COLUMN
PART SIX
Isolation Basics: Gas Plant
Isolation Requirements
Natural Gas Processing
Natural gas (methane) is currently – and
for the foreseeable future – one of the
most cost effective fuels available. It’s also
generally more acceptable from an emis-
sions standpoint, especially sulfur and ni-
trogen oxides. Gas plants take inputs from
wells and upstream facilities and condition
them to be commercially usable.
By Gobind Khiani, Stephen Johnson &
Reza Kabganian – Fluor Canada Ltd.
A typical gas plant consists of the fol-
lowing sections:
1. Inlet Separation
2. Desulfurization (when required)
3. Dehydration
4. Liquid Recovery and Dew Point Control
5. Refrigeration
6. Sales gas Compression
7. Liquid Treatment
8. Water and Condensate Recovery
A typical block flow diagram of a gas
plant is presented in Figure 1.
AD
16 Valve World Americas | April 2018 • www.valve-world-americas.net
Figure 1 – Gas Plant
Inlet Separation
In order to protect the downstream pro-
cessing facilities in the gas plant and to
meet the Sales Gas specification, the
Feed Gas from the wellheads has to
go through an inlet separation system
to separate water, liquid hydrocarbons
and fine particulate solids (primarily
sand). The inlet separation equipment
in a gas processing plant is usually a
horizontal Separator (Slug Catcher) or
a Finger Type Slug Catcher. This system
is usually followed up by an Inlet Filter
Separation Unit, which removes the fin-
er particles prior to further processing.
If high amounts of solids are present, a
dedicated sand filter may be required.
Upstream of the inlet separation system
is also equipped with pigging receivers,
used for pipeline cleaning.
Desulfurization (Sweetening)
In the hydrocarbon processing world,
high sulfur content is referred to as sour,
and the process of sulfur removal is
sweetening. The type of gas sweetening
process is a function of the quantity of
the feed gas, sulfur content, and specifi-
cation of the Sales Gas. In some feed gas
streams, other acid gases like carbon
dioxide may also be present. Selection
of the technology for removal of these
contaminants is a fairly complex subject
beyond the scope of this paper.
Dehydration and Water Dew
Point Control
This process is used to lower the wa-
ter content of the Feed Gas to meet the
water content specification for the Sales
Gas in the pipeline. The two most com-
mon processes for this application are
Glycol and Methanol Dehydration Pro-
cesses. In some applications, depend-
ing on the gas flow and water/conden-
sate content, adsorbents like charcoal,
silica gel, and zeolite material can also
be utilized for dehydration.
Liquid Recovery and
Hydrocarbon Dew Point Control
Liquid hydrocarbons are substantially
more valuable than natural gas, so there
are strong economic reasons to remove
these materials. Depending on the scale
of the operation and the specification
for the sales gas, it may be economi-
cally desirable to separate the heavier
components. In any case, the feedstock
is cooled and fractionated to remove
heavier hydrocarbons. The remaining
methane and ethane (up to 10%) is then
passed on to the sales gas compression.
Refrigeration
Refrigeration may be present for two
primary purposes:
1. If mechanical refrigeration is used
to cool the gas, rather than turbo-
expanders
2. If a cold sweetening and/or
dehydration solvent is used (i.e.
Rectisol)
Where present, refrigeration is a
closed loop using a hydrocarbon such
as propane.
Sales Compression
The Sales Gas recovered from the Liquid
Recovery System, will be sent to the Sales
Gas Compressor after exchanging heat
with the feed gas.The Sale Gas Compres-
sor will boost the Sales Gas pressure to
meet the pipeline requirement.
Liquid Treatment
The recovered liquid from the separa-
tion system may be directed for further
processing and/or storage for ultimate
shipment, which may be a dedicated
pipeline, rail, truck or other means.
Water and Condensate Recovery
Water and condensate from the Inlet
Separation facilities (usually in form
of emulsion) are directed to this sec-
tion of the plant for water/hydrocar-
bon condensate separation and hy-
drocarbon condensate stabilization.
These products are being stored in a
Storage Tank Farm area and shipped
via pipeline, railroad, or trucks. A De-
sanding Unit might be considered in
the Liquid Recovery Section depend-
ing on the Feed Gas Source.
ISOLATION
The purpose of isolation is:
• For routine or emergency
maintenance;

• To provide safe entry into a confined
space;
• To minimize potential for loss of
containment;
• To minimize the plant-wide
operational impacts of a unit level
shutdown.
In general, the isolation philosophy
should address the physical separation
of individual equipment, Instrumen-
tation, processing system, or an indi-
vidual train from all energy sources.
This can be done using a combination
of two valves and a bleed in between
(Double Block and Bleed or DBB), or a
single Double Isolation and Bleed (DIB)
valve. For the purpose of instrument or
sample point isolations, a single isola-
tion root valve followed by a second
isolation valve and a bleed valve can
be applied. The second isolation valve
and the bleed valve usually are part of
the instrument. The following consid-
erations should be taken into account
to meet the isolation requirements in a
gas plant:
• Emergency Shut-Down and
Depressuring
• Unit/Train Isolation
• Equipment Isolation
• Isolation in Sand Services
Emergency Shut-Down
and Depressuring
To minimize the transient surges in the
pipeline, the Emergency Shut-Down
(ESD) valves are selected to isolate the
plant from the pipeline. They also are
selected to isolate a single gas process-
ing train from the operational trains.
AD
The ESD valves are not being consid-
ered as a secondary isolation valves as
a part of two valves and bleed for the
purpose of system isolation. For a safe
isolation, a manual isolation valve in a
form of DBB or DIB is required.
Unit/Train Isolation
A typical train isolation is presented in
Figure 2. Gas processing train depres-
surizing is required if a train is needed
to be isolated as a part of emergency
event or turnaround. A cold material
spec for part of the system that is sub-
ject to depressurization should be taken
into consideration (i.e. cold flare head-
er, low temperature material, etc.)
Equipment Isolation
A positive equipment isolation is re-
quired for the purpose of inspection
or entry. This can be achieved by using
spec blinds or paddles or removable
spool pieces. Removable spool pieces
are common in isolation of a utility
source from a piece of equipment.
The requirement for equipment isolation
should be taken into consideration at the
beginning of the Piping and Instrumen-
tation Drawing (P&ID) development to
minimize the impact on piping isometric
generation which occurs later on in the
job. A typical isolation schematic for a
vessel in high pressure gas processing
service is presented in Figure 3.
Isolation in Sand Services
Where significant sand or other sol-
ids are present, special considerations
around isolation are required until the
solids have been removed, because
Figure 2 – Train Isolation
of the abrasive and erosive potential,
so that valves may become unable to
provide positive seal. For isolation of
hazardous services with sand content,
two individual gate valves with a bleed
valve in between is being used. In
some instances to reduce the construc-
tion cost, by further modularizing the
packages, special DIB ball valves can
be used. These valve are designed with
self-cleaning seats with seal capability
on both direction and vent to confirm
adequate isolation.
Valve Selection Critical to Suit
the Explained Isolations are:
Single Isolation
This presents that the lowest level of iso-
lation and care shall be taken to ensure
proof of an effective seal. Single block
valve isolation uses an adjacent drain
valve to assist in detecting an ineffective
seal. To the best of our knowledge the
single isolation is applicable for:
• Hot flashing non-flammable liquids
(e.g. domestic hot water) at all pres-
sures.
• Non-flammable, non-flashing, non-
toxic non-irritant liquids (e.g firewa-
ter, potable water, cooling water) at
all pressures.
• Non-flammable, non toxic gases (e.g.
plant air, instrument air nitrogen gas)
at <1000kpa.
Implementation of Single Isolation:
Figure 3 – Equipment Isolation
www.valve-world-americas.net • April 2018 | Valve World Americas
COLUMN
When isolating non-hazardous sys-
tems, establish the single valve isola-
tion and conduct valve integrity test by
checking for leakage.
When isolating a hazardous system
(having considered this action as part
of a rigorous risk assessment) the fol-
lowing requirements must be met;
• The fire and gas detection system in
the area shall not be inhibited.
• No hot work permits are allowed
within a minimum of a 15meter/50ft
radius of work.
• Ongoing integrity of the sealing valve
must be monitored.
• The work site shall be monitored by a
process specialist.
Double Block and Bleed (DBB)
and Double Isolation and Bleed
(DIB1 or DIB2)
The double block and bleed valve ar-
rangement consists of two separate
block valves in line, with a bleed valve in
the connecting line between them. Ide-
ally the two block valves are located rel-
atively close together. The bleed is to be
routed to a safe location but should be
visible and accessible to confirm effec-
tive isolation. The bleed valve normally
has two functions; first to indicate if the
upstream valve is passing and second in
the event of the upstream valve passing,
the bleed prevents pressuring the line
between the block valves (in this circum-
stance the drain line must be directed to
17
 COLUMN

a safe location and monitored). • Opening of equipment when the re-

The following issues should be consid-
ered when using bleed valves:
• Possibility of bleed valve blockage.
• Access to the bleed valve.
• Diversion of any excess leakage to a
safe location/contained.
• Ensuring the process operator can
detect flow through the bleed when
checking integrity of isolating valves.
• Blind off bleeds when possible where
they are closed during normal plant
operations.
• Cease work if the bleed is passing sig-
nificant quantities as pressure may
increase between the double block
valves possibly causing the down-
mainder of unit, though not in opera-
tion, contains hazardous materials
and there is a high level of risk of un-
controlled energy release.
If implementing this before breaking
containment to insert a spade, swing
a spectacle blind or remove a spool
piece, ensure that:
• Adequate valve isolation is in place.
• Successful integrity tests have been
carried out on all block valves in the
isolation scheme.
• The piping has been proven to be de-
pressurized and free from hazardous
fluids on both sides of the flange to
be broken.
• The order in which blinds are in-

AD
stream block valve to leak.
This method of isolation shall be
deemed invalid if the bleed section of
the isolation cannot be fully depressur-
ized to atmosphere. It is applicable for:
• Flammable, flashing liquids and flam-
mable gases (not hydrogen) at all
pressures.
• Toxic gases/liquids at all pressures.
• Non-flammable, hot, flashing liquids
at all pressures.
• Non-flammable, non-toxic, non-irritant,
lethal gases (e.g. nitrogen gas, C02).
• Non-flammable non-flashing, toxic
and or irritant liquids (e.g. treatment
chemicals, hypochlorite, biocides,
scale and corrosion inhibitors, emul-
sifiers) as all pressures.
stalled is high pressure lines, low
pressure lines and finally pressure
safety valves and blowdown valves.
When carrying out the isolation, the fol-
lowing considerations shall be taken:
• Fit new gaskets as required,
• The permit issuer shall consider the
implications of the work on the safety
of personnel and equipment involved
and the impact of any other work
planned in the area,
• Fit all flange bolts and tighten to the
specified torque in the correct se-
quence,
• Loosen all bolts on the far side of the
flange to ensure that any stored con-
tents/pressure will be released in di-
rection of the least risk,

CONCLUSION • Ensure adequate personal protective

Isolation in a plant is applicable for:
• Confined space entry,
• Hydrostatic testing of equipment,
• Hot work on pressurized hydrocarbon
systems,
• Long term isolations,
• Opening of equipment for mainte-
nance while the remainder of the unit
is in operational service and there is
a consequent high level of risk of un-
controlled energy release,
equipment is available and in use,
• Ensure all blinds and gaskets are rat-
ed for the line class.
REFERENCES:
Content contribution by:
1. WMC Environment, H&SM – D. Batchler
2. Oil Industry Advisory Committee – The Safe Isolation
of Plant and Equipment
3. MHS 07, Permit to work standard.
4. HSG253 The safe isolation of plant and equipment
available from http://www.hse.gov.uk/pUbns/priced/
hsg253.pdf
5. VMA, VWA and VW articles

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Gobind Khiani, M.Eng., P.Eng. has served in engineering

and project management roles for both operating and EPC
companies. He has a bachelor’s degree from the University
of Pune in India and a Master of Engineering from the Uni-
versity of Calgary in Alberta, Canada. Currently, he is the
Fellow Piping Valves with Fluor in the piping materials en-
gineering group. He is a chairman of Calgary Branch Execu-

AD tive Committee at the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists

of Alberta and Valve Users Group and Vice Chairman of International Standards
Organization, representing Canada.

Stephen Johnson is a Chemical Engineer by education, and

has been working in the field of Process Safety Management
since 1992. His professional experience is focused on hydro-
carbons & petrochemicals, but has also included agricultural
chemicals, forest products and the food industry. Primary
technical activities include all areas of risk engineering -
qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assess-
ments, consequence modeling, and noise modeling. Stephen is currently the Sr.
Fellow - HSE Director at Fluor Canada Ltd.

Reza Kabganian is a Process Engineering Manager at

Fluor Canada Ltd. He has more than 25 yrs of experience
in the refining and petrochemical industries. Prior joining
Fluor in 2001, he worked in Operation with Dow-Chemi-
cal, and in process engineering at Enerchimi Eng. Corp.
Mr. Kabganian has a B.Sc. Degree from Sharif University
of Technology, Tehran, Iran.

18 Valve World Americas | April 2018 • www.valve-world-americas.net