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EXPLORING THE BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE
Basic Income, Disability

Pensions and the Australian
Political Economy
Envisioning Egalitarian
Transformation, Funding
and Sustainability
Jennifer Mays
Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee
Series Editor
Karl Widerquist
Georgetown University in Qatar
Doha, Qatar
Basic income is one of the most innovative, powerful, straightforward, and
controversial proposals for addressing poverty and growing inequalities.
A Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is designed to be an unconditional,
government-insured guarantee that all citizens will have enough income
to meet their basic needs. The concept of basic, or guaranteed, income is
a form of social provision and this series examines the arguments for and
against it from an interdisciplinary perspective with special focus on the
economic and social factors. By systematically connecting abstract philo-
sophical debates over competing principles of BIG to the empirical analy-
sis of concrete policy proposals, this series contributes to the fields of
economics, politics, social policy, and philosophy and establishes a theo-
retical framework for interdisciplinary research. It will bring together
international and national scholars and activists to provide a comparative
look at the main efforts to date to pass unconditional BIG legislation
across regions of the globe and will identify commonalities and differences
across countries drawing lessons for advancing social policies in general
and BIG policies in particular.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14981
Jennifer Mays
Basic Income,
Disability Pensions
and the Australian
Political Economy
Envisioning Egalitarian Transformation, Funding
and Sustainability
Jennifer Mays
Kelvin Grove Campus
Queensland University of Technology
Kelvin Grove, QLD, Australia
ISSN 2662-3803 ISSN 2662-3811 (electronic)

Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee
ISBN 978-3-030-32348-6 ISBN 978-3-030-32349-3 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32349-3
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
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For John Tomlinson, Kay and Les Mays and Spence, Christine, Philip
and Jen K. In solidarity and the struggle for just social protection
and an egalitarian society
Acknowledgements
The journey of writing is not simply a start and finish. Along the way, the
ideas for the book evolved from small insights that gradually became more
conceptually concrete; however, the conceptualizing never really finishes. It
is an ongoing process, because as ideas develop, new insights emerge that
contribute to the broader debate. My commitment to social justice and radi-
cal transformative change started from an early age and was formatively
shaped by my family (parents and grandparents). There were many social or
household events where political discussions dominated. The most influen-
tial political leader of our time was Gough Whitlam, who inspired new
thinking about the possibilities of a different vision of society: an egalitarian
society that was socially just, fair and equitable. This also had an immense
effect in shaping my social justice and radical critical approach. In my uni-
versity years, it was John Tomlinson who inspired the pursuit of the basic
income alternative. He gave a name to the ideas I had been framing at the
time. To each of you I am eternally grateful for the ongoing support, debate
and patience as I grappled with issues of wealth and income inequality, pov-
erty and the basic income solution. Even though my parents, grandparents
and John have since passed away, their wisdom has remained. I cannot go
past Karl Widerquist who has also provided invaluable support and guidance
in making this project happen. I would also like to thank Guy Standing, Jim
Mulvale and Malcolm Torry, amongst others from BIEN, who have also
contributed to the exchange of ideas and insights that helped inform the book.
I am especially grateful to my partner Spencer, who was there with me
in the long hours of writing, patiently waiting for some response from me,
but also giving clarity to complex ideas.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My colleagues and friends also deserve a special mention, and I would

like to thank Christine Morley, Jenny Kaighin, Greg Marston and Philip
Ablett, to name a few, for their unyielding belief in me and in this book.
Finally, I would like to thank the hard workers at Palgrave Macmillan,
especially the long-suffering Sophia Spiegler who was an immense support
during particularly difficult and painful times. Without all of you, this
book could not have happened!
Contents
Part I Political Economy, Basic Income and Disability

Conceptions 1
1 Introduction: Basic Income, Fit for Australia and the

Fairness Test 3
2 Basic Income in Australia and Disability Conceptions 37
3 Basic Income, Disability Dimension and the Fairness Test 57
4 Reconfiguring Social Security Arrangements and

Strengthening Public Services103
Part II Policy Synergy 133
5 Financing a Basic Income: Explorations of International

Models for Application in Australia135
6 Disability Pensions and the Legacy of Targeting and

Classification165
ix
x Contents
Part III Policy Implementation 211
7 Future Vision: Building a Sustainable Basic Income

and Egalitarian Society213
Index223
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Snapshot of main social security regimes over time from
1908 to the present 106
Table 4.2 Summary of Australian pensions and benefits from 1900
to present 126
xi
PART I
Political Economy, Basic Income

and Disability Conceptions
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Basic Income, Fit for Australia

and the Fairness Test
Introduction. Basic Income, Justice and ‘Fit’

for Australia
Basic income is a matter of social and distributive justice. Such a prelude

into the book sets up from the outset the call for justice and fairness in
responding to poverty for people who are disadvantaged, particularly peo-
ple with disabilities. Such an egalitarian approach alludes to a welfare state
and provision that is universal, progressive and sets the foundation for a
socially just society. Economic, social and political security, equity and
equality are critical requirements for transitioning to universal welfare and
an egalitarian society. In the modern context, the political and economic
climate is characterized by growing inequality and major labour market
adjustments. The concern for growing inequity in income and wealth dis-
tribution and associated disadvantage has propelled debates on the neces-
sity for an unconditional basic income and corresponding policies of robust
universalism (Birnbaum, 2012; De Wispelaere, 2016; Morley & Ablett,
2016). Basic income is just that, an unconditional, regular cash payment to
all people on an individual basis, without conditionality (means-testing or
work activity requirements) (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).
Responding to broader structural impacts shaping basic income debates,
centres on the concern for vulnerable groups in achieving a decent life. Of
interest is considering the conditions towards implementing basic income
and the relevance of the notions about the commons and collective b enefit.
© The Author(s) 2020 3

J. Mays, Basic Income, Disability Pensions and the Australian
Political Economy, Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32349-3_1
4 J. MAYS
The predominance of market and economic policies shaping capitalist

society (i.e. capitalist economy based on the preeminence of the market
and individuals) has been at the expense of ideals of collective solidarity
and matters of collective benefit. These considerations compel us to criti-
cally reflect on the normative justifications and emerging questions con-
cerning the nature of distributive justice, society and welfare arrangements.
In drawing on Piketty (2014), such deeper level questioning explores
ideas around “what public policies and institutions bring us closer to an
ideal society?” (p. 574). In offering some guidance for exploring distribu-
tive justice and normative conditions, the question posed is crucial for
examining the range of institutions and policies needed to achieve just
provisions and society, and the type of universal provision best fit for
Australia. This is one of the key aims of the book: exploring the arguments
as to why Australia needs a universal basic income (and what type), what
is involved in transitioning to a basic income and what changes will need
to be made to structural arrangements to ensure sustainability over time.
Such an examination helps position the fairness objective and assess the
regime using the fairness test. In doing so, further exploration is under-
taken to consider the basic income interaction with notions of the com-
mons (such as how basic income fits with other programmes and what
ethical and structural change is needed? What shared wealth looks like and
how achieve?) (Jordan, 1992; Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). General
insights emerging from the exploration can be adopted, which in turn
contribute to extending basic income debates. An exploration of these
features and questions is necessary for developing strong claims to justify
transformatory change and present credible arguments for implementing
basic income. Before delving into the terminology and normative justifica-
tions, there needs to be a contextualization of the broader modern politi-
cal context and political significance of such conceptual discussions. There
is a sense of urgency to the task of deeper analysis and making claims to
transform society and introduce universal provision of basic income. This
is because of the impact of contemporary political global shocks and events
(such as the Global Financial Crisis), endurance of dominant neoclassic
economics and the intrusion of neoliberal orthodoxy on all aspects of life
and society (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).
The broader social conditions demand a normative and coherent ana-
lytical response to the pressing social problems of our time. Theorists such
as Piketty (2014) and Stiglitz (2013) highlight the growing concern for
inequality in income and wealth distribution, which has reached
1 INTRODUCTION: BASIC INCOME, FIT FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE FAIRNESS… 5
unprecedented levels in contemporary times. Since the 1970s, Western

governments and political leaders (such as the United Kingdom and
Australia) have placed greater emphasis on policies underpinned by neo-
classic economics and neoliberal orthodoxy to redress social problems
(poverty and inequality). Exploring the historical, political and economic
dynamics of income and wealth distribution in modern Western capitalist
economies is crucial for making sense of the way inequality manifests to
perpetuate unequal wage and capital distribution (Piketty, 2014). When
vast concentrations of income and wealth (r>g) are held within the hands
of a few dominant elites, the outcome if left unchecked over time, is a
propensity towards greater gaps between rich and poor (r>g inequality
equation) (Piketty, 2015).
Divergent forces have operated to produce a destabilizing effect on
democracy (Hopkin, 2014; Piketty, 2014). Major structural shifts and
forces of divergence (seen in the global financial crisis in 2008, attacks on
democracy, decline of manufacturing and an emerging robot and gig econ-
omy) have produced greater levels of precarity and economic insecurity,
higher levels of unemployment, financial meltdowns, environmental crisis
and growing poverty and inequality (Amin, 2010). If there is unrestrained
inequality and the inequality levels continue to grow at a rapid rate, the
injustice of burgeoning inequality, poverty and disadvantage has dire con-
sequences on the vast percentage of the population who do not share in the
amassed wealth. The periods in history whereby there was a brief stabiliza-
tion of inequality (between 1940 and 1970) due to government interven-
tion and strengthening of welfare states illustrates the potential to achieve
universal provision and a democratic, just society (Piketty, 2014). Since the
1980s, the contest for hegemonic power and control has played out in the
context of capitalism in crisis (Amin, 2013; Piketty, 2015). The global and
national experiences of economic stagnation, precarity through increased
unemployment, underemployment or job insecurity, together with the ero-
sion of wages, economic insecurity and pensions and benefits has created
unparalleled challenges for those working to redress poverty and inequality.
In conjunction with rising inequality, the neoliberal and neoclassic eco-
nomic policies have done much to undermine democracy and ideas of uni-
versal welfare provision, with greater shifts away from the ideals of the
collective good and conceptions of a socially just society (Goodin, 2000;
White, 2013). If one of the goals of basic income is to address inequalities
and structural poverty, then serious attention needs to be given to the his-
torical dynamics of inequality, normative justifications and challenges
6 J. MAYS
emerging from neoclassical economics and neoliberal orthodoxy (Jordan,

1992; Standing, 2014). As Birnbaum (2012) points out, attending to the
normative dimensions in basic income analyses, therefore, can be justified.
This is particularly so given the propensity for overreliance on neoclassic
economics perpetuating greater levels of material and social hardship, and
traditional policy responses which separate groups based on need. Universal
welfare and socially just provision are antithetical to modern Western devel-
oped countries’ dominant forms of welfare, including targeted mecha-
nisms. If we continue to maintain a system that is failing and perpetuating
greater crisis, hardship and precarity, then the consequences for those most
vulnerable groups will be dire. In the ethical and moral sense, we will have
failed in meeting the basic income objective of preserving and safeguarding
the right of all to living a dignified life with a decent income that meets
basic need and upholds social solidarity (Standing, 2014).
Inequality and poverty are persistent political and economic issues. The
challenge for basic income policy centres on realizing virtues and ideals of
equality and equity in citizenship, participation and solidarity in increas-
ingly unequal societies. The global shifts and shocks have implications for
basic income and policy. The reliance on neoclassic economics has rendered
issues of inequality and poverty almost invisible (or deemed a second order
problem) in policy decision-making spheres (Birnbaum, 2012). Here,
political leaders have focused on pursuing minimalist government, struc-
tural adjustments and economic development. The contrast is in basic
income debates, whereby scholars, advocates and political leaders have
sought to redefine the global agenda and challenge the policy orientations
of free market capitalism, productivity and social investment (Piketty,
2014). Basic income debates have sought to place socially just redistribu-
tive justice and basic income at the forefront of policy change. The counter
measure represents a way to shift the terms of debate to produce new policy
possibilities for transformational change in global and national contexts.
A radical, transformative change is crucial for transitioning to universal
basic income and securing the rights and protections of all people. In this
book, radical transformation and inclusion of normative justifications are
examined to establish strategies for the equalization of opportunities through
redistributive justice and transforming society. For basic income to respond
to poverty, inequality and inequity, it needs to establish equity objectives
alongside normative dimensions as part of an overall inclusive strategy (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). The ideas will help capture competing claims
and orient the analysis to a radical transformative approach. The pertinent
goal of the book is to consider the way distributive justice and ideals need to
be considered as part of the strategies for transitioning to basic income and a
socially just society (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). Basic income as an
instrument of freedom is the central pillar for creating a free society. It is an
essential feature of a sustainable, emancipatory approach to reshaping institu-
tions, policies, distribution and belief representations. Such explorations help
transform threats into potentialities and, in turn, shape basic income to
become a relevant ‘fit’ within the Australian context and beyond.
In exploring basic income fits for Australia and the fairness test, disability
is an important site for deeper analysis. The erosion of the commons and
collective benefit over time, and the destabilizing effects of neoliberalism
on democracy, indicates that any design and implementation strategies of
basic income need to consider the disability dimension as part of the overall
strategy. While attention has been drawn to other structural dimensions of
age, gender and locality in basic income debates, the disability dimension
has received limited attention (Mays, 2016; Standing, 2009, 2011, 2014;
Tomlinson, 2012; Widerquist, 2013). Where attention has been drawn to
disability, it tends to remain at the pragmatic level (for example, type of
grant and supplements), without delving into the deeper normative dis-
tributive justice claims that shape basic income design. Disability is an
important concept regarding distributive justice because of the inherent
moral challenges in achieving justice for people with disabilities that has
otherwise not been explored in the basic income or disability policy litera-
ture. As such, the discussions on Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice in the
basic income literature have not gone so far as to explicate the relevance to
disability dimensions and moral concerns about fairness. Further work on
the case of disability relative to distributive justice and basic income is
required to reveal the nuances in the normative justifications. It is to this
task that the book responds and examines the inherent moral contradic-
tions and complexities associated with basic income achieving distributive
justice for all (egalitarian aims), while balancing disability egalitarianism.
For disability, the interacting liberty and freedom (individual rights) con-
ceptions and egalitarian (collective) conceptions need some deeper analysis
to set the scene for ensuring basic income can in effect provide a guaran-
teed, material foundation that can be relied on by all people, inclusive of
people with disabilities. This exploration is to develop a politics of disability
egalitarianism in basic income and prevent arguments from creating a priori
assumptions in meeting objectives in conceptions of justice and explore
dominant ideas of justice theorists such as Rawls’s (1971) and Nancy
Fraser’s (1995) approach to distributive justice.
8 J. MAYS
In this book, disability egalitarianism is established in a similar vein to

Brighouse and Olin Wright’s (2008) argument for gender egalitarianism.
For disability egalitarianism, drawing on analyses of Rawls’s (1971) theory
of justice and Fraser’s (1995) approach assists in detecting the way basic
income and other policies are equity and equality enhancing or equity and
equality restricting. John Rawls’s theory of justice provides a useful start-
ing point for the examination of basic income in relation to distributive
justice. However, what is not clear is the way the structural social relations
and social forces influence disability conceptions and constructions. If the
aim of basic income concerns a just distributive system (unconditional and
fair), then it needs to ensure that people with disabilities are afforded
opportunities to participate freely and flourish in the absence of unin-
tended barriers (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). Defending an egali-
tarian vision for basic income inclusive of disability involves more than
arguing for just disability rights. It would also need to consider design
implications that account for social and structural constructions of disabil-
ity and conceptions of distributive justice to prevent reproducing existing
disability categorizations between abled and disabled people. For people
with disabilities, the ascribed role expectations have normative associa-
tions, which separate, and differentiate between groups in society. These
ideas are particularly helpful for capturing a theory of justice that pro-
motes full inclusion, considers universalism, historical antecedents and
variance. Yet, it also needs to reject oppressive norms that recreate oppres-
sive distinctions, policies and institutional arrangements (Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). Distributive justice for people with disabilities has
held a relatively marginal role in basic income and other political debates.
Deeper consideration of the moral requirements is necessary to forge new
normative justifications that position disability egalitarianism in basic
income debates. Such an exploration as the one carried out in this book
will help redress competing and often conflicting claims in distributive
justice when it comes to issues of disability and presents a way forward. It
is in this way that Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice and Fraser’s (2001)
politics of distributive justice can offer new interpretations and meanings
about redistribution and power. The work of Fraser (2001) on distributive
justice, policy struggles, participation parity and disability is particularly
instructive. Fraser (2001) states that in the politics of redistribution, con-
sideration needs to be given to participatory parity. The ideal of participa-
tory parity is illustrated in the merging of two preconditions for justice
that are relevant to the disability dimension: objective precondition of just
distribution and intersubjective precondition of reciprocal recognition to

be responsive to divergent needs and experiences (politics of redistribu-
tion) (Fraser, 2001). The analytical approach detailed in the book goes
some way in establishing a common conception and approach for tran-
scending competing visions and claims and moving to egalitarian justice.
The transformational potential of fairness and creating opportunities for
realizing justice and participation is highly relevant for a deeper account on
how basic income would normatively and concretely function relative to the
disability dimension. Essentially, this aspect relates to assessing Australia’s fit
for basic income and the fairness text, when it comes to issues of disability
and conceptions of justice. A deeper analytical and normative approach as the
one presented in this book contains the intent of bringing greater clarity to
Rawls’s (1971, 2001) ideals of justice as fairness and libertarian virtues into
the open and shed light on ways to overcome normative challenges with dis-
ability conceptions (Bickenbach & Cieza, 2011; De Wispelaere & Stirton,
2004). This aim to move beyond assumptions suggests that there will be an
automatic uptake of basic income in terms of social citizenship, participation,
solidarity, employment activities and political rights. There is an inherent
disjuncture in basic income proposals which assert the automatic uptake
tenet without consideration of disability and distributive justice implications.
This examination will be a highly useful consideration for basic income advo-
cates and those policy analysts who draw on Rawls’s theory of justice or ques-
tion the utility of distributive justice in meeting basic need, while aligning
collective egalitarian goals with individual freedom and liberty notions.
If universal basic income is to be underpinned by the conception of
egalitarian distributive justice, then it must connect to outcomes in which
all people can benefit. In short, universal basic income strategies need to
account for the notion that people with disabilities are treated as equal
citizens with status and value, rather than potentially return to justice ide-
als that inadvertently reifies inferior, unequal conceptions (Fraser, 1995,
2007). Distributive justice and disability considerations in the past have
tended to overemphasize functional limitations associated with disability
(leading to deficit conceptions) at the expense of social justice, participa-
tion, equality and equity considerations (Bickenbach & Cieza, 2011; De
Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Therefore, analyses involving basic income,
distributive justice and disability, require deeper exploration to ensure jus-
tice is achieved and not a token construction (Fraser, 1997, 2001). The
way structural inequalities and social arrangements function to promote
disadvantage does not preclude it from claims of justice (Nussbaum, 2003;
10 J. MAYS
Wasserman, Asch, Blustein, & Putnam, 2015). Failing to redress issues of

disadvantage may lead to greater injustice in philosophical justice accounts.
Wasserman et al. (2015) suggested that much attention has been given
to conceptualizing philosophy disability, and justice. This is in part because
justice is, as Rawls (1971) considers, the “first virtue of social institutions”
(p. 3). Philosophical discussions on distributive justice and disability, par-
ticularly Rawls’s (1971) conception of distributive justice have pointed to
the need to consider exploring the conflicting aims of libertarian and con-
tractarian or contractualist theories of justice, when it comes to experiences
of disability (Stark, 2007). This is because clarity is required for under-
standing the capacity to meet Rawlsian conceptions of mutual advantage,
reciprocity and hypothetical agreement, or reciprocity and the implications
for disability relative to basic income. Exploring the Rawlsian account
alongside Fraser’s (2001) politics of redistribution helps reveal insights for
renewed conceptions of disability egalitarianism. It will in turn provide a
moral compass to guide a fully inclusive basic income scheme. Such an
extension is necessary for broadening normative justifications and justice
conceptions to ensuring the realization of justice for people with disabilities
in an inclusive basic income framework. Such a consideration is crucial. If
we attend to equality and not consider the variance across dimensions of
inequality such as disability, age and other factors, then the problem of
concern is not just simply a matter of equality, but also one of equity. As
Tomlinson (2000) revealed,
Clearly, to treat unequals equally is as unjust as treating equals unequally and

many people experiencing profound impairments have needs some of which are
quite different from those of ‘able bodied’ people. Such recognition lies at the
heart of the difference between equality and equity. People with severe mobility
impairments might ‘need’ a wheelchair and those who are blind a white cane.
It is possible to guarantee all blind people a white cane and all those who can
not walk a wheelchair. However, it would be more useful to incorporate in leg-
islation an extended conception of the ‘right to freedom of movement’ so as to
encompass more than the removal of politically repressive obstacles. (Tomlinson,
2000, Ch. 7)
Therefore, in exploring potentials for basic income, it is important and

necessary to explore variance across disability experiences, and divergences
in institutional arrangements or types of support to disrupt hegemonic
norms attached to a blanket application of distributive justice. The notion
that basic income represents a socially just approach thus necessitates
conceptualizing ways to not impede its equity and freedom-enhancing

aims towards the promotion of a more egalitarian society. As noted, this
book attends to these concerns and develops a deeper analytical approach
by incorporating a discussion on Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice and
Nancy Fraser’s (2001) approach for a more nuanced basic income debate.
Wasserman et al. (2015) gives credibility to such an exploration by adding
that there are inherent complexities when it comes to the disability dimen-
sion and redistributive aims that need to be explored. They argued that
creating a just, inclusive society and universal social protection measures
that are freedom-enhancing for all people, inclusive of people with dis-
abilities, is crucial for progressing policy changes. Extending on basic
income debates and the disability dimension in relation to redistributive
justice resonates with Torry’s (2016a) thinking around feasibility (such as
issues concerning the political process transition to implementation and
political, social and economic feasibility). The focus contributes to a re-
envisioned basic income approach and social contract with the modern
social (welfare) state (Bickenbach & Cieza, 2011; De Wispelaere &
Stirton, 2004; Stark, 2007).
The brief excursion into distributive justice and normative justifica-
tions, sets the scene for basic income, equity, feasibility and its role in poli-
cymaking (Raventós, 2007; Standing, 2014). Basic income represents a
just, alternative welfare strategy to the modern targeted measures of wel-
fare dominating developed Western capitalist countries. For this reason,
the principles of universalism, fairness and distributive justice provide the
basis for an egalitarian basic income grounded in a commitment to mean-
ingful rights for true social justice (Duffy, 2010, 2011). The standpoint
derives from the assumption that basic income, as transformative, plays a
key role in restructuring the social protection system (income support,
pensions and benefits) in the transition to a stronger social state and state
provision. The central premise of this assumption is, reclaiming the com-
mons and public, towards a democratic society. The role of basic income
in restructuring the social protection system and reconfiguring an indi-
vidual’s contract with the welfare state is a critical one. Basic income rede-
fines the social contract and relates to meeting the basic need to support
individual freedom and socioeconomic and political security. The central
concern is on exploring ways to transform income support policy to imple-
ment a universal basic income and progress towards a more socially just,
democratic society (Duffy, 2010, 2011). The ontological approach pro-
vides a scaffold for inspiring new ways of seeing and restructuring
12 J. MAYS
democratic society using egalitarian policies, such as universal basic income.

The ontological insights derived from the exploration are crucial for coun-
tering the hegemony of neoliberalism and austerity policy discourses
(Fairclough, 2009; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). This conceptual foundation
informing the book provides a means to redress issues of oppression,
extreme poverty and financial hardship. Unequal resource distribution
brought about by burgeoning wealth and income inequalities and extreme
poverty in modern capitalist industrial societies (United States of America,
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Germany) reflects the criticality in
progressing to basic income and an egalitarian society.
Terminology and Principles of Disability and Basic Income

Drawing on disability activism in Australia, the concept of ‘people first’ is
applied, therefore the term ‘people with disabilities’ is used throughout
the book. The people first standpoint in Australia corresponds with the
preferred term ‘disabled people’ used in Britain by the disability rights
movement and academics such as Barnes and Mercer (2004). Globally,
there are multiple variations of terminology, however, for the purpose of
this book and in contextualizing debates in the case of Australia, the peo-
ple first perspective is applied. The people first perspective captures the
socio-political, economic and cultural environment for exploring disability
policy and basic income from a critical social theory standpoint. Disability
social theorists, such as Abberley (1987, 2006), Gibilisco (2003), Goggin
and Newell (2005), and Hughes (2007) agree that variation in the termi-
nology occurs across the disability literature, and suggest the need for a
socio-contextual awareness in the application of the terms. Further, the
people first terminology used here forms a strategy for politicizing the dis-
ability concept and recognizing the way disability conceptions have been
connected to forms of oppression such as disablism.
The people first stance aligns politically and socially with my own com-
mitment to critical social science epistemology, critical theory ontology and
disability as a socio-political construct. From this position, the causes of
disability are structural and social in nature, origin and expression, and not
based on individual deficits or charity conceptions (personal tragedy). Such
a standpoint considers power differentials, structural inequities and conflict
between groups within society (Hughes, 2007). Disability is taken to be a
consequence of social oppression and structural inequities (Mays, 2016).
Irrespective of the nuances in disability conceptions (‘people first’ or ‘dis-
abled people’), the stance is adopted to prevent language and discourse

from being an instrument of power, which reinforce historically embedded
stereotypes of disability (Gibilisco, 2003; Hughes, 2007; Mays, 2016;
Oliver, 2013). Inequality and disadvantage have origins in individual dys-
functions, deficit or paternal theories (medical and charitable models of
disability), yet manifest from consequences of unequal structural and soci-
etal arrangements, which maintain disability in terms of a secondary status.
In turn, able-bodied standards of behaviour and divisions are privileged
upholding ableism as the norm. Conceptualizing disability in this way does
not suggest that individual biological impacts of disability and impairment
are not considered. Instead, individual agency is positioned relative to the
unequal structural arrangements of society and the capitalist system that
cause disadvantage and inequality. The focus on the structural nature of
disability as oppression helps uncover instances in policy or policy debates
in which disability becomes an object of policy through conceptions of dis-
ability as a personal deficit, individual dysfunction, personal tragedy or
deservingness. Basic income does have an interest in explaining the struc-
tural nature of disability conceptions to establish strong claims for social
justice and egalitarianism.
The contentions raised by Titchkosky (2001, 2007) concerning the
‘people first’ representation, while acknowledged, do not reflect the politi-
cal nature of the ‘people first’ conception adopted in this book. Titchkosky
(2001, 2007), views the ‘people first’ concept as problematic. He sug-
gested the idea that the socio-political dimensions of disability become
ignored over time in policy debates when using ‘people first’ language. In
part, Titchkosky (2001, 2007) has a credible point. However, the approach
employed here is that disability is taken to be a social construct and a form
of oppression and ‘people first’ terminology responds to the socio-political
dimensions By drawing on Abberley (1987), Gramsci (1977) and Hughes
(2007), the structural dimensions and political nature are upheld to
include social, political, economic and cultural aspects (Mays, 2016).
Disability is employed in this respect to politicize disability and encompass
a disability egalitarian approach.
Associated with disability dimensions and basic income is the concept of
social citizenship. The notion of social citizenship used here is an all-
encompassing concept that includes ideas of social inclusion and poverty in
the pursuit of income support policies that are supported by an egalitarian
society (Bickenbach, 2011; Bickenbach & Cieza, 2011; Birnbaum, 2012).
The idea of a citizen in this respect to signify both a person who is formally
14 J. MAYS
a citizen of a nation and a person who has been accepted by the govern-
ment to be a permanent resident (Bickenbach, 2011; Bickenbach & Cieza,
2011; Birnbaum, 2012). The term citizenship also denotes the formal sta-
tus of being a citizen inclusive of permanent residence. Citizenship in this
way frames the associated social, civil, political and human rights attached
to the citizenship of people with disabilities across society (Duffy, 2010,
2011). The application of social citizenship provides a foundation for
defending the argument for an egalitarian society in which an inclusive
income support, universal welfare and democratic engagement is available
for all. This is a critical viewpoint. Early writings on basic income by Thomas
Paine (late 1700s) advocated for egalitarianism and justice in which differ-
ent pension payments were established in terms of a right, rather than
based on charitable and deserving poor ideals (Standing, 2002). Paine’s
(1987) influential work, Agrarian Justice (1797), makes a claim for a uni-
versal basic provision, which in turn is highly useful for this book. Paine’s
universal endowment proposal is relevant for developing arguments based
on the redistribution of wealth by upholding of rights to the commons and
justice, particularly in terms of collective benefit and sharing of the com-
mon wealth of the nation or earth (Birnbaum, 2012; Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). Such ideas help in furthering the normative debates
for socially just redistribution and mechanisms of basic income and pro-
gressive taxation for progressing to equitable income distribution
(Raventós, 2007).
What is relevant here is extending debates to consider basic income as a
type of a social dividend for the commons and public wealth. It is the foun-
dation of an egalitarian provision in that it is available for all permanent citi-
zens (universal principle) that makes basic income appealing. It can be
applied either in-country or alternatively based on global citizenship (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). The basic income provision founded on
egalitarian values and principles reinforces social citizenship, democracy,
civic virtues, rights, participation and collective solidarity (Mays, 2016).
This is an essential aspect for securing rights and social justice under this
grant. Thus, the ‘right of citizenship’ status becomes attached to basic
income provision (Torry, 2016a, 2016b; Van Parijs, 2007; Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). Across the basic income literature, there are a multi-
tude of similar terms to describe basic income in different inceptions, includ-
ing citizens’ income, citizens’ participation income, citizens’ stake or
guaranteed minimum income. For this book, the term employed is basic
income because of its universal, unconditional tenets.
The central tenet of basic income is that it represents a universal and

unconditional grant, set at a sufficient level to counter poverty and reduce
the potential for poverty traps (Mays, 2016; Torry, 2016a, 2016b; Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). For the Australian context, a full basic
income payment would go directly to individuals, rather than households
or family units to provide socioeconomic independence (Bowman, Mallett,
& Cooney-O’Donoghue, 2017; Mays, 2016; Torry, 2016a). It is basic
income’s inherent precondition of distributive justice in meeting basic
need, together with normative, ethical and economic preconditions (social
justice and social citizenship) that responds to poverty traps, unintended
consequences and injustices.
The first requisite condition of distributive justice and meeting basic need
creates the preconditions for safeguarding against economic insecurity. Such
a safeguard is crucial for people with disabilities and the disability dimen-
sion. Basic income as an unconditional individual grant prevents precarity,
vulnerability and disadvantage brought about by reliance on families, carers
or the state for income or material subsistence (Van Parijs & Vanderborght,
2017). Thus, basic income presents a means to secure economic freedom
and dignity. Where individuals are reliant on others or on targeted pensions
as their main source of income for subsistence, there is a corresponding
higher level of conditionality, oppression and powerlessness due to extreme
material dependency, financial hardship, work precarity, and unjust activity
requirements (conditional welfare) (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017;
Widerquist, Vanderborght, Noguera, & De Wispeleare, 2013). In setting
the basis for redistribution through basic income and directing guaranteed
payment to individuals (not families, carers or households), it supports peo-
ple to be socially, materially and politically independent from the govern-
ment, their partners, family or caregivers (Torry, 2016b). Basic income
therefore, has the propensity for redressing unequal power and authority
within the household and beyond, which is crucial for preserving the just
and fair redistribution principle through the provision of a grant (Widerquist
et al., 2013). Payment to individuals also redresses the entrenched structural
inequities in the social contract with the state (freedom from bureaucratic
control and coercion), household or other institution, whereby money is
used as a form of oppression, authority and social control (Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017). Assigning the provision to an individual is freedom-
enhancing (not constricting) (Van Parijs, 2007). People, as part of the col-
lective political community, have control over distribution due to separate
payment, and autonomy over their own finances. In turn, this reduces
16 J. MAYS
reliance on stigmatizing work activity requirements, or enforced reliance on

perpetrators of violence, caregivers or families (Van Parijs & Vanderborght,
2017; Widerquist et al., 2013). The provision also simplifies and reduces
insecurity brought about by income variations and precarity originating
from a lack of control over material resources, interrupted income flows or
disruptions to work (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). Therefore, the
power of basic income is in its poverty reduction aim which redirects
resources to the most vulnerable groups. Basic income redresses poverty
traps by equalizing inequitable disabling relations and conditions, through
the provision of greater material security and emancipation from spouses,
the state and the broader labour market (Widerquist et al., 2013).
Setting basic income at a specific rate according to a defined age group
represents the means in which a basic income provision is most appropri-
ately funded. The inference is that any implementation of basic income
necessitates the transformation of the existing taxation systems, and pen-
sions and benefits regulations, such as, different taxation scales, descrip-
tions of new taxes or proposals for reclaiming royalties and taxes through
permanent fund dividends or for fund financial sustainability creation (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017; Widerquist et al., 2013). If paid to a politi-
cal community and distributed through socially just and democratic means
of distribution of wealth and resources (egalitarianism), basic income
forms greater connections between egalitarian and libertarian (basic right
to live a decent life that is free from poverty and marginalization) justice.
In doing so, basic income can respond to different needs and levels of
resources for diverse group decided through public deliberation, partici-
pative democracy and social agreement (Standing, 2014; Van Parijs, 2007;
Widerquist, 2013).
The idea of a ‘universal’ provision can be contentious. In recent debates,
the issue has been raised that the central tenet of all people receiving the
provision ignores the way some criteria can narrowly define citizenship
and residence. Consequently, the criteria can in effect potentially exclude
some vulnerable people (such as non-resident citizens and short-term
migrants) (Standing, 2014). Although it is highly relevant to explore the
issues associated with the concept of ‘universal’, it is also crucial to not
retain the principle as well as the ideal of universal policy to challenge
dominant neoclassic economics, neoliberal orthodoxy and targeted mech-
anisms of social protection given the way these forces have destabilized
universal welfare state regimes and democratic society. In Australia, there
are constraining criteria for universal schemes, such as the family benefit
allowance, which is a provision solely for couples with children. Despite its
political and criteria constraints, it could be more effective to broaden the
criteria to all people and introduce universal measures to protect poten-
tially excluded groups such as refugees or migrants. This argument sug-
gests that there is a place for universal tenets and responding to criticisms.
If constraints can be recognized there is greater capacity to develop strate-
gies to resolve. For example, perhaps a global basic income might be a way
forward to redress criticisms about the contradictions in universal princi-
ples. Such a deeper consideration reflects exploring potentialities and pos-
sibilities rather than narrow frames of universal approaches.
ustralian Political Economy and Basic Income

A
The discussion so far has alluded to the different structural adjustments
needed for transitioning to a basic income, reconfiguring the social state
and transforming to a democratic society grounded in egalitarianism.
Australia has a unique welfare state that is a needs-based and contributory
scheme. In this sense, it is unlike other developed countries such as the
United Kingdom, United States of America and Germany which rely on
social insurance or tax credits as part of their welfare state regime. The
Australian welfare state is positioned in the broader capitalist political
economy (Mays, 2016). The original intent of the welfare state was to
function as a safety net against the excesses and inequalities brought about
by capitalist society, that is, ameliorate social and economic disadvantage
for people experiencing poverty (Mays, 2016).
The Australian welfare state became the central organizing mechanism
for the distribution and redistribution of goods and resources through
social policy and programmes to improve the welfare and well-being of
people (Marston & McDonald, 2014; Spicker, 2017). Philanthropic and
charitable systems sought to provide assistance to the ‘most needy’ per-
sons in society, such as people classified as widows, the poor, single moth-
ers, the aged, and the infirm or incapacitated (Marston & McDonald,
2014). Consequently, charitable welfare relief focused on establishing
definitions, which rewarded appropriate types of behaviour and specific
circumstances, as a means of determining the eligibility and entitlement of
those persons receiving welfare assistance. In this way, the Australian
approach to welfare distribution reflected the English Poor Laws of the
1800s, which similarly established conservative notions of eligibility for
assistance for those people deemed to be in ‘need’ of poverty alleviation
(Mays, 2016; Tomlinson, 2000). The English Poor Laws of the 1800s
18 J. MAYS
(Victorian era) defined people in terms of their capacity to participate in

the labour market. Earlier manifestations of the Poor Laws of the 1600s
sought to assist those persons who were not working “through no fault of
their own” (Geremek, 1994, p. 889). This clause signified the concern for
welfare provision only to the deserving poor. In employing conservative
notions of ‘worthy and unworthy’, social policies redressing poverty in
turn contained assumptions whereby unemployment and destitution were
consequences of an individual’s character deficits or moral failings (such
as, ‘idleness’), instead of resulting from unequal structural conditions and
arrangements (Marston & McDonald, 2014). The dominant neoliberal
orthodoxy enduring in Australian politics and policy has reified deserving
poor notions. The political economy approach helps basic income discus-
sions by responding to inequalities and promoting alternative change
strategies in relation to the political institutions, unequal structures and
distribution/redistribution models. Such an approach guides basic income
arguments concerning the exploration of structuring welfare state arrange-
ments (access to social services and programmes) to incorporate basic
income and meet distributive justice. The modern crisis tendencies of neo-
liberalism and pursuit of austerity measures across developed Western
industrial countries (the United States of America, United Kingdom and
Australia) have contributed to the pursuit of extreme wealth, whereby
poverty, inequality and greater economic insecurity are persistent features
(White, 2013). Any transition to basic income implementation in Australia
necessitates major structural adjustments (welfare state and society). This
book tackles the nature and type of changes necessary for implementing a
basic income and draws on the political economy approach as a deeper
analysis of the Australian welfare state and basic income.
Within any given developed country, ideas around the distribution and
redistribution of wealth and structures of inequality manifest from political
and socioeconomic forces that shape unequal distribution over time. The
categorization defined in the targeted measures underpinning welfare pro-
vision (such as eligibility criteria) functioned to generate distinctions
between able-bodied and disabled dimensions (Mays, 2016). The way
work is organized in the political economy around the principles of profit
maximization perpetuated the exclusion of specific groups from the labour
market, most specifically people with disability. This produced notions of
strong connections between work, the labour market, and productive and
non-productive citizens (Mays, 2016). Policies drew on incentives to pre-
vent so-called idleness. The concern for basic income is in the way developed
Western capitalist economies produce, reproduce and entrench destabiliz-

ing divergent forces. A further concern is the preeminence of principles of
a capitalist societal system as the only type of society, based on increased
competition, individualization and monopolization (Mays, 2016; Mays &
Marston, 2016; Mays, Marston & Tomlinson, 2016).
The potential for lessons to be learned regarding historical dynamics
and modern trends, such as the global, is crucial for responding with a
basic income alternative and potential for changes made to wealth and
income distribution. To date, although wealth and income inequality are
at record high levels across Western developed industrial societies (includ-
ing Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of
America), and despite the destabilization of democracy and welfare states,
a full basic income has not been implemented. The persistent and ever-
widening inequalities and poverty gaps have produced greater precarity in
modern capitalist societies. Basic income is necessary for welfare states to
implement, given the criticality in introducing redistributive apparatuses
founded on notions of social citizenship (or residence), for the benefit of
all people.
Piketty’s (2014) vision of a more equitable society is found in his solu-
tions to capital distribution, minimum wage, protectionism and offers
much for basic income. However, his theorizing falls short in proposing
an alternative grounded in egalitarianism and social citizenship, such as
the universal basic income, as one way of not only redressing extreme
wealth and income inequality, but also responding to poverty gaps. His
conceptual framework drawn on in this book offers the inclusion of deep
philosophical interpretations about what makes a good and socially just
society. It also allows for responding from a social justice perspective in
revisioning ideas around income and wealth distribution through mecha-
nisms of greater social state intervention and regulation, tighter fiscal con-
trols through progressive income tax and radical changes to Ideological
persuasions and belief systems (such as the nature of work). Conceptualizing
the historical and ideological antecedents of power and inequality dynam-
ics in capitalist political economies assists in understanding the perpetua-
tion and entrenchment of inequality over time. The use of Piketty’s (2014)
conceptualization of political nature of and diverse policy actors that shape
the vision of society and the way governments respond to inequality from
a historical-comparative analysis helps to reveal capital, power and inequal-
ity in relation to the Australian political economy. From there, new insights
are gleaned in locating divergences that influenced and shaped social pro-
tection. Piketty points to the urgency in responding to structural
20 J. MAYS
inequalities and re-envisioning a new social protection system in line with

a return to a democratic society. His approach to analysis, informed by the
political economy, is a form of critical, historical-comparative policy analy-
sis that is used in the book. For example, the policy principles (for exam-
ple, citizenship, equity and participation) of basic income can be explored
against the Australian welfare state and disability income support policy to
give measurement equivalence (Marshall, 2000; Mays, 2016). Further, as
Piketty (2014) contends, the historical dynamics of wealth inequality, dis-
tribution and institutional arrangements also require investigation to
explore historical and comparative continuities and points of convergence
or divergence (as in ideological distinctiveness and distinct historical trends
over different time periods relevant for comparison) (Mays, 2016). For
example, there were distinct moments in time whereby Australian political
leaders considered the implementation of universal social security mea-
sures, however, this did not lead to universalism being adopted across
income support provisions. These points in time and comparative diver-
gences are critical for making sense as to why Australia (and other Western
capitalist economies) have provided minimum income security through
means-tested and targeted pensions or social insurance. The residualist
approach to welfare provision in the Australian political economy contains
highly targeted mechanisms which excluded those persons deemed to be
outside approved criteria (Marston & McDonald, 2014). These ideologi-
cal distinctions functioned to determine the way in which the targeted
Australian disability income support model became the dominant approach.
The exploration will consider the way additional transformative strate-
gies help address structural inequities and disadvantage (Gramsci, 1977;
Smith-Carrier & Green, 2017). The historical connection between dis-
ability, capitalism, productivity and ability, which operates to oppress peo-
ple with disability (Gramsci, 1977) is detailed in the political economy
section of the book. Raventós (2007) is particularly insightful here, as he
suggests, “what is true of a basic income is that it can change situations
that constitute a major part of capitalism’s characteristic features … [such
as] more freedom for a good part of the population” (p. 190). Thus,
where a basic income scheme is relevant is in the model’s capacity to pro-
duce the initial social conditions and social forces necessary to enhance the
lives of all people, inclusive of people with disabilities (Gramsci, 1977;
Smith-Carrier & Green, 2017). These social conditions function to chal-
lenge conventional viewpoints by providing the space for alternative think-
ing around income support (basic income grant), and universal welfare
provision, which in turn becomes a step towards constructing an egalitar-

ian society (Gramsci, 1977). When established as an alternative socially
just strategy, basic income demands transformative change. The notion of
disability has tended to occupy marginal role in basic income debates and
indeed broader policy debates. However, as one of the key themes of this
book, any exploration of universal and unconditional distribution, together
with distributive justice, necessitates the inclusion of disability concep-
tions. In setting preconditions for income security (not obligations and
conditions) and suggesting normative guides for policymaking, basic
income arguments must be re-set to counter any potential barriers. The
aim of the book in this sense is to develop a politics of universal basic
income that is unconditional and accounts for normative justifications,
distributive justice and disability dimensions. Such an approach is radical
in the way that it demands an extensive impact.
The Piketty (2014) conceptions of the political economy, therefore,
help position disability in relation to distributive justice, basic income and
the Australian welfare state. Clearly, the idea is to inform broader debate;
however, there is an opportunity to not only politicize disability and dis-
tributive justice, but also make visible the hidden assumptions that reify
dominant normative conceptions of disability, such as incapacity and per-
sonal tragedy norms. Piketty’s (2014) work on the political economy and
inequality is particularly refreshing for bringing together connections
between disability conceptions, the political economy, basic income and
progressing alternative visions. He states,
By patiently searching for facts and patterns and calmly analyzing the eco-
nomic, social, and political mechanisms that might explain them, it can inform
democratic debate and focus attention on the right questions. It can help to
redefine the terms of debate, unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent
notions, and subject all positions to constant critical scrutiny. (Piketty,
2014, p. 3)
As a catalyst for transformational change, basic income aligns strongly

with visions for a strong universal social state with just social protection
measures (Piketty, 2014; Raventós, 2007). Forms of universal welfare
through its principles of social justice and social citizenship, support the
civil, political, social and economic rights to protect all members of society.
Basic income is a powerful strategy not only for providing a decent provi-
sion for socio-economic security, but also fostering inclusion through civic
22 J. MAYS
and community engagement. The normative foundations of social justice

and solidarity, equity and equality and social citizenship help frame strate-
gies from making structural adjustments to the social (welfare) state
(income support, education, health, social services), and also wider society.
However, an inclusive strategy is required to align normative ideals with
foundations. As Piketty (2014) argues, there is a need to provide concrete
universal strategies because “there is no natural spontaneous process to
prevent destabilizing, inegalitarian forces from prevailing permanently”
(p. 21). Where basic income has the power to introduce transformative
change, the idea of a basic income becomes even more appealing and polit-
ically relevant to policy debates, as a just, universal policy. It is this norma-
tive position that forms part of the vision underpinning this book, and the
central argument for reconstructing the social state for progressing to a
democratic society grounded in egalitarian values (Raventós, 2007). While
many basic income advocates promote the normative justifications (see
Birnbaum, 2012; Standing, 2014; Van Parijs, 2007), there are commenta-
tors who do not subscribe to basic income as a radical transformative mea-
sure (see Harvey, 2006). Notably, more radical measures are necessary in
the current political context of neoliberalism, austerity policy measures
(cost cutting and tax increases), which have subsequently eroded social
protection over time across developed Western industrial countries (the
United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia).
The book involves gaining a fuller picture of the nature of institutional
arrangements and structural dimensions in relation to basic income,
egalitarianism and the disability dimension. As discussed, the work of
Piketty (2014) and his ideas of historical antecedents, convergence and
social forces provide a space for reclaiming the ethical arguments on basic
income and the nature of society, income support and the taxation system.
Piketty’s (2014) conceptual framework and notion of wealth extremism in
relation to the disability dimension and necessary conditions are extended
on to frame an ethical commitment to social and distributive justice.
Piketty’s (2014) conceptual framework comprises the ontology of social
(distributive) justice connected to income and wealth distribution; egali-
tarian philosophy, critical theory (epistemology of critical social science
and structural dimensions of political, social, historical and economic) and
relevant transformative concepts (convergence, patrimonial societies,
wealth extremism and collective representation) are critical for creating a
vision of a democratic and just society and social protection. The values of
fairness, equity and justice and degrees of income and wealth distribution
inform the pursuit of social citizenship, fairness and social justice to frame
basic income debates and work towards egalitarianism in social protection
and society. No other basic income book so far has provided an extensive
inclusion of French economist Thomas Piketty (2014) to explore barriers
to basic income and shed insight into universal strategies for developing a
stronger pathway forward.
Positioning Basic Income in the Australian Political Landscape

For Australia, a full basic income provision is viewed as the most appro-
priate, which is consistent across much of the basic income literature
(Widerquist et al., 2013). Basic income is a regular, universal automatic
payment (fortnightly or monthly), without stringent conditions attached
(apart from residency or potentially age-related status) and is non-
withdrawable, nor taxed (Torry, 2016a, 2016b). Non-withdrawable
means that the provision can be retained irrespective of any monies earnt
during work (Mays, Marston & Tomlinson, 2016). Full basic income
infers that the universal and unconditional payment is set at a sufficient
level to meet basic need (Torry, 2016a, 2016b; Widerquist et al., 2013).
The full basic income model where each person over 18 years of age would
receive the same amount is comparatively analysed against a basic income
model that comprises additional specific social security benefits or earnings
(Scutella, 2004).
While basic income has a progressive redistribution effect, further
exploration is required to explore the extent to which it is an egalitarian
form of income support for people with disability. Therefore, the provi-
sions of a partial basic income and Negative Income Tax will be consid-
ered in order to determine the relevance and/or appropriateness for the
disability dimension. Partial basic income refers to smaller, yet regular
unconditional payments (Torry, 2016a). Negative Income Tax, while in
part is like a tax credit, contains the exception that tax rates are defined. It
provides a welfare provision replacing many of the existing welfare schemes
with one single payment supplementing the income of unemployed and
low waged people (Torry, 2016a). When wages are below the threshold,
payments are equalized with the tax rate and adjusted according to the
difference between received wage and tax threshold. As earnings increase
and go above the threshold, the provision is withdrawn and taxation is
applied (Torry, 2016a, 2016b). the challenge of partial basic income
grants or other payments, such as Negative Income Tax, is the way each
24 J. MAYS
can reify the very existing regulations, conditionality and categorization

existing in the social protection system that basic income seeks to redress
(Tomlinson, 2012, 2016; Torry, 2016b). However, it is not warranted to
discount the role that partial basic income grants, such as Negative Income
Tax, can play concerning incrementalism in policy implementation, when
transitioning to basic income.
Having considered the potential of partial basic income and negative tax
income model, some attention will be given to participation income, tax
credits and job guarantees to identify relevance for transitioning to full
basic income. The chapter will draw on an extended ADIS framework
(Mays, 2012) and notions of universality, individuality, conditionality, uni-
formity, frequency/duration, modality and adequacy together with afford-
ability and equity. This helps to detect levels of basic income and forms of
taxation (progressive or flat rate tax), role of social insurance-based benefits
(such as the NDIS in Australia), and effects on effective marginal tax rates.
Such an approach allows for greater insights into the extent to which the
proposals achieve the outcomes relative to disability, that is, whether prem-
ises subscribe to universalism or generate ‘abled versus disabled’ distinctions.
This is a crucial task, given that, since the formation of the Australian
Commonwealth in 1901 (Federation), various governments and parlia-
mentarians have debated the merits of universal income support and the
social insurance. The 1970s reflected a watershed moment for basic
income debates, whereby research into poverty and the guaranteed mini-
mum income proposal gave credibility to ideas of universal grants based
on egalitarianism. Although this time period pursued universal policies for
social protection measures, the reform recommendations were liberal and
conservative, rather than purely egalitarian (Mays, 2016):
We believe that the guaranteed income scheme which we propose provides a

framework which better meets the fundamental purposes of social security, and
that urgent attention should be given to developing it for implementation.
(Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, 1975, p. 67)
The narrative suggested that full implementation of what was then

referred to as a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme, deriving
from tax revenue, is a relevant way forward to respond to poverty traps.
Similarly, the report alludes to the urgency in progressing to implementa-
tion phases, but is constrained by implementation challenges such as bal-
ancing conflicting principles of universalism and categorization:
The system would retain a number of inherent drawbacks which cannot be over-
come without more radical reform. These shortcomings may be summarised
under the headings (1) the continuing prominence of disability categories and
(2) continuing divided administration. (Australian Government Commission
of Inquiry into Poverty, 1975, p. 67 )
The paradox centred on removing categorizations through the take-up

of guaranteed minimum income, while allowing for incremental steps in
moving to a more equitable system. The conundrum for political leaders
relates to Richardson (2006) and Wasserman et al. (2015) arguments high-
lighting that distributive justice may fail the fairness test whereby disability
categories are reinforced and re-embedded in unequal social protection and
social service systems. This is important to be aware of when considering
partial basic income grants or Negative Income Tax in basic income policy
debates. Resolving these issues, especially in terms of the removal of catego-
rizations, helps advance basic income understandings beyond the pragmatic
concerns. This is particularly relevant, given the dominant reliance on cate-
gorization for determining eligibility to income support. Even with careful
explication of the potentials and challenges in considering the best type for
Australia, preconceived notions of maintaining artificial distinctions through
categorizations need to be uncovered. To achieve this objective, a compre-
hensive critical policy analysis of the types of basic income models relevant
to Australia are considered with a view to reconcile the categorization debate
and propensity for producing more of the same targeted models. The book
explores transition features for a universal basic income and changing the
taxation system, which potentially incorporates consolidating many existing
transfer schemes and replacing others to create an equitable distribution of
income. During the 1970s, early explorations contended that the tax rate
required to finance universal basic income was estimated to be about 50%
(Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, 1975). The
suggested annual rate for the 1970s was set at AUD$2000 redistributive
figure and set at a modest rate of approximately 25% of average weekly earn-
ings (Tomlinson, 2000, 2007, 2012). Calculations to date propose the fig-
ure to be a total of approximately AUD$60–80 Billion (Ingles, Phillips, &
Stewart, 2019). While arguments suggest that basic income is unaffordable,
this book argues that it is based on redistributive strategies and changes to
the tax transfer system and implementation of other models such as a tax for
natural resources and strengthening mining royalties. In presenting a deeper
account, some of the ideas central to ecological concerns, such as renew-
ables and their role in creating sustainability, are touched upon.
26 J. MAYS
Intellectual and Civic Courage in Basic Income:

Overview of the Book
Basic income has a progressive redistribution effect, potentially promoting
an egalitarian form of income support for people with disability. The cen-
tral premises in this is concerned with taking intellectual and civic courage
in the legitimation of and justification for transitioning to a basic income.
The diverse range of basic income proposals including advocates and crit-
ics alike necessitates some degree of politicizing basic income and develop-
ing intellectual and civic courage in the pursuit of transformative change
for a just society (Piketty, 2014). The book begins with this premise set-
ting the scene for the other sections.
In part, the book aims to disrupt the hegemony of conventional wis-
dom of activation, productive citizenship and earned the right principles.
The Rawlsian analyses and critiques pointing to the need to consider lib-
ertarian freedoms tend to assume that people with disabilities have had life
chances and opportunities to participate in society. The assumption c entres
on notions that people with disabilities have amassed considerable wealth,
owned property or could in effect bargain for high salaried jobs. In reality,
these belief systems and representations need to be challenged—to ensure
that basic income can respond to inclusion, participation and solidarity.
The moral requirements are as necessary as economic, political and social
considerations to support people with disabilities engagement in civic and
political life and ensure the prevention of poverty and inequality. This goes
some way to posing a vision for a way for all people, inclusive of people
with disability, to live a good life. Such a vision contains freedom virtues
that are not constricted to contributing through simply labour potential
and wages, but incorporate a person’s own creative or political or social
and cultural endeavours. There is still much to be explored concerning
within-country analyses, modelling and redistributive challenges, particu-
larly around financing a basic income in Australia and sustainability issues
to ensure the longevity of a basic income scheme post implementation. In
short, as Smith-Carrier and Green (2017) suggested, progressing to a sys-
tem and society grounded in egalitarianism, social justice and solidarity
necessitates structural adjustments to institutions, governance, social state,
society and belief-system representations (attitudes and ideologies).
Critical insight is needed for making sense of redistribution, transforma-
tion (implementation and financing) and sustainability (Smith-Carrier &
Green, 2017).
To date, there has been little call in Australia for embedding basic
income in the Constitution or developing a supplementary bill of rights
for basic income that enshrines, protects and safeguards the basic income
scheme and associated citizens’ rights. There is capacity for broadening
the Australian Constitution to include basic income and associated norma-
tive justifications to preserve virtues of an egalitarian democratic society,
and other vital public programmes already in existence (the social state),
such as the universal Medicare health scheme. This takes intellectual and
civic courage. For too long, debates on sustaining basic income through
constitutional means have been shut down in Australia. The final chapter
captures this argument and poses the need for basic income sustainability
in policy initiatives.
Part I
The first section outlines the political economy, basic income and disability
conceptions and consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 orients the reader to
what a basic income is and explores the key principles underpinning basic
income. The chapter also considers the complexities of different basic
income models and explores the way it would be beneficial for people with
disability and why now. The chapter then explores notions of adequacy,
equity and in the provision of basic income drawing on contemporary
findings from modelling in Australia to determine what is an adequate
payment level and how does this work for people with disability in relation
to direct and indirect costs associated with disability experiences? This is
juxtaposed against issues of equality and equity to identify the preferred
approach. Chapter 3 delves into the philosophical arguments of Rawls’s
theory of justice and fairness to understand the relevance of basic income
in relation to the disability dimension, adequacy and equity and precondi-
tions. The central question posed, “can a non-marginalizing basic income
be achieved for people with disability?” will be comprehensively examined.
It extends Rawls’s theory of justice and egalitarian justification to under-
stand the necessary conditions for an egalitarian income support system in
Australia and its potential impact on existing structural arrangements.
Strong connections will be made to articulate the relevance of Rawls’s
distributive justice and disability dimension. The works of Nancy Fraser
(1995, 2001) will be positioned alongside Rawls to achieve conceptual
clarity in responding to challenges of reciprocity and participation. There
is an excursion into the ethical requirements of basic income for full inclu-
sion of disability.
28 J. MAYS
Reconfiguring the social security arrangements and strengthening the

social state and public provisions is the subject of Chap. 4. This chapter
will argue for the central role of government in providing a basic income
payment via the taxation revenue system. The existing structural arrange-
ments of social security will be detailed and an argument established for
the reconfiguration of social security arrangements to support a basic
income. Piketty’s (2014) idea of the multidimensional history of capital,
power and inequality, divergence and wealth extremism is discussed in
relation to social protection, disability income support and inequality to
develop a nuanced analysis of widening income and wealth inequalities
and foundations for a new vision of an egalitarian society inclusive of basic
income and disability dimension. Piketty’s (2014) argument for strength-
ening existing public services (such as Medicare and National Disability
Insurance Scheme) is drawn on to explore the potential for these public
services and social insurance measures as a supplementary way to provide
additional supports for direct costs of disability otherwise not accounted
for in a basic income. Therefore, the argument is advanced that any
transition to basic income necessitates a reconfiguration not only of exist-
ing social security arrangements, but also existing public systems of health,
education, social services support and housing. It is these changes that
makes the effects of basic income transformational, egalitarian and
freedom-enhancing. The chapter also makes a claim for reconfiguring the
taxation transfer and revenue system to ensure smoother distribution of
resources and fairer allocation.
Part II
Part II leads into policy synergy. This section examines the synergy between
conceptions and strategies necessary for feasibility of basic income over
time. In framing the argument, there is a call for a return to egalitarianism
through basic income as a redistributive strategy. As a redistributive strat-
egy, basic income can potentially respond to income and status inequality
and the consequences of poverty (Chap. 5). This chapter further considers
the nature of the transformation in social protection, the extent of redistri-
bution, the character of the tax system and the pattern of work incentives.
It examines the issue of financing a basic income through natural resources
royalties (cost, distributional impact and feasibility) and nationalized min-
ing by examining international examples such as in Alaska in relation to the
contemporary political economy of Australia. A redistributive argument is
established for major changes to the taxation revenue system, to ensure the
rights of all are being met, not just the top 1% wealthy. It draws on insights
from international basic income texts, such as Widerquist and Howard
(2012), to explore model applicability. The chapter also explores the envi-
ronmental debates in relation to basic income surrounding such a financing
approach. Longer term visions concerning financial feasibility are explored
to provide several models that allow for sustainability. This chapter provides
greater sophistication to the discussion on UBI levels and payment rates to
progress to a cost effective and sustainable proposal for the Australian con-
text. As noted by Torry (2013), further exploration on making the pay-
ment sustainable is required, and given that an estimate for universal basic
income in Australia has been touted at AUD$12 billion, serious design
modelling and debates needs to occur. A recent study by Oxford University
found that Australia loses an estimated AUD$90 billion through not col-
lecting revenue from oil, coal and gas corporations. The Oxford Institute
for Energy Studies argued that Australia needed to ‘radically overhaul its
fiscal regime’ to reclaim lost revenue. Such an argument is timely as, given
the amount required for a basic income in Australia, reclaiming royalties or
lost revenue becomes a critical option towards funding the scheme.
Chapter 6 extends on the argument further to discuss disability pensions
and the legacy of targeting and classification. The first national income sup-
port provision in Australia was the needs-based Invalid and Old-Age
Pension 1908. A detailed account has been presented in Mays (2012;
2016). New ideas are necessary for progressing to basic income and over-
coming the precariousness of disability experiences in Australian social pro-
tection. Using Piketty’s (2014) conceptual framework capturing critical
historical-comparative analysis helps reveal new conceptualizations about
the multidimensional history of the capital, power and inequality posi-
tioned in the Australian political economy from 1908 to the contested
space of policy in relation to vision of society and government response to
inequality and historical and contemporary divergences shaping disability
income support. This analysis situates disability dimension in relation to
distribution and redistribution of wealth and income and consequences of
poverty and inequality over time and across income support models.
Piketty’s conceptual framework for analysis is in keeping with the policy
logic of other Australian policy commentators such as Saunders (2007) and
Whiteford (2011, 2014, 2015). The following eras will frame the analysis:
1908 to 1970 (constructions of disability in disability pensions and ade-
quacy); 1971 to 1982 (paradoxes and recognition of poverty and stigma in
30 J. MAYS
the disability pension); 1983 to 2006 (contradictions and clawbacks);

2007–2018 (‘end of the age of entitlement’, global economic shocks, cor-
porate tax breaks, wage capping and deprivation, inadequate levels of pay-
ment for disability pension). The legislative frameworks and regulatory
arrangements are detailed to better understand the interaction with dis-
criminatory practices in employment and beyond.
Part III
Part III finishes with policy implementation where Chap. 7 offers a future-
oriented vision towards building a sustainable basic income and society.
This section connects the themes across the book to position arguments
for basic income implementation in relation to the political economy of
Australian social state and sustainable strategies. All of these features are
considered essential requirements for transitioning to a basic income
scheme in our region and ensuring its longevity over time. In discussing
the potentialities of basic income and the call for a return to egalitarianism
though basic income as a redistributive strategy, it explores the context of
the Australian political economy and transitioning to a basic income. The
section examined brings together themes from the book to progress a
strategy for implementation and consider an argument for sustainability,
such as the role of renewable energies (ecological economic stimulus),
legislative and constitutional frameworks (the Constitution and bill of
rights) for sustainable practices, and building a critical mass for transfor-
mation. Given the historical impact of ideological barriers and policy chal-
lenges, securing a commitment for transitioning to an egalitarian and
universal basic income that enhances the citizenship of all people, requires
safeguards. Such safeguards are necessary for the transition and implemen-
tation phases. The chapter argues that safeguards (such as a change to the
Constitution or bill of rights, and legislative and administrative practices)
help to protect basic income and build in ethical and moral foundations of
egalitarian democratic society and basic income. This aim is to safeguard
inherent rights beyond party politics, policy fiascos and ideological con-
flicts, as well as giving power to the scheme by allowing for social, moral
and legal principles to be invoked. As such, the exploration is critical for
ensuring the preservation of basic rights and transcending party politics.
Historically, income support and social protection have been used as polit-
ical tools by Australian governments, particularly since the 1970s. A con-
stitutional change or bill of rights enshrined in the Constitution, alongside
basic income implementation, will contribute to shaping a socially just

vision of society that helps transition to a universal basic income and also
provides a foundation for an egalitarian democratic society.
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CHAPTER XXI.
We Spend a Couple of Days at a Michigan Man’s Ranch in Darkest
Africa—Pa and the Cowboys Take a Bath—After Smoking about 50
Cigars—Pa Told What Cowards Lions and Tigers Were—Pa Walked
up to a Lion and Gave Him a Cut with a Whip.
We have spent a comple of days at the Michigan man’s ranch in

Darkest Africa, where he has brought civilization right into the
Jungle, and after spending six months with negro savages and wild
animals, and menagerie people, it has been the most enjoyable two
days I ever knew.
It is good sometimes to see ourselves as others see us, and not
having looked into a mirror for half a year, we found that we were
about the most disreputable looking tourists that ever came in sight
of beds with linen sheets on, and pillows.
I noticed that the family of the Michigan man and the servants looked
at us with suspicion, and turned up their noses at us, but I never
realized what it was all about until they showed us to our rooms that
night, when I saw myself in a mirror, and found that my face and
hands were black with dirt and smoke, my clothes were greasy and
patched with buckskin patches, sewed on with strips of rawhide, and
my torn coat was pinned together with thorns. I could see Pa and the
cowboy all the time, and knew that they looked like tramps, but I
thought I was all right.
The Michigan man showed us to our rooms, after Pa and the cowboy
had drank a few quarts of highballs, and they were going to go to
bed with their clothes on, but I knew they would ruin the beds if they
did, so I insisted that we all get in the bath tubs and take our semi-
annual bath, and as the man left us he said we could find clothes to
put on in the morning, in a closet, and to leave our clothes out in the
hall and he would have a servant take them away with the tongs and
burn them in the furnace.
That sobered Pa and the cowboy a little, and they decided to try the
baths.
Well, we didn’t do a thing to the running water, and before we retired
we had washed ourselves so clean, with real soap, the first we had
seen since we left Germany, that Pa and the cowboy had to be
introduced to each other, and I was so clean that I didn’t know
myself, and we put on pajamas that we found in the room, and
crawled into the clean beds and slept till morning, after putting all of
our clothes out of the room, to purify the air.
In the morning we dressed up in the clothes the Michigan man told
us we would find in the closet, and such a transformation was never
seen before.
Pa found a pair of gray pants and a frock coat, and a silk hat, and
when he was dressed and had on a white shirt he looked like a
senator from South Carolina.
The cowboy found a golf suit, with short pants, long socks, and putty
leggins, and a Tam o’ Shanter cap, and he looked like an escaped
Scotchman, while I found a Buster Brown suit that fit me, and all I
wanted was a dog to be complete, and we went down to breakfast,
and made a hit, the family acting as though they were proud to have
us in their midst.
During breakfast they all drew Pa out, and he told them of his
experiences capturing wild animals in Africa, and exploring the
country, and being made king of a tribe, and they called Pa “Your
Highness,” and Pa lied enough about his adventures to send him
over the road for disorderly conduct.
The women drew out the cowboy, and he lied some on his own
account, and the children got me to going, and you know how it is
with me when I get to going.
When the breakfast was over we were all heroes, and Pa pulled out
a handful of uncut diamonds and spread them on the table by his
plate, and gave each one a diamond as big as a hickory nut, and left
a lot of smaller ones on the table with the bread crumbs for the
servants, and when we left the table the whole family bowed low to
us, and stood back until the king and the cowboy and I had passed
out on to the veranda.
Gee, but they seemed to think King Edward wouldn’t be ace high to
Pa, and Pa swelled up so I thought he might bust.
Pa Swelled Up So I Thought He Might Bust.

After smoking some fifty cigars, Pa told of what cowards lions and
tigers were, and how he could take a riding whip and chase a lion up
a tree, and the Michigan man proposed to have an exhibit of his wild
animals, which he kept in his private forest outside of the clearing.
He had a race track in the clearing next to the forest, and told Pa that
every morning his herders turned a lot of lions, giraffes, rhinoceroses
and zebras into the track, and the family chased them around the
track in automobiles, and Pa said he would like to enter into such a
race, and the man ordered the herders to turn in the animals.
The cowboy wanted a saddle horse and a lariat rope, and they fixed
him out, and when the herders announced that the animals were on
the track all right, we got into the waiting autos, the man and Pa lit
cigars and sat on the front seat with the chauffeur, and some of us
got in the back seats and started out.
When the animals saw us coming they started down the home
stretch, and the auto gave chase, and we yelled and fired guns in the
air, and the chauffeur put a charge of bird shot into the hind hams of
a lion that didn’t seem to be in much of a hurry, and the lion turned
on us, and Pa told the chauffeur to stop and he would settle with the
lion.
Pa got out with a horse whip and started for the lion, which gave a
roar like distant thunder, and as I looked at Pa with the frock coat
and silk hat, walking towards the lion I thought that was the last of
Pa, and begged him to come back, but he said, “Never you mind me,
I have seen lions before,” and Pa walked up to the lion and gave him
a cut with the whip, and yelled, “Get back into the jungle, you Tom
Cat.”
Well, really, that lion ought to have turned and put his tail between
his legs and galloped for the woods, but Pa had made a mistake in
his lion, for the animal went up to Pa and took a mouthful of his
pants, and shook him like a dog would shake a rat, and Pa yelled for
them to take away their lion if they didn’t want the animal injured.
The animal rolled Pa over on the ground in the dust, chewed his silk
hat, and Pa got loose and made a rush for the auto and crawled
under it to fix something, and just then the cowboy came along on a
pony and threw his lariat over the lion’s head and pulled him away
across the track, and Pa came out from under the machine and took
a big monkey-wrench and started again for the lion, bareheaded,
and so mad he fairly frothed at the mouth, after he saw the lion was
choked nearly to death, and then Pa mauled the apparently dead
lion until the cowboy dismounted from the pony and gave his lariat
rope back.
Pa gave the lion a couple of kicks, and got back into the auto, and
the Michigan man patted him on the back and said, “Old man, you
are a king of beasts, sure enough;” and Pa said, “O, I don’t know; I
never did like a cowardly lion, no how.”
We chased some more animals around the track, and the Michigan
man said he hoped the toothless old lion would not die, as he was
saving him for Roosevelt to practice on when he came to the ranch
after the 4th of March.
The cowboy went across the field where a tame giraffe was grazing
in a tree top, and took the saddle off his pony and put it on the
giraffe, and we run up to where he was, and the Michigan man
asked him what he was going to do, and he said he was going to
ride the giraffe, as he had ridden almost everything that walked on
four legs except a giraffe.
The Michigan man told him he had better leave the giraffe out of his
repertoire, because a giraffe was mighty uncertain, but the cowboy
got the saddle on, and climbed into it, and then the trouble began.
The giraffe didn’t have any bridle on, and no mane to hold on to, and
he was built so that the saddle slipped down by his rump, and when
the animal turned around and saw he had the cowboy where he
wanted him, he started off towards the forest on a hop, skip and a
jump, kicking up his heels like a bucking broncho, and the last we
saw of the expedition the giraffe had jumped over a wire fence and
took to the woods, with the cowboy dangling by one stirrup, swearing
in the Wyoming dialect.
The Giraffe Didn’t Have Any Bridle On—and No Mane to
Hold On To.
Then we went back to the house to play golf, and the Michigan man
sent some servants into the woods with a strecher to bring in the
remains of the cowboy.
As we dismounted at the veranda, Pa lit a cigarette and said to the
man, “You certainly have all the comforts of a home here, and all the
facilities for enjoyment that anybody has outside of a traveling
menagerie, except draw poker.”
“We can fix you all right on the draw poker,” said the Michigan man.
“Boy, bring the chips and the cards, and let me know when they find
the remains of Mr. Cowboy,” and they began to play poker, and I
went out to see them milk a Jersey cow.
CHAPTER XXII.
Pa and the Boy Have a Series of Ups and Downs—Pa Plays Poker with
the Michigan Man and Loses All His Money—Pa Puts Up His Airship
and Loses—Pa and the Boy Start for Hamburg—The Boy Makes a
King’s Crown Out of Tin—The Boy Tells How They Escaped from the
Negro Tribes in Africa.
It seems to be just one series of ups and downs with Pa and I. One
day we are kings and things, and the next day we are just things and
not kings, or ninespots, or anything in the deck, except it’s Jacks.
That short stay at the ranch of the Michigan man in Africa, which
seemed like being set down from hades in Darkest Africa to Heaven
in America, terminated just as everything else does with us.
After we had enjoyed the morning with the wild animals on the race
track, Pa and the Michigan man set into a game of draw poker with
some other sharps and the cowboy, and they must have stacked the
cards on Pa and the cowboy, for before night they had got all Pa’s
money away, and the cowboy was burst, too, and in the evening Pa
put the airship up against the creamery and a drove of Jerseys, and
Pa lost the airship, and then Pa gave checks on a bank in the River
Nile, and lost all the checks, and about a pint of the diamonds, and
when we went to bed the Michigan man said he hated to part with
us, but if we must go he would send us over to Lake Victoria
Nigouza, where we could take a steamer for Hamburg.
We didn’t sleep much that night, and the next morning the auto was
at the door, and we took what little stuff Pa had not lost playing
poker, and crossed the country to the lake, at a town where Pa sold
some of his uncut diamonds for money enough to pay for our
passage to Hamburg, and we got on board the vessel and got into
our state rooms.
Just before we were ready to start an officer came on board looking
for two white men who had been giving checks that were no good,
and for selling diamonds that would not wash.
I heard about it, and there was such a crowd that the vesselmen did
not remember Pa and the cowboy, but they said the officers could
search the vessel if they wanted to.
I went to the state room and told Pa and he turned pale, and
trembled like a leaf, and the brave cowboy had a fit. They were
scared at the prospect of being taken ashore and put in an English
jail, and Pa sweat so he looked like a hippopotamus sweating blood.
Pa said they were up a stump, and asked me if I could think of
anything to help them out. I told Pa the only thing for us to do was to
take a burned cork and black up, and pretend that Pa was an African
king, on the way to England to have a conference with King Edward
about tribal affairs.
Gee, but Pa and the cowboy bit like a bass and I got a champagne
cork and burned it over the lamp and went to work bleaching us all
up, and in half an hour we were three of the blackest niggers that
ever emigrated from Africa. I even blacked the place on Pa’s leg
where the lion had chewed a hole through his pants.
We looked at ourselves in the mirror, and inspected each other, and
couldn’t find a white spot, and then I told Pa what to do when the
officers of the law came.
He was to be seated in state, on a high chair, looking like a nigger
king, and the cowboy and I were to get down on our knees before
him and kowtow.
I got a crown made out of a tin basin, and a feather duster for a
plume, and fixed Pa up so that any tribe would have gone wild over
him.
Just as we got Pa fixed up, and we had all stopped laughing, there
was a knock at the door of the state room, and I opened it, and two
semi-Englishmen came in looking for Pa and the cowboy, but when I
waved my hand and said, “Behold the King of Natabeland,” and the
cowboy bit the duster and saluted Pa, and Pa looked savage and
said in broken negro, “What, ho! varlets,” the officers said, “Beg
pardon, don’t you know, your ’ighness,” and they backed out of the
door, making salaams, and soon disappeared. Gee, it was a close
call.
Soon after the engine began to turn the screw of the propeller, and
when we looked out of the porthole the vessel was going towards the
ocean, and when I told Pa he got down off his throne and danced a
jig and hugged the cowboy, and we were having a jollification when
there was another rap at the door, and Pa jumped up on the throne
and put on his tin basin crown, and I opened the door, and the
steward of the vessel came in with his hat in his hands, and asked
Pa what he would have for supper. Pa said he didn’t care what he
had if he only got it quick, and the steward said mostly when they
were carrying African kings to England they served the meals in the
state rooms, as the kings did not care to sit at the same table with
the common herd, and Pa said that suited him all right, and the
steward added that the passengers also complained of the manners
of the African kings, and the smell that they emitted in the cabin.
There Was a Knock at the Door of the Stateroom.
Pa was going to get hot at that remark, but I was afraid the burnt
cork would rub off, so I said His Highness would be served in his
state room, and to bring the best the ship offered, and bring it quick if
he didn’t want trouble aboard, and he bowed low and went out, and
pretty soon the waiters began to bring in oysters and soup and
turkey and boiled pheasants, and ice cream, and we kings and
things didn’t do a thing to the food, and when the dishes were taken
away empty, and the wine had been drank, and the cigars brought
in, King Pa got down from his throne and just yelled, and he said to
the cowboy, “Say, Alkali Ike, wouldn’t this skin you?” and Ike said he
guessed it would when they found out what frauds we were, and
after awhile we turned in and slept just like we were at home.
For several days they fed us like they were fattening us for a
sausage factory, and the ocean was blue and calm, and we were let
out on deck near our state room for exercise, and I kept burning cork
and keeping us all blacked up nice, and Pa would repeat African
words that he had picked up, mixed with English words, and
everybody kept their distance and thought we were the real nigger
thing.
Well, everything was going along beautifully, and we thought we had
never struck such a snap in all our lives, until about the fifth day.
We had eaten so much that our appetites had gone, and Pa and the
cowboy took to drinking more and more, and one night it began to
blow, and the vessel was part of the time on one end and then on the
other, and then rolling from side to side, so that Pa couldn’t sit on his
throne without sideboards, and towards morning we all got seasick
and fell all over the state room, and Pa had a pain under his belt that
doubled him up like a jackknife, and he yelled for a doctor. I told him
never to send for a doctor until the boat tied up at a dock, because it
was dangerous, but Pa said he had to have a doctor, and the
cowboy had drank a bottle of Scotch whiskey and had laid down
under a bunk, and he was no good, so I rang for the ship’s doctor,
but I told Pa he must keep the parts of his body that were not black
covered up, or the doctor would find out he was a white man, and
then it would be all off in the nigger king masquerade.
Pretty soon the ship’s doctor came with a female trained nurse, and
Pa was a pitiful sight when he saw them. The doctor felt of Pa’s
pulse, and asked him where the pain was, and Pa, like a darn fool,
put his hand on his stomach, and before Pa could stop it the doctor
had opened Pa’s shirt, and was feeling where the appendix gets in
its work.
Pretty Soon the Ship’s Doctor Came with a Nurse.
It was a little dark, but the doctor said, “You old seney ambion, you
have got about the worst case of appendicitis that was ever pulled
off on this vessel. Boy, bring me that lantern.”
I hated to do it, because I knew Pa would be discovered, and I
delayed bringing the lantern as long as I could, but, turning the wick
down, but the doctor snatched a match so he could see Pa’s
stomach, and then he said, “Say, old skate, you are no more nigger
king than I am; you are a white man blacked up;” and the trained
nurse said, “The ’ell you say,” and then I got the lantern and they
looked at Pa’s white skin, and the doctor asked Pa what he had to
say for himself, and Pa admitted that he was a white man, but said
he had many of the estimable qualities of a nigger, but that he was
traveling incog, to throw his enemies off the track, and then Pa
fainted away from the pain, and the cowboy got sober enough to
wake up and take notice, and we told the doctor who we were, and
how we had escaped from negro tribes and draw poker sharps and
officers of the law, and the cowboy fell in love at first sight with the
trained nurse, and then Pa came to, with the aid of a bucket of water
and some whiskey, and the storm went down, and the doctor said Pa
would have to have an operation performed to remove his appendix,
and Pa kicked about it, but they took him to the ship’s hospital, with
the cowboy for an assistant nurse, and I was left alone in our state
room, the only king there was left, and when I washed off my burnt
cork I was so white and pale that they gave me medicine, and the
trained nurse held me on her lap and sang English songs to me, with
all the h’s left out, and every day she told me how they removed Pa’s
appendix, and it was swollen up bigger than a weiner sausage, but
that he would live all right, and when he got well enough the captain
would put Pa in irons for passing himself off for a nigger king, and
that he would probably be transported for life, if he couldn’t raise the
price of a ransom. And there you are.
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Transcriber’s Notes
Spelling and possible printer’s errors have mostly been retained. Likewise,
inconsistencies in hyphenation, spacing and capitalization have also been
retained. Changes made to the text are noted in the comments below.
Pg. 8: The page number for CHAPTER XIX. has been added in the Table of
Contents.
Pg. 8: The last page of the Table of Contents, containing the last chapters, is
missing in all known editions of the text.
Pg. 9 - 10: Three entries from the List of Illustrations refer to non-existent
illustrations. They have been removed because the illustrations were not in the
original publication:
“Am Going to Have Him Mended and Keep Him for a Souvenir,” Said the Pussy
Woman.
My Lawyer Told Me to Groan When Anyone Was Present.
I Never Saw a Giant Negro So Mad as That Husband Was.
Pg. 11: The last eight illustrations in the book are missing from the end of the List
of Illustrations.
Pg. 28: Punctuation fix: ‘..Orphan’ to ‘Orphan’ - Extra periods removed in block
quote at start of chapter
Pgs. 38, 58 & 197: The following three illustrations do not seem to correspond to
the printed text and are by a different illustrator, but are present in all known
editions. Their source is ‘Peck’s Bad Boy Abroad’ (1905).
Pg. 38: ‘Tossed him over the fence.’
Pg. 58: ‘Started on a stampede.’
Pg. 197: ‘Dad started to run for the fence.’
Pg. 78: Heading standardization: ‘VI.’ to ‘CHAPTER VI.’ - Missing word in heading
inserted to match other headings
Pg. 87: Caption fix: Added missing caption present in List of Illustrations: ‘When it
Exploded the Jap Was the Scaredest Person I Ever Saw.’
Text on Pg. 117, from ‘Pa has had the hardest time ...’ and until chapter end is
replicated at the beginning of Chapter X, Pg. 145, with minor differences inluding
punctuation and initial capitals on some words. Both have been retained as they
appear in the original.
Pg. 131: Heading standardization: ‘IX.’ to ‘CHAPTER IX.’ - Missing word in

heading inserted to match other headings
Pg. 157: Heading standardization: ‘XI.’ to ‘CHAPTER XI.’ - Missing word in

heading inserted to match other headings
Pg. 278: Punctuation fix: ‘Cigars Pa Told’ to ‘Cigars—Pa Told’ - Added missing
em-dash in heading block-quote
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Basic Income, Disability Pensions and

the Australian Political Economy:

Basic Income, Disability

More information about this series at

ISSN 2662-3803 ISSN 2662-3811 (electronic)

My colleagues and friends also deserve a special mention, and I would

Part I Political Economy, Basic Income and Disability

1 Introduction: Basic Income, Fit for Australia and the

2 Basic Income in Australia and Disability Conceptions 37

3 Basic Income, Disability Dimension and the Fairness Test 57

4 Reconfiguring Social Security Arrangements and

Part II Policy Synergy 133

5 Financing a Basic Income: Explorations of International

6 Disability Pensions and the Legacy of Targeting and

Part III Policy Implementation 211

7 Future Vision: Building a Sustainable Basic Income

Political Economy, Basic Income

Introduction: Basic Income, Fit for Australia

Introduction. Basic Income, Justice and ‘Fit’

Basic income is a matter of social and distributive justice. Such a prelude

© The Author(s) 2020 3

The predominance of market and economic policies shaping capitalist

unprecedented levels in contemporary times. Since the 1970s, Western

emerging from neoclassical economics and neoliberal orthodoxy (Jordan,

In this book, disability egalitarianism is established in a similar vein to

distribution and intersubjective precondition of reciprocal recognition to

Wasserman, Asch, Blustein, & Putnam, 2015). Failing to redress issues of

Clearly, to treat unequals equally is as unjust as treating equals unequally and

Therefore, in exploring potentials for basic income, it is important and

conceptualizing ways to not impede its equity and freedom-enhancing

democratic society using egalitarian policies, such as universal basic income.

Terminology and Principles of Disability and Basic Income

abled people’), the stance is adopted to prevent language and discourse

The central tenet of basic income is that it represents a universal and

reliance on stigmatizing work activity requirements, or enforced reliance on

 ustralian Political Economy and Basic Income

(Victorian era) defined people in terms of their capacity to participate in

Western capitalist economies produce, reproduce and entrench destabiliz-

inequalities and re-envisioning a new social protection system in line with

provision, which in turn becomes a step towards constructing an egalitar-

As a catalyst for transformational change, basic income aligns strongly

and community engagement. The normative foundations of social justice

Positioning Basic Income in the Australian Political Landscape

can reify the very existing regulations, conditionality and categorization

We believe that the guaranteed income scheme which we propose provides a

The narrative suggested that full implementation of what was then

The paradox centred on removing categorizations through the take-up

Intellectual and Civic Courage in Basic Income:

Reconfiguring the social security arrangements and strengthening the

the disability pension); 1983 to 2006 (contradictions and clawbacks);

basic income implementation, will contribute to shaping a socially just

Fairclough, N. (2009). A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analy-

Retrieved from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/

We have spent a comple of days at the Michigan man’s ranch in

Pa Swelled Up So I Thought He Might Bust.

Fine paper, profusely illustrated, silk cloth stiff

My Lawyer Told Me to Groan When Anyone Was Present.

I Never Saw a Giant Negro So Mad as That Husband Was.

Pg. 58: ‘Started on a stampede.’

Pg. 197: ‘Dad started to run for the fence.’

Pg. 131: Heading standardization: ‘IX.’ to ‘CHAPTER IX.’ - Missing word in

Pg. 157: Heading standardization: ‘XI.’ to ‘CHAPTER XI.’ - Missing word in

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

Part I Political Economy, Basic Income and Disability

1 Introduction: Basic Income, Fit for Australia and the

2 Basic Income in Australia and Disability Conceptions 37

3 Basic Income, Disability Dimension and the Fairness Test 57

4 Reconfiguring Social Security Arrangements and

Part II Policy Synergy 133

5 Financing a Basic Income: Explorations of International

6 Disability Pensions and the Legacy of Targeting and

Part III Policy Implementation 211

7 Future Vision: Building a Sustainable Basic Income

ustralian Political Economy and Basic Income