A Geo Economic Turn in Trade Policy Eu Trade Agreements in The Asia Pacific Johan Adriaensen Full Chapter

A Geo-Economic Turn in Trade Policy?
:
EU Trade Agreements in the
Asia-Pacific Johan Adriaensen
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/a-geo-economic-turn-in-trade-policy-eu-trade-agreem
ents-in-the-asia-pacific-johan-adriaensen/
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A Geo-Economic Turn
in Trade Policy?
EU Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific
Edited by
Johan Adriaensen
Evgeny Postnikov
The European Union in International Affairs
Series Editors
Sebastian Oberthür, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
Philomena B. Murray, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia
Sandra Lavenex, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
This Book Series aims to be a central resource for the growing community
of scholars and policy-makers who engage with the evolving inter-
face between the EU and international affairs. It provides in-depth,
cutting edge and original contributions of world-class research on the
EU in international affairs by highlighting new developments, insights,
challenges and opportunities. It encompasses analyses of the EU’s inter-
national role, as mediated by its own Member States, in international
institutions and in its strategic bilateral and regional partnerships. Books
in the Series examine evolving EU internal policies that have external
implications and the ways in which these are both driven by, and feed
back into, international developments. Grounded in Political Science,
International Relations, International Political Economy, Law, Sociology
and History, the Series reflects a commitment to interdisciplinary schol-
arship. We welcome book proposals relating to the changing role of the
EU in international affairs across policies and the Union’s relations with
different parts of the world, as well as relations with states and multi-
lateral institutions. We are interested in research on values and norms,
interests and global governance and welcome both theory-informed
studies and studies comparing the EU with other major global actors. To
submit a proposal, please contact Commissioning Editor Ambra Finotello
ambra.finotello@palgrave.com. This series is indexed by Scopus.
More information about this series at

https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14438
Johan Adriaensen · Evgeny Postnikov
Editors
A Geo-Economic
Turn in Trade Policy?
EU Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific
Editors
Johan Adriaensen Evgeny Postnikov
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences School of Social & Political Sciences
Maastricht University University of Melbourne
Maastricht, Limburg Melbourne, VIC, Australia
The Netherlands
ISSN 2662-5911 ISSN 2662-592X (electronic)

The European Union in International Affairs
ISBN 978-3-030-81280-5 ISBN 978-3-030-81281-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81281-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
The idea for this book emerged in the wake of an academic conference on
EU external relations. We noted that contrary to the trade policy literature
with its penchant for scrutinizing trade negotiations or the design of a
trade agreement; foreign policy scholars interpreted decisions on trade in
a much larger context not eschewing from invoking bigger strategic ques-
tions. The idea of engaging with both perspectives that do not always talk
with one another formed the initial drive behind the book. And as the US
president Trump catapulted trade policy to the arena of high politics, we
felt we need to empirically assess the policy impact of the geo-economic
discourse.
We could not foresee at the time that the European Commission
would soon come to brand itself as “geo-political”. Beyond this boost
to the timeliness of the book, we are also extremely grateful for the
Commission’s support provided through the Erasmus+ programme. In
the context of the Jean Monnet Network “Europe-Asia Security and
Trade” (EAST) we were able to organize two conferences and a work-
shop. Special thanks goes out to the local organizing teams at Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, S. Rajaratnam School of Inter-
national Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and
School of Social and Political Sciences at The University of Melbourne
for facilitating our fruitful discussions. We would also like to extend our
gratitude to Thomas Christiansen who coordinated the Jean Monnet
Network, offered useful advice and guidance, and supported our efforts.
v
vi PREFACE
Administrative support by Lorenzo Mariani, Martijn Custers and Aslak

Busch has also made completing the project smoother.
An edited volume would not exist without its contributors. We owe
them our gratitude for confiding their work to this volume, their partic-
ipation and input at the network events, and their constructive engage-
ment with our feedback. Much like the turmoil in the trade regime we aim
to capture, the book itself was forged through a global pandemic, a cyber-
attack, a shift to online teaching, the expansion and untimely contraction
of our families. This has caused repeated delay to the project. We are
therefore also extremely grateful for the patience and understanding from
our contributors. We believe that the timeliness of the book will only
increase in the post-pandemic world as evidenced by some recent events.
Completing a book is always taxing on our immediate environment.
Johan would like to thank Eulalie, Rose, Josephine and Pippa for their
support and timely distractions.
Evgeny is extremely grateful to Lisa for her putting up with ups and
downs of academic work and providing constant re-assurance, emotional
support and useful advice.
Maastricht, The Netherlands Johan Adriaensen

Melbourne, Australia Evgeny Postnikov
Contents
Part I Introduction
1 Geo-economic Motives and the Negotiation of Free
Trade Agreements: Introduction 3
Johan Adriaensen and Evgeny Postnikov
Part II A Geo-Economic Trade Environment

2 The Politics of FTAs in Asia: The Role of China
and Implications for EU Trade Policy 29
Soo Yeon Kim
3 US Trade Policy: Japan vs. China, from Politically
Economic to Existential 55
Bart Kerremans
4 Global Value Chains and EU–East Asia Trade:
An Antidote for Geo-Economic Competition? 73
Ferdi De Ville
Part III Designing Geo-Economic Trade Agreements

5 Intellectual Property Rights. EU and US Initiatives
in the Asia–Pacific: Competition, Coordination
or Duplication? 97
Jean-Frédéric Morin and Madison Cartwright
vii
viii CONTENTS
6 Most-Favoured Nation Clauses: A Double-Edged

Sword in a Geo-Economic Era 127
Fabian Bohnenberger and Clara Weinhardt
7 Product Regulations: You Can Drive My Car,
Otherwise Let It Be 149
Alasdair R. Young
8 Rules of Origin: Bridging Regions to Withstand
Turbulent Times 175
Jong Bum Kim
9 Sustainable Development in EU–Asia Trade Relations 197
Camille Nessel and Jan Orbie
Part IV Case Studies

10 EU and South Korea: A Model Example for Foreign
Trade Policy Relations? 225
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Sunghoon Park
11 Australia and the EU: From Trade Tensions to FTA
Negotiations 247
Margherita Matera, Laura Allison-Reumann,
and Philomena Murray
12 EU–Singapore Negotiations: Overlapping
Negotiations, Conflicting Interests? 273
Lachlan McKenzie and Katharina L. Meissner
13 The Vietnam-European Union Free Trade Agreement:
Victim of Changing Times? 295
Ha Hai Hoang and Maria Garcia
14 EU-Indonesia Trade Relations 319
Alexandra Hennessy and Poppy S. Winanti
Part V Conclusion
15 Geo-Economic Motives in EU FTA’s
with the Asia–Pacific: More Discourse Than
Design? 345
Evgeny Postnikov and Johan Adriaensen
Index 361
List of Contributors
Johan Adriaensen Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht

University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
Laura Allison-Reumann University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC,
Australia
Fabian Bohnenberger Department of European and International
Studies, King’s College London, London, UK
Madison Cartwright University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Ferdi De Ville Ghent Institute for European and International Studies,
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Maria Garcia University of Bath, Bath, UK
Alexandra Hennessy Department of Government, University of Essex,
Colchester, UK
Hanns Günther Hilpert Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin,
Germany
Ha Hai Hoang Hanoi National University of Education, Hanoi,
Vietnam
Bart Kerremans University of Leuven (KU Leuven), Leuven, Belgium
ix
x LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Jong Bum Kim Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei

University, Seoul, Korea
Soo Yeon Kim National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
Margherita Matera University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC,
Australia
Lachlan McKenzie Melbourne School of Government, The University
of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
Katharina L. Meissner Department of Political Science, University of
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Jean-Frédéric Morin Université Laval, Québec City, Canada
Philomena Murray University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC,
Australia
Camille Nessel Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium;
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Jan Orbie Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Sunghoon Park Korea University, Seoul, South Korea
Evgeny Postnikov School of Social and Political Sciences, University of
Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
Clara Weinhardt Department of Political Science, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, The Netherlands
Poppy S. Winanti Department of International Relations, Universitas
Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Alasdair R. Young Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia
Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Number of newspaper articles covering trade negotiations

using geo-economic language 5
Fig. 2.1 Preferential trade agreements in Asia and the world,
1948–2020 31
Fig. 2.2 China’s Conflict Behavior by Region 34
Fig. 2.3 Average Intensity of Events between China and Others,
by Asia Subregion 35
Fig. 2.4 Trade Flows between the EU and China 39
Fig. 2.5 EU-China Trade Concentration 39
Fig. 5.1 US and EU preferential trade agreements (2000–2018)
with Asia–Pacific countries 102
Fig. 5.2 TRIPs-plus provision in EU and US preferential trade
agreements with Vietnam, South Korea and Singapore 104
Fig. 5.3 EU and US targets of coercion, 2006–2018 108
Fig. 5.4 IPR issues for the EU and US, 2009–2018 110
Fig. 5.5 IPR issues for the EU and US in China, 2009–2018 112
Fig. 6.1 MFN Clauses concerning services and investment
for FTAs over time 137
Fig. 9.1 The functioning of dispute settlement in TSDs 201
Fig. 10.1 Exports, imports and trade balance between the EU-28
and South Korea, 1990 to 2019—in USD billions 238
Fig. 10.2 The intensity of EU exports to Korea and the intensity
of Korea exports to the EU, 2010 to 2018 240
Fig. 11.1 Australia’s top 10 two-way trading partners
as a percentage of total Australian trade, 2018–2019 253
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 11.2 The EU’s top 10 trading partners and Australia

as a percentage of total EU trade, 2019 254
Fig. 14.1 EU trade with selected ASEAN members (in Mil e) 327
Fig. 14.2 Liberalizing vs. discriminatory measures 330
List of Tables
Table 2.1 EU’s trade agreement partners in Asia 40

Table 2.2 China’s trade agreement partners in Asia 42
Table 2.3 Text similarity across EU and PRC trade agreements 43
Table 2.4 Depth of EU and PRC trade agreements 45
Table 2.5 CPTPP and RCEP’s member countries 47
Table 5.1 Prevalence of issues raised in country reports 111
Table 5.2 EU socialization initiatives in Asia 115
Table 5.3 US IPR trade capacity building program recipients,
1999–2014 118
Table 6.1 Variations in MFN Inclusion 138
Table 6.2 Coverage of MFN Clauses in EU FTAs with Asian
countries 140
Table 7.1 Regulatory cooperation and agreement clash 154
Table 7.2 General TBT and SPS provisions in completed
agreements: Carry on WTO 156
Table 7.3 The EU’s proposed TBT and SPS provisions: Still carry
on WTO 158
Table 7.4 Pursuing alignment in motor vehicle regulations 160
Table 7.5 Other trade powers’ regulatory cooperation
in the Asia–Pacific 166
Table 9.1 Differences in EU–US TSD chapters 202
Table 9.2 Differences of labour commitments in EU–Asia FTAs 208
Table 9.3 Environmental agreements in TSD chapters and status
quo of ratifications 211
Table 9.4 Civil society involvement in TSD chapters 213
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Table 9.5 Civil Society Index, long version 216

Table 12.1 EU’s and Singapore’s motives in the USFTA
negotiations 288
PART I
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
Geo-economic Motives and the Negotiation

of Free Trade Agreements: Introduction
Johan Adriaensen and Evgeny Postnikov
Introduction
Often seen as a technical, de-politicized area, the regulation of interna-
tional trade has re-entered the realm of high politics. Public mobilization
of contentious mega trade deals played no small part in this trend.
However, the increasing use of trade policy as a strategic instrument
reflects perhaps a more fundamental shift rather than a response to
increased contestation of trade. Initial fears of rising protectionism during
J. Adriaensen
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The
Netherlands
e-mail: j.adriaensen@maastrichtuniversity.nl
E. Postnikov (B)
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne,
VIC, Australia
e-mail: evgeny.postnikov@unimelb.edu.au
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2022
J. Adriaensen and E. Postnikov (eds.), A Geo-Economic Turn
in Trade Policy?, The European Union in International Affairs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81281-2_1
4 J. ADRIAENSEN AND E. POSTNIKOV
the financial crisis pale in comparison with outright trade wars common
in recent years.
Whether shaking down long-trusted allies, or starving the Appellate
body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mech-
anism off its judges, trade wars initiated under the Trump presidency
symbolize a return of the law of the jungle to global trade, making
power politics and competition trump cooperation and the multilateral
rules-based system sustaining it. Still, it would be too simple to view
this geo-economic turn in trade policy as an aberration and reduce it
to a by-product of US domestic politics. Indeed, trade conflicts, rivalry
among major powers, and realist concerns were already venting through
the cracks of the multilateral trading system for years. Discontent over
China’s market economy status masks the distinction between states and
firms fuelling further disputes in the WTO and creating concerns over
the nature of Chinese investments in strategic sectors. Likewise, the
EU’s active pursuit of preferential trade agreements has inspired polit-
ical discourse on ‘competitive liberalization’ and the view of trade policy
as regulatory competition between big powers aiming to set global stan-
dards. It underscores that trade remains a key tool of economic statecraft
(Bradford, 2020; Dür, 2010; Evenett & Meier, 2008; Garcia, 2013;
Sbragia, 2010). The abdication of the United States from its traditional
role of a global leader has brought these trends to the fore, leaving a
power vacuum in the trade system and creating profound uncertainty
for other actors including those whose economic security traditionally
depends on it.
These observations suggest that contemporary trade policy is increas-
ingly used to achieve greater geo-economic objectives. The gradual ascent
of geo-economic frames used to interpret trade policy is perhaps most
strongly reflected in public news reporting on trade across the world.
Figure 1.1 indicates the frequency in news articles that use such geo-
economic frames when reporting on the course of trade negotiations.
Importantly, beyond the steep increase, it also shows that the rhetoric
did not start and will not end with the US Presidency of Donald Trump.
The presence of a geo-strategic dimension in trade news reporting has
become a ubiquitous feature of this new landscape. But does this rhetoric
correspond to a more fundamental shift in trade policy dynamics and
outcomes?
The overt ambition of the Von der Leyen Commission to become a
‘geopolitical’ actor with a special role for a ‘trade enforcer’ (European
1 GEO-ECONOMIC MOTIVES AND THE NEGOTIATION OF FREE TRADE … 5
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Fig. 1.1 Number of newspaper articles covering trade negotiations using geo-
economic language (Source Database search in NexisUni [We used the following
search terms ‘geopolitic* OR geo-economic OR geostrategic’ which we narrowed
down to articles mentioning “trade negotiation”])
Commission, 2020), suggests this rhetoric has moved beyond political

spin and began guiding real policy choices of the European Union,
despite its traditional unease with high politics and great power rivalry. As
bilateral trade agreements constitute one of the central pillars of contem-
porary trade policy in an era of the WTO impasse (Baldwin, 2016), a key
question emerges: To what extent are bilateral trade negotiations moti-
vated and shaped by geo-economic motives? This question has both an
empirical and conceptual dimension.
Empirically, we need to cut through the rhetorical veneer to assess the
extent to which geo-strategic thinking affects trade policy decisions. But
doing so also requires us to conceptually investigate how trade agreements
can be designed to meet this objective.
With that in mind, this book’s main ambition is to provide a first
systematic study of the broader international context in which EU trade
agreements are conceived, negotiated, and designed. It aims to do so by
merging the rich literature on the international political economy (IPE)
of trade that has mapped the design and content of FTAs in ever greater
technical detail, with the foreign policy analysis tradition that excels at
placing trade negotiations in a broader strategic context of rivalry and
cooperation. Empirically, the analysis focuses on the relations between
the EU and countries of the Asia-Pacific, an economically significant area

rife with competition among major trade powers.
The remainder of our chapter is structured as follows. In the first
section, we elaborate the broader contribution we hope to make to the
IPE of trade. The second section introduces the framework used in the
following chapters and the final section covers the methodology and
structure of the book.
Geo-economics and the IPE of Trade

A recent uptake in interest notwithstanding (Meunier & Nicolaides,
2019; Orbie, 2021), geo-strategic motives have been largely neglected in
the study of contemporary trade policy. Trade negotiations—particularly
at the multilateral level—are seemingly antithetical to the neo-realist logic
inherent to geo-economic thinking. They are, after all, an attempt at inter-
national cooperation, the creation (or harmonization) of international
rules, and the management of complex interdependence (but see Grieco
et al., 1993). Therefore, it is of limited surprise that the trade policy
scholarship has a rather strong domestic politics bias (Oatley, 2011).
But there is also another reason why the concept of geo-economics
has received limited traction in academic research (and perhaps much use
in public discourse) which is the lack of conceptual clarity. This concept
was coined at the end of the Cold War by Luttwak who observed that
conflicts were increasingly resolved through economic rather than military
means (Luttwak, 1990). Soon thereafter, debates emerged on the distinc-
tion between geo-economics and geo-politics but also from other—more
traditional—IR theories and concepts. If geo-economics is defined as
‘the application of economic means of power so as to realize strategic
objectives’, there is little that sets it apart from a more conventional
understanding of power as commonly studied in IPE. Indeed, Neo-
realists have long embraced the pursuit of relative gains through economic
coercion, prompting scholars to examine economic statecraft and condi-
tionality (e.g. Grieco, 1988). Scholarship on EU external relations has
also focused extensively on the use of economic conditionality for polit-
ical goals, as the absence of military competences largely defines the EU
as an international actor (e.g. Duchêne, 1973; Grabbe, 2006; Schim-
melfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Yet few would classify their analysis as
geo-economic. In their critique on the liberal use of the concept, Scholvin
and Wigell (2018) therefore highlight the importance of specifying the

geographic dimension when defining geo-economics.
Thus for the purpose of studying international trade negotiations, we
need to define ‘the economic means of power’ more carefully. Power,
including its economic form, is always a relational concept. Therefore,
in addition to traditional notions of economic power like market size
or natural resource endowments, we contend that such power is also
derived from a country’s position within the spatial network of the global
economy. This position is determined by multiple factors. Some of these
have a distinctive geographic character, like the proximity to different
markets, each creating certain (strategic) interdependencies. Other factors
are more economic or political in nature and relate to a country’s role
in global value chains or its integration in transnational policy networks.
Free trade agreements (FTAs) play a central role here as they shape the
web of these interdependencies and can thus be used to improve one’s
own economic power (e.g. by securing access to vital resources, creating
strong dependencies) or to reduce the influence and power of global
rivals (e.g. by limiting a country’s sphere of influence). In summary,
geo-economics refers to the manipulation of one’s position within the
global networked economy in pursuit of strategic objectives. FTAs are key
elements of this economy, determining its networked structure and rela-
tionships among players. The book thus aims to study the extent to which
their initiation, negotiation and design is used to strategically shape these
interdependencies within the existing regime complex of trade relations.
Despite the aforementioned ‘liberal bias’ in the study of trade agree-
ments, there is, fortunately, significant scholarship seeking to explain trade
policy choices by focusing on the international context in which such
negotiations take place. In our overview, we try to situate the contribu-
tion of this volume at the nexus of two particularly relevant debates. The
first relates to analyses on the international trade regime and its evolving
structure. It offers a nuanced yet complex understanding of the context in
which contemporary negotiations take place. The second debate concerns
the use of trade negotiations as a means of economic statecraft wielding
the trade regime to achieve strategic goals. Our goal is to examine the
political economy of FTAs with a particular focus on the role of power
therein, trying to remedy the ‘liberal and domestic bias’ of previous IPE
scholarship on trade and bring the international dimension back in.
Systemic Approaches
The most elaborate debate on power and the international trade regime
pertains to the creation and maintenance of the multilateral system.
Hegemonic stability theory highlighted the importance of a hegemon
to create a system providing global public goods (Gilpin, 1971; Kindle-
berger, 1981; Krasner, 1976). The hegemon was central to the creation
of international institutions as their expected gains would be sufficiently
high to offset the costs of their maintenance and ensuring compliance.
Apart from the hegemon’s power, another key element of the system was
the distinction between outsiders and insiders where the latter could set
high demands on the former if they sought to enter the GATT/WTO
(Zimmermann, 2004, 2007).
The lead-up to the new millennium saw the rise of bilateral trade
negotiations which triggered a heated debate on their causes and impact.
Growing membership of the GATT/WTO along with its rigid decision-
making procedures made negotiations more protracted, as evidenced by
the never-ending Doha round. Additionally, the rise of new economic
powers and their increased assertiveness reduced the effectiveness of the
WTO as a forum for trade negotiations (Hopewell, 2015; Narlikar, 2010).
The shifting distribution of power and resulting multipolarity compelled
members to leverage power differentials outside the multilateral trade
regime (Evenett, 2007). While the multilateral system proved to be
resilient up until now, the WTO ceased to be the main forum for trade
negotiations. As a consequence, much of the literature shifted its focus
to the emergence and design of bilateral trade agreements (Baccini et al.,
2015; Horn et al., 2010). Still, systemic approaches persist as the relation
between the newly created agreements and the existing trade regime high-
lighted their mutual influences and raised new questions (Mansfield &
Reinhardt, 2003). Central among those is whether bilateral negotiations
act as stepping stones or stumbling blocks to global free trade (Baghwati,
2008; Estevadeordal et al., 2008; Krueger, 2000). Many more agree-
ments have been concluded since the initial debate, and the question has
evolved to assess commensurability of various commitments under the
different regimes and how to design inclusive agreements (Hoekman &
Sabel, 2019).
Rather than treating different multilateral, bilateral and plurilateral
arrangements as independent policy choices, scholars turned their atten-
tion to the whole regime complex of overlapping rules (Alter & Meunier,
2009; Meunier & Morin, 2015). Perhaps, the most striking acknowl-
edgment of the interconnected nature of the trade regime comes in the
observation that up to 80% of trade treaties are copy-pasted from earlier
agreements (Allee & Elsig, 2019) Approaching the trade regime as a
Complex Adaptive System, Morin et al. (2017) try to identify agreements
that were particularly innovative in pushing new norms onto the agenda.
Where do actors copy from? While a large part of the continuity in trade
agreement design can be due to efficiency and path-dependence argu-
ments (e.g. Milewicz et al., 2018), the tabling of ‘boilerplate’ texts can
also be used to pursue self-interest. As far as ‘non-trade objectives’ are
concerned, this could not be discerned from the data (Peacock et al.,
2019). Still, the idea that countries seek to expand the use of their partic-
ular template (at the expense of rivaling partners) remains potent as it
neatly fits the discourse on rule export to exclude potential rivals.
In summary, the literature on regimes and regime complexes is partic-
ularly useful as it escapes the myopic view inherent in much empirical
work on preferential trade agreements. It draws attention to the inter-
connectedness of various trade arrangements. We also benefit from their
examination of trade agreements design, particularly as it entails the focus
on systemic factors. However, for the empirical objectives of this book, we
still miss greater detail on the conceptual ‘micro-foundations’ that would
help us understand in a systematic way how geo-economic considerations
can influence the pursuit and design of bilateral trade deals. All in all, the
role of power and how it manifests itself through the regime complex has
received only limited attention.
Power in Trade Negotiations

The move toward bilateralism has also increased the interest in the impact
of power in trade negotiations. This has primarily emerged in the context
of North–South agreements where scholars critically scrutinized the EU’s
pursuit of the Economic Partnership agreements (Murray-Evans, 2018).
The asymmetric bargaining context resulted in additional concessions
from developing countries (Heron, 2011), locked in policies beneficial
for the EU (Hurt, 2012) and undermined the developmental objec-
tives of its partners (Sheahan et al., 2010). Through the addition of
conditions on human rights, democracy or sustainable development, the
leveraging of economic power for political objectives is also a common
subject of research (Adriaensen & González-Garibay, 2013; Milewicz
et al., 2018; Orbie, 2011). Yet, one can question the extent to which such
conditionality reflects (geo-) strategic objectives or rather an act of norma-
tive window dressing of domestic protectionist preferences (Postnikov &
Bastiaens, 2020).
The findings of the aforementioned scholarship tend to corroborate
the argument by Brandi, who suggests that the trade regime complex
does not favor the weak, as developing countries cannot make use of
the opportunities presented by the shifting regime to the same extent as
their developed counterparts (Brandi, 2017). Apart from Brandi’s refined
analysis of the international context, power resources identified in most
studies pertain primarily to the economic size and trade dependencies, as
well as administrative and legal capacity. By contrast, studies of the impor-
tance of power in negotiations among developed nations have been rather
rare. For example, applying a realist perspective, D’Erman (2020) shows
how the EU obtained concessions from Canada on public procurement.
Sources of power in these analyses often highlight domestic constraints
rather than the international context (Clark et al., 2000; De Bièvre, 2018;
McKenzie, 2016). While this research has taken power seriously, scholars
tend to employ a reductionist approach focusing on bilateral bargaining
power differentials eschewing the role of third countries on the agree-
ment. However, the role of these third parties is central if we want
to assess the veracity of the alleged geo-economic competition driving
contemporary trade politics, i.e. the objective of this volume.
Yet, there have been several pieces of scholarship that applied the geo-
economic perspectives along the lines established above. We find them in
three particular debates: (1) the EU–US economic rivalry, (2) the notion
of competitive regionalism and (3) the rise of China.
As the EU and the United States were the first and most prolific
signers of FTAs, it did not take long before the EU–US relationship
was described as a form of competitive interdependence. Alberta Sbragia
claims such geo-economic consideration already characterized the EU–US
engagement in the GATT and WTO (Sbragia, 2010). While providing
a compelling narrative, the work does not offer a systematic analysis
to assess the salience of the proposed argument. Relying on political
discourse, Maria Garcia echoes similar sentiments on the growing preva-
lence of realist motives in the EU’s more recent trade strategy (Garcia,
2013). The economic rivalry between the EU and the United States, also
served as a convenient focal point to garner support from the European
Parliament for the EU–Korea trade deal (Elsig & Dupont, 2012). While
these analyses gave due attention to the idea of geo-economic compe-

tition, they could not pierce the veil of strategic discourse, leaving the
question of its effective policy impact open.
Moving away from the transatlantic relation, we also see a similar
discussion pertaining to the Pacific Rim. A central notion here is compet-
itive regionalism. As trade agreements in the region flourished, a debate
rose on their origins whereby processes of emulation were contrasted with
competition. Solis et al. (2009) show the explanatory power of compet-
itive pressures, primarily in terms of trade partner selection. Relevant
powers were defined based on relative similarity in export profile and trade
intensity, but major powers like the EU, United States and China were
also becoming heavily involved in the region.
The rise of China and its growing assertiveness has further brought
geo-economic worldviews into the limelight. Pertinent observations first
emerged in Africa and South America, where the growing Chinese
economic presence concerned Europe (Carmody & Owusu, 2007) and
the United States (Ellis, 2005). But the sense of great power rivalry rose
in importance with the advent of so-called mega-regionals. Whereas the
US-led Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) aimed to contain the
Chinese influence, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) could reinstate western economic hegemony by making the EU
and the US global rule setters (Garrett, 2019).
Overall, while there are several studies applying a geo-economic frame
to the analysis of trade policy, they tend to primarily rely on observations
of politicians’ rhetoric and a thick description of events. Rigorous and
comparative empirical analysis of geo-economic drivers of trade agree-
ments is lacking. By devoting more attention to the specific design of
concluded FTAs, our book aims to remedy this and provide a compre-
hensive account of the role of geo-economic factors in trade negotiations.
To meet this objective, we propose a systematic approach to trace the
potential impact of geo-economic motives throughout different empirical
domains comprising contemporary trade negotiations.
Analyzing the Geo-economic

Dimension in FTA Negotiations
To enable a systematic assessment of the presence (or absence) of geo-
economic considerations in the negotiation of FTAs, the book proposes
a focus on three potential loci of geo-economic motives: the initiation,
process and outcome of the negotiations. If we assume that geo-economic

power is derived from a country’s position within the regime complex, it
also implies that countries can seek to enhance their position through
strategically selected and designed trade agreements. Indeed, the struc-
ture of a network is not a fixed property and the addition of strategically
crafted new ties can cause significant ripple effects throughout the global
system. In other words, geo-economic motives can manifest both in the
selection of a negotiating partner and in the bargaining power of the
involved parties during negotiations where the dynamic and relational
nature of networked power is on display. Trade agreements are therefore
both a source of geo-economic power but also a reflection of (power)
bargaining. Both of these dimensions (partner selection and bargaining
power) are explored further below, but there is also a third manifestation
of geo-economics that warrants our attention—the negotiated outcome as
observed in the design of the agreement which can lock in certain network
effects and influence subsequent agreements and policy outcomes.
Selecting a Negotiating Partner

There has been extensive research exploring the motives driving the
launch of a trade negotiation. As political resources are scarce, there is an
impetus to select partners strategically (US GAO, 2004). Motives gener-
ally encompass a mixture of political and economic objectives (Ravenhill,
2016). A good example of the former are the US–Oman FTA (US GAO,
2007) or the stability and association agreements in the case of the EU’s
neighborhood. As an example of the latter, one can consider the EU’s
Global Europe strategy (European Commission, 2006) where the Asian
tigers were prioritized for their growing market size.
But to what extent do broader geo-economic motives drive FTA
negotiations? The dyadic (or even monadic) focus in much quantitative
research, severely limits the range of strategic motives to be tested, and—
beyond the number of agreements concluded with other partners—it
offers limited space for third countries to enter into the equation (see e.g.
Müller & Seabra, 2019; Ye, 2017). Yet, qualitative studies have offered
more useful insights on how strategic motives affect partner selection.
Particularly instructive here is the edited volume by Solis et al. (2009)
where contributors discuss how different countries in the Pacific select
their FTA partners in a context of competitive regionalism. Others have
focused on specific cases. Schott (2003) discusses the selection strategies
of the United States and Kong (2012) provides an overview of China’s

motives for selecting their FTA partners. Park , finally, offers a compelling
analysis of motives of the EU and Korea to embark on negotiations (Park,
2017).
A key issue in these debates is the implications of trade diversion both
to ‘beat a rivalling partner’ in securing preferential market access, or in
leveling the playing field after other powers have agreed to enter a PTA
first (the so-called snowball or juggernaut effect) (see e.g. Garcia, 2013).
But expected benefits are not restricted to the (re-)direction of trade flows
or foreign procurement contracts. In debates on the ‘Hub-Spoke’ model,
there is an agglomeration effect in which production concentrates in a
hub from where one can export to all the ‘spoke-markets’. As there is
limited scope for multiple hubs within one region, South Korea and Japan
were particularly assertive in expanding their trade network.
Partner selection can also be guided by broader strategic considera-
tions. The pivot to Asia, instrumental for the US’ motives to enter TPP
negotiations, inevitably suggests a containment strategy vis-à-vis China
(Capling & Ravenhill, 2013; Poletti, 2018). China-led Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can be seen as way to rival the US
pivot in the region by pursuing a competing agreement with similar part-
ners. Intensification of trade relations ties a partner country more closely
to one’s sphere of influence. Scholars argue that trade ties can be a func-
tion of geo-political interests (Antkiewticz & Momani, 2009; Bagozzi &
Landis, 2013). Sbragia (2010) further discusses how competitive interde-
pendence between the EU and the United States makes them compete
for access to lucrative emerging markets.
Thus, to understand how geo-economic motives shape the strategy for
selecting agreement partners one needs to focus on parallel bilateral rela-
tionships while paying attention to their wider systemic significance. This
would entail the simultaneous analysis of bilateral gains from entering
trade agreements and their consequences for the broader global ambitions
(i.e. building trade relations as part of countries’ grand strategies).
Bargaining Power During Negotiations

If power is derived from one’s position in the global trade regime,
it becomes inevitable that geo-economic considerations will affect the
balance of power between negotiating partners. The strategic importance
attached to the success or failure of a negotiation affects the costs one
is willing to incur for its conclusion and the speed by which negotia-
tions need to take place. The negotiations between the EU and Japan
were expedited by the Commission’s desire to show they were still
‘open for business’ and able to deliver on trade following the height of
public campaigns against the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement
(CETA) with Canada and TTIP. Whether this had any effect on agree-
ment design or whether it only presented a window of opportunity to
speed up the negotiations is subject to debate. Similarly, ratification of
the EU–Korea FTA in the European Parliament was also facilitated by
the Commission’s ability to stress its importance as the focal point for
transatlantic competition (Elsig & Dupont, 2012).
The use of templates from past or future agreements provides another
example of how third countries can influence the dynamic of bilat-
eral trade negotiations (Meunier & Morin, 2015). The frequent use
of templates or ‘copy-pasting’ in trade agreements is well-documented
(Allee & Elsig, 2019). Past agreements with third countries provide
convenient benchmarks by which one can assess the preferences obtained.
The recurrent renegotiations of and adjustments made to trade agree-
ments in order to deepen prior commitments may well be influenced by
developments in other trade agreements (Castle, 2019). In this case, a
special role is reserved for the Most-Favoured Nation clauses within bilat-
eral trade agreements which should extend (additional) concessions to
third parties automatically as they do to the home country.
However, negotiations can also be guided by expectations on future
arrangements. For example, EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht argued
that the investor-state dispute settlement clause (ISDS) was to be included
in the TTIP to improve the probability that China, where the risks of
(indirect) expropriation are significantly higher, would agree to a possible
investment agreement of a similar kind (European Commission, 2014).
If we were to take the argument at heart, it would imply that the EU
would weaken its hand in the TTIP negotiations and accommodate US
preferences not to jeopardize the grander transatlantic hegemony. Overall,
the pursuit of geo-economic goals can therefore affect bargaining power
differentials in negotiations by raising the stakes of an agreement and
allowing the influence of third parties on the negotiation. While the
two-level game theory (Putnam, 1988) is well-suited for the analysis of
separate bilateral negotiations, a geo-economic perspective requires a shift
of focus away from domestic audiences to how other agreements and
partners can determine negotiators’ win-sets.
Harnessing Externalities in the Design of FTAs

Debates on templates already bring us closer to the third theme to be
explored in this book: the ultimate design of FTAs. This design can impact
a country’s strategic position in the spatial network either directly or indi-
rectly. The ‘anti-Non-Market Economy’ clause incorporated in several US
agreements is perhaps the best example of direct impact as it prohibits a
partner from engaging in trade negotiations with a non-market economy.
While no country is specifically targeted, the clause is clearly directed at
China (Vidigal, 2020). This is as explicit as agreements can be in seeking
to exclude or even isolate other powers. But just as protectionist measures
are increasingly obfuscated from transparent tariffs by murky regulations
(Kono, 2006), so too would geo-economic motives be more commonly
inferred from their indirect (or unintended) effects.
This primarily transpires through the manipulation of externalities.
While rarely phrased in terms of externalities, the pursuit of relative gains
has been generally acknowledged in the political economy of trade. The
most common example is the notion of trade diversion. Bilateral trade
agreements intensify trade between the signatories at the expense of
third countries whose market access terms are comparatively weakened.
So when a competing trade power negotiates a trade deal with a third
country, there is a strong incentive to negotiate a defensive trade agree-
ment to balance the playing field anew (Dür, 2010; Manger, 2009). Rules
of Origin provisions play an important role in generating such negative
externalities. They specify the conditions for goods to qualify for prefer-
ential rates primarily in terms of how much of the product’s added value
is created locally.
Two other closely linked concepts often used in this context are the
idea of regulatory competition (cfr. Drezner, 2005) and the pursuit of
first-mover advantages to achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other
powers to obtain relative gains. Regulatory competition refers to the
desire of a country to have its domestic regulations recognized as an
international or regional standard. This implies that domestic producers
would not have to incur additional costs of having to conform to two
sets of standards or having products comply with multiple sets of testing
procedures to guarantee compatibility with domestic and foreign rules.
First-mover advantages rely on the benefits that accrue from sequencing
the order of agreements struck. Many services or public procurement
contracts exhibit steep entry costs but—once overcome—enable providers
fend off new (foreign) competitors with relative ease. This implies that—
in order to balance the playing field—a bigger concession needs to be
obtained by any subsequent trade partner.
Contrasting the pursuit of negative externalities, we can also foresee
instances where positive externalities are leveraged by a country in an
effort to attain strategic objectives or improve its geo-economic position.
While negative externalities are primarily defined in relation to key rivals,
positive externalities can be pursued in the joint interest of strategic allies.
By setting agreement templates and standards after shared (international)
norms and multilateral rules (e.g. by referencing the norms of the Inter-
national Labour Organization or multilateral environmental agreements
or multilateralizing rules regulating investment in separate agreements)
the EU could steer third countries into accepting broader multilateral
frameworks, preventing potential regulatory competition in future nego-
tiations. More importantly, it would facilitate a coordinated effort behind
which multiple like-minded states can gather. This could potentially take
the form of political cooperation on implementation and enforcement.
For example, one can argue that the EU and the United States have an
incentive to foster linkages in their sustainable development chapters (e.g.
in the form of joint-monitoring) as they pursue similar objectives. Do, for
example, their approaches to IPR protection or sustainable development
in trade agreements converge or diverge (Bastiaens & Postnikov, 2017;
Morin & Rochette, 2017)?
Additionally, pursuing positive externalities in trade negotiations could
further pave the way for multilateralizing or regionalizing trade agree-
ments by making accession potentially easier which would serve the EU’s
broader strategic interests of modeling the international system after its
own image and making EU-style regionalism attractive despite its multiple
internal issues (Cameron, 2010). So the credibility of EU model and
approach to global trade with its long-term preference for multilateralism
might dictate more cooperative approaches toward agreement design.
Geo-economic discourse manifests primarily with reference to the initi-
ation and negotiation of trade agreements, but has been less commonly
associated with specific design choices. Part of the challenge is that not
all aspects of contemporary trade agreements equally lend themselves to
the pursuit of geo-economic objectives. The argument is therefore in part
conceptual—assessing to what extent a specific clause can be designed to
generate positive/negative externalities—and partly empirical—assessing
to what extent specific designs are intentionally used for such objectives.
Obviously, the three dimensions are not independent from one

another. Templates are a good case in point. Not only do they affect
the negotiating dynamic as well as the agreement design, they could
also affect partner selection. Selecting negotiation partners in the area of
IPR by the United States was motivated—at least in policy statements—
by their ability to act as a powerful enabler within their region. While
the rhetoric did not amount to much practice (Morin, 2009), it lends
credence to the idea that the selection of partners is part of a broader
strategic ambition in a given issue area. The EU’s proposal of a new
gender chapter in the modernization of their agreement with Chile exem-
plifies a similar logic. As Chile has one of the worlds’ most ambitious
gender chapters in its FTAs with Argentina and Uruguay, the EU is more
likely to develop a strong template in these negotiations, which can then
more credibly be exported to other partners.
Research Design and Structure of the Book

By applying this tri-partite framework systematically, we aim to gain a
better view of the extent to which geo-economic considerations effec-
tively play a role in contemporary trade negotiations. This exercise is
focused empirically on the relations between the EU and countries in the
Asia-Pacific for three reasons: firstly, it is a region of strategic economic
importance as evidenced by significant rates of economic growth among
its many emerging powers, their integration in global value chains, and
the potential to reap the benefits of further trade liberalization; secondly,
all major global trade powers, conceived in this book as the United States,
China and the European Union, are actively promoting their interests in
the region, often in opposition to one another; and, finally, the region
is extremely heterogeneous in terms of levels of development, economic
size, and historical ties between its countries and major players. Each of
these factors is likely to affect the kind of trade relations the EU is able
to forge in the region. Furthermore, the focus on the EU is well justified
because trade policy is the main vehicle through which the EU projects its
power on global stage (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006) while simultaneously
seeking bilateral agreements and defending the multilateral system.
The book is comprised of three sections. The first set of chapters lays
out the geo-economic scene in which all the negotiations take place,
focusing on both the EU’s main systemic rivals in the region and their
strategies, as well as the changing nature of trade which matters for the
realization of strategic objectives. This necessitates the inclusion of chap-

ters on the United States (Kerremans, 2022) and China (Kim, 2022b),
who are both key players in the Asia-Pacific alongside the EU. The third
chapter engages with one of the main counter-arguments to a trade policy
guided by geo-economic motives i.e. the liberal pressures created via
global value chains (De Ville, 2022). The EU’s efforts in the region vis-
a-vis the United States and China are likely to be the main source of
geo-economic contention which will play out in bilateral negotiations.
These chapters will examine the larger strategic goals the United States
and China pursue as systemically important economic players and how
their foreign economic policies are used as a means of economic state-
craft when it comes to trade. This focus on national economic interests
of the EU’s main rivals coupled with the discussion of the context of
trade bilateralism provides a comprehensive context for the following two
sections.
The second section extends these themes and explores the manner in
which a country can and does pursue strategic (international) objectives
through the design of specific chapters of a trade agreement. We focus
on the key areas of trade negotiations: regulatory cooperation (Young,
2022), intellectual property rights (Morin & Cartwright, 2022), the use
of the MFN (Bohnenberger & Weinhardt, 2022), rules of origin (Kim,
2022a) and sustainable development (Nessel & Orbie, 2022). All are
essential elements of a modern trade agreement and feature prominently
in EU trade deals, as well as those pursued by the United States and
other players. Of course, many more issues areas are covered by trade
agreements so this section is by no means exhaustive but highlights some
of the EU’s long-standing trade policy preferences. We chose to focus on
these particular areas to have a good balance between the so-called trade-
plus (e.g. MFN) and trade-extra (e.g. rules of origin) issues and between
those areas where geo-economic concerns have been commonly linked to
(e.g. regulatory cooperation and intellectual property) and those where
they might be hidden but nevertheless at play (e.g. sustainable devel-
opment). In these issue chapters, authors explore various legal designs
for their ability to exclude or contain rivaling powers (i.e. pursue nega-
tive externalities) but also the scope for cooperation and coordination
if third parties have similar objectives The EU’s approach is compared
and contrasted with the approaches of the United States and, where
appropriate, China—Europe’s main systemic rivals.
The third section of the volume, then, investigates how geo-economic

factors play out in bilateral trade negotiations between the EU and
its main trading partners in the region. We focus on South Korea
(Hilpert & Park, 2022), Singapore (McKenzie & Meissner, 2022),
Vietnam (Hoang & Garcia, 2022), Indonesia (Hennessy & Winanti,
2022) and Australia (Matera et al., 2022), countries that have either
signed or are negotiating a trade agreement with the EU. These coun-
tries have also entered into other agreements with the EU’s systemic
rivals which make these cases particularly pertinent for the ambition of
this volume. Through these case-studies, we explore the role third coun-
tries play in the EU’s trade relations with a partner. We draw particular
attention to the three topics elaborated in this chapter i.e. the motives for
entering into the negotiations, negotiating dynamics, and—ultimately—
FTA design. We are interested in both the motives of the EU and
its negotiating partner. To enable such insights, these chapters are co-
authored by a team covering both an expert on the EU and an expert
on the partner country in question, leveraging their relative expertise.
The resulting framework implies up to six topics can be explored by the
authors. As not each issue is equally pertinent, different contributions
expand on those aspects that are most illustrative of the geo-economic
dynamic we hope to uncover in this volume.
Jointly considered, the sections provide a comprehensive plausi-
bility probe for whether geo-economic motives shape bilateral negoti-
ations during the partner selection, bargaining and design stages. The
concluding chapter offers synthesis, reflects on the external validity for
our findings and lays out the contours of an emerging research agenda.
References
Adriaensen, J., & González-Garibay, M. (2013). The illusion of choice: The
European Union and the trade-labor linkage. Journal of Contemporary Euro-
pean Research, 9(4), 542–559. http://www.jcer.myzen.co.uk/index.php/
jcer/article/view/459
Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2019). Are the contents of international treaties
copied and pasted? Evidence from preferential trade agreements. International
Studies Quarterly, 63(3), 603–613. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz029
Alter, K. J., & Meunier, S. (2009). The politics of international regime
complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7 (1), 13–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592709090033
Antkiewicz, A., & Momani, B. (2009). Pursuing geopolitical stability through

interregional trade: The EU’s motives for negotiating with the gulf cooper-
ation council. Journal of European Integration, 31(2). https://doi.org/10.
1080/07036330802642789.
Baccini, L., Dür, A., & Elsig, M. (2015). The politics of trade agreement design:
Revisiting the depth-flexibility nexus. International Studies Quarterly, 59(4),
765–775. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12188
Bagozzi, B. E., & Landis, S. T. (2015). The stabilizing effects of interna-
tional politics on bilateral trade flows. Foreign Policy Analysis, 11(2), 151–171.
https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12034.
Baldwin, R. (2016).The world trade organization and the future of multilater-
alism. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(1), 95–116.
Bastiaens, I., & Postnikov, E. (2017). Greening up: The effects of environmental
standards in EU and US trade agreements. Environmental Politics, 26(5),
847–869. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1338213
Bhagwati, J. (2008). Termites in the trading system: How preferential agreements
undermine free trade. Oxford University Press.
Bohnenberger, F., & Weinhardt, C. (2022). Most-favoured nation clauses. In J.
Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Bradford, A. (2020). The brussels effect. How the European union rules the world.
Oxford University Press.
Brandi, C. (2017). The trade regime complex and megaregionals—An explo-
ration from the perspective of international domination. Global Justice: Theory
Practice Rhetoric, 10(1), 24–42.
Cameron, F. (2010, September 24). The European Union as model for regional
integration. Council on Foreign Relations.
Capling, A., & Ravenhill, J. (2013). Australia, the United States and the
Trans-Pacific partnership: Diverging interests and unintended consequences.
Australian Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 184–196. https://doi.org/10.
1080/10361146.2013.786677.
Carmody, P. R., & Owusu, F. Y. (2007). Competing hegemons? Chinese versus
American geo-economic strategies in Africa. Political Geography, 26(5), 504–
524. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.03.005
Castle, M. (2019). Why revise? Presenting a new dataset on renegotiations in the
international trade regime. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425591.
Clark, W. R., Duchesne, E., & Meunier, S. (2000). Domestic and international
asymmetries in United States-European Union trade negotiations. Interna-
tional Negotiation, 5(1), 69–95. https://doi.org/10.1163/157180600208
48659
D’Erman, V. J. (2020). The EU’s realist power: Public procurement and

CETA negotiations with Canada. Journal of International Relations and
Development, 23(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-018-0135-3
De Bièvre, D. (2018). The paradox of weakness in European trade policy:
Contestation and resilience in CETA and TTIP negotiations. Interna-
tional Spectator, 53(3), 70–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.
1499849
De Ville, F. (2022). Global value chains and EU-East Asia trade: An antidote
for geo-economic competition? In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A
geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Drezner, D. W. (2005). Globalization, harmonization, and competition: The
different pathways to policy convergence. Journal of European Public Policy,
12(5), 841–859. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500161472.
Duchêne, F. (1973). The European community and the uncertainties of inter-
dependence. In M. Kohnstamm. & W. Hager (Eds.), A nation writ large?
foreign-policy problems before the European community (pp.1–21). MacMillan.
Dür, A. (2010). Protection for exporters. Power and discrimination in transat-
lantic trade relations, 1930–2010. Cornell University Press.
Ellis, R. E. (2005). U.S. National security implications of Chinese involvement in
Latin America. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
Elsig, M., & Dupont, C. (2012). European Union meets South Korea: Bureau-
cratic interests, exporter discrimination and the negotiations of trade agree-
ments*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(3), 492–507. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02243.x
Estevadeordal, A., Freund, C., & Ornelas, E. (2008). Does regionalism affect
trade liberalization toward nonmembers? Quarterly Journal of Economics,
123(4), 1531–1575. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.4.1531
Evenett, S. J. (2007). EU commercial policy in a multipolar trading
system. Intereconomics, 42(3), 143–155. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-
007-0217-8
Evenett, S. J., & Meier, M. (2008). An interim assessment of the US trade policy
of ‘competitive liberalization’. The World Economy, 31(1), 31–66. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01081.x.
European Commission. (2006). Global Europe, competing in the world. A
contribution to the EU’s growth & jobs strategy. COM/2006/0567 final.
European Commission. (2014). Statement by commissioner Karel De Gucht
on TTIP. European parliament plenary debate Strasbourg. 15 July 2014.
SPEECH/14/549.
European Commission. (2020). State of the Union 2020. The von der Leyen
Commission: One year on.
Garcia, M. (2013). From idealism to realism? EU preferential trade agreement
policy. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(4), 521–541.
Garrett, C. S. (2019). Constructing narratives of global order: The Obama pres-

idency, TPP, TTIP, and the contested politics of geoeconomics. Atlantic
Studies: Global Currents, 16(2), 261–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/147
88810.2018.1434107
Gilpin, R. (1971). The politics of transnational economic relations. Interna-
tional Organization, 25(3), 398–419. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208183
00026229.
Grabbe, H. (2006). The EU’s transformative power: Europeanization through
conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan.
Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique
of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization, 7 (1), 485–
507.
Grieco, J. M., Powell, R., & Snidal, D. (1993). The relative-gains problem for
international cooperation. American Political Science Review, 87 (3), 729–743.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2938747.
Hennessy, A., & Winanti, P. (2022). EU-Indonesia trade relations. In J. Adri-
aensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU trade
agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Heron, T. (2011, March). Asymmetric bargaining and development trade-offs in
the CARIFORUM-European Union economic partnership agreement. Review
of International Political Economy, 18(2015), 328–357. https://doi.org/10.
1080/09692290.2010.481916
Hilpert, H. G., & Park, S. (2022). The EU-South Korea FTA: A model example
for foreign trade policy relations? In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A
Hoang, H. H., & Garcia, M. (2022). The Vietnam-European union free trade
agreement: Victim of changing times? In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.),
A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Hoekman, B., & Sabel, C. (2019). Open plurilateral agreements, interna-
tional regulatory cooperation and the WTO. Global Policy, 10(3), 297–312.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12694
Hopewell, K. (2015). Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and
China at the World Trade Organization. Review of International Political
Economy, 22(2), 311–338.
Horn, H., Mavroidis, P. C., & Sapir, A. (2010). Beyond the WTO? An anatomy
of EU and US preferential trade agreements. World Economy, 33(11), 1565–
1588. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01273.x
Hurt, S. R. (2012, July). The EU-SADC economic partnership agreement nego-
tiations: “locking in” the neoliberal development model in southern Africa?
Third World Quarterly, 33(2014), 495–510. https://doi.org/10.1080/014
36597.2012.657486
Kerremans, B. (2022). US trade policy: Japan vs. China, from politically

economic to existential. In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-
economic turn in trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Kim, J. B. (2022a). Rules of origin: Bridging regions to withstand turbulent
times. In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade
policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Kim, S. Y. (2022b). The politics of FTAs in Asia: The role of China and
implications for EU trade policy In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.),
A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Kindleberger, C. P. (1981). Dominance and leadership in the international
economy: Exploitation, public goods, and free rides. International Studies
Quarterly, 25(2), 242–254. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600355 .
Kong, Q. (2012). China’s uncharted FTA strategy. Journal of World Trade,
46(5), 1191–1206.
Kono, D. Y. (2006). Optimal obfuscation: Democracy and trade policy trans-
parency. American Political Science Review, 100(3), 369–384.
Krasner, S. (1976). State power and the structure of international trade. World
Politics, 28(3), 317–347. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009974.
Krueger, J. (2000). The cognitive infrastructure of opportunity emergence.
Entrepreneurship: Theory and practice. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=
o&se=gglsc&d=5002357539
Luttwak, E. (1990). From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict,
grammar of commerce. National Interest, 17–23
Manger, M. (2009). Investing in protection: The politics of preferential trade
agreements between north and south. Oxford University Press
Mansfield, E. D., & Reinhardt, E. (2003). Multilateral determinants of region-
alism: The effects of GATT/WTO on the formation of preferential trading
arrangements. International Organization, 57 (4), 829–862. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0020818303574069.
Matera, M., Allison-Reumann, L., & Murray, P. (2022). Australia and the EU:
from trade tensions to FTA negotiations. In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov
(Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-
Pacific.
McKenzie, L. (2016). Market power and misunderstandings: The case of EU-
Australian trade diplomacy. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 62(2),
219–235. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12246
McKenzie, L., & Meissner, K. (2022). EU-Singapore negotiations: Overlapping
negotiations, conflicting interests? In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A
Meunier, S., & Morin, J.-F. (2015). No agreement is an Island: Negotiating
TTIP in a dense regime complex. In J.-F. Morin, T. Novotná, F. Ponjaert, &
M. Telò (Eds.), The politics of transatlantic trade negotiations: TTIP in a

globalized world (pp. 196–209). Ashgate.
Meunier, S., & Nicolaïdis, K. (2006). The European Union as conflicted trade
power. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 906–925.
Meunier, S. & Nicolaides, K. (2019). The geopoliticization of european trade
and investment policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, 57 Annual Review,
103–113.
Milewicz, K., Hollway, J., Peacock, C., & Snidal, D. (2018). Beyond trade:
The expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 62(4), 743–773. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200271
6662687
Morin, J. F. (2009). Multilateralizing TRIPs-plus agreements: Is the US strategy
a failure? Journal of World Intellectual Property, 12(3), 175–197.
Morin, J. F., & Cartwright, M. (2022). Intellectual property rights: EU and US
initiatives in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, coordination or duplication? In J.
Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade policy? EU
trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Morin, J. F., Pauwelyn, J., & Hollway, J. (2017). The trade regime as a complex
adaptive system: Exploration and exploitation of environmental norms in
trade agreements. Journal of International Economic Law, 20(2), 365–390.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgx013
Morin, J., & Rochette, M. (2017). Transatlantic convergence of preferential trade
agreements environmental clauses. Business and Politics, 19(4), 621–658.
Murray-Evens, P. (2018). Power in North–South trade negotiations making the
European union’s economic partnership agreements. Routledge.
Müller, M. T., & Seabra F. (2019). Partner country choices in China’s free
trade agreements. The Chinese Economy, 52(3), 263–278. https://doi.org/
10.1080/10971475.2018.1548143.
Narlikar, A. (2010). New powers in the club: The challenges of global trade
governance. International Affairs, 86(3), 717–728. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00907.x/pdf
Nessel, C., & Orbie, C. J. (2022). Sustainable development in EU-Asia trade
relations. In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in
trade policy? EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Oatley, T. (2011). The reductionist gamble: Open economy politics in the global
economy. International Organization, 65(02), 311–341. https://doi.org/10.
1017/S002081831100004X
Orbie, J. (2011). Promoting labour standards through trade: Normative power
or regulatory state Europe ? In R. Whitman (Ed.), Normative power Europe:
Empirical and theoretical perspectives (pp. 160–183).
Orbie, J. (2021). EU trade policy meets geopolitics: What about trade justice?
European Foreign Affairs Review, 26(2), 197–201.
Park, S. (2017). The new politics of trade negotiations: the case of the EU-Korea
FTA. Journal of European Integration, 39(7), 827–841. https://doi.org/10.
1080/07036337.2017.1371707.
Peacock, C., Milewicz, K., & Snidal, D. (2019). Boilerplate in international trade
agreements. International Studies Quarterly, 63(4), 923–937. https://doi.
org/10.1093/isq/sqz069
Poletti, A. (2018). Containment through trade? explaining the US support for
the trans-pacific partnership. In M. Clementi M, M. Dian, & B. Pisciotta
(Eds.), US foreign policy in a challenging World. Cham: Springer. https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54118-1_3.
Postnikov, E., & Bastiaens, I. (2020). Social Protectionist bias: The domestic
politics of North-South trade agreements. British Journal of Politics and
International Relations, 22(2), 347–366.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level
games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
Ravenhill, J. (2016). The political economy of an “Asian” mega-FTA: The
regional comprehensive economic partnership. Asian Survey, 56(6), 1077-
1100.
Sbragia, A. (2010). The EU, the US, and trade policy: Competitive interdepen-
dence in the management of globalization. Journal of European Public Policy,
17 (3), 368–382. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501761003662016
Scholvin, S., & Wigell, M. (2018). Power politics by economic means: Geoe-
conomics as an analytical approach and foreign policy practice. Comparative
Strategy, 37 (1), 73–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2018.1419729
Schott, J. (2003). Free trade agreements: U.S. strategies and priorities. Wash-
ington, DC Institute for International Economics.
Sheahan, L., Chaban, N., Elgström, O., & Holland, M. (2010). Benign partner
or benign master? Economic partnership agreement negotiations between the
European Union and the Pacific Islands. European Foreign Affairs Review, 15,
347–366.
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality:
EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 661–679.
Solis, M., Stallings, B., & Takada, S. N. (2009). Competitive regionalism: FTA
diffusion in the pacific rim. Palgrave MacMillan.
United States Government Accountability Office. (2004). International trade:
Intensifying free Trade negotiating agenda calls for better allocation of staff
and resources.
United States Government Accountability Office. (2007). International trade:
An analysis of free trade agreements and congressional and private sector
consultations under trade promotion authority.
Vidigal, G. (2020). A really big button that doesn’t do anything? The anti-NME
clause in US trade agreements between law and geoeconomics. Journal of
International Economic Law, 23(1), 45–64. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/
jgaa001
Ye, M. (2017). South Korea’s free trade strategy and east asian regionalism: A
multistage approach. Asian Perspective 41(1), 147-173. https://doi.org/10.
1353/apr.2017.0007.
Young, A. (2022). Product regulations: You can drive my car, otherwise let it be.
In J. Adriaensen & E. Postnikov (Eds.), A geo-economic turn in trade policy?
EU trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific.
Zimmermann, H. (2004). Governance by negotiation: The EU, the United
States and China’s integration into the world trade system. In S. A. Schirm
(Ed.), New rules for global markets: Public and private governance in the world
economy (pp. 67–86). Palgrave Macmillan.
Zimmermann, H. (2007). Realist power Europe? The EU in the negotiations
about China’s and Russia’s WTO Accession. JCMS: Journal of Common
Market Studies, 45(4), 813–832. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.
2007.00749.x
PART II
A Geo-Economic Trade Environment

CHAPTER 2
The Politics of FTAs in Asia: The Role

of China and Implications for EU Trade
Policy
Soo Yeon Kim
Introduction
The political landscape of free trade agreements in Asia raise important
questions for the European Union’s trade policy in the region. The region
is a major locus of economic activity in the global economy, involving
not only the European Union but also the United States and China. For
more than 25 years since the establishment of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), global trade has been governed by the myriad of free trade
agreements (FTAs) that together form a complex network of often over-
lapping and varying commitments to trade liberalization. FTAs in Asia
reflect this global pattern. On 15 November 2020, 15 nations from Asia
signed the largest trade pact in the world, the Regional Comprehensive
S. Y. Kim (B)
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: sooyeon.kim@nus.edu.sg
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 29

Switzerland AG 2022
J. Adriaensen and E. Postnikov (eds.), A Geo-Economic Turn
in Trade Policy?, The European Union in International Affairs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81281-2_2
30 S. Y. KIM
Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). After eight years of negoti-

ations, ASEAN’s 10 member nations and China, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and New Zealand successfully negotiated this mega-FTA, with
the notable absence of India after it withdrew from negotiations in 2019.
The other notable absence is, of course, the United States, now sitting out
in both of the region’s mega-FTAs, the RCEP and also the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement. The
RCEP economies comprise about one-third of the world’s total popula-
tion and economic output. The agreement enters into effect following
ratification by at least six ASEAN member states and three non-ASEAN
signatory countries.1
Existing scholarship has noted the ‘proliferation’ of trade agreements, a
dramatic and sustained rise in the number of FTAs that has characterized
much of the trading world since the 1990s (Mansfield, 1998). For Asia,
there is a similar upward trend; however, this took place only a decade
later, in the early years of the twenty-first century (Kim, 2015c; Solís &
Katada, 2009). This is reflective perhaps of the ASEAN Way (Acharya,
2014) and the ‘aversion’ to legalization that has characterized institutions
in the Asia-Pacific (Kahler, 2000). Figure 2.1, generated from data made
available by the WTO, shows the cumulative number of FTAs in force in
Asia, 1950–2020, that were notified to the WTO.2 They show that the
majority of FTAs in Asia came into effect in the first decade of the new
century and have been growing ever since.
Of the many state actors in Asia, the European Union’s trade policy
toward the Asian region is significantly shaped by China, the largest
economy in the region boasting a huge market for EU exports and invest-
ment. With the signing of the RCEP, the EU must also now contend with
China as a leading economy in the largest FTA in the world. Whether it is
indirectly affected by the trade war between the United States and China
or in the pursuit of its own foreign policy goals in the Asian region, the
question of China’s position in the Asian network of FTAs is likely to
impact EU trade policy going forward.
This chapter examines how Asia’s FTA network, and in particular
China’s position in these institutions, provide challenges and directions
for EU trade policy in the region. Trade relations in Asia are shaped
1 https://www.ft.com/content/2dff91bd-ceeb-4567-9f9f-c50b7876adce.
2 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx
2 THE POLITICS OF FTAS IN ASIA: THE ROLE OF CHINA … 31
Fig. 2.1 Preferential trade agreements in Asia and the world, 1948–2020
first by the context of geopolitics, namely the rise of China and its
‘assertiveness’ in pursuing projects such as the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI). Analysis of trade links between the EU and China shows
that EU countries’ imports of Chinese goods outstrips EU exports to
China. In institution-building, EU and China’s FTAs use much of the
same language in drafting their trade agreements; however, EU agree-
ments cover more issue areas and with stronger legal obligations. Moving
forward, the most important challenges for EU trade policy in Asia will
be to ensure market access for European firms navigating the two mega-
FTAs, the RCEP and CPTPP. Among the EU’s FTA partners, Japan,
Singapore, and Vietnam are pivotal as members of both mega-FTAs.
Finally, the successful conclusion of the EU–China Investment Treaty
further challenges the EU to balance the pursuit of its economic interests
with its strategic relationship with the United States.
The Strategic Context

At the center of Asia’s geopolitics is the role of China and its relations
with the major powers of the region. These include not only the United
States but also other major powers and trading nations such as India and
Japan. This section discusses the strategic context of EU trade policy in
32 S. Y. KIM
Asia, focusing on the rise of China as an ‘assertive’ actor and the most
prominent and relevant of China’s initiatives to date, namely its Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI).
An ‘Assertive’ China
The Carnegie Foundation’s China Leadership Monitor in 2010 referred
to a more ‘assertive China’ on the global stage (Swaine, 2010), some five
months ahead of the announcement that China had overtaken Japan to
become the second largest economy in the world, just behind the United
States. An ‘assertive China’ had several qualities associated with it, most
notably the transition from a low-profile actor to an anti-status quo power
offering alternative norms and policies and also an anti-Western aspect to
pronouncements from Beijing. In terms of behavior, an ‘assertive China’
can be observed, for example, in Beijing’s unwillingness to revalue its
currency following the 2008 global financial crisis. China also took an
aggressive stance against disputing parties in the South China Sea, to arms
sales to Taiwan, and Obama’s visits to the Dalai Lama (Friedberg, 2014).
It can also be observed in China’s leadership in establishing the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the announcement in 2013 of
the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), signaling Beijing’s assertiveness in seeking
cooperation on its own terms.
Transition as a key property of Chinese assertiveness means a shifting
away from active cooperation with the West and from commitment to an
open economic system. At the center of China’s assertiveness is a manifest
commitment to core national interests, a willingness to escalate tensions
where China perceives a threat to its sovereignty (Mastro, 2014). China’s
anti-Western stance is, of course, directed chiefly at the United States and
expressed in terms of challenges to US leadership in the global political
and economic arena. In material terms, Liao (2018) points to the signifi-
cant increase in military spending and power projection capability, foreign
aid, and expansion of alliance commitments around the world as markers
of China’s assertiveness. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis,
Beijing’s various diplomatic initiatives have strongly signaled a ‘transfor-
mation’ in China’s foreign policy toward an active quest for great power
status.
A consistent theme in the Chinese government’s foreign policy stance
has been a framing of ‘peace and development’ (Rolland, 2017). This
framing extends to the official narrative and representations of the Belt
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
perceived in the east, in consequence of which, and on account of
her great personal beauty, all the young men fell in love with her—
Naiogabui ordered one of her female slaves to cook a yam and take
it to the foreign canoe, and at the same time inform its owner that
she would be with him at the first opportunity. To give a further proof
of her affection she ordered all the women in Naicobocobo to have a
day’s fishing. This order having been promptly executed, and the fish
cooked, Naiogabui herself swam off with it during the night and
presented it to the Rewa god.
“Ravovonicakaugawa was charmed with the princess and ready
to start with her at once. She, however, begged him to wait another
night to enable Naimilamila, one of Rokoua’s young wives, to
accompany them. Naimilamila was a native of Naicobocobo, and,
against her will, united to Rokoua, who had no affection whatever for
her, and kept her exclusively to scratch his head or play with his
locks—hence her name. Dissatisfied with her sad lot, she had
concocted with her stepdaughter a plan for escape, and was making
active preparations to carry it into execution. On the night agreed
upon, Naimilamila was true to her engagement. ‘Who are you?’
asked the god as she stepped on the deck. ‘I am Rokoua’s wife,’ she
rejoined. ‘Get your canoe under weigh; my lord may follow closely on
my heels; and Naiogabui will be with us immediately.’ Almost directly
afterwards a splash in the water was heard. ‘There she comes,’ cried
Naimilamila, ‘make sail;’ and instantly the canoe, with
Ravovonicakaugawa, his friend, and the two women, departed for
Rewa.
“Next morning, when Rokoua discovered the elopement, he
determined to pursue the fugitives, and for that purpose embarked in
the ‘Vatateilali,’ a canoe deriving its name from his large drum, the
sound of which was so powerful that it could he heard all over Figi.
His club and spear were put on board, both of which were of such
gigantic dimensions and weight that it took ten men to lift either of
them. Rokoua soon reached Nukuilailai, where he took the spear
out, and making a kind of bridge of it walked over it on shore. Taking
spear and club in his hand, he musingly walked along. ‘It will never
do to be at once discovered,’ he said to himself. ‘I must disguise
myself. But what shape shall I assume? that of a hog or a dog? As a
hog I should not be allowed to come near the door; and as a dog I
should have to pick the bones thrown outside. Neither will answer
my purpose; I shall therefore assume the shape of a woman.’
Continuing his walk along the beach he met an old woman carrying a
basket of taro and puddings ready cooked, and without letting her be
at all aware of it, he exchanged figures with her. He then enquired
whither she was going, and being informed to the house of the god
of Rewa, he took the basket from her, and leaving club and spear on
the beach, proceeded to his destination. His disguise was so
complete that even his own daughter did not recognize him. ‘Who is
that?’ she asked as he was about to enter. ‘It is I,’ replied Rokoua in
a feigned voice; ‘I have come from Monisa with food.’ ‘Come in, old
lady,’ said Naiogabui, ‘and sit down.’ Rokoua accordingly entered
and took care to sit like a Figian woman would do, so that his
disguise might not be discovered. ‘Are you going back to-night?’ he
was asked. ‘No,’ the disguised god replied, ‘there is no occasion for
that.’ Finding it very close in the house, Rokoua proposed a walk and
a bath, to which both Naiogabui and Naimilamila agreed. When
getting the women to that spot of the beach where club and spear
had been left, he threw off his disguise and exclaimed, ‘You little
knew who I was; I am Rokoua, your lord and master;’ and at the
same time taking hold of their hands, he dragged the runaways to
the canoe and departed homewards.
“When the Rewa god found his women gone he again started for
Naicobocobo, where, as he wore no disguise, he was instantly
recognised, his canoe taken and dragged on shore by Rokoua’s
men, while he himself and his faithful friend, who again accompanied
him, were seized and made pig drivers. They were kept in this
degrading position a long time until a great festival took place in
Vanua Levu which Rokoua and his party attended. Arrived at the
destination the Rewa god and his friends were left in charge of the
two canoes that had carried the party thither, whilst all the others
went on shore to enjoy themselves; but as both friends were liked by
all the women they were kept amply supplied with food and other
good things during the festival. Nevertheless Ravovonicakaugawa
was very much cast down, and taking a kava root he offered it as a
sacrifice, and despairingly exclaimed, ‘Have none of the mighty gods
of Rewa pity on my misfortune?’ His friend’s body became instantly
possessed by a god, and began to tremble violently. ‘What do you
want?’ asked the god within. ‘A gale to frighten my oppressors out of
their wits.’ ‘It shall be granted,’ replied the god, and departed.
“The festival being over, Rokoua’s party embarked for
Naicobocobo; but it had hardly set sail when a strong northerly gale
sprung up, which nearly destroyed the canoes and terribly frightened
those on board. Still they reached Naicobocobo, where the Rewa
god prayed for an easterly wind to carry him home. All Rokoua’s
men having landed and left the women behind to carry the goods
and luggage on shore, the desired wind sprang up, and the two
canoes, with sails set, started for Rewa, where they safely arrived,
and the goats and other property were landed and distributed as
presents among the people. But Rokoua was not to be beaten thus.
Although his two canoes had been taken there was still the one
taken from Ravovonicakaugawa on his second visit to Naicobocobo:
that was launched without delay and the fugitives pursued. Arriving
at Nukuilailai, Rokoua laid his spear on the deck of the canoe and
walked on shore, as he had done on a previous occasion. Landed,
he dropped his heavy club, thereby causing so loud a noise that it
woke all the people in Viti Levu. This noise did not escape the quick
ear of Naimilamila. ‘Be on your guard,’ she said to her new lord;
‘Rokoua is coming; I heard his club fall; he can assume any shape
he pleases, be a dog, or a pig, or a woman; he can command even
solid rocks to split open and admit him; so be on your guard.’
Rokoua, meanwhile, met a young girl from Nadoo on the road,
carrying shrimps, landcrabs, and taro to the house of the god of
Rewa, and without hesitation he assumed her shape, and she took
his without being herself aware of it. Arriving with his basket at his
destination, Naiogabui asked, ‘Who is there?’ To which Rokoua
replied, ‘It is me; I am from Nadoo, bringing food for your husband.’
The supposed messenger was asked into the house, and sitting
down he imprudently assumed a position not proper to Figian
women; this and the shape of his limbs was noticed by Naiogabui,
who whispered the discovery made into her husband’s ear.
Ravovonicakaugawa stole out of the house, assembled his people,
recalled to their minds the indignities heaped upon him by Rokoua,
and having worked them up to a high pitch of excitement, he
informed them that the offender was now in their power. All rushed to
arms, and entering the house they demanded the young girl from
Nadoo. ‘There she sits,’ replied Naiogabui, pointing to her father; and
no sooner had the words been spoken than a heavy blow with a club
felled Rokoua to the ground. A general onset followed in which the
head of the victim was beaten to atoms. This was the end of
Rokoua.”
According to the evidence of Turner and other reliable Polynesian
travellers, the entrance to the Hades of the Samoans was supposed
to be a circular basin among the rocks at the west end of Savaii.
Savaii is the most westerly island of the group. When a person was
near death, it was thought that the house was surrounded by a host
of spirits, all waiting to take the soul away to their subterranean
home at the place referred to; if at night the people of the family were
afraid to go out of doors, lest they should be snatched away by some
of these invisible powers. As soon as the spirit left the body, it was
supposed to go in company with this band of spirits direct to the west
end of Savaii. If it was a person residing on one of the more easterly
islands of the group—on Upolu, for example—they travelled on by
land to the west end of the island, not to a Charon, but to a great
stone called “the stone to leap from.” It was thought that the spirits
here leaped into the sea, swam to the island of Monono, crossed the
land to the west point of that island, again leaped from another stone
there, swam to Savaii, crossed fifty miles of country there again, and,
at length, reached the Hafa, or entrance to their imaginary world of
spirits. There was a cocoa-nut tree near this spot, and it was
supposed that if the spirit happened to come in contact with the tree
it returned, and the person who seemed to be dead revived and
recovered. If, however, the spirit did not strike against the tree, it
went down the Hafa at once. At this place, on Savaii, there are two
circular basins, not many feet deep, still pointed out as the place
where the spirits went down. One, which is the larger of the two, was
supposed to be for chiefs, the other for common people. These lower
regions were reported to have a heaven, an earth, and a sea, and
people with real bodies, planting, fishing, cooking, and otherwise
employed, just as in the present life. At night their bodies were
supposed to change their form, and become like a confused
collection of sparks of fire. In this state, and during the hours of
darkness, they were said to ascend and revisit their former places of
abode, retiring at early dawn, either to the bush or back to the lower
regions. It was supposed these spirits had power to return and cause
disease and death in other members of the family. Hence all were
anxious as a person drew near the close of life to part on good terms
with him, feeling assured that, if he died with angry feelings towards
any one, he would certainly return and bring some calamity upon
that very person, or some one closely allied to him. This was
considered a frequent source of disease and death, viz., the spirit of
a departed member of the family returning, and taking up his abode
in the head, or chest, or stomach of the party, and so causing
sickness and death. The spirits of the departed were also supposed
to come and talk through a certain member of the family,
prophesying various events, or giving directions as to certain family
affairs. If a man died suddenly, it was thought that he was eaten by
the spirits that took him. His soul was said to go to the common
residence of the departed; only it was thought that such persons had
not the power of speech, and could only, in reply to a question, beat
their breasts. The chiefs were supposed to have a separate place
allotted them, and to have plenty of the best food and other
indulgences. Saveasuileo was the great king, or Pluto, of these
subterranean regions, and to him all yielded the profoundest
homage. He was supposed to have the head of a man, and the
upper part of his body reclining in a great house in company with the
spirits of departed chiefs. The extremity of his body was said to
stretch away into the sea, in the shape of an eel or serpent. He ruled
the destinies of war, and other affairs. His great house or temple was
supported, not by pillars of wood or stone, but by columns of living
men.
Samoan Idol Worship.
At his birth every Samoan was supposed to be taken under the
care of some tutelary or protecting god, or aitu, as it was called. The
help of perhaps half a dozen different gods was invoked in
succession on the occasion; but the one who happened to be
addressed just as the child was born, was marked, and declared to
be the child’s god for life. The gods were supposed to appear in
some visible incarnation, and the particular thing in which his god
was in the habit of appearing was to the Samoan an object of
veneration. It was in fact his idol, and he was careful never to injure it
or treat it with contempt. One, for instance, saw his god in the eel,
another in the shark, another in the turtle, another in the dog,
another in the owl, another in the lizard, and so on throughout all the
fish of the sea, and birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping
things. In some of the shell fish even gods were supposed to be
present. A man would eat freely of what was regarded as the
incarnation of the god of another man, but the incarnation of his own
particular god he would consider it death to injure or to eat. The god
was supposed to avenge the insult by taking up his abode in that
person’s body, and causing to generate there the very thing which he
had eaten, until it produced death. This class of genii, or tutelary
deities, they call aitu-fule, or god of the house. The father of the
family was the high priest, and usually offered a short prayer at the
evening meal, that they might all be kept from sickness, war, and
death. Occasionally, too, he would direct that they have a family
feast in honour of their household gods; and on these occasions a
cup of their intoxicating ava-draught was poured out as a drink-
offering. They did this in their family house, where they all
assembled, supposing that their gods had a spiritual presence there,
as well as in the material objects to which we have referred. Often it
was supposed that the god came among them, and spoke through
the father or some other member of the family, telling them what to
do in order to remove a present evil, or avert a threatened one.
Sometimes it would be that the family should get a canoe built, and
keep it sacred to the god. They might travel in it and use it
themselves, but it was death to sell or part with a canoe which had
been built specially for the god. Another class of Samoan deities
may be called gods of the town or village. Every village had its god,
and every one born in that village was regarded as the property of
that god. “I have got a child for so and so,” a woman would say on
the birth of her child, and name the village god. There was a small
house or temple also consecrated to the deity of the place. Where
there was no formal temple, the great house of the village where the
chiefs were in the habit of assembling was the temple for the time
being, as occasion required.
In their temples they had generally something for the eye to rest
upon with superstitious veneration. In one might be seen a conch
shell suspended from the roof in a basket made of sinnet network,
and this the god was supposed to blow when he wished the people
to rise to war. In another, two stones were kept. In another,
something resembling the head of a man, with white streamers
flying, was raised on a pole at the door of the temple, on the usual
day of worship. In another, a cocoa-nut shell drinking cup was
suspended from the roof, and before it prayers were addressed and
offerings presented. This cup was also used in oaths. If they wished
to find out a thief, the suspected parties were assembled before the
chiefs, the cup sent for, and each would approach, lay his hand on it
and say, “With my hand on this cup, may the god look upon me and
send swift destruction if I took the thing which has been stolen.” They
firmly believed that it would be death to touch the cup and tell a lie.
The priests in some cases were the chiefs of the place; but in
general some one in a particular family claimed the privilege, and
professed to declare the will of the god. His office was hereditary. He
fixed the days for the annual feasts in honour of the deity, received
the offerings, and thanked the people for them. He decided also
whether or not the people might go to war. The offerings were
principally cooked food. The first cup was in honour of the god. It
was either poured out on the ground or waved towards the heavens.
The chiefs all drank a portion out of the same cup, according to rank;
and after that, the food brought as an offering was divided and
eaten, “there before the Lord.” This feast was annual, and frequently
about the month of May. In some places it passed off quietly, in
others it was associated with games, sham fights, night dances, etc.,
and lasted for days. In time of war special feasts were ordered by the
priests. Of the offerings on war occasions, women and children were
forbidden to partake, as it was not their province to go to battle. They
supposed it would bring sickness and death on the party eating who
did not go to the war, and hence were careful to bury or throw into
the sea whatever food was over after the festival. In some places the
feasts, in honour of the god, were regulated by the appearance in
the settlement of the bird which was thought to be the incarnation of
the god. Whenever the bird was seen, the priest would say that the
god had come, and fixed upon a day for this entertainment. The
village gods, like those of the household, had all some particular
incarnation; one was supposed to appear as a bat, another as a
heron, another as an owl. If a man found a dead owl by the roadside,
and if that happened to be the incarnation of his village god, he
would sit down and weep over it, and beat his forehead with stones
till the blood flowed. This was thought pleasing to the deity. Then the
bird would be wrapped up, and buried with care and ceremony, as if
it were a human body. This, however, was not the death of the god.
He was supposed to be yet alive and incarnate in all the owls in
existence. The flight of these birds was observed in the time of war.
If the bird flew before them it was a signal to go on; but if it crossed
the path, it was a bad omen, and a sign to retreat. Others saw their
village god in the rainbow, others saw him in the shooting star; and in
time of war the position of a rainbow and the direction of a shooting
star were always ominous.
Throughout Polynesia the ordinary medium of communicating or
extending supernatural powers was the red feather of a small bird
found in many of the islands and the beautiful long tail-feathers of
the tropic or man-of-war-bird. For these feathers the gods were
supposed to have a strong predilection: they were the most valuable
offerings that could be presented to them; the power or influence of
the god was imparted, and through them transferred to the objects to
which they might be attached. Among the numerous ceremonies
observed, the palatua was one of the most conspicuous. On these
occasions the gods were all brought out of the temple, the sacred
coverings removed, scented oils were applied to the images, and
they were exposed to the sun. At these seasons the parties who
wished their emblems of deity to be impregnated with the essence of
the gods, repaired to the ceremony with a number of red feathers
which they delivered to the officiating priest.
Polynesian Idol.
The wooden idols being generally hollow, the feathers were
deposited in the inside of the image, which was filled with them.
Many idols, however, were solid pieces of wood bound or covered
with finely braided cinnet of the fibres of the cocoa-nut husk; to these
the feathers were attached on the outside by small fibrous bands. In
return for the feathers thus united to the god, the parties received
two or three of the same kind, which had been deposited on a former
festival in the inside of a wooden or inner fold of a cinnet idol. These
feathers were thought to possess all the properties of the images to
which they had been attached, and a supernatural influence was
supposed to be infused into them. They were carefully wound round
with very fine cinnet, the extremities alone remaining visible. When
this was done, the new made gods were placed before the larger
images, from which they had been taken, and, lest their detachment
should induce the god to withhold his power, the priest addresses a
prayer to the principal deities, requesting them to abide in the red
feathers before them. At the close of his ubu, or invocation, he
declared that they were dwelt in or inhabited (by the god), and
delivered them to the parties who had brought the red feathers. The
feathers taken home were deposited in small bamboo canes,
excepting when addressed in prayer. If prosperity attended their
owner, it was attributed to their influence, and they were usually
honoured with an image, into which they were enwrought, and
subsequently perhaps an altar and a rude temple were erected for
them. In the event, however, of their being attached to an image, this
must be taken to the large temple, that the supreme idols might
sanction the transfer of their influence.
Animals, fruits, etc., were not the only articles presented to the
idols: the most affecting part of their sacrificing was the frequent
immolation of human victims. These sacrifices, in the technical
language of the priests, were called fish. They were offered in
seasons of war, at great national festivals, during the illness of their
rulers, and on the erection of their temples. Travellers have been
informed by the inhabitants of the town of Maeva, that the foundation
of some of the buildings for the abode of their gods was actually laid
in human sacrifices, that every pillar supporting the roof of one of the
sacred houses at Maeva was planted upon the body of a man who
had been offered as a victim to the sanguinary deity about to be
deposited there. The unhappy wretches selected, were either
captives taken in war or individuals who had rendered themselves
obnoxious to the chiefs or the priests. When they were wanted, a
stone was, at the request of the priest, sent by the king to the chief of
the district from which the victims were required. If the stone was
received, it was an indication of an intention to comply with the
requisition. It is a singular fact that the cruelty of the practice
extended, not only to individuals, but to families and districts. When
an individual has been taken as a sacrifice, the family to which he
belonged was regarded as tabu, or devoted; and when another was
required, it was more frequently taken from that family than any
other; and a district from which sacrifices had been taken was in the
same way considered as devoted, and hence, when it was known
that any ceremonies were near on which human sacrifices were
usually offered, the members of tabu families or others who had
reason to fear they were selected, fled to the mountains and hid
themselves in the dens and caverns till the ceremony was over.
In general the victim was unconscious of his doom until suddenly
struck down by a blow from a club or a stone, sometimes from the
hand of the very chief on whom he was depending as a guest for the
rights of hospitality. He was usually murdered on the spot, his body
placed in a long basket of cocoa-nut leaves, and carried to the
temple. Here it was offered, not by consuming it with fire, but by
placing it before the idol. The priest in dedicating it, took out one of
the eyes, placed it on a plantain leaf, and handed it to the king, who
raised it to his mouth as if desirous to eat it, but passed it to one of
the priests or attendants stationed near him for the purpose of
receiving it. At intervals, during the prayers, some of the hair was
plucked off and placed before the god, and when the ceremony was
over, the body was wrapped in the basket of cocoa-nut leaves, and
frequently deposited on the branches of an adjacent tree. After
remaining a considerable time it was taken down, and the bones
buried beneath the rude pavement of the marae or temple. These
horrid rites were not unfrequent, and the number offered at their
great festivals was truly appalling.
The most remarkable institution prevailing among the inhabitants
of the islands of the southern seas is that known as tabu or tapu.
Although it could only be imposed by a priest, and a religious motive
was invariably assigned for its imposition, there can be little doubt
that its chief use was civil; and though, as in all state engines, the
component parts of which are multitudinous and of as diverse a
character as selfish interest can make them, abuse and depravity will
appear, still there can be no question that in its working the tabu is
an institution not to be hastily thrown aside or abolished. To quote
the words of Ellis, “the tabu forms an important and essential part of
a cruel system of idolatry, and is one of the strongest means of its
support.” This may be so far true, but at the same time, inasmuch as
it affects the proper government, the tranquillity, the very daily bread
of an idolatrous country, it is a thing to meet with tender
consideration, unless, indeed, because a nation is idolatrous, it is to
be straight stirred to rebellion, and driven to famine and death. It is
fair to regard tabu, not as a purely religious institution, but as a
political institution, propped and upheld by the most influential men in
the country, the priests, who, in their turn, are backed by the
kiaimoku (island keepers), a kind of police officers, who are
appointed by the king, and empowered to carry out the commands of
the priest, though the lives of offenders be blotted out at the same
time. Thus blended, does “Church and State” form a quickset hedge,
pleasant to the sight,—for the profusion of the “rewards” to come,
promised by the holy men to the faithful, cover it as it were with
green leaves, hidden among which are the thorns—the spears of the
king’s servants, not insolently thrust out, but modestly retiring and
challenging a brush with no man; altogether, however, it is a hedge
that no savage may break, and which, for heaven knows how many
hundreds of years, myriads of savages have been content to regard
harmlessly, passing their lives in the shadow of it.
In most of the Polynesian dialects the usual meaning of the word
tabu is sacred. “It does not, however,” says Ellis, “imply any moral
quality, but expresses a connection with the gods or a separation
from ordinary purposes and exclusive appropriation to persons or
things considered sacred.” Those chiefs who trace their genealogy to
the gods are called arii tabu chiefs, sacred from their supposed
connection with the gods. It is a distinct word from rahui, to prohibit,
and is opposed to the word, noa, which means general or common.
Hence the system which prohibited the females from eating with the
men, and from eating, except on special occasions, any part of
animals ever offered in sacrifice to the gods, while it allowed the men
to partake of them, was called the ai tabu, eating sacred.
This appears to be the legitimate meaning of the word tabu,
though the natives when talking with foreigners use it more
extensively, and apply it to everything prohibited or improper. This,
however, is only to accommodate the latter, as they use kaukau (a
word of Chinese origin) instead of the native word for eat, and
picaninny for small, supposing they are better understood.
The antiquity of tabu was equal to the other branches of that
superstition, of which it formed so component a part, and its
application was both general and particular, occasional and
permanent. Speaking of the custom as observed in Figi, Mr. Williams
says, “It is the secret of power and the strength of despotic rule. It
affects things both great and small. Here it is seen tending a brood of
chickens, and there it directs the energies of a kingdom. Its influence
is wondrously diffused. Coasts, lands, rivers, and seas; animals,
fruits, fish, and vegetables; houses, beds, pots, cups, and dishes;
canoes, and with all that belong to them, with their management,
dress, ornaments, and arms; things to eat, and things to drink; the
members of the body, manners and customs; language, names,
temper, and even the gods also; all come under the influence of the
tabu. It is put into operation by religious, political, or selfish motives,
and idleness lounges for months beneath its sanction. Many are thus
forbidden to raise their hands or extend their arms in any useful
employment for a long time. In this district it is tabu to build canoes;
on that island it is tabu to erect good houses. The custom is much in
favour with chiefs, who adjust it so that it sits easily on themselves,
while they use it to gain influence over those who are nearly their
equals: by it they supply many of their wants, and command at will
all who are beneath them. In imposing a tabu, a chief need only be
checked by a care that he is countenanced by ancient precedents.
Persons of small importance borrow the shade of the system, and
endeavour by its aid to place their yam beds and plantain plots within
a sacred prohibition.”
Ellis continues in the same tone of banter. “The tabu seasons
were either common or strict. During a common tabu the men were
only required to abstain from their usual avocations and attend at the
temple, when the prayers were offered every morning and evening;
but during the season of strict tabu, every fire and light on the island
must be extinguished, no canoe must be launched on the water, no
person must bathe; and except those whose attendance was
required at the temple, no individual must be seen out of doors; no
dog must bark, no pig must grunt, no cock must crow, or the tabu
would be broken and fail to accomplish the object designed. On
these occasions they tied up the mouths of the dogs and pigs, and
put the fowls under a calabash or fastened a piece of cloth over their
eyes. All the common people prostrated themselves with their faces
touching the ground before the sacred chiefs when they walked out,
particularly during tabu; and neither the king nor the priests were
allowed to touch anything; even their food was put into their mouths
by another person. The tabu was imposed either by proclamation,
when the crier or herald of the priests went round, generally in the
evening, requiring every light to be extinguished, the path by the sea
to be left for the king, the paths inland to be left for the gods, etc. The
people, however, were generally prepared, having had previous
warning, though this was not always the case. Sometimes it was laid
on by fixing certain marks, called unu unu, the purport of which was
well understood, on things tabued. When the fish of a certain part
are tabued, a small pole is fixed in the rocks on the coast in the
centre of the place, to which is tied a bunch of bamboo leaves on a
piece of white cloth. A cocoa-nut leaf is tied to the stem of the tree
when the fruit is tabued. The hogs which were tabued, having been
devoted to the gods, had a piece of cinnet woven through a
perforation in one of their ears. The females in particular must have
felt the degrading and humiliating effects of the tabu in its full force.
From its birth the child, if a female, was not allowed a particle of food
that had been kept in the father’s dish or cooked at his fire; and the
little boy, after being weaned, was fed with his father’s food, and as
soon as he was able sat down to meals with his father, while his
mother was not only obliged to take her meals in the outhouse, but
was interdicted from tasting the kind of which he ate.”
At the time when Mariner was traversing Polynesia and became a
guest of King Finow’s, he happened to witness the ceremony of
removing a tapu, which for certain reasons had been laid on hogs.
The places appropriated for this ceremony were two marleys and the
grave of Tooitonga. For distinction’s sake, we shall call the first
marley Tooitonga’s, and the second Finow’s. Tooitonga’s marley is
near Finow’s residence, and on this were erected four columns of
yams in the following manner:—Four poles about eighteen feet long
were fixed upright in the ground, to the depth of a few feet, at about
four feet distance from each other, in a quadrangular form, the
spaces between them all the way to the top being crossed by smaller
poles about six inches distant from each other, and lashed on by the
bark of the fow (species of the Hibiscus), the interior of this erection
being filled up as they went with yams; and afterwards other upright
poles were lashed on to the top, with cross pieces in like manner, still
piling up the yams; then a third set of poles, etc., till the column of
yams was about fifty or sixty feet high, when on the top of all was
placed a cold baked pig. Four such columns were erected, one at
each corner of the marley, the day before the ceremony, and three or
four hundred hogs were killed and about half baked. The following
day the hogs were carried to the king’s marley, about a quarter of a
mile off, and placed upon the ground before the house, as well as
four or five wooden cars or sledges full of yams, each holding about
five hundred. While this was doing, the people assembling from all
quarters, those who were already arrived sat themselves down
round the king’s marley. Occasionally some of them got up to amuse
themselves, and the rest of the company, by wrestling with one
another. The king and his chiefs, all dressed in plaited gnatoo, were
already seated in the house, viewing what was going forward. The
company being at length all arrived, and having seated themselves,
the king gave notice that the ceremony was to begin. The young
chiefs and warriors, and those who prided themselves in their
strength, then got up singly and endeavoured in turns to carry off the
largest hog. When one failed, another tried, then a third, and so on
till every one that chose had made a trial of his strength. To carry
one of the largest hogs is not a thing easy to be done, on account of
its greasiness as well as its weight, but it affords a considerable
share of diversion to see a man embracing a large fat, baked hog,
and endeavouring to raise it on his shoulder. As the hog was found
too heavy for one man’s strength, it was carried away by two, whilst
a third followed with its liver. They were deposited on the ground
near Tooitonga’s marley, where the men waited till the other hogs
were brought. In the mean time the trial was going on with the
second hog, which being found also too heavy for one man, was
carried away by two in like manner, and so on with the third, fourth,
etc., the largest being carried away first and the least last. The
second, third, fourth, etc., afforded more sport than the first, as being
a nearer counterbalance with a man’s strength. Sometimes he had
got it nearly upon his shoulder, when his greasy burden slipped
through his arms, and his endeavour to save it brought him down
after it. It is an honour to attempt these things, and even the king
sometimes put his hand to it. The small hogs and pigs afforded no
diversion, as they were easily lifted and carried away, each by one
man, and deposited, not at the outside of Tooitonga’s marley along
with the largest hogs, but carried at once into it, where the cars of
yams were also dragged, one at a time. When everything was thus
cleared from the king’s marley, the company got up and proceeded
to the other marley, where they again seated themselves, whilst
Tooitonga presided, and the king and his chiefs, out of respect, sat
on the outside of the ring among the great body of the people. The
large hogs which had been deposited in the neighbourhood of the
marley were now to be brought in each by one man, and as it had
been found that one man’s strength was not sufficient to raise any of
them upon his shoulders, two others were allowed to lift the hog and
place it upon his shoulders for him, and then he tottered in with his
load, followed by another man with the liver; and in this manner all
the hogs and their livers were carried in and deposited in two or
three rows before Tooitonga. Their number was then counted by the
head cooks of Tooitonga and Finow, and announced aloud to
Tooitonga by his own head cook; the number of cars and piles of
yams was also announced at the same time.
This being done, about twenty of the largest hogs were carried to
Tooitonga’s burying-place, nearly a hundred yards distant; those
which were too heavy for one man to lift being put upon his
shoulders by two others, etc., as before, and deposited near the
grave; one car of yams was also taken and left in like manner. This
portion of pork and yam being disposed of, the remainder was
shared in the following manner: one column of yams was allotted to
the king, to be removed in the afternoon, and to be disposed of as he
pleased (he always shares it among his chiefs and fighting men);
another column was allotted to Veachi and two or three other chiefs;
the third was given to the gods (the priests always take care of this
portion); and the fourth Tooitonga claimed for his own share. As to
the cars of yams, they were never inquired after. Tooitonga generally
takes care of them, and appropriates them to his own use and that of
his numerous household, not that he has any legal right to them
beyond custom and silent consent. The hogs were disposed of in like
manner; the greatest quantity to the greatest chiefs, who share them
out to the chiefs immediately below them in rank, and these again to
their dependants, till every man in the island gets at least a mouthful
of pork and yam. The ceremony now concluded with dancing,
wrestling, etc.; after which every person present having secured his
portion retired to his home to share it with his family. From this
moment the tabu, or prohibition upon hogs, fowls, and cocoa-nuts,
was null and void.
In New Zealand, although the principle of the institution of tapu is
much the same as in other islands of the Polynesian group, its
application differs in so many and such essential particulars as to
make it worth while to devote a few pages, chiefly supplied from
Taylor, Thompson, and other New Zealand missionaries and
travellers of distinction.
During the time of tapu a man could not be touched by any one,
or even put his own hand to his head himself; but he was either fed
by another who was appointed for the purpose, or took up his food
with his mouth from a small stage, with his hands behind him, or by a
fern stalk, and thus conveyed it to his mouth. In drinking, the water
was poured in a very expert manner from a calabash into his mouth,
or on his hands when he needed it for washing, so that he should not
touch the vessel, which otherwise could not have been used again
for ordinary purposes. Places were tapued for certain periods—rivers
until the fishing was ended, cultivation until the planting or reaping
was completed, districts until either the hunting of the rat or catching
of birds was done, woods until the fruit of the kie-kie was gathered.
A person became tapu by touching a dead body or by being very
ill; in this respect it appears to bear a very close resemblance to the
Mosaic law relating to uncleanness.
The garments of an ariki, or high chief, were tapu, as well as
everything relating to him; they could not be worn by any one else
lest they should kill him. “An old chief in my company,” says Mr.
Williams, “threw away a very good mat because it was too heavy to
carry; he cast it down a precipice. When I inquired why he did not
leave it suspended on a tree, that any future traveller wanting a
garment might take it, he gravely told me that it was the fear of its
being worn by another which had caused him to throw it where he
did, for if it were worn by another his tapu would kill the person. In
the same way the tinder-box of a great chief killed several persons
who were so unfortunate as to find it, and light their pipes from it
without knowing it belonged to so sacred an owner; they actually
died from fright. If the blood of a high chief flows (though it be a
single drop) on anything, it renders that tapu. A party of natives
came to see Te Hewhew, the great chief of Taupo, in a fine large new
canoe. Te Hewhew got into it to go a short distance; in doing so he
struck a splinter into his foot, the blood flowed from the wound into
the canoe, which at once tapued it to him. The owner immediately
jumped out and dragged it on shore opposite the chief’s house, and
there left it. A gentleman entering my house, struck his head against
the beam and made the blood flow; the natives present said that in
former times the house would have belonged to that individual. To
draw blood, even from a scratch, was a very serious matter, and
often was attended with fatal consequence.”
A chief’s house was tapu; no person could eat therein, or even
light his pipe from the fire, and until a certain service had been gone
through, even a woman could not enter. The chief being sacred had
his food to himself, generally in his verandah, or apart from the rest.
No chief could carry food, lest it should occasion his death by
destroying his tapu, or lest a slave should eat of it, and so cause him
to die. A chief would not pass under a stage or wata (a food store).
The head of the chief was the most sacred part; if he only touched it
with his fingers, he was obliged immediately to apply them to his
nose, and snuff up the sanctity which they had acquired by the
touch, and thus restore it to the part from whence it was taken. For
the same reason a chief could not blow the fire with his mouth, for
the breath being sacred communicated his sanctity with the fire, and
a brand might be taken from it by a slave, or a man of another tribe,
or the fire might be used for other purposes, such as cooking, and so
cause his death. The chief power, however, of this institution was
principally seen in its effects on the multitude.
In former times, life in a great measure depended upon the
produce of their cultivations; therefore it was of the utmost
importance that their kumara and taro should be planted at the
proper season, and that every other occupation should be laid aside
until that necessary work was accomplished. All, therefore, who were
thus employed were made tapu, so that they could not leave the
place, or undertake any other work, until that was finished. So also in
fishing and hunting; and this applied not only to those thus
employed, but to others. The kumara grounds were tapu; no strange
natives could approach them. Even the people of the place, if not
engaged in the work, were obliged to stand at a distance from the
ground thus rendered sacred by solemn karikia. Doubtless this was
a wise precaution to avoid interruptions, and to keep them from
stealing. No one but the priest could pass in front of the party
engaged in gathering in the kumara; those who presumed to do so
would be either killed or stripped for their temerity. The woods in
which they hunted the rat were tapu until the sport was over, and so
were the rivers; no canoe could pass by till the rabue (generally a
pole with an old garment tied to it) was taken down. In the early days
of the mission, this was a great annoyance; the members of the
mission were often unable to communicate with each other until the
dreaded pole was removed; but at last they determined to observe
the tapu no longer: the boat was manned, and they rowed along in
defiance of the sacred prohibition. They had not gone far, however,
before they were pursued, the boat was taken ashore, and all the
articles in it were seized, amongst which were some bottles of
medicine and pots of preserves. These were immediately eaten, and
great wrath and indignation expressed; but by preserving a firm
deportment, the natives were conquered; the medicine perhaps had
its share in obtaining the victory, as they found they could not
meddle with the Europeans with impunity. They held a meeting, and
it was then resolved that, for the future, as Europeans were a foreign
race and subject to a different religion, the tapu should not apply to

A Geo Economic Turn in Trade Policy Eu Trade Agreements in The Asia Pacific Johan Adriaensen Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Geo Economic Turn in Trade Policy Eu Trade Agreements in The Asia Pacific Johan Adriaensen Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Geo-Economic Turn in Trade Policy?

More information about this series at

ISSN 2662-5911 ISSN 2662-592X (electronic)

Administrative support by Lorenzo Mariani, Martijn Custers and Aslak

Maastricht, The Netherlands Johan Adriaensen

Part II A Geo-Economic Trade Environment

Part III Designing Geo-Economic Trade Agreements

6 Most-Favoured Nation Clauses: A Double-Edged

Part IV Case Studies

Johan Adriaensen Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht

Jong Bum Kim Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei

Fig. 1.1 Number of newspaper articles covering trade negotiations

Fig. 11.2 The EU’s top 10 trading partners and Australia

Table 2.1 EU’s trade agreement partners in Asia 40

Table 9.5 Civil Society Index, long version 216

Geo-economic Motives and the Negotiation

Johan Adriaensen and Evgeny Postnikov

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Commission, 2020), suggests this rhetoric has moved beyond political

the EU and countries of the Asia-Pacific, an economically significant area

Geo-economics and the IPE of Trade

and Wigell (2018) therefore highlight the importance of specifying the

Power in Trade Negotiations

these analyses gave due attention to the idea of geo-economic compe-

Analyzing the Geo-economic

process and outcome of the negotiations. If we assume that geo-economic

Selecting a Negotiating Partner

of the United States and Kong (2012) provides an overview of China’s

Bargaining Power During Negotiations

Harnessing Externalities in the Design of FTAs

Obviously, the three dimensions are not independent from one

Research Design and Structure of the Book

realization of strategic objectives. This necessitates the inclusion of chap-

The third section of the volume, then, investigates how geo-economic

Antkiewicz, A., & Momani, B. (2009). Pursuing geopolitical stability through

D’Erman, V. J. (2020). The EU’s realist power: Public procurement and

Garrett, C. S. (2019). Constructing narratives of global order: The Obama pres-

Kerremans, B. (2022). US trade policy: Japan vs. China, from politically

M. Telò (Eds.), The politics of transatlantic trade negotiations: TTIP in a

A Geo-Economic Trade Environment

The Politics of FTAs in Asia: The Role

Soo Yeon Kim

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 29

Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). After eight years of negoti-

The Strategic Context

You might also like