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Challenges J. Tochukwu Omenma
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Ten Years of Boko
Haram in Nigeria
The Dynamics and
Counterinsurgency
Challenges
Edited by
j. t o c h u k w u om e n m a
i k e e . on y i sh i
a l oy si us-m ic h a e l s okol i e
Ten Years of Boko Haram in Nigeria
J. Tochukwu Omenma • Ike E. Onyishi
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie
Editors
Ten Years of Boko Haram

in Nigeria
The Dynamics and Counterinsurgency
Challenges
Previously published in Security Journal

Volume 33, issue 3, September 2020
Editors
J. Tochukwu Omenma Ike E. Onyishi
University of Nigeria University of Nigeria
Nsukka, Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie
University of Nigeria
Nsukka, Nigeria
Spin off from “Security Journal” Volume 33, issue 3, September 2020
ISBN 978-3-031-22768-4
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Contents
A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses

and challenges ahead ............................................................................................... 1
J. Tochukwu Omenma, Ike E. Onyishi and Alyious-Michaels Okolie:
Security Journal 2020, 2020: 33:337–356 (10, February 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9
A decade of terror: revisiting Nigeria’s interminable
Boko Haram insurgency........................................................................................ 23
Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao: Security Journal 2020, 2020: 33:357–375
(10, February 2020) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8
Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle
for a caliphate ........................................................................................................ 43
J. Tochukwu Omenma, Ifeanyichukwu M. Abada
and Z. Onyinyechi Omenma: Security Journal 2020, 2020: 33:376–400
(17, February 2020) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00233-7
Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military
and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle .......................... 69
Freedom C. Onuoha, Chikodiri Nwangwu and Michael I. Ugwueze:
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6
Mathematical approach to the analysis of terrorism dynamics......................... 95
C. Okoye, O. C. Collins and G. C. E. Mbah: Security Journal 2020, 2020:
33:427–438 (17, February 2020) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00235-5
Boko Haram, pro-synergic conditions and community involvement
in counterinsurgency ........................................................................................... 107
Bonaventure N. Nwokeoma, Kelechi E. Okpara and Nnabuike O. Osadebe:
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00236-4
Interagency collaboration and the management of counter-insurgency
campaigns against Boko Haram in Nigeria ....................................................... 123
Okechukwu M. Ikeanyibe, Charles N. Olise, Isah Abdulrouf
and Ikechukwu Emeh: Security Journal 2020, 2020: 33:455–475 (21, February
2020) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00237-3
v
vi Contents
Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: deradicalization

strategies and challenges in countering Boko Haram....................................... 145
Hakeem Onapajo and Kemal Ozden: Security Journal 2020, 2020:
33:476–492 (17, February 2020) https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00238-2
Responsibility to protect: external intervention on Boko Haram
terrorism in Nigeria ............................................................................................. 163
Chijioke Egwu Ekumaoko and Kingsley Emeka Ezemenaka:
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00239-1
Security Journal (2020) 33:337–356
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses

and challenges ahead
J. Tochukwu Omenma1,3 · Ike E. Onyishi2 · Alyious‑Michaels Okolie3

Published online: 10 February 2020
© Springer Nature Limited 2020, corrected publication 2020
Introduction
The goal of this special issue is to provide a contemporary overview of Jama’atu

Ahlis Sunnar Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad1 (that is, people committed to the propaga-
tion of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad) activities, which is detailed, extensive in
its coverage, and able to chart responses over time. Since Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnar
Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (henceforth, Boko Haram) emerged as a low-intensity politi-
cal violence in 2002, media-driven narratives as well as social scientific methodolo-
gies have been increasingly applied to draw generalisable conclusions on what goals
the groups have pursued, what strategies used for these purposes and the counter
campaign strategies pursued. But over the last 10 years from 2009 to 2018, Boko
Harm has transformed to high-intensity violence of assassinations, bombing, kid-
nappings, beheading or threats of violence, conscriptions and territorial occupation,
which makes it imperative to deepen and broaden our understanding of the groups’
activities toward a problem-solving and policy-relevant analysis.
This introduction provides the ground norm for the articles collected in this
special issue of Security Journal. The introduction should be read and understood
from the perspectives of both general and specific issues. On the general term, it
begins by deconstructing the essential concepts of insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla
warfare and rebellion. Analysing these related concepts help the classification of
Boko Haram activities as well as understanding the groups’ ultimate goal. Rely-
ing on the data from Global Terrorism Index, Armed Conflict Location & Event
Data Project (ACLED) and International Crisis Groups, we operationalised Boko
Haram’s tactics, the nature of attacks, casualty rates and weapons to analyze the
1
The local Hausa translation is Boko Haram, meaning Western education is forbidden or a sin.
Chapter 1 was originally published as Omenma, J. T., Onyishi, I. E. & Okolie, A. ‑M. Security Journal
(2020) 33: 337–356. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9.
* J. Tochukwu Omenma
tochukwu.omenma@unn.edu.ng
1
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg,
South Africa
2
Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
3
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
Reprinted from the journal 1

J. T. Omenma et al.
groups’ global ranking. Next, we specifically established the critical security man-
agement approaches used against the Boko Haram activities. Essential distinctions
were drawn between defensive and offensive (proactive) strategic counter measures
toward ultimate defeating of Boko Haram groups. Finally, we summarised the eight
articles in the special issue through logical data presentations of the main theses,
methodologies and findings. We concluded by identifying future challenges as high-
lighted by the authors of the article in the Security Journal special issues.
Where does Boko Haram belong?
Terrorism concept is a complex matter, and there are over 100 definitions in the
literature (Young and Dugan 2014; Blanquart 2012; Record 2003). The complexity
manifests from several aspects, whether there should be a distinction between terror-
ism and other related violent-production narratives, defined based on the methods
and tactics employed, or from the prism of ideological motivation—religious, politi-
cal, economic or territorial sovereignty. Essentially, most definitions emphasis on
central components such as the use of violence, attacks on non-combatants, creates
a state of fear, aims to influence, intimidate or coerce and being inspired by political,
social and ideological goals (Aly 2011). What is common is the focus on tactical
violence carried out by non-state actors. O’Neill treats the subject with some depth
as terrorism is “a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against
non-combatants… Insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence
because terrorists seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term
goals” (O’Neill 1990, p. 24). In the same tradition, McCuen (1966 cited in Connable
and Libicki 2010, p. 103) identifies terror as a phase of insurgency, while the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007) notes that “terrorism is an anxiety-inspir-
ing method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-) clandestine individual,
group or state actor, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in
contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets”.
Also, the US Department of Defence (2002) states that terrorism is “the calculated
use of unlawful violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to
coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are gen-
erally political, religious, or ideological.” The common denominator is the deploy-
ment of high-intensity of violence by a clandestine organisation that usually results
to several deaths, maiming and instilling fears on the population. The motivation
may vary depending on the prevailing circumstance of the conflict environment.
From these viewpoints, Boko Haram is considered both a terrorist and insurgent
organisation that uses the guerrilla strategies to draw attention to their grievances
as well as promote their goals. The group, which has existed in various forms since
the late 1990s, is primarily a religious study, but later metamorphosed into a violent
insurgent group in 2009 seeking to overthrow Nigerian Government and replace it
with a regime based on Islamic law. Boko Haram’s activities since 2009 marked an
escalation in the frequency and violence of its attacks. Following this, the US des-
ignated the group a terrorist organisation in 2013 due to fears that it had developed
links with other international militant groups to wage a global jihad. The US action
2 Reprinted from the journal

A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses and…
was informed by AFRICOM Commander, General David M. Rodriquez’s report that

“communications, training, and weapons links between Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM)” (Guitta and Simcox 2014, p. 6). Soon after, other countries such
as Canada in 2013, Australia in 2014, United Kingdom in 2014 and international
organisations like United Nations and European Union in 2014 equally designated
Boko Haram a terror group and proscribed its activities. In June 2013, Nigerian
President Jonathan Goodluck officially declared Boko Haram a terrorist organisation
and proscribed it under Nigerian law. The terrorist members and anyone caught aid-
ing them could be prosecuted under the country’s Terrorism Prevention Act, which
was expected to facilitate legal prosecution of the accused.
Over the years, Boko Haram has adopted two strategies—offensive and defen-
sive. Their offensive method is aimed at defeating, destroying or neutralising the
Nigerian state authority, while defensively, they use avoidance, protection and decoy
to sustain their forces and campaign. Boko Haram uses large numbers of assault
rifles, rocket propelled grenades, shells, mortars and improved explosive device
(IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in their activities.
The group retains an unknown number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, some
anti-aircraft capability, and of recent uses drones to drive their offensive and defen-
sive operations (THISDAY (Nigeria) newspaper, 22 September 2019; Vanguard
(Nigeria) newspaper 2018; Open Briefing 2015; US Army TRADOC 2015). Due
to the group’s frequency of attacks and threats in Nigeria, the country remains the
third most impacted country in the world by terrorism—a position it has retained
since 2014, when Nigeria was ranked the second most terrorised country in the
world (Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2019, p. 18). Boko Haram has helped to create
political environments where violence is dominant, and the military campaign has
been unable to end the threat.
Spiral of violence: incidents, fatalities (death) and injuries
Since 2009, Boko Haram activities have resulted to about 20,000 to 30,000 fatali-
ties and over 2.3 million population displaced from their homes. At its peak periods,
that is between 2010 and 2015, the group seized large swath of territories in north-
eastern Nigeria, including major cities such as Maiduguri, Mubi and Gwoza as well
as constituted a significant threat to the Nigerian state (Febab-Brown 2018). Over-
all, an estimated 15 million people have been severally affected by the Boko Haram
insurgency and the military counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts (Febab-Brown 2018).
Boko Haram fighters continue to attack and kill civilians in villages and towns,
abduct thousands of people, forcibly marrying off women and girls to their fight-
ers, and conduct mass-casualty terrorist attacks against mosques, markets, govern-
ment property and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Figure 1 presents
impact analysis of Boko Haram number of attacks, fatalities (death) and injuries for
the past 6 years, 2013 to 2018.
Figure 1 indicates that Boko Haram attacks started building up significantly in
2013, and the total percentage of attacks is 10.13%, of fatalities is 9.28% and of

J. T. Omenma et al.
Impact analysis of Boko Haram attacks, 2013-2018

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Incident Fatalies Injuries
Fig. 1 Impact analysis of Boko Haram attacks, 2013–2018. Source: Global Terrorism Index reports,
(2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
injuries is 5.69%. The character and impact of attacks changed significantly in 2014,
and Nigeria ranked the second countries most impacted by terrorism in 2014 against
the fourth position in 2013. On record, Nigeria experienced the biggest yearly dete-
rioration in terrorism in 2014, which is represented by the astronomical rise in the
number of attacks (22.13%), fatalities (38.17%) and injuries (27.96%). There were
5686 more people killed from terrorism in 2014 than in 2013, “an increase of almost
300 per cent, which is largely due to the increasing ruthlessness of Boko Haram”
(GTI 2015, p. 22). Although, there was a slight fall in Boko Haram attack inci-
dent from 22.13% in 2014 to the 19.65% in the year of 2015, showing a decrease
of 2.48%. The substantial reductions in attack incidents and deaths coincided with
major military operations in partnership with Civilian Joint Task Forces (Civilian-
JTF) that effectively targeted terrorist groups (Omenma and Hendricks 2018). Fig-
ure 1 indicates that incidents, deaths and injuries from Boko Haram terror activities
fell for the three consecutive year, since its peak period of 2014, and the percentage
of incidents, deaths and injuries keep decreasing for the 2 years (2016 and 2017)
running until an increase of 5.04% in terrorism incidents in 2018. As at 2015,
8 years after Boko Haram inception, approximately half of the violence (49%) attrib-
uted to Boko Haram involves civilian targets, 44% involves engagement with state
and external forces, and 2% involves conflicts with other non-state armed groups
(ACLED 2015 cited in Dowd and Drury, 2017, p. 138). Global Terrorism Index
(2019, p. 18) data show Nigeria as one of the 10 countries most impacted by terror-
ism, ranked by the number of deaths primarily arising from Boko Haram incidents.
Of recent, suicide attacks have accounted for an increasing proportion of deaths
(Campbell and Harwood 2018). This is to continuously terrorise local populations
and undermine confidence in the ability of the government to provide protection to
the civilian and challenge the sect groups in some of their controlled territory.

Government response
Nigeria has initiated different kinds of intervention policies to counter Boko

Haram. Prior to 2009 when Boko Haram emerged, Nigerian laws regarding ter-
rorism were based on Sect. 11 of the 1999 Nigerian constitution, which enjoins
or empowers the National Assembly to make law for public safety and order and
laws to ensure their maintenance and security. In 2011, the National Assembly
promulgated the Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA), which defines acts of ter-
rorism and provides the framework for the investigation, prosecution, and inter-
diction of suspects in terrorism cases. This law was amended in 2013, and the
amended version expanded the role of the Office of the National Security Advisor
(ONSA) as the main coordinator for all counterterrorism enforcement activity.
Since 2009, the Nigerian security forces—the Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigeria
Police Force (NPF), the Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Customs
Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigeria Security and
Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)—are
the primary interveners against the threats and attacks of Boko Haram.
The military has been the dominant actor with the active involvement of the
Civilian-JTF in the implementation of operational capability and degrading secu-
rity environment. The military, through the command of Operation Lafiya Dole,
has been involved in a number security actions. Ground forces have been a pre-
dominant feature of the military counterterrorism, especially in south-central
Borno, where Operation Deep Punch I and II have seen a number of incursions
into the Sambisa Forest area as well as the use of air power through a series of
operations called Ruwan Wuta (Rain of Fire) has also been essential part of coun-
terterrorism operations (Omar and Ndubishi 2018). The military focuses on sta-
bility operations, which aim at restoring order, security and providing the plat-
form for the return of peace and order in the north east.
To achieve these aims, the military operational mechanisms involve road blocks,
checkpoints, cordon and search, guarding of key points, armed military patrols,
and military raid operations (Aminu 2013). The regular offensive of Boko Haram
through suicide, use of explosive devices and wholesale assaults and conscriptions
have forced the military on relying on the establishment of checkpoints along major
roads and armed military patrol operations in the north east. Permanent checkpoints
are placed at locations that are intended to maximise the chances to identify, arrest
and intercept Boko Haram members who are in possession of explosives or seeking
to reach large population centres or bombing targets. In addition, military uses raid
operations to destroy specific Boko Haram hideouts, rescue conscripted persons,
reclaiming of locations and the killing of designated terrorist members. Omenma
and Hendricks (2018) note that the combined military and Civilian-JTF effort
increases the efficacy of raid operations at Boko Haram hideouts, cells, camps and
networks, as well as impacting devastating effects on the group, as more terrorist
members were either arrested, killed or dispersed in the process.
As at 2014, former President Goodluck Jonathan, in his efforts to end to the
insurgency turned to the Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection

J. T. Omenma et al.
(STTEP), a South African private military contractor, which assisted to degrade

and reclaims some territories under Boko Haram before the 2015 general elec-
tions. By March 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari terminated the STTEP
contract, turned to the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram, con-
tributed US$100 million and strengthened diplomatic cooperation with Nigeria’s
neighbours for more effective regional counterterrorism approach (Assanvo et al.
2016, p. 8). As at 27 July 2016, MNJTF recaptured 80% of the territories under
Boko Haram; civilian causalities dropped from 2000 in 2015 to 573 in 2018,
while MNJTF has foiled Boko Haram attacks in Niamey and in the South-eastern
city of Diffa in May 2019 and in Baga area in July 2019 among several counter-
terrorism operations (Nextier SPD 2019, pp. 1–2). Within this period, MNJTF
has significantly weakened the capability of the terrorist group and continued to
successfully dislodge it from its strongholds. Presently, the Nigerian military in
combination with the civilian defence forces and Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) has pressed back Boko Haram to the Sambisa forest and Lake Chad
region, and their operations restricted to Borno, Yobe and part of Adamawa states
bordering Borno and Nigerian neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon and
Niger.
Besides the military being the dominant actor that engages Boko Haram, both
domestic and regional, the Nigerian government continues to employ non-military
strategies. The declaration of state of emergency was led to the formation of the
CJTF—a localised network of informal, paramilitary vigilante forces with loose ties
to the Nigerian military. Since 2009, repeated efforts to open dialogues with Boko
Haram has been unsuccessful. In 2011, former President Olusegun Obasanjo held
discussions with key members of Boko Haram without formal or tangible results. In
2012, Colonel Sambo Dasuki2 engaged in shuttled diplomacy to persuade northern
community leaders to engage with Boko Haram members and emphasised govern-
ment willingness for negotiation and possible group-level amnesty. Prior to the suc-
cessful negotiation and release of 21 and 82 Chibok School girls on October 2016
and May 2017, respectively, both the administrations of Goodluck Jonathan and
Muhammadu Buhari repeatedly sought to negotiate a peace deal with Boko Haram,
publicly offering unspecified amnesty as an incentive. There was also a ceasefire
announced by the Federal government spokesperson in 2014, but Boko Haram
members denied the existence of a ceasefire and its participation in negotiation (Pate
2014, p. 32). The Jonathan administration in particular invested significant political
capital in negotiations to exchange detained Boko Haram members with more than
200 school girls kidnapped in 2014. The approach to the negotiations has been ad
hoc, reactive, frequently secretive and highly controversial.
The development and adoption of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy
(NACTEST) in 2014 and its review in 2016 paved the way for a multi-faceted
2
Colonel Sambo Dasuki is a retired military officer of northern extraction and was appointed the new
National Security Advisor to President Goodluck Jonathan in 2012. The appointment was strategically
aimed at appeasing the northern Nigerians to buy into the President Jonathan’s counterterrorism pro-
grammes.

approach to preventing/countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) and the devel-

opment of a comprehensive national approach to tackle violent extremism. Non-
military approaches include deradicalisation programme through the Office of
the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Presidential Initiative for the North
East (PINE) that seeks to alleviate the economic motivation (poverty and illit-
eracy) behind terrorism, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
that focuses on the provision of humanitarian relief to victims of violence, and the
military collaboration with the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative
(PCNI) and National Directorate for Employment (NDE) to implement Operation
Safe Corridor programme, which aims at deradicalisation, rehabilitation, resettle-
ment and reintegration of repentant low-risk Boko Haram combatants. The non-
military counterterrorism approaches continue to record modicum of achievements
through prevention of attacks, reintegration of repentant terrorists and rescuing civil-
ian captives from terrorist members. For instance, the Operation Safe Corridor pro-
gramme initiated since 2016 has facilitated the unconditional surrendering of over
87 terrorist members to the Nigerian security forces between 24 August and 13 Sep-
tember, 2017 (The Guardian (Nigeria) newspaper, 24 August, 11 and 13 September
2017); about 760 suspected Boko Haram members have been released to the Borno
state government for reintegration into the society (The Nation (Nigeria) newspaper,
6 October 2017); while 468 suspects discharged for lack of evidence by the court
are under the auspices of ONSA for deradicalisation programme (New Telegraph
(Nigeria) newspaper, 16 October 2017) and some 1,800 women and children have
returned to their communities after rehabilitation programme at Gombe camp facil-
ity (Febab-Brown 2018, p. 87). As of November 2018, report shows that 101 clients
had graduated from the Gombe camp facility of Operation Safe Corridor since 2016,
and 157 were still undergoing deradicalisation (Bukarti et al. 2019, p. 16). While the
responses of Nigerian government have been varied, with a greater focus on the use
of hard-power, repressive measures, emphases of government on rehabilitation and
deradicalisation are beginning to be highlighted because they have produced some
tangible outcomes.
The success of this approach, both the kinetic and non-kinetic, is clear and this
informed the declaration of Boko Haram as being technical defeated by Maham-
mudu Buhari administration. On the contrary, civilians consider Boko Haram as
part of daily life activities because the jihadist groups have successfully coerced
them through fear into a desired behaviour pattern, such as “buying of peace”
(Comolli 2015, p. 80). Instead of the jihadist groups declining in operations, they
have expanded to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and linked up with al-Qaeda fam-
ily in Maghreb region. Despite the official position of the Buhari’s administration,
large body of literature agrees that counterterrorism suffers from three crucial weak-
nesses. First, the security sector corruption and mismanagement have continued to
undermine Nigeria response to Boko Haram and hence, the repeated incidents of
Boko Haram activities. Transparency International (TI) 2017 report that corrupt
military officials have siphoned money through the creation of fake defence con-
tracts, and the proceeds are often laundered in the United Kingdom, United State
and elsewhere (The Guardian (Nigeria) newspaper 19 May 2017). The consequence
is lack of access to modern and key war capability such as Amphibious Equipment,

J. T. Omenma et al.
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) equipment, ground and air lift

assets, intelligence gathering platforms as well as low morale of soldiers. Second,
the slow pace of the judicial system with regard to charging and trying suspected
militants, and a lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to implement
antiterrorism laws (Blanchard and Husted 2019). This explains the absence of wit-
nesses that stalled the trial of some high profile Boko Haram cases and the hasty
discharge of 468 detainees over want of evidence by a special court panel. Third,
the Operation Safe Corridor is highly obscured and unclear criteria as to who con-
stitutes “low-risk” and “high-risk”, and in practice that leave any potential defector
unable to judge what category or fate he will be assigned if he does indeed defect
(Febab-Brown 2018). To surrender is not enough, especially in the case of Boko
Haram. Combatants may be forced to surrender by a number of factors, such as mili-
tary pressure or a lack of supplies or war fatigue. There are allegations of some ex-
combatant who previously surrendered, and subsequently rehabilitated and released
to the society returning to the Boko Haram sects due to their inability to reintegrate
properly.
Special issue: specific findings and concluding argument
This special issue seeks to provide an analysis of the policies and measures adopted
to counter Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency. The experts brought together
demonstrate the origin of Boko Haram, the obvious and not-so-obvious motivations,
the pull and push factors, policies of military interventions and the non-military
deradicalisation that have been adopted, revealing emerging trends, lessons learned
and overviews of the security status of the conflict environment of the north east.
Their findings demonstrate a diverse approach to counterterrorism that attempts to
match and counter the unique local conditions which drive terrorism, while also
seeking to provide insight and policy recommendations for countering insurgency.
As presented in Table 1, we summarise the important findings of selected articles
from three broad perspectives: the historical and motivational aspect of Boko Haram
insurgency; the counterterrorism approaches within the rubrics of military opera-
tions and civilian participation; and the non-military security management in a com-
plex global phenomenon, the push and pull factors that mobilise people who are
usually localised and may differ from country to country. The special issue contains
several important and rich data that advances our knowledge in the understanding of
the dynamic nature of insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.
From a historical perspective, Amao (2020) establishes the JAS and the IS
backed-ISWAP evolution as well as the push and pull factors that defined Moham-
med Yusuf’s movement in early 2000, while Omenma et al. (2020) provide reasons
to take seriously the incremental drive for a West Africa Caliphate as both JAS
and ISWAP motivation, which appears unrecognised or not taken seriously in the
government responses. Both articles agree that Shekau led JAS and al-Barnawi led
ISWAP have gained significant legitimacy within their operational jurisdictions,
which aids their offensive prowess and claim over territorial space. Although Amao
(2020) makes a case for more emphasis on human security management of the

Table 1 Summary sheet
Author Article title Methods Unit of analysis Data sources Findings
Amao (2020) A decade of terror: Historical–analytical Shekau’s JAS and IS Documentary evidence ISWAP has gained legitimacy
revisiting Nigeria’s approach backed-ISWAP in its areas of controls,
interminable Boko which increases the volatil-
Haram insurgency ity of Lake Chad areas;
The increasing success of
Reprinted from the journal

attacks by ISWAP requires
human security approach
to complement military
counterterrorism; and
Cooperation is needed
between host communities
of conflict environments to
address common terrorist
threats
9
Table 1 (continued)
Omenma et al. (2020) Boko Haram insurgency: Critical discourse Shekau’s JAS and IS Map reading, location The article shows a causal
a decade of dynamic analysis, territorial and backed-ISWAP event data, relation between the estab-
evolution and struggle deterritorial analysis lishment of West African
for a caliphate caliphate and a decade
of terrorism in the Lake
region;
There is little or no immedi-
ate or short-run effect of the
military defensive-oriented
strategy on reclaiming
territorial strong holds
of Shekau’s JAS and IS
backed-ISWAP; and
The military requires a highly
10
offensive approach to
neutralise JAS and ISWAP
ability to challenge the state
authority as well as cut off
their pool of foot soldiers
and new recruits
J. T. Omenma et al.

Table 1 (continued)
Onuoha et al. (2020) Counterinsurgency opera- Mixed methods approach Nigerian military Interviews, Focus Group The military has recorded
tions of the Nigerian Discussion, SIPRI, modicum of successes
military and Boko Global Terrorism Index, in the counterinsurgency
Haram insurgency: Nigerian Defence operations such as recovery
Expounding the viscid Budget of some previously seized

manacle territories, freeing of cap-
tives, and interdiction of the
group’s logistics, among
others;
Despite huge allocation
($19.176 billion, between
2009 and 2018) to the
defence sector, complaints
about military underfunding
11
persists; and cases of battle-
field shortages of arms and
ammunition while soldiers’
low morale and desertion

continue unabated; and
Contrary to the official refrain
that the Boko Haram has
been technically defeated,
the group has proven resil-
ient and continues to launch
audacious and successful
attacks on military bases
Table 1 (continued)
Okoye et al. (2020) Mathematical approach to Mathematical models Boko Harma Global Terrorism Index Terrorism/terrorists activities
the analysis of terrorism (2017–2018) reduces if the basic recruit-
dynamic ment number (R0) less than
unity, otherwise the reverse
is the case;
The use of public enlighten-
ment as counter terrorism
measure have impacts in
reducing terrorism activities
provided the basic recruit-
ment number in the pres-
ence of counterterrorism
measures (Rc0 ) is less than
unity; and
12
Using military intelligence as
a counterterrorism measure
have significant impact
reducing terrorism activities
provided Rc0 < 1.
J. T. Omenma et al.

Table 1 (continued)
Nwokeoma et al. (2020) Boko Haram and the Cross-sectional research Boko Haram; Civilian Questionnaire; interviews Civilians with higher com-
imperative of pro- design Joint Task Force munal consciousness were
synergic conditions for more likely to be effectively
effective community involved in counterinsur-
involvement in counter- gency campaign (p < .01);

insurgency in Nigeria Community support
significantly predicted
effective involvement in
counterinsurgency(p < .01);
and
Willingness to provide intel-
ligence to state security
operatives significantly pre-
dicted effective involvement
13
in counter insurgency
Table 1 (continued)
Ikeanyibe et al. (2020) Interagency collaboration Mixed methods approach Security/law enforcement Interviews, official docu- In a complex problem as
and the management agencies ments and newspaper terrorism, interagency
of counter-insurgency reportage collaboration works like a
campaigns against Boko complex adaptive system,
Haram in Nigeria where non-linearity in
agency operations through
adaptation, self-organisation
and co-evolution with other
agencies ensures unity of
purpose rather than unity
of action in dealing with a
shared problem;
The Terrorism Prevention
Act (2011, 2013) of Nigeria
14
recognises the import of
interagency collaboration
among security organsia-
tions, but has not resulted to
the defeat of Boko Haram;
and
The impact of interagency
collaboration on counterter-
rorism has not reached its
optimal level in Nigeria
due to lack of resources and
weak institutional capacity
to drive collaboration
J. T. Omenma et al.

Table 1 (continued)
Onapajo and Ozden Non-military approach Qualitative approach Deradicalisation pro- Documentary research— Authorities should look
(2020) against terrorism in gramme against terror- official and institutional beyond military approach
Nigeria: deradicaliza- ism; ex-combatants of documents; media and focus on deradicalisa-
tion strategies and chal- Boko Haram; govern- reports; scholarly papers tion to counter the adverse
lenges in countering ment officials effect of Boko Haram;

Boko Haram A positive association
between deradicalisation
programme and associated
economic empowerment
would enhance reintegration
processes; and
The implementation of Oper-
ation Safe Corridor should
equally focus on changing
15
the perceptions of the soci-
ety about the low-risk and
high-risk repentant Boko
Haram members to enhance

their re-integrations
Table 1 (continued)
a
Ekumaoko and Ezeme- Responsibility to protect: Qualitative method Boko Harm Qualitative data document The high human causalities,
naka (2020) external intervention on approach review especially from school chil-
Boko Haram terrorism dren and teachers, indicates
in Nigeria that authorities should look
beyond domestic measures
to contain the menacing
effect of Boko Haram in the
north east;
Boko Haram terrorism
impacts transnational
(Chad, Cameroon, Niger
and Nigeria), hence,
external intervention should
be a significant part of
counterterrorism as well as
16
introducing mechanisms to
ensure accountability and
human rights protection;
and
There is no evidence that the
minimal external interven-
tions (military aids, training
and intelligence shar-
ing) has eroded Nigerian
sovereignty to support the
government unwillingness
to directly involve interna-
tional community
a
Boko Haram is used in generic term to include both the pre-and post-splitting of the terrorist group
J. T. Omenma et al.

insurgency, but due to the claim for Community of Ummah and control of territorial
space by JAS and ISWAP Omenma et al. (2020) advocate a highly military offen-
sive approach to neutralise the groups’ ability to challenge the state sovereignty and
authority as well as re-claim territory under their control.
Onuoha et al. (2020) present evidence on the three levels of military campaigns—
strategic, operational and tactical and use the data to examine the impact of coun-
terterrorism on Boko Haram activities. The authors infer that military crackdown
remains the most visible and enduring response to the Boko Haram insurgency, but
the morale and fighting spirits of the soldiers in the battle fields have been perfo-
rated due to institutional corruption that has resulted to shortage of arms and ammu-
nition and poor reward system. The authors note that between 2014 and 2018, Nige-
ria spent over US$3.9 billion in arms procurement, while more than US$2 billion of
the budget siphoned in the process. There is close relation between institutional cor-
ruption and soldiers’ desertion from the battle field on one hand, and Boko Haram
resilient on the hand. Okoye et al. (2020) use mathematical model to show that ter-
rorism/terrorist activities depend on the successful membership recruitments, and
aggressive public enlightenment campaigns targeted at recruitments nodes could as
well have positive impact on gathering of relevant security intelligence information
to counter terrorist activities. On their part, Nwokeoma et al. (2020) investigate the
community impact on counterterrorism from the perspectives of communal con-
sciousness, willingness to offer intelligence information to the military and security
synergy with the military in order to facilitate trust and confidence in state secu-
rity operatives. As presented in Table 1, the authors argue that civilians with higher
communal consciousness of the security threats and risk in their environments are
more likely to witness more effective counterterrorism operations. Ikeanyibe et al.
(2020) explain that collaboration is in terms of unity of purpose than unity of action;
this implies that each agency tried to improve on its responsibility in view of the
problem at hand. This was seen in the various ways some of the agencies involved
tried to reform their operations and rules to tackle the shared problem.
Onapajo and Ozden (2020) note that after a decade of reliance on military
approach and the minimal successes recorded against Boko Haram activities, it
becomes imperative that the strategic priorities of the Nigeria approach changed
and create the room to integrate non-military approach. The issue of counterter-
rorism, nonetheless, goes deeper, particularly when dealing with ideologically
motivated terrorism, the aims should anchor on deconstructing, rehabilitating,
and re-integrating both the low-risk and high-risk repentant terrorist members
into the civil society. Onapajo and Ozden (2020) interrogate Nigerian context of
deradicalisation programme under the Operation Safe Corridor that has facili-
tated in rehabilitating about 254 ex-combatants in 2018, while between 2016 and
2017 an estimated 1 803 females were released from the government rehabili-
tation camp centre at Bulumkutu, Borno state. Although Operation Safe Corri-
dor has recorded modicum of success, but the authors note that the non-military
programme should include changing the violence-prone beliefs of an individual,
even when they have not physically engaged in the acts of violence. The last arti-
cle by Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka (2020) shift to human security paradigm, which
has global origins and ramifications. Considering the evolving global norm of

J. T. Omenma et al.
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the high human causalities, especially non-
combatant members, associated with Boko Haram terrorist activities, it means
that Nigeria has manifestly failed to protect its citizens, therefore, such responsi-
bility could be extended to the international community. As Ekumaoko and Eze-
menaka (2020) note,
The insurgency has grown from a domestic to global threat, which neces-
sitates an international response. However, the emphasis of the external
intervention should begin with non-military measures and civil strategies
and should only be expanded to include military options as a last resort (in
accordance with the R2P theory).
The above quote alludes to the fact that military campaigns against Boko Haram
have not ended the terror threats, rather, they are breeding a new generation of
radicalised youth. There are no concrete measurements of results to indicate
that after more than 10 years of Nigeria military, Civilian Joint Task Force and
multinational task force taking a military approach to violent terrorism in north-
eastern Nigeria, Lake Chad and Sahel regions is ending. The military strategy is
not working against Boko Haram, this agrees to Jones and Libicki (2008) find-
ing that military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terror-
ist groups. In fact, following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed
between 1968 and 2006, military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7% of
the cases. It does make sense to explore dialogue more deeply.
The combat against terrorism is not a battle to be won exclusively with guns
and bombs. Boko Haram is partly driven by ideology, and war over ideas are
hardly destroyed through the use of war arsenals. The Nigerian Chief of Army
Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai alluded to this fact when he retreated to the political
class that the military has won the ground war against Boko Haram that the “civil
authorities must fight the ideological, social and propaganda war” (Omenma and
Hendricks 2018, p. 786). The dialogue option is considered counterintuitive to
some policy-makers, who are apprehensive of creating the impression of state
weakness or attending to unreasonable and outlandish demands of terrorist group.
No doubt that such impression maybe alive among some critical opinion mould-
ers in multi-ethnic configurations like Nigeria, but willingness to dialogue shows
a government that prioritise human security. There are several flawed attempts at
dialogue with Boko Haram, especially in 2011. The failure of past dialogues was
not because the idea of dialogue is wrong, but because the execution was flawed.
There was a lack of political will, an absence of discretion, leaking of informa-
tion and limited cohesion in the expectations of the process and its outcomes. If
negotiation and dialogue instruments were deployed to release some Chibok and
Dapachi school girls, then government should not be put off by previous failure of
dialogue with Boko Haram leaders.

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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Security Journal (2020) 33:514
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00243-5
CORRECTION
Correction to: A decade of Boko Haram activities:

the attacks, responses and challenges ahead
J. Tochukwu Omenma1,3 · Ike E. Onyishi2 · Alyious‑Michaels Okolie3
Published online: 8 April 2020

© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Correction to: Security Journal

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9
The author would like to correct the given name for the below co-author in the
online published article.
The correct author name should read as:
Alyious‑Michaels Okolie
The original article has been corrected.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
The original article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9.
* J. Tochukwu Omenma
tochukwu.omenma@unn.edu.ng
1
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg,
South Africa
2
Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
3
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
Vol:.(1234567890)
Security Journal (2020) 33:357–375
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
A decade of terror: revisiting Nigeria’s interminable Boko

Haram insurgency
Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao1,2
Published online: 10 February 2020

© Springer Nature Limited 2020
Abstract
Since 2009 when Boko Haram launched its first attack in Nigeria, the terrorist sect
has remained a significant security and economic threat to the countries of the Lake
Chad region. While moderate successes were recorded between 2015 and 2016, with
the government maintaining that the insurgent sect has been technically defeated,
empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Using the historical approach as its research
methodology, this paper analyses the factors responsible for the sect’s resurgence,
and Nigeria’s response. It argues that Nigeria’s failure to nip the insurgency in the
bud is attributable to two main factors: the emergence, growing, and unchecked
influence of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISAWP) in the Lake Chad
region, and the unresolved ill-equipped state of the Nigerian military. The paper
submits that any serious attempt aimed at arresting this trend must begin by address-
ing these issues.
Keywords Boko Haram · ISWAP · Nigeria · Insurgency · Terrorism
Introduction
There is an abundance of scholarly literature on Boko Haram terrorism on the Nige-

rian state. Some have identified bad governance, widespread failures of state poli-
cies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, and endemic corruption, poverty, unem-
ployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the north of Nigeria as the contextual
factors that gave rise to the emergence and radical evolution of the Boko Haram
sect (Onuoha 2010; Uzodike and Maiangwa 2012). Onapajo and Uzodike (2012)
has highlighted the transnational dimension of the insurgency, particularly, the
Chapter 2 was originally published as Amao, O. B. Security Journal (2020) 33: 357–375. https://doi.org/
10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8.
* Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao

talk2smath@yahoo.com
1
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
2
African Heritage Institution, Enugu, Nigeria
Reprinted from the journal 23 Vol.:(0123456789)

O. Amao
increasing links between Boko Haram and the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), and al-Shabaab.
Aghedo and Osumah (2012) have argued that Boko Haram’s uprising in Nigeria
is a consequence of governance failure and institutional fragility, and that to effec-
tively address the uprising, a human security, rather than a repressive state security
approach is necessary. For Brinkel and Ait-Hida (2012), the Boko Haram crisis is
primarily driven by religious motives, particularly, a Jihadist version of Islam, which
seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria on the basis of the Sharia. Others have
maintained that the Boko Haram crisis is not overtly religious, and that the sect’s
ability to continue to wreak havoc on the Nigerian state is a consequence of the
mobilisation and politicisation of religion in Nigeria, and the heavy-handedness of
Nigeria’s conflict management processes (Agbiboa and Maiangwa 2013).
In his contribution to the discourse, Thurston (2016) has argued that Boko Har-
am’s ideological framework for violence towards the Nigerian state, other Muslims,
and Christians, must be seen as a combination of a feeling of exclusivism and griev-
ance and other drivers of violence such as local politics, intra-Muslim rivalries, soci-
oeconomic factors, and the brutality of the Nigerian government’s response. Asking
if Nigeria has defeated Boko Haram, Onapajo (2017), interrogated the counter-ter-
rorism approach of the Muhammadu Buhari presidency, and submitted that Boko
Haram continues to pose a threat to Nigeria and the West African sub-region. In a
comparative study of Nigeria’s response to the Liberian Civil War (1990–1997) and
the Boko Haram insurgency (2009–2015), Amao and Maiangwa (2017) have argued
that Nigeria’s apparent failure to nip the insurgency in the bud is deeply rooted
within the context of its home-grown challenges; particularly, its seeming indecisive
political leadership and the politicisation of the country’s national security. Using
the stabilisation theory as a framework of analysis, Omenma and Hendricks (2018)
have examined the civilian contribution and the impact of their partnerships with the
military on counter-terrorism in Nigeria’s campaign to end the insurgency.
Zenn (2019) has noted that Boko Haram’s ability to sustain its reign of terror on
Nigeria is attributable to the cordial relationship it enjoys from international terrorist
organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) and its
allies. While these and many more studies have focused on Boko Haram’s attacks in
Nigeria, the state’s response and a number of policy prescriptions on how the insur-
gency can be overcome, the sect continues to pose a significant threat to Nigeria’s
military formations and its allies. This is a far cry from the repeated claims by the
Nigerian government and its President, Muhammadu Buhari, that the sect has been
driven out from their strongholds, have had their operations curtailed, and are no
longer capable of operating effectively.
President Buhari noted that, “technically, we [Nigeria] have won the war because
people are going back into their neighbourhoods. Boko Haram as an organised fight-
ing force, I assure you that we have dealt with them” (BBC News, 24 December
2015a). This position has again been restated by the Nigerian government on 30
July 2019, when it reaffirmed that the 10-year-old (2009–2018) insurgency had been
defeated. As Garba Shehu, spokesman for the Nigerian government noted, “the posi-
tion of the Nigerian government is that the Boko Haram terrorism has been degraded
and defeated. The real Boko Haram we know is defeated” (Defence Post, 31 July

A decade of terror: revisiting Nigeria’s interminable Boko…
2019). What Nigeria, according to Garba Shehu, is currently facing is “a mixture of

the remnants of Boko Haram, fugitive criminals and the Islam in Maghreb together
with West African terrorists bonding together” (Defence Post, 31 July 2019).
Drawing references from documentary evidences sourced from Boko Haram’s
activities in the period under review, the paper locates the factors responsible for
this resurgence along two main strands: the emergence, growing, and unchecked
influence of the Islamic State (IS) backed—Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISAWP) as a splinter sect within the Boko Haram camp, and the gross underfund-
ing and ill-equipped state of the Nigerian military. The paper utilises the historical
approach, and credible statistics to appraise published materials on Boko Haram’s
campaign of violence in Nigeria between May 2016 and August 2019. The histori-
cal approach methodology was adopted as it helped to systematically recapture the
complex nuances of the Boko Haram phenomenon, its main actors, the ideology and
motivation fuelling its attacks on the Nigerian state, and its implication for Nigeria’s
security architecture (Berg and Lune 2012). The paper is structured into four sec-
tions, with the first serving as introduction. The second undertakes a review of Boko
Haram’s decade of terror in Nigeria. In the third section, the factors that have fuelled
the sect’s post-2016 resurgence are in focus. The final section offers the concluding
remarks.
Revisiting Boko Haram’s decade of terror (2009–2019)
It has been a decade since Boko Haram launched its first major violent attack on
Nigeria, ostensibly to entrench an ideology that stands diametrically opposed to the
acquisition of Western education, and to seek the establishment of an Islamic cali-
phate in West Africa. Although opinions have remained divided on the fundamental
cause of the conflict, and the most appropriate response to the insurgency, the jury
is unanimous on the casualty figure and the stigma it has imposed on the Nigerian
state. The conflict, focused mostly in Nigeria’s northeast, has left more than 7.1 mil-
lion people relying on humanitarian assistance, 2.4 million displaced, (with 80%
of them located in Borno state), created an estimated 232,000 Nigerian refugees
between May 2011 and May 2019, and has claimed at least 37,500 lives (Global
Conflict Tracker 2019).
Historically, Boko Haram’s exact origin remains largely contested, but there are
suggestions that the sect’s emergence may have drawn inspiration from the Maitat-
sine riots of the 1980s and the ensuing religious and ethnic crises that followed in
the late 1990s (Hickey 1984). Founded in Maiduguri in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf,
the group was initially set up as a religious complex (a school and mosque), but it
had other concealed objectives, as it later served as a conscripting ground for future
jihadists (Umar 2011). At formation, Boko Haram had no specific name, and its
members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perception
of the local population. Some of its early names included the “Taliban”, the “Yussu-
fiyyah”, and the “Ahulsunna wal’jama’ah Hijra—Congregation of Followers of the
Prophet Involved in the Call to Islam and Religious Struggle”, and the Jamaatu ahlis
Sunna li’Dawati wal Jihad (JAS) (Okereke 2011, p. 450).

O. Amao
The sect has a founding philosophy centred on its opposition to the totality of
Western culture upon which its educational system is founded. (Maiangwa and
Amao 2015). Its ideology is entrenched in radical Salafism, and its devotees are
influenced by the Koranic phrase: “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has
revealed is among the transgressors”.1 According to Thurston (2016, p. 5):
Boko Haram’s theology and politics encompass more than hatred for West-
ern influence. Its worldview fuses two broader ideas. First, there is a religious
exclusivism that opposes all other value systems, including rival interpreta-
tions of Islam. This exclusivism demands that Muslims choose between Islam
and a set of allegedly anti-Islamic practices: democracy, constitutionalism,
alliances with non-Muslims, and Western style education. Second, there is a
politics of victimhood. Boko Haram claims that its violence responds to what
it sees as a decades-long history of persecution against Muslims in Nigeria.
Boko Haram sees state crackdowns on the sect as the latest manifestation of
such persecution.
Boko Haram’s reign of terror has been sustained by a rhetoric, of false narrative,
particularly the notion that “a secular nation promotes idolatry, (for instance, state
worship), and that the pledge of allegiance to the flag, and singing of the national
anthem are manifestations of such idolatry, hence punishable by death” (Campbell
2014, p. 2). Boko Haram sees “the state is a nest of corruption that exploits the poor,
and believes the state is formed and sustained by Western values and education, both
of which are against the will of Allah” (Campbell 2014, p. 2). By spreading this
well-orchestrated narrative, Boko Haram has been able to convince its followers that
fighting a jihad is part of the will of Allah, and a cause every faithful must embrace
and be ready to die for.
Furthermore, Thurston (2016, p. 6) argued that “Boko Haram leaders have bor-
rowed ideas and postures from other Salafi-jihadis in order to give intellectual
weight to their stances and paint their movement as part of a wider tradition”. The
sect draws references from Islamic countries, “where the doctrines of Wahhabism,
Salafism, the non-violent Izala movement, and other fundamentalist sects are domi-
nant, to argue that everything necessary to ordering society is contained in the sacred
texts of religion—the Qur’ran, which it references to as its constitution” (Omenma
2019, p. 2). From a different standpoint, Hegazi (2015, p. 305) stated that “Boko
Haram’s leaders tell a provocative story about what it means to be Muslim in Nige-
ria, a story that seeks to activate fears that pious Muslims are losing grounds to the
forces of immorality. The leaders’ religious messages may, moreover, have greater
appeal than is often assumed”. Thus, religion for Boko Haram is seen as a veri-
table tool for conscription, and as a means of brainwashing its recruits for suicide
1
There are at least 5 commandments which the Almighty Allah in Soorat al-Maa’idah 5 (49), expects
every faithful Muslim to obey. Among them is the command to rule according to what Allaah has
revealed: “And so judge between them by what Allah has revealed”. For more on this see: “The kufr
of one who rules according to other than what Allah revealed”, https://islamqa.info/en/answers/974/the-
kufr-of-one-who-rules-according-to-other-than-what-allaah-revealed (Accessed 7 November 2019).

missions. This perhaps explains Omenma’s (2019, p. 2) position that “Boko Haram
shares some characteristics of religious terrorism: it is inclined to Salafist ideology,
religious exclusivism that opposes all other values”. In part, this rhetoric helps in
facilitating and hastening the radicalisation of its new recruits, which it draws from
an array of Nigeria’s unemployed youths, who having been frustrated with a lack of
opportunities are constrained to accept Boko Haram’s religious dogmas and incen-
tives as an alternative.
Boko Haram’s formal radicalisation and subsequent resort to violence dates
back to 2009, when a confrontation between the group and the Nigerian police
force (Operation Flush in Borno state) triggered an uprising in five northern states
which claimed over 800 lives. (Human Rights Watch 2012). That uprising led to the
destruction of the sect’s spiritual fortress—the Ibn Taymiyya Masjid mosque in Mai-
duguri, and the arrest and subsequent death of its founder and leader, Mohammed
Yusuf, in police custody. Yusuf’s death in police custody according to Hill (2012),
only made matters worse for the Nigerian state, particularly its security establish-
ments, as it drew more sympathisers to the group’s ideology, and led them to aggres-
sively pursue an armed campaign against the Nigerian government. A 1-year lull in
activity from 2009 to 2010 created a situation where the sect “transform itself into a
network of underground cells with a hidden leadership—a situation that today makes
any military solution illusory” (Marchal 2012, p. 3). Following this lull, Abubakar
Shekau,2 emerged as the sect’s new leader. Shekau is a witty character, who derives
gratification in making a mockery of Nigerian state symbols (Barkindo 2018). Like
Yusuf, Shekau’s fluency and ability to deliver sermons in Kanuri language, endeared
him to the predominantly Kanuri-speaking population in Borno State (Zenn 2019).
Shekau was later to lead a plethora of sophisticated attacks on the Nigerian state,
majorly through the use of suicide bombings and gunmen on motorbikes.
These attacks and their security and cost implications on the Nigerian state have
been well documented in the literature. (Adegbulu 2013; Zenn 2014; Amao and
Uzodike 2015; Popovski and Maiangwa 2016; Matfess 2017; Omenma and Hen-
dricks 2018; Zenn 2019). An informal split in the camp of the sect in 2013 into Boko
Haram and Ansaru also meant a shift in priorities in terms of attack (Zenn 2014),
but Shekau has controlled and retained the original name (Boko Haram) of the sect
since 2009, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Mamman Nur was in charge of the other splinter
sect—Jama’atuAnsaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru).3 A leadership tussle
2
Abubakar Shekau is the emir of Boko Haram and a U.S.-designated terrorist. Shekau subsequently
worked with Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic preacher who went on to found and lead Boko Haram.
Shekau shared Yusuf’s commitment to restructuring society in accordance with sharia law and was
named as his successor after Yusuf was killed by Nigerian security forces in July 2009. He is reputed to
be responsible for most of the bombings on the civilian population and other state assets between 2009
and 2016, including the abduction of 276 female students of Chibok government school, Chibok, Maidu-
guri, Nigeria, between 14 and 15 April 2014.
3
Khalid al-Barnawi and Mamman Nur are uniquely capable of expanding Boko Haram’s international
connections to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabab, the Movement for Unity and Jihad
in West Africa (MUJAO). Al-Barnawi is said to be a son of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko
Haram who the police extra-judicially murdered in 2009. Mamman Nur was a veteran jihadist who had
been with Boko Haram for years, and some viewed him as the real power within ISAWP.

O. Amao
within the Ansaru camp led to the reported death of Nur by ISAWP commanders
because of discontent over his more moderate stance (Council on Foreign Relations
2019). With its rank depleted, Ansaru, as Jacob Zenn noted, could only function for
a short period of time, as its members were too few to stop Shekau from crushing
their revolt (Zenn 2019). In 2016, the loyalty of Shekau’s men was tested, and the
switch in allegiance by some of them to the Islamic State (IS) led to a successful
rebellion against, and deposition of Shekau (Zenn 2019). With the strong backing
of the Islamic state, the Khalid al-Barnawi-led ISAWP succeeded Ansaru, before he
was replaced in late February 2019 by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi, as the
new Amir of ISAWP (The Punch 2018a, b, c). It is imperative to note that the two al-
Barnawis are unrelated, as the designation— “al-Barnawi” mainly connotes that the
individual is from Borno. In terms of distinction, the differences lie in their leader-
ship style, war strategy and ideology. While the Shekau-led JAS maintains a harder
stance on who an apostate Muslim is, and the deserving punishment for such ‘sin’,
Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi’s ISWAP, appears more moderate (Council on
Foreign Relations 2019). Similarly, ISWAP sees the JAS faction “as acting brutally,
in violation of the Islamic doctrine, and using methods which undermine support for
Islamist militancy in the region” (International Crisis Group 2019). JAS on the other
hand, questions its rival’s religious bona fides, insisting instead that al-Barnawi did
not “follow a sound doctrine from authentic Salafism” (Kassim and Nwankpa 2018).
This difference in ideology and leadership style notwithstanding, Boko Haram’s
record of atrocity on the Nigerian state is indisputable. Between 2009 and 2013,
Boko Haram was responsible for 2.34% of more than 34,000 terrorist attacks that
took place worldwide (START 2014, p. 5). Additionally, Boko Haram was respon-
sible for 5.9% of fatalities from terrorist attacks during this time, and the group’s
attacks in Nigeria represented nearly 70% of all fatalities from terrorist attacks in
the world (START 2014, p. 5). A total of 801 attacks, and at least 3666 casualties
were credited to the sect, and only the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
terrorist sects from Pakistan had a graver record (START 2014, p. 5). The Human
Rights Watch (HRW) equally noted that Boko Haram killed at least 2053 civilians
in an estimated 95 attacks targeting marketplaces, places of worship, and residen-
tial neighbourhoods in the first half of 2014, including the now infamous abduc-
tion of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state (Human Rights Watch, 15 July 2014).
By December 2014, at least 3425 lives had been lost to Boko Haram in 220 docu-
mented attacks (Washington Post, 3 April 2016). In early 2015, Boko Haram’s atro-
cious campaign against the Nigerian state beat a retreat, with Nigeria reclaiming
lost territories. This brief reprieve was due in part to two main factors—the suc-
cess recorded by the South African mercenaries contracted by the Nigerian govern-
ment in the build-up to the 2015 general elections (New York Times 2015), and
the subsequent election of Muhammadu Buhari, a one-time head of state, return as
president in May 2015 (BBC News 2015a). Basking in the euphoria of the gains and
successes recorded during that time, the Nigerian government was quick to declare
victory over Boko Haram (BBC News 2015b). That ecstatic declaration was short
lived, as Boko Haram, basking in the euphoria of the material and strategic support
it secured from the Islamic State (IS) resurrected to launch some of its deadliest
attacks on Nigeria.

In response to Boko Haram’s territorial control across Nigeria’s northeast, and

the threat it posed across the borders of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, a Multinational
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was reactivated with an expanded mandate to encom-
pass counter-terrorism operations (Humanitarian Practice Network 2017). Increased
cooperation between the MJNTF and the Nigerian military, and reported fragmenta-
tion within the sect, led to a momentary decline in Boko Haram’s ability to carry
out attacks on civilian targets. In 2016 and 2017, Boko Haram’s attack locations
remained the same as with previous years, with Borno State, experiencing the
most attacks, although there were limited attacks in Cameroon’s far north region,
Niger’s Diffa region, and Chad’s Lac region, all of which border Nigeria’s northeast
(BBC News 2018a). By the end of 2016, a total of 137 attacks had been carried
out in Nigeria (80), Cameroon (26), Chad (3), and Niger (18), resulting in about
910 deaths. In 2017, a total of 150 attacks were credited to Boko Haram within the
same geographical spread. As with previous years, Nigeria suffered the most casu-
alty with 109 attacks while there were 32 in Cameroon, 2 in Chad, and 7 in Niger
Republic (BBC News, 25 January 2018a). The total deaths in Nigeria fell to 1532 in
2017, representing a 16% drop from 2016 estimates (Global Terrorism Index 2018).
Women and children, mostly girls, have consistently been targeted and exposed
to brutal violence in their homes, schools, and public places, and they have func-
tioned as a constant weapon for Boko Haram in its jihad against the Nigerian state
(Maiangwa and Amao 2015). For example, in February 2018, 110 students of Gov-
ernment Girls Science and Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe state, were kidnapped
by the ISAWP-led faction of the sect. When they were released a month later in a
swap deal facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), five
of the girls had died in custody, while the lone Christian girl remained in captivity
(BBC News 2018b).
Boko Haram continues to challenge the country’s authority in the northeast, and
in some instances, it has formed a government which collects taxes and provides
some services to the people in the areas it controls. The succeeding discussion
undertakes a historical account of the other faction of the insurgent group—ISWAP
and used same to draw conclusions on responses from the Nigerian government and
the presumption of the groups’ defeat.
The Al‑Qaeda, AQIM, and the ISWAP factor
Boko Haram has well-established “roots in the religious landscape of Northern

Nigeria and in intellectual currents connecting Northern Nigeria to the Mid-
dle East. Like other Salafis, it claims “to represent the authentic legacy of the
early Muslim community of the al-salaf al-salih, the phrase from which the term
Salafism derives” (Thurston 2016, p. 9). Boko Haram’s religious creed is embed-
ded in a Wahhabi understanding of “tawhid” (the oneness of God or monothe-
ism, through which they try to convince its followers that “God’s kingdom on
earth can be achieved through the rigid application of Islamic law, or sharia and
ensuring justice for the poor” (Campbell 2014, p. 2.). The group’s ties with for-
eign terrorist organisations are not without antecedents. As early as 2003, there

O. Amao
were reports that some members of the sect were already cooperating with jihad-
ist groups abroad by making contacts with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s
(AQIM) and maintaining a line of communication with Al-Qaeda’s external oper-
ations unit in Pakistan (The Sunday Morning Herald 2003). This perhaps explains
Shekau’s adoption of an al-Qaeda’s style of jihad and his subsequent reference
to the leaders of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Algeria, Iraq, Somalia, and
Yemen, in his first video statement in 2010 (Zenn 2014). For example, Abu Qaqa,
the then Boko Haram’s spokesman was quoted to have said:
Al-Qaida are our elder brothers. During the lesser Hajj, our leader travelled
to Saudi Arabia and met al-Qaida there. We enjoy financial and technical
support from them. Anything we want from them we ask them (The Guard-
ian UK, January 27, 2012).
Similarly, it has been noted that even under Muhammed Yusuf’s leadership, some
members of the sect trained with AQIM’s predecessor, and that:
every prominent jihadist commander in Nigeria since 2009 has also been
reported to have had experience with jihadist groups abroad except for
Shekau, including four commanders who along with Shekau have been des-
ignated by the U.S. as terrorists, namely Mamman Nur (with AQIM and
al-Shabab); Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi (with Islamic State members in North
Africa and Syria/Iraq); the late Adam Kambar (with AQIM and al-Shabab);
and Khalid al-Barnawi (with AQIM and jihadists in Sudan in the 1990s)
(Zenn 2019, pp. 2–3).
Similarly, Boko Haram’s ideological underpinnings and goals appear to have
been inspired by al-Qaeda. According to Patrick Zimmet (2017 p. 1):
Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf, respected and admired al-Qaeda
from early on. Yusuf preached that Usama bin Laden was one of the “four pure
Salafists” that Muslims should follow and had in the early 2000s sent dozens
of his followers to Algeria and Mauritania to train with al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in order to “gain the strength to succeed” in jihad.
It was therefore not surprising that following Yusuf’s death in 2009, many of
his followers were trained by AQIM in the Sahel to avenge his death. Mention
has been made of Khalid al-Barnawi, the founder of Ansaru, as one of the first
jihadists to train with AQIM, and Adam Kambar, who Nigeria’s security forces
once described as the “main link” between Boko Haram and al-Shabab (Thurston
2011; Zenn 2018, 2019). In fact, both Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi were at
some point in charge of AQIM’s training camp in Algeria where Boko Haram’s
new recruits were trained (Zenn 2019). It has also been noted that AQIM has also
contributed operationally and financially to Boko Haram before Ansaru split from
the sect in 2011. AQIM, as Thurston noted, was believed to have provided about
$250,000, some of which aided the operational cost of Boko Haram’s attack on
Bauchi prison in September 2010, and the 2011 attack on Nigeria’s Federal Police
headquarters, and the UN building in Abuja. (Thurston 2011).

Furthermore, some AQIM leaders have also in the past indicated their willing-
ness to provide substantial military and logistical support to Boko Haram as part
of its organisation’s expansion agenda (Reuters, 31 January 2012). While this may
have established that Boko Haram’s fraternisation with similar international ter-
rorist networks is not without precedence, the question worth asking is: how has
the central goal and operational approach of ISWAP been different from Shekau’s
JAS since its formal secession? Since 2016, ISWAP has attempted to distinguish
itself from Shekau’s JAS which it sees as “acting brutally, in violation of Islamic
doctrine, and using methods that alienated the Lake Chad basin’s inhabitants
and thus undermined support for Islamist militancy in the region” (International
Crisis Group 2019). With an estimated 3500–5000 members, ISWAP overshad-
ows JAS, which has roughly 1500–2000, and appears to have gained the military
upper hand over the latter (International Crisis Group, 16 May 2019). A report
based on interviews with soldiers, refugees, intelligence officers, arms smugglers
and diplomats in Nigeria and Niger, as well as with people who participated in
talks with the faction, by the Wall Streets Journal, has described ISWAP “as a
well-armed and motivated insurgent group that expects to establish a state out
of strategic geography where the United States dialling back its military pres-
ence” (The Wall Street Journal, 3 February 2019). While there appears to be no
clear departure between ISWAP’s approach to law and order, and what obtains in
Shekau’s JAS, the former’s social governance approach is, however, remarkably
different to the latter.
A recent study carried out by the International Crises Group has provided a bird-
eye view of ISWAP’s attempt to constitute itself into a full-fledged government
within the Lake Chad Basin. According to the study:
ISWAP seeks to provide Islamic education (Western-style education is
banned) and basic health care. ISWAP has at its command a number of medi-
cal specialists, both militants and captives, who serve not just as fighters and
their families, but also local civilians, sometimes for a fee, sometimes for free.
The group procures medicine in raids on health centres or purchases it in Cam-
eroon and Nigeria’s Yobe state. ISWAP can organise the transfer of seriously
ill patients to hospitals in neighbouring countries. The improvement in access
to health care has been particularly felt around Lake Chad, where previously it
was minimal (International Crisis Group, May 16, 2019).
ISWAP has gained some form of legitimacy in the communities it controls, as its
taxes are well accepted by the local population, who appear grateful to the latter for
facilitating a convivial environment for their businesses to thrive, and an accompa-
nying adequate security, in contrast to what they felt obtained under the Nigerian
state (International Crisis Group 2019). In sum, ISWAP appears to have adapted
unique military tactics and policies towards civilians, such that it has been able to
foster ties with local communities under its watch. Thus, by curbing some of Boko
Haram’s most wanton practices, and filling the void in civilian governance and ser-
vice provision, ISWAP appears to have strengthened its hand for the future.
Perhaps, a better way to capture the level of reception and legitimacy ISWAP
enjoys within its territory is the narrative provided by a local who noted that:

O. Amao
If you are a herder, driver or trader, they won’t touch you - just follow their
rules and regulations governing the territory. They don’t touch civilians, just
security personnel. Rather, they protect locals from Boko Haram, something
Nigeria’s army cannot always do (Reuters, April 29, 2018a).
Unlike Shekau’s JAS whose capacity to unleash terror has been severely weakened
by the Nigerian government and its allies, ISWAP has grown in power and influence
from its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, by providing some
semblance of governance for the local population—a responsibility the Nigerian
government has abdicated (International Crisis Group 2019). Two plausible expla-
nations have been advanced for this. First, since 2015, ISWAP has earned some form
of legitimacy from the locals in the area they control, in contrast to the hostility the
local population believed the Shekau group visited on them. Second, ISWAP has
created a thriving business environment for the erstwhile neglected local community
around the Lake Chad basin, and in return, the locals appear to have surrendered
their legal sovereignty to ISWAP as a show of appreciation (International Crisis
Group 2015).
It has been reported that:
ISWAP treats local Muslim civilians better than its parent organisation did,
better than its rival faction, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS),
does now, and in some ways better than the Nigerian state and army have done
since the insurgency began in 2009. It digs wells, polices cattle rustling, pro-
vides a modicum of health care and sometimes disciplines its own personnel
whom it judges to have unacceptably abused civilians (International Crisis
Group, May 16, 2019).
While ISWAP has extended a hand of fellowship to the civilian population within
the Lake Chad Basin, it has inflicted monumental casualties on the Nigerian mili-
tary by making it, its principal target, overrunning dozens of its bases, and killing
hundreds of Nigerian troops. To be sure, Boko Haram’s attacks on Nigeria’s military
formation is not a recent phenomenon, as the sect had carried out a number of suc-
cessful attacks on Nigeria’s military bases, prior to the split. Perhaps, the deadliest
of such offensives was the mayhem it visited on Baga, and Doron Baga, in Borno
state on 3 January 2015, where an estimated 2500 lives were lost and well over 3700
houses destroyed (BBC News, 2 February 2015c).
Since the split of the sect into two factions—(Shekau’s JAS and ISWAP), the
severity and sophistication of the attacks on Nigeria’s military asset have been
remarkably different and it bears highlighting. While Shekau’s JAS has been notori-
ous for suicide bombings, use of children and women and indiscriminate killings of
civilians, ISWAP focuses on attacking military and government targets, even though
both of them have sworn loyalty to ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, but the lat-
ter only gave its formal backing to ISWAP. A better testimony to the efficacy of the
support ISWAP enjoys from ISIS is the upsurge in the attacks on military formations
since 2018. Between July and November 2018, there were 17 documented attacks on
military bases by ISWAP (Defence Post 2018a). For example, on 30 August 2018, at
least 30 Nigerian soldiers were killed when Boko Haram jihadists overran a military

base in Zari village, northern Borno, near the border with Niger Republic (The
Guardian Nigeria 2018). In what remains one of the most audacious acts carried out
on Nigeria’s military bases, ISWAP launched an attack on army base in Metele vil-
lage, northeastern Borno state, killing around 100 soldiers (Reuters 2018a, b). The
insurgents, as an eyewitness puts it:
took us unawares, the base was burned with arms and we lost about 100 sol-
diers. It is a huge loss. We all flew because we didn’t know where the bullets
were coming from. They killed some of us who went to evacuate the bodies of
the killed soldiers. We left our amour, tanks and weapons. They were all there.
The village is still under their control (Reuters, November 23, 2018b).
Also, on 28 November 2018, the military base in Cross-Kauwa village, 11 miles
near the garrison town of Monguno, came under attack. As with previous attacks,
Nigerian troops were forced to beat a retreat to another base in nearby Kekeno
(Defence Post 2019a). This was followed with another assault on 17 December
2018, when ISWAP Jihadists, in four technical trucks fitted with anti-aircraft guns,
killed a Nigerian soldier in an army base in Mairari village, Borno state. The base
was only recaptured after reinforcements arrived from Monguno, the garrison com-
mand centre (Defence Post 2019b). On 26 December 2018, Baga, a remote fishing
town in Borno state, hosting the operational headquarters of the MJNTF, came under
attack by militants linked to the Islamic State (IS) (BBC News 2018c). During the
attack, large cache of weapons was seized from the military base, and a naval base
on the shores of Lake Chad was torched. This claim was later refuted by the Nige-
rian authorities, arguing instead that the troops only made a ‘tactical withdrawal’
from their base after coming under attack. (BBC News 2018c). ISWAP struck again
on 23 February 2019—the day Nigeria held its general elections—by launching its
first-ever attack on Borno state’s capital, Maiduguri, in an operation that targeted
only military assets (Defence Post 2019c).
ISWAP launched another attack on Mararrabar Kimba military base, in Borno
state on 27 April 2019 and made away with three armoured personnel carriers sto-
len from Nigeria’s security forces. (Aljazeera 2019a, b). Again, on 3 May 2019, at
least five Nigerian soldiers were killed when the Daesh-affiliated group Boko Haram
overran the Magumeri military base, located 50 kilometres (30 miles) from the
Borno state capital, Maiduguri (TRTWORLD 2019). Similarly, between 27 May
and 29 May 2019, army bases in Dikwa, Marte, Dalwa, and Kirenowa in Borno state
were also overran by Boko Haram militants (Press TV 2019). It bears nothing that in
most instances where Nigerian army bases had come under attack, troops are often
left with very limited options in terms of resistance as they are often overpowered
by the superior fire power of the Boko Haram militants. During the Dalwa offensive,
the Nigerian military engaged the militants in a 6-h battle, before they were eventu-
ally pushed back. (Press TV 2019). Lastly, on 17 July 2019, six soldiers, including
a colonel and a captain, were killed by Boko Haram insurgents, believed to be from
the ISWAP camp when their base in Jakana, in Borno state was attacked. It took a
reinforcement from the ‘29 Task Force Brigade Headquarters’ in Benisheik, before
the attack was effectively repelled. Arguably, it is clear from this narration that
ISWAP’s ability to launch decisive attacks on military targets in Nigeria has been

O. Amao
done with more precision, and it has produced greater casualties than it did before
its breakup from Shekau’s JAS in 2016. The succeeding discussion examines how
welfare issues, continuous underfunding and the ill-equipped state of the Nigerian
military has continued to fan the embers of the insurgency.
A poorly motivated, underfunded, and under‑equipped military
When Boko Haram evolved in 2009, many would have thought that the insurrec-
tion will be over sooner than it began, given the track record of the Nigerian army
in conflicts it has intervened in Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone and Liberia in
the 1990s, and its erstwhile reputation as a professional, operational, and effective
military power in Africa (Amao 2019). The Nigerian armed forces were number-
ing around 18,000 soldiers at independence in 1960, the army ballooned to around
200,000 at the end of the 1967–1970 civil war which ended the secessionist Repub-
lic of Biafra (Medium Corporation 2016).
According to Peter Pham:
The Nigerian military has been in decline over or the past 16 years (1999–
2015), ever since the country moved from a military dictatorship to a democ-
racy in 1999. The intervening years have seen the country’s armed forces hol-
lowed out by a combination of poor leadership, graft, misdirected staff training
and a succession of civilian governments so worried about another coup that
they have starved the armed forces of key resources (TIME, February 10,
2015).
With the return to civilian governments in the 1990s, Nigeria’s military strength
fell below 100,000 soldiers, with the majority serving in the ground forces. Only
as few as 25,000 of these troops were actually equipped and trained for combat
operations until a few years ago (Medium Corporation 2016). While this figure may
sound impressive, the size of the Nigerian armed forces falls behind its contempo-
raries in Africa, including countries that are not at war. Egypt with a population
of 99 million, and Algeria with about 41 million people, boast of an armed forces
strength of 920,000 and 280,000 personnel, respectively (Global Fire Power 2019).
And they equally boast of superior fire power when compared to Nigeria. Besides
being understaffed and Nigeria’s high exposure to insecurity and violent terrorism,
its military spending to GDP ratio continues to be unimpressive.
In 2018, for example, less than 0.6% of its GDP was earmarked for military
infrastructure (World Bank 2018). Though, Nigeria has made a number of unsuc-
cessful attempts in the past to upgrade its military hardware, it had been held
back by the LEAHY law which prohibits the United States (US) from selling
weapons to countries with poor human rights record. It was not until year 2017
that the Muhammadu Buhari-led government secured the approval of the US gov-
ernment for the purchase of ‘12 Super Tucano A-29 planes’ and other military
hardware worth $593 million (Reuters 2017). The apparent decay in the combat
quality of the Nigerian military, as Olumba (2014) argues, came to the open when

the Nigerian contingent sent to Mali for peace keeping were declared unfit for the
mission, and were only found suitable to man checkpoints and load trucks.
In the same counter-insurgency mission, troops from Mali were considered
better trained for combat and lined up in the battle front with their contemporar-
ies from France. Similarly, in early 2015, it took the combined help of fighters
linked to officials at Executive Outcomes (EO), a now-defunct private military
firm/mercenaries based in South Africa, before Nigeria could aggressively push
Boko Haram backwards and reclaim some of the territories in the northeastern
states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, where it had already established a cali-
phate. (Amao and Maiangwa 2017). When situated within the confines of Nige-
ria’s protracted 10-year counter offensive, the forgoing explains why the country
has been struggling to defeat what was initially considered a grievance orches-
trated by a rag-tag group Islamic sect.
One of the unintended consequences of these issues highlighted above is low
morale on the part of troops in the heat of the battle. Revelations from those at the
forefront of the insurgency paint a pitiable picture of the many challenges Nigerian
troops often face. There are reports that Nigeria’s “rank-and-file soldiers are under-
paid, underfed, under-equipped and overstretched”, and that Nigerian soldiers now
ask humanitarian organisations to provide them with “food and mattresses, and, in
some instances build watchtowers for them” (Financial Times, 6 December 2018).
In one of the many protests by some of the troops involved in battle against Boko
Haram, an unnamed Nigerian soldier was caught on tape complaining about the
lack of motivation and ill treatment they face in the line of duty. “Imagine, they
are killing us every day”, an unidentified man says in the video, as he surveys the
charred hulks of tanks and trucks. “We are fighting to defend our country—the gen-
erals are cheating us” (Financial Times, 6 December 2018). This development per-
haps explains why some have asked “what loyalty does one expect of a Nigerian
soldier who goes to war poorly armed, poorly kitted for battle and not provided for
financially to take care of himself not to talk of the family members left behind?”
(Oluba 2014, p. 1). In the past, stories of Nigerian soldiers running away from Boko
Haram militants have been widely reported—but low on ammunition and allocated
vehicles that do not work, a former soldier says they are being outgunned and over-
powered (BBC News 2015c). It is noteworthy that as recent as 2018, very little has
changed. For example, some Nigerian soldiers were reported to have complained of
the poor state of their combat equipment in an ISWAP-inspired attack on their base
in Melete, Borno state on 18 November 2018:
No less than 100 plus soldiers died here. Many are missing in action; they are
nowhere to be found. See the weapons they bring here. These are not working.
These are outdated vehicles; they are not working. They just keep them here
for formality. Imagine, they are killing us every day. The situation is getting
worse (The Punch (Nigeria) newspaper, November 24, 2018).

O. Amao
A more apt testimony to the heavy fatality suffered by the Nigerian army in the
course of this insurgency is well documented in SB Morgen Intelligence report.4
The SB Morgen report notes that at least 5,656 soldiers have died in the war since
2011, with 2014 recording the highest number of military casualty of at least 2789
soldiers.5 While in 2015, not less than 189 soldiers lost their lives, the figures rose to
287 in 2016; 472 in 2017; 661 in 2018, and 873 casualties as at 12 September 2019.6
Others have increasingly noted that although the Nigerian soldiers and ISWAP
fighters may have the same equipment, Nigerian army troops often run out of
ammunition when confronted. According to the soldiers, “each time ISWAP comes
on the offensive, they became much stronger, with much more firepower. We have
to break contact and retreat when they engage us”. (The Wall Street Journal, 3 Feb-
ruary 2019). An undercover report in 2015 revealed a more pathetic story of cases
where soldiers were complaining of how they were “sent out to fight militants armed
with RPGs while they only have dozens of bullets each, and how they had to cover
medical expenses for wounds received in battle” (CNN, 15 January 2015). The
‘ammunition crisis’ is only a part of the many challenges bedevilling the Nigerian
military in its fight against Boko Haram. Nigerian military authorities admitted that
they noticed daring moves by the terrorists, increased use of drones against the mili-
tary’s defensive positions and infusion of foreign fighters in Boko Haram’s ranks
(Reuters 2018a, b). By implication, the Nigerian military authorities confirmed the
use of technology by the ‘enemy’ but seemed to be at a loss on how to stop them.
In many ways, this development underscores the lack of strategy and coordination
that has defined Nigeria’s response to the insurgency and puts a question mark on
the tactical competence of the Nigerian military, and their response time to Boko
Haram’s onslaughts. As one observer puts it:
There appears to be a lack of co-ordination—someone will attack a military
compound and for 2 or 3 h that the battle is raging and no one coming to sup-
port them. Where is the air force? How is it that Boko Haram can travel tens
of kilometres and sneak up on a military base? (Financial Times, December 6,
2018).
It seems obvious also that the Nigerian government is aware of these challenges,
given the admittance of its Army Chief, Lt. General Tukur Buratai, that “the [army]
must start to plan and strategise on how to end the operations in the north-east, and I
have directed for a change from a wholly defensive posture to one where we defend
in numbers and conduct offensive operations in smaller packets but simultaneously
in different fronts” (Financial Times 2018). Beyond this admittance, however, there
is little evidence to suggest a radical tactical change on the ground.
Lastly, some commentators have identified widespread corruption or fraud as a
significant undermining factor in Nigeria’s attempt to defeat the insurgency. While
4
See for example: Stalemate: Boko Haram’s New Strategy requires it to commit fewer attacks. https://
www.sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/201910_Boko-Haram.pdf.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.

“there has been no firm evidence of graft”, observers have often pointed that “there
is enough anecdotal evidence to make a case” (TIME, 10 February 2015). Mention
has been made for example of Israeli-made surveillance drones purchased by the
Nigerian government to aid its reconnaissance missions on the battle field. Accord-
ing to John Campbell:
A few years ago. The drones were paid for and delivered, but despite budget
allocations for their maintenance and upkeep, the drones were inoperable last
spring, [2014] when they could have been used to locate the missing Chibok
schoolgirls. Instead U.S. and British drones had to be flown into do reconnais-
sance” (Reuters, May 21, 2014).
There was also the case of Nigeria’s former National Security Adviser, who was
accused of awarding phantom contracts to buy 12 helicopters, four fighter jets and
ammunition, and other arms-related expenses worth over US$2bn by a panel inves-
tigating the procurement of arms under the Goodluck Jonathan administration (BBC
New 2015d). Arguably, these challenges reflect the plethora of reasons why the
Nigerian military has been unable to contain the insurgency since 2009.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria over 10 years
(2009–2018), and the contributory factors that appear to have made it an intermi-
nable stigma. On the strength of the facts examined here, concrete attempts must
be made by Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin allies to complement its ongoing mili-
tary action with a prompt and effective service delivery in the areas where ISWAP
holds sway. As empirical evidence from this contribution has shown, the seeming
legitimacy ISWAP presently enjoys from the locals in the area it controls is a conse-
quence of the failure of the Nigerian government to perform its statutory responsi-
bility of guaranteeing the welfare and security of its people. At the moment, events
on the ground in communities under the grip of ISWAP and JAS evince a seem-
ing resignation to fate on the part of the locals about the incapacity of the Nigerian
government to protect them. The danger in the continued neglect of this sacrosanct
responsibility by the Nigerian government is that ISWAP will continue to retain
an almost unchallenged authority to exercise de facto sovereignty it was gifted on
a platter of gold. As things stand, ISWAP’s expanding foothold on the territory it
occupies, implies that Nigeria, and its allies involved in the campaign against the
insurgency, may want to consider a human security approach, as an additional alter-
native to the military campaign.
This is particularly pertinent, given that one of the drivers of the cooperation
which ISWAP enjoys among its host community is the profound realisation and
assurance by the people that their human and material security is guaranteed. Lastly,
there is a need to declare a state of emergency to address the fire power and strength
of the Nigerian armed forces. As presently constituted, Nigeria lacks a substantial
capacity to effectively combat the myriad of security-related issues it faces. The
181,000 total military personnel, (124, 000 are active and 57,000 reserved), Nigeria

O. Amao
has is grossly inadequate to contain the myriad of security challenges threatening its
sovereignty. From the Boko Haram/bandits in the North to kidnapping and herds-
men attack in the South, Nigeria is at its brink, and if it is to overcome this insur-
gency, addressing the obvious under-staffing and underfunding crisis in the Nigerian
armed forces must be prioritised, and tackled head-on.
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Fruitful women, 60.
Fruit tree, a simile, 15.
Fruitless suckling, 283.
Fumigations, 129.
Garters, ill effects of, in pregnancy, 123.

Gathered breasts, 282.
causes of, 283.
importance of early treatment, 286.
German breakfast, 289.
Gestation, period of, 185.
Ginger plaster, 157.
Girl or boy?, 188.
Greens, cabbages, and pickles, 290.
“Guarding of the bed,” 218.
Hair, on washing, 46.

Health, a beautifier, 23.
importance of, 101.
of wives, 13.
worth trying for, 17.
Heart, palpitation of, during pregnancy, 167.
Heartburn in pregnancy, 147.
Hints to attendants, 228.
to mother when infant is ill, 268.
Home known only in England, 86.
Honey, on the wholesomeness of, 289.
Hot-water bag, 147, 168.
House, a healthy, 36.
Household duties, 86.
good, 272.
Hysteria, 113.
Husband in lying-in room, 210.
Idle ladies, 78.

people, 25.
Idleness brings misery, 127.
effects of, 17.
India-rubber teat and shield for drawn-in nipple, 276.
for sore nipple, 280.
Indolence, the ill effects of, in pregnancy, 126.
Infant born apparently dead, 230.
the period of suckling an, 293.
the cry of an, 230.
Introductory Chapter, 13.
Irish women, poor, 38.
Irritation and itching, 172.
Jam as an aperient, 89.

Jeremy Taylor’s description of a wife, 13.
Labor, 199.
the easy and the hard, 94.
rapid, directions concerning, 228.
symptoms of, 199–215.
treatment of, 216–254.
Lavements in pregnancy, 144.
Leather cheaper than physic, 24.
Legs, the swollen, of pregnancy, 152.
Length of time of first labor, 210.
of an after labor, 210.
Life is to be well, 18.
Light, effects of, 79.
is life, 79.
Little ablution—much clothing, 84.
Lively women and easy labors, 127.
Luxurious idle wife, 77.
Luxury, an age of, 28.
ill effects of, 38.
Lying-in room, 237.
temperature of, 237.
Maid-servants and the “ologies,” 92.

Marmalade as an aperient, 290.
Marshmallow and chamomile fomentation (note), 245.
Martin Luther on work, 89.
Mastication, thorough, 54.
Materials of food should be mixed and varied, 265.
Means to strengthen, 16.
Meddlesome breast-tending, 260.
midwifery reprobated, 205.
Medical men, 209.
Medicines in pregnancy, 140–173.
opening, danger of, 99.
Menstrual fluid, 111.
Menstruation, 103.
accompanied with “the whites,” 112.
before marriage, 111.
during 30 years, 102.
painful, 111.
dangers of, 111.
profuse, 112.
sparing, 112.
too pale or too dark, 111.
when not properly performed, 111.
Milk at its “height,” 259.
the best way of “drying up” the, 296.
flowing away constantly, 280.
very fattening, 54.
Miscarriage, 174.
care required after, 178.
causes of, 175.
consequences of a neglected, 178.
flooding in, 177.
prevention of, 179.
symptoms of a threatened, 176.
treatment of, 179.
usual time of taking place, 177.
Misconception and prejudice, 238.
Mission, the glorious, 101.
Monthly nurse, 189–198.
Morning sickness, 117, 158.
Mothers predisposed to consumption, 300.
who cannot suckle, 299.
unnatural, 255.
Mountain-air, 97.
Mufflers and sore throats, 84.
Mutton-chops, folly of living entirely on, 52.
Nature in early morning, 68.

Navel, pouting of, as a sign of pregnancy, 122.
Navel-string, the manner of tying, 233.
not to be tied until the child breathes, 232.
Nipple, cracked and fissured, 279.
during suckling, 257.
means to harden, 162.
great importance of hardening, 162.
retraction of, 275.
shields, 276.
sore, 277.
an obstinate, 299.
washing of, and breast, 257.
wet, 280.
shields, Wansbrough’s, 279.
Nose, a sentinel, 129.
Nurse, monthly, 189–198.
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on wearing crinoline, 197.
on wearing slippers instead of shoes, 198.
Nursery-basin, 43.
Nursing, prolonged, danger of, 293.
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Oatmeal, Derbyshire, 143.

gruel as a fomentation, 245.
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fresh air, and exercise, 272.
Offspring of very young and very old, 104.
Olive oil as an aperient, 142.
Opening medicine, 99.
Pains, “bearing down,” 203.

before and during menstruation, 111.
“grinding,” 200.
at night in pregnancy, 139.
Painless parturition, 212.
Palpitation of the heart in pregnancy, 167.
Passion, the ill effects of, during suckling, 270.
Pendulous belly of pregnancy, 154.
Pepper plaster, 157.
Period of gestation, 185.
of taking exercise, 254.
Pessaries, 248.
Physic, a substitute for exercise, 31.
best, is exercise, 25.
Piles in pregnancy, 148.
Pleasure and health, 85.
Plethoric pregnant females, 136.
Poisoned by one’s own breath, 35.
Porter and ale for a nursing mother, 266.
Position after delivery, 237.
of a mother during suckling, 270.
of patient after labor, 237.
“Pottering” nurse, 190.
Poultice, a bread and milk and sweet oil, 282.
Precursory symptoms of labor, 199.
Pregnancy, 117.
duration of, 185.
a natural process, 127.
period of, 185.
signs of, 117.
Preliminary observations, 13.
Preparation for health, 47.
for labor, 216.
Profession of a wife, 90.
Prolific mothers (note), 105.
Proper time for a patient to sit up after labor, 246.
to send for medical man, 200, 203.
to send for the nurse, 200.
Protrusion of the bowels, 149.
Prunes, stewed, 289.
Puberty, period of (note), 105.
Pump-water, contamination, 132.
on boiling, 133.
on purity of, 132.
“Quickening,” 120.
flatulence mistaken for, 121.
Quiet after confinement, 246.
Rain and wind, exercise in, 24.

Rats in drains and sewers, 130.
“Reckoning,” to make the, 186.
Refreshment after labor, 235.
Remedies to prevent costiveness, 291.
Respiration, artificial, 232.
Rest after delivery, 234.
in pregnancy, 133.
and quietude after labor, 246.
Restlessness at night, 138.
remedies for, 138.
Rich ladies, 38.
Rising of the sun on seeing the, 71.
Rock-salt, 45.
Rules for a female prone to miscarry, 180.
for barren wife, 14.
of health, 99.
Sea-bathing, in pregnancy, 125.

Sea water good for hair, 46.
Servants taught the “ologies,” 92.
Shivering during labor, 201.
“Show,” a sure sign of labor, 200.
Shower-bath in pregnancy, 125.
Sick pregnancies, 161.
Sickness during labor, 201.
Signs of the fœtal circulation (note) 123.
of pregnancy, 117.
Sitting over fire, 27.
with back to fire, 27.
Sitz-bath, the value of, 44, 124, 172.
Skin of the abdomen cracked, 154.
Skylight the best ventilator, 128.
Sleep in pregnancy, 137.
the choicest gift, 77.
the value of, immediately after labor, 238.
for young wife, 78.
Sleepiness of pregnant females, 138.
Sleeplessness of pregnant females, 138.
Slipper bed-pan, 239, 244.
Sluggard’s dwelling, 71.
“Smoking dunghill,” a, 131.
Sore nipples, 277.
Spirits during suckling, 268.
Spurious labor pains, 183.
Stages of labor, 213.
Stays should not be worn during labor, 218.
Stocking, elastic, 153.
Stomach, functions of, 271.
Subsidence of the womb before labor, 199.
“Suck-pap,” 258.
Suckling, 255.
when female is pregnant, 300.
Suppers, hearty meal, 52.
Support to bowels after confinement, 236.
Swedish ladies, 91.
Swollen legs in pregnancy, 152.
Symptoms of labor, 199.
denoting necessity of weaning, 298.
Table of duration of pregnancy, 185.

Taking, the frequent, of physic, 31.
Teat, india-rubber, and shield, 276.
Teeth frequently decay in pregnancy, 156.
and gums, 55.
Temperature of a lying-in room, 237.
“The top of the morning,” 72.
Things which will be wanted at a labor, 216.
Tic-douloureux, 157.
Tight lacing injurious to a young wife, 81.
ill effects of, in pregnancy, 123.
Time when a child should be weaned, 293.
Toothache in pregnancy, 155.
remedies for, 156.
Tooth extraction, the danger of, in pregnancy, 155.
“Trap to catch sunbeam,” 81.
True labor pains, 202.
“Trying of a pain,” 221.
“Turn of years,” 115.
Unladylike, on being, 96.

Urine, retention of, 240.
Vaginal syringe, 196.

Veal-and-milk broth, 251.
Veins, enlarged, of the leg, 152.
Ventilation, importance of, 33, 128.
manner of performing, 34.
of lying-in room, 254.
thorough, 36.
Visitors in a lying-in room, 238.
Walk before breakfast, 47.

in frosty weather, 28.
Walking glorious exercise, 23.
Warm ablutions after labor, 245.
baths for infants apparently still-born, 231.
Water poisoned by drains, 132.
Waters, “the breaking of the,” 202.
Weaning, 292.
Weaning an infant, the method of, 294.
Wellington, the Duke of, 67.
Westmoreland and Cumberland poor women, 229.
Wet-nurses’ and mother’s milk, 265.
Whining and repining, 95.
“Whites” during pregnancy, 169.
cause miscarriage, 112.
when not pregnant, 112.
Wife, a domestic, 90.
educated to be useful, 90.
instructing servants, 92.
the mission of a, 22.
the profession of a, 90.
young, 13.
Wine, abuse of, 57.
bibbing causes barrenness, 57.
drinking of, 55.
in France, 61.
on children taking, 61.
much injures complexion, 64.
during suckling, 267.
Womb, bearing down of, 247.
Work, a cure for many ailments, 93.
Wormwood on nipples in weaning, 296.
ADVICE TO A MOTHER
ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF HER CHILDREN,
AND ON THE
TREATMENT ON THE MOMENT
OF
SOME OF THEIR MORE PRESSING
ILLNESSES AND ACCIDENTS.
BY
PYE HENRY CHAVASSE,

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS OF ENGLAND; FELLOW
OF THE OBSTETRICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON; FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF
QUEEN’S COLLEGE MEDICO-CHIRURGICAL SOCIETY, BIRMINGHAM;
AUTHOR OF “ADVICE TO A WIFE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF HER OWN
HEALTH.”
“Lo, children and the fruit of the womb are an heritage and cometh of the Lord.”
SEVENTEENTH EDITION.
PHILADELPHIA
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1881.
TO
Sir CHARLES LOCOCK, Bart., F.R.S.,

FIRST PHYSICIAN-ACCOUCHEUR TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.
Dear Sir Charles:
Your kind and flattering approval of this little Book, and your
valuable suggestions for its improvement, demand my warmest
gratitude and acknowledgments, and have stimulated me to renewed
exertions to make it still more complete and useful, and thus more
worthy of your approbation.
You have greatly added to my obligation, by allowing me to
indicate those passages of the work that you considered required
correction, addition, and improvement. On reference to these pages,
it will be at once perceived how greatly I am indebted to you, and
how much I have profited by your valuable advice.
I have the honor to remain,

Dear Sir Charles,
Your faithful and obliged servant,
PYE HENRY CHAVASSE.
Priory House, Old Square,

Birmingham.
PREFACE.
The sale of this book is enormous; where hundreds were formerly

disposed of, thousands are now sold; and the sale still increases with
increasing velocity.
The book has been a great success: I had the good fortune, some
thirty years ago, to turn up new ground—to hit upon a mine, which I
have, ever since, even until now, worked with my best energy and
ability. One cause of the immense success this work has achieved is,
that it treats of some subjects which, although they be subjects of
vital importance to the well-being of children, all other works of a
kindred nature do not even touch upon.
I have, during the last thirty years, been constantly on the watch to
give a mother additional and useful advice on the management of her
children; so that, in point of fact, this present edition consists of
more than treble the quantity of information contained in the earlier
editions. The quantity is not only increased, but the quality is, I trust,
greatly improved.
The last edition, comprising five thousand copies, has been rapidly
exhausted: to supply the increased and increasing demand, seven
thousand copies of this—the Ninth Edition—are now published.
The enormous, and, for a medical work, unusually large sale, is most
gratifying to me as well as to my worthy publishers.
I have taken great pains to improve the present edition: much new
matter has been introduced; several paragraphs have been abridged;
some portions have been rewritten—as my extended experience has
enabled me to enter on many of the subjects more fully, and, I trust,
more usefully; and the book has been throughout thoroughly revised.
Lord Chesterfield, in writing to his son, once said: “If I had had
longer time, I would have written you a shorter letter.” Now, I have
found time both to curtail some of the passages of this work, and to
remove many, indeed, a large majority of the quotations from the
text. I have, consequently, been able to fill up the various spaces with
much original, and, I trust, useful matter; and thus, without
materially increasing the bulk of the book, to keep it within
reasonable bounds. The notes and annotations of Sir Charles
Locock are, however, perfectly intact—they are too valuable either to
be omitted, or to be, in the slightest degree, curtailed.
The writing, revising, improving, and enlarging of this, and of my
other work—Advice to a Wife—have, for upwards of a quarter of a
century, been my absorbing occupation—my engrossing study. I have
loved, and cherished, and tended the two books as though they were
my children; and have, in each successive edition, always striven to
bring them, as nearly as my abilities would allow, to a state of
completeness—to make them, in fact, a perfect Vade-mecum for
Wives and Mothers. I might truly say, that the occupation has ever
been to me a source of pure and unalloyed enjoyment. The correction
of the pages has often cheered me when I have been in grief or in
trouble, and has soothed me when, in my profession, I have been
either harassed or vexed: truly, I have had my reward! My fervent
desire is, that some portion of the pleasure and comfort I have
derived from the writing of these books may be experienced by my
readers. If it be only a tithe of what I myself have felt, I shall be more
than amply rewarded for my pains.
P. H. C.
CONTENTS.
PART I.—INFANCY.
PAGE
Preliminary Conversation 1013
Ablution 1016
Management of the Navel 1024
Clothing 1028
Diet 1032
Vaccination 1056
Dentition 1062
Exercise 1075
Sleep 1077
The Bladder and the Bowels 1084
Ailments, Disease, etc. 1085
Concluding Remarks on Infancy 1119
PART II.—CHILDHOOD.
Ablution 1120
Clothing 1123
Diet 1132
The Nursery 1150
Exercise 1172
Amusements 1177
Education 1183
Sleep 1188
Second Dentition 1194
Disease, etc. 1195
Warm Baths 1294
Warm External Applications 1295
Accidents 1297
PART III.—BOYHOOD AND GIRLHOOD.

Ablution, etc. 1318
Clothing 1327
Diet 1332
Air and Exercise 1337
Amusements 1341
Education 1347
Household Work for Girls 1355
Choice of Profession or Trade 1355
Sleep 1359
On the Teeth and the Gums 1364
Prevention of Disease, etc. 1366
Index 1403

Ten Years of Boko Haram in Nigeria The Dynamics and Counterinsurgency Challenges J Tochukwu Omenma Full Chapter

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Ten Years of Boko Haram in Nigeria:

The Dynamics and Counterinsurgency

Ten Years of Boko Haram

Previously published in Security Journal

A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses

Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: deradicalization

A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses

J. Tochukwu Omenma1,3 · Ike E. Onyishi2 · Alyious‑Michaels Okolie3

The goal of this special issue is to provide a contemporary overview of Jama’atu

Reprinted from the journal 1

Where does Boko Haram belong?

2 Reprinted from the journal

was informed by AFRICOM Commander, General David M. Rodriquez’s report that

Spiral of violence: incidents, fatalities (death) and injuries

Reprinted from the journal 3

Impact analysis of Boko Haram attacks, 2013-2018

Incident Fatalies Injuries

4 Reprinted from the journal

Nigeria has initiated different kinds of intervention policies to counter Boko

Reprinted from the journal 5

(STTEP), a South African private military contractor, which assisted to degrade

6 Reprinted from the journal

approach to preventing/countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) and the devel-

Reprinted from the journal 7

Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) equipment, ground and air lift

Special issue: specific findings and concluding argument

8 Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

low morale and desertion

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal

Haram members to enhance

Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal 17

18 Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal 19

20 Reprinted from the journal

Correction to: A decade of Boko Haram activities:

J. Tochukwu Omenma1,3 · Ike E. Onyishi2 · Alyious‑Michaels Okolie3

Published online: 8 April 2020

Correction to: Security Journal

The original article can be found online at https​://doi.org/10.1057/s4128​4-020-00231​-9.

A decade of terror: revisiting Nigeria’s interminable Boko

Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao1,2

Published online: 10 February 2020

Keywords Boko Haram · ISWAP · Nigeria · Insurgency · Terrorism

There is an abundance of scholarly literature on Boko Haram terrorism on the Nige-

* Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao

Reprinted from the journal 23 Vol.:(0123456789)

24 Reprinted from the journal

2019). What Nigeria, according to Garba Shehu, is currently facing is “a mixture of

Revisiting Boko Haram’s decade of terror (2009–2019)

Reprinted from the journal 25

26 Reprinted from the journal

Reprinted from the journal 27

28 Reprinted from the journal

In response to Boko Haram’s territorial control across Nigeria’s northeast, and

The Al‑Qaeda, AQIM, and the ISWAP factor

Boko Haram has well-established “roots in the religious landscape of Northern

Incident Fatalies Injuries

Correction to: Security Journal

The original article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9.