management and circular economy, green, resilient, and speedy
recovery for lives and livelihoods in rural and urban areas, including mitigat-
ing COVID-19 efects. The objectives of the programme are to promote a
shared ecosystem to facilitate trans-boundary collaboration and catalyse a
joint actions framework (The World Bank 2021). The countries of the region
are now exploring various ways and means through collaborative and con-
structing dialogue to mitigate the challenges posed by the climate change.
The Heads of States of Central Asian countries, in January 2018, initiated the
4th Aral Sea Basin Programme and adopted the concept for its development,
specifcally referring to the multi-functional uses of water to ensure water,
energy and food security. Given the geographical and strategic conditions of
the region, it must be realised that the threat posed by climate change is a
common issue. Another recent efort is the UN Special Programme for the
Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) Economic Forum meeting held on 16 and
17 November 2022 in Almaty with high-level participants from the fve CARs
and Azerbaijan. The theme of the meeting was “Greener and safer future”.
68 Vikash Kumar
The key issues deliberated upon at the Forum were assisting the countries with
transforming their economic structure, transitioning to sustainable energy and
adopting more digital technologies while ensuring the full participation of
women in society. (UN Economic Commission for Europe 2022).
The sudden outbreak of the recent pandemic warrants collective and sus-
tained action framework. On the one hand the pandemic caused enormous
loss of human lives and had devastating efects on economic, health and
other social infrastructure across borders; it also gives an opportunity for
the countries of the region to maximise investments in health and allied sec-
tors to minimise the risks any future adverse efects of pandemics, climate
change and environmental degradation. Therefore, its mitigation lies in com-
mon eforts through concerted and steady policy interventions and signifcant
investment in institutional and infrastructural levels. The countries of the
region need to fnd out sustainable solutions with long-term objectives for a
sustainable future.
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difculties-for-breastfeeding-tajikistan-steps-up-for-babies-health
PART II
Geopolitics and
Geo-Economics
6
CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL
AND GEO-ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
OF INNER ASIA
G. M. Shah
Introduction
In order to understand the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic
signifcance of Inner Asia, it is essential to defne frst the concepts of geo-
politics, geo-economics and Inner Asia. The word “geopolitics” is derived
from Greek word “ge” meaning earth, land, and Swedish, German and Dan-
ish word “politik” meaning “politics”. The term “geopolitics”, which is the
study of the efect of geography on politics and international relations, was
coined by Swedish scholar Rudolph Kjellen in 1916. Geopolitics can also be
defned as “the study of infuence of such factors as geography, economics
and demography on the politics, and especially the foreign policy of a state”
(Merriam-Webster). The word “geo-economics” has been in usage since
1981 as a sub-feld of geopolitics and is attributed to Edward Luttwak and
Pascal Lorot. Geo-economics is the “study of spatial, temporal and political
aspects of the economies and resources” (Merriam-Webster). Geo-economics
can be understood as the “interplay of international economics, geopolitics
and strategy” (Wigell and Vihma 2016). Similarly, the concept of “Inner
Asia” has its origin in the treatise of German geographer Alexander Von
Richthofen, who divided Asia into two types of natural regions, “Central”
and “Peripheral”, varying by their geological origin and physiographic fea-
tures. Ivan Mushkatov defned Inner Asia as the aggregate of “all the land-
locked regions of Asian mainland, having no fow of water into open sea and
possessing the features of Khan-Khai”. The distinguishing features of Inner
Asia from the “Outer Asia” are its landlocked nature, inland drainage and
remoteness from the Atlantic, Pacifc, Arctic and Indian Oceans. Inner Asia
comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-8
74 G. M. Shah
Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, parts of Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Iran and Siberia in the Russian Federation (Sinor Research Institute
for Inner Asian Studies). Inner Asia comprises the civilizations of Central
Asia, Mongolia and Tibet as well as the surrounding areas and peoples that
in certain historical periods were politically, culturally and ethno-lingually
parts of these regions. The term “Inner Asia” was popularised in the English
language by Owen Lattimore, who used the term “Inner Asia” in the context
of the Qing dependencies of China from 1755 to 1911 (Lattimore 1988).
The present chapter is an endeavour to study the contemporary geopo-
litical and geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia with special reference to
Central Asia. The chapter has been divided into fve broad sections. The frst
section is an introductory section dealing with the defnition of key concepts
and the frame of the study. The second section deals with the geopolitical and
geo-economic discourse surrounding Inner Asia in general and the Central
Asia in particular. The third section deals with the geopolitical signifcance
of Inner Asia with special reference to Central Asia. The fourth section deals
with the geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia with special reference to
Central Asia. The ffth section summarises the main conclusions of the pre-
sent study. A systematic account of the remaining four sections of the present
study is given as under.
Discourse on Inner Asia’s Geopolitics and Geo-Economics

It is imperative to highlight the narratives on geopolitics and geo-economics
given by fve well-known scholars: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford John
Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Samuel P. Huntinton and Zbignew Brzez-
inski. The American naval expert Alfred Thayer Mahan (1987) argued the
geopolitical discourse that sea powers are more advantageous in dominating
international politics. To him, Britain’s locational advantage as well as the
choice to control the seaports and sea routes in the open oceans helped it to
emerge as a dominant world power from 1850 onwards. Mahan wanted the
United States to control the open oceans to dominate the world in general
and surround the Eurasian supercontinent in particular.
Similarly, the British geographer Halford Mackinder (1967) underscored
the geopolitical signifcance of Central Eurasia, which he named as the pivot
area. Mackinder narrated the mobility of horsemen in the vast steppe belt
north of the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush-Himalayas and south of the Taiga
forests. Mackinder opined that the large landmass of Eurasia spread over
the river basins of the Volga, Yenisey, Amu Darya, Syr Darya and the Cas-
pian Sea as the pivot of geopolitical infuence because of its central location
in the supercontinent and ease of mobility for the conquerors who infu-
enced the historical processes far beyond Central Eurasia. The pivotal area
or the “Heartland” was roughly defned as Central Asia from where the
Contemporary Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Signifcance 75
horsemen dominated Asia and Europe. Mackinder held the view that during
the post-Columbian era, the Silk Route shifted to disuse as the international
trade began to be carried out through the maritime routes. However, with the
construction of the transcontinental railroad by Russia, the mobility of the
pivot area was going to be renewed again. According to him, one who con-
trols Eastern Europe can rule the Heartland, one who controls the Heartland
will rule the World Island (comprising Asia, Europe and Africa) and one who
controls the World Island can rule the world. Though Mackinder revised his
Heartland Theory a couple of times in 1919 and 1939 to incorporate chang-
ing geopolitical realities, his categorisation of the Eurasia-centric world as
Heartland, Inner Crescent and Outer Crescent with varying degrees of geo-
political signifcance remained unchanged.
Nicholas Spykman (1944) agreed with Mackinder with respect to the geo-
political structure of Eurasia, but difered with him on the great geopolitical
importance to the Heartland. Spykman coined the term “Rimland” for the
Inner Crescent in 1944, which comprised the European Coastland, Arab-
Middle Eastern desert land and Asiatic Monsoon Land. Spykman argued
that the power of the Heartland could be contained by the surrounding
“Rimland” given the latter’s advantage in population, resources and access
to the sea. To him, Rimland countries like Japan, Britain and China would
become the major powers due to their access to sea and would have greater
contact and cooperation with the outside world.
Samuel P. Huntington (1996) put forth the theory of “Clash of Civiliza-
tions” in 1996 in which he divided the world into the eight civilizational
realms out of which the Orthodox Christian Civilization, Islamic Civilization
and the Confucian Civilization fell in the Inner Asian region. Huntington
saw not only the possibility of ‘West versus the Rest’ in the event of any
clash among the civilizations during the post–Cold War era but also the pos-
sibility of the Heartland and Inner Crescent allying together on the basis of
civilizational clash with the Outer Crescent in general and United Kingdom,
United States, Canada and Australia in particular. To Western scholarship,
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States was the brightest example of
Huntington’s thesis.
Zbignew Brzezinski (1999) identifed (1) geopolitically active players,
(2) signifcant but inactive players, (3) geopolitical bolts and (4) the arch of
instability in the Eurasian landmass. Within Inner Asia, China was regarded
as an active geopolitical player whereas Russia was considered as a signif-
icant but inactive player. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran were considered
important geopolitical bolts because of their strategic location. The Greater
Middle East and Central Asia were recognized as the arch of instability.
Although geo-economics is comparatively a new sub-feld of geopolitics,
the discourse on geo-economics has been indirectly an indispensable dimen-
sion of geopolitical analysis and theorisation throughout the 20th century.
76 G. M. Shah
The Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder discusses the geo-economic

signifcance of the Heartland region. Similarly, Nicholas Spykman accords
very signifcant importance to the Rimland because of its vast human and
natural resources. The discourse of the New Great Game in Central Asia and
the Caspian Sea region is intrinsically about control over the hydrocarbon
resources, pipeline consortiums, transport corridors, fnancial investments
and control over the business in the region.
Contemporary Geopolitical Signifcance of Inner Asia

During the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR, Amer-
ica’s trade-driven maritime world aimed at containment and deterrence of
the former USSR-led continental world in general and the Central Eurasian
belt in particular. The American grand strategy of containing the growing
infuence of former Soviet Union in the Rimland and the oceanic world in
a blanket manner or selectively was informed by the geopolitical theories
advanced by Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman and Sual O. Cohen. However,
after the disintegration of former Soviet Union, the U.S. grand strategy in
Eurasia in general and the Inner Asia in particular has been aiming at thwart-
ing Russian resurgence, contain the growing infuence of China and defeat
militant Islam. At the time of political transformation in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) in the post-Soviet space, Huntington and Brzez-
inski presented their theories of Eurasia, which characterised Inner Asia as
a potentially dangerous geopolitical and ethnically highly volatile region.
The political instability in Afghanistan, Iran and Indian states of Punjab and
Kashmir had already started as a result of American foreign policy towards
the former Soviet Union in the Rimland, but after the dismemberment of
the communist bloc, the power vacuum in Inner Asia in the form of stabil-
ity in the region was seriously threatened by the number of conficts in the
Caucasus region, Central Asia, Xinjiang, Afghanistan and in the immediate
neighbourhood of Inner Asia. The theses of Huntington and Brzezinski made
United States highly concerned about the potential instability in Inner Asia
(Brzezinski 1999; Huntington 1996).
It is important to describe the situation in Inner Asia in this context.
According to Legvold (2003), as a result of internal problems in Inner Asia
such as economic uncertainty, disintegrating infrastructure and the poten-
tial for internal ethnic and ideological conficts and geopolitical situation of
Central Asia, the region presented a complex set of challenges and prospects
for the United States, China, Russia and the European Union. Iseri (2009)
elaborated how U.S. foreign policy makers considered the Caspian region’s
geostrategic implications for their country’s grand strategy in the 21st cen-
tury, which aimed at China and Russia. To Klare (2003), the Global War on
Terrorism was “the beginning of the New Cold War in south-central Eurasia,
with many possibilities for crises and fare-ups, because nowhere else in the
world are Russia and China directly involved and supporting groups and
regimes that are opposed to the United States”. Dugin (2007) analyses the
geopolitical role and interests of Russia, United States and China in Cen-
tral Asia in the international relations centred on Inner Asia. Cooley (2014)
prophesized that a new “Great Game” in Central Asia involving the United
States, Russia and China could be a possibility.
The main geopolitical objective of the United States is to secure Central
Asia against the growing infuence of Russia, China, Iran and militant Islam.
The Greater Central Asia project and Five Plus One (5+1) framework are a
couple of U.S. tactics to promote regional cooperation within Central Asia
and making these fve republics economically and politically strong enough
to resist the temptation of their immediate neighbours in general and Russia
and China in particular to fll the power vacuum in the region. The Central
Asian countries in general and Kazakhstan in particular have favoured the
multi-vector foreign policy to enhance their bargaining power against the
energy-hungry economies of the world, especially Eurasia. There are several
Central Asian countries that want United States as a balancer against grow-
ing Russian and Chinese infuence.
The geopolitical goals of China in Central Asia are to challenge the U.S.
interference in its Inner Asian neighbourhood. The conversion of Central
Asia as a safe transit zone to link itself with the European market is its second
important geopolitical objective. The containment of Uyghur separatism in
Xinjiang province as well as militant Islam in Central Asia and Afghanistan
through multilateral forum of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
are the main geopolitical priorities of China in Central Asia. The Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) coupled with border contiguity with Tajikistan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Kazakhstan justify the analysis of the Central Asian region as
an integral part of the “China and the Global South discourse” although the
region is not generally seen as a part of the Global South (Xiangming and
Fakhmiddin 2018).
After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Russia did not show
much interest in Central Asia during the frst half of the 1990s as Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin wanted to concentrate on internal issues. However, the
Primakov doctrine described the Central Asian region as its backyard and
near-abroad after 1995. Russia deepened its engagement with Central Asia
more seriously when Vladimir Putin became Russian President in 2000. Mul-
tilateral frameworks such as the CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Customs Union were the
instruments which Russia used to bring the Central Asian countries back in
its own fold (Cooley 2014). In this context, it is important to highlight the
assertion of geopolitical Eurasianism by Russia; its war with Georgia Ossetia
and Abkhazia in 2008; war with Ukraine in the Crimean Peninsula in 2014
78 G. M. Shah
and Luhansk and Donetsk in 2022 as well as Russian alliance with Syria
against rebels and recapture of Afghanistan by Taliban.
Assertion of Geopolitical Eurasianism by Russia

Russian foreign policy towards Inner Asia has to be understood in the con-
text of its post-Soviet self-image, geostrategic position and great power ambi-
tions, especially during the Putin era. Voytek (2012) analyses how Russia
has historically oscillated between the “Atlanticists” and “Eurasianists”,
who have traditionally dominated Russia’s foreign policy discourse. Under
Putin, Russia has shifted its diplomatic eforts away from collaboration with
the transatlantic powers who compose the West and towards the nations
and regions which are distinctively non-Western. Simultaneously, Russia has
sought to reinforce the idea of “multipolarity” in the international system
by opposing the United States and its allies on a variety of issues in an efort
to undermine what they perceive to be “unipolar” system. In response to
changing demographic realities as well as need for a more comprehensive
national identity, the Russian leadership has increasingly embraced a con-
ception of Russian statehood which traces its roots to the development of
“Eurasianism”.
The roots of “Eurasianism”, otherwise known as “geopolitical Eurasian-
ism”, can be traced back to Slavophilism of the 19th century, classical Eura-
sianism of the early 20th century and the neo-Eurasianism that appeared in
the post-Soviet period. Geopolitical Eurasianism has characterised Russian
foreign policy over the past two decades; it not only addresses the changing,
political, economic and domestic realities but also represents an intersection
between geopolitics and the creation of national “Russian” identity. Thus
both external and internal pressures have led to this shift in policy.
Eurasianism is a rather nebulous term especially within the context of Rus-
sian foreign policy. At its core, it is a political ideology based on the idea that
Russia inhabits a unique geographical place between Europe and Asia. It is,
therefore, neither Europe nor Asia. Instead it constitutes a singular political
space known as Eurasia. This idea is largely borne out of the contention that
Russia “never seemed completely European to the Europeans, and although
most of its territory was in Asia, it was never completely Asian to the Asians
(Heller 2009). Hosking (2012) sums up: “Russia is an empire, it is not a
nation-state. And it shouldn’t try to become one, because its large popula-
tion is non-Russian”. Mackinder (1904) argued that whatever political entity
controlled the Eurasian landmass, or the “great pivot”, would be destined to
be the most powerful actor in the international system. Clearly the geopoliti-
cal considerations were a common element throughout all stages of devel-
opment of Eurasianism. To Clover (1999), “Russia need not Westernise to
modernise, but in its hard-line version, the movement envisions the Eurasian
heartland as the geographic launchpad for a global anti-Western movement”.

Eurasianism thus has been used to justify Russia’s great power status.
A few examples of Russian assertion with traces of Eurasianism can be
elaborated herewith. Firstly, in the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expanded their infuence in
Eastern and Central Europe, formerly a Soviet stronghold. Vladimir Putin bit-
terly resented the loss of this bufer zone between Moscow and the West. For
its part Georgia was moving further West, even joining the United States to
fght the Iraq War in 2003. After the election of pro-Western President Mikheil
Saakashvili in 2004, as Pruitt (2018) puts, “Georgia was clearly embarked on
a process of trying to break out of Russia’s sphere of infuence. As far as Rus-
sia was concerned, this was an absolute priority. It had to maintain its sphere
of infuence, and if it left Georgia go, then who could be next”. The roots of
the Russia-Georgia confict go back to the time of Civil War within Georgia,
following the Soviet disintegration, when two Georgian provinces – South
Ossetia and Abkhazia – sought to declare their independence. The relation-
ship between Russia and Georgia became tense in late 2006 when Saakash-
vili accused Putin of supporting separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In August 2008, both Russia and Georgia went to war and Russia formally
recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Meanwhile,
Georgia turned further away from Russian infuence in the aftermath of the
confict and signed an association agreement with the EU in 2014.
Secondly, the lasting consequence of the Russia-Georgia war was wit-
nessed six years later in Ukraine, when Kremlin-backed forces seized control
of Crimea (a Ukrainian autonomous republic whose population is predomi-
nantly ethnic Russian) and parts of the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014.
The sequence of events is the following: (1) the overthrowing of Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, who fed to Russia; (2) by
early March 2014, Russian troops and pro-Russian paramilitary groups had
efectively taken control of Crimea; (3) in a popular referendum on 16 March
2014, residents of Crimea voted to join Russia; (4) on 18 March 2014, Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin stated that Crimea had always been part of
Russia and signed a treaty incorporating the Crimea peninsula into Rus-
sia; (5) on 21 March 2014, Putin signed the legislation that formalised the
Russian annexation of Crimea. Further, in April 2014, unidentifed gunmen
equipped with Russian arms seized government buildings in south-eastern
Ukraine that led to an armed confict. Putin referred to the region as Novo-
rossiya (New Russia) evoking claims from the imperial era. Even though
Russian and Ukrainian leaders met for ceasefre in Minsk, Belorussia on
5 September 2014, it didn’t stop the pro-Russian forces pushing back Ukrain-
ian government forces for several months. In February 2015, Putin met with
other world leaders at Minsk to approve a 12-Point Peace Plan to end confict
in Ukraine.
80 G. M. Shah
Thirdly, in his address before the UN General Assembly on 12 September

2015, Putin presented his vision of Russia as a world power capable of pro-
jecting its presence across the globe and painted the United States and NATO
as threats to global security. Two days later, Russia joined the Syrian Civil
War conducting wide-ranging hybrid warfare, which had shifted the balance
of power in Syria. Putin boasted of a robust expansion of Russian military
power, particularly in the feld of hypersonic weapons to make Russia great
again.
Fourthly, following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021
after the international forces left the war-torn country, Russia took immense
interest in extending its geopolitical infuence. It is important to note herewith
that Russia was an active player in the geopolitical ballgame in Afghanistan
during the Cold War, which is evident from the decade-long stay of Russian
forces in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989. Russian moves in Afghanistan
after the Taliban takeover include the following: (1) not closing its embassy
in Kabul; (2) ofering to mediate between the Taliban and the opposition;
and (3) criticizing the United States for the mess in Afghanistan in the past
two decades.
Lastly, in late 2021, Vladimir Putin ordered a massive build-up of Rus-
sian forces along the Ukrainian border besides dispatching additional units
to Belarus for joint military exercises. By February 2022 as many as 190,000
Russian troops were poised to strike into Ukraine from forward bases in Rus-
sia and Crimea and the Russian-backed enclave in Moldova. On 21 February
2022, Putin recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and three
days later, on 24 February 2022, Putin began a special military operation
(Ray 2022), which is continuing till date.
Contemporary Geo-Economic Signifcance of Inner Asia

During the Cold War era, Moscow tapped hydrocarbon, mineral and agricul-
tural resources of Central Asia without any interference of the outside world.
The oil and gas pipelines, railway lines and roads connected Central Asia,
Caucasus and Siberian regions with the European part of the Soviet Union.
Thus the Soviet Union continued its monopoly on the geo-economics of Inner
Asia. However, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the
Central Asian and Caspian regions opened up for the outside world. The
processes of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation enhanced the eco-
nomic integration of Inner Asia with rest of the world. In the initial period,
there was much hype about the hydrocarbon reserves of the Central Asian
and Caspian regions prompting the energy-hungry economies, multinational
companies, fnancial institutions and major powers to show immense inter-
est in the geo-economics of Inner Asia in general and the Central Asian and
Caspian region in particular.
Central Asia accounts for about 4 per cent of the global energy deposits.
The oil reserves in Central Asia and along the Caspian Sea coast amount to
17 to 33 billion barrels of oil per day. Kazakhstan’s total proven reserves
constitute 37 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic metres of natural gas
making the country one of the major oil producers. Kazakhstan’s natural gas
reserves are around 8.6 trillion cubic metres. Turkmenistan has proven natu-
ral gas reserves of 265 trillion cubic feet. Uzbekistan has 65 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas reserves, the fourth highest in the Eurasian region and 19th in
the world. (Xiangming and Fakhmiddin 2018).
The geo-economic interests of American companies in Central Asia and
the Caspian region have been to exploit the energy resources and export the
hydrocarbon resources westward through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline to avoid the Russian and Iranian monopoly over the regional energy
resources. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline
has U.S. backing to make Turkmen gas available for its South Asian allies.
Similarly, the CASA-1000 hydropower transmission line to export the Kyr-
gyz and Tajik hydropower to Afghanistan and Pakistan enjoys the American
support. The Greater Central Asia project and New Silk Road project of the
United States announced in 2005 and 2011 respectively are American visions
to enhance regional economic cooperation between South Asia and Central
Asia to create conditions for political stability and economic development
in Afghanistan within the larger inter-regional security and development
framework.
The Inner Asian region has been geo-economically very much signifcant
for Russia right from the 19th century. The Russian and Soviet dependence
on Central Asia for cotton, petroleum, natural gas, coal, uranium, minerals
and Kazakh wheat has been a permanent feature of trade between the two
regions. Historically, the oil and gas pipelines, railway lines, highways and
other communication lines of Central Asia have been aligned towards the
northwest running through central Russia to Moscow and other important
urban and industrial centres of former Soviet Union. The diversifcation of
energy markets and trade partners of Central Asia during the post-Soviet
period has minimised the geo-economic signifcance of Central Asia for Rus-
sia. Moscow has tried to prevent the Central Asian governments from signing
pipeline deals that moved gas or oil without going through Russia (Denoon
2015). The dependence on the Central Asian region has reduced over the past
three decades. However, in the defence production sector, hydropower gen-
eration and energy trade, Russian companies are quite visible in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Labour migration from Central Asia to Russia,
especially from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, is quite large. It has
been estimated by the foreign ministry of Russia that around 5 million Cen-
tral Asian labour migrants stay and work in Russia at any point of time. Rus-
sia transfers 2 per cent of its GDP to Central Asia in the form of remittances
82 G. M. Shah
of the labour migrants. Almost half of the GDP of Tajikistan is constituted

by the remittances from the migrant workers who mostly work in Russia and
Kazakhstan.
The geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia for China can be hardly over-
emphasized because the country is importing annually about 60 billion cubic
metres of natural gas from Central Asia. Upon completion, Line D of the
Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline will have an annual delivery capacity of
85 billion cubic metres, the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan’s crude oil export to China is around 20 million tons of annually
(Xiangming and Fakhmiddin 2018). Apart from energy exports, the Central
Asian region is an important trade partner of China. The total trade turnover
is 60 billion dollars annually. China is a huge investor in energy expansion
and infrastructure development in Central Asia. In January 2011, Chinese
General Liu Yazhou said, “Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to
modern China by the heavens” (Pannier 2020). The Chinese BRI has been
a gigantic infrastructure development project to link China through Cen-
tral Asia with Europe. The development of Khorgos dry port on Kazakh-
stan-Xinjiang border is emerging as an important international trade centre
within Inner Asia. Central Asia is becoming an important destination for
the Chinese migrant workers working in agriculture, energy exploration and
infrastructure development sectors in Central Asia. The “Look West” policy
of China aims at developing the less developed western and south-western
provinces of China. The regional economic cooperation between China and
Central Asia is very important to realize this objective.
However, Chinese geo-economic interests face the greatest hurdle in the
form of protests and dissension among the local people against Chinese
excesses. For example, in Kazakhstan, local people protested Chinese activi-
ties in April and May 2016 and further in October 2019. Similarly, in August
2019 a group of several hundred residents of Kyrgyzstan’s northern Naryn
Province attacked Chinese workers from the Zong Ji Mining Company.
Anti-Chinese sentiment is further stocked in Central Asia by Beijing’s policies
towards Muslims in China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), which has been especially noticeable in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan. A Chinese military facility in the remote high mountains of far east-
ern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese and Afghan borders, too has created
anger among the Central Asians. Chinese use of technologies in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan for facial recognition through respective blacklisted Chinese
companies such as Hikvision and the China National Electronics Import and
Export Corporation have sparked resentment among the people of the region
against China (Pannier 2020).
Further, the economic situation in Central Asia in the past couple of years
has been critical because of economic contraction in almost all the republics.
Growth has remained sluggish despite a resumption of domestic economic
activity, as seen in the gradual increase in transit and workplace mobility

since governments began relaxing a number of lockdown restrictions around
July 2020 following the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides, countries such as
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which are highly dependent on remit-
tances of labour migrants from Russia and some other countries, have been
seriously afected. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, where remittances amount
to almost one-third of GDP, infows fell by 62 per cent in April 2020 at the
height of frst lockdown in Russia. The estimated 500,000 migrants from
Tajikistan in Russia in 2019 generated remittance infows equivalent to
one-third of the GDP of the country. The signifcant collapse in remittances
was 50 per cent in March 2020, which made the poverty situation more
precarious. Of the 2.4 million people in Europe and Central Asia that the
World Bank estimated will be pushed to poverty in 2020, about 58 per cent –
some 1.4 million – live in Central Asia. There was a negative impact on the
employment rate in Central Asia because of the COVID-19. For example,
the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan increased from 9.4 per cent to 15 per
cent between the frst two quarters of 2020 (OECD 2020). Falling exports in
the frst half of 2020, for example, in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan by 22 per
cent and 13 per cent respectively, along with the consequences of COVID-19
compounded due to falling global oil prices (State Statistical Committee of
Uzbekistan 2020; Qaz Trade 2020).
Conclusion
The Inner Asian region is defned as the central portion of Asia having inland
drainage and landlocked nature as opposed to peripheral Asia connected to
the Arctic, Pacifc and Indian Oceans. The Inner Asian region has geostrategic
location in the Central Eurasia, because of which it has been considered as
the geographical pivot. The Inner Asian region constituted the middle section
of the historical Silk Route connecting the Chinese seacoast in the east with
the Mediterranean seacoast in the West. The strategic location of the Inner
Asian region in general and the Central Asian Heartland in particular has
ofered both challenges and prospects for security and development to the
countries of the region. Inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation is the
way forward to avoid confrontation of geopolitical rivals and make use of
the international inter-dependencies for sustainable peace and security in the
region. The Inner Asian region has remained a theatre of geopolitics between
the United States and Russian Federation and the Russian confict with both
Georgia and Ukraine has been provoked by the eforts of United States to
expand NATO membership in Central and Eastern Europe following the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Similarly, the growing economic
presence of China in Central Asia has flled the people in the region with
suspicion about the eastern neighbour to push its western border further,
84 G. M. Shah
which has given birth to anti-Chinese protests in Central Asia, especially

in the republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The COVID-19 pandemic
has negatively impacted the economy of Central Asia during the year 2020
although the hydrocarbon-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have not suf-
fered as much as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because of their dependence on
remittances from the labour migrants from Russia. The decline in remittances
has impacted to some extent Uzbekistan as well but its gold production and
agricultural sector has helped it maintain positive growth in industrial and
service sectors.
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7
THE REGION AND IDEATIONAL
SECURITY
The Geopolitical Belonging of Central
Asia in Inner Asia
Selbi Hanova
Introduction
Recalling the centuries-old close civilizational, cultural, trade and people-to-
people linkages between India and Central Asian countries, the Leaders looked
forward to building a long term, comprehensive, and enduring India-Central
Asia partnership based on mutual trust, understanding and friendship.
Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit,
27 January 2022
The epigraph is from the Delhi Declaration of the frst India-Central Asia
Summit in 2022, a meeting where political elites of India met with their coun-
terparts from fve post-Soviet states of Central Asia. The quote is symbolic
of the general declarative language that multi-lateral fora is known for in
the region. This quote also represents a dominant theme in the academic
literature between Delhi and fve country capitals, that of historical linkages,
shared culture and the not-so-distant past of Indo-Soviet cooperation. This
quote calls for more questions: how do India and Central Asia look at each
other? What storylines do they have towards each other? And how do these
storylines afect cooperation between India and fve post-Soviet states.
Linking the overall theme of connectivity, this piece is ofered as a food-
for-thought for the researchers of regionalism in post-Soviet Central Asia and
those in South Asia who study inter-state and specifcally inter-regional con-
nections. It looks at how states in the Central Asia region so diverse as those
in Inner Asia and South Asia with varying political legacies in the 20th century
defne themselves and identify geographically, geopolitically and culturally.
This chapter seeks to invite experts and policy makers to delve into the ideas
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-9
Region and Ideational Security 87
that surface in the regionalism and inter-state cooperation in post-Soviet Cen-

tral Asia comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Infuenced by the ideas expressed by Amitav Acharya (2011), as
he seeks to uncover the norm acceptance in the Asian regionalism, this piece
aims to argue for the need to study local voices in regionalist dynamic of
post-Soviet Central Asia and it attempts to bring out the right theoretical and
methodological lens to unpack the “geopolitical belonging” of Central Asia
within Inner Asia and in its relations with South Asia.
What requires to be researched and uncovered is how Central Asian states’
elites fnd themselves in relation to the “the development of geopolitical sto-
rylines, internal tensions and incoherencies in geopolitical scripts, and the ways
in which the foreign policy process defnes ‘problems and ‘solutions’” (Tuathail
2002). Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) writes, “I can only answer the question
‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘of what story or stories
do I fnd myself a part?’” In that regard, does post-Soviet Central Asia belong to
Inner Asia, elsewhere in Asia or does it aspire to put itself outside of the Asian
continent in its ideational self-representation? The responses of the local state
elites to this question depend on how they view and describe the geographi-
cal space and their belonging there. The gist of this chapter is an invitation
to unveil the ideational layer of regionalism to ofer more nuanced and thick
explanations to the geopolitical understanding of region of Central Asia and its
place in the map of the neighbouring South Asia and Inner Asia. Such a discus-
sion is aimed at furthering the already existing Neorealist explanations with an
attempt to capture the ways in which all these material concepts are understood
and employed by state ofcials speaking on behalf of the states they represent,
through their respective foreign policies towards the region and the rest of Asia.
Moving to a more constructivist understanding of it as a process that is con-
stantly re-created and formalized, we are equipped with an additional tool that
is not always easily measurable in material terms, but that is equally useful to
measure qualitatively, and that could, conceivably, ofer more insights into the
“unquantifable” dimensions of the analysis. That is, what stories we tell each
other about ourselves infuences our motivations and actions.
To attempt to answer these questions, the chapter is divided into three parts,
including the Theory Section that seeks to derive the right theoretical lens to
look at the region; the Case Study Section follows and, fnally, the Conclusion,
which attempts to draw parallels and understand the contribution that Central
Asia brings as a case in Asian Studies from the ideational perspective.
Theories: What Frames to Take to Analyse Regional Identity

and Perceptions of Belonging?
While states are socialized by the international system and while norms,
decision and rules form part of the “institutional context in which regional
88 Selbi Hanova
politicians operate, infuencing their professional socialization as well as their

opportunity structure” (Stoltz 2001); there are also other ideational factors
that require analysis. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch
(2002), while looking at Iran and Syria as “middle powers” in the regional
system, argue that foreign policy goals cannot be fully grasped without look-
ing at the conceptions of roles, shaped by history and geography. They argue
that the regimes that were conceived in the movements against Western pen-
etration tend to “retain some aspiration to ‘organize the regional system’
against this penetration” by seeking the status of region’s middle powers,
and their foreign policies are then directed “to balance external powers and
their regional proxies, and to create regional spheres of infuence as bufers
against external penetration” (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 2002). The ontol-
ogies and worldviews in Central Asia do not contain the element against
penetration of foreign powers into the region, as they do not see the region
as an important common value that requires preservation. In this regard, the
region-construction or region-building requires
changes in structures of meaning, that is the development and redefnition

of political ideas, common visions and purposes codes of meaning, casual
beliefs, and world views that give direction and meaning to capabilities
and capacities – in efect, the narrative-based production of spaces for
state regulation.
(Jones 2006)
The alliances/bilateral cooperation frameworks that the states create, or

become members of, tell us what narratives these states convey about them-
selves and what identities they represent there. For instance, International
Fund for Saving the Aral Sea was established in 1993 in Nukus, Uzbekistan,
to develop and fnd environmental, scientifc and practical projects and pro-
grammes aimed at environmental rehabilitation of areas afected by the Aral
Sea disaster, as well as to address socio-economic problems of the region.
Later, in 1997, the initiative merged with the Interstate Council for the Aral
Sea, and a rotating 2-year presidency among fve of the states was estab-
lished. All fve states joined the initiative showcasing that the shrinking Aral
Sea is a common threat to the entire region and bringing forth the idea of
environmental security, which was quite novel at a time but is a common
speak currently. Display of this concept of environmental security put these
states at the progressive lead in the 1990s.
What are other ideas that we associate with regional ideas in Central Asia?
The non-interference in the internal afairs of a state, emphasis on sover-
eignty and, subsequently, the protection of borders and securitization of the
discourses of the common global security threats of terrorism and fundamen-
talism are a few defning characteristics of Central Asian security perceptions
in general. An example of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

is perhaps most telling as it was often mentioned as a “league of dictators”
(Kagan 2006). The SCO and CSTO, the former with its proclaimed fght
against three evils of extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism, the latter
through its Russian hegemonic discourse, have been in the spotlight of aca-
demics. Both focus on their respective reading of non-interference. While
putting the principle of non-interference at the heart of the SCO’s geopo-
litical identity applies certain limitations on its ability to serve as an active
regional security actor”, the CSTO’s principle of non-interference, in view of
the war in Ukraine, acts as “a reaction against international condemnation
and punishment for their domestic policies aimed at regime security” (Aris
and Snetkov 2013).
Finding the most appropriate theories to approach the ideational layer of
regionalism and the embedded-ness of the concept of “Central Asian region”
among the elite of these states is a challenge. In that regard it is important to
look at the concept of “regionness” of Central Asia, which is “the process
whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active
subject, capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging
region” (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000). Regionness denotes the constructed
nature of regions, and it calls for thicker and deeper explanations that are
beyond the classical defnition of a region as a group of states that share geo-
graphic proximity and economic and infrastructural interdependence. The
process of Central Asia becoming a region is important in this discussion;
moreover the region must be viewed not as an actor that interacts with other
region-actors, but rather as one that opts for “looking at the actors, practices
and processes of social and political interaction that defne the region not as
a unitary actor but as “spaces or arenas for action’” (Riggirozzi 2012), where
narratives are showcased and enacted.
Having established the frame where region is an arena for dialogue of
narratives, it is important to look at the specifc behavioural actions that
these states engage in their symbolic meanings. Since being a state and acting
as a state is important, sovereignty becomes central vis-à-vis the region and
the interactions within it. Illustratively, analysing regional cooperation and
regionalism projects in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley writes that the mem-
bership of Central Asian countries in these projects provides them with jurid-
ical sovereignty through the mutual recognition of their respective authorities
and “a steady diet of regional summits and cooperative initiatives also allow
these leaders to regularly emphasize their foreign policy profles and agendas
to a domestic audience and captive media” (Cooley 2012). The author argues
that though the international community maintains the mantra of the need
for regional cooperation in Central Asia, “the preservation of national bor-
ders, as it turns out, is a key part of the region’s local rules” (Cooley 2012).
While sovereignty and physical expression of it through borders is important
90 Selbi Hanova
for Central Asian elites, there are also key factors of creating storylines that
infuence their stances on regional cooperation.
Ted Hopf (1998) argues that where interests are absent, and we are faced
with varying degrees of interests in inter-state cooperation in Central Asia,
one should look at the social practices and structure, since “the social prac-
tices that constitute an identity cannot imply interests that are not consistent
with the practices and structures that constitute that identity”. The practice
of virtual regionalism as “a form of collective political solidarity with Russia
against international political processes or agendas that are interpreted as
challenging politically incumbent regimes and their leaders” (Allison 2008)
hints at the absence of clearly defned mutual interest in creating a Central
Asian union if we discuss integration. On the interests derived from identi-
ties, Hopf (1998) writes that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was consistent
with multiple U.S. identities, “great power, imperialist, enemy, ally, and so
on”, and consequently “durable expectations between states require inter-
subjective identities that are sufciently stable to ensure predictable patterns
of behavior”. The question here is, then, what lies in the self-articulation pro-
cesses of these state identities in the region that provokes virtual regionalism
and the repeated rhetorical spells of cooperation. Cooley’s argument about
mutual recognition through regional fora is essential; however, we need to
look deeper into the narratives by states about the region.
Comparatively, if we look at other regions, Kuniko Ashizawa (2008) traces
the role of Japan’s self-recognition and self-narrative in regional policies and
how a relatively inactive regional policy based on bilateral ties changed to a
more self-assertive stance of Japan in creating APEC and ARF. The author’s
fnding points to a conception of Japan as “the sole member of the West in
Asia” and as “a one-time aggressor in the region” that changed the percep-
tion of the role of the state in the region. Ashizawa (2013) writes:
In the process of conceptualizing a regional order, the concept of Japanese

state identity as perceived by foreign policymakers – a “dual member of
Asia and the West” (in both the APEC and the ARF cases) and a “past
aggressor in Asia” (in the ARF case) – manifested prominently in their
thinking.
The author analyses the change of perceptions based on the refections on

the part of Japanese foreign policy makers about the tiers foreign policy in
the early 1990s. The reasons for these tiers evolved from the refections on
self-recognition after the end of the Cold War keeping the bilateral U.S.-
Japan relationship as one of the tiers and categorizing the relations with
other states in other relevant tiers to maintain the opportunity for all possi-
ble arrangements open. Is there a Central Asian parallel? In fact, the Central
Asian regional cooperation is tiered as well. It has the following analogous
tiers: Russian (CIS, CSTO) and Chinese-Russian (SCO) and Western (OSCE,
NATO Partnership for Peace programme) and a tier through UN agencies
and projects as well as a separate tier with bilateral agreements of states with
the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, Japan, Afghanistan and Iran. South
Asia is not in the immediate frst tier.
What theoretical conclusions do we draw from this discussion of vari-
ous concepts? First, we distinguish that there is no ready-made theory to
understand the complexity of the relations between the state elites’ storylines
on regionalism and what constitutes a region in terms of ideas and narra-
tives. In fact, this strand of theory on studying regional identity is yet to be
elaborated and enhanced. Second, we recognize that a Constructivist study
of the concept of identity might prove useful in this discussion, albeit the dif-
fculties associated with assigning an identity to a corporate structure like a
state, looking deeper into regional identity and then drawing analysis into the
region. Biographical storylines produced by state elites to socialize their state
within the international system is a conglomerate of a myriad of ideas stem-
ming from value systems infuenced by history, culture and linguistics utilized
for certain interests. Third, if we adopt the concept of regional identity, we
arrive at a frame where we could start deciphering the complex processes
within the regionalism and non-physical security of the region. The next sec-
tion will guide us through some case studies.
Central Asia and India: Storylines Beyond Great Games

and History and Culture
The epigraph of this chapter is from the Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-
Central Asia Summit that mentions cultural, trade and people-to-people
linkages, thus epitomizing the dominant storyline between Central Asia and
India, tying it to the overall narrative about Silk Routes. The Kushan, Mughal
and other historical references are often voiced in the dialogues between the
states and India at various diplomatic fora. Certainly, the storylines are cre-
ated on both ends: in the post-Soviet Central Asia about India and South
Asia at large and in India towards the fve Central Asian states. A proper
feld research is required to understand the narratives of Central Asians in
each state and their respective political elites in India to be able to weave
out those storylines beyond viewing India as an ally of USSR and a coun-
try of Bollywood-like lifestyles. There are clearly two distinct storylines as
seen from Delhi: that of a distant region which is culturally and historically
similar and that of a region of a new Great Game that is being taken over by
Chinese investments, projects and infuence.
On culture and history, for example, the Delhi Declaration mentions
the role of Indian Cultural Centers and within the same paragraph a pos-
sibility of commissioning a “Dictionary of Common words used in India
92 Selbi Hanova
and Central Asian countries” and showcasing of a Buddhist exhibition in

the Central Asian countries. This view has been dominant since 1991 and
as Frederick Starr writes in the introduction to Nirmala Joshi’s edited book
on Central Asia and India, “it is true that India was a rapidly rising power,
but Central Asian leaders felt no compelling need to include it in their geo-
political or economic calculus. The Indians returned the compliment” (Joshi
2010). The narrative only started to change around the military operations
in Afghanistan and has become more prominent since 2009 when the then
President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev was invited to National Day
celebrations in New Delhi. Since then, we witness visits and prominence of
India in Central Asian afairs and a new calibrating of views between the fve
states and India.
A new Great Game between Beijing and New Delhi is another storyline
present among Indian scholars looking from the outside. In this view the
“One Belt One Road” initiative of China is tying the region into the large
infrastructural project in addition to Chinese investments in on-going hydro-
carbon, construction and transport sectors. India’s “One Earth One Health”
is another concept that emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic giving way
to “One Earth, One Family, One Future” thus signalling the global inter-
linkages. For Central Asian political elites trained in slogans from the Soviet
period, these symbolic one liners attract attention and signal the motiva-
tions of states promoting them. Already in 2010 in China and India in Cen-
tral Asia: A New “Great Game” Marlene Laruelle, Jean-Francois Huchet,
Sebastien Peyrouse and Bayram Balci look at Beijing and New Delhi and
their own internal worldviews, perceptions, motivations suggesting balanc-
ing tactics vis-à-vis Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
What about local voices of belonging? Where do populations and top
elites in these countries see themselves in the cultural and social geography?
The over-reliance on geopolitical analysis that has dominated the local and
largely external academic research since 1991 had overlooked these local
narratives and voices in practically all thematic spheres. Academic and pol-
icy circles often portrayed this part of post-Soviet space as a subject of the
power play or an experimental case for EU-like functionalist projects. In this
regard, the eforts of development agencies to foster cooperation were often
associated with modernization rhetoric. Erik Ringmar (1996) brings forth
an example of the so-called Third World, especially in Islamic countries,
where a rhetorical battle is going on between modernizing “nation build-
ers” and fundamentalist groups. This approach has been adopted in the way
that various development assistance agencies ask for progress in reforms and
democratization and induce intra-regional cooperation. For instance, the
EU’s Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) goals involve intra- and
inter-regional cooperation between the border agencies of the Central Asian
states, which includes cooperation of law enforcement agencies present at the
borders between each other internally within a state and externally with their
counterparts in the neighbouring states, thus paving the way to the accelera-
tion of EU-like “free movement of goods and people”. This would require
the opening of the borders to the neighbours for the states, whose ontologies
and worldviews are not socialized to view the signifcance of the neighbour-
hood or the apparent need to cooperate with the neighbour. As an exam-
ple, Kyrgyzstan is faced with its storylines to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and
Kazakhstan, having been drawn into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
by Russia and Kazakhstan and simultaneously seeking aid and donor invest-
ment outside of the region.
Conclusion: Common Denominators and Parallels

The reason to present these ideas in India in 2019 in a conference dedi-
cated to Inner Asia was to understand what Central Asia after almost three
decades of the fall of USSR has in common with the rest of “Inner Asia”
and India (as the term used in the title of this conference) and what pos-
sible lessons and parallels one could draw from the experiences in this spe-
cifc part of Asia, which had been undergoing waves of regionalism during
de-colonization and the Cold War. While it is apparent that geographically
Inner Asia experienced the presence of non-regional states in the entirety
of the 20th century till the present, the need to study local views on the
matter is crucial. Acharya (2007) writes that “local responses to power
may matter even more in the construction of regional orders. How regions
resist and/or socialize powers is at least as important a part of the story
as how powers create and manage regions”. This chapter ofers an idea-
tional framework to analyse the region and its belonging is aiming to invite
scholars to explore this venue to fnd a more nuanced understanding of
the issues and re-introduce Central Asia to South Asia ideationally and
socio-culturally.
In one of his online interviews in 2007, an Indian essayist and novelist Pan-
kaj Mishra said: “if you belong to a small country that is geopolitically not
that important, or strategically not that important, you have no place among
nations. Those countries are neglected and left to fend for themselves”; pro-
viding an example of Nepal, the author said that it only appears if there is a
regicide or a murder of a member of the royal family (Fay 2007). Similarly,
Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan seldom features in the mainstream global news
unless there is an ethnic confict or an alleged coup d’état or some eccentrici-
ties of the political rule are showcased. Globally, the fve post-Soviet states
of Central Asia are in the periphery of world politics. In and of itself, this
geographic placement plays out in the domain of political imagination mak-
ing the political elite of these states constantly re-defne the mission and the
role of the states they represent.
94 Selbi Hanova
The regionalization in Central Asia entails production of a new geographi-

cal and political space with relevant norms, ideas and values, in addition to
the geographic proximity, common languages and common historical and
cultural reference points. Michael Keating (2003) notes that regional norms
form a “system of action to frame issues and proposals” in the “space recog-
nized by actors”, where they agree on decisions that they fnd legitimate for
this system and space. The recognition of Central Asia as a space for action
requires it being inter-woven within the narrative of the regional self-artic-
ulation in the bigger geographical space. Europeanization, which includes a
multi-dimensional “difusion of distinctive forms of political organization
and governance, and the promotion of European ‘solutions’ outside of EU
territorial space” to motivate “change in the rational and structures of State
action”, (Jones 2006), has been exercised through the United States and
EU as well as the UN, ADB and World Bank projects. However, how does
Asianization manifest itself? And in that regard, which Asianization route
does Central Asia take?
The reality of the absence of one organization where all fve post-Soviet
states cooperate shows that “international region building is characteristi-
cally messy, problematic, and deeply contested” (Jones 2006). Cooperation
in the region of Central Asia is cooperation between the representatives and
the representations of the region in the form of their identities. The specifc
character of the inter-state cooperation in this region is that of the closed bor-
ders and the emphasis on sovereignty, where cooperation discussion is car-
ried out formally through the means of diplomatic meetings and, therefore,
the formal meetings of the representatives of the state where “each speech is
an identity-building project, with the resulting text serving as an instantiation
of the Ministry itself” (Neumann 2007). Illustratively, Kyrgyzstan looks at
the region pragmatically as an area of vulnerabilities, and therefore it self-
articulates as a state in need of international assistance to help it sustain its
unique status in an otherwise unpredictable region. At the same time, the
internal instability of a “small” and relatively “free” state presents challenges
to the formation of a coherent state-articulated message to the domestic and
foreign audiences. In addition, the actual reality of being physically depend-
ent on the energy resources of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the under-
standing of its geographical location between Russia and China forces the
state to maintain the neighbourhood in its storylines.
Muratbek Imanaliev and Valentin Bogatyrev say that when it comes to
the understanding of the region, “Central Asia started and ended in Mos-
cow” (Imanaliev and Bogatyrev 2016). However, the fve states continue to
be grouped together as one region within a bigger Asian continent. Is it semi-
Asian? How does it place itself in Inner Asia and vis-à-vis South Asia? As
the discussion shows, the ideational domain of Central Asian cooperation
requires further research in terms of testing the existing theories of regional
identity building with post-Soviet experience of the fve states, thus enlarging
the empirical dimension with necessary methodologies and fnding the suit-
able methods of inquiry. The venture into the ideational realm of political
imaginations between storylines of Central Asia and India would provide
insightful analysis for both researchers and practitioners to uncover the con-
ceptions of the worldviews and the socialization of the ideas. The attempt is
a challenging qualitative endeavour; however, it would expose an additional
layer of regional fabric of post-Soviet Central Asia and its relations with
South Asia and specifcally India. This discussion, although theoretical, is
aimed at highlighting and signposting those ideas and invites all those inter-
ested in regionalism and regionalization of Central Asia in wider Asia to take
note of these abstract notions and ideas that, nevertheless, play a crucial role
in imagining the state, the region and the world and in turn looking at how
this analysis aids the existing Realist and Geopolitical research.
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8
REGIONAL COOPERATION AND
SUSTAINABLE STABILITY IN
CENTRAL ASIA
Ajay K. Patnaik
Introduction
Regional cooperation refers to mechanisms that countries in a geographi-
cal region create to promote common interests through mutual understand-
ing. Regional cooperation is more efective when bilateral relations between
states in a region are quite good. From this perspective, the prospect of deep-
ening regional cooperation in Central Asia is much better today due to the
improved bilateral relations in the last few years, between Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan for example. Within a short span of time, countries that had dif-
culty with or practically no relations are coming closer. Borders are becoming
open and movement of people has become relatively easier. There are also
greater prospects of connectivity projects succeeding which would be helpful
in economic progress as well as regional stability. As regional cooperation
increases between the Central Asian Republics (CARs), the space for geo-
political competition will shrink though not become totally absent. Instead,
external powers would seek engagement through economic and connectiv-
ity strategies. This chapter looks at the trends of regional cooperation in
the region and how it is moving forward in last few years. It also discusses
how this cooperation could bring about stability in the broader Central Asia-
Afghanistan region.
The Central Asian Region and Its Problems

The regional coherence of the Soviet period diminished with its disintegra-
tion. With the creation of new independent CARs, boundaries became rigid,
thereby putting restrictions on free movement of people and goods. Relations
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-10
98 Ajay K. Patnaik
between ethnic groups deteriorated, resulting at times in inter-ethnic riots.

Ties between states became tense as Soviet-drawn borders were disputed. The
issue of river water sharing had the potential of creating confict between the
CARs. Economic blockades were witnessed, as were sealing and even mining
of borders from time to time. Stoppage of energy supplies and building of
large dams that divide countries into opposing camps aggravated the already
deteriorating relations in some countries (Patnaik 2016).
This author (2016) had underlined that today one talks of the region either
in terms of cultural commonalities or as a geopolitical or security entity.
This is in contrast to the Soviet period when Central Asia functioned as an
integrated economic region. There were some eforts to integrate the region
in the post-Soviet period, but without success. Even the latest attempt to
economically integrate the region is led by Russia through the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, which has Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as members.
Uzbekistan from time to time closed its border with Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan, reduced legal crossing points and introduced visas for the citizens of
those two countries. Tashkent followed an energy policy that was detrimen-
tal to the interests of its neighbours. It reduced hydropower imports from
Tajikistan, due to which the latter could not sell its surplus power to Uzbeki-
stan. Given the unreliability of Uzbekistan’s gas supplies in winter, Tajikistan
resumed construction of the Rogun Dam, which Uzbekistan opposed fearing
that this dam would reduce water supply downstream (Olcott 2010).
The division within the region afected intra-regional trade and politi-
cal relations. Trade between neighbours has been quite low, while that with
Russia and China is quite high. Over the years trade within the region has
declined drastically, while with the outside world it has been increasing. Fur-
ther, inter-ethnic confict in one state afects political and economic relations
with a neighbouring state. For example, after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots in south
Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the volume of trade between the two declined (National
Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan 2012). Even sometimes states sought to
settle these disputes by putting economic pressure on the neighbours by (1)
closing the borders, (2) putting visa restrictions to prevent trans-boundary
movement, and (3) cutting of energy supplies.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that various attempts at
regional integration by the CARS have not succeeded. The evolution of the
integration projects in Central Asia ranged from Central Asian Union (CAU),
Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and Central Asian Cooperation
Organization (CACO) to the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC)
that was formed in 2001 with members from outside the region as well. The
Eurasian Economic Union, formed in 2015, has only Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan from Central Asia as members, besides Russia, Belarus and Armenia.
In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan set up the CAU. After
Tajikistan joined it in 1998, the grouping was renamed as CAEC. However,
Regional Cooperation and Sustainable Stability in Central Asia 99
each efort to revive the organization has not been followed up by policies
that promote cooperation. These four countries had created CACO in 2002.
After failing to establish a common market of the member states, the CACO
in 2005 was merged with the EURASEC led by Russia (Patnaik 2016).
Uzbekistan, which joined EURASEC in 2005, left the organization in 2008.
Since then it has been a member of only one major multilateral regional
organisation – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The situation, however, changed dramatically after Uzbek President Islam
Karimov’s death. Shavkat Mirziyoyev became the new President, who took
Uzbekistan along a new road to renew engagement with neighbours on a
cooperative basis. With his initiative the meeting of the Heads of States of
Central Asia was held in March 2018 at Astana (Kazakhstan). The unfolding
of events since then has aroused hopes of stronger regional cooperation in
Central Asia. This summit was followed by other summits in 2019 (Tash-
kent), 2021 (Avaza, Turkmenistan) and 2022 (Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan).
The need for regional cooperation is not limited to trade, economy, energy
and water issues only. Health and environment management have become
major challenges. In a post-COVID-19-pandemic world, eforts towards global
and regional cooperation can save the population from further sufering. The
COVID-19 pandemic underlined the need for regional cooperation. Yet all the
CARs did not have similar approaches. Turkmenistan and to some extent Tajik-
istan were in denial about pandemic spread. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
were proactive in their responses to the pandemic, Uzbekistan was taking the ini-
tiative with proactive undertakings, such as partnering with Slovakian factories
to manufacture ventilators and other respiratory devices for Uzbeks and neigh-
bouring countries, including Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmeni-
stan. To Clement (2020), Uzbekistan is fnding its footing as “regional leader”.
SCO members India, Russia and China, who developed their own vac-
cines, are in a position to help other member countries as well as the rest of
the world. In December 2020, Uzbekistan made a deal to purchase 70 mil-
lion doses of Sputnik V vaccine from Russian company Gamaleya to cover
the entire Uzbek population in a two-dosage vaccination. Earlier, Uzbekistan
had tried Chinese vaccines in the country (Hashimova 2020). SCO’s Special
Working Group on Healthcare (SCO WHO) is selecting projects to set up a
structure within the SCO framework similar to the World Health Organisa-
tion, which would work in the interests of improving medical services among
SCO member states, developing disease-prevention capabilities and satisfying
the needs of the population in high-tech medical treatments (Neapole 2020).
Positive Developments in Bilateral Relations

Conficts over borders often sour bilateral relations between countries. At
the same time, a resolution of border issues could lead to greater cooperation
100 Ajay K. Patnaik
between states. The best example is the SCO, which emerged out of Shanghai
Five to settle border issues between China and four CARs. Later, SCO mem-
bers expanded their cooperation in combating terrorism, drugs and arms and
human trafcking.
The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is an important institution
of the SCO. Under RATS coordination, 20 terrorist attacks were prevented
between 2011 and 2015, besides averting 650 crimes of terrorist and extrem-
ist nature and neutralizing 440 terrorist training camps and 1,700 interna-
tional terrorists. More than 2,700 members of illicit armed groups and their
accomplices were arrested, while 213 people associated with terrorist or
extremist organizations were extradited (Alimov 2017).
Within Central Asia, a widening of cooperation among states is visible
today. Kazakhstan’s relations with other CARS have been mostly tension free
despite contentious issues like water release by the upstream countries and
border problems. Kazakhstan’s borders with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
had been settled in 2001 and the border with Kyrgyzstan was demarcated
with the signing of a treaty on 25 December 2017.
However, Uzbekistan has diferences over border demarcation with most
of its neighbours. Though Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed a Treaty in
2001 to respect the Soviet-drawn border, its relations with two other coun-
tries, which also share the Fergana Valley, are more complicated. These
three – Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have never really come
to terms with the Soviet-created borders and from time to time tensions
along the borders have resulted in periodic closure and even laying of land
mines on the borders. Relations, however, moved in a positive direction after
Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed presidency. For example, the disputed border
of 324 kilometres out of total 1,378 kilometres between Uzbekistan and Kyr-
gyzstan was unresolved till 2016. The presidents of both countries signed an
agreement in 2017 demarcating 1,170 kilometres of the border, which left
only about 208 kilometres to be demarcated (Toktogulov 2017). The Uzbek-
Tajik border, which had been more or less settled to the tune of 96 per cent
(only 93 kilometres out of 1,332 kilometres remain disputed) by a Treaty
on 5 August 2008, however, remained one of the most rigid and confict
prone in the region. Movement of people and goods had remained practi-
cally absent until then. Tension along the border prevailed from time to time,
which impacted relations in other spheres as well. There were exchanges of
gunfre, for instance, on the Bekabad-Khujand border in November 2011
after a series of accusations and counter accusations post September 2011
(Akhmedov 2012).
With improvement in relations, the Tajik government formed a new
Commission on the border issue with Uzbekistan in late November 2017.
The then head of State Committee for Land Management and Geodesy1
Rajabboy Ahmadzoda expressed hope that the dispute over the remaining
border areas would be resolved soon (Aliyeva 2018). Several factors had
afected inter-state relations since the early 1990s, which included border
issues, claims of Tajiks over historical cities of Samarkand and Bukhara and
the construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Station (HPS) in Tajikistan
that could afect water fow downstream to Uzbekistan. This resulted in
(1) a substantial drop in Uzbek-Tajik mutual trade, (2) scrapping of fights
between their capitals and (3) blocking of Tajik railway cargoes transiting
Uzbekistan’s territory.
As a renewed efort, President Mirziyoyev visited Tajikistan on 9–10
March 2018, and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon made his frst-ever
state visit to Uzbekistan on August 17–18, 2018. Rahmon’s visit resulted in
27 path-breaking agreements related to industry, standardization and cer-
tifcation, border crossing, recognition of education documents, geology,
agriculture and culture and so forth. The visa regime was simplifed and
transport connection between the two countries was restored. Bilateral trade
was projected to increase from $US 500 million to $US 1 billion annually.
The National University of Tajikistan and State University of Samarkand
established cooperation. More than one million people had crossed Uzbek-
Tajik border in the frst nine months of 2018 (Tolipov 2018).
In March 2018, Uzbek-Tajik Defence Ministries signed an agreement to
cooperate on the transit of special cargo and military contingents through
their territories. During the summit of both the presidents in August 2018,
Uzbek and Tajik border guards conducted joint military-tactical exercises at
Termez, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan inter-
sect. Both sides announced that the two states agree to construct two other
HPSs on the Zarafshan River. Rahmon even ofered to provide Uzbekistan
with potable water from Tajikistan’s high mountainous Sarez Lake (Tolipov
2018). The Rogun Dam issue no longer looks like an insurmountable issue
given the improvements in bilateral relations. The frst turbine of Rogun
hydro-electricity project was operationalized on 16 November 2018. After
meeting his Uzbek counterpart in March 2018, Rahmon expressed hope that
“the existing hydropower facilities and those under construction will help
resolve the region’s water and power issues”. Rahmon welcomed Uzbeki-
stan’s support for the development of hydropower facilities in Tajikistan,
including Rogun (Putz 2018a).
Uzbek-Tajik energy trade has resumed too, which is a major breakthrough
since Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the common power grid in 2009. In Feb-
ruary 2018, Tajikistan agreed to supply 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electric-
ity between April to September. The price was to be half of what Tajikistan
charged Afghanistan in 2017. In return, Uzbekistan agreed to resume gas
supply to Tajikistan, which had been stopped since 2012. Mirziyoyev had
signed an agreement in March 2018 for supply of about 126 million cubic
meters of natural gas annually by Uzbekistan to Tajikistan at a price of $120
102 Ajay K. Patnaik
per 1,000 cubic meters, which is quite cheap compared to the $145 charged
in 2008 and $300 in 2009 for the same amount of gas (Putz 2018b).
The importance of water and energy for taking the bilateral relations for-
ward was demonstrated during Mirziyoyev’s visit to Tajikistan on 10 June
2021, when both countries agreed to jointly develop plans to build two
hydropower projects with a total capacity of 320 megawatts on the Zaraf-
shan River in Tajikistan. Both also agreed to jointly build a 140-megawatt
hydroelectric power station at Yavan (Tajikistan) at a cost of $282 million,
followed by a second hydroelectric power station at a cost of $270 million
and a capacity of 135 megawatts and production of 500–600 million kilo-
watt-hours (Shaikh 2021).
In short, Mirziyoyev’s initiatives have resulted in enhanced levels of trade,
economic, energy, travel, tourism and people-to-people contacts. Citizens
from neighbouring countries can travel to Uzbekistan without a visa for vari-
ous periods of time (3 months for Kazakh, 2 months for Kyrgyz and 1 month
for Tajik citizens). At the Astana Summit (March 2018), Mirziyoyev gave
details of trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,
which reached nearly $3 billion in 2017, an increase of 20 per cent over
2016, in addition to vowing it to make $5 billion “in the coming years”
(Eurasianet 2018).
Connectivity and Sustainable Stability

An International Conference titled “Central Asian Connectivity: Challenges
and New Opportunities” organised on 19–20 February 2019 by the Minis-
try of Foreign Afairs of Uzbekistan in Tashkent, in which this author par-
ticipated, highlighted regional stability in Central Asia and how it can be
achieved through connectivity and regional cooperation.
It was generally recognized that border disputes, water and energy issues
would destabilise the CARs and make it confict prone. However, the current
trend seems to be in the direction of resolving these issues amicably. The
more serious issue is the Afghan situation, especially with the exit of U.S.
troops. Most of the discussions among the CARs focused on how to stabilize
Afghanistan. The Uzbek leadership feels that connectivity and transport cor-
ridors could be the basis of development and stability of Central Asia and
Afghanistan. This is in tune with the U.S. New Silk Road Initiative, China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-India-Iran-promoted International
North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) through Bander Abbas and
India-Iran-funded Chabahar port project.
On the eve of the Astana Summit, Mirziyoyev spoke about sustainable
cooperation in Central Asia at an International Conference titled “Central
Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Devel-
opment and Mutual Prosperity” in Samarkand on 11 November 2017.
He specifcally focused on the transit and logistical potential of the region

that needs to be used more efciently to ensure accelerated development of
transport infrastructure. Mirziyoyev gave the example of the newly opened
Turkmenabad-Farab railway and automobile bridges over the Amu Darya
River, which forms an important section of Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-
Oman transport and transit route. Incidentally, at the Ashgabat Agreement
of 2011, this route was agreed upon and India joined it in February 2018.
The Agreement enables India to utilize this existing transport and transit
corridor to facilitate trade and commercial ties with Central Asia. It will
synchronize India’s eforts to take forward the INSTC for enhanced con-
nectivity. Mirziyoyev spoke of an agreement on the earliest start of construc-
tion of Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railroad, which would be “necessary
to develop and adopt a region-wide Program of Development of Transport
Communications” (Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan
2017).
Another major project promoted by the United States and its allies as part
of the New Silk Road Initiative connects Central Asia with Afghanistan and
South Asia is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline
project. The construction along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border started
in December 2015 and that on the Afghanistan-Pakistan section in February
2018. The gas from Galkynysh gas felds in Turkmenistan would be used for
the purpose (Hydrocarbons Technology 2019). Other projects under the U.S.
initiative include Cross-Border Transport Accord (CBTA) between Afghani-
stan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan; Central Asia-South Asia electricity project
or CASA-1000; Tajikistan Cotton Processing Complex; and Afghanistan Pine
Nut Processing Plant. The railway line between Uzbekistan’s Hairaton and
Afghanistan’s Mazar-e-Sharif was completed with funding from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), for which the United States was instrumental.
Uzbekistan hopes to earn an estimated $32 million annually from this project.
A 670-metre truck bridge linking Tajikistan with Afghanistan was com-
pleted in 2007. Tashkent planned to extend this line from Mazar-e-Sharif to
Herat, which could provide an opportunity to India for accessibility through
Iran and Afghanistan to Central Asia. Uzbekistan also launched its own
transmission line to Afghanistan in 2009 and by early 2010 it was already
exporting 2.3 kilowatt-hours of power daily to Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul. In
addition, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed agreements with both Afghanistan
and Pakistan for the construction of a 1,300-megawatt power supply project
with funding from ADB and the Islamic Development Bank (Blank 2012).
Other major connectivity projects include Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
(INOGATE), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and
CASA-1000. Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) is another multi-
lateral organisation that includes Iran, Turkey and the CARS. ECO created a
104 Ajay K. Patnaik
trade agreement – ECOTA – in 2003, as a result of which Sarakhs-Mashhad

rail link between Iran and Turkmenistan opened in 1996, giving Central Asia
access to the Persian Gulf (Tehran Times 2012).
The improving regional cooperation among the CARs would thus help in
the success of many of the connectivity projects promoted by diferent global
and regional powers. At the same time, improved connectivity can contribute
to regional stability by bringing in greater economic development and creat-
ing stakes for all the countries in the region to cooperate. The engagement of
major global and regional powers in building infrastructure and promoting
economic cooperation in Central Asia has helped the region in becoming a
hub of East-West and North-South connectivity. In the long run, however,
these projects would create strong economic bonds among CARs and help in
common prosperity.
It is also worth noting that competition between major powers in Cen-
tral Asia has not resulted in the so-called “New Great Game”. This author
(2016) has argued:
Central Asian states have sought to take advantage of the multiple-power

engagements in the region to extract maximum benefts for themselves
without becoming subordinate to any big power. There have been eforts
by external powers to focus on some states to advance their strategic
goals – for example, Kazakhstan for Russia’s Eurasian integration project
or Uzbekistan becoming the focus of American strategy of creating a geo-
political pivot to counter Russian infuence.
On their part, CARs have been active players in regional geopolitics. They
have used various strategies like multi-vector policy (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan), neutrality (Turkmenistan), shifting strategic partners and
equidistance policy (Uzbekistan) to protect their interests and maximise ben-
efts. In short, CARs have not allowed their countries to be centres of power
rivalry and confict. They have balanced the engagement of external powers
quite well. In fact, some powers are together on many global issues and have
a common interest in shaping the global order into an equitable and non-
discriminatory one. Russia, China and India are part of many multilateral
groupings like Brazil Russia India China and South Asia (BRICS), SCO and
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China and India are both inter-
ested in free trade agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union as well.
If development is the answer to sustainable stability, then it is important
that Central Asia achieves a certain degree of economic integration or at
least greater economic openness within the region. There are many issues
that have a bearing on inter-ethnic and inter-state relations, like poverty,
unemployment and fall in income of the population, which can deepen ethnic
and religious divides. These issues also push people towards extremism. Such
threats can be mitigated by greater economic development, which require

cooperation among the states. For example, energy- and water-sharing
issues and the projects related to them require cooperation between states.
Even infrastructure and connectivity projects require regional cooperation.
Though the U.S.-promoted connectivity linking Central Asia with South Asia
has sufered a setback due to its departure from Afghanistan and lack of
infuence over the current Afghan regime, there are projects promoted by
other countries that can move forward. From this perspective, the current
trends in regional cooperation are extremely positive.
Post-U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan and

Regional Cooperation
After two decades of invasion, the last of the U.S. troops fnally left Afghani-
stan on 30 August 2021. The Taliban takeover of the country created many
apprehensions about their role in the region. However, unlike its previous
rule during 1996–2001, the current Taliban leadership has announced that it
will not let terrorist groups to operate from its territory against other coun-
tries. The new regime has also reached out to other powers with the hope of
being recognized internationally and normalize trade and economic relations.
Afghanistan’s neighbours are also interested in a stable Afghanistan that does
not spread instability across borders. China and Russia have reached out to
Taliban, and Iran, Pakistan and CARs (except Tajikistan) are engaging with
the Taliban (Bekmurzaev 2022).
China was engaging with the Taliban even before it came back to power.
A nine-member Taliban delegation led by Mullah Ghani Baradar met the
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tianjin on 28 July 2021 and assured
that “it will not allow Afghan soil to be used for attacks against China in
exchange for Chinese economic support and investment for the reconstruc-
tion of the war-ravaged country”. It is an indicator of potential Chinese
involvement in Afghanistan. China not only strongly criticized the United
States for freezing Afghan assets, but also pledged $31 million in humanitar-
ian assistance within a short period of less than a month of American with-
drawal, with the frst batch of cargo from China landing in Kabul airport in
September (Sherazi 2021).
India, which felt isolated from Afghan developments in the beginning of
Taliban takeover, is coming to terms with the new dispensation in Kabul. It
started with humanitarian aid of 20,000 metric tonnes of wheat, 13 tons of
medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines and winter clothing in the
beginning of January 2022. A team from New Delhi also visited Kabul to
oversee the distribution of these items (MEA 2022).
Russia has quickly moved to establish diplomatic ties when it accredited
an Afghan diplomat in April 2022. Out of the total 108 tons of humanitarian
106 Ajay K. Patnaik
aid from Russia to Afghanistan, the frst batch was delivered on 18 Novem-
ber 2021 consisting of 36 tons (Business Standard 2021). Alarmed by Tali-
ban takeover in Afghanistan and Western sanctions due to war in Ukraine,
Moscow is eager to keep Eurasia stable and peaceful. Zardykhan (2022)
analyses the apprehension of the CARs, three of which border Afghanistan
(Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). They intended to defend their
borders through security reinforcement and diplomacy, primarily relying on
Russian initiatives. There have been joint military exercises involving Tajik
and Uzbek troops in August 2021 near the Tajik-Afghan border. In October
2021, the CSTO carried out military drills in Tajikistan, involving troops
from all the six member states.
Afghanistan still evokes security concerns, especially in Tajikistan, where
Islamic State reportedly fred several rockets on 7 May 2022. The Islamic
State Khorasan Province (IS-K) claimed responsibility for a series of bomb-
ings in the northern province of Kunduz in April 2022 that killed 33 people
(Economic Times 2022). These developments would push Tajikistan further
into Russian security protection.
Russia has shown no more reluctance to get involved in Central Asia, like
it did during internal turmoil in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. As protests gripped
many parts of Kazakhstan in January 2022, President Tokaev requested Rus-
sia for help. As a result, CSTO peacekeeping troops went into Kazakhstan
on 5 January and after stabilizing the situation returned on 19 January 2022.
Nevertheless, despite security cooperation, the CARs have not come out in
support of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. Their distancing from the
Russian position was articulated in Kazakh President Tokaev at the St. Peters-
burg Economic Forum (17 June, 2022). He expressed his country’s desire not
to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent countries. However, he
denied any discord with Russia, whose leadership has good understanding
with Eurasian partners (Satubaldina 2022).
The recovery of Russian economy and its currency after the initial shock
of Western sanctions enables Russia to play a leading role in bringing the
Eurasian region together. In fact, Putin’s frst visit abroad since the military
operation in Ukraine was to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on June 28 and 29
2022 respectively. Tajikistan has a Russian military base, whose troops have
been guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. The talks focused on cooperation in
several areas related to security. In Turkmenistan, Putin attended the Summit
of Caspian states, where leaders of Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were
present. Addressing the Summit, Putin pointed out the key goals of the Cas-
pian states as further expansion of regional trade and investment links and
mutually benefcial cooperation in industrial production and advanced tech-
nology. It is important to note herewith that Russia’s trade with the Caspian
littoral states is constantly on the rise. For example, in 2021, mutual trade
increased by more than one-third, or 35 per cent, to reach $34 billion and
increased another 12.5 per cent between January and April 2022 (Kremlin
website 2022).
All the littoral states of the Caspian, except Turkmenistan, are members
of the INSTC. Though Turkmenistan is not a member, it has its own connec-
tivity agreement known as Ashgabat Agreement (in force since April 2016)
that connects four CARs (except Tajikistan) through a multimodal transport
corridor with the aim to enhance connectivity within the Eurasian region and
synchronise the corridor with other such corridors including INSTC.
Economic recovery in Russia would also help some countries in Central
Asia, which depend a lot on the remittances of migrant workers working in
Russia. The COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine war has slowed down the
demand for labour in Russia, which has severely afected the Central Asian
economies. Before the war in Ukraine, there were four million Central Asian
migrant workers in Russia (two million Uzbeks and a million Tajiks and
Kyrgyzs each). Remittances accounted for 31 per cent and 27 per cent of
Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s GDP in 2020 respectively (Reliefweb 2022).
While the migrants are reluctant to leave Russia, many returnees from Rus-
sia would like the situation to improve so that they can go back. This creates
additional incentive to restore transport connectivity and improved relations
with Russia.
After the United States and its allies withdrew from Afghanistan, there is
some hope that the CARs and Afghanistan would be less divided by geopo-
litical games of other powers, at least in the near future. Russia’s cooperation
with China, Iran and India has increased, especially in the energy sector. They
all are trying to engage with the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan. Within the
region, this is the best time for inter-state cooperation and regional integra-
tion, rather than geopolitical division.
Conclusion
Many connectivity projects were promoted in Eurasian region by diferent
powers. The United States promoted the New Silk Road initiative to connect
Central and South Asia through pipeline and infrastructure projects. China
has pumped in huge investments through its BRI project. Russia has man-
aged to draw Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia, India and Iran are actively promoting INSTC. The aforementioned
projects and New Delhi-Tehran-Kabul link to Eurasia through Chabahar
(Iran) can bring in much needed investments and develop the region. Devel-
opment and stability in Central Asia is possible if there is greater cooperation
between the states there. One example is Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmeni-
stan pipeline to China, which was brought about by cooperation of the three
CARs. The INSTC involves the cooperation of a number of countries of
Eurasia. Though the New Silk Road project would face difculties in the near
108 Ajay K. Patnaik
future, BRI and Russia-India-Iran promoted INSTC are going to be impor-

tant projects connecting the region.
Following the war in Ukraine, Russia has stressed on trade with Asian
countries due to which the INSTC has come into focus. The frst Russian
cargo to India sent by train travelling around 3,800 kilometres using the
INSTC reached Iran on 13 July 2022, from where goods were moved by ship
to India. This route is expected to boost trade not only between Russia and
India but also between other participating countries linked to this route like
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The potential benefts of many connectivity projects could not be fully
realized due to lack of cooperation between the CARs. Though most of the
CARs have been following multi-vector foreign policy and cooperating with
all major powers, political and geopolitical considerations have also been
factors in their orientation, which came in the way of a common regional
mechanism or help in regional integration. Once internal cooperation devel-
ops in the region, external powers would have less room to manoeuvre or
engage in competition with one another at the cost of the CARs. Many of
the connectivity projects would beneft from the intra-regional cooperation
and transport networks, open borders and smooth transit of goods within
Central Asia. This is going to generate economic development and create a
stable environment in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Thus, the process of
inter-state and regional cooperation that has unfolded in the recent years
augurs well for long-term and sustainable stability in Central Asia and its
neighbourhood.
Note
1 Geodesy is the science of accurately measuring and understanding of the shape
and area of the earth or large portions of it, including its geometric shape, its ori-
entation in space and its gravity feld, as well as changes in these properties with
time.
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9
NEW FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE
ON SILK ROAD IN THE POST–COLD
WAR PERIOD
Ramakrushna Pradhan and Atanu Kumar Mohapatra
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union was sudden and unexpected, which left both
insiders and outsiders tentative with regard to orienting their approaches
towards the new geopolitical peculiarity. This vagueness was quite refected
not just in the policies of the United States, China and India but also in the
Russian policy strategies immediately after the disintegration. To the south-
ern periphery of the Soviet Union, a new geopolitical region emerged con-
sisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
collectively known as Central Asia. This region is believed to be in the global
limelight in every epoch of history for its geopolitical locations and posses-
sions as well. In every period of history, attempts were made to control and
administer the region by regional and extra-regional powers to rule over
the world. Even during the Tsarist period, there was a Great Game between
Tsarist Russia and the British to gain control of the region then known as
Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Dadabaev 2018). During the Soviet period,
the Marshall plan was perhaps aimed at luring the region with economic
leverages and military support, then known as Central Asia or Inner Asia.
Today, in the post-Soviet era, the region has exhibited a new kind of great
game, which this chapter terms as “Silk Road rivalry” again to control and
administer the region. It is with this rhetoric now that states of the region
and beyond are striving hard to build closer engagements with the Central
Asian region. This chapter focuses on four such Silk Road narratives adopted
by the United States, China, Russia and India to transform Central Asia’s
geopolitical landscape demonstrating their goals and objectives projected as
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-11
112 Ramakrushna Pradhan and Atanu Kumar Mohapatra
“self”, projecting as the best, proftable and accommodative in comparison

to the rest as “others”.
The content and nature of these Silk Road strategies have changed with
time and the international environment. The concept carried diferent mean-
ings depending upon the country that chose the Silk Road as a brand of its for-
eign policy (Dadabaev 2018). In this sense, the static concept of the traditional
Silk Road got transformed into a social construction of that particular coun-
try’s foreign policy engagement with the region. This chapter, therefore, claims
that the Silk Road is not a foreign policy doctrine but rather a discursive
practice involving the grand design of the adopted country. With this premise,
this chapter focuses on the Silk Road narratives of the United States, China,
Russia and India for their engagement with the Central Asian countries and
examines their social construction to stimulate a debate that Silk Road rivalry
in Central Asia involves agenda promotion through historical connotation
to prevail their alternative world views of “self” difering from the “others”.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), America’s New Silk Road Strategy,
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and India’s International North-
South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) have led to contending versions for
revitalizing the antique trade routes linking Asia with Europe via the heart-
land region. The U.S. Silk Road strategy focuses on stabilizing Afghanistan,
while China’s BRI hopes for economically integrating Central Asia into Bei-
jing’s geostrategic orbit. On the other hand, Russia in recent times has reas-
serted its position through EAEU at least to play a dominant regional role,
whereas India lately has come up with its version of the Silk Road known
as INSTC to secure its much-needed energy security with the help of Central
Asian energy resources. These stated Silk Road concepts are socially con-
structed to secure the interests of the respective countries by using the nar-
rative as a proxy. Why these countries intend to use Silk Road discourses in
their recent foreign policy orientation has a reason underneath: the geopoli-
tics of Central Asia itself. It is imperative here to understand the centrality of
Central Asia in the Silk Road diplomatic frameworks.
Centrality of Central Asia: A Prelude

Central Asia refers to an area that largely extends from the Kipchak steppes of
Central Russia to the Great Wall of China (Kaushik 1970). The geographical
denomination of Central Asia is not an indigenous term. It dates back to the
19th century, when the Europeans named this region intending to establish a
territorial identity for this region. Central Asia as a single geopolitical entity
comprises fve independent republics and covers a vast area of approximately
four million square kilometres that is almost one-sixth of the size of the former
Soviet Union (Kaushik 1970). It stretches from the seashores of the Caspian
Sea and River Volga in the west to China in the east and Russia in the north
New Foreign Policy Discourse on Silk Road 113
to Afghanistan and Iran in the south. Because of this unique geographical

location, Central Asia, after its independence, both literally and fguratively
changed the map of Asia and subsequently redefned the world politically.
The geographical location of Central Asia at the heart of Eurasia situated
in the middle half of the Silk Route is strategically vital for not only Russia
and China but also the United States, Europe and other countries in Asia and
outside. The CARs together share a border of 6,200 kilometres with Russia
in the north, a 3,500-kilometre-long border with China in the east, approxi-
mately a border of more than 3,500 kilometres to the west with the Cas-
pian Sea and a huge length of the inland border with Iran and Afghanistan
in the southwest and the south (Akiner 1994). The geopolitical importance
of Central Asia cannot be explained without taking recourse to Sir Halford
John Mackinder’s view of “he who controls the heartland controls the world”
(Mackinder 1904). Hitherto, the Mackinder thesis of the geographical pivot
of history, Central Asia, was a little known landmass. Even when the Soviet
Union administered the region, the importance of the region was hardly
outlined anywhere barring the U.S. attempt of containment of communism
through the Marshal Plan. Yet after independence, though quite often lumped
together as a single entity, Central Asia is neither a common geographical
landmass nor central to any of its neighbours. Despite its name and geopoliti-
cal location, Central Asia was not central to any of the regional and extra-
regional countries. For Russia, the region is no longer its hinterland in the
post-Soviet period. In fact, the Russian Federation used a new term called
the “Near Abroad” to indicate the Commonwealth of the Independent States
(CIS), which includes Central Asia in its foreign policy objectives. For the
United States, the region remained unwanted and isolated following the Soviet
disintegration and continued to be the same until 1994. While the European
Union remains the primary object and vector of Turkey’s foreign policy, for
Iran the Persian Gulf is still paramount in its orientation and security concern.
It is beset with its domestic problems and the U.S. hegemonic attitude point-
ing towards it. China’s security lies to the east, with the Taiwan issue looming
large over its foreign policy and relations to the Korean Peninsula and Japan
following closely. India and Pakistan primarily focus on their bilateral rela-
tionships. Nevertheless, an impoverished region like Central Asia suddenly
became the focal point of regional politics and global economics by virtue of
its geostrategic location and geo-economic possessions. Its huge untapped oil
and energy reserves and promising potentials in the hydro and nuclear energy
front have once again put it right back in world politics.
Energy Resources
Central Asia is rich in hydrocarbons with gas being the predominant energy
fuel. While Kazakhstan has large reserves of oil and coal and signifcant
amounts of uranium deposits, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have huge gas

reserves. Kyrgyzstan is a leading producer of hydroelectricity. With proven
oil reserves estimated to range from 9 to 40 billion barrels and natural gas
reserves possibly exceeding 131 trillion cubic feet, Central Asia is poised to
become a major world supplier of energy, especially in hydrocarbon. With
23,000 tons of uranium, Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and had
the second-largest reserves as of 2016. It is also home to minerals including
iron ore, coal, oil, gas, gold, lead, zinc, molybdenum and so forth in com-
mercially viable quantities (Sajjanhar 2016). Uzbekistan has large reserves of
gas, uranium and gold. Turkmenistan is endowed with the world’s fourth-
largest reserves of natural gas. Tajikistan is blessed with huge hydroelectric
potential. Kyrgyzstan is rich in gold and hydroelectric power. Since most
of its reserves are undeveloped and promising, Central Asian energy excites
international interests.
In addition, the Caspian Sea, the world’s largest inland Sea, has a sea
basin of around 700 miles. It is surrounded by fve riparian states of Azer-
baijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and some part of Iran and adja-
cent countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Dekmejian and Simonian
2001). Iran is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting coun-
tries (OPEC); the rest of the countries form a part of the former Soviet Union.
Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan form a part of the non-OPEC and non-
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (non-OECD)
group along with Latin America, Africa and China. The former Soviet Union
contributes 11.60 million barrels per day of crude oil production in the group
(Kramer 2009). Caught in the throes of the restructuring of global power
relations after the Soviet collapse, the Caspian has emerged as a focus of
world attention.
Conceptualizing the Silk Road Rivalry

Through the analysis of the evolution of Silk Road narratives of the United
States, China, Russia and India in Greater Central Asia, this chapter argues
that the nature and content of these Silk Road strategies have changed with
the time and international environment. Discarding the traditional notion of
the Silk Road being a historical trade route and statistic concept, this chapter
claims that the Silk Road narrative has been transformed into political and
diplomatic strategies of the social construction of powerful states as foreign
policy discourse – that is constantly shaped, imagined and re-interpreted.
New Silk Road of the United States

The United States has come up with its own New Silk Road Strategy in June
2011 (Fedorenko 2013) to procure its interests in Central Asia, to maintain
stability, to facilitate and enhance regional cooperation in trade, energy and

transportation. It envisions plans for joint investment projects and regional
trade blocs that have the potential to bring economic growth and stability to
Central Asia. Following the surge of 30,000 additional troops into Afghani-
stan in 2009, which President Barack Obama had hoped would lay the
groundwork for complete withdrawal a few years later, Washington began to
lay out a strategy for supporting these initiatives through diplomatic means
to enable Afghanistan to build an economy independent of any foreign assis-
tance (McBride 2015). As part of this strategy, William Burns, the then Dep-
uty Secretary of State, had outlined in 2014 that the main focus of the United
States in the region was to build a regional energy market for Central Asia
connecting with Afghanistan to meet its electricity consumption. If material-
ized the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM)
could provide more than 1.6 billion consumers in India, Pakistan and the
rest of South Asia with all-time energy supplies. Marc Grossman, the Special
Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2011 and 2012, was
in favour of connecting private sector investment and entrepreneurship and
trade relationship among export industries like Afghani fruits and Pakistani
cement to establish order in the region. The United States had taken several
initiatives to get rid of Afghanistan and for that its Silk Road strategy envi-
sioned several initiatives as narrated herewith.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in September
2013 had laid down a New Silk Road vision in the form of the Silk Road
Economic Belt (SREB) in Astana (Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of
China 2013) to initiate and strengthen bilateral trade and economic rela-
tions between China and the Eurasian region. In a signifcant addendum in
May 2015, China and Russia agreed in Moscow to integrate the former’s
SERB with the latter’s vision of a trade and infrastructure network across
Eurasia, the EAEU, which was launched in January 2015. The EAEU com-
prised the former Soviet Union states of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan (Dijak and Martens 2016). This reinforces Russia’s own
“pivot to the East” and serves to dispel the perspective that Russia and China
are natural adversaries. Moreover, the SERB directly links China to the EU,
strengthening economic ties, eventually raising doubt that there is any new
Great Game in Central Asia and the Caucasus involving Russia and China in
an alliance against the West. Free trade and growing cooperation in a number
of spheres further undermine the new Great Game thesis (Dijak and Martens
2016). These reasons assert that China has certain critical interests linked
to the Central Asian geopolitics and geostrategic calculations in world poli-
tics. And the strategy it has in place makes her invincible and unchallenged,
outclassing the West. Hence, the hitherto apprehension of a Great Game in

energy-rich Central Asia has undoubtedly lost its character and has given
way for Chinese domination in the heartland. However, how and why the
region remains of such importance to China that Beijing cannot aford to lose
the grip or let others stay for longer is still inexplicable.
The BRI has been derived from the Chinese Yi dai Yi lu, which literally
means One Belt One Road (OBOR) (Magari 2017), which is a commitment
to easing bottlenecks to Eurasian trade by improving and building networks
of connectivity across Central, Western and South Asia, as well as to reach
out to the Middle East as well as East and North Africa (Amighini 2017).
BRI is an attempt to revive the historical Eurasian Silk Road that is approxi-
mately 2,000 years old with vigour to reconnect Europe with Asia and Africa
with the use of modern transportation, thereby boosting trade, investments,
economic development and by improving diplomatic relations, scientifc pro-
gress and cultural exchange for all countries and regions across the Eurasian
continent. This initiative gives due importance to Central Asia like its pre-
decessor, the ancient Silk Road. The BRI has two separate roads: the SREB
that is the overland part of the broader BRI, and the 21st-century Maritime
Silk Route. Among the number of corridors the Silk Road encompasses, six
of them are currently in some stage of planning or construction: the China-
Mongolia-Russia corridor; the New Eurasian Land Bridge; the China-Central
Asia-Western Asia Corridor; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; the
Indochina Peninsula Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
Corridor (Magari 2017). In this context, Central Asia is the region most
likely to receive maximum global attention.
Chinese Interests and Initiatives in Central Asia
Energy
China’s major energy partners in Central Asia are Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan. As of August 2016, China was in control of 20 per cent of the Kazakh
oil production and had constructed one of the world’s longest pipelines, run-
ning about 2, 300 kilometres from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang (Hart 2016).
Beijing has been actively participating in exploring the Alktyuinks and Man-
gyshlak oil deposits and building an oil pipeline in the Kazakhstan-Xinjiang
region (Pradhan 2010). The Chinese national oil company CNPC owns a
signifcant stake in the Kashagan oil feld in the Caspian Sea while other Chi-
nese companies own and develop several key oil felds in Aktobe city (Hart
2016). With Turkmenistan, China has negotiated to directly transfer the gases
through the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. One of the most ambitious pro-
jects signed by China includes the 5,730-kilometre-long gas pipeline project
estimated at $11 billion in Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China in
which a consortium of companies from the United States, Japan and China
have already been conducting preliminary surveys (Muller Kraenner 2008).
In 2013 alone, China invested $15 billion in energy deals with Central
Asian states. Besides, it fnanced two refneries in Kyrgyzstan, in Kara-Balta
and Tomok, which are supplied by CNPC-run oilfelds in Kazakhstan and
produce 1.35 million refned products annually (Hart 2016). The Chinese
inroads into Central Asian energy markets have decisively oriented the fow
of oil and gas from Central Asia eastward and have undoubtedly established
a Chinese dominance in the region, which was earlier controlled by the West
and Russia.
Border Security
The peripheral security of China in Central Asia has two dimensions. First,
it is the preservation of the stability, economic well-being, political order
and security of its westernmost province XUAR, which shares a long and
common border with Russia, Mongolia and three Central Asian states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Intricately linked to this goal is the
second aim of the creation of a friendly and secure belt of states around
Xinjiang.
A central aim of its regional security policy is to ensure that Central Asia
remains free from the hegemonic control of powerful rivals such as the
United States now that Russian power has considerably declined and part-
nership with Russia is seen to advance strategic goals.
(Dutta 2003)
The long border China shares with Central Asia was given priority by Beijing
to resolve all disputes and stabilize the region critically linked to the security
stability to its western border (Zhi 2016).
Xinjiang is China’s largest province in size occupying roughly one-sixth
of the country’s territory. It produces one-third of China’s cotton and explo-
rations in the Tarim Basin have indicated the region to have the country’s
largest oil and gas reserves (Zhi 2016). It is an ethnically mixed region with
a 22-million-strong population consisting of Uyghurs, Hans and Kazakhs
as the top three ethnicities population wise (Bovingdon 2010). Uyghurs and
other Turkic tribes constituting the overwhelming majority of Xinjiang made
its integration into China problematic. They were keen to join in Central
Asian mainstream, because of their historical, cultural, linguistic and civili-
zational links and commonalities. Thus, there arose separatist movements.
Taking serious note of the events, China for some years after 1991 waged a
large campaign to crash the three evil forces of terrorists, religious extremists
and separatists in Xinjiang. China believes that the separatists are backed by
Al-Qaeda and other militants such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia and militant groups operating in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. It accused outside powers especially the West and the
overseas terrorist groups of being behind most of the violent separatist acts
in Xinjiang.
Since 1994, Beijing has negotiated border security as one party with the
CARs as other parties (Zhi 2016). Two treaties have emerged from this robust
arrangement: the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions
(1996) and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regimes
(1997) (Zhi 2016). China initiated the idea of the Shanghai Five in 1996 in
collaboration with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle
border problems of China with Russia and three states of Central Asia. Fur-
thering this process China also transformed Xinjiang into a free market zone
in 1998 in collaboration with Kazakhstan only to put an end to the ethnic
crisis and for establishing cooperative relations with its Central Asian neigh-
bours. This may also be pointed out as one of the most important reasons for
the Chinese support of the United States in its Global War on Terror.
Strategic Interests
Central Asia is a strategic area for China as well. China’s security policy rests
upon four pillars (1) countering terrorism and Islamic militancy backing for
Uyghur independence, (2) military cooperation, (3) countering the infuence
of major powers in the region inimical to China, and (4) strongly infuenc-
ing Central Asia’s multilateral security arrangements which mostly originate
from Central Asia. China also seriously views Central Asia’s opening as its
road to the vast regions of Eurasia –the energy centres of Central Asia, Rus-
sia and the Middle East to Europe and the ports of Pakistan and the Gulf.
Therefore, it is obvious on the part of China not to allow Central Asia to
become Russia’s backyard and American chessboard. Hence, China has been
cementing its position in Central Asia.
Economic Interests
The increasing interests of China in Central Asia’s economy can be seen
because of the following points.
1 Central Asia serves as a transit road for economic ties between China and
Europe, South Asia and the Middle East.
2 Central Asia’s richness in natural resources (oil, gas, gold, uranium, cotton
etc.) attracts international forces and enhances its economic importance.
3 The CARs turned the region into a vacant and easily accessible market
for Chinese goods and a source of cheaper raw materials. Land transport
communications ofered more advantageous conditions for Chinese

exports.
4 The CARs can now establish direct ties with the Asia Pacifc. Some of
them (Japan and South Korea) have come to the fore. In these condi-
tions, China, connected with Central Asia by railways and highways, has
become the most convenient and reliable link between Central Asia and
the Asia-Pacifc, which is economically good for China.
5 Central Asia needs Chinese consumer goods.
(Khojaev 2007)
Therefore, it is not surprising to ascertain that after energy, economic rela-

tionship with Central Asia remains China’s topmost priority, even though the
economy was not the driving force of Chinese engagement with the region
in the early 1990s. In fact, the Chinese economic profle in Central Asia has
remained far below in comparison with the United States and Russia until the
initiation of Beijing’s Western Development Strategy. The geostrategic loca-
tion of Central Asia provided further strength to China to use the region as
a transportation hub linking China with West Asia and Europe. Further, the
decision of Beijing to build a regional economic framework in Central Asia
allowed it to enhance its economic development and political infuence in
the region. Since 2009, however, China has diversifed its economic endeav-
our in Central Asia. At the moment, China is the biggest trading partner of
four Central Asian states (except Uzbekistan). Although Russia still controls
the majority of Central Asian energy exports, its economic clout is slipping
into the hands of China. Beijing’s trade volume with Central Asian states as
of 2016 was in total $50 billion (which declined to $41.6 billion in 2018)
(Umarov 2020).
Russian Strategy and the EAEU

Despite political, economic, personal and institutional links with Central
Asia, Russia could not maintain its sway over the region due to its declin-
ing economic infuence. Therefore, early post-Soviet attempts to develop
regional organizations failed until a Customs Union among Russia, Bela-
rus and Kazakhstan was formed in 2010. This evolved into the EAEU in
2015, whose Central Asian members include Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
As always, Moscow’s main game is political, rather than economic. Kremlin
understands well that in the realm of trade and fnance, Russia’s position in
Eurasia is much weaker than China’s. Russia’s crucial strengths traditionally
lie in the political-military and diplomatic domains. Hence, leaving economic
initiatives to China, Moscow strives for the role of the chief architect of a
Eurasian political and security order that would refect its preferences and
coincide with the basic interests of the major powers active in the region.
The kind of political order Russia envisions for Eurasia is essentially one of
a concert of powers, a model that hails from 19th-century Europe and places
a premium on relations among a few major countries: Russia, China, India
and, with some qualifcations, Pakistan, Iran and maybe Turkey. Account-
ing for the bulk of continental Eurasia’s population, landmass and military
potential, the six big players should collectively manage the security and eco-
nomic afairs of the mega-region.
Russia aspires to be the main security and diplomatic broker in Eurasia
while leaving China with the role of the economic leader. As Gabuev (2016)
puts it, “China would be the bank, and Russia would be the big gun”. Such
an arrangement might hark back to the history of the European Community,
when France acted as the political leader, while West Germany was the eco-
nomic engine. Moscow’s preference for a new Eurasian order is refected in
its diplomatic activism, such as its leading role in securing the admission of
India and Pakistan into the SCO and in advocacy for the future membership
of Iran. Comprising Eurasia’s most powerful non-Western nations, “Greater
Eurasia” is being imagined as the antithesis to the Western-dominated world
order. All the members of the prospective Eurasian concert – with the impor-
tant exception of India – are autocracies or illiberal democracies. Beijing may
well like the notion of illiberal Eurasian continentalism.
Post-Pandemic World Order and the Silk Road Discourse

The post-pandemic world order has brought unprecedented transformation
in world politics. The COVID-19 pandemic gripped the entire world and
forced it into lockdown leading to serious health, humanitarian and eco-
nomic crises all over the world. Indeed, the political implications of this pan-
demic are far reaching than the economic consequences. The pandemic has
undoubtedly been the game changer of world politics. World politics hitherto
dominated by the United States and Europe was worst hit by the virus. The
UN, known for discussing anything and everything, couldn’t even organ-
ize a debate in the UN Security Council on Corona as successfully vetoed
by China; the recent (in)-activities of World Health Organization (WHO)
have led to many now openly naming and shaming it as the Wuhan Health
Organization. If it is not a clear indication of the resurgence of Chinese infu-
ence and riches of its power then what it is? Let us not be in delusion and
accept it forthright that we are in a changed world order After Corona (AC)
largely dominated by communist China. On top of this, the on-going Russia-
Ukraine war, a handiwork of the United States, has led to serious economic
repercussions in the world by creating economic backlashes. If one sees the
pandemic, re-emergence of Taliban and the Russia-Ukraine crisis, then its
geopolitical genesis are pointing towards a reordered world politics with a
resurgent China and a declining United States. Here what matters are the
foreign policy narratives that the countries concerned are following to actual-
ize their visions and dreams. China is way ahead of other countries in making
a footprint just not its neighbourhood but also in the world without facing
any substantial competition from Europe and America. The only country at
the moment China is worried to cope up is India.
Does India Have Any Strategic Narratives?

It can be noted herewith that New Delhi with disparate policies lacks a clear
vision that can guide India in Central Asia. The region holds importance for
India and has enough energy resources to mitigate India’s energy scarcity. If
addressed efectively, Central Asia undoubtedly is critical for India’s national
security and geostrategic perspectives. Hence, India needs to have a well-
planned strategy in place to broadly conceive its goals and aspirations in the
region. India had come up with the Look North Policy towards the fag end
of Rajiv Gandhi’s prime ministership but failed to consolidate its position in
the region after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and largely remained
disconnected for quite some time. The policy of neighbourhood relations of
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee started warming up towards the region
again but lacked vigour. When Dr. Man Mohan Singh adopted Connect Cen-
tral Asia Policy in 2012, there were wide expectations that India would play
an active role in the region but failed to its political apathy back home. How-
ever, with the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, through the Reconnect
Central Asia Policy with its emphasis on connectivity, culture and commerce,
India could make an entry into the region, which has been cemented further
by the recent inclusion of India as a full member of SCO with Russian and
Central Asian backing. Narendra Modi’s visit at one go to all the “fve stans”
is unprecedented in history and symbolizes India’s keenness to engage with
the region transforming the cultural afnity to that of commercial ventures.
The recent development in INSTC is evidence enough to claim that India is
also working out on a strategic narrative to make her presence felt in the
heartland.
International North-South Transportation Corridor

As part of his neighbourhood-frst policy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
since 2014 has pursued outreach to India’s neighbours. This, of course, has
included unprecedented engagements with the immediate neighbours such
as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. India has shown keen
interests to establish a cordial relationship with all the CARs. Importantly,
New Delhi for the frst time has taken policy initiatives to project itself not
just as the cultural capital for the heartland countries, but as a commer-
cial partner with huge interests in their market and to invest heavily in the
economy energy sectors for mutual benefts in business transactions. The

INSTC has been one such commercial endeavour where both the regions are
equally excited to connect through this roadway network connecting India
with Eurasia through Chabahar of Iran and Caspian to Central Asia and
Russia. If materialized at the earliest, the road will provide an alternative to
the CARs compared to the BRI.
Conclusion
As demonstrated, the narrative of the Silk Road has been successfully utilized
by a number of states as a foreign policy framework to infuence the region
known as a grand chessboard of world politics. The main thrust of this chap-
ter has been to discard the static concept of the Silk Road as traditionally
accepted and to project the notion as dynamic depending upon the time and
international environment. It further argued that the foreign policy formula-
tion of any country including the strategies it adopts has to do with its social
construction to achieve its well-designed interests by setting the agenda in
its favour. Finally, the frequent mention of Silk Road being an honest design
having historical roots has been discarded by this chapter with the claim
that “Silk Road” has been adopted as a trope for Central Asian policies. Its
historical and cultural links are exhibited widely; academic conferences, cul-
tural events and dialogue fora are organized more frequently for generating
more interests among the public on Silk Road narration. But the question this
chapter proposes to ask is why to sell the dream of Silk Road when multiple
roads already exist? The answer to this question is perhaps to develop a
social construction of the respective countries among the wider public about
the honesty of their Silk Road propaganda.
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10
SILK ROAD SHENANIGANS
P. L. Dash
Introduction
In May 2016, Bukhara (Uzbekistan) hosted the 15th “Silk and Spice Festival”
to commemorate the Silk Road heritage. Jointly organized by the Bukhara
municipality, Bukhara Regional Branch “Uzbektourism” and the association
of craftsmen “Hunarmand”, this festival is reminiscent of how traders and
craftsmen in ancient times straddled the space. On 24–26 May 2019, the
18th festival was held in Bukhara, which has been an important commercial,
cultural and tourist hub along the Silk Road that has played a crucial role as
much in invasions as in commerce, art and culture.
Three factors have catapulted the old Silk Road concepts to debates and dis-
cussions in post-Soviet years: (1) emergence of independent countries in Eura-
sia, which seek a better road network for communications as much within their
territories as with their neighbours and beyond; (2) China’s thirst for business,
commerce and energy that has been driving it to Eurasia in various directions
to search business prospects; and (3) the proliferating markets from Turkey on
one hand, China on the other and Russia from the north has mandated them to
build broader roads, connecting rail network and even seek to link all these to
new seaports and airports. As a result, an entirely new network of communica-
tion links has come up in Eurasia in the last quarter century. This has resulted
in labour migration, movement of people and goods from one place to another,
rapid exchange of inter and intra-state communications – in the ethos of com-
merce and globalization, albeit it could not galvanize a unity.
Labour has a tendency to move from dry to green pastures, where stand-
ard of living is high and salary is good. And this tendency has driven millions
of people from smaller post-Soviet states to Russia. Through Silk Road and
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-12
Silk Road Shenanigans 125
other connecting routes, workers have congregated in Russia, supplying Rus-

sia the much needed human resources. Russia is, therefore, interested in bet-
ter roads because those lead to faster movement of workforce. With many of
the post-Soviet countries, Russia has signed bilateral or multilateral security
agreements most of which imply that in the event of military confict, Rus-
sian aid would be supplied to erstwhile Soviet states. And troop movement is
possible if roads are smooth. Russia has directly deep, strategic and economic
interests in the Silk Road. The Tashkent Pact or the Collective Security Treaty
of 15 May 1992 was a stepping stone in this direction.
Big and small countries in Central Asia have been building arterial roads to
link with the highways running through their countries. The new Silk Road
concept by the United States has been debated threadbare. Similarly, China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received global attention. The same could
be talked of Maritime Silk Route connecting Asian countries and beyond to
the European and African continents. Besides, the highways in all the Central
Asian Republics (CARs) through which the ancient Silk Road transported
silk from China to Europe is receiving fllip. This chapter addresses some of
these new developments in recent decades and analyses their implications for
greater and faster-than-now communicability. It is no longer silk and spice
alone, but a variety of goods that shufes hands through quick commercial
transactions. Whether it is Barakholka in the suburbs of Almaty or Abu Sahi
in the micro-borough of Tashkent, the Silk Road serves its purpose in Eurasia
in an integrative fashion.
How It All Began

It is important to mention herewith the contributions of several people in
making the Silk Road historically strong and formidably irreversible as the
Russia-India ties. The beginning was made by Afanasy Nikitin, a trader from
Tver, who travelled to India as the frst Russian, long before Vasco da Gama
came to India. Nikitin has documented the lifestyles of Indians, wrote about
how and where he lived and left behind the imprints of his experiment and
experience with Indians and the prevailing realities. Centuries later, those
who followed the Russian trader were Indian scholar travellers – Rahul
Sankirtyayan and Madan Mohan Hardatt, who travelled along the Silk
Road. Padma Bhushan Rahul Sankirtyayan was born as Kedarnath Pandey
on 19 April 1893 in Pandaha village in Azamgarh district of Uttar Pradesh.
His travelogues earned him the popular title as “Mahapandit”. His travel
accounts were well depicted in Madhya Asia ka Itihas (History of Central
Asia). Similarly, Madan Mohan Hardatta went from undivided Punjab in
India to Afghanistan from where he crossed into Soviet border. He was
arrested by Joseph Stalin’s police and exiled to Siberia. After his release, he
landed up in Tashkent and found the department of Urdu and Hindi at the
126 P. L. Dash
Oriental Faculty in Tashkent University (Myrkasymov 2014). The intercon-

tinental outreach of these Indologists spanned across time and space and
served as the transcendental connections of bilateral relations.
Many other eminent personalities from one family, who made appreciable
contribution by their endeavour, were the Roerich family. Migrating to the
United States in the aftermath of the 1917 October Revolution, Nicholas C.
Roerich looked eastward for spiritual solace in the 1930s and moved frst to the
Altai mountains and then to Kullu valley in Indian state of Himachal Pradesh.
From St. Petersburg to Washington, D.C., to Altai mountains to Kullu valley to
Tataguni estate in suburban Bengaluru, wherever the family lived, it left a rich
legacy of their valuable paintings. And everywhere there is a Roerich museum
invariably containing something about India that testifes their devotions to
spiritual India and its rich culture. The Roerich family synthesized East-West
culture, when one of the sons married Indian actress Devika Rani and the other
devoted his life to the study of Indology. Alongside the museums, they set up
libraries, which demonstrated their inclination to research on India.
Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore too contributed to the civili-
zational ties between the two regions. Both visited the Soviet Union in 1927.
Tagore wrote about the vast experience of reforms in Soviet Russia. Jawahar-
lal Nehru was diferent and was so impressed by transformations in backward
Central Asia that he wrote pages of panegyrics in the letters to his daugh-
ter Indira Gandhi in his book Glimpses of World History. Nehru’s sister,
Vijayalaxmi Pandit, and eminent philosopher and India’s second President,
Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, and well-known diplomats such as K. P. S Menon,
Triloki Nath Kaul, Nurul Hasan and Inder Kumar Gujral (who later became
India’s Prime Minister) together and individually connected both regions to
the core of their peoples and relentlessly worked in bettering mutual ties.
Belt and Road Initiative

With substantial economic growth in the 1990s and subsequent geopoliti-
cal and economic prominence worldwide, China forayed into the Eurasian
arena in search of markets. It considered the Silk Road a natural corollary of
its aspirations. China considered the Eurasian space the most suitable area
for economic interaction. However, the area was laden with woeful infra-
structure and network of communications. All countries put together in the
Chinese periphery were no match for her growing economic and political
clout, but they were a potential market. Therefore, it devised One Belt One
Road (later known as Belt Road Initiative) – a concept that visualized natural
expansion of the ancient Silk Road with many corollaries and arterial wings
forging out from the main road and directed at many countries.
Access to the CARs would bring China to the littoral countries of the Caspian
Sea from where it could look to Iran for energy and access to the Persian Gulf.
It also could look to the Caucasian states and an access through them to the
Black Sea from where it could establish communication links with Turkey
and other countries of southern Europe. In priority of things came all the
CARs frst and Kazakhstan foremost. Laying road and rail network through
them would open up wings of commerce and facilitate the fow of oil and gas
to the underdeveloped parts of western China, particularly XUAR.
This prodded China to visualize road and rail links in various directions:
(1) the Eurasian continental bridge to connect developed parts of China’s
eastern fank with Xinjiang and its capital Urumqi as the hub; (2) connecting
Urumqi with Kashgar and trifurcate road connectivity from there – via Kyr-
gyzstan in the west to access Central Asia, build a road to Lhasa in Tibet and
construct a highway via Pakistan to Gwadar – all this in one belt, but only in
its southern wing; (3) the northern wing of this BRI explored possibilities of
access to Russia via Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Kazakhstan is China’s gate-
way to Europe while Mongolia is the gateway to Siberia.
China has pursued an active and integrative plan in the northern direction
with Russia. Aware that Siberia is endowed with enormous resource potential
and China has the manpower to exploit them, China’s resource exploitation
was based on two aspects. Russia’s demographic profle in Siberia is poor and
communication links are remote beyond cities, which are far too few. With
just less than 7.5 million people residing in the huge space from east of Lake
Baikal to Vladivostok, while on the Chinese side the demography is twenty
times more, China considered it a golden opportunity to populate the region
through porous Sino-Russian borders. Thus it planned several Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZ) along its border with Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia.
The BRI included pentagonal, integrative directions: (1) From Kashgar via
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia and beyond to Iran; (2) Eurasian
direction that includes the oil rich space from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan and
Russia; (3) Siberian direction, stretching via Mongolia and Ulan Ude to Vlad-
ivostok; (4) Tibetan direction stretches from Kashgar to Lhasa and China has
been actively building a connecting road between the two cities; and fnally
(5) South Asian direction, from Kashgar to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea.
One could easily conclude that with rising Chinese hunger for energy, the
entire Chinese thrust around the BRI is an ambitious initiative to integrate
countries rich with energy resources and consider the entire range as one
belt, wherever the source of energy is located. Three countries – Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan and Pakistan – which come to the fore, are massively prone to
road-building projects designed by China as part of the BRI.
Quest for Outlets

The Chinese land deals with Kyrgyzstan in the Tengry peak as well as with
Tajikistan in the mountains where Amu Darya originates are well known
128 P. L. Dash
for how a mighty China could browbeat its small poor neighbours. In its
search for infrastructure building, China has cut Kyrgyzstan in the middle
into two halves. The natural north-south ethnic divide of Kyrgyzstan based
on which there were military coups in the post-Soviet years to dethrone
Kyrgyz leaders Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev is further split in an
east-west divide by the road China has been building there (Panflova 2010).
Kyrgyz leader Almazbek Atambayev was convinced of the need of the Chi-
nese roads that would run through Kyrgyzstan. At the 13th Summit of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek on 12–13 September
2013 the construction of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line as part
of regional economic cooperation was discussed. The railway line is not only
a link between Kyrgyzstan and China, but also a facilitating transit corridor
that provides Chinese access to Uzbekistan and beyond. It would bring tran-
sit proft to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and facilitate commercial transac-
tions in the region. The railway project ftted perfectly within the framework
of the “National Sustainable Development Strategy of Kyrgyzstan for the
period 2013–2017” (National Council for Sustainable Development of the
Kyrgyz Republic 2013), which focused on the development of infrastructure
at an annual outlay of $230 million. However, critics pointed out that it may
not solve Kyrgyzstan’s national problems and bring adequate benefts to the
CARs (Bucsky and Kenderdine 2020).
China needs access to Uzbekistan and farther into the Caspian Sea and
Iran. And it has been pursuing its “Caspian Access Policy” in two clear direc-
tions: (1) via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan through rail and roads and (2) via
railway in Kazakhstan with two transit points – Khorgos and Dostlyk. How-
ever, this railway line may widen the north-south divide within Kyrgyzstan
and exacerbate existing confrontation, where a pro-China lobby in north
Kyrgyzstan may pit the more underdeveloped south in unending confict
(Stratfor 2018). This commercial route is more viable for China because it
can trade its stufs in Central Asia, less viable for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki-
stan, which produce goods that cannot be competitively sold in international
markets.
At some point closer to the Kamchik pass in Uzbekistan, there hangs a
signboard, indicating how many kilometres is Kashgar from that spot,
reminding everyone about the great Silk Road. From the interests of Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan, this road and a parallel rail line are need of the day.
If Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan do not produce goods that are in demand in
the Asian markets, they have other things to ofer including minerals, hydro-
carbon and agricultural items. Therefore, many feel that Beijing has been
consistently implementing energy and infrastructure projects such as laying
the pipelines, building railroads and highways.
Kyrgyzstan’s silver, aluminium, copper and coal, Uzbekistan’s gas, oil,
coal and uranium and Tajikistan’s aluminium and uranium besides the gas
connectivity with Turkmenistan are high on the Chinese radar. However,

other than trading with raw material on terms advantageous to them, the
Central Asian resource market has proved to be tricky in the past 25 years.
Yet the Chinese persist in business through fnancing and building surface
communication infrastructure across countries that have hooked the CARs
to a Chinese tether of long-term loans. In some cases, the Chinese insist on
authorities to consider the issue of transfer of deposits to China, particularly,
the Sandyk aluminium deposit in Naryn oblast.
Kazakhstan Corridor
The second outlet in the Eurasian direction via Kazakhstan is of utmost sig-
nifcance for China. Kazakhstan is a huge country with enormous natural
and mineral resources China could access for its economic development, par-
ticularly of Xinjiang. In the decade 2005–2015, China had invested $23.55
billion in Kazakhstan compared to $3.88 billion in Turkmenistan, $3.61 bil-
lion in Kyrgyzstan, $1.51 billion in Uzbekistan and $ 1.24 billion in Tajik-
istan (Dash 2015). An amount of $10.24 billion in all the four CARs put
together and $23.55 billion alone in Kazakhstan put the latter in the priority
list of regional investment. These investments have spawned in energy and
infrastructure sectors and paled the U.S. investment in Kazakhstan for 2005–
2014, which comprised just $14 billion (US Department of State 2015).
Kazakhstan visualizes China as a business partner, which could use its tran-
sit corridor to Europe via Russia. Kazakhstan has partnered China for its own
development in infrastructure and it seems both countries have joined hands
to materialize the New Silk Road concept, of which Kazakhstan is an impor-
tant and integral part. A key transit point on the way of Chinese goods to the
markets in Europe, Kazakhstan is also a source of energy supply to China.
Alena Zelenin, reporting from Astana in the Regnum News Channel on
7 November 2015, stated that the mood in Astana is serious about China’s
BRI. Kazakhstan is determined to hasten the speed of its implementation.
The hitch is that the land route will be signifcantly costlier: $3,000 via sea
versus $8,000 on land route that pays transit tarif to many countries it
passes through. Yet Kazakhstan readies itself to provide transit and serve as a
corridor between China and Europe. Further, the land route will reduce time
from 40–60 days to merely 13–14 days to cover a distance of 10,500 kilome-
tres from Zhengzhou in China to Hamburg in Germany by train. The ease
of speed delivery has surged land route freight trafc. In the frst 8 months of
2015, as many as 295 goods trains shuttled on return journey between China
and Europe–an increase of 105 trains more compared to a year before and
the shenanigans continue.
In September 2013, when China launched the OBOR in Astana, it went
unnoticed by Russia and other countries because it was then too vague. A
130 P. L. Dash
few days later, Russia termed the proposal something as “intrusion in the
Russian sphere”. However, months later when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin
met in Moscow, they not only endorsed the idea, but linked it to EAEU as a
facilitator (Gabuev 2014).
Ever since November 2014, when Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev
announced his policy of NurlyZhol (Shining Path) that aimed at infrastruc-
ture building, signifcant activities have been under way within Kazakhstan.
NurlyZhol visualizes an interconnectivity of road network and establish-
ment of transport and logistics centres throughout Kazakhstan, particu-
larly involving such cities as Almaty, Shymkent, Aktau, Pavlodar, Kostanay,
Semey, Aktobe and Atyrau so that the country becomes the key distribution
hub for goods to Russian and the CARs. Kazakhstan has received $3.9 bil-
lion loans from international fnancial institutions since 2015, so that 9,800
kilometres of public roads would be built or renovated. During the second
stage (2020–2025) of this road-building project, the target of building nearly
4,000 kilometres of roads by 2022 (Bulatkulova 2021).
Khorgos or the “Eastern Gates to Eurasia” has not only become a dry
port, but an epicentre of commerce, a logistics centre and an SEZ for Chinese
investment. This is the largest goods distribution centre in Kazakhstan spread-
ing over an area of 149 hectares and one of the busiest dry ports along the Silk
Road. In collaboration with Dubai Port World of UAE, the largest port opera-
tor in the world, Kazakhstan is strengthening the Khorgos dry port.
Within its territory, Kazakhstan has been developing a bifurcate transport
corridor “North-South”: the north accesses Russia and Europe and the South
veers towards the trans-Caspian corridor through Aktau port, the west fanks
of which goes to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and southern fank aims
at Iran. An international automobile transit corridor is being built through
Kazakhstan. This is the Eastern Europe-Western China road network
between St. Petersburg and Lianyungang or the Shuangxi Highway, which is
the virtual New Silk Road, the total length of which will be 8,445 kilometres
of which 2,787 kilometres will pass through Kazakhstan. Besides, emphasis
is being laid on Almaty, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Atyrau radial highways.
In addition, the Borzhakty-Ersai rail line, an infrastructural basis for
the ferry complex Kuryk that has a capacity of 4 million tons of cargo a
year on the Caspian Sea, has been completed. Road and rail infrastructure
development along the Caspian coast has become signifcant in view of the
imperatives of oil transport and modernization of Kazakhstan’s only sea-
port at Aktau, along the trans-Caspian international transport corridor. The
inter-linkages between the dry port at Khorgos and seaport at Aktau and
the myriad arterial connectivity linking the two hubs together constitute the
salience of the New Silk Road for Kazakhstan. Aktau port handled 14 mil-
lion tons of cargo in 2014 compared to 7.9 million tons by Astrakhan and
Makhachkala put together. Aktau is turning to be an important link in the
International North-South Transport Corridor as well as a signifcant point

along the Silk Road.
Kazakhstan has already become the transit point for cargo transfer of
China and Russia. Kazakhstan is emerging as a great facilitator of integra-
tion and interoperability within the Eurasian Economic Community and
beyond. However, there is a stark imbalance in cargo movement: 90 per cent
of all goods are coming from Asia to Europe, and most of these will pass via
Kazakhstan. Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov (2015) has said: “forget
the Great game, the New Silk Road is a Great Gain and a great beneft for us,
for China, Russia, the USA, Europe, India, Iran, and Turkey, and of course,
Kazakhstan”.
Uzbek-Turkmen Corridor
In the Soviet years, Kazakhstan was not considered a part of Central Asia.
All Soviet literature mentioned Kazakhstan separately from Central Asia.
Therefore, China’s quest for a transport corridor to Europe via neighbouring
Kazakhstan was a positive indication. The existing Beijing-Moscow rail line
has been serving China and Russia for decades. Besides, three clear directions
of communication links are in the ofng from China to Moscow and beyond
to Europe: (1) an express rail line between Beijing and Moscow; (2) the one
already operating through Kazakhstan as surface-sea links via Aktau; and (3)
the one coming up when China would be linked via Kyrgyzstan to Uzbeki-
stan through numerous tunnels.
In this connection, the real ancient Silk Road is getting revived within
Uzbekistan and beyond. Uzbekistan has the advantage of a massive east-
west expanse from Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders to Uzbek-borders near Termez and
Uzbek-Turkmen borders across a long stretch of Amu Darya river. A visit to
the town Khodjaev beyond Andijan close to Uzbekistan’s borders with Kyr-
gyzstan convinced the author about the real intentions of Uzbek authorities
to broaden the roads and lay a rail line. From there on and westward through
the Kamchik Pass – where a “chicken neck territory” connects Uzbekistan’s
mountains with valleys – the road throughout is getting widened. As of 2016
and early 2017, with completion of Angren-Pap railway line, Fergana valley
was well connected through a road and rail network within the territory of
Uzbekistan.
This massive road construction network underscores the importance the
ancient Silk Road has for economic development of western Uzbekistan,
which is an arid desert-like landmass. While the Silk Roads travelled in the
south-western direction via Karshi to Shortan in Uzbekistan and via Bukhara
and beyond to Merv and Nisha in Turkmenistan, the trajectory of the ancient
Silk Road is slowly assuming a new connotation – that of an energy highway
of transportation. These upcoming new roads and railway lines will connect
132 P. L. Dash
Central Asia and the Caspian littorals in two directions: (1) with China and
beyond in the east and (2) with Afghanistan and India in South Asia. The
upcoming roads are looking up for greater commercial transactions with
prospering economies of East and South Asia with Central Asia.
Thus, Uzbekistan, aside from its eastern parts of the Fergana valley, has
been laying considerable importance in furthering road and rail networks as
much by itself as through neighbouring Turkmenistan. The major eforts of
this Silk Road connection include the following:
• Traditional Silk Road through Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva and

beyond through Turkmen territory to Iran has been strengthened despite
the fact that rail communication links among the CARs have been largely
suspended and slowly getting resumed.
• The completion of Angren-Pap railway line at a cost of $1.68 billion on
the Silk Road.
• The Chinese connectivity to this traditional route has been welcomed and
new investments encouraged.
• Uzbekistan has built in the past 5 years a rail link with Afghanistan, both
with tacit acquiescence of Iran and the United States.
• Many arterial roads within the country point out at these main networks
and work is progressing in all directions.
Conceptualized in June 2003 by the Heads of States of Iran and Uzbeki-

stan at a meeting in Tehran, the construction of a 75-kilometre major trans-
Afghan rail link of Khayraton-Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat with fnancial help from
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was completed in 2010 and 70 per cent
of the cargo is already being transported between the two countries (Dul-
taeva 2015). Uzbekistan is determined to engage Afghanistan in a big way
in the communication networking system since both countries have a very
central location at the juncture of South, Central and West Asia.
The CASA Concept

The Uzbek position is complementary to the U.S. position with regard to
considering Afghanistan as a new geo-economic pivot on the New Silk Road.
The link between Central and South Asia is likely to remain in discussion
and analysis for years to come for the very importance Afghanistan has in
the new scheme of unfolding communication networks. It would end the
isolation of the region and integrate the CARs with Iran, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Washington viewed this integration essential in order to actively
engage Afghanistan and the CARs in economic development programmes.
In fact, the United States wished to economically integrate Afghanistan
frst to the CARs and then to the wider world. The then U.S. Secretary of
State Hilary Clinton then broached the new Silk Road Project idea with
Afghanistan as the pivot during a meeting with 25 countries on the sidelines
of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2011. This project
had “characteristic of a formal act of intergovernmental or supranational
engagement among 25 countries of European, American, South and Central
Asian regions. It featured Afghanistan’s direct overland linkages with Central
and South Asia for intra-regional trade” (Kaw 2014).
The CASA concept is complementary to the Chinese and Russian position.
The CASA is a blueprint of integration along the Silk and the Spice routes
and has the integrative potential of uniting Central Asia with South Asia
via Afghanistan. It aims at providing maritime access to land-locked and
doubly land-locked countries of Central Asia with their access to Pakistan,
Iran and India. The concept ought to pick up for commercial gains of all
those involved in expanding their engagement in the region, but it requires
a cooperative platform of ensuring peace and stability, which have so far
been evading Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and the fve CARs. However,
political fuidity and economic volatility and widespread apprehensions of
spreading terrorism in the region are an impediment to implementation of
the CASA concept.
Maritime Silk Road

China has been pursuing a combination of two theoretical postulates of geo-
politics for domination: Mackinder’s Heartland and Mahan’s Domination
over the Seas. The eforts at the Central Asian and Kazakhstan direction cul-
minated in realizing the frst one following which, or rather in the middle of
it, China paid attention to Sea routes. It came out with Maritime Silk Route
concept as oceanic extension of the ambitious communication links.
Aware that the strength of a great power rests on its maritime capabilities,
China has been assiduously pursuing its relations with South and South East
Asian countries to have access to building deep seaports in these countries.
Three countries in the periphery of India fgured prominently in this pic-
ture: Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – all surrounding India from three
sides – the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk
Road has a number of moorings across the oceanic expanse. First, China has
eked out a maritime strategy in the South China Sea to dominate the aquatic
expanse through all its lanes and by-lanes, shelf and ridges and from year to
year it has been strengthening its position. Second, it has taken up cudgels
with Vietnam concerning its presence in the periphery of that country and
claiming rifs and ridges with energy deposits. Third, it wishes to expand its
maritime prowess via the Malacca strait to have unhindered business access
to the Indian Ocean. Fourth, it has landed on a huge mission of building
or modernizing ports across the expanse – Mergui and Sittwe in Myanmar,
134 P. L. Dash
Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan and Djibouti on the Horn of

Africa. Fifth, what has accentuated China’s discernible, geopolitical strategy
is the road and rail connectivity China has been building in these countries.
The Kashgar-Gwadar highway is as much a good example as the upcoming
railway connectivity through Kyrgyzstan. These surface communication links
are likely to facilitate swift movement of goods and labour force between and
among the countries in the years to come. Finally, a grand plan for transna-
tional and cross-country trade routes, both along maritime and surface, is
emerging as the routes of commerce for the future of which rising China is
the initiator and to a great extent implementer.
Conclusion
In the years when railways were absent in Asia, what had begun as the jour-
ney of a trader from Tver to India via sea has turned the quest today to span
in various directions – rails, roads and sea with many small and big actors at
interplay. A rising power is always an aspiring power for domination. China
has so far no control over the South China Sea – its primary deep sea access
to warm waters along its developed eastern coast. The maritime domination
of the United States prevails there. Thus future years will witness an intense
jostle for power over the seas between the United States and China, while
other Indian Ocean powers with marginal role in the region will play side
with one or the other.
The scenario on revival of the Great Silk Road in the European and Asian
directions on the surface has so far been an unhindered Chinese sway, pri-
marily due to massive Chinese investment in Kazakhstan, and secondarily
because there is a complementarity of economic interest of concerned coun-
tries of the region. The tussle on the Asian theatre is largely between China
on the one hand and a number of CARs on the other and Russia on the third
front. The United States is here a marginal player, but it has been retaining its
potency through its chosen regional actors.
The arterial roads built within the region such as Angren-Pap rail line,
Dustlyk-Kamchik road widening and 10 bridges over Amu Darya to con-
nect Tajikistan and Afghanistan are feeder roads of integrative nature; the
more of them, the better the economic prospects and faster the communica-
tion in an area full of mountains and deserts. While the interplay of these
three scenarios of roads, rails and maritime directly concerns the Silk Roads,
in geopolitical parlance there is diferent ground. The region is fecund with
hostilities. A Russian scholar, A. Kazantsev (2013) predicts four upcoming
scenarios for Central Asia: (1) a concert of powers – Russia and China on one
side and the United States and European Union on the other; (2) loss of inter-
est by big powers in the region due to nagging conficts and no tangible out-
come in sight in the foreseeable future; (3) continuation of the Great Game
strategy, where all big and small powers will vie for regional supremacy; and
(4) regional hegemony of China over the entire region (Kazantsev 2013). A
combination of all scenarios is the likely possibility because no one could
exclude the United States, China, Russia and the EU from the emerging Silk
Road in whichever direction you look.
References
Bucsky, Peter and Tristan Kenderdine. 2020. “The Fergana Valley Railway Should
Never Be Built.” March 17. Accessed April 17, 2020. www.mei.edu/publications/
ferghana-valley-railway-should-never-be-built
Bulatkulova, Saniya. 2021. “Nurly Zhol Infrastructure Project Pledges 95 Percent of
Local Roads to be Improved by 2025.” Astana Times. October 28. Accessed Octo-
ber 20, 2022. https://astanatimes.com/2021/10/nurly-zhol-infrastructure-project-
pledges-95-percent-of-local-roads-to-be-improved-by-2025/
Dash, P. L. 2015. “Modi in Central Asia: Will Modi’s July Forays Bring About a
Change?” World Focus. November, 432: 39.
Dultaeva, Sevara I. 2015. “Developing an Architecture of Transport Networks on
the New Silk Road in Uzbekistan: Threshold of an Era.” In Central Asia and
Regional Security, edited by P. L. Dash, Anita Sengupta and Murat Bakhadirov.
Chandigarh: CRRID.
Gabuev, Alexander. 2014. “Post-Soviet States Jostle for Role in China’s New Silk
Road Project.” Hong Kong TDC. August 17.
Idrissov, Erlan. 2015.“The Great Gain Not the Great Game: How Kazakhstan is
Charting Its Own Course in the World.” November 16. Accessed October 17,
2018. https://astanatimes.com/2015/11/the-great-gain-not-the-great-game-how-
kazakhstan-is-charting-its-own-course-in-the-world/
Kaw, Mushtaq A. 2014. “New US Silk Road Project for Post -2014 Afghanistan:
Myth or Reality.” Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 9 (17).
Kazantsev, A. 2013. “Whither Central Asia: Changing Role of Global Actors in Per-
spective 2020.” Russia and the Muslim World 6 (252).
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logue Quarterly. January–March, 15 (3): 90–99.
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“National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the
Period of 2013–2017.” Accessed January 15, 2019. www.un-page.org/fles/public/
kyrgyz_national_sustainable_development_strategy.pdf
Panflova, Victoria. 2010. “Kyrgyzskie kacheli.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. February 26.
Stratfor. 2018. “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway to Improve Attractiveness of
Central Asia.” January 19. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://worldview.
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central-asia
US Department of State. 2015. “Kazakhstan Investment Climate Statement.” May.
Washington, DC.
11
AFGHANISTAN AS THE BELT
AND ROAD PIVOT FOR ASIA
Satyam
Introduction
Afghanistan’s long chequered history has largely been defned by its geogra-
phy, which puts this war-torn country right at the “heart of Asia”. It proved
to be an advantage during the two-millennium-long existence of the ancient
Silk Road as Afghanistan fourished throughout this period both economi-
cally and culturally. However, by the 10th century AD, trade along the Silk
Road began to reduce drastically mainly due to frequent wars in the region
as well as the advancement in maritime technology. Further, as a result of
the Great Game, Afghanistan by the 20th century found itself surrounded by
Russian, Chinese, British and Persian empires. This left Afghanistan isolated
from the rest of the world. The condition of Afghanistan was further deterio-
rated during the Cold War era that witnessed internal disturbances as well as
external aggressions inside its territory. However, this turn of events led to
the recognition of the geostrategic advantage of Afghanistan in international
politics.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991 triggered a
huge shift in the geopolitics of Central Asia region, including Afghanistan,
as it opened up this resource-rich region to the rest of the world for the frst
time and also made the neighbouring states susceptible to traditional and
non-traditional threats emanating from this region. This forced the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) to form a more proactive policy with regard to this
region, which would help China tap into the resources of this region without
letting it worsen the security situation in Xinjiang. However, in the post-9/11
period, China’s foreign policy with regard to this region has expanded beyond
the Xinjiang factor and now caters to its geopolitical ambitions as well.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-13
Afghanistan as the Belt and Road Pivot for Asia 137
The recent power shift in Kabul that led to the return of Taliban has now
forced China to put Afghanistan among the top priorities on its foreign pol-
icy agenda as a swift action from China right now is both necessary (in terms
of securing Xinjiang from threats arising out of Afghan soil) and desirable
(in terms of the opportunity that the current situation provides for China to
present itself as a regional leader).
It is against this backdrop that this chapter tries to present Afghanistan’s
case as a possible “Pivot or Transit Hub” for the BRI in Asia by highlighting
Afghanistan’s potential as well as its need for the same. The chapter argues
that there has been a commonality of objectives behind China’s Afghan pol-
icy since 1991 and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which in turn points
towards the importance of Afghanistan in achieving the dual objectives of
securing Xinjiang and establishing geopolitical advantage in Asia.
Afghanistan as a Transit Hub for Asia

Afghanistan was once dubbed as “the heart of the Silk Road”, “a route of
prosperity and wealth” (Peyrouse 2007). Afghanistan’s geopolitical impor-
tance was well established around two millenniums ago, when it fourished a
lot in this period. However, this very geopolitical situation led to the reversal
of the period of prosperity into a period of insecurity, devastation and under-
development. In the post–Cold War period, with the U.S. focus on its initia-
tive of “New Silk Road”, Afghanistan regained her historical geopolitical
position (Starr 2007). This had prompted former Afghan President Ashraf
Ghani to afrm that “Afghanistan’s goal is to become a transit country for
transport, power transmissions, gas pipelines and fbre optics” and that “in
the next 25 years, Asia is going to become the world’s largest continental
economy but that without Afghanistan, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia
and West Asia will not be optimally integrated” (Starr and Kuchins 2010). It
is believed that development of Afghanistan as a transit hub “would provide
Afghanistan with the opportunity to exploit and maximize the value of its
natural resources, build human capacity, create employment, pay for pro-
curement of services, and capitalize on the economic potential of Central and
West Asia” (Asian Development Bank 2011).
The followings key factors highlight Afghanistan’s potential and its need
to develop itself and be developed by the regional as well as global par-
ties as “a transit and transport hub for Asia” and integrate various regional
economies.
Geographical Location
Halford Mackinder (1904) had described the region surrounding Afghani-
stan as “the heartland of Eurasia” and “the geographical pivot of history”.
138 Satyam
Kuchins (2011) has drawn a similar conclusion that “demonstrates the con-
sensus of literature and experts on Afghanistan’s geo-strategic and geo-polit-
ical importance in the region and the world”. Afghanistan shares its borders
with six neighbouring countries – Pakistan (2,430 kilometres), Iran (936
kilometres), Turkmenistan (744 kilometres), Uzbekistan (137 kilometres),
Tajikistan (126 kilometres) and China (76 kilometres)–putting it right at the
centre of the regional transport network. Afghanistan is at the crossroad of
East, West, Central and South Asia and as Saikal (2014) points out,
each of these regions has its own riches to complement one another in
trade, industrial development and investment; for example, Central Asia
is rich in gas, oil and gold; South Asia and the Far East in capital, technol-
ogy, industry and trained manpower; and the Middle East in gas, oil and
capital.
Afghanistan’s development as a transit hub, therefore, will not only help con-
nect these complementary areas with each other as well as with the rest of the
world but will also provide Afghanistan with a much needed regular source
of income in terms of transit fee.
Foreign Trade Defcits and Transit Costs

As per the data received from Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2020), Afghan-
istan’s imports in 2019 amounted to $6776.18 million whereas the exports
were $863.8 million with a huge trade defcit. Afghanistan is dependent on
neighbours such as Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan for trade. As almost all these imports comprise essential goods, it
is not possible to reduce the quantity of these imports, which is in fact going
to rise as long as the reconstruction works are not concluded; the advisable
solution to reduce this trade defcit therefore would be to make substantial
cuts in the import costs. It is clear from this information that Afghanistan’s
geographical location that was once its strength has now become one of its
major weaknesses. Afghanistan, therefore, needs to improve its connectivity
with the neighbouring countries to secure access to the global markets and
reduce its dependency.
Afghanistan’s Natural Resources

There are undiscovered oil and gas reserves besides a copper ore reserve of
around 240 metric tonnes, which according to American estimates is around
$908 billion and $3 trillion as per Afghan estimates. To utilize these natural
and mineral resources for a sustainable Afghan economy, Shroder (2008)
suggests a “national level transport infrastructure” so that accessibility to the
resources can be ensured and thus these resources can be explored. Shorder
adds that the “regional” and “international” strategies require inter-regional
and international trade and transit infrastructure to be able to transport the
resources to the appropriate markets. Therefore, “pipelines, railway cor-
ridors and road linkages are a must for Afghanistan to get the maximum
value out of its resources and stabilise its economy on the basis of the same”
(Asian Development Bank 2011). International aid agencies recognized the
importance of infrastructure in improving the “efciency of both the govern-
ment and aid agencies” and therefore, “substantial investments were diverted
towards the development of roads, dams, power lines and railways” (Shroder
2008).
Regional Connectivity
Developing Afghanistan as a transit hub would require at least some level
of pre-existing infrastructure in order for international actors to be a part of
this endeavour. Afghan government under Hamid Karzai took the frst step
towards developing regional cooperation to promote political, economic
and regional security by hosting the frst Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) in 2005, which was followed by simi-
lar conferences in New Delhi (2006), Islamabad (2009), Istanbul (2010),
Dushanbe (2012) and Kabul (2015). The 2015 RECCA had identifed these
six diferent projects as being central to the attainment of its policy objectives:
(1) The Lapis Lazuli Route that connects Central Europe, the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Central Asia and South Asia and traverses through Ukraine, Bul-
garia, Romania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and China, and provides Afghanistan the shortest
and most economical route to both Europe and China (Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan 2018); (2) Iran-India Garland Highway, which is an extension
to the Zaranj-Delaram highway constructed by India in 2009, plans to con-
nect Afghanistan to the Iran’s Chabahar port through Iran’s existing road
network (Times of India 2009); (3) Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan and Pakistan (TUTAP), which aims at the transfer of surplus
energy from hydroelectricity-rich Central Asian countries to electricity-
defcient Afghanistan and Pakistan (Daily Outlook Afghanistan 2016);(4)
The Five Nations Railway Corridor, which aims to link China, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran by a single rail link; (5) Central Asia and
South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) aims at transferring excess hydroelectricity
produced by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (US
Department of State 2015); (6) Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
(TAPI) gas pipeline, which could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s grow-
ing energy needs and provide signifcant transit revenues for Afghanistan
and Pakistan (Reuters 2015).
140 Satyam
These connectivity projects while providing the much required push to the
idea of “Afghanistan as a Transit Hub” have also established the geo-strate-
gic importance of Afghanistan. However, analysing the present situation in
Afghanistan, it is found that the country is still far away from the desired level
of “connectivity” and “development” that it seeks and had once enjoyed as
part of the ancient Silk Road and therefore is in need of a “New Silk Road”.
Afghanistan and the Silk Road Renaissance

The Silk Road renaissance in the modern and contemporary times led to
the inception of many initiatives in the region, some backed by multilateral
organizations like the EU and others by countries like the United States and
China: (1) Turkey’s “Silk Road Project” announced in 2008 by Turkey’s Min-
istry of Customs and Trade that primarily focused on transportation, secu-
rity, logistics and custom procedures at borders; (2) The U.S. New Silk Road
Strategy, which was frst mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(2011), during her visit to India in July 2011, where she talked about “revi-
talisation of the ancient Silk Road” (Fedorenko 2013); (3) New Silk Road
Initiative by Europe as “an internationally recognized programme, which
was initiated with the aim of strengthening trade, economic relations and
transport communication in the Black Sea basin, South Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia” (TRACECA 2012). None of the initiatives discussed has displayed
the potential to develop the trade and transit infrastructure of the region in
comparison to the One Belt One Road (OBOR) or the BRI by China.
Belt and Road Initiative

The BRI was introduced as the Silk Road Economic Belt by the Chinese
President Xi Jinping in September 2013 in Kazakhstan and 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia. China’s National Development Reforms
Commission (2015) elaborated on the BRI:
[T]he overland Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on creating a Land Bridge
spanning across Eurasia and developing China, Mongolia and Russia;
China, Central Asia and West Asia; and China and Indochina Peninsula
economic corridors by building international transport routes, with a
focus on core cities along the Belt and Road and using economic industrial
parks as cooperation platforms, on the other hand, Maritime Silk Road
will connect major sea ports along the Belt and Road, focusing on jointly
building efcient, secure and smooth transport routes.
The Silk Road Economic Belt will also include “the development of fnan-
cial cooperation, high speed railways, energy transportation infrastructure
like oil and gas pipelines, telecommunication linkages, electric grids etc”
(Tsao 2015).
Fallon (2015) has mentioned that the project will be funded by a Silk Road
Fund amounting to USD 40 billion, established in December 2014 under the
People’s Bank of China along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), amounting to USD 100 billion, and the New Development Bank or
BRICS Bank, with an initial capital of USD 50 billion and a lending capac-
ity of USD 34 billion annually. More than 70 countries had joined BRI by
the year 2015, forming 62.3 per cent of the world population, 30 per cent
of the world GDP, 38.5 per cent of the world land area and 24 per cent of
the world household consumption (National Development Reforms Com-
mission 2015).
Highlighting the rationale of the BRI, Zhiping (2014) has said that “in
China’s push for westward opening-up it is incumbent for it to include the
Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean into a broader coopera-
tion involving West, Central and South Asia, dozens of European countries
and a population of 3 billion people, for a wider Central Asian growth”. The
BRI, as Fallon (2015) points out, has “a strong domestic angle”, that is “to
develop its comparatively less advanced and less developed western region
of Xinjiang, this is the reason why the Silk Road Economic Belt starts from
the more advanced eastern coastal regions”. The BRI can thus be studied as
an extension of China’s “Go-West” policy too, which aims to “develop its
vast western reaches which have till now remained poor and have been com-
pared to Siberia or American West” (The Economist 2000). Hongyi Harry
Lai (2002) has pointed out that “there is a large diferential in the incomes
of agricultural farmers in this area and those on the eastern coast and that
only about 5 per cent of the total foreign investments have been aimed at
this region in the past two decades”. The government, therefore, “diverted
majority of its tax revenues and multi-lateral funding aid to the western prov-
inces under this policy and is investing billions of dollars in this policy, mak-
ing this one the biggest economic regeneration projects of all time” (China
Daily 2011).
However, ever since its inception, the BRI has been under constant watch
of its critics who point towards a “grand-strategy” behind this initiative.
According to Ying (2015), “the Chinese BRI has often been compared with
the U.S. Marshall Plan which was aimed at increasing the United States’ infu-
ence in Europe after the end of the Second World War in order to contain the
Soviet infuence”. Some are therefore of the view that “the hidden objective
of this initiative is to create its infuence in the Asian as well as the Eura-
sian region by creating China-centred infrastructure” (Rudolf 2015). Others
compared it with “the ‘Great Game’ that took place in the same region, as a
100-year war between the great empires of the British and the Soviets dur-
ing the nineteenth century” (China Briefng 2015). A major criticism of the
142 Satyam
BRI is that “China is investing such huge sums of money in the region to
provide a larger market as an outlet for its industrial overcapacity” (The
Economist 2015).
These arguments lead us to the conclusion that there are at least two main
objectives behind China’s BRI. Firstly, in a narrow sense, to develop, inte-
grate and secure its western region, especially Xinjiang, and secondly, in a
broader sense, to gain geopolitical advantage in Asia.
The BRI is working towards China’s eforts to fll the infrastructure gap
left by the Western countries in addition to helping countries boost their
development. However, it can be argued that the events that have taken place
in countries like Sri Lanka, Nicaragua and the Solomon Islands have proven
to be more complex, controversial and political, and have been accompanied
by social unrest and debt crisis. The United States’ 2018 Report to Congress
by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2018) has
highlighted the “debt sustainability problems for the BRI countries” aris-
ing out of the fact that the Chinese commercial and policy banks have been
the major source of fnancing BRI projects, rather than direct investment,
and form the majority share (52 per cent) of the total outstanding loans
and equity relating to BRI. Another issue pointed out by experts regarding
BRI is that the countries that are unable to pay back Chinese debt end up
providing China with an undue economic and strategic leverage and “in
some cases threatening the sovereignty of host countries”. Further, it is also
claimed in the report that BRI has “facilitated and justifed” the presence of
Chinese military overseas and “could eventually create security problems
for the United States and its allies and partners beyond China’s immediate
maritime periphery”.
Hurley et al. (2018), while terming the chances that BRI will be plagued
with “wide scale debt sustainability problems” as unlikely, have stated that it
is also unlikely that the BRI will avoid any instances of debt problems among
its participating countries”. Jones and Hameiri (2020) have proved how Sri
Lanka’s debt crisis was made, not in China, but in Colombo, and in the
international (i.e. Western-dominated) fnancial markets. The data show that
till 2016, the percentage of Chinese loans in general and specifc borrowings
from Chinese for the Hambantota Port accounted for only 9 per cent and 4.8
per cent, respectively, of the total borrowings by the Sri Lankan government
(Jones and Hameiri 2020). The fact that maturities and interest rates for the
Chinese loans were around 15–20 years and 2.5 per cent, respectively, clearly
shows that the pressure to repay the Chinese debt was not as severe as that of
the debt from other foreign sources (Jones and Hameiri 2020).
While the “debt-trap” allegations are difcult to prove and it is undeniable
that the BRI has grown over time to become “the largest transnational infra-
structure project ever undertaken by a single nation”, mounting evidence
suggests that China itself is at present experiencing “its frst overseas debt
crisis” due to unprecedented rate at which the loans granted for funding vari-
ous projects under BRI are defaulting (The Economist 2022).
Alternative to BRI
A $600 billion initiative, known as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment (PGII), launched by the United States and its partners on
27 June 2022 at the G-7 summit in Germany, is being viewed as a Western
alternative to the BRI (Singh 2022). This project aims to fll the infrastruc-
ture gap in “developing and middle-income countries” (Munjal 2022). The
PGII is essential a re-launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) that was
launched by the G-7 in June 2021 and both share the same objectives as prin-
ciples. However, a major diference between the two projects is the clear and
explicit mentioning of “hard infrastructure” projects in the PGII announce-
ment which was absent from B3W (Savoy 2022). This puts the PGII directly
against the BRI by China. When compared with the BRI, the PGII is focused
more on the human development than mere economic growth and aims at
“improving the quality of education and health care facilities (The Economic
Times 2022).
The PGII looks like a worthy competitor for the BRI, at least on paper, as
it seems to be created with all the criticism in mind that the Western world
has hurled towards the BRI over the years. However, it is too early to predict
its future as we have seen many such ambitious initiatives by the West in the
past which have failed to bring about the promised results, like the Inter-
national North-South Transport Corridor or many of the “new Silk Road”
projects mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter.
Sino-Afghan Relations
During 1990s
China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan in the post–
Cold War era had three core interests of security, development and energy,
which developed because of the erstwhile Soviet Union’s disintegration and
out of China’s need for ensuring security in its north-western province of
Xinjiang and its integration into the mainland (Clarke 2011, 123–128).
China during the 1990s followed its “new security diplomacy” that worked
towards reducing external tensions through “cooperation, multilateralism
and regionalism” to “focus on domestic, political and social reform chal-
lenges” (Gill 2010, 26). Xinjiang’s geographical proximity as well as its cul-
tural linkages to Central Asia which were perceived as an obstacle in its
integration with China during the Cold War era were seen as an advantage
in the post–Cold War period to achieve the same (Clarke 2011, 126–128).
144 Satyam
This change in approach towards the geopolitics of Xinjiang by China can be

clearly seen through China’s eforts since the early 1990s to develop Xinjiang
as “Eurasian Continental Bridge”, “a hub of New Silk Road” and recently as
“a hub of Silk Road Economic Belt” for which huge investments were made
in Xinjiang as well as Central Asia (Becquelin 2004).
China’s approach towards Afghanistan during this period however
remained negative as it was perceived as a source of Islamic radicalism.
Therefore, China’s Afghan policy at this time mainly dealt with the “preven-
tion of any potential spill over of radical Islamism and other non-traditional
threats like trafcking of drugs and weapons” from Afghanistan into the
troubled region of Xinjiang (Chang 1997). The threat of such spill over was
more eminent at the time as Karakoram highway played an important role in
China’s policy of increasing cooperation and linkages with Central and South
Asia which facilitated not only legitimate but also illegal trade between Paki-
stan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang (China) (Roberts 2004). This security threat
encouraged China to initiate the formation of the Shanghai Five (now Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation) in 1996. Thus, it can be said that China’s
approach to Afghanistan in the 1990s was guided by “its interests in securing
Xinjiang and developing constructive relations with the post-Soviet Central
Asian republics” (Clarke 2016).
Post 9/11
In the aftermath of 9/11, China found itself in a dilemma as it wanted “nei-
ther a Western victory in its backyard, nor a Taliban victory” both of which
pose risks to Xinjiang and the adjacent region (Small 2014). Therefore,
China remained more or less uninterested or least interested in Afghanistan
with “limited engagement in the economic sphere” and “refusal to become
directly involved in the security sphere” while maintaining a minimum neces-
sary presence in the country (Wishnick 2014).
China’s Afghan policy witnessed its frst major change in the post 9/11 era
with Barrack Obama’s election as the President of United States in 2009 and
the formulation of his “Af-Pak Strategy”. China suddenly became proactive
in Afghanistan and risked the security of Xinjiang while also putting its rela-
tionship with its “all-weather friend” Pakistan at stake (Clarke 2016). This
was a result of conficting views regarding Barrack Obama administration’s
future plans for Afghanistan under its “Af-Pak Strategy” as the People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) believed the U.S. forces are going to stay there for long,
whereas the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Afairs predicted “withdrawal of
the US forces” from Afghanistan (Small 2014). In any case, China had to
increase its presence in Afghanistan either to counter America’s rising power
in its “backyard” or to fll up the void created by the U.S. withdrawal in
order to control the security situation in Afghanistan. By this time, however,
a broader geopolitical calculus had emerged, encapsulated in President Xi

Jinping’s BRI strategy, which, at its core, is an outgrowth of Beijing’s decades
long agenda to integrate Xinjiang and utilize this region’s unique geopolitical
position to facilitate a China-centric Eurasian geo-economic system (Clarke
2016).
Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan (2021)

The fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 led to a change in Afghanistan’s leader-
ship; however, China’s policy objectives with regard to Afghanistan remain
the same. It is still mainly driven by China’s security concerns in Xinjiang
in particular as well as of the larger region around Afghanistan in general.
China has invested a considerable amount of money both in and around
Afghanistan, especially since 2013 as part of the BRI programme and there-
fore has a lot to lose in case the security situation in the region deteriorates.
A stable Afghanistan is what China desires and that is why it was quick to
engage with the Taliban leadership post their takeover of Afghanistan and
even kept its embassy open in Kabul (Kuo 2022; Henley and Burke 2021).
In fact, China was the frst country to promise as well as provide assistance
to Afghanistan and has since delivered more than 12 batches of humanitar-
ian aid (Yau 2022). The Taliban too is likely to welcome China’s resumption
of commercial activities in Afghanistan since the investment will “bring in
much-needed funds”. Even in the best-case scenario, it is improbable that
the Afghan economy, which is fragile and heavily dependent on foreign aid
from the West (that has stopped as a result of various sanctions imposed on
Afghanistan post Taliban’s return to power in August 2021), can recover to
pre-Taliban levels (Jami et al. 2021). China has, on many occasions, shared
its concerns regarding the Uyghur militants, linked to East Turkestan Islamic
Movement or Islamic State-Khorasan, operating from Afghanistan under
Taliban rule but the Taliban leadership has been reiterating since before the
fall of Kabul that they will not “interfere in China’s internal matters” and
“will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used against any other country”,
and has called China its “principal partner” (Trofmov and Deng 2021; Kele-
men 2022).
Another factor that rationalizes Sino-Afghan partnership is that Afghani-
stan and the rest of the world, including China, have a common enemy, that
is Islamic State Khorasan. The current situation in Afghanistan has presented
a great opportunity for China to project itself as a regional leader and a
peacemaker, a role it is performing very well by “leveraging its good rela-
tions with regional countries to create a regional consensus and push for all
neighboring countries to support the Taliban in Afghanistan” (Yau 2022).
Apart from the seven bilateral meetings held between Chinese and Afghan
ofcials since April 2022, China has held three multinational meetings on
146 Satyam
Afghanistan with its neighbours and other interested parties. All these dia-
logues were aimed towards providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan
and help stabilise it. China hosted the latest of these multinational meet-
ings attended by representatives from Afghanistan and nine other countries,
including Russia and the United States, apart from its neighbours (The Indian
Express 2022; Al Jazeera 2022). The third meeting resulted in commitments
by the neighbouring countries in their individual capacity to assist in the
delivery of humanitarian aid as well as to provide “tangible support to eco-
nomic rebuilding” of Afghanistan (Yau 2022).
It is understood that China’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was
shaped by two diferent objectives during diferent periods; initially, in the
1990s the objective to secure Xinjiang took prominence over other objec-
tives while the post 9/11 period saw the emergence of a larger “geopolitical
calculus”.
Afghanistan and the BRI

For China’s investment initiatives, Afghanistan is a strategically signifcant
location and its strategic location at the crossroads of West, Central and
South Asia gives it an edge over its neighbours in terms of being a regional
trade and transit hub. Afghanistan has enormous potential to connect with
markets of South, Central and West Asia and to take advantage of its strate-
gic location to advance domestic economic development (Oertel and Small
2021).
Afghanistan too has shown its willingness to join the BRI ever since its
inception in 2013 (Khalil 2017). In fact, Afghan ofcials believe that “Afghan-
istan would play a key role (within BRI) due to its strategic location” (Tolo
News 2018). On 16 May 2016, Afghanistan’s inclusion into the BRI was
formalized after the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding
regarding the same (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016). Shortly after this
development, in August 2016 the frst train from China started its journey
from western China, travelling through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to reach
Afghanistan in September (Najafzada 2016). Afghanistan’s membership to
AIIB was approved in March 2017, which further strengthened its integra-
tion with the BRI (Reuters 2017). Another major step in Afghanistan’s inte-
gration with BRI was the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’
Dialogue that took place in December 2017, where Chinese Foreign Minister
said that “his country and Pakistan will look at extending their $57 billion
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan” (Tolo News 2017).
The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, which has resulted in various
sanctions being imposed on the new administration as well as the appre-
hensions of foreign nations regarding the Taliban government, has halted
all development activity in the country and it will take some time for the
foreign agencies and actors to return to Afghanistan and resume their activi-
ties. Although China has been proactive in dealing with the new administra-
tion and was one of the frst countries to return to Afghanistan, it will still be
difcult for the Chinese government to resume its operations in Afghanistan
to the pre-Taliban level.
Conclusion
To sum up, it can be inferred that while the events of 2021 have had a big
impact on Afghanistan, both domestically and internationally, its dire need to
develop itself as a “transit hub” in order to provide a sustainable source of
income to its weak economy and to support its developmental and reconstruc-
tion still remains the same. The chapter also tries to establish Afghanistan’s
potential as the Belt and Road pivot for Asia by highlighting its geostrategic
importance. And through China’s perspective, it is quite clear, more than ever
before, that a secure and stable Afghanistan, both in the political and the eco-
nomic sense, is very important for the attainment of China’s dual policy objec-
tives of securing Xinjiang and establishing a geopolitical advantage in Asia, an
extension of which is the BRI. Therefore, expanding Afghanistan’s role in the
BRI and considering and developing it as “Pivot” or “Transit Hub” for Asia is
of signifcant value to both Afghanistan and China. However, considering the
recent shift of power in Afghanistan and the resulting security situation, it will
be naive to assume that Afghanistan’s inclusion in the BRI could be achieved
in the near future. In the meantime, small infrastructure and development
projects being undertaken by neighbouring countries will be very helpful in
laying the ground work for future transnational projects.
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PART III
Indian Connection
12
INDIA AND ITS INNER ASIAN
NEIGHBOURHOOD IN THE
POST–COLD WAR ERA
Introduction
India’s connection with Inner Asia is mostly civilizational and more than 2,000
years old. Regular overland trade between India and the kingdoms/empires/
khanates of Inner Asian entities such as Central Asia, Mongolia, Afghani-
stan, Xinjiang and Tibet is a remarkable feature of this age-old linkage. The
historical and cultural aspects of this relationship between India and Inner
Asia were marked by religio-cultural-cum-spiritual linkage with the intro-
duction, spread and prevalence of Buddhism, one of the foremost precursors
of Indian culture. Buddhist gospels about India’s rich cultural heritage and
spiritual thought percolated into the hearts and minds of the people of the
entire region further leading to cultural eforescence in Inner Asia. Indian
kings (Mauryan king Ashoka, Kushana king Kanishka and Vardhan king
Harsh Vardhan) had popularized Buddhism in the region by sending their
emissaries and courtiers to various kingdoms in Inner Asia. Buddhist monks,
scholars, translators and travellers such as Kumarajiva (3rd century AD),
Fahien (4th century AD), Hieun Tsang (7th century AD), Padmasambhava
(8th century AD), Kamalshila (8th century AD) and Atisha (11th century
AD) had contributed immensely to the growing spiritual relationship that had
strengthened people-to-people bonding between the two regions. Buddhism
remained the most important religious faith among the people of Afghani-
stan, Xinjiang and Central Asia for over eight centuries, till the advent of
Islam in the region (Debata 2018). The Buddhist site at Tapa Sardar along the
ancient southern route, which was a royal Kushan foundation known as the
Kanika Maharaja Vihara (the temple of the Great King Kanishka), bears tes-
timony to how Buddhism was a “hegemonic religious culture” in the region
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-15
156 Mahesh Ranjan Debata
(Chavan 2020). The people of Mongolia and Tibet follow Buddhism even
today as their religion, culture and spiritual path. Further, the international
trade route, or the Silk Route, which remained important from 3rd century
BC to the 15th century AD, helped in integrating the unique cultural heritage
of India and the Inner Asian region, and promoted the exchange of idea and
intellect, and most importantly, trade and travelling.
However, with India’s partition on 15 August 1947, India’s centuries-
old overland trade connections with Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond
were severed as India lost the direct geographical border with these regions
to Pakistan. In this era of land connectivity amongst neighbouring nations,
India has the biggest disadvantage that is lack of geographical connectiv-
ity with Inner Asia. Similarly, with the establishment of People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in September 1949, India’s relationships (especially direct
overland trade) with Xinjiang, Tibet and beyond (Mongolia) were cut of.
India had to maintain indirect relationship with Central Asia for over four
decades as part of the former Soviet Union (till the Soviet disintegration in
1991) and, with Xinjiang and Tibet as part of PRC, on a very low scale. Even
the creation of independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) in the post-
Soviet period, with all its promises, hypes and brouhaha, could not do away
with the geographical disadvantage India does have. For instance, to reach
Central Asia, India needs to connect to Iran’s Chabahar port (which became
functional in 2018) from where it can enter Afghanistan over land and then
to Central Asia and beyond, may be Mongolia. Moreover, in post–Cold War
period, there emerged a ray of hope for India to renew her age-old bonding
with Inner Asia.
This chapter argues that India considers the countries that are described as
the “heart of Inner Asia”, such as the CARs, Afghanistan and Mongolia, as
key to maximize its vital national interests in this region. Thus, this chapter
discusses India’s policy towards these friendly neighbours in the post–Cold
War period. This chapter argues that the present Indian government led by
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has extended a more humane and pragmatic
approach towards these valuable Inner Asian neighbours in the last eight
years, keeping in view their signifcance to India’s vital stakes in the region,
be it strategic, economic, energy or security.
India’s Concerns and Stakes

Three important issues can be noted here with regard to India’s interests in its
Inner Asian neighbourhood, and concerns over some issues: (1) geostrategic
issues; (2) energy interests; and (3) security challenges (Debata 2017).
Firstly, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union created a new polit-
ical reality in and around Inner Asia. Economic and demographic poten-
tial, abundant natural resources such as energy (oil, natural gas, uranium,
India and Its Inner Asian Neighbourhood 157
hydroelectricity etc.) and minerals of independent CARs (Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) and their geographic
location being at the crossroads of Russia, West Asia, South Asia and the Far
East led the entire neighbourhood to a theatre of competition, confrontation
and confict. Global powers such as the United States, Russia and China and
regional players (India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) became party to a kind
of geopolitical ballgame, which was described as the replication of “Great
Game”, the 19th-century rivalry between Russia and Britain.
In the new format of 21st century rivalry for geopolitical and geo-eco-
nomic supremacy in the heart of Inner Asia, the United States was quick to
begin its “strategic tryst” (Stobdan 2020) with two motives: (1) to keep Rus-
sia, its arch rival during the Cold War period, out of this region; and (2) to
curb any Chinese advancements. It is important to recall here that the United
States has been present in the region (in Afghanistan) since the Soviet Union’s
Afghan misadventure in 1979, providing support and succour to anti-Soviet
elements. Similarly, in response to Mongolia’s “third neighbour approach”,
in the early 1990s, the United States tried to wean over this bufer between
powerful fank states like Soviet Union and China for decades (Soni 2015).
Russia’s intervention in the region aimed at frustrating United States’ sinister
designs in its backyard (Central Asia), despite its disintegration.
The saying in India that “when two people (Russia and United States here)
quarrel, it is often the third person (PRC) who gains” became true in this
context. The PRC took advantage of this U.S.-Russia rivalry and gained the
maximum, be it trade, energy or security and stability of Xinjiang that shares
borders with three CARs: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The PRC
now controls the fow of goods and services to and from any country in Inner
Asia. Almost all the countries in Inner Asia have welcomed PRC’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). By 2022, PRC’s total trade with Inner Asian countries
of CARs, Mongolia and Afghanistan was nearly USD 80 billion (a total of
USD 70 billion with CARs) (China International Import Expo 2023). Fur-
ther, the PRC has acquired hydrocarbons from Central Asia, with one oil
pipeline from Kazakhstan and one natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan.
Similarly, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) had signed
a $3 billion agreement with Afghanistan in May 2008 to lease Mes Aynak
copper feld (world’s second largest with a deposit of 14 million tons) for 30
years to mine $50 billion worth copper (Felbab-Brown 2020).
This peculiar situation in the heart of Inner Asia also prompted some
regional players like India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to play their part. This
chapter would stick to India, which treaded cautiously and kept a close watch
on the critical situation arising out in its extended neighbourhood, particu-
larly the fear of encirclement either by China or by the United States, or any
military presence (especially by the United States) in the region (Sikri 2008)
that could potentially threaten India’s security and stability. India’s concern
was genuine as it was not in the good books of the United States because
of her favourable tilt towards Soviet Union. Similarly, the PRC was “the
potential threat number one” (Indian Express 2008) because of its aggressive
attitude and posture towards India after the India-China war (1962). It has
been proved in the past few years the way PRC has tried to outshine India,
be it Asia, Africa or anywhere else. Forget about Central Asia; even in India’s
traditional stronghold South Asia, the PRC has won the confdence of Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh through considerable capital invest-
ments. And through strategic and defence cooperation, China has spread its
strategic tentacles across the entire Inner Asian region.
Secondly, Inner Asian and Caspian energy resources [(natural gas –
Turkmenistan), (oil – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), (uranium – Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Mongolia), (hydroelectricity – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan),
(copper – Afghanistan)] are believed to be helpful for India’s energy security
and a viable alternative to oil imports from West Asia and nuclear energy
support from former Soviet Union. Two factors are important to note here:
(1) crisis-ridden West Asia, which catered to most of India’s oil needs; and
(2) accelerated energy demand following rapid and robust economic growth.
Since India’s 9 per cent growth rate target would take it towards the $5 tril-
lion economy club by 2024–2025, there has been an enormous demand on its
energy resources, energy systems and infrastructure (Niti Ayog 2020).
Thirdly, the security situation in Inner Asia, especially Central Asia,
Afghanistan and Xinjiang, is in shambles due to growth of radical Islamic
extremism and compelling existence of local, regional and global terrorist
infrastructure. Revival of Islam in the region owes its allegiance to Great
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 for ideological reasons and also to Saudi
Arabia for funding. This state of afairs fuelled the existing Islamic move-
ments. Islam that was under the strict control of governments in Central Asia
and Caucasus and Xinjiang got a new lease of life just a few years before
the Soviet disintegration because of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s
policies of Glasnost and Perestroika and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s
relaxation to Muslims of Xinjiang respectively. However, Islam in the Inner
Asian region took a radical turn and an extreme form in the post–Cold War
period because of (1) emergence of Mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan
as believers and propagators of radical Islam; (2) rise of radical Islamic forces
in Central Asia with Hizbut Tahrir as the fountainhead (Debata 2011); (3)
growth of Islamic extremism in Xinjiang. What added fuel to the fre was the
dangerous anti-state, anti-nation, anti-culture and anti-humanity activities
of the ISIS and Al Qaeda, besides local militant and terrorist groups such as
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and East Turkistan Islamic Move-
ment (ETIM) (Debata 2017).
Moreover, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which was launched in
Afghanistan immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States,
minimized the threats from these hostile forces for a brief period. Most of
the terrorists and their leaders were killed, including Al Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The ISIS has been dismantled in Iraq and
Syria. Terrorist activities in Xinjiang are under control because of stern meas-
ures by China. However, the situation in Afghanistan remains grim. Taliban
was back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 after the international
forces withdrew. But this has not stopped the ISIS being involved in several
terrorist attacks in Afghanistan since then. Pakistan-based terrorist groups
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban and Jaish-e-Mohammed are active
too (Sen et al. 2020).
Reconnecting India With the “Heart of Inner Asia”

India had established a diplomatic, political and economic relationship with
Afghanistan in 1947 and with Mongolia in 1955. But the CARs, after being
independent entities in 1991, looked at their age-old ally India for its benig-
nity, secular credentials, non-intervening stance, no-nonsense approach and
its biggest strength – loads of soft power. For example, this author (Debata
2008) found at a Conference in Tashkent the widespread appreciation for
India’s soft power (historical link, cultural heritage and goodwill gestures).
Looking retrospectively, within months of independence, presidents of the
CARs of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan visited India in the year
1992 and solicited India’s presence in Central Asia and a major role in their
nation-building process. In response, India continued its engagement with
individual CARs at bilateral level and brought out a pragmatic policy Connect
Central Asia in June 2012 to have all-encompassing cooperation (consular,
commercial, connectivity and cultural) with these neighbours. Partnership on
strategic lines, building regular economic cooperation and ensuring energy
security with the aforesaid northern neighbours remain the main features
of India’s policy. In order to upkeep vital Indian interests in the region, it is
imperative to discuss Indian endeavours to reach out to these valued neigh-
bours for better, long-term and meaningful cooperation.
Strategic Partnership Agreements

The strategic concerns and security challenges in India’s Inner Asian neigh-
bourhood have driven her to ink SPAs with these friendly, resource-rich and
much-needed neighbours. Indian government has understood well the need
and necessity of SPAs, especially when you have China as a formidable force
on your neighbourhood, thwarting the advances made by any other coun-
try, be it the United States, Russia or India. Strategic partnership, which is a
long-term interaction between two countries based on political, economic,
social and historical factors, manifests itself in a variety of relationships
(Gupta and Azad 2011). India has so far signed Strategic Partnership Agree-
ments with more than 27 countries (besides EU and ASEAN), which include
Inner Asian neighbours such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and
Mongolia.
India signed an SPA frst with Kazakhstan, during Kazakh President Nur-
sultan Nazarbayev’s visit to India in January 2009. The Joint Declaration on
Strategic Partnership foresees comprehensive cooperation in all spheres. The
“Joint Action Plan” on furthering strategic partnership between India and
Kazakhstan (“Road Map”) for the period of 2011–2014 was signed. While
signing the Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,
India and Kazakhstan underscored the need for expansion of mutually ben-
efcial cooperation, while adhering to their existing obligations under multi-
lateral nuclear regimes (Ministry of External Afairs 2011a).
The year 2011 has remained remarkably important as far as India’s strate-
gic cooperation with the Inner Asian neighbours is concerned. Within a span
of 5 months, India signed SPAs with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. During
President Islam Karimov’s visit to India on 17–18 May 2011, Uzbekistan
signed SPA with India to elevate the bilateral relationship to the level of a
long-term and strategic partnership based on equality and mutual under-
standing (Ministry of External Afairs 2015b). The Agreement on Strate-
gic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan signed on 4 October 2011 in New Delhi is the steady resolve by
the two countries to extend their relationship to a new high. The importance
of this Pact stems from the fact that this is Afghanistan’s frst such SPA with
any foreign country, which is marked by a strong convergence over regional
security and the shared threat from terror infrastructure in and around the
region. The most important part of the Strategic Partnership is the point
no. 4 Paragraph 2 under the head “Political and Security Cooperation”,
which states: “Security cooperation between the two sides is intended to help
enhance their respective and mutual eforts in the fght against international
terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafcking in narcotics, money laundering
and so on” (Ministry of External Afairs 2011b). Similarly, the SPA between
India and Mongolia was signed on 17 May 2015, on the 60th anniversary of
establishment of India-Mongolia diplomatic relations, during Indian Premier
Narendra Modi’s visit to Ulaanbaatar. The partnership is
guided by the universally recognized principles of sovereign equality of

states, the principles of the United Nations Charter, collective interests of
our peoples and the fundamental ideals of the Treaty of Friendly Relations
and Cooperation between Republic of India and Mongolia, signed on Feb-
ruary 22, 1994, and other bilateral documents, would be their common
yet a new objective of their respective foreign policies.
(Ministry of External Afairs 2015a)
During Mongolian President Khaltmaagiin Battulga’s visit to India on 19–23

September 2019, both India and Mongolia vowed to continue their Strategic
Partnership and take it to a new level.
The First India-Central Asia Dialogue in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on 12
January 2019, a meeting of Foreign Ministers from India, all the CARs and
Afghanistan, hailed India signing SPAs with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Afghanistan as the “starting point for a new era in relations between India
and Central Asia”. This historic meeting of great strategic minds of the par-
ticipating countries (1) reafrmed “centuries-old ties between the peoples
of India, Central Asia and Afghanistan”;(2) dubbed themselves as “natural
partners”;(3) underlined the need to develop a “modern and comprehen-
sive partnership”, which was envisioned by Prime Minister Modi during his
landmark visit in 2015; and (4) set up the “India-Central Asia Development
Group” to take forward “development partnership” between India and the
CARs (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). The signing of four SPAs between
India and her Inner Asian neighbours within a span of six years between 2009
and 2015 assumes great importance and shows India’s resolve to establish its
presence in the region in a positive manner to secure her strategic interests.
Energy Cooperation
A long-term, sustained and meaningful cooperation on energy resources
and trade of natural resources is an important component of the partner-
ship between India and these neighbours. India, after analysing its foray into
the energy sector of this region, understood well the difculties in getting
hydrocarbon resources from the region over land through pipelines. Though
the eforts to bring hydrocarbon from the CARs through TAPI were initiated
in the early years (1992) of the independence of the CARs, the frst phase of
TAPI laying from Mary, near Galkynysh gas feld (Turkmenistan) to Afghan
border, was done on 13 December 2015, and beginning of construction of
Afghanistan-Pakistan section of TAPI was facilitated in February 2018 at
Islim Cheshme (Serhatabat) near Afghan border (Debata 2020). India is still
optimistic about TAPI, because India was the frst foreign country to visit
after Turkmenistan’s new President Serdar Berdimuhamedov in March 2022.
President Ramnath Kovind visited his Turkmen counterpart in April 2022
and stressed the importance of security along the TAPI pipeline if it is to be
implemented (Burna-Asef 2022).
In addition, nuclear energy of the region is what India has longed for ear-
nestly. It is imperative to note here that Kazakhstan, which has 12 per cent
of the world’s total uranium reserves, became the leading producer of ura-
nium in the year 2009 with almost 28 per cent of world’s total production,
which increased to 44 per cent of world’s total in 2018. In 2019, Kazakh-
stan has produced 22,808 tonnes and 19,500 tonnes in 2020 (World Nuclear
Association 2021b). Mongolia has uranium reserve to the tune of 1.39 mil-
lion tonnes. Uzbekistan is the seventh largest producer of uranium in the
world, with a production of 2,404 tonnes in 2018 and 3,500 tonnes in 2019
(World Nuclear Association 2021a).
The year 2009 is signifcant as far as India’s nuclear energy cooperation
with these northern neighbours is concerned. India signed one MoU each with
Kazakhstan and Mongolia. The MoU on civil nuclear cooperation was signed
in 2009. Another MoU was signed in 2009 between the Department of Atomic
Energy of India and the Nuclear Energy Agency of Mongolia for cooperation
in the feld of peaceful use of radioactive minerals and nuclear energy. The
year 2015 witnessed more meaningful and result-oriented energy cooperation
between India and Kazakhstan, and India and Mongolia. Both the aforesaid
MoUs worked as steppingstones to India’s Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agree-
ment with Mongolia (May 2015) and Kazakhstan (July 2015) respectively.
Similarly, India’s Department of Atomic Energy and JSC National Atomic
Company (KazAtomProm) signed a long-term contract for sale and purchase
of natural uranium concentrates (Ministry of External Afairs 2015e). As per
the landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Kazakh-
stan signed on 6 July 2015, Kazakhstan, which caters to more than 80 per
cent of India’s uranium requirements, has supplied India 9,000 tonnes of
uranium, some 5,000 tons in the 2015–2019 period only (Business Standard
2019). India has imported 4,558 tonnes (2019–2022) from Kazatomprom,
Kazakhstan’s national atomic company (World Nuclear News 2022). Kazakh
company Samruk Energo and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) of
India agreed to cooperate in the energy sector for production, construction
and reconstruction of thermal, hydropower, gas-turbine and other power
plants and stations during the Kazakh-Indian Business forum in July 2015
(Eurasian Research Institute 2015). The 12th and 13th meetings of Kazakh-
India Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientifc, Technical, Industrial and
Cultural Cooperation at New Delhi respectively on 16–17 June 2015 and
September 2017 have mainly focused on energy cooperation.
During Prime Minister’s Modi’s visit to Mongolia in May 2015, both the
countries vowed to have more cooperation in civil nuclear domain, such as
societal and industrial applications of radio isotopes, exploration and min-
ing of radioactive minerals in Mongolia. Prime Minister Modi, while wel-
coming Mongolia as partner in India’s economic transformation, noted that
Mongolia’s rich mineral deposits, including radioactive minerals, could help
ensure India’s low-carbon growth. The Joint Working Group (JWG) estab-
lished between the atomic energy establishments of both countries agreed to
explore opportunities for future collaborative actions in the spirit of mutual
beneft. Modi announced a credit line of $1 billion for infrastructure sec-
tor in Mongolia, which is currently being utilized by Mongolia to build a
frst oil refnery (Ministry of External Afairs 2018c). India’s Department
of Atomic Energy and Uzbekistan’s Novoi Minerals & Metallurgical Com-

pany signed a Long Term Supply of Uranium agreement during Uzbek Prime
Minister’s India visit on 18 January 2019, under which India will get 1,100
tonnes of uranium ore concentrates during 2022–2026 (Chaudhury 2019).
Similarly, both India and Afghanistan had talked over a high-level institu-
tionalized dialogue on access to and development of Afghanistan’s natural
resources, particularly oil and mining sectors, and the substantial amount of
uranium discovered in Helmand province (The Embassy of Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan 2019). However, there has been no development in the past
one year or so since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. It is heartening to
note that India has now been able to harness the nuclear energy potential of
Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Uzbekistan to feed its nearly two dozen indig-
enously built pressurized heavy water reactors.
Connectivity Eforts
India now seeks to do away with the geographical disadvantage it has for not
having direct borders with these neighbours. The political leadership of India
and these northern neighbours calls for respect for sovereignty, regional
integrity, good governance, transparency, practicality and reliability as the
basis of connectivity initiatives. As a remarkable feat in this connection, India
has started operating Air Freight Corridor between Kabul and Kandahar and
New Delhi and Mumbai since 2017 (Modi 2019). India formally became a
member of “Ashgabat Agreement” on 3 February 2018 to work on the estab-
lishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor along with other
member countries (Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) (Ministry of
External Afairs 2018b). During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) summit at Qingdao (China) in 2018, Prime Minister Modi articulated
the foundational dimension of Eurasia (which covers most part of Inner Asia)
as being “SECURE” (Ministry of External Afairs 2018a) (Security of our
citizens, Economic development for all, Connecting the region, Unite our
people, Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity, and Environment protection
issues), which is likely to guide India’s future engagement with the region,
and connectivity. The frst India-Central Asia Summit was inaugurated on 27
January 2022 on a virtual mode by Prime Minister Modi, where all the fve
Presidents of the CARs stressed on “connectivity” in addition to other issues.
The proposal to hold a “Round-Table on Energy and Connectivity” among
other important issues assumes great signifcance.
Security Cooperation
As discussed earlier, security in and around the region has remained an
intractable issue. To fend of security challenges, India has called upon these
neighbours to make all out eforts and long-term cooperation. For example,
during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Uzbekistan in July 2015, both
countries reafrmed coordination of their law enforcement agencies and
special services in a Joint Statement to expand cooperation in the felds of
defence and cyber-security (Ministry of External Afairs 2015d), and counter-
terrorism (Ministry of External Afairs 2015c). Recalibration of India-Uzbek
defence partnership was witnessed during the Indo-Uzbekistan Joint Field
Training Exercise (FTX), known as DUSTLIK-I (2019), and its second and
third editions respectively in 2021 and 2022. Similarly, India and Kazakhstan
agreed to widen the scope of bilateral defence cooperation including regular
exchange of visits, consultations, training of military personnel, military-
technical cooperation, joint military exercises, exchange of special forces and
so forth (Ministry of External Afairs 2015f). India and Kyrgyzstan signed an
agreement for defence cooperation, which aims at “deepening cooperation
between India and Kyrgyzstan in matters relating to defence, security, mili-
tary education and training, conduct of joint military exercises, exchange of
experience and information, exchange of military instructors and observers”.
Both the sides have been continuing bilateral military exercise “Khanjar”
since December 2011 as an annual afair, the latest held in Bakloh (Himachal
Pradesh, India) in March-April 2022.
India and Mongolia support the evolution of open, balanced and inclu-
sive security architecture in the region based on collective eforts, considering
legitimate interests of all states of the region guided by respect for norms
and principles of international law. During Modi’s visit to Mongolia in May
2015, both the countries expressed concern over the nature and spread of
international terrorism in recent years and suggested cooperative measures
of the international community without double standards or selectivity. They
agreed to direct ofcials concerned to work together for the adoption of the
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. While recognizing
their shared interests in security of cyber domain, both the countries decided
to work together to preserve the integrity and inviolability of this common
global threat. India made a commitment to set up a cyber-security centre in
Mongolia (Ministry of External Afairs 2015b), which is in the advanced
stage of implementation. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the cooperation
between the border security guards of both the countries. Mutual sharing of
the experiences between Mongolian and Indian border forces will further
strengthen the bilateral defence and security cooperation. Two MoUs on (1)
cooperation in the feld of Border Patrolling and Surveillance and (2) coop-
eration between National Security Councils were signed (Ministry of Exter-
nal Afairs 2018c). Both sides have agreed to strengthen cooperation in the
feld of border protection and management, especially between India’s Border
Security Force (BSF) and Mongolia’s General Authority of Border Protection
(GABP) (Unurzul 2019).
India’s security cooperation with Afghanistan assumes greater impor-

tance because of the security situation prevailing in this war-ravaged nation.
Point no. 5 of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, which states
“India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping
and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces”, is
important herewith. India agreed to continue to train Afghan security forces,
as it has been doing for the past few years, and also provide lethal and non-
lethal weapons to Afghanistan to strengthen its security infrastructure. Both
countries are mulling over a high-level institutionalized dialogue on joint-
anti-terrorism eforts. India supports an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-
based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation, and underlining the
need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the inter-
national community (Embassy of India, Kabul). However, the security situ-
ation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international forces and
subsequent Taliban takeover has remained a serious concern for India. The
frst meeting of the National Security Advisers of India and all the fve CARs
was held on 6 December 2022, which aims at boosting security in the region.
India’s Soft Power

Soft power has been India’s most efective endeavour to renew relationship
with these valued neighbours in Inner Asia. While emphasizing India’s history
and cultural heritage linkage that has percolated into the hearts and minds
of the people of Inner Asia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about
four commonalities between the two regions: “common interests”, “common
issues”, “common heritage”, and “common historical space” (Dash 2015). It
is a well-known fact that India’s relations with its northern neighbours have
been multi-dimensional, deep, old and continuous from the ancient times till
date. The major advantage with India while dealing with these valued neigh-
bours, according to one former Indian diplomat, has been its soft power status
with a plethora of virtues such as democracy, secularism, non-alignment, plu-
ral society, eclectic culture and signifcant technological and scientifc advance-
ment (Bhadrakumar 2013). In this age of globalization, economy or trade may
be ruling the roost, but culture matters the most. Indian government promotes
culture as the fulcrum of her contact, cooperation and coordination with these
friendly neighbours. The admiration, respect and friendliness Inner Asian peo-
ple and Indians have towards each other is well known. This could be the
basis of people-to-people contact between the two regions. India’s eforts dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 to provide all kinds of medical support,
equipment, medicines and vaccines to more than 100 countries, including the
CARs like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, have been dubbed
as “high mark of friendship and solidarity” (Asian News International 2020)
by Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart K. Tokayev.
Conclusion
India has found Inner Asian neighbours as her “immediate”, “near”,
“extended” or “northern” neighbours, who assume great importance for
India from many angles, be it strategic, economic or security. Successive
Indian governments in the post–Cold War period have made constant eforts
to keep these neighbours in good humour. The “New India” under Prime
Minister Narendra Modi not only feels it, but also thinks it wise to reach out
to the countries in this strategically important neighbourhood, revive the old
historical-cultural linkage, reinvigorate new avenues of cooperation and reap
maximum dividends for the country’s national interest. Though not on great
fnancial terms, but on strategic point of view, and from energy angle, India is
gaining the confdence of these neighbours day by day and setting its foothold
in the region. India, as the President of three important international summits
(G-20, SCO and UN Security Council) in 2023, had organized the SCO sum-
mit and G-20 summit at New Delhi successfully. This will help asserting her
stature as a global leader, and rebuilding faith and trust in the minds of the
Inner Asian people as well as leaders and having an image makeover. India
has to cash in on this unwavering faith by the people and political leaders of
the CARs. The waning infuence of the PRC, especially the Chinese complic-
ity in the COVID-19 conundrum, and resistance in the CARs (Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) against Chinese activities in the region can be a
boon in disguise for India to step up its activities in the region.
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13
INDIA’S CONNECTIVITY WITH
EURASIA
INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central
Asia Transport and Transit Corridor
Gatikrushna Mahanta
Introduction
The Eurasian region holds economic and strategic signifcance for India.
Although India has established friendly relations with the post-Soviet coun-
tries after their independence, it has not been able to use the opportunity to
develop vibrant economic cooperation with these states. The former Soviet
Union was India’s major trade partner. However, India’s trade with the 15
post-Soviet countries has varied from about 1.53 per cent to 2.16 per cent
in the last eight years ending 2021–2022 (see Table 13.1). Connectivity has
been one of the major hurdles in enhancing trade ties with Eurasia.
There is a renewed Indian interest to develop ties with the region. For
example, India’s Connect Central Asia Policy (2012) refects her interest to
reengage the CARs. The policy emphasizes the need for greater connectivity
with the region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to all fve CARs and
Russian city of Ufa for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) sum-
mit in July 2015 indicates India’s interest in strengthening cooperation with
Eurasia. India’s joining in the SCO in July 2017 as a full member provides
India with a common platform to share with four CARs (except Turkmeni-
stan) and two of their signifcant neighbours Russia and China. India has a
strategic partnership with Russia and Kazakhstan, two important members
of the EAEU.
India shares a historical relationship and strategic partnership with Rus-
sia, which is India’s largest trading partner in the Eurasian region (Patnaik
2017). However, till now India-Russia trade has not achieved its actual
potential. The trade between India and the Eurasian region takes place via
the European route or East Asian route. Lack of direct access to the region
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-16
170
Gatikrushna Mahanta
TABLE 13.1 India’s Trade with Eurasian Countries, 2014–2015 to 2021–2022
Countries 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 2021–22
Russia 6,346.23 6,172.79 7,489.36 10,686.85 8,229.91 10,110.68 8141.26 13124.68

Kazakhstan 952.35 504.84 642.16 1,032.81 851.91 2,458.29 1030.92 560.89
Kyrgyzstan 38.53 26.90 31.93 59.53 32.60 30.46 43.87 34.68
Tajikistan 58.09 32.24 42.26 74.24 26.52 23.80 54.51 46.09
Turkmenistan 105.03 115.50 78.92 80.46 66.27 37.89 60.64 114.36
Uzbekistan 226.31 139.89 155.51 234.39 328.14 247.06 295.01 342.53
Ukraine 2,587.89 2,010.21 2,791.63 2,686.07 2,731.82 2,524.60 2590.83 3386.29
Azerbaijan 308.96 110.47 501.93 626.29 191.34 327.12 279.88 141.23
Armenia 92.29 36.82 31.38 33.91 26.85 42.05 166.29 162.32
Georgia 105.02 107.04 122.45 104.30 132.58 94.17 186.22 360.55
Belarus 230.31 200.63 210.73 255.39 282.91 203.21 349.95 446.41
Moldova 10.22 12.70 18.45 8.71 9.02 8.96 12.58 9.12
Estonia 186.15 205.72 199.96 140.86 172.53 119.50 111.79 134.40
Latvia 134.34 141.07 155.25 164.85 273.97 384.79 152.36 267.57
Lithuania 215.15 302.44 367.15 293.23 339.51 372.86 484.71 531.77
Total 11,596.87 10,119.26 12,839.07 16,481.89 13,695.88 16,985.44 13,960.82 19,662.89
India’s Total Trade 758,371.89 643,298.84 660,209.46 769,107.15 844,156.51 788,070.32 686,244.36 1,035,056.45
% Share 1.53 1.57 1.94 2.14 1.62 2.16 2.03 1.90
(Values in US$ Millions)
Source: Prepared by the author from the data of Department of Commerce: Export Import Data Bank, Government of India. 2022. Accessed October 20,
2021. https://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/iecntq.asp
India’s Connectivity With Eurasia 171
is a major obstacle for strong economic ties. India could address the issue
by implementing two routes passing through Iran: (1) International North-
South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and (2) India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central
Asia Transport and Transit Corridor that connects Iran’s Chabahar port with
Afghanistan and then to Central Asia. This chapter discusses the develop-
ments that have taken place in the INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Cen-
tral Asia Transport and Transit Corridor so far. It highlights the challenges
the aforesaid two routes face. The chapter argues that the implementation
of these routes through Iran can address India’s connectivity issues with the
Eurasian region.
International North-South Transport Corridor

INSTC is a 7,200-kilometre-long multi-modal (ship, rail and road route) and
multi-national transport project, which was started by India, Russia and Iran.
The Inter-Governmental Agreement on INSTC was signed on 12 Septem-
ber 2000 at St. Petersburg during second Euro-Asian Conference on Trans-
port on 16 May 2002. INSTC has 13 members (Iran, Russia, India, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Oman, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Syria, Ukraine, Turkey
and Kyrgyzstan) and one observer member (Bulgaria). Iran is the Depositary
State, which shall inform the parties regarding accession by other countries
to this Agreement and regarding cessation of this Agreement by any Party
(INSTC Corridor 2018c). The details of the route are as follows: Mumbai
to Bandar Abbas (Iran) by ship, Bandar Abbas to Bandar-e-Anzali and Ami-
rabad (Iranian ports on the Caspian Sea) by road/rail, Bandar-e-Anzali to
Astrakhan (Russia) by ship through Caspian Sea and from Astrakhan to
Moscow and northern Europe by Russian railways (The Hindu 2003).
Article 1.1 of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on INSTC describes
transport network as follows: “transport infrastructure and transport mode
providing transportation of passengers and goods by rail, sea, road, river and
air routes. However, in case of India, transport infrastructure and transport
modes providing transportation of goods by sea routes only” (INSTC Secre-
tariat 2018d). The main objectives of the Corridor are as follows:
• Increasing efectiveness of transport ties in order to organise goods and

passenger transport along the international “North-South” transport
corridor;
• Promotion of access to the international market through rail, road, sea,
river and air transport of the state Parties to this Agreement;
• Assistance in increasing the volume of international transport of passen-
gers and goods;
• Providing security of travel, safety of goods as well as environmental pro-
tection according to the international standard;
172 Gatikrushna Mahanta
• Harmonisation of transport policies as well as law and legislative basis in

the feld of transport for the purpose of implementing this Agreement; and
• Setting up equal non-discriminative conditions for all types of transport
service providers from all the parties in transport of passengers and goods
within the framework of the international “North-South” transport
corridor.
(INSTC Secretariat 2018a)
The Coordination Council of the INSTC was established at the St. Peters-
burg meeting in 2002 to oversee implementation of the Corridor. According
to Article 6 of the INSTC agreement, a Coordination Council is to “regulate
the issues related to implementation and application of the provisions of this
Agreement” (INSTC Secretariat 2018b). Later on, two Expert Groups were
established to facilitate the implementation of the route. Table 13.2 shows
the suggestions of the frst Expert Group on the transit time from Mumbai
to Moscow.
The Corridor has been diversifed with the gradual addition of new
routes. The western branch of the INSTC is a land route crossing through
Azerbaijan connecting Astrakhan with Rasht (Iran). Azerbaijan’s section of
the western branch and the Qazvin-Rasht section (164 kilometres) of the
TABLE 13.2 Transit Time
Voyage Leg Mode Current Situation Recommendation
Direct Indirect Direct Service Indirect

Service Service (with (days) Service
(days) transhipment*) (days)
(days)
Mumbai/Bandar Abbas Sea 5 8 5 8

Bandar Abbas – 3 3 1 1
Bandar Abbas/Bandar Road 4 4 3 3
Anzali
Bandar Anzali – 7 7 4 4
Bandar Anzali/ Sea 4 4 3 3
Astrakhan
Astrakhan – 7 7 3 3
Astrakhan/Moscow Rail-Road 7 7 5 5
Total Duration 37 40 24 27
Source: INSTC Secretariat. 2002. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Expert Group (1) con-
stituted by the International “North-South” Transport Corridor Co-ordination Council on
“Commercial & Operational Matters.”17–18 December. Accessed January 19, 2019. http://
instcorridor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1st_EG1-Meeting_Mumbai-Dec-2002.pdf
* Transhipment is transfer of cargo from one ship to other form of transport to another.
Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway line (350 kilometres) in Iran have been com-

pleted (Azernews 2018). The construction of the Rasht-Astara railway line
is under progress (Mammadova 2018). Once completed, the western branch
would be the fastest and shortest land route connecting St. Petersburg and
Bandar Abbas (Chatterjee 2018). The eastern branch is a 926-kilometre-long
railway route connecting Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) that passes
through western Turkmenistan and connects Uzen (western Kazakhstan) to
Gorgan (northern Iran). The route became functional in 2014 of which 146
kilometres of the route lie in Kazakhstan, 700 kilometres in Turkmenistan
and 80 kilometres in Iran (Tehran Times 2014). This route can be used from
the Chabahar port after completion of Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mash-
had line, which will be benefcial for India (Roy 2015). The route reduces the
distance between the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Europe by 600 kilome-
tres and would integrate countries in the Eurasian region with Indian Ocean
and Persian Gulf (Roy 2015).
Progress on the Corridor has been slow, but developments since 2012 have
increased optimism. In January 2012, New Delhi hosted a meeting of the
INSTC member countries to discuss modalities for implementing the project.
The meeting called for necessary cooperation of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkey to complete the missing links in INSTC. Kyrgyzstan
and Turkey are now members of INSTC, and Uzbekistan has shown inter-
est to join. Further, the sixth meeting of the Experts Group I and II of the
Coordination Council of INSTC project was held in May 2012 in New Delhi
and the ffth Coordination Council meeting was held at Baku in June 2013.
In 2012, the Expert Group of INSTC had suggested a dry run of container
on INSTC and India had then volunteered to conduct it. It was completed in
August 2014 by the Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India
(FFFAI) with 2´20-foot containers on two routes: Nhava Sheva (Mumbai)-
Bandar Abbas-Baku and Nhava Sheva-Bandar Abbas-Amirabad-Astrakhan
route via Caspian Sea (Daily Shipping Times 2015). The dry run showed that
shipment cost of the cargo can be reduced by $2,500 per 15 tonnes of cargo
(Prasad 2015). It suggested that the route through Bandar Abbas is the most
efective route connecting India and Eurasian countries (Ministry of Com-
merce, Government of India 2014).
The FFFAI in cooperation with India’s Ministry of Commerce organized
the INSTC conference at Mumbai on 12 June 2015 to generate awareness
about the Corridor among stakeholders. The sixth INSTC Coordination
Council meeting and the seventh Expert Committee meeting were held on
19–21 August 2015 in New Delhi. The seventh Coordination Council Meet-
ing of INSTC and eighth Meeting of Expert Groups were held in Tehran on
4–5 March 2019. All member countries (except Kyrgyzstan) attended the
meeting. It was decided in the meeting to constitute a follow-up commit-
tee with a representative from each member country. It proposed to start a
single transporting or forwarding company as a joint venture with equities of

member countries to oversee the project. The joint venture would deal with
various challenges like regulation and customs. Because of the pandemic, the
INSTC Coordination Council Meeting in 2020 was not held; thus the pro-
gress of the project has been slowed down.
Regular meetings of the institutionalized bodies of the INSTC highlight
the willingness of member countries to speed up the implementation of the
Corridor. The inauguration of Qazvin-Rasht railway line on 6 March 2019
is another milestone. Earlier, in October 2018, India-Kazakhstan-Iran-Turk-
menistan meeting was held in India to create awareness among Indian entre-
preneurs doing business in Eurasia through the eastern branch of INSTC.
In 2022, greater activity in the INSTC route has been seen. The sanctions
on Russia following the war in Ukraine have increased the signifcance of the
INSTC route and there is increase in the volume of trade through INSTC.
Due to Western sanctions, Russia is keen to see the route as a major corridor
for trade with India and other countries. INSTC began operation in June
2022 with the frst shipment from St. Petersburg reaching Mumbai in July
2022. The cargo travelled from St. Petersburg by rail to Astrakhan port, then
by ship to the Bandar-e-Anzali port, further by rail to Bandar Abbas port and
from there by ship to Mumbai. Using the INSTC, Iran Shipping Lines (ISL)
transported about 3,000 tonnes of goods and 114 containers during May–
July 2022. Earlier in April 2022, ISL established an operational Working
Group for developing transportation along INSTC. ISL has so far allocated
300 vessels to transport goods through the Corridor. At present, the bulk of
trade through INSTC via Iran is primarily trade between Russia and India.
Addressing the sixth Caspian Sea Summit (July 2022), Russian President
Vladimir Putin highlighted the INSTC as the key connectivity link between
India and Russia, describing it as a “transport artery from St. Petersburg to
ports in Iran and India” (Roy Chaudhury 2022).
India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and

Transit Corridor
Given the India-Pakistan conundrum, the routes passing through Iran are
ideal for India to connect with Eurasia, particularly with Central Asia and
Russia. Another corridor connecting India with Eurasia via Iran is from
Chabahar port, that is the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport
and Transit Corridor. The Chabahar-Zahedan railway project will connect
Chabahar port with Iran-Afghanistan border. From Zahedan, the Zaranj-
Delaram road developed by India will connect Iran with major Afghan cit-
ies. Further, extending this route to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would add to
regional integration and connectivity. This route addresses India’s concern to
access Afghanistan.
The Chabahar port is a crucial point in promoting trade and connectivity

among India, Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and other Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) countries. In May 2016, India, Iran and Afghani-
stan signed the Trilateral Chabahar Agreement to establish an International
Transport and Transit Corridor, and to develop and operate the Chabahar
port. This corridor will improve connectivity and trade with Afghanistan,
which further can be extended to Central Asia. Chabahar reduces the burden
on Bandar Abbas, which handles about 85 per cent of Iran’s seaborne trade
and is highly congested (Ramachandran 2014). Chabahar can handle cargo
ships bigger than 100,000 tonnes (Ramachandran 2019). Integrating Chaba-
har port with INSTC will further enhance regional connectivity.
The frst phase of Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, developed by
India, was inaugurated in December 2017. Shahid Kalantari and Shahid
Behesti are the two terminals in Chabahar. The Shahid Kalantari terminal,
the older port, handles about 2.1 million tonnes of cargo per year. With the
operationalization of the Shahid Behesti terminal, the cargo-handling capac-
ity of Chabahar port has increased to about 10 million tonnes per year.
The capacity of Shahid Behesti terminal is expected to increase from pre-
sent 8.5 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes on completion of Phase I of the
project (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2022a). India Ports
Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ), a subsidiary of India Ports Global
Limited (IPGL), has been taking over logistics and cargo handling services
of Chabahar port since 24 December 2018. It is expected that for fnancial
transactions India, Afghanistan and Iran would open their bank branches,
such as Pasargard, Iranian Bank in Mumbai, India’s UCO Bank in Tehran
and Gazanfar, Afghan Bank in Chabahar (Stobdan 2017).
India hosted second Maritime India Summit-2021 (virtually) on 4 March
2021, which was attended by the Ministers related to trade or transport
of Afghanistan, Armenia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. The
Chabahar port has emerged as a commercial transit hub for the region and
has played a critical role in delivering humanitarian aid and emergency sup-
plies to Afghanistan and Iran during the pandemic (Ministry of External
Afairs, Government of India 2021b). India has shipped through Chaba-
har port 75,000 metric tonnes of wheat as humanitarian food assistance to
Afghanistan in 2020. In 2021, India supplied 40,000 litres of pesticide to
Iran to address the locust attack in Iran through this route (Ministry of Exter-
nal Afairs, Government of India 2022). The frst shipment of dried fruits
from Afghanistan and aquatic products from Iran to South-East Asia took
place through the Chabahar Port in 2020 (The Hindu 2021). Further, till
July 2022, 2.5 million tonnes of wheat and 2,000 tonnes of pulses have been
trans-shipped from India to Afghanistan through Chabahar.
In a question put up in Indian Parliament (Question No. 1340) regard-
ing the Chabahar port, the Government stated that from December 2018 to
July 2022, Chabahar has handled 215 vessels, 16,000 twenty-foot equivalent
units and 4 million tonnes of cargo (Ministry of External Afairs, Govern-
ment of India 2022). It has handled several shipments and trans-shipments
from countries like Russia, Brazil, Thailand, Germany, Ukraine, Oman,
Romania, Bangladesh, Australia, Kuwait, Uzbekistan and UAE (Ministry of
External Afairs, Government of India 2021a).
To recognize the growing importance of Chabahar, the frst Chabahar Day
was celebrated in 2021 during the Maritime India Summit-2021. This refects
“India’s strong commitment to work together with all regional stakeholders
to enhance connectivity in our region and provide unhindered access to the
sea to the landlocked Central Asian countries through Chabahar” (Minis-
try of External Afairs, Government of India 2021b). The second Chabahar
Day was celebrated in Mumbai on 31 July 2022. India’s Ministry of Ports,
Shipping & Waterways and the IPGL observed Chabahar Day to promote
optimum use of the port to connect India with landlocked Central Asia. India
pushed to link Chabahar Port with INSTC as part of its trade and business
outreach (The Economic Times 2022). The Minister for the Indian Ports,
Shipping & Waterways observed: “Our vision is to make Chabahar Port a
transit hub under the INSTC to reach out to CIS countries”. He stated, “The
idea of INSTC via the vibrant Shahid Beheshti Port at Chabahar in Iran is
an idea to connect the two markets using a multi modal logistical corridor.
This will rationalise our logistics cost which will contribute towards the trade
volume between the two regions” (Press Information Bureau, Government
of India 2022b). The Chabahar Port linking the Central Asian region with
South Asian markets is a signifcant development promoting trade, economic
cooperation and connecting people between the two regions (Press Informa-
tion Bureau, Government of India 2022b); it has thus emerged as a “com-
mercial transit hub for the region” (Ministry of External Afairs, Government
of India 2022).
The India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor
would link Chabahar port with the garland highways of Afghanistan through
Zahedan and then it can be connected with the bordering CARs. In 2011,
the Uzbek state railway company Ozbekiston Temir Yollari built a short
75-kilometre-single-rail link between Hairatan in Uzbek-Afghan border and
Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan). Uzbekistan and Afghanistan are negotiating to
extend the railway line of about 700 kilometres from Mazar-i-Sharif (north
of Afghanistan) to Herat (west of Afghanistan) passing through Sheberghan,
Andkhoy and Maymana towns. To make the Corridor more efective and
economical, there is a need to connect Mashhad with Herat, which will link
the northern part of Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad line with the
garland highways (Stobdan 2017).
India joined the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018. It was initiated in April 2011
and came into force in April 2016 to establish an international multimodal
transport and transit corridor between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.
The prime objective of the Agreement is to enhance connectivity within the
Eurasian region and integrate it with other regional transport corridors,
including the INSTC. India joined the Customs Convention on the Interna-
tional Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (Transports Interna-
tionaux Routiers Convention, 1975) in 2017 to facilitate seamless transfer of
goods throughout Asian and European countries. The United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which administers the Conven-
tion, defnes TIR Carnet as a standard internationally recognized Customs
Document. TIR Carnet serves as a proof of an internationally valid guarantee
that is exemption from paying Customs duties during transit. Digital and
paperless border formalities, which are required for eTIR came into force on
25 May 2021, will give impetus to digitalization. It will support green, con-
tactless and resilient freight movements in the TIR including INSTC coun-
tries (The EurAsian Times 2021). Being a member of TIR Carnet, India now
is part of the single transport corridor.
The Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) railway line, also part of the
INSTC, is a major route of the Ashgabat Agreement. The proposed Chaba-
har-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad corridor could be connected to Sarakhs
(Iran-Turkmen border) and in future linked to the existing Eurasian railway
line that connects other parts of Central Asia (Stobdan 2018b). Further, if the
Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad line materializes, the Chabahar port
can also be connected with the INSTC.
During Maritime India Summit-2021, India proposed to link the Chabahar
port with the INSTC that can change the “geo-economy” of region (Haidar
2021). India’s Minister of External Afairs, in his address at the Maritime
India Summit-2021, said:
The INSTC is an important trade corridor project, wherein India is part-

nering with 12 countries to establish an economic corridor for the beneft
of our peoples. We also welcome the interest of Uzbekistan and Afghani-
stan to join the multilateral corridor project. Establishing an eastern cor-
ridor through Afghanistan would “maximize its potential.” India has also
proposed the inclusion of Chabahar in the INSTC route.
(Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2021b)
The SCO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July 2022 emphasized improving

connectivity. The sudden disruptions caused by the pandemic and the Rus-
sia-Ukraine confict have highlighted the importance of secured and robust
connectivity. India’s Minister of External Afairs S. Jaishankar indicated the
signifcance of the Chabahar Port for improving India’s trade ties with the
CARs and emphasised the port’s potential for enhancing economic coopera-
tion in the SCO region (Girdhar 2022).
Benefts of the Corridors for India

India’s interest in the progress of the south-north or north-south axis is driven
by her energy interest in Iran, Central Asia and Russia and Afghanistan’s
mining sector (Patnaik 2017). India is showing greater willingness to play
a stronger economic role in the Eurasian region. The aforesaid two routes
once fully operationalized will address India’s major handicap in establish-
ing ties with the Eurasian region. Bypassing Pakistan, India can connect with
Afghanistan and Eurasia via Iran. Lower cost and reduced transport time will
make Indian goods economically viable.
India depends on the sea route via the Red Sea, Suez Canal, Mediterranean,
North Seas (via Rotterdam) and the Baltic Sea to St. Petersburg, and through
China to transport goods to Russia. China, Europe or Iran routes are used
to trade with Central Asia and other Eurasian countries. These routes are
expensive and long. INSTC is a viable alternative as it is 40 per cent shorter
and 30 per cent cheaper. The Suez Canal route takes 45–60 days, whereas the
INSTC would take 25–30 days (Roy 2015). Once implemented, the INSTC
will reduce travel time between Moscow and Mumbai by 15–20 days (The
Hindu 2003). The INSTC will facilitate India’s access and trade with Central
Asia, Russia and Europe. India-Russia trade is expected to grow from $6
billion in 2015–16 to $30 billion by 2025. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war
and the subsequent Western sanctions on Russia, the INSTC is emerging as
an efective alternate route for India-Russia trade. It is argued that with the
operationalization of the Chabahar port and INSTC, India’s trade with Eura-
sia could grow up to $170 billion, including $60.6 billion export and $107.4
billion import (Stobdan 2017).
The INSTC provides the countries in the region an alternative to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI projects in the Eurasian region con-
nect Europe to China via the CARs and Russia giving China access to the
resources of the region. China plans to connect Turkey and Iran via the BRI
(Roy Chaudhury 2022). The completion of the rail link connecting western
China and Tehran passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmeni-
stan makes Iran a vital point in BRI project (Dorsey 2020).
The development and operationalization of the Chabahar port substantiates
India’s growing eforts to connect with the Eurasian region. In October 2017, the
frst shipment of 1.1 million tonnes of wheat from India to Afghanistan through
the Chabahar port took place. The Chabahar port will broaden Afghanistan’s
options, and reduce its dependence on Karachi port for transit. Afghanistan has
reduced about 80 per cent of its cargo trafc from Karachi to Bandar Abbas and
Chabahar. Afghanistan is likely to reduce its dependency on Pakistan for transit
of Afghan goods by using the Chabahar port (Stobdan 2018b).
The completion of the Shahid Beheshti terminal and India joining the
Ashgabat Agreement and TIR Convention widen the “scope of Chabahar to
become a vital gateway and the shortest land route to access Central Asia”
(Stobdan 2017) and “fast-tracking implementation of the INSTC” (Stobdan
2018a). Analysts argue that India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport
and Transit Corridor and Chabahar port can counter the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar port respectively (Stobdan 2017).
The waiver of the U.S. sanctions on the Chabahar port in November 2018 is
a positive signal for regional connectivity. Compared to Gwadar, the Chaba-
har port enjoys several advantages, as Sajjanhar (2018) describes:
It is located in a peaceful region as opposed to Gwadar which is situated

in a violent and terrorism prone province. The possibilities for establish-
ing manufacturing and downstream petrochemical industries in Chabahar
are much greater as ready, easy, cheap natural gas is available in plentiful
in Iran. Above all, Chabahar is a natural harbour and can serve as the
sourcing point for the INSTC which has also been taken up much more
seriously in recent years.
For the CARs, Chabahar ofers the shortest land route option for maritime
trade. The Chabahar route provides a secure and commercially viable access
to the Indian Ocean region for the CARs. It will not only provide connectiv-
ity, but also boost investments, thereby improving India’s cultural and politi-
cal ties (The Economic Times 2022). Since the pandemic followed by Taliban
takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent humanitarian
crisis, India has used the Chabahar port to ship humanitarian aid to Afghani-
stan. Iran too will beneft from the routes. Both the Corridors will increase
Iran’s trade opportunities with the Eurasian region. These Corridors thus
provide more avenues for the member countries by opening multiple trade
and transport opportunities. The two routes can be further connected with
other transport networks in the region, thereby widening its opportunities
like the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and regional
corridors like Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC).
Challenges in Implementing the Corridors

The recent years have seen signifcant progress in the two Corridors, reinforc-
ing the strategic signifcance of Iran for India’s connectivity with the Eurasian
region. Eforts in the last few years explain the willingness of the members to
fructify the two projects. These routes in addition to economic benefts hold
strategic signifcance for India. Various challenges have impeded the imple-
mentation of the Corridors. Despite having addressed a number of issues,
many more challenges are yet to be resolved.
INSTC still sufers from several logistical issues like availability of funds
for building various infrastructure projects and low level of container trade.
The U.S. sanctions on Iran have also afected the progress of the INSTC. For
example, the U.S. sanctions have impeded the development of the section
from Bandar Abbas to northern Iran. Lack of funds for up-gradation due
to the U.S. sanctions on Iran has slowed down the progress in this section.
An unresolved issue is the payment and insurance for the Iranian part of the
route. Banks are worried about Iran-related transactions, although transit
goods are not covered by sanctions. The most important obstruction to the
success of the INSTC route is the lack of banking channels (Srivastava 2022).
For the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corri-
dor, security issues remain a serious impediment. The volatile situation of the
Af-Pak region is a major threat to connectivity networks passing through this
region. Active participation and cooperation of the CARs bordering Afghani-
stan, besides Iran and Afghanistan, are crucial for the implementation of the
Corridor (Stobdan 2017).
Conclusion
Enhancing transport network via Iran would address India’s connectivity
issues with the Eurasian region and Afghanistan. As Iran is the vital link
in the projects, U.S. sanctions on Iran impede the implementation of the
transport network. For example, to build and upgrade the infrastructure for
the INSTC huge funds are required; U.S. sanctions on Iran have afected the
availability of funds. The waiver on the Chabahar port from the re-imposed
U.S. sanctions on Iran in November 2018 is a welcome step that needs to be
pursued for other projects too. Geopolitical dimensions will be crucial for
the projects as both hold strategic signifcance. Further, the New Silk Route
Initiative bypassing Iran is a U.S. initiative to enhance connectivity between
South and Central Asia. Some analysts view INSTC as a Russian initiative to
connect South Asia to Eurasia. Because of Western sanctions on Russia since
the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia is pushing hard to promote the
INSTC route for trade with India and others in the region. The geopolitical
dynamics associated with connectivity projects make it complex. Strength-
ening the Central Asian part of the INSTC project depends on cooperation
of countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Regional organizations like
the SCO could play a more active role in enhancing connectivity projects
in the Eurasian space. To attract the CARs to participate in the Chaba-
har project and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit
Corridor, India seeks cooperation from the SCO. Active participation of
Afghanistan is necessary for the success of India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central
Asia Transport and Transit Corridor. However, with the political changes in
Afghanistan since August 2021, the future of the route seems ambiguous.
It is important that the regional countries make concerted efort to address
the Afghan crisis.
Given India’s handicap in accessing the Eurasian space, India needs to

explore various avenues. Economic ties, particularly trade ties, will defne
India’s position in the Eurasian space, which at the moment is far below its
potential. It is expected that through the EAEU, India would gain access to
the huge Eurasian market. For its geo-political and geo-economic interests,
India in cooperation with other countries needs to pursue steadily the INSTC
and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor
projects.
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railway-to-facilitate-regional-trade
14
INDIAN TRADE ALONG AFGHAN
ROUTES FROM 6TH CENTURY BCE
TO 19TH CENTURY CE
Sunita Dwivedi
Introduction
Among the South Asia countries, Afghanistan is the most strategically placed
in terms of international routes aforded by its land and river ways. A look at
the map of Afghanistan will help trace the network of routes converging and
diverging from Afghan cities through several passes in the Hindukush and
Pamirs, and the ranges on its border with Pakistan, namely the Safed Koh,
Sulaiman and Toba Kakar and along rivers fowing into the valleys of the
Oxus, Kabul and Indus. The export and import facility through numerous
outlets provided by Afghan routes contributed to India’s prosperity and birth
of hundreds of new cities along these routes, where commodities were pro-
duced for sale. Indian goods were transported across the world marts. Nec-
essary raw materials which India needed for its industry and defence were
imported. Besides, the Afghan routes were crucial in the spread and dissemi-
nation of Indian religion and art. Names of several villages and settlements
along the Afghan trade routes into Central Asia prompt one to believe that a
number of Indian traders had settled in and around Afghanistan. Even today,
dry fruit dealers from Punjab are settled in Karte Parwan (Kabul). In 2013,
this author had the opportunity to meet some of them at their Gurudwara
over langar (community meals). Indian settlement “Mela” is located near
the mouth of river Vakhsh, which was called Panjab in 13th century. Indians
had migrated along the Wakhan Corridor and the Karakoram Highway to
settle in Xinjiang’s Yarkand and Khotan, where rulers traced their dynasty
from Indian kings (Barthold 2012; Mukhamedjanov 1999; Harmatta 1999;
Puri 2000).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-17
Indian Trade Along Afghan Routes 185
This chapter discusses Indian trade along the routes (Uttarapath, west-
ern routes to Mediterranean, Wakhan Corridor route, Lapis Lazuli route,
Sulaiman passes etc.) in the South-Central Asia region, especially through the
Afghan route. It gives a detailed account of the Indian and foreign commodi-
ties or goods traded along the routes as well.
Levi (2007a) studied Indian trade and cultural and political exchanges with
Central Asia via Afghan routes. Goods and commodities from every corner
of India, especially from the northwest (now Pakistan), were traded. Marko-
vits (2007) described that Multani traders from Punjab and Marwaris from
Rajasthan (India) were settled in Astrakhan, Moscow and Nijni-Novogorod
(Russia) in the 17th and 18th centuries. Astrakhan was a major terminus of the
India-Russia route. During a visit to Bukhara, Burnes (2009) found about 300
Hindu traders living in a caravanserai of their own (Hindu serai), who were
chiefy natives of Shikarpur in Sindh and had come to Bukhara after selling their
wares in the trade hubs of Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. Besides, says Burnes,
one Hindu from Bombay was proceeding to the shores of the Caspian as well.
Afghanistan functioned as a crucial conduit for Indian goods and for Chi-
na’s Sichuan and Yunnan provinces as well. The proximity of India’s north-
eastern region with southwest China was mentioned by Xuanzang, when
he was in Pragjyotishpur (Assam) in 7th century CE (Beal 1884). Xuanzang
informed that Sichuan took only 2 months to reach by land. These southern
routes to Balkh via India existed even in the 2nd century BCE, when Zhang
Qian, the Chinese envoy, saw in Daxia (Baktria/Balkh) bamboo stufs and
cloth made in Shu (Sichuan), which the merchants told him they had brought
from Shendu (Hindu/India). Zhang Qian’s observation was corroborated by
Marco Polo’s report on the southern route from Yunnan to India, which
states: “in the Yunnan province, horses are of a large size and the young
horses are carried for sale to India (Masefeld 2003).
Afghanistan provided India connection with the whole of Asia, China
southern Russia and through the Mediterranean and Black Sea with Europe
along the following routes:
1 Northwards through Balkh and Termez into Central Asia on an ancient

road now modernized as the M-39;
2 Westwards into Margiana along the Trans-Caspian route, now modern-
ized as the M-37;
3 North-eastwards through Badakhshan and the Wakhan Corridor into the
Pamirs termed as the Wakhan Route;
4 Eastwards along the Kabul-Jalalabad route (the ancient Uttarapath) via
the Khyber Pass and across Punjab into the Gangetic plains.
5 Southern routes through Ghazni and Kandahar into the middle and lower
Indus region into western India.
186 Sunita Dwivedi
Trade Along the Uttarapath

The Uttarapath, also called the northern highroad, linked the Ganges Valley
with the Oxus valley. It connected the heart of India with the remote regions
of Central Asia. It connected with China’s Tibet, Yunnan and Sichuan prov-
inces. It connected along coastal routes with southern India. It had sea links
with South-East Asian countries through the Bay of Bengal. Running along
the Himalayan foothills to Taxila, Peshawar and Kabul with extensions up
to Bamiyan and Balkh, the Uttarapath carried the bulk of Indian goods to
Afghan trading hubs of Kandahar, Kabul, Bamiyan and Balkh. The trading
hubs of Ghazni, Kandahar and Herat were reached by mountain passes of
the Sulaiman range. From here, the goods were carried to the marts of Mar-
giana, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, and all along the valley of the Arys,
Chuy and Ili rivers.
Uttarapath’s Links With the Black Sea and Caspian

Trade routes coming from the Black Sea and the Caspian regions after enter-
ing the Oxus Valley could cross into Afghanistan either through Uzbekistan
or through Tajikistan’s southern territories at Balkh and Kunduz, respec-
tively. The main route from Balkh followed the Uttarapath from Kabul join-
ing the Taxila-Patliputra route up to the Bay of Bengal. This was the “mother
of all routes” for India’s trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caspian
region and southern Russia. Goods from southern India, mainly pearls, gems,
spices, elephants and ivory, were brought to this route via the Dakshinapath
(southern highroad) and its many branches running along the east and west
coast of India to Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and sent up to Kabul and Balkh,
and across the Oxus into Central Asia. The Uttarapath is known to have
existed as early as the 5th century BC. Trapussa and Bhallika, two traders
from Balkh, travelled with hundreds of wagons of merchandise as far east on
the Balkh-Bengal route up to Sarnath, where they met the Buddha after his
Enlightenment (Beal 1884).
Rtveladze (2009) calls the Uttarapath as the “Great Indian Road”, which
was used exclusively for transmitting Indian goods via Afghan routes. Rtve-
ladze tracked the route running across the river Indus, crossing the Hindu
Kush range into northern Afghanistan and along the river Oxus up to Chor-
asmia (Khorezm). Another route to Chorasmia ran through Kandahar-Herat
(and Balkh) into Margiana and northwards through the Trans-Caspian
region to Chorasmia. The Chorasmian route, according to Rtveladze, con-
tinued along the Uzboi channel to the Caspian Sea, and thence through mod-
ern Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia, it crossed the Surami Pass to reach the
Rioni river valley (ancient Phasis). In the lower course of the Phasis (western
Georgia, legendary Colchis), as reported by Pseudo-Scymnus, was situated a
city bearing the same name and inhabited by people of six nations, including
from those of India and Bactria).
The routes were facilitating trade in Indian human resources to Central
Asia and the Caspian. Ibn Batuta, in his travelogue Ibn Batuta Travels in
Asia and Africa 1325–1354, writes about Indian attendants led by “Sun-
bul, the Indian”, in the service of Khatun Bayalun (the Byzantine emperor’s
daughter), who was travelling from Astrakhan to Constantinople. Princess
Bayalun, Christian wife of Sultan Öz Beg Khan, had been given permission
to return to Constantinople to give birth to a child. Batuta mentions further
that the Indian slaves were brought through mountain passes of the Hindu
Kush, which had a history of slave trading (Gibbs 2006). In the 14th century,
the best Indian craftsmen had settled in suburbs around Samarkand to build
Ak Serai, an ambitious project of Amir Timur, and Bibi Khanum mosque
(Gonzalez de Clavijo and Guy Le1928, 278–300).
Major Trading Commodities

Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Chandra 1977; Kangle 1965) describes Indo-Afghan
trade along the Haimavata marg or the Grand Route from Balkh to India via
Hindukush. This was an easier route and was used for trade in horses, wool-
len cloths, hides and furs. The Arthasastra gives a long list of hides and furs
coming from northwest India, eastern Afghanistan and Central Asia, rubies
and lapis lazuli from Badakhshan mines and yellow and green jade from the
Urungkash and Karakash rivers of Khotan.
Horses
This route was frequented by animal traders (especially horse traders) from
India, Afghanistan, the Trans-Caspian and Khorezmian deserts and Ferghana
Valley, “to obtain good quality war horses from West and Central Asia”
(Chakravarti 2016; Chandra 1977); they were taken as far east as Kaviripad-
dinam (Kaveripatnam) on India’s east coast (Warmington 1995).
During Mauryan times, special physicians, trainers and feeders were
appointed to take care of horses under the Asvadhyaksas or (superinten-
dents of horses). The Arthasastra narrates: “of those ft for use, the best
come from Kamboja, Sindhu, Aratta and Vanayu; the middling from Bahlika
(Balkh) Papeya, Sauvira and Titala; the rest are inferior”. Kamboja was an
ancient kingdom north of Gandhara; Arattu was a part of Punjab; Vanayu
was known as Arabia or Persia, and Bahlika as Bactria; Sauviras was situ-
ated along the Indus to the north of the Sindhus (Kangle 1965). India was the
largest market for horses during medieval period and beyond uptill the 18th
century. The bulk of the supply of horses was produced by pastoral nomads
in the Kalmuk and Kazakh steppes of southern Russia, Turkoman wastes
188 Sunita Dwivedi
east of the Caspian Sea and Afghan Turkistan. Italian traveller Niccolo
Manucci estimated that in the 17th century over 100,000 horses were annu-
ally imported to India from Balkh, Bukhara and Kabul with some 12,000
going directly into the stables of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (Levi 2007b).
According to Alam (2007), horses were imported to India in very large num-
bers from trans-Caspian region of the Margiana (Turkmenistan) right from
the early Middle Ages. The Uttarapath received horses not only from Margi-
ana and Persia, but also from the steppe lands of southern Russia via a route
north of the Caspian Sea through Dashtikipchaq and Transoxiana down to
Khyber Pass. Traders from Bengal, Gangetic plain and Deccan were seen in
Kabul and Peshawar on their way to Khurasan, Transoxiana and Turkistan,
and some of them were settled in Astrakhan, Bukhara and Samarkand.
War Elephants
Indian war elephants were favoured by the Greeks. Mauryan rulers had
established a department for elephants under the charge of hastadhyak-
sas and elephant forests were strictly guarded by hastvanaraksam (Kangle
1965). Eudemos, commander of Alexander’s garrison on the Indus, after
the latter had left Punjab, obtained 120 elephants by treacherously slaying
a native prince in 317 BC. The importance of elephants as war animals is
highlighted in the Treaty of 303 BCE between Seleucus and Chandragupta
Maurya following which the former received 500 war elephants in lieu of
southern Hindukush territory conceded to the latter. Antiochus the Great of
Syria (223–187 BC), who invaded the Indus region for elephants, crossed the
Hindu Kush and compelled an Indian King Subhagsena ruling in Kabul Val-
ley to surrender a considerable number of elephants (Smith 2008).
Indian Ivory
Dosarene, identifed with southern Kalinga, and northern Andhra areas
were noted not only for their fne elephants but for their excellent ivory
(Chakravarti 2016). Indian ivory and tortoise shells were used for all kinds
of ornaments, also in decorating statues, chairs, beds, sceptres, scabbards,
chariots, carriages and book covers and its trading was done via both land
and sea routes (Warmington 1995). The tusk of Indian elephants was traded
along the Herat-Merv and Balkh-Nisa routes with the Parthian state and on
the western routes to Rome, where tusks were turned into jewellery, chess
pieces and the unique drinking vessels, called rhytons. Excavations in old
Nisa Complex have uncovered ivory articles with fabulous decorations and
rare treasures lying sealed inside rooms of the Treasury or the “Quadrate”.
The ivory drinking vessels depicting Greek Gods were used for libation
(Gafurov 2005).
Excavations at Afghan city of Kapisa revealed valuable information on the

trade in Indian ivory along the Kabul Valley (Puri 2000). Kapisa controlled
the roads to the Etymandrus valley (Helmand river), to the Cophen (Kabul)
valley and to the passes in the Hindukush leading to Bactria. Its modern
name is Begram, north of Kabul, near Charikar. This famous Kushan city
lying at the confuence of Panjshir and Ghorband rivers had in its palace
several store rooms containing hundreds of articles of carved ivory brought
from India. (Litvinsky 1999). Some collections brought from Begram by the
Franco-Afghan archaeological excavations between 1920s and 1939 were
displayed at the Musee Guimet, Paris. Ivory also reached the city of Talkhiz
near Almaty (Kazakhstan) along the Ili River route, an extension of the Chuy
Valley route, where a rare statue of ivory Buddha was found during excava-
tions by K. Baipakov and Dmitry Voyakin.
Indian Textiles
Weaving of textile was one of the foremost crafts of India, especially at Vara-
nasi, Mathura, Bengal, Paithan, Tagara and Nasik. There were a number
of weaving guilds or srenis (organizations), including two known weaving
organizations of Nasik (Chakravarti 2016), which were well known in Cen-
tral Asia and the West. Burnes (2009) gave frst-hand records of his journey
into Kabul and onwards to Bukhara through Michnee in India’s northwest
frontier regions (now in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) on the
Kabul river route and trade between India and Central Asia through Afghan-
istan. According to Burnes, “trade with India was considerable” and that the
wealth of Kabul was to be found “eastwards of the Indus”. Burnes listed (1)
costly fabrics of Punjab exported to kingdoms of Persia, Tartary and China;
(2) Punjab salt, condiments and fruits; shawls of Lahore and Delhi; (3)
“kais” of Multan having the “strength of texture and brilliancy of hue”; and
(4) satin of Multan called “atlass”. To Burnes, cotton produced in the Doab
region between the Sutlez and the Beas and manufactured in Hoshiarpur and
Rohun and furnished white cloth of various textures were cheaper than the
British-manufactured ones.
Plant Products, Salts and Precious Metals

There was also brisk trade in indigo and salt. Rock salt from the Salt Range
near the Jhelum, coal, iron and gold found in the Acesines (Indus) and alum,
sulphur and nitre were supplied along the cities of the Oxus (Burnes 2009).
Indian gold was used to pay revenue and for the purpose of trade and wor-
ship. In Dalverzintepe city, across the Oxus from Balkh, were discovered
inscribed gold tablets mentioning the monks of Kalyan seaport near Mumbai
(Chakravarti 2016), showing the private property of the monks, and also the
190 Sunita Dwivedi
highlighting growing importance of commerce in the Buddhist Sangha. There

is no authentic information whether the gold tablet was for worship at the
Buddhist temple of Dalverzintepe or for trade in Surkhandarya. The remark-
able treasure of gold jewellery and gold bars with inscriptions in Kharosthi,
indicating their weight, prompts one to believe that Indians used gold for
trading across the Oxus river (Litvinsky 1999).
Western Routes to Mediterranean

Afghanistan’s Herat province shares its western border with Mashhad (Iran)
and through Towraghundi (Turkmenistan) in north making it an important
trading region. Today, the Herat route enters the trans-Caspian through the
small oasis settlement of Tagtabazar, on the Murghab river. The road runs
through the town of Kushka (Serhetabad), 90 kilometres from Tagtabazar
(Brummel 2005). The route reaches the Caspian coast and across it to Baku
in Azerbaijan. A branch route skirts the southern Caspian and reaches Tehe-
ran and onwards through West Asia to reach Turkey and Europe. A southern
route through Isfahan runs to Alleppo and Damascus in Syria.
Buryakov et al. (1999) inform that in ancient times, on their way from
Roman territories, caravans passed along the Caspian coast and entered the
land of Parthia. Merchants, who wanted to deal only with India, would turn
southwards from Merv and undertake an easy journey through Afghanistan
passing through Herat and Seistan and then eastwards to Kandahar from
where passes along the river routes in the Sulaiman mountains could be fol-
lowed up to the Indus (Warmington 1995).
In the 4th century BCE, the Laghman-Susa route connected with Patalipu-
tra in the east, possibly an overlapping of the Uttarapath, along which Mau-
ryans were trading with the Mediterranean countries. The Mauryan king
Bindusara was in touch with the Syrian king Antiochus I and could have
used the Laghman-Susa route to Syria on the shores of the eastern Mediter-
ranean for trade. Bindusara had requested his Syrian counterpart to buy fne
wine, fg and a sophist for him (Chakravarti 2016). Further, emperor Asoka
despatched his missionaries to the Greek kingdoms, probably along the same
route. Indian merchants on their trade journey to the Black Sea region could
also take the Taxila-Kapisa-Balkh highway to reach Merv from where a route
ran to Khorezm (Roy and Kumar 2007). Today, the modern Highway M-37
passing between the Kopet Dagh mountains and the Karakum Desert across
the oases cities of Nisa, Bagabat, Abiverd, Merv and Amul (Chardzhou) in
southern Turkmenistan actually corresponds to the ancient route connecting
Asia and Europe.
The Laghman-Susa route became an important trade route in the 6th cen-
tury BCE. Raw materials and painters from India were taken through this
route for building the royal palace of Darius – the “Palace of the New Year”
(the Naubahar), “in the very heart of Persis” (Manfredi 2002). Precious lapis
from Bactriana (at Badakhshan), gold from India transported by camels, pre-
cious stones from the Paropamisus (the Hindukush), linen from India, turtle
breast-plates from Taxila inlaid with ivory and coral and the precious yaka
wood from Gandhara were brought for this purpose. Indian painters worked
on the frescoes (Manfredi 2002; Livius 2004; Wikipedia). It is worthwhile to
mention here the close relation between Indians, Gandharans and Persians
that was witnessed on the walls of the apadana at Persepolis. “Gandarians”
(people from Gandhara) and Indians used to carry gifts in bamboo baskets,
swords and shields made out of ore excavated and smelted in Indian mines,
and excellent breed of milching cattle (bufaloes) as presents for king Darius
through the road to Susa. Two centuries later, during Alexander’s invasion
of India, thousands of high breed cattle were sent to Macedonia through
this route (Dandamayev 1999). An important road to the West also passed
through the Zagros mountains linking Babylon to Ecbatana and running
onwards to Bactria and borders of India from where gold, ivory and incense
were sent to West Asia (Dandamayev 1999).
Trade in Pashm
Indian “Shawl-goat” wool or pashm/pashmina or Kashmir wool was the
most sought-after commodity in Afghanistan, Persia and Europe. When
Sassanid Hormizd II (302–310) married the daughter of the king of Kabul,
the bride’s trousseau carried the special pashm woollen fabrics of Kashmir.
(Warmington 1995). Kashmiri pashm and safron were imported by Romans.
Along the Afghan routes, Indian cotton fabrics from Madhura, Aparantas,
Kalingas, Kasi, Vangas, Vatsas and the Mahiisas and a special fabric called
“dukula” was prepared in Bengal, Magadh and Pundras were traded (Kangle
1965). An Indian fabric dyed in a colour obtained from “red-beetle” and red
dye obtained from lac-insect (Tacharrdialacca) was exported to Persia and
the West. But Chinese silk was the staple article of commerce and was traded
along the western land routes through Parthia. It could come via the north-
ern regions of the Afghan Wakhan route, through the routes into Taxila and
from China via the southern Silk Road or down the Brahmaputra through
Assam (along with the Assamese Muga silk) (Warmington 1995).
Other traded items included aromatic spices, pepper, cinnamon, costus,
cardamom, ginger, aloes, indigo, rice as cereal, and precious stones like dia-
monds, onyx, beryl, agate, carnelian, crystal, amethyst, opal, sapphire, ruby
and turquoise. Skins of lion, tiger and leopard from India also reached the
markets of Rome and lyceum (berries) from lyceum shrub was packed in
the skin of rhinoceros and camel for export by India (Warmington 1995).
Diferent varieties of sandalwood also reached the Mediterranean countries
through the western routes: red and blackish red from Satana, Grameru,
192 Sunita Dwivedi
Devasambhava, Gosrsa and Jonga; parrot’s feather from Hari; whitish red
from Mala; Safron colour from Mt. Kala; black and black variegated from
Kosagara; colour of moss from Naga mountains; and brown from Sakala
(Kangle 1965). Pearls from India’s southern kingdoms and the Gulf of Man-
nar were popular as well (Warmington 1995). The best pearls, which were
big, round without a fat surface, lustrous, white, heavy and smooth, as the
Arthashastra describes, came from Tamraparni, Pandyaka-vata, Pasika,
Kula, Curni, Mt. Mahendra, Kardama, Srotasi, the Lake and Himavat (Kan-
gle 1965). Indigo from Bengal and Bihar were brought via Afghan routes to
Alleppo (Syria) and Europe. Numerous neelkothis (indigo stores) still exist
all over the eastern provinces of India and Bangladesh. Punjab towns were
stocked with indigo, both locally produced and those coming from other
parts of the country, mainly Bihar and Bengal. Lahore and Agra were the
chief market for indigo. Indigo, which reached Europe from Aleppo or the
Levant, was known as Lauri or Lahori (from Lahore) (Alam 2007).
Wakhan Corridor Route

Through Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, India was in contact with Tajik-
istan, Kyrgyzstan and China’s Xinjiang. North-eastwards through Badakh-
shan, the route ran through the Wakhan Corridor into Xinjiang and onwards
to Gansu Corridor (China). The Wakhan route, on its way to Kashgar, could
enter southern Tajikistan and eastern Kyrgyzstan through passes in the
Pamirs. Precious green and yellow jade mined in the rivers of Yarkand and
Khotan and goods from Kashgar and the foothills of the Tien Shan and the
Kun Lun were brought into Afghanistan through the Wakhan Corridor and
distributed all over West Asia and India. This was also the route for Indian
scholars and Buddhist texts to Tarim Basin and China. Xuanzang mentions
some important states of the Wakhan during 7th century AD, where Tibetan
musk was prized and traded. These were Po-to-ch’ang-na – to the east of
Himatala, identifed with Badakhshan, Ku-lang-na- to south-east of the for-
mer, identifed with modern Karran (in the upper Kokcha valley), Ta-mo-si-
t’ie-ti- to north-east of Karran, identifed with Wakhan valley (Beal 1884). A
route that connected Badakshan to the Upper Indus valley passed through
Yamgan, Karran, Wakhan and Shughnan as well (Beal 1884). Musk obtained
from Musk Deer in the upper Indus and Gilgit region, extending to Tibet was
exported through Persia to Rome (Warmington 1995).
Lapis Lazuli Route

Lapis Lazuli route, an important route emanating from Wakhan ran from
Badakhshan to Balkh, was followed by Xuanzang. Through this route passed
blue stone lapis and bright red rubies of Badakhshan. Lapis was transported
from the ancient mines to the countries of the Near East. To Rtveladze (2009),
by the second half of the third and the frst half of the second millennium BC,
the people of the Indus had opened up a route through the Khyber Pass going
north from the Indus Valley to the valley of the Amu Darya to mine lapis
lazuli in Badakhshan. This could probably have been the Kunar/Chitral Val-
ley route that opened in Badakhshan region. A report titled “Sarazm-2006”
by A. Donish Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, Tajik
Academy of Sciences, stated that from ancient burial tombs of Sarazm, near
Penjikent along the Zerafshan valley, there was evidence of trade with India.
Bracelets made of shell obtained from the Indian Ocean were found in the
grave of a princess there. It was found during this author’s travel along the
Surkhandarya and Zerafshan valley route that seashells were probably taken
through Badakhshan routes or Surkhandarya route across the Oxus into the
Zerafshan valley.
Indian Trade Along Sulaiman Passes

Indian trade was also carried along the Gomal valley route that ran into
Ghazni through the Gomal Pass and also along a third route running through
the Bolan Pass into Kandahar. The aforesaid passes in the north-western fron-
tiers of the subcontinent were crucial in commerce between India, Afghani-
stan, Persia and Trans-Caspia. While the Khyber Pass connected Kabul with
Peshawar, the Bolan Pass along the Bolan river valley runs through the Toba
Kakkar range of Baluchistan connected Kandahar with Quetta and Sibi. It
was used as a gateway to and from South Asia and was the nearest route into
southern Afghanistan through Jaisalmer, Sibi, Quetta, Kandahar and Herat
into Persia. Northwards the Kandahar road ran through Ghazni to Kabul up
to Kunduz and Balkh. Gomal Pass in the Hindukush falls midway between
Khyber and the Bolan Pass. It takes its name from the Gomal river and is
today located on the Durand Line (Afghanistan-Pakistan border). It connects
Ghazni in Afghanistan with Tank and Dera Ismail Khan in Pakistan.
Vigne’s (2004) journey in 1836 in the company of Lohani merchants from
Derabund to Ghazni along the Gomal River gives us the idea about this trade
route, the kind of Indian goods in demand and the interesting life and tra-
vails of the kaflas to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Lohani merchants,
believed to have been goat herders from Ghor, or Mushkon, east of Herat,
traded between India and Afghanistan. Such was the network of routes that
the kaflas could easily divert from forks in the river and stream to supply
Indian goods to new villages and forts on the way. Several Lohani kaflas,
each with several thousand camels, horses and mules loaded with goods com-
ing from all over India left for Ghazni between April and May. Vigne writes
about three kaflas. The frst carried coarse goods of Moghiana (a town situ-
ated on the Chenab river), and the salt of Punjab. The whole of these goods
194 Sunita Dwivedi
were disposed of at Ghazni, Kabul and Kandahar. The camels of the second
kafla were burdened with indigo purchased at Multan and Bahawalpur and
chintz. The third kafla was the largest consisting of merchants travelling
from Hyderabad, Kolkata, Benaras, Delhi and Jaipur cities of India. The bulk
of their load consisted of kimkab/khinqhab or golden clothes of Benaras,
English chintzes and calicos, gun locks, red tobacco or suruk, manufactured
red silk or kaish, carpets and embroidery. From Ghazni, the Lohani kaflas
travelled in the month of October bringing pomegranate, almonds, raisins,
ruwash from Kabul, and Bokhara horses and cochineal. There were fve or
six other kaflas, which annually passed the Hindukush for Bukhara, laden
with various wares. (Vigne 2004).
Bolan Pass Route

Burnes (2009) informs that the export for Central Asia (from India) might
be landed at Bukkur/Bakkar, which may be considered the port of Shikarpur.
It has an extensive connection with all parts of Asia and is situated on the
plains below the Bolan Pass, the great defle through the Sulaiman moun-
tains. The Bolan Pass through the Toba Kakkar range of Baluchistan is only
120 kilometres (75 miles) from the Afghan border. The Pass connects Sibi
with Quetta. From the Bolan Pass a road runs up to the Khojak pass leading
into Chaman on the Afghan border and into Kandahar. (Singh et al. 2004).
Conclusion
Control of the Afghan trade routes was about controlling the economic cor-
ridor of Asia – the Haimavata marg (Uttarapath) extending up to Peshawar,
Kabul and Balkh. This is believed to have led to the war between Chan-
dragupta and Seleucus in Mauryan times. In a way, the “warfare” over trade
routes has continued up to present times when China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) is coming up as a rival to the “Great Indian Road” men-
tioned by E. Rtveladze.
The Afghan routes made it possible for emperors and merchant guilds to
patronize spread of Buddhism and Buddhist art outside the country. Asoka
put up his important edicts along the Uttarapath and its branches, namely
Kandahar-Ghazni Road, the Jalalabad-Kabul Road and along the Shalatak
Road, which that attracted enormous trade from all over Asia and had a
large foating population of Greeks, Persians, Bactrians and Indians. These
routes transported Asoka’s Dhamma to the land of the Greeks besides trans-
mitting Buddhist sutras into China and the land of the Turks. These routes
popularized India’s Brahmi and Kharosthi scripts and introduced Hindu and
Buddhist iconography in Central Asia’s art. These routes set the trend of the
“Colossal Buddhas” of Bamiyan and Kakrak.
The importance of Indo-Afghan collaboration of trade and trade routes can

be understood from the fact that in the 12th century Hindu merchants were
settled in Ghazni and trade had introduced fexibility in relations between
diferent religious groups. For example, Muhammad Ghuri refrained from
confscating the property of Wasa (Vaishya) Abhira, a wealthy Hindu mer-
chant settled in Ghazni. Similarly, a Jain merchant, Jagadu, had constructed
a mosque for his trading partners from Hormuz in 14th CE (Thapar 2008).
The present status of Afghan routes and their Asian connectivity presents
a grim picture to any traveller. The Wakhan corridor leads to nowhere. China
has blocked the passage into the Pamirs. Afghan pleas of reopening this cru-
cial route for trade have fallen on deaf ears. The Uzbek route (at Arytam near
Termez) into Balkh at Hairatan is restricted for a traveller. Heavy police and
army guard the Tajik route into Kunduz. Few travellers can venture on the
Turkmen route beyond Tagtabazar into Afghanistan at Towraghundi. The
Pakistan route through historic Khyber Pass and the Parachinar and Cha-
man, an entry point into Ghazni and Kandahar, shares the same fate. This
has resulted in immense loss of trade opportunities to Afghanistan. The situa-
tion has resulted in impoverishment of Afghanistan and has deprived India of
cheap and easy land transport to regions beyond Afghanistan. This calls for
urgent measures to bring peace in Afghanistan and help restore and revital-
ize dormant and broken trade routes that for centuries have nourished India,
Central Asia, China and the Mediterranean regions. This may seem a difcult
task but not impossible as massive endowments of copper, iron, lithium, rare
earths, uranium and precious gemstones lying largely untapped in the Afghan
mountains will prompt any government in Afghanistan to see wisdom in dia-
logue with neighbours for skilled manpower, funding and technology.
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conquest_of_the_Indus_Valley
15
INDIA’S NEW DIPLOMACY
IN CENTRAL ASIA
Analysing the First India-Central
Asia Summit
Manish S. Dabhade
Introduction
India hosted the frst ever India-Central Asia Summit, albeit virtually, on
27 January 2022, which coincided with the 30th anniversary of the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between India and the fve Central Asian
Republics (CARs) – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. One of the highlights of the Delhi Declaration adopted at this
Summit was the renewed emphasis on “the centuries-old close civilizational,
cultural, trade and people-to-people linkages between India and Central Asian
countries”, and all leaders expressing resolve “to building a long term, com-
prehensive, and enduring India-Central Asia partnership based on mutual
trust, understanding and friendship” (Embassy of India 2022). This Summit
attended by the Heads of States of all the fve CARs was a successful, expected
culmination of India’s new diplomacy heralded by Indian Prime Minister Nar-
endra Modi during his historic visit to all the fve CARs (6–13 July 2015), a
frst by any Indian Prime Minister since their independence in 1991.
This chapter argues that India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia has wit-
nessed a transformational shift from Connect Central Asia to Act Central Asia
especially from 2014 that included diplomacy at the highest levels, namely
summitry, bilateral and multilateral, and the India-Central Asia Dialogue
at the Foreign Ministers level driving an expansive but focused diplomatic
agenda for India and the Central Asian states. For India, it marked a real,
strategic and diplomatic attempt to penetrate its “extended neighbourhood”
in the West with new ideas, policies and actions. Prime Minister Modi’s new
summit diplomacy, what David Dunn calls “diplomacy at the highest level”,
has re-energized the deepening ties between India and the region.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-18
198 Manish S. Dabhade
This chapter has been divided into four sections. The frst section analyses
the signifcant outcomes of the Summit in the form of the Delhi Declaration.
The second specifcally identifes Indian objectives that guided its new diplo-
macy embodied in the Summit. The third section examines the multi-layered
fabric of India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia especially since 2014. The
conclusion explains the new Indian diplomacy leading to transforming of ties
between India and the CARs and the challenges ahead.
Delhi Declaration 2022: Principal Takeaways

The inaugural India-Central Asia Summit assumes signifcance as it was
held in the backdrop of a rapidly changing security dynamics in South and
Central Asia triggered by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
Taliban usurping power in August 2021. The Delhi Declaration contained
landmark agreements and announced ambitious initiatives. At the broader
level, it helped identify key areas of cooperation as well as challenges for
India and the CARs. Looking at the Declaration, it can be said that Afghan-
istan, connectivity, security/defence and economic ties and post-COVID-19
recovery assumed primacy in the Summit deliberations and formed the cen-
trepiece of the Declaration signed by all the Leaders (Embassy of India
Tashkent 2022).
At the symbolic level to commemorate three decades of diplomatic ties, all
the leaders agreed on the “issuance of joint postal stamps”. At the more sub-
stantive level, the Declaration announced to hold India-Central Asia Sum-
mit every two years. Apart from the continuing India-Central Asia Dialogue
being held at the Foreign Ministers’ level since 2019, there was an agreement
“that the Ministers of Trade and Culture would meet at regular intervals to
take forward cooperation in these areas”. It was also “agreed to continue
regular meetings of Secretaries of the Security Council to discuss security
developments in the region” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022).
The Declaration announced “the establishment of the India-Central Asia
Centre in New Delhi which will serve as the Secretariat of the India-Central
Asia Summit”. This Centre would lead to “better coordination and crea-
tion of ministerial-level platforms focusing on four areas including defence
and security, trade and connectivity, among other issues” (Roy Chaudhury
2022). The idea was to create a nodal point of setting the multilateral as well
as bilateral agenda for India and Central Asia to be deliberated at the high-
est levels of respective states. Also announced was the relevance of the pro-
posal to create an India-Central Asia Parliamentary Forum to serve “as an
important forum of interaction between the legislatures of these countries”.
India, being the oldest and the largest democracy in the world, can signif-
cantly share its democratic and governance experiences to further strengthen
democracy in these new, democratic republics (Tayal 2022).
India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia 199
The Summit highlighted the centrality of collective eforts by India and

the CARs to tackling the efects and after-efects of the pandemic. Thus, the
leaders “called for collective eforts in the fght against the pandemic” and
“stressed the importance of extensive vaccination, vaccine supply, transfer of
technology, development of local production capacities, promotion of supply
chains for medical products, and ensuring price transparency”. All leaders
“expressed mutual gratitude to each other for timely assistance during the
pandemic and agreed that early mutual recognition of Covid-19 vaccina-
tion certifcates will facilitate easier travel of citizens of their countries”. The
leaders laid out a combined agenda that “called for a timely, transparent,
efective and non-discriminatory international response to global health chal-
lenges including pandemics, for ensuring an equitable and afordable access to
medicines and critical health supplies”. Taking note of Prime Minister Modi’s
One Health One Earth approach, the Declaration “emphasized that the post-
pandemic world requires diversifed global supply chains that are based on
trust, resilience and reliability”. Going further and highlighting the impor-
tance of transport in returning to normalcy after the pandemic, the Decla-
ration endorsed the adoption, at the initiative of Turkmenistan, of the UN
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/313 on “strengthening the links
between all modes of transport to ensure stable and reliable international
transport for sustainable development during and after the corona virus dis-
ease (Covid-19) pandemic” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022).
High Impact Community Development Projects for socio-economic
development in the CARs based on Indian grants have emerged as the cen-
trepiece of India’s engagements in the region in recent years. Thus, it was
agreed to assess the on-going projects and ensure their speedy implemen-
tation. This has assumed a priority in light of the Indian $1 billion Line
of Credit announced in 2020 for infrastructure projects in all the CARs.
Additionally, all leaders agreed to further enhance India’s capacity-building
and human-resource development initiatives under its Indian Technical and
Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and the Indian Council for Cul-
tural Relations (ICCR) scholarships. The Indian proposal to organize “cus-
tomized” professional training programmes for the diplomats from all the
Central Asian states was accepted too, in addition to India’s ofer to provide
“more training slots and scholarships including customized training pro-
grammes to meet the requirements of Central Asian countries” (Embassy of
India Tashkent 2022).
Identifying the rather low level of trade and investments between India
and the CARs, the leaders emphasized “the importance of making concerted
eforts to boost trade and investment in sectors like medicine, healthcare,
pharmaceuticals, education, information technology, business process out-
sourcing (BPO), infrastructure, agriculture and processing of agricultural
products, energy, space industry, textiles, leather and footwear industry,
gems & jewellery etc.”, and directed their respective Ministers to draw an
agenda to enhance mutual trade and industrial cooperation between the two
sides. Both sides expressed the desire of the newly established India-Central
Asia Business Council (ICABC) to take necessary steps to fll this much-
needed gap. Both sides acknowledged the ICABC proposal to establish an
India-Central Asia Investment Club to further promote investments in each
other’s countries (Tayal 2022).
The Declaration acknowledged the inherent and the most signifcant con-
straint in the further development of trade and commerce amongst them-
selves due to the landlocked nature and the absence of overland connectivity
with India; it drew utmost attention to prioritizing development of more
connectivity that could serve as a force multiplier at many levels. India and
member-states in the region that were part of the International North-South
Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement on International
Transport and Transit Corridor invited other CARs to join these connectivity
initiatives. The Indian proposal to include the Chabahar port and Turkmeni-
stan’s proposal to include the Turkmenbashi port within the framework of
the INSTC found support among all leaders. They also agreed to the Indian
proposal to form a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Chabahar port to
discuss all issues to facilitate an unhindered movement of goods and services
amongst India and all the CARs (Gupta 2022).
Another important arena highlighted in the Declaration was the emerg-
ing defence cooperation between India and some states in Central Asia
especially in the form of bilateral counter-terrorism exercises. All leaders
laid emphasis on “the importance of regular dialogue between the Security
Councils of their countries” especially in light of “the common challenges
of terrorism, extremism and radicalization in the region”. In an acknowl-
edgement of the rise of terrorism as the principal security challenge the
region has been facing, the Declaration condemned terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations, and emphasized the early adoption of the UN
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (Embassy of India
Tashkent 2022).
Since Afghanistan remained central to peace, security and stability within
South and Central Asia, the Declaration “reiterated strong support for a
peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan while emphasizing the respect for
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal
afairs”. In an attempt to seeking a combined approach towards Afghanistan,
it was agreed to establish a JWG on Afghanistan at senior ofcials’ level
(Embassy of India Tashkent 2022).
The frst India-Central Asia Summit, therefore, seemed to have succeeded
to bring all the Heads of States to identifying the primary areas of coopera-
tion and identifying the ways and means to jointly move ahead to achieve the
objectives stated in the Delhi Declaration.
India’s New Diplomacy at the First India-Central Asia Summit

The frst Summit marked a strategic-cum-diplomatic high point for India in
its Central Asia policy in terms of determining the trajectory of security,
stability and a geostrategic equilibrium of its western frontiers and has show-
cased the salience of India’s extended neighbourhood approach “in address-
ing the emerging challenges in the region with strong determination, under
the spirit of reformed multilateralism and transparency in global govern-
ance” (Bhattacharya 2022). Looking at the intensive engagement between
the two in the past few years, there seems to be an agreement between India
and the CARs on a shared vision and approach towards stabilizing a criti-
cally important geostrategic arena in India’s northern neighbourhood that
would have increasing global signifcance in the years ahead.
Continuing with the tradition with a huge symbolic signifcance coupled
with a strategic intent, in December 2021, India decided to invite the Heads
of States of all fve CARs as Chief Guests at its annual Republic Day celebra-
tions on 26 January 2022. However, due to the pandemic, the Summit had to
be held in a virtual mode.
In his opening address at the Summit, Prime Minister Modi identifed
three specifc objectives. The frst objective was to highlight “that coopera-
tion between India and Central Asia is essential for regional security and
prosperity”. Modi added that in Indian eyes, “Central Asia is central to
India’s vision of an integrated and stable extended neighbourhood”. The sec-
ond objective was “to give an efective structure to our cooperation. This will
establish a framework of regular interactions at diferent levels and among
various stakeholders”. The fnal objective, according to Modi, was “to cre-
ate an ambitious roadmap for our cooperation”. Laying out an ambitious
agenda, he emphasized that “through this, we will be able to adopt an inte-
grated approach for regional connectivity and cooperation for the next 30
years” (PM India 2022).
The announcement of the India-Central Asia Summit in December 2020
also drew attention from major players in the region. China, in fact, went
ahead and organized a similar Summit with all the fve Central Asian Heads
of States just two days before the Summit in Delhi (Sachdeva 2022).
Zafar (2022) puts the number of initiatives announced in the Delhi Dec-
laration in four broad categories: (1) regional security, (2) connectivity,
(3) economic relations and (4) cultural and people-to-people engagements.
The focus was on institutionalizing the multilateral summit process and other
high-level ministerial engagements other than the summit itself. On regional
security, there seemed to be a convergence of interests in securing regional
stability arising out of terrorism, extremism and drug trafcking. On the
security dynamics emerging in Afghanistan, all the states supported a peace-
ful, secure and stable Afghanistan, central to their regional stability. India,
in continued engagement with Afghanistan despite many connectivity hin-

drances, agreed to send humanitarian assistance and ofered to send food
grains to the Afghan people. Regarding the connectivity domain, the Decla-
ration openly acknowledged the lack of direct land route between India and
Central Asia severely limiting the gamut of economic and trade ties possible
between the two. Despite this, many measures introduced in past few years
could serve to counter these real hindrances. These include India’s joining
the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018, and the expansion and functioning of the
INSTC connecting with increasing number of Central Asia and West Asia
nodes. To Zafar (2022), it is in the domain of cultural and people-to-people
engagements that India has an edge over many of the powers present in Cen-
tral Asia. India’s deep, extensive civilizational, religious and cultural linkages
covering a large part of Central Asia provide a human, popular bond that
transcends geopolitics and geo-economics in the region. India’s telemedicine
and health support during the pandemic have created immense goodwill for
India in the region to its advantage and further cemented their ties.
Looking at the Indian initiative and the multiple, game-changing out-
comes of the Delhi Declaration, it can be argued that India’s new diplomacy
in the India-Central Asia Summit was singularly driven by three core objec-
tives: (1) the question of securing regional stability. India focused on building
convergences amongst all the CARs on the importance of a peaceful, secure
and stable Afghanistan. This was critically important to successfully counter
the challenges of terrorism and extremism emanating with the Taliban in tak-
ing over power in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghani-
stan. (2) Indian diplomacy remained committed to signifcantly increasing
and diversifying its economic and trade exchanges that were much below the
actual potential. India’s trade with Central Asia stood at a mere $2 billion
compared to the Chinese trade with the region that stood at around $100
billion. (3) Indian diplomacy remained focused on overcoming the inherent
connectivity problems through a variety of means. The creation of the JWG
on Chabahar Port and an agreement to include it in the INSTC marks a bet-
ter appreciation of repeated Indian eforts to enhance connectivity with the
region. These Indian eforts also provide a bufer to the energy-rich states to
decrease their dependencies on any actors in Central Asia.
The frst Summit marks the successful culmination of the series of new
Indian diplomatic initiatives, bilateral and multilateral, that sought to deepen
and expand ties between the two regions. According to Sachdeva (2022),
India’s diplomatic energies in Central Asia in the earlier decades have been
dictated by its Afghanistan, Pakistan and China policies and Russian and
U.S. strategies in the region. Though the rising instability in Afghanistan will
continue to infuence Indian strategies in Central Asia, the new diplomacy is
a clear indication of New Delhi’s willingness to consider Central Asia’s stra-
tegic relevance in its own right.
India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia Since 2014

Central Asia has always been seen in major global capitals as Russia’s post–
Cold War strategic and cultural “backyard” and China’s new “Far West”
increasingly fushed with Chinese investments, especially through its Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) in the last nine years. For Indians, the region has been
seen as “Greater Central Asia” intrinsically linked to South Asia as part of
its extended neighbourhood. Despite the historic and geographic proximity
between the two regions, there had been a lack of real interest in each other
for a variety of reasons. At one level, Central Asia’s landlocked geography,
despite the proximity, was seen as an insurmountable obstacle to any further
progress in their relationship. Similarly, despite age-old civilizational link-
ages going back thousands of years including the Silk Road, and the spread
of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and beyond and the spread of Sufsm
to India from Central Asia, both were tied down by recent history. With the
gradual decline of the Silk Road, the emergence of the European “age of
discovery” and the tightening embrace of Russia and China, Central Asia
ceded to occupy the Indian strategic imagination. After India’s independence,
its immediate neighbourhood and the intractable territorial disputes therein
as well as the leadership of Afro-Asian nations became India’s top strategic
and diplomatic priority. Also, India’s close relations with the former Soviet
Union precluded any direct relationship with Central Asia. In fact, India’s
only direct contact with the region was the establishment of its consulate in
Tashkent in 1987. All the CARs, part of the former Soviet Union, became
independent in December 1991. A special relationship between India and
the former Soviet Union thus precluded any direct, close ties with the region.
India too was seen preoccupied with its immediate neighbourhood, and its
inward economic outlook. The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic change
in the diplomatic outlook and engagements of India and CARs too. It saw
high-level visits from both sides, but not any substantive progress in realizing
actual potential of each other.
India had traditionally preferred the bilateral track in developing ties with
the CARs in an attempt to secure its limited, albeit crucial, objectives of
access to these energy rich states. In an attempt to shed its historical bag-
gage, India announced a “Connect Central Asia” policy in 2012 in Bishkek
(Jha 2016). The primary goal behind this policy was, as the name suggests,
re-connecting with the region which has a long-shared history with India. In
the words of Indian strategic expert K. Subrahmanyam, “The Central Asian
Republics (CARs) posed the most excruciating and complex challenges to
Indian diplomacy judged whether by geostrategic compulsions or by India’s
energy concerns”. India’s Minister of State for External Afairs E. Ahmed
unveiled the “Connect Central Asia Policy” (CCAP) at the frst meeting of
the India-Central Asia Dialogue, a Track II initiative, held over 12–13 June
2012 in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) to fast-track India’s relations with the CARs.

In his keynote speech, Ahmed mentioned that
the policy calls for setting up universities, hospitals, information technol-

ogy (IT) centers, an e-network in telemedicine connecting India to the
CARs, joint commercial ventures, improving air connectivity to boost
trade and tourism, joint scientifc research, and strategic partnerships in
defense and security afairs.
(Roy 2013)
The key elements of this policy covered many important areas, including
political cooperation, economic cooperation, strategic cooperation, regional
connectivity, information technology (IT), cooperation in education, people-
to-people contact, medical cooperation and cooperation in regional group-
ings (Jha 2016).
India’s intensive diplomatic engagements in Central Asia since Prime Min-
ister Modi assumed ofce marked a beginning of its Act Central Asia policy,
a logical extension of India’s CCAP. This was largely driven by the deteriorat-
ing security landscape in Afghanistan. According to Indian security planners,
Afghanistan and Central Asia constitute the same geopolitical space and the
threat of terrorism and radicalization emanating from Afghanistan has grave
consequences for both India and Central Asia. The robust, increasing pres-
ence of China added another rationale for India to renew its diplomatic focus
on the region.
In a signifcant display of increased strategic interest in the Central Asian
region, and what David Dunn describes as diplomacy at the highest level,
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited all the fve CARs in a rare, single
visit. This was indeed historic visit by an Indian Prime Minister since the inde-
pendence of the CARs, and marked almost a quarter century of establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two regions (Zafar 2016). This visit had
both a bilateral and a multilateral, regional component. The bilateral sum-
mits saw the signing of a total of 22 agreements encompassing diverse felds
such as energy, defence and military, science and technology, tourism, rail-
ways, culture and sports. In a signifcant move, India and Kazakhstan, during
the Prime Minister’s visit, signed a bilateral agreement to purchase uranium.
Kazakhstan now has become the source of around 80 per cent of India’s
uranium imports (Sachdeva 2022). Similarly, India and Kyrgyzstan signed
an agreement to hold Khanjar, their bilateral military exercise on an annual
basis. In 2016, both states agreed to “to construct a Mountain Training Cen-
tre to provide instruction, train personnel of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces and
to host joint mountain training exercises” (Menon and Rajiv 2019). At the
multilateral level, India participated in the BRICS Summit and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit (as an observer) in Ufa that led to
a region-level engagement to with the CARs. Taking this ahead, and show-
casing the region’s importance for India, this was signifcantly followed by
inviting the President of Kyrgyzstan along with BIMSTEC states and Mau-
ritius at the second swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi in May
2019 (Dutta 2019).
In a very signifcant development, showing its renewed interest in Central
Asia, India joined as a full member of the SCO in 2017, after 12 years as
an observer. This brought another regional tier of the CARs in close diplo-
matic intercourse with India, other than China and Russia. However, the ties
between India and Central Asia underwent a dramatic transformation, with
India and Uzbekistan proposing an India-Central Asia Dialogue at the For-
eign Ministers level to bring more coherence, create more opportunities and
jointly address varied challenges in their ties.
At the 2019 inaugural India-Central Asia Dialogue, India’s Foreign Min-
ister Sushma Swaraj reiterated India’s long-held position that “connectivity
initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good
governance, rule of law, openness, transparency, and equality. They must
follow principles of fnancial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner
that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity”. These remarks must be
viewed against the backdrop of India’s strong sovereignty objections to the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a vital component of
the BRI. With increasing concerns being raised about BRI projects, India will
not want to see the CARs relying exclusively on China for their exports or
falling into the “debt trap”. At the Dialogue, India ofered extending devel-
opment partnership to countries in the region wherein “we can bring our
countries closer by taking up concrete projects, inter alia, under our Lines
of Credit and Buyers’ Credit, and by sharing our expertise” (Ministry of
External Afairs 2019). To further this goal, in a government-to-government
initiative, India also proposed setting up of an “India-Central Asia Develop-
ment Group” that would comprise representatives of all states and would be
tasked to come up with concrete proposals. On Afghanistan, India reiterated
“its support and commitment to peace, security and stability of Afghani-
stan; to promote inclusive Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled
peace and reconciliation process and to assist in economic reconstruction of
Afghanistan” (Ministry of External Afairs 2019).
The joining of Afghanistan in the Dialogue carried remarkable signifcance
in more ways than one. The participation of Afghanistan for India and the
CARs acknowledged its place as a “bridge” to connect Central and South
Asia. It brought out their shared interests to meet the unique challenges of
connectivity and terrorism for India and Central Asia.
For India, the Dialogue provided a frst, high-level diplomatic opportunity
to show its renewed importance of the region, and what India’s Foreign Min-
ister Sushma Swaraj said “the starting point for a new era in relations between
India and Central Asia”. For India, it also meant a reafrmation of the cen-
turies-old ties between the peoples of India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: in
Swaraj’s words, “comfortable” with each other. Most signifcantly, India saw
itself and the region as “natural partners”. According to Swaraj, though her
visit to the region then had already “achieved important results bilaterally
with each one of the fve Central Asian countries”, it substantively “also set
us thinking what we can do more together to substantially enhance economic
engagement and development partnership between India and Central Asia”.
Driven by taking this ahead, India further announced at the Dialogue that
it now wanted “to build a modern and comprehensive partnership on these
strong foundations”. Also, as “development partnership has emerged as an
important component of India’s engagement with other countries”, Swaraj
“ofered to extend this partnership to Central Asia as well, where we can
bring our countries closer by taking up concrete projects, inter alia, under our
Lines of Credit and Buyers’ Credit, and by sharing our expertise”.
The frst India-Central Asia Dialogue, thus, provided a signifcant diplo-
matic opportunity to identify the shared interests, their shared challenges and
construct new roadmaps to take the ties ahead for mutual benefts in a large
number of arenas.
The second India-Central Asia Dialogue, hosted by New Delhi in a virtual
format on 28 October 2020, saw the attendance of the Foreign Ministers
of the fve CARs and the Afghan Foreign Minister as a special invitee. The
dialogue acknowledged the role of this mechanism in strongly furthering
partnerships in diverse arenas such as politics, security, economics, trade,
development and connectivity. This Dialogue too emphasized the “need for
building a comprehensive and enduring India-Central Asia partnership based
on historical, cultural, and civilizational bonds and traditionally close people-
to-people contacts” (Gupta 2020). In the context of the existing COVID-19
pandemic, India’s positive role in providing humanitarian and medical assis-
tance to all the CARs in confronting the pandemic was duly acknowledged
and all emphasized the need for more cooperation between the Sanitary and
Epidemiological Services of both India and the CARs. The Foreign Ministers
also welcomed the Indian initiative to extend $1 billion Line of Credit to
them for development projects in the energy, Information and Technology,
healthcare, connectivity, agriculture and other priority sectors. India made an
ofer to grant assistance to High Impact Community Development Projects
for socio-economic development of all the CARs in the Dialogue, which was
also welcomed by all. Taking cognizance of the very low volumes of bilateral
trade between the two sides, the Ministers agreed to make determined eforts
to enhance trade and commercial ties. The launch of the India-Central Asia
Business Council was seen as a welcome step. On the issue of Afghanistan,
all the participating Ministers whilst welcoming the participation of Afghani-
stan in the Dialogue emphasized their “frm stand about the Afghan confict’s
settlement on the principle of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-con-

trolled peace process” and expressed their “interest in strengthening cooper-
ation for Afghanistan’s development and economic reconstruction, including
infrastructure, energy, transit, and transport projects” (Embassy of India
Tashkent 2020). This Dialogue also highlighted the need for progress in the
arenas of connectivity and culture. In totality, the Dialogue represented an
excellent mechanism to identify a shared vision and approach to issues of
regional stability, security and development.
In December 2021, in a sign of strengthened, blooming partnership, all
CARs decided to send their respective Foreign Ministers to attend the third
India-Central Asia Dialogue and miss the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the
Organization of Islamic Countries organized by Pakistan, despite being its
members. The Joint Statement of the Dialogue signed by all Foreign Minis-
ters included “their readiness to joint celebrations marking the 30th anniver-
sary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Central
Asian States in 2022”. The Foreign Ministers of the CARs “appreciated
India’s assistance in supply of vaccines and essential medicines during their
early stage of fght against Covid-19” and India’s External Afairs Minister
S. Jaishankar “expressed gratitude for the supplies received from Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan and the ofer made by Turkmenistan during the second wave
of Covid-19 in India in April-May 2021”. All the parties took note of the
Outcome Document of the Regional Security Dialogue held on 10 Novem-
ber 2021, and emphasized that there was a broad ‘regional consensus’ on
the issues related to Afghanistan, which includes formation of a truly repre-
sentative and inclusive government, combating terrorism and drug trafck-
ing, central role of the UN, providing immediate humanitarian assistance for
the Afghan people and preserving the rights of women, children and other
national ethnic groups (Ministry of External Afairs 2021).
India’s diplomatic forays and focused energies in Central Asia seemed to be
paying dividends in the form of an increasing plethora of diplomatic engage-
ments at various summits, bilateral earlier and now multilateral, at the frst
India-Central Asia Summit. Both sides have gradually progressed from a state of
neglect dictated by history and geography to making concerted eforts to break
the shackles. This has been singularly driven by the new diplomacy engendered
by Prime Minister Modi and duly reciprocated by the leaders of the CARs taking
into account mutual interests in a range of domains, geopolitics to geo-economics.
The Delhi Declaration signed at the conclusion of the frst Summit stands testi-
mony to this dramatic upswing in ties between India and Central Asia.
Conclusion
As India showed a heightened urgency and interest in a full spectrum engage-
ment of Central Asia through the frst India-Central Asia Summit, the rise
of China with its mighty economic prowess embodied in the BRI and the
growing China-Pakistan cooperation in Central Asia remain a primary chal-
lenge to India’s diplomacy in the years ahead. The return of the Taliban
in Kabul has further complicated India’s security and diplomatic calculus.
India’s connectivity agenda that had Iran and Russia at the fulcrum also
look shaken because of increased Western economic sanctions against them.
The on-going Russia-Ukraine war has further aggravated India’s new diplo-
macy in Central Asia.
The geography of Central Asia has placed the region at the centre of rap-
idly transforming geopolitics and geo-economics in the 21st century. With
a rather long history of civilizational and cultural linkages, India seems to
be making diplomatic gains by its new diplomacy that has moved from the
aspirational Connect Central Asia to a more robust, substantive Act Central
Asia and has transformed India from being a relatively weak and largely
absent observer into a real and relatively strong stakeholder in Central Asia.
In conclusion, India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia evident in holding of
the frst India-Central Asia Summit marked a successful return of India to
Central Asia amidst increasing challenges in the years ahead.
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16
CONCLUSION
Selbi Hanova and Mahesh Ranjan Debata
Inner Asia is a constructed region with unset boundaries, and they vary
according to the viewer and according to the subject. The term itself is often
used in the vocabulary of historians rather than policymakers; however,
it remains in the vicinity of major power infuences of India, China, Rus-
sia, Iran and Turkey and is home to states that invariably take part in the
power dynamics of the region and world at large. While the region is studied
from the perspectives of diferent capitals in Inner Asia, be they Dushanbe
or Ulaanbaatar, the idea behind this book was to gather these perspectives
from Delhi and with Delhi. In this regard, the emphasis is given on Central
Asia (yet another region whose boundaries are contested) and the projects
and connections through this region. The main task here is to contribute to
a better understanding between two entities (India and Inner Asian region)
in the evolving global politics and bring forth the importance of the periph-
eral regions in the infrastructurally interconnected world full of complexities
posed by regional conficts, digital innovations and climate change crises.
It is found from the analysis of some 15 chapters of this book that Inner
Asia is an important region of the world from the geopolitical, geo-strategic
and geo-economic point of view. In the post-Soviet period, the Inner Asian
region has become the cynosure of all eyes, particularly when fve Central
Asian Republics (CARs), often dubbed as the “heart” of Inner Asia, emerged
in December 1991 from the ashes of the Cold War. The signifcance of the
region stems from the landlockedness of the region, strategic location (being
at the centre of Europe, Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia), abun-
dant natural resources (especially oil and natural gas and uranium), etc.
The sequence of events in past couple of years has afected the hearts and
minds of the people of the region. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic in
DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-19
Conclusion 211
2020 and a new war between Russia and Ukraine (since February 2022 till
date) in the post-Soviet space adversely afected economies, supply chains
and infrastructural links in this region and its neighbourhood. Adding to the
complexity, Afghanistan headed by Taliban is a new ingredient in the intri-
cate power setting. Taliban grabbed power in this war-torn country, follow-
ing the withdrawal of international forces on 15 August 2021. Since four of
the Inner Asian countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China)
share border with Afghanistan, an apprehension of spillover of any sort from
across the border still looms large. In addition, the current positions taken up
by the United States of America, Russia and China on the Middle East crisis
following the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 are going to aggravate
the already vitiated atmosphere in Inner Asia.
Inner Asia has become a theatre of competition and rivalry by big and
regional powers in the last three centuries. For example, Tsarist Russia and
British India struggled for power and infuence in Central Asia during 19th-
century old Great Game period. In the last leg of 20th century, the CARs fell
prey to the sinister designs of the sole big power (the United States of Amer-
ica) and ambitious plans and programmes of regional powers (Russia, China,
Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, etc.), who did not leave any stone unturned to
nourish their goals. Similarly, the region has not been able to immune itself
from the infuences of power rivalry in the past two decades of the 21st cen-
tury. It is important to highlight how the global actor (the United States) and
regional actors (Russia, China and India) have devised policies and initiatives
to bring the Central Asian states to their fold. For example, China involves
the CARs as the core of its Belt and Road Initiative, which has turned 10 this
year. Similarly, the United States of America came up with C5+1, which is a
renewed efort of its “Greater Central Asia” project, in order to counter Rus-
sia’s Eurasianism. India too has become a vital cog of the 21st-century power
rivalry with its much avowed strategic initiative India–Central Asia Dialogue
with the fve CARs under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Inner Asia has remained a focal point in India’s new-age foreign policy
in the last nine years or so. It is pertinent to point out here that India has
an age-old historical–cultural linkage with the Inner Asian region, which is
more than 2,500 years old. The relationship between the two regions began
with regular contacts between traders/merchants from India and Inner Asian
region. The relationship ushered in a new phase with the introduction of
Buddhism in the region. For a long time, till the advent of Islam, Buddhism
remained the prevailing religion in and around the region. India’s rich cul-
tural heritage and spiritual thought, gospels of Buddhism, which percolated
into the hearts and minds of the people, further led to a cultural eforescence
in the entire region. Besides, the ancient Silk Route helped in integrating
the rich cultural heritage of India and Inner Asian region and promoted the
exchange of idea and intellect and, most importantly, trade.
212 Selbi Hanova and Mahesh Ranjan Debata
The post-Soviet space provided India the much-needed opportunity to

renew the decade-long linkage with the Inner Asian region. India under-
stood well the importance of Central Asia for her strategic, security and eco-
nomic interests. After a continuous engagement with the individual republics
of Central Asia for over two decades, India came up with “Connect Cen-
tral Asia Policy” in 2012 to establish a connectivity with the region and
beyond. The relations between the two regions witnessed a new high during
Prime Minister Modi’s “Look, Learn and Act North Policy”. Between May
and December 2015, Modi visited seven Inner Asian countries – Mongolia
(May), CARs (July) and Afghanistan (December) and signed a number of
agreements. The main highlight of these visits was the signing of Strategic
Partnership Agreement with Mongolia. The main intention of Indian leader-
ship has been to establish a connectivity with this strategically important and
resource-rich region so that India’s trade and commerce with this region can
be stepped up. It will defnitely give a boost to the spread of Indian culture
and tradition in and around the region.
While discussing the establishment of connectivity between India and
Inner Asia, it can be pointed out that there has been a glimmer of hope
for India in the forms of Chabahar as port of promise, the INSTC and the
Middle East Corridor. However, a few recent events (Afghanistan situation,
Russia–Ukraine war, Middle East Crisis, etc.) have cast a shadow over these
promising means of connectivity between India and Inner Asia. The amount
of eforts and money India has pumped to achieve the much needed con-
nectivity is considerable. Instead of losing hope, India should watch closely
and carefully the events and incidents in the global corridor and start with a
positive bent of mind and renewed vigour to fnd out other means to revive
the trade and civilization linkage with Inner Asia.
INDEX
9/11 33, 158 Afghanistan Pine Nut Processing

12-Point Peace Plan 79 Plant 103
1911 Revolution 44–46, 54 Afghan National Security Forces 165
Af-Pak Strategy 144
Acharya, Amitav 87, 93 Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful
Adamant (Roerich) 15, 25 Uses of Nuclear Energy 160
Afghan Bank 175 Ahmadzoda, Rajabboy 100–101
Afghanistan agreements with Tajikistan Ahmed, E. 203
and Kyrgyzstan 103; and BRI Air Freight Corridor 163
146–147; establishing JWG on Akaev, Askar 128
200; as geo-economic pivot on Ak Serai 187
New Silk Road 132; geostrategic Alam, Muzafar 188
advantage of 136; participation Al-Qaeda 118, 158, 159
in India-Iran-Afghanistan- Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary
Central Asia Transport and (Roerich) 15, 18, 21
Transit Corridor 180; post-U.S. Altai 2
withdrawal from 105–107; Altan Bulag 53
relationship with Central Asia Amir Timur 187
4–5; security cooperation with Amu Darya 60, 66–67, 134
India 165, 205; and Silk Road Angren-Pap rail line 134
renaissance 140; strategic Antiochus the Great of Syria 188, 190
partnership with India 160, Aral Sea 7, 60–62
161, 165; Tajik minorities in 8; Aral Sea Basin Programme (2018) 67
145–146, 159, 163, 165, 179, Arthasastra 187, 192
202, 211; US support of economy Ashgabat Agreement 103, 107, 178,
115, Afghanistan as transit hub 200, 202; 2018 163, 176
for Asia 137–140, 147; foreign Ashizawa, Kuniko 90
trade defcits and transit costs Ashoka (king) 25
138; geographical location 137– Asian art 17
138; natural resources 138–139; Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8,
regional connectivity 139–140 103, 132
214 Index
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Buddha 24

(AIIB) 104, 141 Buddhism 2, 15, 16, 20–22, 24, 25,
Asian regionalism 87 194, 203, 211; Asian 21; cultures
Astana Summit (2018) 102 16, 23; philosophy 21, 24;
Astrakhan 184 Transnationality of26
Asvaghosha 25 Build Back Better World (B3W) 143
Atambayev, Almazbek 128 Bulag, Uradyn E. 54
Atisha 24, 155 Burnes, Alexander 184
Atwood, Christopher P. 45 Burns, Richard Dean 17
Aurangzeb 188 Burns, William 115
Buryakov, Y. F. 189
Baasan, R. 46
Baipakov, K. 189 Campi, Alicia J. 46
Bakiyev, Kurmanbek 128 CASA 81, 103, 132–133
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 81 Caspian Access Policy 128
Balci, Bayram 92 Caspian Sea Summit (2022) 174
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 82
Corridor 116 Central Asia-China relationship 116–119;
Baradar, Mullah Ghani 105 border security 117–118;
Battulga, Khaltmaagiin 161 economic interests 118–119;
Bawden, C. R. 44 energy 116–117; strategic
Bayalun, Khatun 187 interests 118
Beautiful Unity (Roerich) 19, 20 Central Asian Cooperation
Beijing-Moscow rail line 131 Organization (CACO) 98, 99
Beijing’s Western Development Central Asian Economic Community
Strategy 119 (CAEC) 98
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 6, 38, 77, Central Asian Republics (CARs):
82, 102, 107, 108, 112, 115–116, depletion of water resources 7;
122, 125–127, 129, 137, 140–143, emergence 111; energy resources
145–147, 157, 178, 203, 205, in 113–114; energy use for
208, 211 development 6–7; environmental
Berdimuhamedov, Serdar 161 issue 7–8; geographical location
Bernardi, Marina 20 of 112–113; India’s strategic
Bhagavad-Gita 21 narratives for 121; Kazantsev’s
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited scenarios for Central Asia 134–135;
(BHEL) 162 oil and natural gas reserves in
Bibi Khanum mosque 187 80–81, 113–114; revival of
BIMSTEC 205 ethnicity and language 8; use of
Bindusara 190 chemical fertilizers 7; see also
bin Laden, Osama 159 individual entries
Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna 20, 22 Central Asian Union (CAU) 98
Bogatyrev, Valentin 94 Central Asia Regional Economic
Bolan Pass 193, 194 Cooperation (CAREC) 103, 179
Bolshevik Revolution 52–53 Central Asia-South Asia Regional
Border Management in Central Asia Electricity Market (CASAREM)
(BOMCA) 92 115
Border Patrolling and Surveillance 164 Chabahar Day 176
Border Security Force (BSF) 164 Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad
Borzhakty-Ersai rail line 130 corridor 177
Brazil Russia India China and South Chabahar Port 102, 107, 156, 171, 173,
Asia (BRICS) 104, 141, 204 174, 175–180, 200, 202, 212
Brock, H. I. 22 Chabahar-Zahedan railway project 174
Brzezinski, Zbignew 74–76 Chandra, Lokesh 20
Index 215
Chandragupta Maurya 188, 194 Clement, Victoria 99

Chatterjee, Suchandana 26 Climate and Environment (CLIENT)
China 5, 7, 8–9, 133–134; access to Programme 67
CARs 126–127; Civil War in Climate change impact on Central
50; control in Mongolia 49–54; Asia 57–68; 4th Aral Sea Basin
control over South China Sea 133, Programme (2018) 67; Climate
134; cooperation with Pakistan and Environment (CLIENT)
208; de-ethnicization of Muslims Programme 67; desertifcation
37, 39; de-extremifcation strategy of Aral Sea basin 60–61, 66–67;
35–36, 39; diluting Uyghurs’ environmental issues 58–59;
cultural identity 38; ethnic food security and health 62–63;
management 31, 38; ethnic policy land and water degradation
reform 39; foreign policy 136, 59–61; livelihood loss and forced
137, 143, 144, 146; geo-economic migration 63–66; shrinking of
signifcance of Inner Asia for 82– glaciers 61; trade 65; UN Special
84; geopolitics in Central Asia 77; Programme for the Economies
Han and non-Han ethnicities 30, of Central Asia (SPECA)
38; historiography 29; investment Economic Forum (2022) 67–68;
in Kazakhstan 129–131, 134; urbanisation 65–66; vulnerability
Islam and Muslim population in 57–58
32–37; loans 142; Maritime Silk Clinton, Hilary 133, 140
Route concept 116, 125, 133– Clover, Charles 78
134; in Mongolia’s independence Clubb, O. Edmund 49
46–48; nation-building 29, 31; CNPC 116
one-child policy 37; relations Cohen, Sual O. 76
with Russia 37–38; religion in 29; Collective Security Treaty Organization
resource exploitation in Siberia (CSTO) 77, 89, 91, 106
127; resurgence of infuence after Commonwealth of Independent States
Corona 120–121; security policy (CIS) 76, 77, 91, 113, 175
118; stability-security paradigm Communism 113
34, 36; state-society relationship Comprehensive Convention on
31; trade with Inner Asian International Terrorism 164
countries 157; see also Xinjiang Confucianism 30, 31, 32
in China Connect Central Asia Policy (CCAP,
China-Central Asia-Western Asia 2012) 4, 121, 169, 197, 203,
Corridor 116 204, 208, 212
China Islamic Association 33 Cooley, Alexander 77, 89, 90
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway Cosmic mentality 18
line 128 Counter-terrorism 35, 38, 118, 200
China Metallurgical Group Corporation COVID-19 pandemic 3, 37, 63, 66–68,
(MCC) 157 83, 84, 92, 99, 107, 120, 165,
China-Mongolia-Russia corridor 116 206, 210
China National Electronics Import and Cross-Border Transport Accord
Export Corporation 82 (CBTA) 103
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Cross-cultural exchanges 1
(CPEC) 116, 179, 194, 205 Cultural Revolution 33
China’s 9/11 36 Customs Union 77, 119
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Afairs 144
Chorasmian route 186 da Gama, Vasco 125
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Daoism 30
(2015) 162 Das , Sadhu Ram Udhar 2
“Clash of Civilizations” 75 Datong (Great Unity/Great Harmony) 31
Classical Eurasianism 78 Decter, Jacqueline 21
216 Index
Delhi Declaration of the 1st India- Flame in Chalice (Roerich) 15, 19

Central Asia Summit (2022) 86, Flowers of Morya (Roerich) 15
91, 197–200, 202, 207 Foreign Ministers Meeting of the
Democratization 92 Organization of Islamic
Deng Xiaoping 158 Countries 207
Department of Atomic Energy of India Four Noble Truths 24
162–163 Friters, G. M. 51
Devika Rani 126 Frontier Services Group (FSG) 38
Digital India 5
Digital Silk Road 6 G-7 summit (2022) 143
Dubai Port World 130 G-20 summit 166
Dugin, A. 77 Gabuev, Alexander 120
Dunn, David 197, 204 Gamaleya 99
DUSTLIK-I (2019) 164 Gandhi, Indira 126
Gandhi, Rajiv 121
Eastern culture 21 Gandola monastery 22
Eastern Europe-Western China road General Authority of Border Protection
network 130 (GABP) 164
Eastern religions 19, 20 General Circulation Models (GCMs) 62
East Turkistan Islamic Movement geo-economics, defnition 73, 75
(ETIM) 145, 158 “geopolitical belonging” of Central
Economic Cooperation Organisation Asia within Inner Asia 86–95;
(ECO) 103–104 ideational layer of regionalism
Economic Cooperation Organisation 87, 89, 95; regionalization,
trade agreement (ECOTA) regionness, regional identity
103–104 and security perceptions 87–91,
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan 88 93–95; storyline between Central
Eight-Fold Path 24 Asia and India 91–93
environmental refugees 61 geopolitics, defnition 73
environmental security 88 Ghani, Ashraf 137
Eudemos 188 Gitanjali (Tagore) 21
Eurasia 2, 6, 8; political and security Glimpses of World History (Nehru) 126
order by Russia 119–120; globalisation 80, 165
see also India-Eurasia Global Times 36
connectivity Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 33,
Eurasian continentalism 120 76–77, 118, 158
Eurasian Economic Community Golodnikova, I. Yu. 18
(EURASEC) 98, 99, 131 Gomal Pass 193
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 77, Gorbachev, Mikhail 158
93, 98, 104, 107, 112, 115, Gordan, George 19
119–120, 130, 169, 181 Gorki, Maxim 16
Eurasianism 77–80, 211 “Go-West” policy 141
Eurasian Silk Road 116 The Greater Central Asia project 77, 81
Euro-Asian Conference on Transport Great Islamic Revolution (1979) 158
(2002) 171 gross domestic product (GDP) 8
Europeanization 94 Grossman, Marc 115
European Union (EU) 79, 92, 113 Gujral, Inder Kumar 126
Gwadar port 179
Fahien 155
Fallon, Theresa 141 Haimavata marg 187
Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Halal law 36
Associations in India (FFFAI) 173 Hamas attack on Israel (2023) 211
Five Nations Railway Corridor 139 Hameiri, Shahar 142
Five Plus One (5+1) framework 77, 211 Hardatt, Madan Mohan 125
Index 217
Hasan, Nurul 126 India-Central Asia Dialogue 197; in

Heartland theory 74–76, 133, 137 Bishkek (2012) 203–204;
Heart of Asia - Memories of Himalayas in New Delhi (2020) 4, 206; in
(Roerich) 15, 23–25 Samarkand (2019) 4, 161, 198,
Hieun Tsang 155 205, 206, 211
High Impact Community Development India-Central Asia Investment Club 200
Projects 199, 206 India-Central Asia Parliamentary
Highlander, M. 25 Forum 198
Hikvision 82 India-Central Asia Summit (2022) 163,
Himalayan Prophesies (Roerich) 25 197, 201–202, 207, 208
Himalayas 6, 15–17, 19, 21–23 India-China war (1962) 158
Himalayas - Abode of Light (Roerich) India-Eurasia connectivity 169–181;
15, 16, 23, 25 benefts of Corridors 178–179;
Himavat - Diary of Leaves (Roerich) 15, challenges in implementing
16, 19, 22, 23 Corridors 179–180; Connect
Hinnebusch, Raymond 88 Central Asia Policy (2012) 169
Hizb-ut-Tahrir 118, 158 India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia
Hopf, Ted 90 Transport and Transit Corridor
Hosking, Geofrey 78 171, 174–177, 179–181
Hsu Shu-cheng 52 International North-South Transport
Huchet, Jean-Francois 92 Corridor (INSTC) 171–174,
Huis 32, 33, 36, 38, 39 177–181; trade 169–171
Hunarmand 124 India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia
Huntinton, Samuel P. 74–76 Transport and Transit Corridor
Hurley, John 142 171, 174–177, 179–181
Indian Council for Cultural Relations
Ibn Batuta 187 (ICCR) 199
Idrisov, Erlan 131 Indian Cultural Centers 91
Imanaliev, Muratbek 94 Indian Technical and Economic
imperialism 31 Cooperation (ITEC)
India 8–9; Chinese attack on Ladakh Programme 199
(2020) 9; confict with Pakistan 9; Indian trade via Afghan route 184–195;
humanitarian aid to Afghanistan along Sulaiman passes 193–194;
105, 175, 179, 201–202, 207; along Uttarapath 186; Bolan
New Delhi 121; strategic Pass route 194; cultural and
narratives for Central Asia 121 political exchanges 185; export
India and Inner Asia relationship 155– and import facility 184; horses
166; concerns and stakes 156–159; 187–188; ivory 188–189; Lapis
connectivity eforts 163; energy Lazuli route 192–193; in pashm
cooperation 161–163; lack 191–192; plant products, salts
of geographical connectivity and precious metals 189–190;
156; reconnecting with “Heart textiles 189; Uttarapath’s links with
of Inner Asia” 159; security Black Sea and Caspian 186–187;
cooperation 163–165; soft power Wakhan Corridor route 192,
165; spread and prevalence of 195; war elephants 188; Western
Buddhism 155–156; strategic routes to Mediterranean 190–191
partnership agreements (SPAs) India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone
159–161 (IPGCFZ) 175
India-Central Asia Business Council India Ports Global Limited (IPGL)
(ICABC) 200, 206 175, 176
India-Central Asia Centre, India-Russia Business Summit (2018) 2
New Delhi 198 India’s new diplomacy 197–208; Delhi
India-Central Asia Development Group Declaration 2022 197–200, 202,
161, 205 207; India-Central Asia Summit
218 Index
2022 197, 201–202; since 2014 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

203–207 118, 158
Indochina Peninsula Corridor 116 Islamic State-Khorasan see East
Indo-Tibetan Buddhism 22 Turkestan Islamic Movement
Indo-Uzbekistan Joint Field Training Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K)
Exercise (FTX) 164 106, 145
industrialisation 59 Islamophobia 36, 38
Inner Asia: cosmopolitan image 26;
defnition 73–74, 83; see also Jadidism 2
individual entries Jagadu 195
Inter-Governmental Agreement (2000) Jaishankar, S. 177, 207
on INSTC 171; Article 1.1 171 Jaish-e-Mohammed 159
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Jamsran, L. 45
Change 57 Japan: bilateral relationship with US 90;
International Atomic Energy Agency role of self-recognition and self-
(IAEA) 7 narrative 90
International Fund for Saving the Aral Jawaharlal Nehru University 3
Sea (1993) 88 Jebsundamba Khutagt (Bogd Gegeen)
International North-South 45–49, 53
Transportation Corridor (INSTC) Jetsun Milarepa 22, 25
6, 102, 103, 107, 108, 112, Joint Action Plan (2011–2014) 160
121–122, 131, 171–174, 177–181, Joint Statement of the Dialogue
200, 202, 212; Coordination (2022) 207
Council of 172–174; Expert Joint Working Group (JWG) 162,
Group of 173 171–174, 177–181; 200, 202
trade 169–171 Jones, Lee 142
International Solar Alliance 7 Joshi, Nirmala 92
inter-state cooperation 87, 90, 107
Interstate Council for the Aral Sea 88 Kaflas 193–194
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Kalachakra tradition 19
Europe (INOGATE) 103 Kamalshila 155
intra-regional cooperation 83, 92, 108 Kamchik Pass 128, 131
Invincible, The (Roerich) 15, 19 Kanika Maharaja Vihara 155
Iran: Chabahar port 11; International Karakalpak Autonomous Republic 7
North-South Transportation Kara Khanid 28
Corridor (INSTC) 107, 108; as Karakoram Highway 184
member of OPEC 114; pesticide Karimov, Islam 99, 160
supply from India 175; Russia’s Karzai, Hamid 139
cooperation with 107; Sarakhs- Kashgar-Gwadar highway 134
Mashhad rail link 104; U.S. Kaul, Triloki Nath 126
sanctions on 180 Kautilya 187; Arthasastra 187
Iranian Bank 175 Kazakh-India Commission on Trade,
Iran-India Garland Highway 139 Economic, Scientifc, Technical,
Iran Shipping Lines (ISL) 174 Industrial and Cultural
Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) Cooperation 162
railway line 173, 177 Kazakhstan 7, 57, 58, 98, 116; Chinese
Iseri, E. 76 investment in 129–131, 134;
ISIS 158 defence partnership with India
Islam(ic): in China 32–36; identity 164; developing international
29; moderate 33; political 39; transport corridor 129–131;
radical/extremist 33, 158; revival droughts in 63; energy resources
in Inner Asia 158; symbolism 34 in 114; land degradation in 61;
Islamic Development Bank 103 nuclear energy cooperation with
Index 219
India (2009) 162, 163; oilfelds Liu Yazhou 82

in 116, 117; protesting Chinese Living Ethics 18
activities 82, 84; relations with Look, Learn and Act North Policy 212
CARS 100; Russian involvement Look West policy 82
in 106; strategic partnership Lorot, Pascal 73
with India 160, 161, 169; Luttwak, Edward 73
unemployment rate in 83
Kazakhstan Corridor 129–131 M-37 Highway 190
Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan MacIntyre, Alasdair 87
pipeline 107 Mackinder, Halford John 74–76, 78,
Kazantsev, A. 134 113, 133, 137
KazAtomProm, JSC National Atomic Madhya Asia ka Itihas (History of
Company 162 Central Asia, Sankirtyayan) 125
Keating, Michael 94 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 74, 76, 133
Ketou 44 Mahayana Buddhism 24
Khanjar 164 Maitreya 24, 25
Khayraton-Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat rail Manucci, Niccolo 188
link 132 Maritime India Summit-2021 175–177
Khorgos 82, 128, 130 Maritime Silk Road 116, 125,
Khyber Pass 193, 195 133–134, 140
Kiakhta Maimaicheng 53 Markovits, Claude 184
Kiakhta Platform 53 Marshall Plan 111, 113, 141
Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement see Marxist-Leninist theory 30
Russia-Mongolia-China McCannon, John 22
Tripartite Agreement Memorandum of Understanding
kimkab/khinqhab 194 (2016) 146
Kjellen, Rudolph 73 Menon, K. P. S. 126
Klare , M. 76 Middle East Corridor 212
Kok Aral 60 Ministry of Commerce, India 173
Kovind, Ramnath 161 Ministry of Ports, Shipping &
Kuchins, Andrew C. 138 Waterways, India 176
Kumarajiva 155 Mirziyoyev, Shavkat 99–103
Kyrgyzstan 57, 58, 98; anti-Chinese Mishra, Pankaj 93
sentiment in 82, 84; border modernization 92
dispute with Uzbekistan Modi, Narendra 2–4, 121, 156, 160–166,
100; collapse in remittances 169, 197, 199, 201, 204, 205,
from Russia 83, 84; defence 211, 212
partnership with India 164, 204; Mongolia 44–55; abrogation of
energy resources in 114 Tripartite Agreement 50–52;
Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots (2010) 98 autonomous suzerainty 49,
50, 54; autonomy 48, 50–54;
Laghman-Susa route 189, 190 defence partnership with India
Lai, Hongyi Harry 141 164; “frst revolution for
Lamas 20–24, 25 national independence” 46;
Lapis Lazuli route 139, 192–193 Mongol-seeking independence
Laruelle, Marlene 92 45, 47, 48, 52–54; New Policies
Lashkar-e-Taiba 159 (1901) 45, 46; nuclear energy
Lattimore, Owen 46 cooperation with India (2009)
Lauri/Lahori 192 162, 163; proclamation of
Legvold, H. 76 independence 45–47; Russia-
Levi, Scott C. 184 Mongolia-China Tripartite
liberalisation 80 Agreement 49–50; Sino-Russian
“Light in the Desert” (Roerich) 17 geopolitical game 44–49, 54;
220 Index
SPA with India (2015) 160–161, Outcome Document of the Regional

212; Urga in 45, 52–54 Security Dialogue (2021) 207
Mongolian People’s Army 53 Ozbekiston Temir Yollari 176
Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) 53, 54
Mongolian People’s Provisional Padma Sambava 22, 24, 25, 155
Revolutionary Government 53, 54 Pandit, Vijayalaxmi 126
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party pan-Mongolism 26
(MPRP) 53 Pan-Mongol movement 51
Mongolian Revolution (1911) 45, 46, 53 Paris Agreement on Climate Change 67
Mongol Messenger, The 46 Partnership for Global Infrastructure
Muhammad Ghuri 195 and Investment (PGII) 143
Mujahideen 158 Pasargard 175
multilateralism 143, 201 People’s Bank of China 141
Mushkatov, Ivan 73 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 28, 144
Mysteries (Roerich) 25 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 136,
156
Nagarjuna 25 People’s War on Terror 35, 36
National Development Reforms Peyrouse, Sebastien 92
Commission (2015) 140 Polo, Marco 185
National Security Advisers of India 165 post-Soviet Central Asia: regionalism in
National Security Councils 164 86, 87
National University of Tajikistan 101 Post-Urumqi riot period 33, 39
Nazarbaev, Nursultan 130 Pre-Cultural revolution period 33
Nazarbayev, Nursultan 92, 160 Primakov doctrine 77
“Near Abroad” 113 privatisation 80
neelkothis (indigo stores) 192 Project Beauty 34
Nehru, Jawaharlal 16, 126; Glimpses of Pruitt, Sarah 79
World History 126 Putin, Vladimir 77, 79, 80, 106, 130, 174
neo-Eurasianism 78
Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement 7 Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway line 173, 174
New Delhi-Tehran-Kabul link 107
New Eurasian Land Bridge 116 Radhakrishnan, Sarvapalli 126
New Great Game 76, 77, 91, 92, 104, Rahmon, Emomali 101
111, 115, 116, 134–136, 141, 211 Realm of Light (Roerich) 15, 23
“New India” 166 Reconnect Central Asia Policy 121
New Policies (1901) 45, 46 Red Army 51, 54
Nikitin, Afanasy 125 Red Cap sect 24
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
(NATO) 79, 80, 91 (RATS) 100
North Western Frontier Defence Force 52 regional cooperation in Central Asia
Novoi Minerals & Metallurgical 97–108; connectivity and
Company 163 sustainable stability 102–105,
Nuclear Energy Agency of Mongolia 162 108; developments in bilateral
NurlyZhol (Shining Path) policy 130 relations 97, 99–102; independent
Central Asian Republics (CARs)
Obama, Barack 115, 144 and its problems 97–99; post-U.S.
October Revolution see Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan
Revolution (1917) 105–107
One Belt One Road (OBOR) 92, 116, regional economic cooperation 81, 82
126, 129, 140 Regional Economic Cooperation
One Health One Earth approach 92, 199 Conference on Afghanistan
Organization of Petroleum Exporting (RECCA) 139
Countries (OPEC) 7, 114 regional integration 5, 98, 107
Oriental mysticism 17 regionalism 86, 87
oriental philosophy 20 regionness 89
Index 221
Regnum News Channel 129 Kazakhstan as transit point

religious extremism 33, 35, 39, 158, 202 for cargo transfer 129–131; in
rhytons 188 Mongolian Revolution (1911)
Richthofen, Alexander Von 73 46; political reality in Inner
Rimland 75, 76 Asia 156–157; relations with
Ringmar, Erik 92 China 37–38; Semenov’s plan
Roadmap for Health and Well Being in in Mongolia 51; status of ethnic
Central Asia (2022–2025) 63 minorities 8; strategic partnership
Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich with India 169; trade with
15–26; Adamant 15, 25; admirer Caspian littoral states 106–107;
of Himalayas 16, 20–23; Altai- trade with India 178, 180; Tsarist
Himalaya: A Travel Diary 15, rule in 3, 47, 51, 52, 111, 211;
18, 21; Beautiful Unity 19, 20; underground nuclear tests 7; war
contribution in Silk Road 126; with Ukraine 80, 106–108, 120,
debates with Lamas on noble 178, 180, 208, 211
gospels of Buddhism 21; exploring Russia-Mongolia-China Tripartite
Buddhism 15, 16; Flame in Agreement 49–50
Chalice 15, 19; Flowers of Morya Russian Revolution (1917) 50, 51, 54, 126
15; Heart of Asia - Memories of Russo-Chinese Declaration (1913) 48, 49
Himalayas 15, 23–25; Himalayan Russo-Japanese treaty (1912) 47
Prophesies 25; Himalayas - Abode Russo-Mongolian Agreement (1912) 48
of Light 15–17, 23, 25; Himavat -
Diary of Leaves 15, 16, 19, 22, Saakashvili, Mikheil 79
23; on humanity 19; interests in Sachdeva, Gulshan 202
humanism, culture and religion Saikal, Amin 138
19–21; international expeditions Sajjanhar, Ashok 179
16–19, 21, 23; Invincible, The Samruk Energo 162
15, 19; “Light in the Desert” Sankirtyayan, Rahul (Kedarnath Pandey)
17; Maitreya 24; Mysteries 25; 125; Madhya Asia ka Itihas
narratives on Inner Asia 26; (History of Central Asia) 125
Nehru’s tribute to 16; passion for Sankrityayan, Rahul 2; Volga Se Ganga 2
forms of alternative spirituality “Sarazm-2006” 193
22; Realm of Light 15, 23; Sassanid Hormizd II 191
Shambhala 15, 18, 21, 24; visit to SCO’s Special Working Group on
Buddhist monasteries 23–26 Healthcare 99
Rogun Dam 101 Seleucus 188, 194
Rogun Hydro Power Station (HPS) 101 Semenov, Grigorii Mikailovich 51
Rtveladze, Edvard V. 186, 193, 194 Semipalatinsk Polygon 7
Russia 5; annexation of Crimea 79; Civil Shahid Beheshti terminal 175, 176, 178
War in 51; Cold War with United Shahid Kalantari terminal 175
States 76; collapse (1991) 54, Shambhala 24, 25
80, 83, 111, 136, 143; confict Shambhala (Roerich) 15, 18, 21, 24
with Georgia 79; dominance Shanghai Cooperation Organization
over Outer Mongolia 49, 50; (SCO, Shanghai Five) 77, 89,
and EAEU 119–120; economic 91, 99, 100, 104, 118, 120, 121,
recovery in 106–107; in favour 128, 144, 163, 166, 169, 177,
Mongolia’s independence 180, 204, 205
47–48, 53, 54; foreign policy Shantha Rakshita 25
78; geo-economic signifcance of Shaposhnikova, L.V. 17
Central Asia for 81; geopolitical Sharifzoda, Khamza 64
Eurasianism by 77–80, 211; Shuangxi Highway 130
humanitarian aid to Afghanistan Sikkim 16, 22, 24–25
105–106; infuence on Rimland Silk and Spice Festival (2016) 124
76; interest in Afghanistan 80; Silk Road 5, 6, 15, 75, 83, 91, 111–122,
interest in Central Asia 77–78; 203, 211; Belt and Road Initiative
222 Index
(BRI) 112, 115–116, 125–127, Sulaiman passes 193–194

129, 140–143; Central Asia- Sultan Öz Beg Khan 187
South Asia (CASA) concept Summit of Caspian states 106
132–133; Chinese energy Swami Vivekananda 21, 22
and infrastructure projects in Swaraj, Sushma 205–206
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Syr Darya 60, 67
Tajikistan 127–129; contributions Syrian Civil War 80
in making 125–126; discourse
and post-pandemic world order Tagore, Abanindranath 20
120–121; Eurasian Economic Tagore, Rabindranath 1, 21, 126;
Union (EAEU) 112, 115, 119– Gitanjali 21
120, 130; International North- Tajikistan 57, 58, 98; border dispute
South Transportation Corridor with Uzbekistan 100–101;
(INSTC) 112, 121–122, 131; collapse in remittances from
Kazakhstan Corridor 129–131; Russia 83, 84; energy resources
Maritime Silk Road 116, 125, in 114; energy trade with
133–134, 140; migration from Uzbekistan 101–102; glaciers in
post-Soviet states to Russia 64; land degradation in 61
124–125; old concepts 124; Tajikistan Cotton Processing Complex 103
renaissance 140; rivalry 111, 112, Taliban 4, 80, 105–107, 120, 137,
114; strategies 112, 114; US New 145–146, 158, 159, 163, 165,
Silk Road Strategy 112, 114–115, 179, 202, 208, 211
125, 133, 140; Uzbek-Turkmen Tashkent Pact (1992) 125
Corridor 131–132 Taxila-Kapisa-Balkh highway 190
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 115, Tehrik-e-Taliban 159
140, 141 terrorism 33, 34, 37–39, 88, 200, 202
Silk Road Fund 141 The Theosophical Society 19, 20
Singh, Man Mohan 121 Third World 92
Sinicization 30, 36 Tibetan Buddhism 19
Sino-Afghan relations 105, 137, 143–147; Tokayev, Kassym-Jomart K. 106, 165
during 1990s 143–144; BRI 146– traditional Silk Road 112, 132
147; post 9/11 144–145; Taliban Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-
takeover of Afghanistan (2021) Asia (TRACECA) 103, 179
145–146 Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in
Smith, Charyl L. 17 Border Regions (1996) 118
Sokobin, Samuel 52 Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 127 in Border Regimes (1997) 118
Special Report on Emission Scenarios Trilateral Chabahar Agreement
(SRES) 62 (2016) 175
Sputnik V vaccine 99 Turkey: Silk Road Project (2008) 140
Spykman, Nicholas 74–76 Turkic societies 3
Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa 21, 22 Turkmenabad-Farab railway and
Stalin, Joseph 125 automobile bridges 103
Starr, Frederick 92 Turkmenistan 57, 58, 116, 117; Central
State Ethnic Afairs Commission 36 Asia-China gas pipeline 116;
State University of Samarkand 101 energy resources in 114; land
St. Petersburg Economic Forum degradation in 61
(2022) 106 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
“Strike Hard” campaign 36 India (TAPI) gas pipeline 81,
Subhagsena 188 103, 139, 161
Subrahmanyam, K. 203 Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-
Sufsm 3, 203 Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP)
Sukhbaatar 53 electricity transfer 139
Index 223
UCO Bank 175 Uzbekistan 7, 57, 58, 98; border dispute

Ukraine-Russia war (2022) 37, 106– with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
108, 120, 178, 180, 208, 211 100–101; collapse in remittances
UN Comprehensive Convention on from Russia 84; constructing
International Terrorism 200 route for connectivity 5–6;
UNESCO 2, 6 defence partnership with India
UN General Assembly 7, 80, 133 164; energy resources in 114;
UN General Assembly Resolution A/ energy trade with Tajikistan
RES/75/313 199 101–102; land degradation in
United Nations (UN) 7, 120 64; laying road and rail networks
United Nations Economic Commission through Turkmenistan 131–132;
for Europe (UNECE) 177 nuclear energy cooperation with
United States 33; bilateral relationship India 163; SPA with India (2011)
with Japan 90; Cold War 160, 161; Tajik minorities in 8;
with Russia 76; exploiting unemployment rate in 83; water
energy resources in Central defcit 60
Asia 81; foreign policy 76; Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China
grand strategy 76; integrating railroad 103
Afghanistan to CARs 132–133; Uzbek-Turkmen Corridor 131–132
maritime domination of 134;
in Mongolia’s independence Vajpayee, Atal Behari 121
52; rivalry with Russia 157; Vigne, Godfrey T. 193
supporting Afghanistan’s virtual New Silk Road 130
economy 115; withdrawal of virtual regionalism 90
forces from Afghanistan 144–145 Volga Se Ganga (Sankrityayan) 2
United States’ 2018 Report 142 Voyakin, Dmitry 189
universalism 22 Voytek, Steven K. 78
UN Security Council 166
UN Security Council on Corona 120 Wakhan Corridor 2, 184, 192, 195
UN Special Programme for the Wang Yi 105
Economies of Central Asia Wang Zhengwei 36
(SPECA) Economic Forum War Participation Bureau 52
(2022) 67–68 White Russian movements see anti-
Urumqi riots (2009) 33, 34 Bolshevik movements
U.S.-China Economic and Security Whitman, Serge 25
Review Commission 142 World Bank 6, 7, 65, 67, 83
U.S. Congress 38 World Health Organisation (WHO) 63,
US New Silk Road Strategy 102, 103, 99, 120
107, 112, 114–115, 125, 133, World Suf Conference (2016) 3
137, 140, 180 World War I 50, 51, 52
Uyghur Bill-2020 38 World War II 141
Uyghur-ness 34–37
Uyghur ethnicity 2, 8, 29; as China’s Xi Jinping 36, 115, 130, 140, 145
ethno-religious challenge 29–30; Xinjiang in China 28, 136, 137,
forced organ harvesting of 142; as contested borderlands
37; human rights abuses of 28, 30; cultural linkages
38; as indigenous population to Central Asia 143; de-
29; Islamic identity 33, 36; as Islamization 36; ethnicity in
migrants from Mongolia 29; 29; geopolitics and ignored
persecution 37; political loyalty crisis 37–38; Han Chinese in
and Islam factor 32–34; re- 29, 36, 37; Hanifcation of 28;
education camps for 35, 37; harmonization 30–32, 38; Huis
Uyghur-ness and 34–37 32, 33, 36, 38, 39; incorporation
224 Index
into People’s Republic of China Yihewani Muslim brotherhood 32

(PRC) 28; investments by Ying, Liu 141
China 144; Islamization of 28;
Qing’s conquest 28; separatist Zafar, Athar 201, 202
movements in 117–118; Uyghur- “Zag Zagaaraabaidaggui” (The Time Is
ness and othering of Muslims Changing, Jamsran) 45
34–37; Uyghurs ethnicity Zarafshan River 102
(see Uyghurs ethnicity) Zaranj-Delaram highway 139
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Zardykhan, Zhar 106
(XUAR) 82, 117, 127 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 159
Xuanzang 24, 184 Zelenin, Alena 129
Zhang Qia 184
Yanukovych, Viktor 79 Zhiping, Pan 141
Yeltsin, Boris 77 Zong Ji Mining Company 82

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INDIA AND INNER ASIA

Selbi Hanova, Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan

Edited by Mahesh Ranjan Debata

List of Contributors viii

2 Buddhist Heart of Asia in the Works of Nicholas

3 Harmonizing Ethnicity at the Contested Borderlands:

4 Inner Asia in the “Geopolitical Game” of the Early

5 Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change:

6 Contemporary Geopolitical and Geo-Economic

7 The Region and Ideational Security: The Geopolitical

8 Regional Cooperation and Sustainable Stability

9 New Foreign Policy Discourse on Silk Road in

10 Silk Road Shenanigans 124

11 Afghanistan as the Belt and Road Pivot for Asia 136

12 India and Its Inner Asian Neighbourhood in the

13 India’s Connectivity With Eurasia: INSTC and

14 Indian Trade Along Afghan Routes From 6th Century

15 India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia: Analysing the

Manish S. Dabhade is Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Poli-

Sunita Dwivedi is a Silk Road Traveller, Independent Writer and Researcher,

Selbi Hanova is Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan.

Jojan Job is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Madras

Gatikrushna Mahanta is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics,

Asoke Kumar Mukerji is former Permanent Representative of India at the

Ajay K. Patnaik is former Professor and Dean, School of International Studies,

Ramakrushna Pradhan is Professor at the Department of Political Science,

Veena Ramachandran is Assistant Professor at the Department of Humanities

G. M. Shah is Professor and Honorary Director at the MMAJ Academy of

ADB Asian Development Bank

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

It is important to describe herewith the main facets of India’s interaction

Ethnicity, Religion and Culture

public, through its monumental History of Civilizations of Central Asia,

At the beginning of a new century, we are at yet another point of transfor-

India’s Policy Towards Central Asia

Afghanistan and Central Asia

Afghanistan’s population? (3) How will the ideological orientation of the

Each country in this region is placed to contribute to the regional and

Central Asia, in which the importance of developing and strengthening bilat-

Geopolitics and Geostrategy

Themes and Perspectives

is an endeavour to study the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic

Inner Asian Issues

aspects of Buddhist cultures in the Asiatic Himalayan mountain ranges. His

When I think of Nicholas Roerich I am astounded at the scope and abun-

It is against this background this chapter throws light on Nicholas Roerich’s

Roerich’s International Expeditions

To produce a pictorial record of lands and peoples of Inner Asia, Nicholas

their Teacher, a Cosmic Hierarch, and maintaining the closest spiritual

According to Golodnikova (2009), Roerich had understood well that the

The main purpose of the expedition was to create a pictorial panorama of

region of the Himalayas, where he crossed more than 30 mountain passes,

Roerich’s Interests in Humanism, Culture and Religion

Nicholas Roerich is unquestionably one of the greatest leaders of history.

In the book The Invincible, Roerich’s dedication to spread sublime ideas to

Humanity is facing the coming events of cosmic greatness. Humanity

The Theosophical Society, which was founded in 1875, instilled in Roerich

insightful pieces contributed by the celebrated Russian mystic and theosophist

The Himalayan paintings of Roerich are a hymn to the vital strength of

cultural monuments, besides collecting and studying the folklores of places

Impact of the Noble Gospels of Buddhism on Roerich

Once, in conversation, the artist (Roerich) compared himself to a fower

According to Roerich, the Himalayan mountain ranges personify the ele-

These are notes of landscapes powerfully and poetically pictured in words,