American Academy of Political and Social Science

The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy
Author(s): Edmond J. Keller
Source: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 489,
International Affairs in Africa (Jan., 1987), pp. 76-87
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and
Social Science
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 ANNALS, AAPSS, 489, January 1987

The Politics of State Survival:

Continuity and Change in

Ethiopian Foreign Policy

By EDMOND J. KELLER

ABSTRACT: For more than a century the Ethiopian state has been

concerned with promoting the idea in the international community that it is

a viable multiethnic nation-state and with having its claimed geographic

boundaries accepted as sacrosanct. Irrespective of the 1974 change from a

modern imperial regime to a leftist-oriented military government, these

foreign policy priorities have been motivated by persistent claims for

self-determination expressed by politically subordinate ethnic communities

questioning the legitimacy of Amhara hegemony. The weak, dependent

character of the state has continued to force Ethiopian leaders to advance

their causes through international diplomacy and military force. Thus the

state has sought both the role of a spokesman for Africa and the military

aid of a big-power patron. The conclusion is that structural requirements

for state survival are more important than ideology.

Edmond J. Keller, professor of political science at the University of California, Santa

Barbara, specializes in Africanpolitics andpublicpolicy. He received his doctoratefrom the

University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has lived and worked in Kenya and Ethiopia. He has

authored numerous articles on African and Afro-American politics and two books: The

Impact of Educational Policy in Kenya and Revolutionary Ethiopia. With Donald Roth-

child he edited Afro-Marxist Regimes.

76

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 POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 77

ROM the very emergence of the

torship, its foreign policy objectives have

modern state of Ethiopia, that

essentially remained the same. Given the

country's leaders have been consumed

weak, dependent character of the state,

with the twin concerns of establishing

no matter what the ideological orienta-

the legitimacy of this multiethnic polity

tion or organizational form of the

as a viable nation-state, and maintaining

regime, leaders have been forced to

its territorial integrity. Domestically,

advance their causes through inter-

public policies have sought to secure

national diplomacy and defensive mili-

and control the acquiescence-if not the

tary action internally as well as in border

genuine support-of disparate ethnic

zones. The fruits of diplomacy are used

groups. Historically, the Amhara ethnic

to assist the state in maintaining its

group has maintained hegemony over

territorial continuity. What seems to

more than forty subordinate ethnic

matter most is the state's ability to

groups, some of whom have consistently

persist by the most expedient means. In

called for their right to self-determination.

order to understand how the essence of

For instance, the Somali of the southeast

Ethiopia's foreign policy has remained

have desired to reunite with their kin in

unchanged for more than a century, it is

the Republic of Somalia since the early

necessary to place this discussion in a

twentieth century; nationalists in the

historical perspective.

former Italian colony of Eritrea have

demanded the right to secede since being

DIPLOMACY AND STATE

incorporated into Ethiopia in 1962; and

BUILDING IN

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIA
segments of the Oromo people in the

south-central part of the country have

Although the state of Ethiopia can

pressed for the right to form an indepen-

trace its history back more than 3000

dent state of Oromia over the past

years, the modern imperial state did not

decade. Faced with such challenges, the

begin to emerge until the middle of the

boundaries of the Ethiopian state have

nineteenth century.2 At that time, Ras

largely had to be maintained through

(King) Kasa, who traced his lineage to

force.

the house of David and King Solomon,

No matter what the character of the

succeeded in consolidating his rule over

regime, the government has comple-

the Abyssinian core from which modern

mented its domestic policies of control

Ethiopia would flower. The establish-

with a foreign policy that has relied

ment of a link to Solomon's line was

heavily on strategic military and diplo-

important because Ethiopian legend held

matic alliances. The ultimate objective

that this was a prerequisite to establishing

has always been to have the world

one's right to rule as king of kings.

community recognize as legitimate the

Kasa's ascension to power came on the

geographic boundaries of the state as

heels of almost 100 years of endemic

they presently exist. Despite the fact

conflict. Local warlords and traditional

that since 1974 Ethiopia has been gov-

nobility competed among themselves

erned by a leftist-oriented military dicta-

and succeeded in fragmenting the state

1. See Edmond J. Keller, "Ethiopia: Revolu-

2. See Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia:

tion, Class and the National Question," African

The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (Chicago:

Affairs, 80(321):519-50 (Oct. 1981).

University of Chicago Press, 1974).

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 78 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

into numerous mini-kingdoms.3 By by Napoleon and Queen Victoria.

1855, Ras Kasa had achieved the military In a fit of desperation in 1865, Tewo-

capacity and popular support needed to dros resorted to force in his efforts to

begin the process of reconsolidation. gain British recognition of Ethiopia as

On being crowned emperor, Kasa an equal and the establishment of diplo-

took the name Tewodros II.4 According matic and trade relations. He took as

to one of the religious documents that hostage several British subjects who

form the basis of Ethiopian myth and happened to be at his court, including

custom, Jesus is said to have prophesied the British consul. At first, Britain tried

that after a prolonged era of evil deeds to negotiate release of the hostages, but

among the chosen Ethiopians, a period failed because it refused to accede to

of divine punishment would ensue. From Tewodros's demands for reciprocal rela-

this chaos would emerge a righteous, tions. Two years later a British military

just, and popular king, Tewodros, who expedition moved from Eritrea into the

would rule for 40 years and restore highland core of Ethiopia, attacking

Ethiopia to its former greatness. Tewodros's capital of Magdala. Tewo-

Tewodros was predominantly con- dros's troops were outmatched and they

cerned with establishing control over succumbed easily. Rather than surren-

the peripheral parts of his fragile empire der, Tewodros committed suicide. The

and with territorial integrity. He wanted British troops withdrew after securing

to create a united Ethiopia, but he never

the release of the hostages, and, after a

quite succeeded. He had to be constantly

brief power struggle, another king named

alert to rebellion in the periphery, and Kasa claimed the imperial throne. He

although he succeeded in modernizing chose the name Yohannes IV.5

and centralizing his army to a degree,

As a personality and as a ruler,

Tewodros was never powerful enough

Yohannes differed from Tewodros as

to feel secure.
night from day. He was more patient

Throughout his reign, Tewodros tried

and less impulsive than his predecessor.

to develop a dynamic foreign policy that

Although both envisioned a united,

reached out beyond the Horn region. He

Christian Ethiopia, their approaches

attempted to have his regime recognized

were in contrast. Yohannes valued order

on an equal footing with the great

more highly than the rigid centralization

powers of Europe. He also appealed

that had characterized Tewodros's rule.

specifically to Britain, France, and

Yohannes's most outstanding accom-

Russia as fellow Christian nations to

plishments were in the field of foreign

assist him in whatever ways possible in

policy. Whereas Tewodros had at-

his fight against the Turks, Egyptians,

tempted brazenly to demand respect

and Islam. In neither case, however, was

and the recognition of Ethiopia by Euro-

Tewodros's request heeded to his satis-

pean powers, Yohannes followed a course

faction. In fact, he was incensed at the

of patient diplomacy. This was a time of

apparent lack of respect accorded him

heightened European interest in Africa

as a base for colonial expansion. It was

3. See Mordechi Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of

also a period when Sudanese Mahdists

the Princes (London: Longmans, 1968).

4. Sven Rubenson, King of Kings: Tewodros

of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Oxford University

5. Zewde Gabre-Selassie, Yohannes IV of

Press, 1966).
Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

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 79
POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL

sawa were recognized as long as Ethiopia

challenged Ethiopia on its western

could use the port freely for trade. Ethi-

border.

opia also agreed to cede part of the Tigre

Although Yohannes considered Islam

Highlands to Italy and to give the Italians

a threat, he saw European expansionism

certain commercial, industrial, and judi-

as an even greater threat to Ethiopia's

cial privileges in Eritrea. For its part,

political survival. At one point, Yohan-

Italy agreed to give Ethiopia a substan-

nes even made an abortive attempt to

tial loan and to continue to supply Mene-

form an alliance with the Mahdists

lik with arms. In general, then, both Italy

against a potential European incursion.

and Ethiopia were guaranteed a measure

His worst fears were confirmed in 1885,

of security and trading privileges.

when Britain, which occupied parts of

Significantly, the treaty was written

Eritrea at the time, allowed Italy to take

in two versions, Italian and Amharic,

control of the port of Massawa and to

which had profound implications for

expand its presence in the area. Italy

future relations between the two coun-

immediately made it apparent that it

tries. Both drafts were identical except

wanted to colonize Ethiopia. In 1889,

for one article, Article XVII. The Italian

before he could raise a challenge to

version of this article essentially implied

Italian encroachment, Yohannes was

killed in battle against the Mahdists. that Ethiopia was a protectorate of

Italy. The Amharic version suggested

Just prior to Yohannes's death, the

Italians had begun to court Ras Menelik that Ethiopia was free to seek the assis-

II of Shoa, Yohannes's most serious tance of the Italians in its dealing with

competitor. The Italians looked upon other governments, but it was not

this initiative as preparation for the obliged to do so. When Menelik realized

impending challenge to Yohannes. the discrepancy in the two versions, he

Menelik saw it as an insurance policy tried to have it corrected through diplo-

macy. After this effort failed, the em-

against a possible invasion of his domain

by Yohannes. Yohannes died, however, peror notified Italy in 1893 that the

before either of these events could occur. treaty would be abrogated in one year.

Only seven weeks after the death of In response Italy prepared for war.

Yohannes, a treaty was concluded be- Menelik, in anticipation, strengthened

tween Menelik and the Italians in the his defensive capabilities by purchasing

small town of Wichale in what is now more arms and military equipment from

Wollo Province. The treaty was officially private dealers as well as from such

described as the Wichale Treaty of Per- governments as the Russian, French,

petual Peace and Friendship.6 Menelik and British. He already possessed a

saw this as insurance against foreign as substantial battery of armaments, which

well as domestic enemies. The treaty had enabled him to expand his territorial

declared that the state of war that had possessions to the north and south even

existed between Yohannes and Italy was before the demise of Yohannes. In order

officially ended and recognized Menelik to secure the popular support he needed

as the emperor of all of Ethiopia. to fend off the Italians, Menelik appealed

Under the treaty Italian claims to Mas- to his subjects, emphasizing Ethiopia's

historic reputation for repulsing external

enemies. Once again, the threat of a

6. Sven Rubenson, Wichale XVII (Addis

Ababa: Haile Selassie I University, 1964), p. 12.

formidable foreign invader seems to

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 80 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

have coalesced the disparate people who

blished Menelik's exclusive rights to

made up the empire.

territories bordering the colonial posses-

In early 1895 Italy began its system-

sions claimed by these powers, respec-

atic penetration of the highland core.

tively. Significantly, these rights made

Minor skirmishes between Italian forces

Menelik an active participant in the

and Ethiopian regional armies took place

colonial partition of Africa along with

throughout that year. By January 1896,

the European powers. It was clear that

however, Menelik decided that the time

the emperor was gifted with consider-

had come for a decisive showdown.7 The

able diplomatic acumen, playing off one

Italians had committed 20,000 well-

power against the other as pawns in an

armed troops to this campaign, and

effort to secure the sovereignty of his

Menelik countered with a force of

country. This contributed greatly to the

100,000. After a period of a war of

almost mythical image of Ethiopia as

nerves, the consummate battle erupted

the epitome of African independence.

at Adowa in late February and lasted for

A critical element in Menelik's efforts

six days. The Italians were resoundingly

to establish effective control over the

defeated with more than 35 percent of

expanded empire was his army. He is

their troops being killed.

credited with professionalizing the armed

The Ethiopian victory at Adowa sent

forces and with creating a standing

shock waves throughout Europe and

army. As circumstances dictated, he

caused the reigning Italian government

could raise an army of up to 200,000,

to fall. The vanquished Italians sued for

with 10,000 to 12,000 men at his direct

peace,'and a treaty was signed that

disposal.9 Through diplomacy, he se-

allowed Italy to keep Eritrea while re-

cured military technical assistance.

nouncing all claims to the Ethiopian

European instructors, mainly French

core. For the first time, the European

and Russian, were invited to his court to

powers realized that Ethiopia was an

assist in military training. That training,

African power to be reckoned with.

however, was confined to weapons use

Now Britain, France, Russia, and Italy

and did not involve strategy and tactics.

flocked to Menelik's court in order to

The first European-style military acad-

arrange the exchange of ambassadors

emy was not established until 1934, four

and to conclude diplomatic agreements

years after Haile Selassie I became

establishing their spheres of influence in

emperor.

the Horn of Africa vis-a-vis Ethiopia.

Menelik introduced the practice of

Even Sudanese Mahdists sought to stabi-

erecting permanent garrison towns

lize relations with Ethiopia at this time.8

throughout the recently conquered pe-

By the end of 1897, Ethiopia's current

riphery to aid not only in defense but

boundaries-save for Eritrea and part

also in establishing the administrative

of the western border-had been set, at

presence of the central authorities. Thus

least on paper. Diplomatic agreements

military administrators were extremely

with Britain, France, and Italy esta-

instrumental in consolidating the phys-

ical boundaries of present-day Ethiopia.

7. See Sven Rubenson, The SurvivalofEthio-

pian Independence (London: Heinemann, 1976).

8. See Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of

9. See R.H. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik

Menelik II (London: Oxford University Press,

and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813-1889 (London:

1975).
Heinemann, 1975), p. 116.

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 POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL
81

HAILE SELASSIE AND THE

His diplomatic skills and Britain's own

RISE OF THE NATION-STATE

strategic necessities in the area enabled

him to elicit the aid of the British in the

Menelik died in 1913, and it was not

liberation of Ethiopia.

until 1930 that the next strong emperor,

In the immediate post-World War II

Haile Selassie I, assumed the throne.10

period, Ethiopia was extremely depen-

The new emperor was dedicated to the

dent on British military, economic, and

creation of a stronger, more modern

technical aid. At the same time, the

bureaucratic empire with unquestioned

emperor feared that Britain might either

respect in the world community. This

declare Ethiopia a protectorate or use

was clear as early as 1923, when as

the claim that the whole of Italian East

Crown Regent Ras Tafari Makonnen,

Africa-Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia

the would-be emperor engineered Ethio-

was occupied enemy territory and thus

pia's entry into the League of Nations.

could be partitioned for administrative

Haile Selassie's efforts were briefly

convenience. Haile Selassie's fears moved

halted by the occupation of Ethiopia by

him to seek alternative relationships

the Italian Fascists between 1936 and

that would allow him to loosen Ethio-

1941. Ethiopia's joining the League of

pia's ties to Britain. This was a period

Nations was clearly instigated by the

when all the Allied powers were jock-

ever present potential for invasion of the

eying for leverage in the reordered inter-

Ethiopian heartland by the Italians.

national political arena. France wanted

When the Italians did finally invade, the

to return to the prewar status quo;

emperor took flight and established a

Russia wanted to block Britain from

government in exile in London. From

claiming too much of the African spoils;

there, he journeyed to Geneva, Switzer-

the British wanted to solidify their pres-

land, to make an impassioned plea before

ence in the Horn; and the United States

the General Assembly of the League of

wanted to establish a new presence in

Nations for aid in defense to the Ethio-

the region.12

pian motherland. l Although the League

Through diplomacy, Haile Selassie

of Nations' charter stipulated that all

was able to regain complete adminis-

members were committed to protect the

trative control over the territory he

sovereignty of one another, the league

claimed-and more-by 1954. In 1952 a

ultimately ignored Haile Selassie's plea.

U.N. resolution had made possible a

Apparently viewing the League of

federation between Ethiopia and the

Nations' inaction as only a temporary

former Italian colony of Eritrea. Eritrea

setback, the emperor continued to be-

was to have regional autonomy within

lieve in the ultimate value of effective

the federation, but Haile Selassie was

diplomacy. He also recognized Ethio-

not content with only administrative

pia's need for a powerful external patron

control. He was not satisfied until he

until he could restore the state's adminis-

secured the endorsement of both the

trative capacity for autonomous action.

Eritrean and Ethiopian Assemblies in

10. See Leonard Moseley, Haile Selassie (Lon-

1962, which allowed him to incorporate

don: Weidenfell and Nicholson, 1964).

Eritrea fully into the empire, making it a

11. See Haile Selassie I, My Life and Ethio-

pia's Progress, 1892-1937, ed. and annotated by

12. See John H. Spencer, Ethiopia, the Horn

Edward Ullendorff (London: Oxford University

of Africa and US Policy(Cambridge MA: Institute

Press, 1976).
of Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977), pp. 17-22.

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 82
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

province of Ethiopia instead of a trustee-

The relationship that developed be-

ship.
tween the two countries under Haile

These maneuvers took place against

Selassie is often considered as one of

the backdrop of the emperor's loosening

dependency on the part of Ethiopia. I

ties with Britain and establishing new

would argue the contrary. A better

patronage links with the United States.

description is interdependence. At least

British military aid was withdrawn in

at the beginning both partners got what

1952, and Haile Selassie moved quickly

they wanted. In the days prior to ad-

to firm up relations with the United

vances in satellite technology, Kagnew

States. Since the early 1940s, the United

Station in Eritrea provided the United

States had coveted a base in Eritrea

States with a valuable link in its world-

where it could set up a radio tracking

wide military communications network.

station. Haile Selassie viewed the use of

To an extent, American policymakers

such an installation by the United States

considered it essential to keep Haile

as having more benefits than costs; that

Selassie in power if access to this base

is, he would reap the benefits of being

was to be preserved. In this sense, the

closely allied with the most powerful

strategic interests of the United States

military power in the world, while being

came to intersect with Haile Selassie's

paid rent in the form of military aid that

domestic and regional interests.

could be used to strengthen the state's

Even though the United States pre-

military capacity. Two agreements were

ferred not to become involved in domes-

concluded in May 1953 to formalize this

tic politics, on occasion it provided the

new relationship. As a result, the United

emperor with the means to put down

States guaranteed Ethiopia's security,

internal upheavals. On a more consistent

which added greatly to the confidence

basis, the United States contributed to

with which the emperor could approach

the expansion of the Ethiopian military

the task of political consolidation.

as a hedge against a Somali threat. It

In addition to the military aid Ethio-

also provided counterinsurgency train-

pia received from the United States over

ing and on-the-ground advisers to help

the next 23 years, its armed forces also

to suppress Eritrean nationalism. The

benefited from the presence of a Military

scale and character of U.S. military

Assistance Advisory Group, which was

involvement in Ethiopia contributed to

established in 1954. This group provided

a low-intensity arms race in the Horn

training for the Ethiopian forces down

region. This notwithstanding, Haile

to the battalion level. By 1975, the total

Selassie felt the association with the

U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia

United States was essential not only to

amounted to almost $280 million. In

his survival but also to the survival of

addition, between 1953 and 1976, 3978

the state itself.

Ethiopian soldiers-more than half the

The military dimension was only one

total for Africa-were trained in the

part of Haile Selassie's survival strategy.

United States.'3
The other involved political diplomacy.

On the one hand, under his leadership,

Ethiopia became an active member of

13. See Edmond J. Keller, "United States

Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with

Blinders On," in African Crisis Areas and US

Coleman, and Richard Sklar (Berkeley: University

Foreign Policy, ed. Gerald Bender, James S.

of California Press, 1985), pp. 178-93.

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 83
POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL

the United Nations, even going so far as REGIME CHANGE, IDEOLOGY,

AND FOREIGN POLICY

to commit Ethiopian troops for peace-

keeping operations in Korea in 1951 as

The reign of Haile Selassie came to an

well as the Congo in 1961. He wanted to

end in September 1974. The emperor

appear to be a champion of freedom and

was deposed by a military coup d'etat.

anticommunism. On the other hand,

The new regime at first did not attempt

when the winds of change for African

to alter the country's foreign policy

independence began to blow in the

significantly. In fact, priority was ini-

1950s, Haile Selassie belatedly jumped

tially given to addressing the long-

to the forefront of the voices calling for

standing problem of underdevelopment

African independence. Until 1958, he

that had characterized Haile Selassie's

had remained silent about European

rule. An equally pressing problem from

colonialism in Africa. But in April of

the perspective of the Provisional Mili-

that year, at the first meeting of the

tary Administrative Council (PMAC)

Conference of Independent African

was a resolution of the nationalist insur-

States in Accra, Ghana, the emperor

gency in Eritrea that had been raging

pressed for a resolution in which the

since the early 1960s and that by 1974

signatories agreed to observe each

had intensified. Even though Eritrea

other's territorial integrity.'4 He thereby

had been annexed only in 1962, the new

avoided Ethiopia's being branded an

regime, as the one before it, asserted

African imperialist for its role in the

that Ethiopia's claim to the region could

partition of Africa during the period of

be traced to antiquity. With the aid of a

European colonial expansion.

newly formed people's militia in alliance

From this point on, Haile Selassie

with units of the regular armed forces,

recognized the value not only of partici-

the PMAC tried to secure a military

pating in international organizations,

solution to the problem.

but also of taking the lead in the interest

Simultaneously, the new government

of the voices of moderation. Such con-

liberalized the political atmosphere and

sideration prompted him to extend an

allowed relatively free and open ex-

invitation to host the 1963 meeting of

change of political ideas. Wanting to

the Conference of Independent African

carve out a vanguard role for the PMAC

States. There he proposed that priority

in the creation of the new society, it

be given to spelling out the meaning of

actually opened the door to civilian

the concept of African unity and to its

criticism of its dictatorial and antidemo-

operationalization. This meeting re-

cratic tendencies. Consequently, urban

sulted in the founding of the Organiza-

guerrilla warfare erupted, involving civil-

tion of African Unity. Due to his role,

ian groups that supported the vanguard

Haile Selassie secured the mantle of

role of the men in uniform, those who

patriarch of African unity. Even more

opposed it, and the politicized military

important, he ensured that Ethiopia's

itself.

territorial integrity would not be ques-

Although the United States had de-

tioned by other African states.

cided not to renew its lease of Kagnew

Station-land-based communications

facilities were no longer needed-it

14. See Peter Schwab, Haile Selassie I (Chi-

cago: Nelson-Hall, 1979), pp. 101-14. wanted to maintain a presence in Ethio-

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 84
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

pia to block Soviet expansionism in

In the face of the worsening Ethio-

Africa. The Ford administration wanted

pian-U.S. relations, the Soviets moved

to avoid an embarrassment similar to

to take advantage of an opportunity to

what it experienced in Angola in 1974,

become Ethiopia's new big-power patron.

when covert United States aid to anti-

By April it was clear that the PMAC had

communist forces failed to dislodge the

decided to shed its unreliable patron and

pro-Moscow Popular Movement for

to replace it immediately with a new

the Liberation of Angola. Yet it was

partner. As head of the PMAC, Colonel

uneasy with the growing leftist tenden-

Mengistu Haile Mariam demanded that

cies and political excesses of the regime.

the United States close down Kagnew,

The United States began to express

all operations of the Military Assistance

concern about violations of human rights

Advisory Group, and most other U.S.

in Ethiopia as early as November 1974,

installations within 72 hours. By then,

when 60 political prisoners were exe-

the Soviets had begun to provide mili-

cuted. Concern was heightened two

tary arms and equipment to replace lost

months later when the struggle for Eri-

American aid.'7

trea reached a crisis level. By June 1975,

Sensing that the regime was in des-

the government had 30,000 to 40,000

perate trouble, internal and external

troops poised in the Eritrean region,

enemies began to take action to hasten

most of whom were poorly trained and

its demise. Most important, civilian

poorly armed militiamen. 5 The Eritrean

opposition groups began to intensify the

forces attacked them in their own camps

urban guerrilla campaign, and Somalia

before they could launch an offensive

committed regular troops to assist ethnic

and decimated them. The United States

Somali in the Ogaden in their efforts to

then appealed to the PMAC to halt its

separate from Ethiopia. The Somali

use of the militia in the Eritrean cam-

government expressed concern over the

paign, threatening to withhold needed

growing Soviet and Cuban presence in

military aid. Presidential candidate

Ethiopia. Until then Somalia had been a

Jimmy Carter, noting growing human

client of the Soviet Union. Although the

rights violations throughout the world,

Soviet Union continued to supply aid to

vowed to make human rights the center-

Somalia, after the Ogaden invasion in

piece of his foreign policy in the event of

June 1977, it began to withdraw its per-

his election. When he assumed office,

sonnel until by September no more than

Carter moved swiftly to make good on

400 remained out of 1000. In November,

his word. On 25 February 1977, it was

Somalia announced the abrogation of

announced that because of continued

the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Coop-

gross violations of human rights by the

eration with the Soviet Union. In addi-

governments of Ethiopia, Argentina,

tion, diplomatic relations with Cuba

and Uruguay, U.S. military aid to those

were suspended. This cleared the way

countries would be reduced in the new

for the unconstrained entry of the Soviet

fiscal year.16
Union into Ethiopia.

15. See Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over

ple?-U.S. Policy on Human Rights," Foreign

Eritrea, 1962-1978: War and Revolution in the

Affairs, 56(4):833 (July 1978).

Horn of Africa (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution

17. Gary D. Payton, "The Soviet-Ethiopian

Press, 1983), pp. 71-78.

Liaison: Airlift and Beyond," Air University Re-

16. Sandra Vogelgesan, "What Price Princi-

view, 31:66-73 (Nov.-Dec. 1979).

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 POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 85

In late November the Soviets launched

The broader implication of these

a huge air and sea lift of arms and

developments was an escalation of the

equipment to Ethiopia.18 In addition,

regional arms race in the Horn. The

over the next several months more than

Soviets and Americans jockeyed to

11,000 Cubans and 1000 Soviet military

check one another; the Ethiopians and

personnel arrived in the country and

Somali tried to outfox each other. The

were sent to the Ogaden front. This aid

consequences were momentous. The size

was decisive in turning the tide in favor of the Ethiopian military jumped from

of Ethiopia by early 1978. As this drama

65,000 in 1976 to almost 300,000 in

unfolded in Ethiopia, the United States

1986. Somalia's army swelled from

and other Western allies rallied to the

31,000 to about 54,000 in the same

side of Somalia.
period. Domestically, Ethiopia's opposi-

As a result of the split between Ethio-

tion groups, although temporarily con-

pia and the United States, tension

tained in 1978, had achieved the military

mounted throughout the whole region.

capacity to cause serious problems for

Beginning in May, clashes occurred be-

the regime by the mid-1980s, particularly

tween Sudan and Ethiopia on their

in the Eritrea and Tigre regions. Between

common border, and Egypt committed

1974 and 1982 Ethiopia's military expen-

troops to help guard the eastern border

ditures grew more than tenfold to $381

of Sudan. The United States eventually

million.20 By then, the Soviets had pro-

began to pursue systematically an encir-

vided over $2 billion in military aid in

clement strategy intended to isolate Ethio-

comparison to less than $300 million

pia by entering into military relation-

provided by the United States over a

ships with its neighbors. Countries such

22-year period. What is more remark-

as Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and able is the fact that both Somalia and

Oman were asked to allow their terri-

Ethiopia now spend almost 10 percent

tories to be used as staging grounds for

of their gross national products for

the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, which

military purposes in spite of being among

could be used to project U.S. military

the poorest countries in the world.

power into the Middle East and Persian As did the previous regime, the pre-

Gulf. 9 These developments caused Ethi- sent Ethiopian government has accorded

opia, South Yemen, and Libya to come its international image and territorial

together in a show of solidarity and integrity the highest priority in its foreign

resolve jointly to repulse any efforts by policy. Domestically its approach to

the United States or its proxies to inter-

foreign policy has resulted in the growing

vene in their affairs. The U.S. policy in

regimentation and militarization of

the Horn was continued and even ex-

society. Opposition groups have forced

tended by the Reagan administration,

the regime to rely extensively on the

which by 1986 was attempting to smooth

Soviet Union to maintain itself in power

the way for covert aid to opponents of

and to preserve the country's territorial

the Afro-Marxist regime.

integrity. Critics suggest that this deep-

ening association has resulted in Ethio-

18. Ibid.
20. U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament

19. Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to

Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms

Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since Transfers, 1985 (Washington, DC: Government

1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982). Printing Office, 1985).

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 86
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

pia's becoming a Soviet pawn. I, how-

Unity, the regime reinforces its defini-

ever, would question this. Although the

tion of the Ethiopian nation-state.

regime consistently sides with the Rus-

One subtle change aimed at enhancing

sians in the international diplomatic

Ethiopia's international reputation is

arena, it has on numerous occasions

its leader's repeated claims of solidar-

demonstrated its independence in the

ity not only with the other peoples

area of domestic policy and interna-

of Africa, but also with all progres-

tional economic policy.21 For instance,

sive forces throughout the world, in-

the PMAC took its time in setting up a

cluding the West.22 To legitimize its

vanguard party in spite of Soviet pres-

position, the regime quotes the charters

sure. When the party was formed, it was

of the United Nations and the Organi-

dominated by military personnel, again

zation of African Unity and pledges

contrary to Soviet wishes. In economic

endorsement of the principle of peaceful

policy, Ethiopia has close aid and trade

coexistence. Significantly, the rhetoric

relations with the West and pursues a

emphasizes peace and friendship, not

pragmatic investment policy. Clearly,

proletarian internationalism and class

then, the new regime takes an opportu-

struggle.

nistic approach to its dealings with the

By 1985, in spite of problems caused

big powers. To be sure, it is heavily

by drought, famine, and internal war,

dependent on the Russians for military

the PMAC was beginning to resolve at

aid, but it cannot do without the West

least temporarily some of its regional

for economic development aid. Ironi-

foreign policy problems. After the over-

cally, this places the current regime in a

throw in Sudan of President Jafar

stronger position than the previous one.

Muhammad al-Nimeiry in April of that

It can use its necessarily diversified aid

year, the regime that replaced him began

sources as leverage, playing one big-

to express a desire to secure Sudan's

power bloc off against the other, al-

border with Ethiopia and to tighten

though within limits.

surveillance of cross-border operations

Ideologically, the PMAC is oriented

by Ethiopian and Eritrean opponents of

toward the Soviet Union, but this has

the regime.23 More remarkably, about

made little difference in the fundamental

the same time Ethiopia and Somalia

essence of its foreign policy. It continues

began to move toward detente. A his-

to strive to have its commitment to the

toric meeting between Mengistu and

principles of nonalignment, self-reli-

Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia was

ance, and self-determination accepted held at the inaugural meeting of the Inter-

as genuine. For instance, in 1974 at

governmental Authority on Drought

Ethiopia's invitation, the Organization

and Development. Ajoint communique,

of African Unity decided to make Addis

issued after extensive talks, stated that

Ababa the permanent site not only for

the aim of these preliminary contacts

its headquarters but also for its annual

was to create the "conditions for the

summit. By emphasizing its leadership

normalization of relations and the estab-

role in the Organization of African

22. See "Ethiopia's Foreign Policy," Yekatit

21. See Edmond J. Keller, "Revolutionary

Quarterly, 8(1):30-32 (Sept. 1978).

Ethiopia: Ideology, Capacity and the Limits of

23. "Foreign Policy and National Interest,"

State Autonomy," Journal of Commonwealth

Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic, 0430GMT,

and Comparative Politics, 23(2):133 (July 1985).

28 Apr. 1985.

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 87
POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL

lishment of lasting peace" between the be the desire to have the multiethnic

two countries.24 character of the nation-state internation-

ally accepted as legitimate and to defend

its territorial integrity. As in the past,

CONCLUSION

these goals are pursued with the military

The fundamental essence of Ethio-

aid of a big-power patron. The identity of

pia's foreign policy has not changed

the patron has changed, but the reason

over the past century despite the change

for the alliance has not. The ideological

in regime. Although the imperial regime

character of the new regime is less

has been displaced by a military Afro-

important for what it is than for what it

Marxist government, the main focus of

does. It provides the government with

the country's foreign policy continues to

the needed military wherewithal to

ensure the survival of the state as well as

24. Pramila Bennett, "The Horn: Burying the

Hatchet," Africa, no. 175, pp. 36-37 (Mar. 1986). the regime.

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