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Lü Peng

A History of China in the 20th Century

Lü Peng
China Academy of Art, Hangzhou, China

Translated by
Bruce Doar
Sydney, Australia

ISBN 978-981-99-0733-5 e-ISBN 978-981-99-0734-2

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0734-2

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license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023

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This book is dedicated to my wife, Hu Jielan, and my daughter, Lü Jing.
Acknowledgments
There are so many names to write down of people who have helped me
with my writing that I can only express my thanks here as follows:
For decades, my university classmates Tang Buyun and Sun Yujing
have been discussants and helpers in my writing, especially in their
opinions and views—on China’s history and the changes of recent
decades, which have always strengthened, changed, or consolidated my
writing, and their support for my research endeavors has been both
ideological and practical in nature and has constituted an enduring
friendship. The photographer Wang Zheng was decisive in helping me
to collect the historical images needed for this book, and he has given
the images in my book their relative historical integrity.
And of course, crucially, I would like to express my sincere gratitude
to Dr Bruce Gordon Doar, who has been engaged in art research and
lived in China for many years. He translated my History of Chinese Art
in the Twentieth Century and other works in a very professional style,
and I appreciate his translation and knowledge of China’s ancient and
modern history. We have become friends who trust each other very
much. The proofreading of the translation of this book by Dr. Sun Yue
has been invaluable. Her English is the best among my many students,
and I would like to extend my special thanks to her here!
Finally, I would like to thank Jacob Dreyer for his recommendation
and persistence as editor of Palgrave Macmillan, which made it possible
for this book to be published at this venerable publishing house.
Contents
Volume I
Prologue
Introduction:​China prior to the Twentieth Century
Chapter One 1900–1912:​The Era of Transformation
Chapter Two 1912–1927:​Disarrangements of Power and New
Intellectual Trends
Chapter Three 1927–1937:​The First Decade of the National
Government
Chapter Four 1937–1949:​From the War of Resistance to Civil War
Chapter Five 1949–1953:​A Confrontation between Two Regimes
Volume II Explanation
Chapter Six 1953–1957:​The Politics and Economy of the People’s
Republic of China
Chapter Seven 1958–1978:​From the Great Leap Forward to Great
Cultural Revolution
Chapter Eight 1978–1989:​Reform and its Politics
Chapter Nine 1990–2002:​Marketization Trends and Involvement
in Globalization
Chapter Ten 2003–2022:​Towards a Structural Crisis
Epilogue
Appendix
References
Index
List of Figures
Chapter One 1900–1912: The Era of Transformation

Fig.​1 Nursery set up exclusively to raise abandoned children and

homeless orphans inside a church in Yantai, Shandong province, early
twentieth century

Fig.​2 Negotiations in 1900 between the representatives of China and

the Eight Powers, led by Li Hongzhang and Edward Seymour (second
from the right)

Fig.​3 1903, Dowager Empress Cixi enjoying the snowy scenery at the
Summer Palace

Fig.​4 Plenipotentiary of the Great Qing Empire, Zaize (middle of front

row), visiting the London Metropolitan Locomotive Workshop, 1906

Fig.​5 Several prominent constitutionalis​ts at the time of the

promulgation of the late Qing Constitution (Wang Rongbao is second
from the left)

Fig.​6 Late Qing Shanghai newspapers

Fig.​7 Liang Qichao

Fig.​8 Li Yuanhong
Fig.​9 Revolutionary Forces who staged the Wuchang Uprising, 1911

Fig.​10 Well-wishers from various walks of life in Shanghai farewelling

Dr.​Sun Yat-sen leaving to take up his post as President in Nanjing, 1911

Fig.​11 Photograph depicting Yuan Shikai receiving foreign envoys after

formally taking up his post as President of the Republic of China, 1913

Fig.​12 Wedding photograph of Sun Yat-sen and Song Qingling in Tokyo,

1915

Chapter Two 1912–1927: Disarrangements of Power and New

Intellectual Trends

Fig.​1 Yuan Shikai (third from the left) worshiping at the Temple of
Heaven after being proclaimed emperor, 11 December 1915

Fig.​2 Cai Yuanpei

Fig.​3 Chen Duxiu

Fig.​4 Hu Shi

Fig.​5 Foreign diplomats at the celebration in Beijing of victory in World

War I, 1919
Fig.​6 Students rally before Tiananmen during the May Fourth
Movement in 1918

Fig.​7 Cai Yuanpei (center) leading the Chinese educational delegation

to the First Pan-Pacific Educational Conference, 1921

Fig.​8 1921, Three Chinese plenipotentiarie​s at the Washington

Conference:​(from left to right) Gu Weijun, Shi Zhaoji, Wang Huilong

Fig.​9 1926, Occupation of Hankou by the Northern Expeditionary

Army, led by Huangpu officers

Chapter Three 1927–1937: The First Decade of the National

Government

Fig.​1 1930s, teachers, students and nude model of the 17th graduate
class in Western painting at the Shanghai Art School

Fig. 2 1931, Pang Xunqin’s The Enigma of Life (oil on canvas)

exemplifies the artist’s understanding of Western modernist art

Fig.​3 1932, Ceremony honoring the officers and soldiers of the

Nineteenth Route Army who fought in the Songhu Battle resisting the
Japanese
Fig. 4 1932, Gao Jianfu’s Flames on the Eastern Battlefield (Chinese-style
painting), 166 cm × 92 cm

Fig.​5 1934, Cai Yuanpei emerging to placate young students

surrounding the KMT’s Central Party HQ

Fig. 6 Li Hua, Roar! China (woodcut), 1935

Fig.​7 1936:​Sha Fei’s photograph of Lu Xun with young woodcut print

artists:​(from the left) Lin Fu, Cao Bai, Bai Wei, Chen Yanqiao

Fig. 8 Tang Yingwei, Advance, woodcut, 26.4 cm × 19.3 cm (cover of the

fourth volume of Woodcut World)

Chapter Four 1937–1949: From the War of Resistance to Civil War

Fig.​1 Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu in Yan’an, 1937

Fig.​2 Helen Foster Snow during the period of KMT-CPC cooperation,

1938

Fig.​3 Photograph taken on 29 March 1938 depicting prominent

cultural figures.​In the front row (from the left) are Mao Dun, Xia Yan,
and Liao Chengzhi, and in the back row (from left) are Pan Hannian,
Wang Fuquan, Yu Feng, Ye Wenjin, and Situ Huimin
Fig.​4 Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC at
Qiaoergou, 1938.​In the front row (from the left) are Kang Sheng, Mao
Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhu De, Xiang Ying, and Wang Ming, and in the
back row are Chen Yun, Bo Gu, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and
Zhang Wentian

Fig.​5 Group photograph of participants at the Yan’an Forum on

Literature and Art, 1942

Fig. 6 1943: Gu Yuan, Rent Reduction Meeting, woodcut, 13.5 cm x 20 cm

Fig.​7 1943:​Meeting of the Allied leaders of the USA, China, and the UK
in Cairo.​Chiang Kai-shek represented China

Fig.​8 1943:​Wang Jingwei and Japanese PM Tojo Hideki entering the

Japanese Prime Minister’s residence

Fig. 9 1945: Cai Dizhi, Evacuating Guilin under Attack, woodcut, 23 cm x

32.2 cm

Fig.​10 Parade in Chongqing celebrating victory in the War of

Resistance against the Japanese, 1945

Fig.​11 Mao Zedong, Patrick Hurley, and Chiang Kai-shek taking part in
KMT-CPC negotiations in Chongqing, 1945

Fig. 12 1947: Gu Yuan, Burning Land Deeds, woodcut, 28 cm x 18.5 cm.

The work records the struggle between the CPC and the KMT to
formulate policies which would win over the peasants

Fig.​13 1947:​John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University,

with teachers and students

Fig.​14 1947:​Yang Nawei, Silence is the Highest Form of Resistance,

woodcut, 21 cm x 29 cm

Fig. 15 Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photograph, Gold Rush, Shanghai, 1948

Chapter Five 1949–1953: A Confrontation between Two Regimes

Fig.​1 Photography by Henri Cartier-Bresson, Shanghai, 1949

Fig.​2 1949:​Ceremony in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square celebrating the

establishment of the People’s Republic of China

Fig.​3 1950:​Zhongnanhai, the CPC Center discusses sending troops to

aid North Korea

Fig.​4 1951:​Struggle against landlords, Minhe County, Qinghai.​

Photograph by Ru Suichu

Fig.​5 1952:​International merchant capitalists handing in “confessions”

to the Five-Anti Committee of Shanghai’s Huangpu District
Chapter Six 1953–1957: The Politics and Economy of the People’s
Republic of China

Fig.​1 1950s propaganda poster extolling Sino-Soviet friendship

Fig.​2 Poster hailing launch of Shanghai Xin Daxiang Silk and Cloth Store
as a public–private joint enterprise, 1955

Fig.​3 In the storm of the anti-Rightist struggle in the summer of 1957,

Railway Minister Zhang Bojun, declared to be China’s leading Rightist, is
here being denounced by more than 3000 employees

Fig.​4 Lin Xiling

Fig.​5 Mao Zedong with Krushchev, visiting China for a second time in
1958

Chapter Seven 1958–1978: From the Great Leap Forward to Great

Cultural Revolution

Fig.​1 1958:​During the nationwide smelting drive, people were

smelting steel in primitive earth ovens

Fig.​2 1958:​Scene of festivities celebrating the establishment of the

Sputnik People’s Commune in Suiping County, Henan Province
Fig. 3 Art serving political propaganda: Jiangsu Chinese Art Academy’s
Creative Collective, People’s Commune Canteen, Chinese-style painting,
1958, 146 cm × 96 cm

Fig. 4 Yang Wenxiu et al., Going Against the Tide, propaganda painting,
1958

Fig. 5 Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts, Long Live the Great Leap Forward,
propaganda painting, 1958

Fig.​6 “Never forget class suffering, always remember revenge”:​Political

activities were commonplace in the 1960s

Fig.​7 Liu Shaoqi addressing the Seven Thousand Cadre Conference in

1962

Fig.​8 Traditional art was used to propagandize the history of the CPC:​
Qian Songyan, Red Crag, Chinese-style painting, 1962, 104 cm × 81.​5 cm

Fig.​9 Buddhist images being destroyed in the street in Beijing during

the “Cultural Revolution”, 1966

Fig.​10 Catholic nuns being subjected to violent struggle at Beijing

Cathedral during the “Cultural Revolution”, 1966

Fig.​11 Violent struggle session targeting Peng Dehuai during the

“Cultural Revolution” in 1966 (Peng Dehuai was the chief commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Forces during the Korean War)
Fig.​12 Red Guards singing before Tiananmen Gate during the “Cultural
Revolution” in 1966

Fig.​13 Chairman Mao and the masses in 1966

Fig.​14 Large parade during the Cultural Revolution in Shenyang in

1966.​Photograph by Jiang Shaowu

Fig.​15 Big-character posters make their appearance on the eastern wall

outside Peking University canteen in May 1966.​This big-character
poster was pronounced to be “the first Marxist-Leninist big character
poster”

Fig.​16 Mao Zedong with Lin Biao on the rostrum of Tiananmen Gate,
18 August 1966

Fig.​17 View of the number 1 gallery of the Capital Red Guard

Revolutionary Rebel Exhibition in the Beijing Exhibition Center in 1967

Fig.​18 Shanghai People’s Commune changes its name to the Shanghai

Revolutionary Committee, 14 February 1967

Fig.​19 Youths being sent to the countryside in Shijiazhuang, Hebei in

1968
Fig. 20 Long Live the Total Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, propaganda painting, 1969

Fig. 21 Long Live the Victory of the January Storm, propaganda painting,
1969

Fig. 22 Luo Yaotang, Revolutionary People Love Watching Revolutionary

Dramas, 1970s

Fig. 23 Tang Xiaohe and Cheng Li, Advancing through the Mighty Wind
and Waves, oil on canvas, 188 cm × 290 cm, 1971

Fig.​24 Mao Zedong with Nixon during his visit to China, 1972

Fig.​25 Deng Xiaoping addressing the sixth special session of the UN

General Assembly, 1974

Fig.​26 Workers of the Shenyang Number One Machine Tool Plant

writing big-character posters for the movement to criticize Lin Biao and
Confucius, 1974

Fig.​27 Li Tiehua, director of the Beijing Red Flag Yue Drama Troupe,
giving a speech in Tiananmen Square, 1976 (Photograph by Luo
Xiaoyun)

Fig.​28 May 1976:​Tiananmen May Fifth Movement (Photograph by Bao

Naiyong)
Fig.​29 October 1976, Beijing people demonstrate in celebration of the
smashing of the “Gang of Four”

Fig. 30 Peng Bin and Jin Shangyi, You Do the Job and I Can Rest Assured,
oil on canvas, 1977

Chapter Eight 1978–1989: Reform and its Politics

Fig.​1 Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun at the CPC’s 11th Central Committee
Plenum, 1978

Fig.​2 Democracy Wall in Xidan, Beijing, 1979

Fig.​3 Artists demonstrate in support of the Constitution, 1979

Fig. 4 Cheng Conglin, Summer Night in 1978: I Felt the Yearning of the
People, oil on canvas, 177 cm × 415 cm, 1980. This work expressed the
hopes of young students at the time

Fig. 5 Art moves towards objective realism: Chen Danqing, Tibet Series:
Herdsmen, oil on wood, 79 cm × 52 cm, 1980

Fig. 6 The depiction of peasants moves from the “red, light, bright” style
of the Cultural Revolution towards realism: Luo Lizhong, Father, oil
painting, 216 cm × 152 cm, 1980
Fig.​7 Zhao Ziyang and Ronald Reagan, 1984

Fig. 8 Young artists emulate European modernism: Zhang Qun and

Meng Luding, In the New Age: The Inspiration of Adam and Eve, oil
painting, 1985

Fig.​9 The burning of works at the “Xiamen Dada” show, 1986

Fig.​10 Group image of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and others, 1986

Fig.​11 June 4, 1989:​Martial Law Forces begin clearing Tiananmen

Square of demonstrators

Chapter Nine 1990–2002: Marketization Trends and Involvement in

Globalization

Fig.​1 Cui Jian and his rock band performing at a street concert in
Shanghai, 1991

Fig. 2 Yue Minjun, The Comedy in the Unnamed City Gate, oil on canvas,
190 cm × 200 cm, 1991

Fig. 3 Flash Art cover of 1-2 issue 1992, devoted to work by Chinese
artists
Fig.​4 Deng Xiaoping at Wuchang Railway Station during his southern
tour, 1992

Fig.​5 10 August 1992:​Riot at Shenzhen Stock Exchange

Fig.​6 Chengdu, the central city of southwest China in 1994.​Photo by

Xiao Quan

Fig. 7 The officially unapproved depiction of Chinese people: Zhang

Xiaogang, Bloodlines: Big Family #12, oil on canvas, 1995

Fig.​8 Jiang Zemin visiting the USA, 1997

Fig.​9 In 1998, the mayor of Taipei was re-elected, and Ma Ying-jeou

defeated Chen Shui-bian, who was seeking re-election, as the new
mayor of Taipei.​Photograph depicts the mayoral inauguration
ceremony

Fig.​10 On December 11, 2001, China formally joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO)

Chapter Ten 2003–2022: Towards a Structural Crisis

Fig.​1 On 7 April 2008, the Beijing Olympic torch was attacked by

Tibetan independence 105, supporters during the Paris relay, and
torchbearer Jin Jing struggled to protect the torch
Fig.​2 On 8 November 2017, President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng
Liyuan accompanied US President Trump and his wife Melania on a
state visit to China on a visit to the Forbidden City

Fig.​3 On 11 March 2018, the First Session of the 13th National People's
Congress’ third plenary session at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing

Fig.​4 Protestors hold up yellow umbrellas during a gathering outside

the government headquarters to mark the third anniversary of mass
pro-democracy rallies, known as the Umbrella Movement, in Hong Kong
on 28 September 2017 (Photo by ANTHONY WALLACE/​AFP via Getty
Images)

Fig.​5 Photo taken on 23 May 2022, during the lockdown period of

Shanghai, at the entrance of an old apartment building on Sichuan
Middle Road, residents of the upper floor are not allowed to go
downstairs and “Da Bai” (Da Bai refers to epidemic prevention workers
wearing white jumpsuits in mainland China) stays in shift for 24 hours
(Photo by Hass Zhang)
About the Author
Lü Peng born in 1956, is an art historian, curator, and art critic. He is
an Associate Professor in the Department of Art History and Theory at
the China Academy of Art in Hangzhou; and a Distinguished Professor
in the Faculty of Humanities and Arts at Macau University of Science
and Technology. He is the Art Director of Chengdu Art Museum, and the
Art Director of the Museum of Contemporary Art Yinchuan.
Major books published include: A History of Art in Twentieth-
Century China; History of China Modern Art: 1979–1989; History of China
Contemporary Art: 1990–1999; Fragmented Reality: Contemporary Art in
21st-Century China; and Chinese Contemporary Art since 1989.
Volume I
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
L. Peng, A History of China in the 20th Century
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0734-2_1
Prologue
Lü Peng1
(1) China Academy of Art, Hangzhou, China

In everyday life, historians, especially those who reveal and expose

problems that seem lost in the dust of time, are often unpopular, in part
because they inevitably make people uneasy and shake their
unquestioning faith in the legitimacy of the present order by attempting
to change people’s long-standing perceptions of the past. Moreover, this
type of historian also constantly “dredges up” old matters, making
people feel the historian wants to delay the good times that lie ahead
and stymie the creation of a new history; for those people who do not
want to hear about “history’s old accounts”, “optimistically looking
forward” is their favored idiom. Indeed, people are more concerned
with judgments or predictions about the future based on the usual
dissatisfaction with reality and a desire for a better world. They feel
this is positive and constructive—the pain of the past is over.
However, people are also concerned about the extent to which
predictions about future possibilities can be verified or “cashed in”. As
with prophecies, they ask: what percentage of events or facts can be
actually “predicted”? Unsurprisingly, no one can provide a satisfactory
answer to this question. Back in the 1980s, Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock
imbued many young Chinese with hope for the future, and most
Chinese born in the 1950s spent unforgettable years gleaning
optimistic knowledge from this particular futurologist, until moving on
to the forecasts of other futurologists, or eventually losing faith in such
predictions. As a historian, I have no intention of mocking the science of
predicting the future. On the contrary, I do agree with Jorgen Randers’s
predictions based on his observation: “Without big changes, humanity
would be in danger of growing beyond the physical limits of our planet”.
I even take seriously the conclusions of Randers and his colleagues:
“Once the overshoot has occurred, there are only two ways to return to
the fertile soil of sustainable growth: either a ‘controlled decline’
(managed decline)—by the orderly introduction of new solutions (fish
from fish farms) or by ‘collapse’ (You have to stop eating fish because
there are no fish—the fishermen’s livelihoods don’t exist, as was the
case in Newfoundland after 1992). Overshoot is not sustainable”.1
However, according to the division of disciplines, these forecasts are not
the work of historians unless we link these developed predictions to
problems of the past we are studying, and the focus of our research is
on historical issues. In this way, terms like “physical limits” and
“collapse” are easily applied as they instantly evoke the China we see
before us. Of course, we do not have a rigorous set of data to prove that
China’s “physical limits” will soon be reached, and so it is perhaps
possible we will face either “managed decline” or “collapse”, but we are
reminded of the reports and scholarly warnings about China’s
environmental pollution, ecological destruction, and increasingly scarce
resources that can be encountered almost daily in different media. For a
humanist, even cursory observation reveals that the problem of “limits”
extends far beyond the physical world and, in terms of morality, beliefs,
and values, China already seems to be experiencing extreme levels of
degradation, deficiency, and latent chaos that may well be all the more
disturbing and anxiety-inducing.
In short, China’s current problems are profound and, as a historian,
I hope this book can serve as a timely reminder that today’s problems
and phenomena derive from historical factors. it is in political,
economic, military, cultural, religious, and ideological traditions that we
should search for the sources of these problems and phenomena and
apply historical analysis to them. The landscape we see today is, in fact,
just one part of a historical landscape. The basic tasks I set myself in
writing this book are, firstly, to find and examine the causes of the
identifiable problems that plague China today through research into the
history of the twentieth century, and, secondly, through the description,
analysis, interpretation, and judgments of history, to provide my
readers a foundation for understanding history and facing the future.
Indeed, people often analyze modern or contemporary Chinese history
from the origins of Chinese history itself (variously estimated to go
back to anything from three to five thousand years) and describe and
explain the formation of Chinese history and its characteristics from its
pre-Qin beginnings to clarify its ideological and cultural contexts. My
approach at the beginning of this book will follow similar contours. In
my “Introduction” (Xuyan) I provide a broad outline of pre-twentieth-
century China, encompassing the sweep of Chinese history from the
Qin-Han dynasties to the Reform Movement of 1898 to clarify the
relevance of earlier events and phenomena for China’s twentieth
century in as succinct and brief a manner as possible, in order to
remind readers that even today it is impossible to shrink from thinking
about historical issues, such as the issue of the unique formation of the
Qin-Han polity that took shape more than two thousand years ago and
persisted through different periods and in different contexts and
discourses.
The appearance of history provided by different historians often
differs. This is not the point I am emphasizing but wish to focus instead
on a particular question: when the history of a country and nation is
limited to the information and single perspective provided by
government authorities or political parties and is used over the long
term in education and propaganda directed at an entire population,
such history seems highly questionable. Like the implicit question that
the historian, John King Fairbank, asked, when he returned to the
Chinese mainland in 1972 after more than two decades away from the
country, and saw the circumstances of his old friends: “In a country
known for its etiquette and pursuit of education, China’s ‘egalitarians’
vent their personal anger at these intellectuals, and where is
Confucianism in all of this? This is a question that demands an answer”.
This question signified that the study of Confucian tradition alone was
not enough to explain China after 1949. Fairbank, who traveled to China
in the 1930s to study China–U.S. relations, later wrote: “If a person is
not interested in China-U.S. relations, and is not surprised, annoyed, or
alarmed by the subject, then his research on China will not long
endure”.2 In fact, the expression, “surprised, annoyed, or alarmed”,
encapsulates a predetermined historical attitude. Studying issues and
providing a critical analysis and judgment of them are basic qualities
underlying historical research; otherwise, historical texts imposed by
the authorities or the Party’s ideology will infringe upon the spiritual
civilization of mankind. Unlike critics or thinkers, the criticality of
historians is not expressed as straightforward opinions and bold
conclusions about events, but in their careful selection of information
and documents, their arrangement and utilization of value positions,
and their presentation of their own views and judgments in the process
of describing, analyzing, and interpreting what are considered to be
historical facts. Among historians in mainland China, there are few
achievements in writing general histories covering the period from the
nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, and research on this period by
historians of the generation, or more, before me was clearly
constrained by the influence of the political system and the ideology
and culture in which they were located. It is not that different schools
were subject to so many historical conditions of their own that we need
to be careful with the contributions of earlier historians, but rather that
the academic value of historical research had largely disappeared under
the ideological pressure that historians need to avoid as much as
possible.
This book, therefore, does have the purpose of trying, through its
description and examination of a particular period of history, to remind
readers to change or even abandon their long-standing attitudes and
rethink the legitimacy of existing historical statements. Of course, my
reiteration of matters past is intended to make people realize that
impeding the creation of history will not delay the good times ahead of
us; on the contrary, our creation of a new history needs a re-
examination and analysis of the past that will enable us to adjust our
plans and even strategies, as much as possible, in order to avoid
“collapse” from occurring. This might disturb some people, but it is only
by critically looking back and describing their views and positions in
language based on historical facts that historical researchers can make
a positive and constructive impact on the future. As someone born in
the 1950s, I have been a witness to almost half of the history in this
book. My personal experience of this past makes it easy to “revisit” that
history. However, we are also outsiders and the voracious reading of the
1980s enabled some of our generation to think freely and freed us, as
much as possible, from the intellectual dogma created by ideological
control and established intellectual habits enabling us to critically
understand the past. As a historical researcher, I can make a fresh
selection of facts from that past and determine what are general facts
and what are historical facts based on the questions I pose and the
concerns I have about historical issues, and to freshly describe, analyze,
and judge those facts.
In China, from 1949 to the 1980s, free thinking in the field of history
was very limited. Now, after almost four decades of reform, albeit
largely confined to the economic sphere, there has been some influence
from unavoidable Western ideas, but self-training and intergenerational
education in history circles have not resulted in what might be called a
shared body of historical knowledge in this country. Nor do we see a
shared knowledge of theories, research ideas, and solutions, so thinking
in the field of humanities is still limited by the political system and
ideology, and the official monopoly on publishing has determined the
scope and limits of what historians can achieve. It should be noted in
particular that in the field of the study of modern Chinese history, the
classification of approaches into what are called the revolutionary
historical paradigm, the modernization paradigm, the West-centric
paradigm, and the Sino-centric paradigm are only general formalistic
conceptual groupings. Although the works of J. K. Fairbank, Jonathan
Spence, Paul A. Cohen, and other Western historians of China have been
translated into Chinese, this has not resulted in the emergence of
unique “paradigms” in Chinese historical research. However, in
mainland China, the emergence of the “revolutionary historical
paradigm” was initially related to China’s social reality, and some
radical intellectuals took Marxism’s theory on the basic contradictions
of society as their starting point. Stimulated by Lenin’s theories on how
Western imperialism influenced Chinese history, they sponsored a
narrative expressing the contradictions between imperialism and the
Chinese nation, and between feudalism and the Chinese masses, seeing
these as the two basic contradictions in Chinese society since the
Opium War, and for a long time this “paradigm” constituted the
mainstream of historical research in mainland China. The success of the
“revolutionary historical paradigm” was related to the violent political
turmoil that engulfed China after the 1920s and, especially after
October 1949, the confrontation with the West and the designation of
class struggle as the main domestic contradictions China faced made
the “revolutionary historical paradigm” occupy a dominant position in
Chinese historical circles. In the history after 1949, we constantly see
how such a paradigm participated in specific political struggles and
dictated the lexicon of academic terminology. Constituting the basic
historical structure of this “paradigm”, the “two processes” (the
combination of imperialism and Chinese feudalism, which was a
process that transformed China into a semi-colonial and colonial
country, a process that also resulted in the Chinese people resisting
imperialism and those serving it as “running dogs”), “three high points”
(Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, 1898 Reform & Boxer Movement, and
1911 Revolution), and “Eight Major Events” (Opium War, Taiping
Heavenly Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Movement, Sino-French War, Sino-
Japanese War, 1898 Reform, Boxer Movement, 1911 Revolution)
together dictated a dogmatic writing pattern, which lacked rational
judgment on the complexities of history and the causes of events and
betrayed a lack of analysis of the internal factors in society, the
economy, and culture. At the same time, under the guidance of partisan
political aims and ideology, the selection, description, analysis, and
judgment of historical facts precluded historians from adopting an
independent position, and historical writing was often merely the tool
of a political movement (or factional struggle within the Party).
In mainland China, the so-called “modernization paradigm”, for a
long time after 1949, did not form the mainstream in the field of
Chinese history, in which it could barely survive given the domination
of the methodology of class analysis. Only when the specific political
period needed the support of scientific and economic materials did the
“modernization paradigm” acquire some legitimacy. This was why the
“modernization paradigm” gradually emerged in China after 1979.
Writers in history circles had been familiar with a methodology close to
the “modernization paradigm” adopted by Jiang Tingfu in writing
Zhongguo Jindai Shi (A Modern History of China) back in 1938, in the
Republican period. Jiang had posed the following questions: “Can the
Chinese modernize? Can they catch up with Westerners? Can they use
science and machinery? Can they abolish the concept of family and
hometown and organize a modern nation-state? If they can”, he
concluded, “then the future of our nation is bright; if they cannot then
this ethnic group has no future. This is because all countries in the
world which can accept modern culture will definitely become rich and
strong, but those that cannot will be defeated, without exception, and
the sooner this fact is accepted the better”. Jiang was able to write in a
way that reflected a global perspective back in 1938: “Modern history is
the history of the Europeanization of the world, and the modern history
of China is the history of the modernization of the Chinese nation, that
is, the history of the Chinese nation’s acceptance of modern European
culture”. (“General Theory”, A Modern History of China) The response of
historical circles in mainland China to this research orientation could
only be seen after the 1980s. In fact, the “modernization paradigm” also
provided historical facts that went beyond political objectives and
ideological requirements in serving a narrative of history in line with
the discipline of history.
The “modernization paradigm” could, of course, easily veer towards
the “West-centric paradigm”. The historical view of John King Fairbank
and Teng Ssu-yü seen in their China’s Response to the West (1954) was
easy to understand, because the history of China, following its
encounter with the West, seemed to provide many examples that
conformed to Fairbank’s impact-response model or to Joseph
Levenson’s tradition-modernity model, especially when Chinese
intellectuals were anxiously proclaiming the slogan of “total
westernization”, which made such historical analysis more acceptable.
We should also note that, compared with Fairbank, Levenson even
stressed the absolute necessity of accepting Western transformation. As
for the “Sino-centric paradigm” developed in the 1970s, it can be seen
as a decisive correction to the “impact-reaction” paradigm or the
“tradition-modernity” model in its emphasis on the internal causes of
historical change, what Paul A. Cohen called “internal approach”, a
formulation which signaled that Chinese history should start with
internal factors in Chinese society (a “Chinese perspective”) rather than
from external, so-called Western (or imperialist) factors, because China
has a Chinese context. Cohen, of course, explained what he meant by a
Sino-centric perspective: “As more and more scholars seek the ‘story
line’ of Chinese history itself, they are wonderfully aware that this main
line does exist, and in 1800 or 1840, the main line was completely
uninterrupted, nor has it been preempted or replaced by the West,
which remains one of the most important central clues throughout the
19th and even twentieth centuries”. In emphasizing “differentiation”,
Cohen rejected the existence of a single “paradigm” (Western
paradigm), saying that the concept of the “West” could be subdivided,
as in the confrontation between the United States and Europe and in
the fact that the United States could further divide, and that the result
of such a view could easily lead to the neglect of a historical
methodology of “integration”. However, the basic historical fact that
should be acknowledged is that the differences between Europe and
the United States (political, economic, cultural, religious, customs, etc.)
are much smaller than those between China and the United States, not
to mention that conflict, competition, or stimulation often produces
new commonalities. If we lose sight of integration and induction, and
ignore some important historical facts, we will fall into the trap of
amplifying the regional and the local and have no way of pursuing
structured historical writing. In historical studies, the use of such
dichotomous terminology as “Oriental”/“Western” or
“Chinese”/“foreign” requires extreme caution. Moreover, since the
seventeenth century, in historical research of any country or region the
methodologies prompted by such terms as “trends”, “connections”,
“differences”, and “synthesis” are all important. No one’s history is
stable and pure, and no one’s history does not owned its special
structure. Premised by such disciplinary cautions, historians need to
acknowledge that the dichotomies of “progress”/“stagnation” or
“continuity”/“development” are merely the final narrative process in
historical research: they are comprehensive judgments made in a
particular historical context.
In discussing the methodology of historical research, I prefer to use
the term “research orientation” rather than “paradigm”, and we know
that the “research orientation” used by different generations of
historians always related to their knowledge background and value
orientation, and that the complexity of history itself cannot be summed
up by the particular “paradigm” of historians. So, we need to
understand that the “impact and response” of Fairbank and others
might have a mechanistic characteristic, but as long as we go deeper
into the study of “response” to the traditions of a civilization, specific
contexts, and personal experiences, we will not simplify “response”.
Based on this, the research orientation of this book is broadly limited to
the strategic interaction of “political systems” and the “clash of
civilizations”. This is because it can be readily appreciated that the
persistence of the Qin-Han polity was not only the perfection of a
structure of its own civilization, but it also featured persistence yet
vulnerability in later dealing with Western civilization from the late
Ming to the late Qing dynasty. If the land-based connection between
faraway China and Europe prior to Marco Polo occurred simultaneously
with the formation and growth of the Chinese order, the connection
between Chinese civilization and Europe after the Great Age of
Exploration began to expose obvious institutional differences and even
conflicts, and by the nineteenth century, Chinese civilization, together
with its political system, was not only strongly shaken by Western
civilization, but also almost completely collapsed in the course of the
accelerating impact. Confucianism was of course the basis of the ideas
and concepts of Chinese civilization, but the principles of the Legalists
were actually the secret and unspoken core of Chinese rule, although
the rulers also borrowed from Buddhist and Taoist thought through the
work of scholars over generations in using such ideas to retouch
Confucianism with metaphysical features, but in the end Confucian
dogma was used to explicate the legitimacy of rule by the Qin-Han
polity. When the Manchus entered China, they inherited the political
system of the Ming dynasty and a complete Confucian culture. These
served to make the Han people more adaptable to their rule, and the
Manchus moreover did not have a complete and mature political
system and ideological culture of their own. However, the Qing court
appointed Manchus to almost all important positions in the
bureaucracy, prohibited marriage between Manchu and Han, initiated a
“literary inquisition” to destroy Han writings expressing dissatisfaction
with the Qing dynasty, and forced Han males to wear pigtails to remind
the Han people of Manchu ethnic rule, all of which fueled anti-Manchu
sentiment and resistance up to the time of the final anti-dynastic
revolution.
In my understanding of the discipline of history, I do not think that
an abstract historical ontology exists. With the purpose of providing
readers with a “brief history”, I want to construct the basic skeleton of
Chinese history in the twentieth century from the perspectives of the
“political system” and the “clash of civilizations”; a “brief history” is
after all general history, and it does not allow too much detail. Of
course, in describing the history of this century, I will still have recourse
to the study of cultural differences. Historical studies concerned with
cultural differences have been questioned by some historians, who
argue that such an approach can easily lead to “cultural essentialism”,
but it is an indisputable fact that cultural differences and even the
resulting emotional differences have triggered a large number of
historical events and affected historical trends. The “Four Books and
Five Classics” and “Marxism” have served different historical functions
in different historical periods, and I am aware of the need to be alert to
the different characteristics of the same culture or its expression at
different times. Fortunately, historians with Chinese experience at any
time in the twentieth century, especially after 1949, have long known
that basically there is no static culture or stable ideological system and,
in their view, the study of the cultural differences in a particular context
or the characteristics of the same kind of thought in different periods is
what has determined the nature of Chinese historical research today.
In terms of historical periodization, the twentieth century is not
simply a temporal concept. It initially might seem difficult to see 1900
as the beginning of the history of China in the twentieth century, just as
some historians believe that the twentieth century of world history
should begin with the First World War in 1914 or that the twentieth
century should end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. The
1911–1912 Revolution might have served as a starting point for the
history of China in the twentieth century, yet it would be difficult to
answer a perplexed reader who wants to know about this history and
reads an account that begins with the sound of gunfire coming from
Wuhan, and asks: Why was history so precipitate? Why was the Qing
government in Beijing so vulnerable? It might also seem appropriate to
put the historical starting point of twentieth century China in 1840,
because after the Opium War, China began to show signs of a complete
collapse from politics to the economy, society, and culture and many of
the factors that led to the 1911 Revolution can be found during this
period. Historians who adopt a Marxist historical position are more
inclined to use the Opium War as a historical node associated with
modern times, which they maintain reveals how China’s semi-colonial
and semi-feudal society was formed.3 However, before 1793, didn’t the
Qianlong Emperor’s attitude towards the British mission signal the
imminent decline of the Qing dynasty? In fact, the continuation of
dynasties has revealed a state of exhaustion. In the “Introduction” I
encapsulate the history from the Qin-Han dynasties to the dynastic
reforms of 1898 to deduce a thread of development with the intention
of providing readers with a basic historical background to twentieth-
century Chinese history since 1900. I do not subscribe to the view that
either the late Ming or the Opium War can serve as markers for
twentieth-century Chinese history. It means that I stress that history
changed over time, although the pace of change in the nineteenth
century accelerated significantly.4
As a result of my research, I regard the Qing dynasty’s efforts to
devise a constitution as the beginning of Chinese history in the
twentieth century, because the constitutional movement that began
shortly after the signing of the Boxer Protocol in fact started a core
enterprise in China throughout the twentieth century. The
implementation of a constitution remained a goal, regardless of the
initial motives for devising a constitution and the reasons for its
original de facto failure. Driving political, economic, cultural,
ideological, and social changes in China for more than a hundred years,
constitutional government, as a great political undertaking of the
Chinese people, has not been realized even today—in the twenty-first
century. however, the constitutional ideology and early steps towards
its implementation completely rescinded the legitimacy of the Qin-Han
polity; it is the “constitutional” problems that have arisen at different
times in the twentieth century in China that constitute the most basic
historical problems of this century. Prior to the 1911 Revolution, the
term “century” was not used in the chronicles of Chinese history, and if
we use the variant Chinese words for “modern” (jindai or xiandai), it is
difficult to relate them to the name of dynasties (chaodai) and their rise
and fall. As the author of a brief history, I regard the richness of history
as the result of a number of basic factors. Moreover, although
traditional ideas and culture do always have an impact on history, and
Chinese intellectuals have never stopped discussing Confucianism and
its cultural traditions, among the extremely complex historical
elements, historical events triggered by the conflict between the
political system and civilization have shaped the basic historical
contours of China for more than a hundred years. For example, to the
present day, the Communist Party, which controls the regime ruling the
Chinese mainland, remains hostile to the universal values of the West.
The richness of history is certainly not an embellishment but a fact, yet
any historical writing can only take into account a particular subject.
We cannot describe how in 1839 Lin Zexu wrote to Queen Victoria to
demand an end to the terrible opium trade while describing life on the
streets of Guangzhou at this time to show the details of the continuity
of history. Here I would like to reiterate that, in terms of historiography,
this book is intended to focus mainly on historical materials related to
the themes of the “political system” and “the clash of civilizations”,
which include ideological movements within the intellectual field and
many historical “patterns” attached to the skeleton provided by these
two themes. It is clear that the interweaving of these two themes began
when the missionaries first came to China and continued until the late
Ming and early Qing period gradually exposed the complex and deadly
clash of civilizations.
Since December 1978, a large number of historical documents have
come to light and been published, which have facilitated our re-
consideration of history, especially the period since 1900, so that this
book can avoid examination and argumentation of existing documents,
and focus on the different issues and their relationship, as raised by the
new documentation. The new documents allow us to reorganize this
stretch of history in order to clarify its true face, or at least one that was
once difficult to see. My aim is not to add a new account to the field of
modern and contemporary Chinese history, but to alert people to the
need to understand history anew and discover the problems that have
always existed in the field of history in order to promote “timely
decisions and changes”, at least in the realm of thought. To be clear, this
book will provide readers with a college education today with a
twentieth-century Chinese history that has the contours I understand,
and if readers develop a skeptical attitude and critically reflect on and
gain a fresh understanding of the appearance of history, this book will
have achieved its goal: for young readers, in particular.
When I wrote the first passage in this Prologue, it was when the
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC National Congress released its
Decisions of the CPC Central Committee on a number of major issues in
the comprehensive deepening of reform (13 November 2013), and at the
same time I read an interview with the economist Xu Xiaonian on
WeChat: “Without the establishment of an independent reform
department, reform will be difficult to implement” (“Interview” by Song
Houliang, Weibo News, 12 November 2013). I found that there were
problematic discrepancies between the two documents. Jorgen Landers
would have described the first document as exemplifying “managed
decline”, while the latter conveyed a deep sense that the foundations
have been destroyed, so that it is likely that “collapse” is coming. Xu
Xiaonian pessimistically reminded people that “the golden age of
reform and opening up is over”. Therefore, can we afford to leave the
validity of different views or opinions for time to address? Will we
again limit ourselves only to “anxiously” reminding, suggesting, and
expecting, and continue to reassure ourselves in the face of the future
after the next possible tragedy occurs? Do we continue to agree that the
old state apparatus has the power to shape history and that human
history does not have a common basis in values at all? The revision of
the Constitution in the “two sessions” of meetings organized by the
Chinese Communist Party in the spring of 2018 presented two
questions that historians need to ask: Is there really nothing that can be
done to history that historians only need to heed the victory of the will
of the authorities that leaves them no room to move? Let’s look back at
history and provide our own answers.
Lü Peng
Wednesday, 13 November 2013, on a flight from Chengdu to
Hangzhou
Saturday, 4 February 2017, revised on a flight from Luang Prabang
to Chengdu
Wednesday, 18 April 2018, revised on flight from Milan to Beijing

Footnotes
1 Jorgen Randers, 2052: A Global Forecast for Next Forty Years, White River Junction,
Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2012. Chinese edition: Qin Xuezheng and Tan Jing
trs., “Foreword”, 2052 Welai Sishi Nian de Zhongguo yu Shijie (2052 China and the
world for the next forty years), Shanghai: Yilin Chubanshe, 2013, p. 005. Jorgen
Randers was one of the co-authors of the Club of Rome’s The Limits of Growth (1972).

2 John King Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir, New York and London:
Harper Colophon, 1983; New York: HarperCollins, 1982. Chinese editions: Lu Huiqin
and Zhang Kesheng tr., Fei Zhengqing dui Hua Huiyi Lu, Shanghai: Zhishi Chubanshe,
1991; Fei Zhengqing Zhongguo Huiyi Lu, Beijing: Zhongxin Chubanshe, 2013, p. 447.

3 See: Liu Danian, “Several issues in the study of modern Chinese history”, Historical
Research, 1959:10. Before the twentieth century, Chinese historical works were
largely confined to traditional chronicles, and dynasties were the important basis for
presenting history. The use of a different calendar also precluded Chinese
contemporaries chronicling the history of the late Ming or late Qing from using the
words “seventeenth century” or “nineteenth century”, respectively. It was mainly in
the second half of the nineteenth century, under the influence of Western history and
with the emergence of Liang Qichao’s New History that Chinese historians began to
pay special attention to more recent historical issues. Before 1949, academic and
political positions determined historians’ periodization schemata, judgments, and
characterization. Early in the twentieth century, Chinese scholars had sought to find
terms corresponding to the English term “modern times”, and their understanding of
the English term determined the temporal range of their writing, many works using
the vague coinage “jinshi shi” 近世史 for the idea of “recent [i.e., modern] history”.
What was meant by “jinshi” (recent/modern)? Chinese historians had two main
designations of the demarcation point signaling the advent of “recent/modern”
history: the late Ming and the Opium War. The earliest works that treated the Opium
War as the beginning of “modern history” include Meng Shijie’s Zhongguo Zuijinshi
Shi (The recent history of China, Tianjin, 1926), Li Dingsheng’s Zhongguo Jindai Shi
(The modern history of China, Shanghai, 1933), Huagang’s Zhongguo Minzu Jiefang
Yundong Shi (The history of China’s national liberation movement, 1940), Zhang
Jianfu’s Zhongguo Jin Bainian Shi Jiaocheng (Course on the history of China’s last
hundred years, Guilin, 1940), and Fan Wenlan’s Zhongguo Jindai Shi (The modern
history of China, 1947), First Section, Volume 1. The first histories that commenced
modern Chinese history with the late Ming were Guo Tingyi’s Jindai Zhongguo Shi
(Modern Chinese history, Chongqing, 1941) and Zheng Hesheng’s Zhongguo Jinshi Shi
(The recent history of China, Chongqing, 1944). There seemed to be adequate reason
for this division or periodization, as Zheng Hesheng explained: “Since the discovery
of new maritime routes, world communications underwent great changes, and
human life and international relations, when compared to ancient times, saw obvious
differences, and this is why we demarcate medieval history from recent (modern)
history. The changes in recent history comprise trends towards ‘opening’, and all its
manifestations exemplify ancient achievements that are carried forward. The new
emerges from the past, and in turn contains the seeds of future trends. Each nation’s
thought is the driving force behind its evolution. Therefore, the category of “recent
history” encompasses nearly three or four hundred years of history, whether we
consider the history of China or the West”. Ref: Zheng Hesheng, “Introductory Points”,
Zhongguo Jinshi Shi (The recent history of China), Chongqing: Nanfang Yinshuguan,
1944. Here quoted from Zhang Haipeng, Zhongguo Jindai Tongshi Diyi Juan: Jindai
Zhongguo Lishi Jincheng Gaishuo (Comprehensive modern history of China, volume 1:
An overview of the processes of modern Chinese history), (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin
Chubanshe, 2009, p. 11).
Zheng Hesheng’s view looks quite similar to today’s position of writing Chinese
history from the perspective of global history. In the search for a more effective
Chinese terminology, some writers began to use the now familiar words jindai and
xiandai for “modern”, so that there are titles such as Fan Wenlan’s Zhongguo Jindai Shi
(1947) and Cao Bohan’s Zhongguo Xiandai Shi (Modern History of China, 1947), in
which the historians do not seem to discriminate between jinshi (recent), jindai, and
xiandai. If we understand the changing social environment and ideological
motivations in the field of history at the turn of the century, we realize that this is
obviously the result of the rapid changes in the world that required historians to find
more effective methods for rewriting history, especially the writing of recent (or
modern) history, so it was natural to emphasize their contemporary stance as
historians. This is how Luo Jialun, for example, explained this development in his
introductory remarks for Guo Tingyi’s Jindai Zhongguo Shi (Modern Chinese history,
Chongqing, 1941):
“To know the past history and evolution of the human race or nations, their
present status and environment, and their future survival and development, all
require the study of modern history. This is not to say that we should not study the
distant past, or that such research is not important, but rather that the more recent
should be studied more and is especially important. Therefore, to be a modern
person, we must study modern history, and to be a modern Chinese, we must study
the modern history of China”. Ref: Luo Jialun, “Introductory remarks”, Guo Tingyi,
Jindai Zhongguo Shi (Modern Chinese history, Chongqing, 1941; Taipei: Shangwu
Yinshuguan, 1963). Quoted here from Zhang Haipeng, Zhongguo Jindai Tongshi Diyi
Juan: Jindai Zhongguo Lishi Jincheng Gaishuo (Comprehensive modern history of
China, volume 1: An overview of the processes of modern Chinese history), Nanjing:
Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2009, p. 7.
Historians (such as Fan Wenlan and Hu Sheng) did a great deal of work on
historical periodization and dating, but their historical views largely accepted
official ideological positions, which made the narrative of modern history naturally
and completely veer towards political history or revolutionary history, especially
the political and revolutionary history of the Communist Party. The writing of
modern history before 1949 had almost ignored the existence of the Communist
Party, but after 1949 the KMT’s image in history books produced on the mainland
was, in turn, close to that of simplistic political caricature. Until the end of the 1970s,
the history books produced in the PRC almost all used “class analysis” to examine
the historical process, with the “semi-colonial and semi-feudal” concept used to
characterize Chinese society, and “anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism” seen as basic
historical tasks from the Opium War onwards. Such historical writing still continued
until the publication of Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Shigang (Outline history of twentieth-
century China) in 2009! Even though its author Jin Chongji presented a confused
account of simple class analysis in this four-volume work, this did not change the
fact that this book adhered to all the Communist Party’s ideological norms for
writing history. Until the 1980s, modern history writing in the PRC was largely
limited to writing within the framework of the “two processes”, “three high points”,
and “Eight Major Events”. Indeed, there was nothing more harmful to the
development of new history in China than such a framework.

4 As far as research in Chinese history is concerned, the traditional historical phases

and periodization schemes of the dynasties are certainly not the basis of my study.
Although I emphasize the importance of the Opium War of 1842 in my
“Introduction”, it does not serve as a node in my periodization or treatment of time.
Moreover, neither “late imperial” nor “early modern” are terms I care for and use.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
L. Peng, A History of China in the 20th Century
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0734-2_2

Introduction: China prior to the

Twentieth Century
Lü Peng1
(1) China Academy of Art, Hangzhou, China

I
The history of China is said to begin with the “Three Emperors and Five
Sovereigns”, but different ancient books present different statements
about these “three emperors and five sovereigns”.1 Roughly speaking,
the period from 2070 to 256 BCE is said to be the time of the Three
Dynasties designated Xia, Shang, and Zhou, respectively,2 but it is only
from the beginning of the Shang dynasty that we have textual evidence
from the time in the form of inscriptions on oracle bones and bronze
objects. The collocation of ideographs that today denotes “China” and
which is now read “Zhongguo” makes its earliest appearance in an
inscription on a bronze vessel,3 which has been dated to the early years
of the Western Zhou dynasty.4 Yet the “central realm” (zhongguo)
indicated by that term does not refer to what is “China” in the modern
Chinese language but to the district surrounding the capital city of the
Western Zhou. This polity later evolved to form the region known as the
“Central Plains” (Zhongyuan)5 occupying a larger area around the
middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River. The early inhabitants of
these Central Plains called themselves in turn the “Huaxia” (both an
ethnonym and toponym that is first seen in a terse record for the 26th
year of the reign of Duke Xiang [roughly equivalent to 547 BCE] in the
ancient Zuo Zhuan, which states “Chu lost Huaxia”, specifically
indicating the lands of the Huaxia people of the Central Plains).6 In 221
BCE, the young Ying Zheng (259–210 BCE) led the army of the state of
Qin to destroy six neighboring states (Qi, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Chu)
over the course of a decade, ending the age of kingdoms headed by
aristocrats, the last phase of which is traditionally termed the “Warring
States”, and establishing a unified monarchy. He regarded himself as the
first emperor, as indicated by the title “Shi Huangdi”. This “First
Emperor” became known to history as Qin Shihuang. After unifying the
Central Plains, he led his armies to subdue the Hundred Yue to the
south and campaign against the Xiongnu (Huns) to the north.7 In 214
BCE, the Qin armies brought the whole Lingnan region, specifically the
area south of the Nanling mountains roughly equivalent to today’s
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, within the fold of the territory of
the Qin dynasty, and in 214–213 BCE the Qin general, Meng Tian (?–210
BCE), led 300,000 troops in an assault on the Xiongnu, forcing them to
move northwards and evacuate the Central Plains. At the same time, the
Qin dynasty successively forced large numbers of the once wealthy
people of the former Six States, as well as prisoners and commoners, to
migrate to the area north of the Yellow River, to labor on land
reclamation projects, to establish borderland farming colonies and
defend the northern borders, while also opening up lands in the
southwest inhabited by national minorities, thereby extending the
reach of the borders of the Qin Empire. This expansion of territory
increased the overall costs of defense and maintaining the army. In
order to prevent Xiongnu harassment and incursions, the Qin dynasty,
on the basis of existing protective walls in the previous states (such as
those of Qin, Zhao, and Yan), embarked on a wall-building project,
creating what would become known as the Great Wall. Qin Shihuang
thus may have thought that he established the first borders of the Qin
Empire (China).8 The political governing mode implemented by the Qin
dynasty entailed the abolition of the original decentralized feudal
system (fenfeng-zhi), weakening the old aristocracy by strengthening
Qin’s autocratic monarchy, and using military merit as the determinant
in promoting men to the new aristocracy. In this way, the Qin polity
dissolved the original rules of clan law determined by blood relations,
replaced the hereditary system of the aristocracy with a new
bureaucracy, and established an administrative and bureaucratic
system based on prefectures and counties (jun-xian) that extended
from the central seat of power out to the local levels of the prefecture
and county.9 Such an institutional and administrative framework
continues to the present day, even though technical modifications and
supplementary adjustments to individual ruling systems were made by
emperors of subsequent dynasties. Repeated reference by later
generations of Chinese intellectuals to the “burning of books and burial
of scholars”, initially enacted by the Qin dynasty, should not serve as a
historical metaphor for the destruction of progressive books and the
persecution of intellectuals by authoritarian dictatorships in modern
societies.10 However, “The Annals of Qin Shihuang” in Shi Ji (Sima Qian’s
Historical Records) makes it clear that Qin Shihuang specifically
targeted “those who recite Confucius”. This was widely interpreted as
referring to the intellectuals of the time, so that the event named the
“burning of books and burial of scholars” was often regarded by later
generations of various historical periods as a precedent for the
persecution of intellectuals and the atrocities committed against them
by subsequent tyrannical or authoritarian dictatorships. In 206 BCE,
the Qin dynasty came to an end. Those once affiliated to the previously
destroyed Six States and all those who contributed to the destruction of
Qin attempted to take advantage of the new situation and restore the
earlier system of independent feudal fiefs; among the victors, Xiang Yu
(232–202 BCE) embarked on implementing this restoration. However,
in the wake of the constant conflicts and slaughter triggered among the
various contending forces, Xiang Yu was finally militarily defeated and
subsequently committed suicide by cutting his own throat in Wujiang
(today’s Hexian county, Anhui) in 202 BCE. The “world” (Tianxia, in fact,
another ancient and ambiguous term for “China”) was subsequently
unified as the Han dynasty. In the eyes of Liu Bang (247–195 BCE), who
was born a commoner but rose to become the first Han emperor,
Emperor Gaozu, “the world” enclosed by the borders Qin had
demarcated was now his. However, he simply inherited the system as it
had been set up by the Qin dynasty and perfected this centralized
imperium. Through the bureaucratic division of duties described as
“[administration by] the three leading court officials and nine chief
officers (sangong-jiuqing)”, Liu Bang ultimately concentrated all power
in his own hands as the emperor. The system would prove effective and
was constantly refined over time so that the governing institutions,
which experienced long periods of stability and which we today call the
“Qin-Han polity”, essentially remained in place until the middle of the
nineteenth century, after which China was plunged into irreversible
crises.
In 138 BCE, a young man named Zhang Qian11 headed an expedition
to the Western Regions comprising more than one hundred men who
set out from Longxi, today’s Lintao In Gansu province.12 The emperor
entrusted Zhang with the task of convincing the Indo-European people
known as the Greater Yuezhi13 to form an alliance with the Han dynasty
to launch joint attacks against the Xiongnu to the north. Entering the
Hexi Corridor, which was under the control of the Xiongnu, Zhang Qian
and some of his men were captured by the Xiongnu army, detained, and
placed in detention. Zhang Qian was forced to marry a Xiongnu woman,
with whom he had a number of children, and he and several others
remained in Xiongnu custody for ten years. In 129 BCE, Zhang left his
wife and children, and escaped with his entourage, resuming his
journey to the kingdom of the Greater Yuezhi. After traveling for many
long weeks in grueling and dangerous conditions they reached the state
of Dayuan.14 The King of Dayuan was familiar with the Han dynasty, so
to show his good intentions, he provided Zhang Qian with guides and
interpreters to travel to Kangju,15 a state whose territory fell within
what is today Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It was via Kangju that Zhang
Qian reached Daxia (Bactria),16 occupying an area roughly equivalent to
today’s valley of the Amu Darya. Subsequently, Daxia sent them on to
the Greater Yuezhi. Zhang Qian and his party remained with the Greater
Yuezhi for more than a year but they were unable to persuade their
hosts to join a strike force with the Han dynasty targeting the Xiongnu.
In 128 BCE, Zhang Qian prepared to return to the Han Empire, but on
the road he and several other members of his party were again
captured by the Xiongnu and kept as prisoners for more than a year. It
was not until the beginning of 126 BCE (the 3rd year of Yuanshuo) that
he took advantage of turmoil among the Xiongnu to escape and
returned to Chang’an, the Han capital. It would seem that Zhang Qian
failed to achieve the goal of his expedition to the Western Regions, but
his long time in the Western Regions made him knowledgeable about
the area’s geography, resources, customs, and way of life. His report to
Emperor Wu became the main source of the information provided in
the “Account of the Western Regions” in Han Shu, the “official” history of
the Han dynasty. In 119 BCE, Zhang Qian embarked on a second
diplomatic mission to the Western Regions. By this time, Han was in
control of the Hexi Corridor and Emperor Wu adopted Zhang Qian’s
proposal to invite the Wusun17 to return east to the Dunhuang region
and join Han in resisting the Xiongnu. At the same time, he intended to
link up with other states of the area to subjugate the Xiongnu. When
Zhang Qian returned from this second mission in 115 BCE, there were
already Wusun envoys in Chang’an. The Han dynasty later sent envoys
further afield—to Anxi (Persia), Shendu (India), Yancai (between the
Caspian and Aral seas), Tiaozhi (a satrapy of Persia), and Lijian (said to
be Alexandria in Egypt). Henceforth, communication routes between
Han and the Western Regions were fully established, and the term
“Western Regions” was gradually no longer limited to designating
foreign states, but also included lands within the purview of the Han
dynasty, as Han rule expanded.18 In fact, up to the time when Qin
Shihuang built the Great Wall to protect the Central Plains, China’s
western boundary was only just outside Lintao and Yumen; prior to
Zhang Qian’s expedition, the countries to the west of the Congling
(Pamirs), such as Dayuan, Wusun, Greater Yuezhi, Kangju, and Daxia,
were not influenced by the Han dynasty. However, Zhang’s expedition
brought China into contact with states west of the Pamirs, and the
country subsequently developed trading, cultural, and political contacts
with Central Asia, Western Asia, and even southern Europe. Zhang
Qian’s route was subsequently traveled and supplemented by later
generations, ultimately forming what was termed the “Silk Road” by the
German geologist Ferdinand von Richthofen at the end of the
nineteenth century. This Han dynasty route thus facilitated the earliest
communications between the civilizations of China, India, and Greece,19
being among the major routes along which ancient religions,
philosophies, and cultures entered China. For example, we know that
Buddhism crossed the Pamir plateau into China, and this was a major
factor leading to the flourishing of Buddhist art in China during the
Northern Wei period (386–534).20 By the Tang dynasty, when
interaction and exchanges between China and the Western Regions in
culture, art, religion, and material production reached their peak, the
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Fenstern auf allen Seiten würden in Mosul unerträgliche Steinkamine
sein. Auch die Häuser der Armen haben dieselbe Bauart; nur fehlt
natürlich der Marmorschmuck; oft sind sie aus unbehauenem Stein
oder nur aus an der Sonne getrocknetem Lehm.
Dem kunstverständigen Auge, das auf diesen Höfen der
zahlreichen vornehmen Häuser an malerischen Motiven reiche
Ausbeute findet, mag Mosul leicht als eine Perle unter den Städten
des Orients erscheinen. Das Panorama von einem hohen Dache aus
enttäuscht aber stark. Man sieht nichts als graue, fensterlose
Mauern, flache Hausdächer mit Brustwehren in verschiedener Höhe,
runde Minarette mit einem oder mehreren Rundgängen für die
Gebetsrufer, und hier und da die viereckigen Türme und flachen
Kuppeln der christlichen Kirchen und Klöster.
Toros, 60jähriger armenischer Karawanenfuhrer aus
Erserum.
 Basarstraße in Mosul.
Weit dankbarer ist eine Wanderung durch die Straßen und
Basare, wahrhaftige Labyrinthe, durch die man sich nur unter
kundiger Führung hindurchfindet. Eng und winkelig sind die Gassen,
wie in Bagdad, weniger häufig die Holzerker. Die belebteren
Stadtviertel haben Steinpflaster, aber so schlechtes, daß eine
Droschke verunglücken würde, wenn sie sich überhaupt hier
durchzwängen könnte. Schmutz, Unrat, Gerümpel, Fruchtschalen,
Gedärme und andere Küchenabfälle liegen haufenweise umher, die
widerwärtigen Hunde wühlen darin herum. Die Straßenreinigung
besorgt nur ab und zu ein heftiger Sturmwind mit riesengroßem
Besen; ganze Kehrichtwolken füllen dann die Basare. Vergebliche
Mühe! In den Winkeln sammelt und häuft sich der Schmutz um so
höher, und dort bleibt er liegen.
 Eine schöne Ecke im Basar.
In den lebhaftesten Straßen des Basars sind die Läden der
Waffenschmiede und Gelbgießer, die Stände der Schmiede und
Seiler, Fleischbänke und Obstläden, wo Rosinen und Mandeln,
Nüsse, Gurken, Gewürze usw. feilgehalten werden. Das Geschäft
der Töpfer blüht, denn der Krug geht solange zu Wasser, bis er
bricht, und ganz Mosul braucht die hübschen Trinkgefäße, die die
Frauen so anmutig auf dem Kopfe einhertragen. In den Buchläden
schmökern Männer im Turban oder Fes umher. Durchmarschierende
Soldaten kaufen Tabak und Pfeifen, Feuerstahl und Mundstücke.
Mächtige Ballen europäischer Stoffe liegen aufgestapelt, immer in
schreiender Farbe, die das Auge des Orientalen erfreut. Ein
Hammam, ein Bad, ist überall in der Nähe. Kleine Tunnel, deren
spitzbogige Tore oft von schönen Skulpturen umrahmt sind, führen
zu den Karawansereien der Großkaufleute, und Stände mit alten
Kleidern, wahre Herde für ansteckende Krankheiten und Ungeziefer,
fehlen auch nicht. In den engsten Gassen arbeiten die Barbiere in
schattigen Gewölben. Schutzdächer aus dünnen Brettern oder
Bastmatten über den Läden erhöhen noch die malerische Buntheit
der Straßenbilder.

Bab-el-Dschiser.
Das Herz des Basars ist ein kleiner, unregelmäßiger Marktplatz,
auf den die Hauptstraßen zusammenlaufen. Hier liegen mehrere
Kaffeehäuser. Auf der offenen Veranda des einen habe ich viele
Stunden zugebracht. Unter mir ein Gewimmel, wie in einem
Ameisenhaufen; würdig einherschreitende Orientalen im Turban
oder Fes und in weißen, braunen oder gestreiften Kopftüchern mit
Scheitelringen, Chaldäer und Syrier — im Fes, aber sonst
europäisch gekleidet —, Priester und Bettler, Frauen mit und ohne
Schleier, Hausierer und lärmende Kinder, Eseltreiber mit ihren
störrischen Langohren und Kameltreiber durchziehender
Karawanen, die nie ein Ende nahmen. Das Reizvollste aber war der
Blick über dies Gewimmel hinweg durch den mächtigen Rundbogen
des gegenüberliegenden Tores Bab-el-dschiser auf den nahen
Strom, die Brücke, die seine Ufer verbindet, und auf die Ruinenhügel
von Ninive.
In 35 Bogen zwischen mächtigen Steinpfeilern setzt die Brücke
über den Strom. Aber nur auf dem linken Ufer ist sie landfest; bei
niedrigem Wasserstand steht sie dort zum größten Teil auf dem
Trockenen. Die Strömung geht am rechten Ufer entlang, wo auch
das Bett am tiefsten ist, und bei Hochwasser, nach der
Schneeschmelze oder nach Frühjahrsregen, würde auch die stärkste
Steinbrücke der rasenden Gewalt des Wassers nicht widerstehen.
Deshalb hat man hier eine Pontonbrücke angesetzt, deren
Verbindungsteil mit der Steinbrücke, je nach dem Wasserstand,
seine Lage selbsttätig ändert. Auch unterhalb der festen Brücke läuft
ein Fußsteig, der aber nur bei niedrigem Wasserstand begangen
werden kann; jetzt war er überschwemmt. Die Brücke wurde vor
achtzig Jahren von einem Italiener gebaut, dessen Sohn noch jetzt
in Mosul leben soll.
Das orientalische Gepräge Mosuls wird starke Einbuße erleiden,
wenn nach dem Kriege die Bagdadbahn fertig ist, und Eisenbahnen,
Lokomotiven und Güterzüge die Kamele verdrängen. Schon jetzt
hatte die Regulierungsmanie eines Wali auch hier gewütet. Vom
künftigen Bahnhof brach man eine Straße quer durch die Stadt zum
Tigris. Dadurch fiel eine Menge schöner alter Häuser und Höfe der
Spitzhacke zum Opfer. Der Krieg verhinderte bisher den Neubau;
infolgedessen sah die Straße aus, als habe ein Erdbeben sie
zerstört, oder als hätten die Russen hier wie in Ostpreußen gehaust.
Halb abgerissene Häuser standen da, und bloßgelegte Höfe mit
hohen Gewölben, Säulen und Marmorarabesken boten einen
traurigen Anblick. Ich fragte den Gendarm, den mir der Kommandant
als Begleiter mitgegeben hatte, ob der für diese Zerstörung
verantwortliche Wali nicht gehängt worden sei. „Im Gegenteil,“
antwortete er lachend, „jedenfalls ist er Ehrenbürger von Mosul
geworden!“
 Tunnel im Basar.

Meine Streifzüge durch Mosul beschloß ich gewöhnlich mit dem

Besuch eines Gasthauses, dessen Besitzer, der Italiener Henriques,
mit einer tüchtigen deutschen Frau verheiratet ist; aus Bagdad hatte
man ihn ausgewiesen, in Mosul aber ließ man ihn unbehelligt. Er
wohnte fast außerhalb der Stadt an einem großen Platz zwischen
den Infanteriekasernen, dem Konak und dem Serail, wo die
Zivilbehörden ihren Sitz haben, und verschenkte den herrlichsten
Nektar, den man sich in der Sonnenglut wünschen konnte, eiskalte
Limonade.
Der chaldäische Patriarch, rechts der Herzog, links Koeppen und Staudinger.
 Monseigneur Chajat.
Von den Kirchen Mosuls soll die ältere chaldäische aus dem 7.
Jahrhundert stammen. Unmittelbar neben ihr liegt die jetzige
chaldäische Kathedrale, die im 14. Jahrhundert erbaut und 1810 und
1896 erneuert wurde. Es war gerade Vespergottesdienst, als wir sie
in Begleitung mehrerer Priester besuchten, und der Gesang der
Chorknaben erfüllte die niedrigen Wölbungen des Kirchenschiffs,
das vom Altar durch einen Vorhang getrennt war. Die Wölbungen
ruhen auf acht Säulen; Kapitäle und das sie verbindende Gebälk
sind mit Bibelsprüchen bedeckt, der Boden mit Teppichen belegt. An
die Kathedrale schließt sich das Seminar mit einem geräumigen Hof.
Ein Gang und eine Treppe führen in eine Krypta, eine andere Treppe
auf einen kleinen Hof, an dem ein Zimmer gezeigt wird, das
Feldmarschall von Moltke 1837 bewohnt haben soll. Ein dritter Hof
umschließt eine Begräbnisstätte der Chaldäer. Sonntag, den 18.
Juni, waren der Herzog und wir andern frühmorgens ½6 Uhr zu einer
feierlichen Messe in der Kathedrale eingeladen. Der Vorhang vor
dem Chor war nun aufgezogen, der Altar strahlte im Kerzenlicht, und
Knaben- und Männerchöre sangen oder vielmehr schrien Psalmen
und Lieder. Der Patriarch, ein ehrwürdiger Greis mit langem, weißem
Haar und freundlichen Augen hinter runden Brillengläsern,
zelebrierte selbst und murmelte mit dumpfer Stimme uns
unverständliche Worte aus goldbeschlagenen Büchern. Die
Morgensonne flutete durch die Fenster herein auf die dichte Menge
der Andächtigen, und die Festkleider der chaldäischen Frauen
leuchteten in allen Farben.

Erntetanz.
Am zweiten Sonntag lud mich der Chorbischof der syrischen
Kirche, Monseigneur Chajat, Fondateur de l’Institut Pius X. à
Mosoul, zu einer höchst originellen Tanzvorstellung kurdischer
Landleute, die zur Erntearbeit nach Mosul zu kommen pflegen. Die
Männer trugen Turbane, Westen, Leibgürtel und lange Hosen, die
Frauen leichte Kopftücher, Mieder oder Jäckchen und bunte Röcke.
Vier Musikanten spielten auf; ihre Instrumente waren ein Kanun, ein
zitherartiges Saitenspiel, das man aus den Knien hält, ein Oud oder
eine Gitarre, ein Dumbug oder eine Trommel und ein Tamburin mit
rasselnden Tellerchen an der Seite, genannt Daff (vgl. das Bild S.
348).

Der erste Teil des Erntetanzes: Die Sicheln werden geschliffen.

 In raschem Tempo.
Erst traten die Männer vor, faßten sich an den Händen und
begannen jenen rhythmisch wiegenden Tanz, den ich schon bei den
Arabern gesehen hatte. Bald warfen sie sich nach rechts, bald nach
links vornüber, jedesmal den Fuß gegen die Steinplatten stemmend,
und zwar mit solchem Nachdruck, daß man fürchtete, sie müßten
sich die Fußsohlen zerreißen. Der Schweiß floß ihnen vom Gesicht
herab, die Augen glänzten vor Eifer; die Tänzer schienen völlig im
Bann der immer leidenschaftlicher anschwellenden Musik, die Finger
rissen immer ungestümer die Saiten, die Knöchel schlugen mit
rasender Schnelligkeit das gespannte Trommelfell, und wie ein
saugender Strudel des Tigris wirbelte es um die Maulbeerbäume des
Hofes herum.
Am zweiten Tanz nahmen auch die Frauen teil, und den Schluß
bildete der Erntetanz der Männer. Erst saßen sie auf dem Boden und
schliffen ihre Sicheln zum Takt der Musik. Dann standen sie auf und
machten in wiegendem Gang die Bewegungen des Schnitters beim
Mähen der Saat. Dann steigerte sich der Tanz zu einem wilden
Krescendo.
 Hinterher gaben uns die Musikanten in einer Loggia noch ein
besonderes Konzert. Sie spielten einen algerischen Marsch, der an
der Nordküste Afrikas volkstümlich sein soll, und melancholische,
eintönige Weisen zu den Liedern eines arabischen Sängers, denen
man stundenlang zuhören konnte.
Das Haus des Chorbischofs war einer der schönsten Paläste in
Mosul, und Monseigneur Chajat hatte die Liebenswürdigkeit, mir
eines seiner Zimmer als Atelier einzuräumen und mir zahlreiche
männliche und weibliche Modelle zu beschaffen. Die Bilder, die ich
von ihnen entwarf, erheben keinen Anspruch auf künstlerischen
Wert, geben aber wohl einen Begriff von der Mannigfaltigkeit
charakteristischer Typen, die Mosuls Straßen und Basare beleben
und dem Auge des Malers einen unerschöpflichen Reiz bieten.
 Das Tor Bab-el-Dschiser in Mosul mit Blick auf die Tigrisbrücke und Ninive.

Dreiundzwanzigstes Kapitel.
Ninive.

I m vorigen Kapitel berichtete ich schon, daß ich am 11. Juni 1916
die alte Seldschukenburg in Mosul bestieg, die sich auf einem
steilen Felsen über dem rechten Ufer des Tigris erhebt, und zum
erstenmal die alte Königsstadt Ninive vor mir sah — oder vielmehr
die Stelle, wo sie ehemals gestanden hat. Keine grauen Massen
gewaltiger Mauern, keine Türme mit Zinnen, keine Terrassen von
Königspalästen oder festen Bürgerhäusern sind mehr zu sehen;
nicht einmal Reste ihrer Grundmauern ragen über der Erde hervor.
Alles ist verschwunden; nur drei ausgedehnte, gleichförmige Hügel
mit schroffen Abhängen verraten den Ort, wo vor Jahrtausenden die
Hauptstadt des assyrischen Weltreichs blühte. Von der
beherrschenden Höhe der Seldschukenburg aus erhält man aber
wenigstens einen ungefähren Begriff von der Lage und Größe dieser
Stadt, und die Phantasie glaubt den Lauf der Stadtmauer zu
erkennen. Sonst nichts als graubraune Wüste in glühendem
Sonnenbrand.
Und diesen Eindruck unendlicher Verwüstung erhielt ich auch, als
ich am 16. Juni mit Professor Tafel, der ebenfalls von Bagdad
herübergekommen war, auf dem Ruinenfeld selbst umherstreifte.
Nur an zwei Stellen dieses ungeheuern Friedhofes hat sich das
Leben noch festgenistet; die eine ist das Dorf Nebi Junus,
unmittelbar neben dem südlichen Hügel und selbst auf einer kleinen
Anhöhe gelegen, von der die Grabmoschee des Propheten Jonas
weithin sichtbar ist, und das Dorf Kujundschik, berühmt als einer der
ergiebigsten Fundorte der Assyriologen.
Die Droschke, mit der wir von Mosul über das Rollsteinpflaster
der Tigrisbrücke Ninive entgegenfuhren, war mit Seilen umschnürt,
weil ihre gesprungenen und eingetrockneten Radkränze und
Speichen auseinanderzufallen drohten. Auf dem linken Ufer bogen
wir rechts ab und hielten bald am Fuße des Abhangs, von wo ein
Fußweg zur Grabmoschee Nebi Junus hinaufführt. Es war gerade
Freitag und Gottesdienst in der Moschee.
 Oberster Priester der Grabmoschee des
Propheten Jonas.
Man empfing uns freundlich und geleitete uns zu einer
Dachterrasse hinauf, von der aus eine Tür in den Tempel führte. In
einem kleinen Kiosk, einem Turmzimmer mit Fenstern nach allen
Himmelsrichtungen, die eine prächtige Aussicht auf das
gegenüberliegende Mosul darboten, mußten wir warten, bis die
Gebete zu Ende waren, die Allahs Segen auf den Sultan, auf Kaiser
Wilhelm und Kaiser Franz Joseph herabflehten und um Sieg über
die Feinde baten — eine erbauliche Zeremonie für die anwesenden
englischen Untertanen, wenn anders sie aufrichtige Gefühle für
England im Herzen hegten. Ein kleiner weißbärtiger Alter, den
Turban auf dem Kopf und eine Brille auf der Nase, leistete uns mit
mehreren andern Mohammedanern Gesellschaft.
 Als die Gläubigen die Moschee zu verlassen begannen, zogen
wir die Schuhe aus; unser Führer ergriff meine Hand und bat uns
ihm zu folgen. Das Innere des Tempels war sehr einfach und
entbehrte jedes Schmucks, nur ein paar verschlissene Teppiche
lagen auf dem Boden. Seitwärts vor einem Gitterfenster standen
einige indische Mohammedaner im Gebet versunken. Durch dieses
Gitter sah man in die Krypta des Propheten Jonas hinab, ein dunkles
Loch, in dessen Mitte sich eine sarkophagähnliche Erhöhung abhob.
Das eigentliche Grab des Toten soll aber unter diesem Denkmal
liegen.

Indische Mohammedaner in der Moschee Nebi Junus.

Eins der Minarette von Mosul hängt bedenklich über. Der Sage
nach verbeugten sich alle Gebetstürme in Ehrfurcht, als der Prophet
Jonas gleich unterhalb dieses Dorfes, das seinen Namen trägt, vom
Walfisch ans Land gespien wurde. Nachher richteten sie sich wieder
auf bis auf einen, der noch heute fortfährt, die Bewohner Mosuls an
das Grab des Heiligen zu erinnern.
 Aus der stillen Kühle der Moschee gingen wir wieder in den
Sonnenbrand hinaus und stiegen langsam den Hügel hinab, auf
dessen Abhang die ärmlichen Hütten des Dorfes Nebi Junus in
amphitheatralischer Anordnung liegen. Auf einem der Höfe hatte sich
eine Schar armenischer Flüchtlinge gelagert. Dann fuhren wir eine
Strecke nordwärts bis zum Flusse Choser, der von Osten nach
Westen die Ruinenstätte durchfließt. Eine schöne neue
Bogenbrücke führte hinüber, die aber auch schon so verfallen war,
daß wir vorzogen, sie zu Fuß zu überschreiten. Auf einer Landspitze
nahm eine Eselkarawane, Führer und Tiere, in dem kristallklaren,
fast stillstehenden Wasser ein Bad.

Josefine Saijo, 13jährige Syrierin.

 Bald hinter der Brücke beginnt der eine von den Hügeln Ninives,
und wir steigen seinen niedrigen Gipfel hinan. Ringsum nur Schutt
und Disteln — nichts, was auch nur einigermaßen an die Welt des
Altertums erinnert, kaum daß die eingestürzte Mündung eines
Tunnels die Spur älterer englischer und französischer Ausgrabungen
verrät. Lautlos und öde dehnt sich die sonnenverbrannte Wüste vor
uns; nur Scherben zerbrochener Wasserkrüge liegen umher,
zwischen denen zahlreiche Eidechsen über glühend heiße Steine
dahinhuschen. Die Grundmauern, auf denen Königspaläste und
Festungen ruhten, sind im Schutt verborgen, und die Phantasie
versagt, wenn sie aus diesem öden Nichts die Herrlichkeit
vergangener Jahrtausende erwecken soll. Auf diesem ungeheuern
Friedhof sind nicht einmal mehr Grabsteine zu finden, die ihr als
Führer dienen könnten, und in meinen Ohren klingen die Worte des
Propheten Nahum, zu dessen Grab in dem Dorf Alkosch, neun
Stunden nördlich von Mosul, an bestimmten Festtagen die Juden
wallfahren: „Es wird der Zerstreuer wider dich heraufziehen und die
Feste belagern. Siehe wohl auf die Straße, rüste dich aufs beste und
stärke dich aufs gewaltigste. Denn der Herr wird die Pracht Jakobs
wiederbringen, wie die Pracht Israels. Die Schilde seiner Starken
sind rot, sein Heervolk glänzt wie Purpur, seine Wagen leuchten wie
Feuer, wenn er sich rüstet; ihre Spieße beben. Die Wagen rollen auf
den Gassen und rasseln auf den Straßen. Sie glänzen wie Fackeln
und fahren einher wie die Blitze. Er aber wird an seine Gewaltigen
denken; doch werden sie fallen, wo sie hinaus wollen, und werden
eilen zur Mauer und zu dem Schirm, da sie sicher seien. Aber die
Tore an den Wassern werden doch geöffnet, und der Palast wird
untergehen. Die Königin wird gefangen weggeführt werden, und ihre
Jungfrauen werden seufzen wie die Tauben und an ihre Brust
schlagen. Denn Ninive ist ein Teich voll Wasser von jeher; aber
dasselbe wird verfließen müssen. Stehet, stehet, werden sie rufen,
aber da wird sich niemand umwenden. So raubet nun Silber, raubet
Gold, denn hier ist der Schätze kein Ende und die Menge aller
köstlichen Kleinode. Nun muß sie rein abgelesen und geplündert
werden, daß ihr Herz muß verzagen, die Kniee schlottern, alle
Lenden zittern und alle Angesichter bleich werden. Wo ist nun die
Wohnung der Löwen und die Weide der jungen Löwin, da der Löwe
und die Löwin mit den jungen Löwen wandelten und niemand durfte
sie scheuchen? Der Löwe raubte genug für seine Jungen und
würgte es seinen Löwinnen. Seine Höhlen füllte er mit Raub und
seine Wohnungen mit dem, was er zerrissen hatte. Siehe ich will an
dich, spricht der Herr Zebaoth, und deine Wagen im Rauch
anzünden, und das Schwert soll deine jungen Löwen fressen; und
will deines Raubens ein Ende machen auf Erden, daß man deiner
Boten Stimme nicht mehr hören soll. Wehe der mörderischen Stadt,
die voll Lügen und Räuberei ist und von ihrem Rauben nicht lassen
will. Denn da wird man hören die Geißeln klappen und die Räder
rasseln und die Rosse jagen und die Wagen rollen. Reiter rücken
herauf mit glänzenden Schwertern und mit blitzenden Spießen. Da
liegen viel Erschlagene und große Haufen Leichname, daß ihrer
keine Zahl ist und man über die Leichname fallen muß. Und alle, die
dich sehen, werden vor dir fliehen und sagen: Ninive ist zerstört; wer
soll Mitleiden mit ihr haben, und wo soll ich dir Tröster suchen?
Siehe dein Volk soll zu Weibern werden in dir, und die Tore deines
Landes sollen deinen Feinden geöffnet werden, und das Feuer soll
deine Riegel verzehren. Schöpfe dir Wasser, denn du wirst belagert
werden! Bessere deine Festen! Gehe in den Ton und tritt den Lehm
und mache starke Ziegel! Aber das Feuer wird dich fressen, und das
Schwert töten; es wird dich abfressen wie die Käfer, ob deines Volks
schon viel ist wie Käfer, ob deines Volks schon viel ist wie
Heuschrecken. Deiner Herren sind so viele wie Heuschrecken und
deiner Hauptleute wie Käfer, die sich an die Zäune lagern in den
kalten Tagen. Wenn aber die Sonne aufgeht, heben sie sich davon,
daß man nicht weiß, wo sie bleiben. Deine Hirten werden schlafen, o
König zu Assur, deine Mächtigen werden sich legen; und dein Volk
wird auf den Bergen zerstreut sein und niemand wird sie
versammeln. Niemand wird deine Schaden lindern, und deine
Wunde wird unheilbar sein.“ —