ABSTRACT

The case of Nusli Neville Wadia vs Ivory Properties (2019), focusing on the
relevance of the literal rule of interpretation within statutory analysis. Central to the
case is the interpretation of Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (Maharashtra
Amendment) Act, 2018, specifically regarding whether the term "jurisdiction"
encompasses issues of limitation. The literal rule, emphasizing a strict adherence to
the plain meaning of statutory language, guides the court in determining the
legislative intent behind Section 9-A. Through meticulous application of this rule,
the court navigates the complexities of statutory language to arrive at a nuanced
interpretation of the statute. This abstract elucidates how the literal rule influences
the court's decision-making process, shaping the outcome of the legal dispute and
providing clarity on the scope of Section 9-A. By examining the interplay between
statutory language and interpretative principles, this abstract contributes to a deeper
understanding of statutory interpretation and its impact on legal proceedings.

Keywords: statutory interpretation, literal rule, Civil Procedure Code, jurisdiction,

limitation, legislative intent.

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 Nusli Neville Wadia vs Ivory Properties (2019)
PETITIONER: NUSLI NEVILLE WADIA
RESPONDENT: IVORY PROPERTIES
CITATION: AIR 2019 SC 5125
DECIDED ON: 4 OCTOBER, 2019
BENCH: JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA, JUSTICE M.R. SHAH, JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, JJ.

FACTS
The Division Bench of this Court had referred the matter after questioning the validity of the ruling
in Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Praveen D. Desai. The uncertainty relates to
the interpretational clauses in Section 9-A of the 1908 Civil Procedure Code, which was added by
the Maharashtra Amendment Act,1977. It has been claimed that because the term "jurisdiction"
had a wider definition, it was broad enough under Section 9-A to cover the question of restriction.
The expression, according to some, was not limited to the traditional definition under financial or
territorial authority. In the Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society case, the court rejected the
opposing argument made in Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javlkar2. In this
particular case, the Court was required to rule on whether the question of limitation falls inside the
definition of "jurisdiction" under Section 9A.

BACKGROUND
The Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1970 added Section 9-A to the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code") as a modification that was specific to the State of
Maharashtra. Out of an abundance of caution, Section 9-A was then reintroduced into the Code
with the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977. The
introduction of Section 9-A into the Code was motivated by particular circumstances, namely the
practice at the time of bringing declaratory actions without properly notifying the government as
required by Section 80 of the Code. In addition to promising to deliver this notice, the plaintiff
would also ask for a temporary remedy. The plaintiff would drop the first lawsuit and file a new
one after the deadline for issuing such notice had passed, successfully requesting new ad interim
reliefs from the Court in the new lawsuit. In an effort to break this vicious cycle, Section 9-A was
added to the Code in 1970.The Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act was
subsequently notified in 2018. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for this modification, among
other things, stated that Section 9-A was causing court delays in the form of the application for
interim relief still being ongoing, leading to the interim relief typically continuing as final relief.

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Additionally, the orders made pursuant to Section 9-A were susceptible to dispute on their own,
resulting in a multiplicity of processes without any assessment of the merits. The aforementioned
change accordingly repealed Section 9(A). However, a second amendment in 2018 stipulated that
any proceedings under Section 9-A that were ongoing on the date of the amendment's introduction
and any preliminary issues raised under Section 9-A would be resolved at the same time as the
other issues raised under Order XIV of the Code. It was also stated that any ad-interim relief
granted under Section 9-A could be confirmed, revoked, or modified at the stage of the interim
application's final hearing.

ISSUE
Is the definition of "Jurisdiction" in Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (Maharashtra
Amendment) Act, 2018 sufficiently inclusive to incorporate the issue of limitation before the
Court?

PETITONER’S ARGUMENTS
• The Court cannot provide the right to try a case on mixed legal and factual concerns as
preliminary issues.

• The term "jurisdiction" under Section 9-A is used in a narrower meaning and does not address
the question of whether an action is temporarily precluded by any legal restrictions.

• The issue of limitation involves both the law and the facts. Jurisdiction has to do with the
issue of limitation.

• According to Order 14 Rule 2, the initial issues may only be a matter of pure law.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
• Under the Civil Procedure Code, the phrase "Objection to the court's jurisdiction" is irrelevant
to the consideration of such a lawsuit. The question of limitation and res judicata may be the
central issue under Section 9-A.

• The Court may provide a decision based on the admitted documents and facts under Orders
12 and 13 prior to articulating the issues under Order 14.

• According to Order 14 Rule 4, the Court cannot be stopped from reviewing the admissible
records and witnesses.

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 • The term "Issue of law," which is subject to resolution in the preliminary issue under Order
14 Rule 2(2), is not utilized in Section 9-A.

• Section 9-A supports the concept of swift justice; as a result, it cannot be described in any
way as being irrational or unjust.

JUDGEMENT
The Court concluded that the terms "Existence of Jurisdiction" and "Exercise of the Jurisdiction"
have different meanings. According to the court's ruling, a judgment should be considered void if
it is rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction. The Court additionally stated, with reference to
Paragraph 77(a) of the Judgment, that the Court must have jurisdiction to consider any questions
pertaining to the bar created by the Law of limitation or res judicata. The Court also overturned
Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe v. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar & Ors7. Foreshore Cooperative Housing
Society Limited v. Praveen D. Desai8. The Court emphasized once more that no matter how it was
drafted under Section 9-A and was being considered on the day the (Maharashtra Amendment)
Act, 2018, went into effect, it could not be determined. The Court made a point of deciding under
Order 14 Rule 2, which limits a Court's authority to exclusively decide legal questions in
preliminary matters. Preliminary issues do not contain inquiries that are solely or primarily of a
factual nature. The question of limitation, which is dependent on the facts and circumstances of
the conflicts, cannot be included in Section 9-A's reference to "jurisdiction" as the preliminary
issue.

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court while interpreting Section 9-A (1) [as inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment
Act (65 of 1977)] and Order XIV, Rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 held that issue
of limitation can be decided as a preliminary issue when it is based on admitted facts. When facts
about issue of limitation are disputed it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. A mixed question
of law and fact cannot be decided as a preliminary issue either under Section 9-A or Order XIV,
Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Unless the question is a pure question of law it cannot
be decided as a preliminary issue. An application of preliminary issue needs to be decided without
recording evidence. Permitting parties to adduce evidence on a preliminary issue of jurisdiction
amounts to grossest misuse of provisions of law. Only a pure question of law can be decided under
Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. With respect to Section 9-A and Order VII, Rule
11 the Court ruled that a plaint can be rejected where the plaint averments indicate cause of action
to be barred by limitation and no further evidence is required to adjudicate the issue. Section 9-A
is limited and not broader than Order XIV, Rules 2(2). A full-fledged trial by leading evidence is
not permissible. Under Section 9 of the Code "jurisdiction to entertain" is distinguished from

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merits, error in exercise of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. The word "jurisdiction" under
Section 9 correlates with the cognizance, which means it is not barred either expressly or impliedly.
The word "entertain" in Section 9-A means to admit a suit for consideration. Jurisdiction exercised
with material irregularity or illegality constitutes jurisdictional error. When a Court has jurisdiction
to entertain a suit but in exercise of jurisdiction mistake is committed, it is open for interference in
appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Court can proceed with the trial by exercising its jurisdiction
where adjudicatory facts are missing but not in case of jurisdictional facts. When jurisdictional
facts to entertain are missing, Court cannot act at all. Pendency of a preliminary issue framed under
Section 9-A on June 27, 2018, i.e., the date of commencement of the Act of 2018 can be decided
only if it comes within the parameters of Section 9-A as interpreted in the instant judgment and
not under the guise of the provision that it has been framed under Section 9-A and was pending
consideration on the date of commencement of the Act of 2018.
In the case of Nusli Neville Wadia vs Ivory Properties (2019), the relevance of the literal rule of
interpretation lies in the meticulous scrutiny of the language used in Section 9-A of the Civil
Procedure Code (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2018. The literal rule suggests that statutes should
be interpreted according to their plain, literal meaning, without considering the legislative intent
or purpose behind them. In this context, the literal rule is relevant because the court needs to
discern whether the term "jurisdiction" within Section 9-A encompasses issues of limitation. By
strictly adhering to the literal meaning of the term, the court can determine whether the statute
explicitly includes or excludes limitation-related matters. This approach is crucial in statutory
interpretation as it ensures consistency and predictability in the application of the law. However,
it's essential to note that while the literal rule provides a starting point for interpretation, it's not
always sufficient on its own. In complex cases like this, where statutory language may be
ambiguous or open to different interpretations, courts may need to consider other interpretative
principles, such as the purposive or contextual approach, to arrive at a fair and just interpretation.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the case of Nusli Neville Wadia vs Ivory Properties (2019) sheds light on the
nuanced interpretation of Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (Maharashtra Amendment) Act,
2018, particularly regarding the inclusion of issues of limitation within the scope of "jurisdiction."
Through meticulous examination, the judgment distinguishes between jurisdictional facts and
adjudicatory facts, clarifying that Section 9-A primarily addresses pure questions of law and does
not extend to issues primarily of a factual nature, such as limitation. By overturning previous
rulings and providing clarity on the application of procedural rules, the judgment underscores the
importance of ensuring swift justice while upholding procedural fairness. This decision serves as
a significant precedent, guiding future legal interpretations and ensuring the proper administration
of justice within the realm of civil procedure law.

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