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The 4Ds of Energy Transition :

Decarbonization, Decentralization,
Decreasing Use, and Digitalization
Muhammad Asif
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The 4Ds of Energy Transition
The 4Ds of Energy Transition

Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use


and Digitalization

Edited by Muhammad Asif


The Editor All books published by WILEY-VCH are carefully
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Dr. Muhammad Asif publisher do not warrant the information
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v

Contents

Preface xv
Foreword xvii

1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition 1


Muhammad Asif
1.1 Energy: Resources and Conversions 1
1.2 Climate Change in Focus 3
1.3 The Unfolding Energy Transition 4
1.4 The Four Dimensions of the Twenty-First Century Energy Transition 6
1.4.1 Decarbonization 7
1.4.2 Decentralization 7
1.4.3 Digitalization 8
1.4.4 Decreasing Energy Use 8
1.5 Conclusions 8
References 9

Part I Decarbonization 11

2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and


Germany 13
Heiko Thomas and Bing Xue
2.1 Global Energy Transition 13
2.2 China 17
2.2.1 How to Achieve Carbon Neutrality Before 2060 and Keep the World’s
Largest Economy Running 17
2.2.2 China as the World’s Leader in Renewable Installations 19
2.2.3 Particular Measures to Reduce GHG Emissions 20
2.3 Germany 23
2.3.1 Climate Action and GHG Emission Reduction Targets 23
2.3.2 System Requirements to Achieve the GHG Emission Reduction
Goals 24
2.3.3 Potential for GHG Emission Reduction in the Building Sector 27
vi Contents

2.3.4 Underachieving in the Transport Sector 27


2.3.5 A New Emission Trading Scheme Specifically Tackles the Heating and
Transport Sectors 29
2.4 Comparing Energy Transitions in China and Germany 30
2.4.1 Different Strategies and Boundary Conditions 30
2.4.2 Comparing the Mobility Sector 32
2.4.3 Policy Instruments and Implementation 33
2.5 Summary and Final Remarks 37
References 38

3 Decarbonization in the Energy Sector 41


Muhammad Asif
3.1 Decarbonization 41
3.2 Decarbonization Pathways 42
3.2.1 Renewable Energy 43
3.2.1.1 Solar Energy 43
3.2.1.2 Wind Power 44
3.2.1.3 Hydropower 44
3.2.2 Electric Mobility 44
3.2.3 Hydrogen and Fuel Cells 45
3.2.4 Energy Storage 46
3.2.5 Energy Efficiency 46
3.2.6 Decarbonization of Fossil Fuel Sector 46
3.3 Decarbonization: Developments and Trends 47
References 48

4 Renewable Technologies: Applications and Trends 51


Muhammad Asif
4.1 Introduction 51
4.2 Overview of Renewable Technologies 52
4.2.1 Solar Energy 52
4.2.1.1 Solar PV 52
4.2.1.2 Solar Thermal Energy 54
4.2.2 Wind Power 57
4.2.3 Hydropower 58
4.2.3.1 Dam/Storage 59
4.2.3.2 Run-of-the-River 59
4.2.3.3 Pumped Storage 59
4.2.4 Biomass 60
4.2.5 Geothermal Energy 61
4.2.6 Wave and Tidal Power 62
4.3 Renewables Advancements and Trends 63
4.3.1 Market Growth 63
4.3.2 Economics 65
4.3.3 Technological Advancements 65
Contents vii

4.3.4 Power Density 67


4.3.5 Energy Storage 67
4.4 Conclusions 69
References 69

5 Fundamentals and Applications of Hydrogen and Fuel


Cells 73
Bengt Sundén
5.1 Introduction 73
5.2 Hydrogen – General 74
5.2.1 Production of Hydrogen 74
5.2.2 Storage of Hydrogen 75
5.2.3 Transportation of Hydrogen 76
5.2.4 Concerns About Hydrogen 76
5.2.5 Advantages of Hydrogen Energy 76
5.2.6 Disadvantages of Hydrogen Energy 76
5.3 Basic Electrochemistry and Thermodynamics 77
5.4 Fuel Cells – Overview 78
5.4.1 Types of Fuel Cells 79
5.4.2 Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cells (PEMFC) or Polymer Electrolyte
Fuel Cells (PEFC) 83
5.4.2.1 Performance of a PEMFC 83
5.4.3 Solid Oxide Fuel Cells (SOFC) 83
5.4.4 Comparison of PEMFCs and SOFCs 84
5.4.5 Overall Description of Basic Transport Processes and Operations of a
Fuel Cell 85
5.4.5.1 Electrochemical Kinetics 85
5.4.5.2 Heat and Mass Transfer 85
5.4.5.3 Charge and Water Transport 86
5.4.5.4 Heat Generation 87
5.4.6 Modeling Approaches for Fuel Cells 87
5.4.6.1 Softwares 89
5.4.7 Fuel Cell Systems and Applications 90
5.4.7.1 Portable Power 90
5.4.7.2 Backup Power 91
5.4.7.3 Transportation 91
5.4.7.4 Stationary Power 92
5.4.7.5 Maritime Applications 93
5.4.7.6 Aerospace Applications 94
5.4.7.7 Aircraft Applications 95
5.4.8 Bottlenecks for Fuel Cells 95
5.5 Conclusions 97
Acknowledgments 97
Nomenclature 97
Abbreviations 98
References 99
viii Contents

6 Decarbonizing with Nuclear Power, Current Builds, and Future


Trends 103
Hasliza Omar, Geordie Graetz, and Mark Ho
6.1 Introduction 103
6.2 The Historic Cost of Nuclear Power 104
6.3 The Small Modular Reactor (SMR): Could Smaller Be Better? 109
6.3.1 New Nuclear Reactor in Town 109
6.3.2 Is It the Smaller the Better? 110
6.4 Evaluating the Economic Competitiveness of SMRs 113
6.4.1 Size Matters 113
6.4.2 Construction Time 113
6.4.3 Co-siting Economies 114
6.4.4 Learning Rates 115
6.4.5 The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE): Is It a Reliable Measure? 118
6.4.6 The Overnight Capital Cost (OCC): SMRs vs. a Large Reactor 120
6.5 Nuclear Energy: Looking Beyond Its Perceived Reputation 123
6.5.1 Load-Following and Cogeneration 123
6.5.2 Industrial Heat (District and Process) 125
6.5.3 Hydrogen Production 127
6.5.4 Seawater Desalination 130
6.6 Western Nuclear Industry Trends 131
6.6.1 The United States 131
6.6.2 The United Kingdom 132
6.6.3 Canada 135
6.7 Conclusions 137
References 141

7 Decarbonization of the Fossil Fuel Sector 153


Tian Goh and Beng Wah Ang
7.1 Introduction 153
7.2 Technologies for the Decarbonization of the Fossil Fuel Sector 154
7.2.1 Historical Developments 154
7.2.2 Hydrogen Economy 155
7.2.3 Carbon Capture and Storage 156
7.3 Recent Advancements and Potential 157
7.3.1 Carbon Capture and Storage 158
7.3.2 Carbon Capture and Utilization 158
7.4 Future Emission Scenarios and Challenges to Decarbonization 160
7.4.1 Application in Future Emission Scenarios 160
7.4.2 Challenges to Decarbonization 164
7.5 Controversies and Debates 167
7.5.1 Opposing Narratives 167
7.5.2 Public Perceptions 169
7.6 Conclusions 171
References 172
Contents ix

8 Electric Vehicle Adoption Dynamics on the Road to Deep


Decarbonization 177
Emil Dimanchev, Davood Qorbani, and Magnus Korpås
8.1 Introduction 177
8.2 Current State of Electric Vehicles 178
8.2.1 Electric Vehicle Technology 178
8.2.2 Electric Vehicle Environmental Attributes 179
8.2.3 Competing Low-Carbon Vehicle Technologies 180
8.3 Contribution of Road Transport to Decarbonization Policy 181
8.3.1 State and Trends of CO2 Emissions from Transportation and Passenger
Vehicles 181
8.3.2 Decarbonization of Transport 182
8.3.3 Decarbonization Pathways for Passenger Vehicles and the Role of
Electric Vehicles 183
8.4 Dynamics of Vehicle Fleet Turnover 190
8.4.1 Illustrative Fleet Turnover Model 190
8.4.2 Implications of Fleet Turnover Dynamics for Meeting Decarbonization
Targets 191
8.5 Electric Vehicle Policy 194
8.5.1 Case Study of Electric Vehicle Policy in Norway 195
8.6 Prospects for Electric Vehicle Technology and Economics 196
8.7 Conclusions 199
References 200

9 Integrated Energy System: A Low-Carbon Future Enabler 207


Pengfei Zhao, Chenghong Gu, Zhidong Cao, and Shuangqi Li
9.1 Paradigm Shift in Energy Systems 207
9.2 Key Technologies in Integrated Energy Systems 210
9.2.1 Conversion Technologies 211
9.2.1.1 Combined Heat and Power 211
9.2.1.2 Heat Pump and Gas Furnace 211
9.2.1.3 Power to Gas 211
9.2.1.4 Gas Storage 212
9.2.1.5 Battery Energy Storage Systems 212
9.2.2 Energy Hub Systems 213
9.2.3 Modeling of Integrated Energy Systems 214
9.3 Management of Integrated Energy Systems 215
9.3.1 Optimization Techniques for Integrated Energy Systems 215
9.3.1.1 Stochastic Optimization 215
9.3.1.2 Robust Optimization 215
9.3.1.3 Distributionally Robust Optimization 217
9.3.2 Supply Quality Issues 217
9.3.2.1 Voltage Issues 217
9.3.2.2 Gas Quality Issues 218
x Contents

9.4 Volt–Pressure Optimization for Integrated Energy Systems 219


9.4.1 Research Gap 219
9.4.2 Problem Formulation 220
9.4.2.1 Day-Ahead Constraints of VPO 220
9.4.2.2 Real-Time Constraints of VPO 222
9.4.2.3 Objective Function of Two-Stage VPO 222
9.4.3 Results and Discussions 223
9.4.3.1 Studies on VVO 223
9.4.3.2 Studies on Economic Performance 227
9.4.3.3 Studies on Gas Quality Management 228
9.5 Conclusions 229
A Appendix: Nomenclature 230
A.1 Indices and Sets 230
A.2 Parameters 230
A.3 Variables and Functions 232
References 233

Part II Decreasing Use 239

10 Decreasing the Use of Energy for Sustainable Energy


Transition 241
Muhammad Asif
10.1 Why Decrease the Use of Energy? 241
10.2 Energy Efficiency Approaches 243
10.2.1 Change of Attitude 243
10.2.2 Performance Enhancement 244
10.2.3 New Technologies 244
10.3 Scope of Energy Efficiency 244
References 245

11 Energy Conservation and Management in Buildings 247


Wahhaj Ahmed and Muhammad Asif
11.1 Energy and Environmental Footprint of Buildings 247
11.2 Energy-Efficiency Potential in Buildings 248
11.3 Energy-Efficient Design Strategies 250
11.3.1 Passive and Active Design Strategies 251
11.3.2 Energy Modeling to Design Energy-Efficient Strategies 251
11.4 Building Energy Retrofit 255
11.4.1 Building Energy-Retrofit Classifications 256
11.4.1.1 Pre- and Post-Retrofit Assessment Strategies 256
11.4.1.2 Number and Type of EEMs 257
11.4.1.3 Modeling and Design Approach 258
11.5 Sustainable Building Standards and Certification Systems 260
11.6 Conclusions 261
References 261
Contents xi

12 Methodologies for the Analysis of Energy Consumption in the


Industrial Sector 267
Vincenzo Bianco
12.1 Introduction 267
12.2 Overview of Basic Indexes for Energy Consumption Analysis 269
12.2.1 Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 269
12.2.2 Energy Consumption Elasticity (ECE) 270
12.2.3 Energy Intensity (EI) 270
12.2.4 Linear Correlation Index (LCI) 271
12.2.5 Weather Adjusting Coefficient (WAC) 271
12.3 Decomposition Analysis of Energy Consumption 272
12.4 Case Study: The Italian Industrial Sector 274
12.4.1 Index-Based Analysis 274
12.4.2 Decomposition of Energy Consumption 276
12.5 Relationship Between Energy Efficiency and Energy Transition 283
12.6 Conclusions 284
References 285

Part III Decentralization 287

13 Decentralization in Energy Sector 289


Muhammad Asif
13.1 Introduction 289
13.2 Overview of Decentralized Generation Systems 290
13.2.1 Classification 290
13.2.2 Technologies 292
13.3 Decentralized and Centralized Generation – A Comparison 293
13.3.1 Advantages of Decentralized Generation 293
13.3.1.1 Cost-Effectiveness 293
13.3.1.2 Enhanced Energy Access 293
13.3.1.3 Environment Friendliness 294
13.3.1.4 Security 294
13.3.1.5 Reliability 294
13.3.1.6 Peak Shaving 294
13.3.1.7 Supply Resilience 294
13.3.1.8 New Business Streams 294
13.3.1.9 Other Benefits 295
13.3.2 Disadvantages of Decentralized Generation 295
13.3.2.1 Power Quality 295
13.3.2.2 Effect on Gird Stability 295
13.3.2.3 Energy Storage Requirement 295
13.3.2.4 Institutional Resistance 295
13.4 Developments and Trends 295
References 296
xii Contents

14 Decentralizing the Electricity Infrastructure: What Is


Economically Viable? 299
Moritz Vogel, Marion Wingenbach, and Dierk Bauknecht
14.1 Introduction 299
14.2 Decentralization of Electricity Systems 300
14.3 Technological Dimensions of Decentralization 301
14.3.1 Grid Level of Power Plants 302
14.3.2 Regional Distribution of Power Plants 302
14.3.3 Grid Level of Flexibility Options 302
14.3.4 Level of Optimization 303
14.4 Decentralization: Costs and Benefits 303
14.4.1 Grid Level of Power Plants 304
14.4.2 Regional Distribution of Power Plants 305
14.4.3 Grid Level of Flexibility Options 306
14.4.4 Level of Optimization 307
14.5 Germany’s Decentralization Experience: A Case Study 310
14.5.1 System Cost 310
14.5.2 Grid Expansion 314
14.5.3 Key Findings 316
14.6 How Far Should Decentralization Go? 317
14.6.1 Grid Level of Power Plants 317
14.6.2 Regional Distribution of Power Plants 317
14.6.3 Grid Level of Flexibility Options 319
14.6.4 Level of Optimization 319
14.7 Conclusions 320
References 320

15 Governing Decentralized Electricity: Taking a Participatory


Turn 325
Marie Claire Brisbois
15.1 Introduction 325
15.2 How Is Decentralization Affecting Traditional Modes of Electricity
Governance? 326
15.2.1 Sticking Points for Shifting to Decentralized Governance 327
15.3 What Kinds of Governance Does Decentralization Require? 328
15.3.1 Security 328
15.3.2 Affordability 329
15.3.3 Sustainability 331
15.4 What Do We Know About Decentralized Governance from Other
Spheres? 332
15.4.1 Nested, Multilevel Governance of Common Pool Resources 333
15.4.2 Key Components of Common Pool Resource Governance 334
15.4.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities 334
15.4.2.2 Policy Coherence 335
15.4.2.3 Capacity Development 336
Contents xiii

15.4.2.4 Transparent and Open Data 336


15.4.2.5 Appropriate Regulations 337
15.4.2.6 Stakeholder Participation 338
15.5 Moving Toward a Decentralized Governance System 339
15.5.1 Phase One 339
15.5.2 Phase Two 340
15.5.3 Phase Three 341
15.6 Conclusions 341
References 342

Part IV Digitalization 347

16 Digitalization in Energy Sector 349


Muhammad Asif
16.1 Introduction 349
16.2 Overview of Digital Technologies 350
16.2.1 Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 350
16.2.2 Blockchain 351
16.2.3 Robotics and Automated Technologies 351
16.2.4 Internet of Things 351
16.2.5 Big Data and Data Analytics 352
16.3 Digitalization: Prospects and Challenges 352
References 354

17 Smart Grids and Smart Metering 357


Haroon Farooq, Waqas Ali, and Intisar A. Sajjad
17.1 Introduction 357
17.2 Grid Modernization and Its Need in the Twenty-First Century 358
17.3 Smart Grid 360
17.4 Smart Grid vs. Traditional Grid 362
17.5 Smart Grid Composition and Architecture 362
17.6 Smart Grid Technologies 365
17.7 Smart Metering 367
17.8 Role of Smart Metering in Smart Grid 369
17.9 Key Challenges and the Future of Smart Grid 370
17.10 Implementation Benefits and Positive Impacts 372
17.11 Worldwide Development and Deployment 373
17.12 Conclusions 375
References 376

18 Blockchain in Energy 381


Bernd Teufel and Anton Sentic
18.1 Transformation of the Electricity Market and an Emerging
Technology 381
xiv Contents

18.2 Blockchain in the Energy Sector 382


18.2.1 Defining Blockchain 383
18.2.2 Utilizing Blockchain in Energy Systems 385
18.2.3 Case Examples for Blockchain Energy 386
18.2.4 Utilization of Blockchain Energy: Introducing an Innovation
Perspective 387
18.3 Blockchain as a (Disruptive) Innovation in Energy Transitions 389
18.3.1 Transition Studies, Regimes, and Niche Innovations 389
18.3.2 Blockchain Technologies Between Niche Innovation and the
Socio-Technical System 390
18.4 Conclusions and Venues for Further Inquiry 392
Acknowledgment 394
References 394

Epilogue 399
Fereidoon Sioshansi

Index 405
xv

Preface

The sustainability of the fossil-fuel-dominated global energy scenario faces serious


problems. With challenges like growing energy demand, depleting fossil fuel
reserves, and escalating energy prices, energy crises are making headlines world-
wide. Problems like supply disruptions and shortages and soaring energy prices
are happening in developing countries and developed and emerging economies
like the European Union (EU), China, and India. For example, some EU member
states have experienced electricity and gas prices increase by 400–500% within a
year. Energy insecurity in terms of its critical dimensions – access, affordability,
and reliability – remains to be a major problem hindering the socio-economic
progress in developing countries, as globally, around one billion people lack access
to electricity, and nearly three billion people have to rely on raw biomass to meet
cooking and heating requirements. However, these severe energy problems are
being overshadowed by the mounting challenge of climate change, deemed to be
the biggest threat to the planet.
Climate change already has its implications like seasonal disorder, rising sea
level, a trend of more frequent and intense weather-driven disasters, such as
flooding, droughts, heat waves, wildfires, storms, and the consequent loss of lives
and economy. For its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the energy sector needs to
lead the fight against climate change, as also reiterated by COP 26. Responding to
climate change and other challenges and ensuring energy supplies compatible with
the demands of a sustainable future for the planet, the global energy sector is going
through a transition.
The energy transition is an evolving concept. Also regarded as energy transitions,
the eighteenth and twentieth-century switchovers of energy systems from biomass
to coal and from coal to oil and gas, respectively, primarily sought more efficient
fuels in logistics and utilization. Although it predominantly pursues decarboniza-
tion of the energy sector, the twenty-first-century energy transition has several other
important dimensions, such as decentralized or distributed energy generation and
digitalization of energy systems. Decreased energy use through energy efficiency
measures is also imperative for this transition. The energy transition is an emerging
and evolving topic in the policy and technology circles and academic and scientific
domains. The book aims to present a comprehensive and integrated perspective
of the twenty-first-century energy transition, defining its four dimensions (4Ds):
xvi Preface

Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use, and Digitalization. It discusses


the wide range of technologies, classifying them under these 4Ds of the energy
transition.
The book has five sections. The first is an opening, and sections two, three, four,
and five are dedicated to the 4Ds of the energy transition: Decarbonization, Decen-
tralization, Decreasing Use, and Digitalization, respectively. The introductory section
consists of two chapters; the first presents an overview of the four-dimensional
energy transition, while the second discusses the energy transition through case
studies from Germany and China. Focusing on Decarbonization, the second section
is the largest part of the book, containing seven chapters. The opening chapter in
this section discusses the broader dimensions of Decarbonization in the energy
sector. Meanwhile, each of the subsequent six chapters focuses on a different decar-
bonization technology, such as renewable energy, hydrogen and fuel cells, nuclear
power, decarbonization in the fossil fuel sector, electric vehicles, and integrated
energy systems. The section on Decentralization has three chapters; the first is
an introductory chapter, and the second and third chapters discuss the relevant
technologies and governance, respectively. The section on Decreasing Energy Use
also has three chapters; the first introduces this important dimension of the energy
transition, and the second and third chapters discuss energy efficiency in buildings
and industry, respectively. The last section of the book covers Digitalization in three
chapters; the first discusses the prospects of broader digital technologies in the
energy transition, and the second and third chapters discuss Digitalization in smart
meters and smart grids, and blockchain technologies, respectively. Finally, the book
concludes with an Epilogue.
xvii

Foreword

The role of energy has never been more important. As the global community keeps
its sights on the goal of 1.5 ∘ C set in the Paris and Glasgow agreements, the need
to decarbonize energy and decarbonize it at pace has never been starker. Much is
already being achieved in parts of the energy system, notably in the power sector
in some parts of the world. Still, the significant challenges ahead of decarbonizing
the entire system, particularly transport, heat, and industry, will be much harder.
At the same time, we have a one-time chance to deliver an energy transition, which
brings low-carbon energy to all 8 billion people on Earth, creates prosperity, and bal-
ances the Earth’s biosystems and climate. If we can get it right, the energy transition
will require industry, governments, and inter-government bodies to respond. It will
require the best and brightest minds to provide the ingenuity, engineering solutions,
and above all, the thought leadership to tackle the greatest challenge our industry
has ever faced.
I am delighted to write the foreword to this thought-leading book. The 4Ds of the
energy transition have their roots in thinking by some of the Energy Institute’s Fel-
lows. In this text, Dr. Asif and some of the leading global experts on energy bring
the 4Ds right up to date and provide deep insights into the fast-evolving changes
in the energy sector, focused on: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use,
and Digitalization. I firmly believe that all four elements are critical to achieving a
net-zero energy system.
The need to decarbonize is clear; the best means of doing so are not always clear.
Understanding the different pathways, compromises and uncertainties are critical,
particularly in aviation, shipping, and industry.
For over 100 years, the energy system in developed economies has been a highly
centralized command and control system. However, decentralization creates the
opportunity for consumers to become energy producers and turn parts of the
energy system upside down. This is particularly true in developing economies,
and as penetration of EVs and heat grows dramatically, it will become increasingly
important, even in the most developed economies.
Digitalization will play a crucial role in enabling decentralized systems to oper-
ate successfully. However, in contrast to telecommunications, media, and travel, the
potential of digital in the energy system to match supply and demand, optimize
xviii Foreword

infrastructure, and engage consumers remains a virtually untapped opportunity.


However, change is coming, and it is coming fast.
Finally, and it does normally come last, is the notion of decreasing our energy use.
Improving energy efficiency must be at the heart of delivering the energy transi-
tion. Our homes, our cars, our offices, everything about how we produce and con-
sume energy involves shocking levels of inefficiency. And yet improving efficiency
and decreasing energy use is often the cheapest, quickest, and easiest route towards
decarbonization. So instead of coming last, it should perhaps come first. This is why
it is an integral part of the strategy, training offer, and chartered qualifications focus
at my organization, the Energy Institute.
I hope this book will help inform the academic and research community on some
of the critical challenges ahead and help them identify new and important areas
to work on. I also believe it will equip policymakers, international bodies, financial
institutions, businesses, and many others to understand the challenges and oppor-
tunities ahead of us and help them make the right decisions to deliver the energy
transition. Finally, I hope you learn as much as I did from reading it.

Dr. Nick Wayth CEng FEI FIMechE


Chief Executive of the Energy Institute
1

Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition


Muhammad Asif
Department of Architectural Engineering, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia

1.1 Energy: Resources and Conversions

Growing human dependence on energy is one of the defining characteristics


of the modern age. Historically, the increasingly extensive and efficient uti-
lization of energy has been pivotal in the evolution of societies. However, the
eighteenth/nineteenth-century industrial revolution has been a turning point in
human-energy interaction. Energy has attained the status of a prerequisite for all
crucial aspects of societies, i.e. mobility, agriculture, industry, health, education, and
trade and commerce [1]. Energy resources exist in many physical states, harnessing
and capitalizing through various technologies. They can be broadly classified into
two categories: renewables and non-renewables. Renewable energy resources are
naturally replenished or renewed.
Examples of renewable resources include solar energy, wind power, hydropower,
and wave and tidal power. Energy resources that are finite and exhaustible are
non-renewable such as coal, oil, and natural gas. In terms of resources, energy
can also be classified into two types: primary resources and secondary resources.
Primary energy resources consist of natural or unrefined resources such as raw
fossil fuel, biomass, solar radiation, wind, and flowing water. These resources can
be extracted or harnessed directly from nature. Secondary energy resources are
refined/converted from primary resources. For example, electricity is a secondary
energy resource that can be produced by transforming different primary resources.
Figure 1.1 shows examples of primary and secondary energy resources.
Energy can be classified in different forms, typically through several conversion
and transformation processes in their usable life cycle. Different forms of energy
include chemical energy, thermal energy, mechanical energy, electrical energy,
light energy, and sound energy. The four commonly used forms of energy and their
mutual transformations are shown in Figure 1.2. It also highlights the associated
energy resources.

The 4Ds of Energy Transition: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use and Digitalization,
First Edition. Edited by Muhammad Asif.
© 2022 WILEY-VCH GmbH. Published 2022 by WILEY-VCH GmbH.
2 1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition

Primary resources Secondary resources

Coal, crude oil, and Petroleum products,


natural gas refined solid duels, and
gases

Transformation
Electricity

Use
Biomass and waste

Heat

Solar radiation, wind


energy, flowing water, Biofuels
wave, and tidal energy

Figure 1.1 Primary and secondary energy resources.

Fossil fuels
Chemical
energy

Solar, nuclear,
geothermal
Thermal
energy

Wind, hydro
Solar wave, and tidal

Electrical Mechanical
energy energy

Figure 1.2 Energy resources and transformations.

The energy contained in fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – contributing
to almost 80% of the world’s total primary energy supplies is chemical energy.
Nuclear power and geothermal energy enter the usable energy equation in the
form of thermal energy. Wind power, hydropower, and wave and tidal power
are capitalized as mechanical energy, while solar energy can be harnessed in
the form of thermal energy and electrical energy. The most common energy
requirements in day-to-day life include heat, electricity, and mechanized mobility.
Heat is primarily acquired through fossil fuels, making it a chemical to thermal
energy conversion process. Useable heat can also be directly acquired from solar
1.2 Climate Change in Focus 3

energy, geothermal energy, and nuclear power. One of the most common energy
transformation pathways is to convert chemical energy into mechanical energy.
The first stage in this transformation process involves converting fossil fuel’s
chemical energy into thermal energy, usually in the form of steam, hot water,
or hot gases, through boilers, rotating turbines, or internal combustion engines.
In the second stage, thermal energy is converted to mechanical energy through
internal combustion engines and rotary turbines. The produced mechanical energy
is used in many applications, such as running machinery and transportation. This
mechanical energy can also be used to produce electricity with the help of genera-
tors. Electricity can be produced through various transformation routes, including
chemical–thermal–mechanical–electrical, thermal–mechanical–electrical, and
mechanical–electrical.

1.2 Climate Change in Focus


Climate change is arguably the biggest challenge the world faces today. It is widely
regarded as a consequence of global warming. The gradual warming of the Earth’s
atmospheric temperature as a small fraction of the solar radiation is entrapped by
greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases are part of the Earth’s atmosphere. Human
activities such as burning fossil fuels, transportation, power generation, and indus-
trial and agricultural processes increase the concentration of these gases in the atmo-
sphere. The eighteenth-century industrial revolution is considered to have triggered
the rapid growth in the release of greenhouse gases. For example, the atmosphere’s
carbon dioxide (CO2 ) concentration has increased from the pre-industrial age level
of 280 parts-per-million (ppm) to 415 ppm. The acceleration in the growth of CO2
concentration can be gauged from the fact that almost 100 ppm of the total 135 ppm
increment has occurred since 1960. Commonly known greenhouse gases include
water vapor, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The impact of a greenhouse gas depends on vari-
ous factors such as their level of concentration or abundance, lifetime (duration of
stay in the atmosphere), and ability to trap radiation (radiative efficiency). Carbon
dioxide (CO2 ) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted through human activities and
has been adopted as a reference index to represent the concentration of greenhouse
gases. Accordingly, the global warming potential (GWP) – an index to compare the
global warming impact of different greenhouse gases – of CO2 has been regarded
as one.
Due to numerous involved factors and their dynamic and complex inter-
relationship, it is difficult to precisely predict the nature and extent of the impli-
cations of climate change. However, based on the expert interpretations of the
available data and scientific models, certain weather-related incidents are attributed
to climate change with a great degree of confidence. Accordingly, climate change
leads to many challenges, including seasonal disorder, a pattern of intense and more
frequent weather-related events such as floods, droughts, storms, heat waves and
wildfires, financial loss, and health problems [2]. Climate change also exacerbates
4 1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition

water and food crises in many parts of the world. In recent decades, the global focus
on climate change has increased exponentially. Extreme weather events and natural
disasters such as floods, storms, hurricanes, wildfires, and droughts have played
a vital role. Since 1880, the atmospheric temperature has increased by 1.23 ∘ C
(2.21 ∘ F). The rising temperature is driven largely by increased anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions. According to the US National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), most atmospheric warming has occurred over the last four
decades [3]. Warmer temperatures are increasing the sea level due to the melting of
glaciers. During the twentieth century, the global sea level rose by around 20 cm.
The rise in sea level has been accelerating every year – over the last two decades. It
has almost doubled that of the last century [3]. Glaciers are shrinking worldwide,
including the Himalayas, Alps, Alaska, Rockies, and Africa.
Extreme weather conditions and climate abnormalities are becoming more
frequent. The situation is already widely dubbed as the climate crisis. With the
recorded acceleration in the accumulation of greenhouse gases and consequent
increase in atmospheric temperature, climate change-driven weather-related
disasters are becoming more intense and recurrent. The recent seven years have
been the warmest since records began, while 2016 and 2020 are reportedly tied
for the hottest year on record [3]. July 2021 witnessed heat waves, wildfires,
storms, and floods worldwide. North America particularly faced intense heat
waves, besides record high temperatures and massive wildfires. California’s Death
Valley recorded a temperature of 54.4 ∘ C (130 ∘ F), potentially the highest ever
temperature recorded on the planet, and British Columbia witnessed a temper-
ature of 49.6 ∘ C, obliterating Canada’s previous national temperature record by
8 ∘ C [4]. While the heat wave killed over 500 people in Canada alone, Europe and
Asia were hit by unprecedented flooding. High temperatures, heat waves, and
droughts are also causing record-breaking wildfires. The 2019–2020 wildfire in
Australia burnt around 19 million ha, resulting in an economic loss of over AU$
100 billion that became the costliest natural disaster in national history [5]. The
year 2021 has also witnessed heat waves fueling massive wildfires in Australia,
North America, and Europe. Extreme wildfires are now becoming a new normal
as experts predict more fires and higher degrees of devastation as each fire season
comes.

1.3 The Unfolding Energy Transition


The global energy scenario experiences a string of challenges such as climate change,
rapid growth in energy demand, depletion of fossil fuel reserves, volatile energy
prices, and lack of universal access to energy. The post-industrial revolution energy
scenario is closely linked to global warming as fossil fuels are responsible for the
bulk of greenhouse gas emissions. Due to surging population, economic and infras-
tructural development, and urbanization, fast growth in the global energy demand is
adding pressures on the energy supply chain. According to the Energy Information
Administration (EIA), between 2018 and 2050, the world energy requirements are
1.3 The Unfolding Energy Transition 5

projected to increase by 50% [6]. Most of this growth in demand is associated with
developing countries.
Energy use is closely linked to the environment. It is estimated that despite
the pledges and efforts by the global community to tackle climate change, CO2
emissions from energy and industry have increased by 60% since the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 [7].
Climate change is already there with its implications like seasonal disorder, rising
sea level, a trend of more frequent and intense weather-driven disasters such as
flooding, droughts, heat waves, wildfires, storms, and associated financial losses
[8, 9]. The situation calls for an urgent paradigm shift in the energy sector. As a
response to the challenges, the global energy sector is going through a transition
to ensure a supply of energy compatible with the demands of a sustainable future
for the planet. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) defines the
energy transition as “a pathway toward the transformation of the global energy
sector from fossil-based to zero-carbon by the second half of this century.” The
ongoing energy transition is needed to reduce energy-related CO2 emissions to limit
climate change [10].
Through the Paris Agreement, the world has adopted the first-ever universally
legally binding global climate deal to avoid the dangers of climate change by limit-
ing global warming to below 2 ∘ C. However, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) warns that the world is seriously overshooting this target, heading
toward a higher temperature rise, asking for major changes in four global systems:
energy, land use, cities, and industry. The energy sector is where the greatest chal-
lenges and opportunities exist [11].
Following the Paris Agreement, many major economies and economic
blocks – such as the US, China, the EU, and the UK – have committed to net-zero
carbon emissions. The US, EU, and the UK are targeting net-zero emissions by
2050, while China by 2060. Each country or economic block is developing its plans
for incrementally achieving its goals, but they will all require a transformation of
the energy sector [11]. For example, the EU has decided to reduce emissions by
55% from the 1990 level by 2030 to go net-zero by 2050. The US has announced to
cut emissions by 40–43% by 2030. Some of the notable initiatives include having
30 GW of new offshore wind projects and cutting the cost of solar energy further by
60% over the next decade to achieve 100% renewable electricity by 2035 [12]. China
targets emissions to peak by 2030 to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Similarly,
the UK has plans to cut emissions by 68% by 2030 to reach the target by 2050.
A landmark decision the UK has made in shifting away from fossil fuels is closing
down all coal power plants by 2024, which means the country reduces its reliance
on coal for power generation from around one-third to zero within a decade. It is
a major step the UK has taken toward the transition away from fossil fuels and
decarbonization of the power sector to eliminate contributions to climate change
by 2050 [13].
Renewable energy is the backbone of the energy sector’s transition toward zero
carbon emissions. Over the last few decades, renewable technologies, especially
solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind turbines, have made significant technological
6 1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition

and economic progress. The global installed capacity of renewables increased


from 2581 GW in 2019 to 2838 GW in 2020, exceeding expansion in the previous
year by almost 50%. For several years, renewable energy is adding more power
generation capacity than fossil fuels and nuclear power combined. In 2020,
renewables contributed to more than 80% of all new power generation capacity
added worldwide. The renewable sector’s growth is propelled by solar and wind
power, with the two technologies accounting for 91% of the new renewables added
[14]. There was over US$ 303 billion invested in renewable energy projects during
the year [15]. The upward scale of the renewable developments can be gauged from
China’s first 100 GW phase of solar and wind power buildout. The initiative will
likely be expanded to several hundreds of GW in capacity as China aims to develop
1200 GW of renewables by 2030 [16]. The renewables growth trends are projected
to continue as the annual capacity addition of solar and wind power is set to grow
fourfold between 2020 and 2030 [11].
Renewables-based decentralized or distributed generation systems are helping
both urban and rural settings, providing several energy services. Solar PV is one
of the most successful technologies, especially at small-scale and off-grid levels.
Since 2010, over 180 million off-grid solar systems have been installed worldwide,
including 30 million solar-home systems. In 2019, the market for off-grid solar
systems grew by 13%, with sales totaling 35 million units. Renewable energy also
supplied around half of the 19 000 mini-grids installed by the end of 2019 [15].
Efficient biomass systems, such as improved cooking stoves and biogas systems, are
also helping with the global efforts to access clean energy [1, 17].

1.4 The Four Dimensions of the Twenty-First Century


Energy Transition
The use of energy has evolved through the course of history. The availability of
refined and efficient energy resources has played a decisive role in advancing
societies, especially since the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. In the
twenty-first century, the international energy scenario is experiencing a profound
transition as the world increasingly embraces a trend away from fossil fuels. In
recorded history, there have been two major energy transitions. The first was a shift
from wood and biomass to coal during the eighteenth-century industrial revolution,
and the second was the twentieth century transition from coal to oil and gas. With
the advent of the twenty-first century, the world is witnessing the dawn of the third
energy transition.
The energy transition unfolding in the twenty-first century is unprecedented. It
is much more vibrant, intriguing, and impactful than the earlier ones. It is fun-
damentally a sustainability-driven energy pathway focusing on decarbonizing the
energy sector by shifting away from fossil fuels. Therefore, this energy transition can
also be termed “sustainable energy transition” or “low-carbon energy transition.”
However, the ongoing energy transition is not just about reducing carbon or shift-
ing away from fossil fuels. Thanks to the enormous changes and developments on
1.4 The Four Dimensions of the Twenty-First Century Energy Transition 7

the fronts of energy resources and their consumption, technological advancements,


socio-economic and political response, and evolving policy landscape, it is much
more dynamic. This energy transition has four key dimensions: decarbonization,
decentralization, digitalization, and decreasing energy use.

1.4.1 Decarbonization
Decarbonization of the energy sector is the most important dimension of the
ongoing energy transition. Reduction in CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions is fundamental to the fight against climate change. The energy sector
can be decarbonized through various technologies and solutions, including renew-
able energy, electric vehicles (EVs), hydrogen and fuel cells, carbon capture and
storage (CCS), and phasing out of fossil fuels. The replacement of fossil fuels with
renewable energy is the most critical part of the decarbonization drive. Renewable
energy is already supplying 26% of the global electricity needs. According to
International Energy Agency (IEA), to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, almost
90% of the global electricity generation must be supplied from renewables. While
some decarbonization solutions like hydrogen, fuel cells, and CCS are yet to
have techno-economic maturity, electric vehicles are already making an impact.
For example, in 2020, the worldwide sale of EVs increased by 41% despite the
COVID-related economic downturn and a drop of 6% in the overall sale of vehicles.
During the same year, Europe recorded the registration of new electric cars increase
by 100%, and the number of electric car models available worldwide increased from
260 to 370 [18]. While electric mobility is also paving its way in the aviation and ship
industry, the sale of electric cars is expected to increase from around 3.5 million in
2020 to over 55 million by 2030 [11].

1.4.2 Decentralization
Decentralized or distributed generation is the energy generated close to the point
of use. Decentralized generation (DG) avoids/minimizes transmission and distribu-
tion setup, saving costs and losses. It offers better efficiency, flexibility, and econ-
omy than large and centralized generation systems. DG systems can employ various
energy resources and technologies and be grid-connected, off-grid, or stand-alone.
Renewables like solar and wind power systems are leading the DG landscape. DG
is leading in the global electrification efforts, presenting viable solutions for mod-
ern energy needs and enabling the livelihoods of hundreds of millions who still lack
access to electricity or clean cooking solutions [4]. Solar PV is one of the most suc-
cessful DG technologies, especially at small-scale and off-grid levels. It is estimated
that since 2010, over 180 million off-grid solar systems have been installed, includ-
ing 30 million solar-home systems. In 2019, the market for off-grid solar systems
grew by 13%, with sales totaling 35 million units. Renewable energy also supplied
around half of the 19 000 mini-grids installed worldwide by the end of 2019. Effi-
cient biomass systems such as improved cooking stoves and biogas systems are also
helping the global efforts toward clean energy access. In 2020, the installed capacity
8 1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition

of off-grid DG systems grew by 365 MW to reach 10.6 GW. Solar systems alone added
250 MW to have a total installed capacity of 4.3 GW.

1.4.3 Digitalization
The digital revolution is also revamping the energy sector. Digitalization of the
energy sector employs technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning,
big data and data analytics, Internet of Things, cloud computing, blockchain,
and robotics and automation. These technologies are at various degrees of
techno-economic maturity for their application in the energy sector. In general,
digitalization is revolutionizing the energy sector by improving the productivity,
safety, accessibility, and overall sustainability of energy systems. New, smarter mod-
eling, monitoring, analyzing, and forecasting energy production and consumption
are helping the sustainable energy transition. However, with its advantages, digital-
ization is also posing several challenges. Most importantly, digital transformation
heavily relies on large datasets, which is increasingly exposing the utilities and
energy industry to cyber security risks.

1.4.4 Decreasing Energy Use


Energy demand is rising worldwide, and it is estimated that between 2018 and 2050,
global energy requirements will increase by 50%. A one-dimensional approach
to matching the growing energy demand with corresponding capacity addition
is not a sustainable solution, especially when the planet is already overshooting
its bio-capacity by almost 70%. Any sustainable way to satisfy global energy
requirements has to begin with decreasing energy use through energy efficiency
(EE) measures. Energy efficiency is a better solution to address energy shortages
than adding new capacity. A negawatt – a watt of energy not used through energy
efficiency measures – is considered the cheapest watt of energy. Energy efficiency
delivers economic and environmental gains to industrial and commercial entities,
besides offering a competitive edge. With the available technologies, building and
industrial sectors can reduce their energy consumption by 40–80% and 18–26%
[19, 20].

1.5 Conclusions
The twenty-first century energy transition is fundamentally a sustainability-driven
energy pathway. In the fight against climate change, the main focus of the energy
transition is on decarbonization by shifting away from fossil fuel-based energy sys-
tems. The energy transition is perceived as a pathway toward the transformation of
the global energy sector from fossil-based to zero-carbon by the second half of this
century. Following the Paris Agreement, several major economies and economic
blocks – including the US, the UK, and the European Union – have committed to
net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, while China has targeted it for 2060. However,
References 9

the ongoing energy transition is not just about reducing carbon or shifting away from
fossil fuels. It is more vibrant and impactful, thanks to the enormous changes and
developments on energy resources and their consumption, technological advance-
ments, socio-economic and political response, and evolving policy landscape. This
energy transition has four main and closely linked dimensions: decarbonization,
decentralization, digitalization, and decreasing energy use. The energy sector can
be decarbonized through various technologies and solutions, including renewable
energy, electric vehicles (EVs), hydrogen and fuel cells, CCS, and phasing out of fos-
sil fuels. Renewable energy has a pivotal role in decarbonizing the energy sector.
Having accounted for over 80% of the worldwide newly added power generation
capacity in 2020, renewable energy has already become an important stakeholder
in the global energy sector. However, it may be challenging for the developed and
industrialized nations to adjust to removing fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive
processes from their economies. Energy transition will be harder for the developing
nations that lack financial resources, infrastructure, policy measures, and technical
know-how.

References

1 Asif, M. (2021). Energy and Environmental Security in Developing Countries.


Springer. ISBN: 978-3-030-63653-1.
2 Asif, M. (2019). Energy and Environmental Security, Handbook of Environmental
Management. Taylor & Francis.
3 NASA (2021), Climate change: how do we know, facts, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Evidence|Facts – Climate Change: Vital Signs of the
Planet (nasa.gov).
4 Samenow, J. (2021). ‘Hard to comprehend’: experts react to record 121 degrees in
Canada, The Washington Post.
5 Read, P. and Dennis, R. (2020). With costs approaching $100 billion, the fires are
Australia’s costliest natural disaster, The Conservation.
6 EIA (2019). EIA Projects Nearly 50% Increase in World Energy Usage by 2050, led
by Growth in Asia, Today in Energy. U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA).
7 IEA (2021). Net zero by 2050: a roadmap for the global energy sector, Flagship
report, International Energy Agency.
8 Asif, M. (2021). Energy and Environmental Outlook for South Asia. Florida, USA:
CRC Press. ISBN: 978-0-367-67343-7.
9 Qudratullah, H. and Asif, M. (2020). Dynamics of Energy, Environment and
Economy: A Sustainability Perspective. Springer. ISBN: 978-3-030-43578-3.
10 IRENA Energy Transition. International Renewable Energy Agency (irena.org).
11 Gillam, E. and Asplund, R. (2021). Will Solar Take the Throne. Invesco.
12 DOE (2021). How We’re Moving to Net-zero by 2050. US Department of Energy.
13 GUK (2021). End to Coal Power Brought Forward to October 2024, Government of
UK, Press Release (www.gov.uk).
10 1 Introduction to the Four-Dimensional Energy Transition

14 IRENA (2021). World Adds Record New Renewable Capacity in 2020. Press
Release, International Renewable Energy Agency (irena.org).
15 REN21 (2020). Renewables 2020 Global Status Report. Renewable Energy
Network.
16 Scully, J. (2021). China Signals Construction Start of 100 GW, First Phase of Desert
Renewables Rollout. PV-Tech (pv-tech.org).
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Solutions. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-547876-1.
18 K. Adler (2021), Global electric vehicle sales grew 41% in 2020, more growth
coming through decade. IEA, HIS Markit. https://ihsmarkit.com/research-
analysis/global-electric-vehicle-sales-grew-41-in-2020-more-growth-comi.html.
19 Hassan, M.T., Burek, S., and Asif, M. (2017). Barriers to industrial energy
efficiency improvement-manufacturing SMEs of Pakistan. Energy Procedia
113: 135–142.
20 Asif, M. (2020). Role of energy conservation and management in the 4D
sustainable energy transition. Sustainability 12: 10006. https://doi.org/10.3390/
su122310006.
11

Part I

Decarbonization
13

Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and


Germany
Heiko Thomas 1 and Bing Xue 2
1
Global Climate Forum e.V., Berlin, Germany
2
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

2.1 Global Energy Transition

Energy consumption is responsible for 73% of all green house gas (GHG) emissions
globally. Decarbonizing the energy system is therefore the primary task in order to
mitigate climate change [1]. The share of renewables in global electricity production
reached 28% at the beginning of 2020, with a share of 9% stemming from volatile
sources like wind and PV. The total final energy consumption includes not only the
electricity sector but also transport, buildings, industry, and businesses. It takes into
account all the energy needed. Renewables make up 11% of the total final energy
consumption as oil, gas, coal, and nuclear dominate all sectors except the electricity
sector. A significant portion of the renewable share comes from hydro and biomass,
two renewable energy sources that substantially alter the environment and have lim-
ited growth potential in many regions. Wind and solar supply 2.1% of the total final
energy consumption, and fossil fuels supply 79.9%, a factor of 38 and giving an idea
of the humongous task to globally decarbonize the energy system (see Figure 2.1).
The energy transition in energy production relies on the growth of modern renew-
able energy sources, wind and PV, which should replace fossil sources. Despite enor-
mous efforts and success stories, these grew significantly slower than the energy
demand and made up less than one-third (+7.3 exajoule) of the additional demand
from 2013 to 2018 (+25.3 exajoules). That means that renewables needed to grow at
least 3× times faster than they did during that period only to match the increasing
demand. Table 2.1 shows the primary energy annual change numbers for all energy
sources comparing 2018 and 2019. The GHG emissions still raised by 0.5% in 2019
compared with 2018 despite renewables accounting for the most significant increase
in energy production (+3.2 exajoule) and a slowed-down economy [3]. The renew-
able energy share in primary energy consumption increases steadily, but one should
not be fooled. The absolute number of energy not produced by renewables is steadily
growing! The annual change for renewables must be higher than the total change to
reverse the increasing energy consumption trend. The COVID-19 pandemic altered
The 4Ds of Energy Transition: Decarbonization, Decentralization, Decreasing Use and Digitalization,
First Edition. Edited by Muhammad Asif.
© 2022 WILEY-VCH GmbH. Published 2022 by WILEY-VCH GmbH.
14 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

Nuclear energy
2.2%

Traditional biomass
6.9%

Biomass/solar/
geothermal (heat)
4.3%
Modern renewables Hydropower
11% 3.6%
Fossil fuels
79.9%

Wind/solar/biomass/
Biofuels for transport
geothermal/ocean
1.0%
power (electric)
2.1%

Figure 2.1 Renewable energy share in global total final energy consumption (2018).
Source: Based on REN21 [2].

Table 2.1 Global primary energy consumption in 2019 compared with 2018 [3].

Annual change Consumption Share of primary Percentage share


Energy source (exajoule) (exajoule) energy (%) change to 2018 (%)

Renewables 3.2 29.0 5 0.5


Gas 2.8 141.5 24.2 0.2
Oil 1.6 193.0 33.1 −0.2
Nuclear 0.8 24.9 4.3 0.1
Hydro 0.3 37.6 6.4 0
Coal −0.9 157.9 27.0 −0.5
Total 7.7 583.9

Table 2.2 Global indicators from 2018–2020 (www.oecd.org/economic-outlook; www.wto


.org) [3, 4].

2018 2019 2020

GHG emissions change in % 2.1 0.5 −6.4


GDP change in % 2.9 2.3 −4.2 (+4.2 forecasted for 2021)
Primary energy consumption change in % 2.8 1.3 −5.3

Source: Based on Refs. [3, 4].

life and disrupted the global economy in 2020. Furthermore, the energy consump-
tion is forecasted to shrink by 5.3%, but this an anomaly (Table 2.2). The global GDP
growth will jump back to normal levels once the pandemic is over. There are indi-
cations that the global GDP can increase by 4.2% already in 2021 compared with a
decrease of −4.2% in 2020 (Table 2.2).
2.1 Global Energy Transition 15

Simultaneously, 11.5% of the global population, or about 860 million people, pri-
marily living in Africa, are still without electricity access, and even a larger number
does not have 24/7 access to electricity [5]. The world’s population is growing at a
rate of 1% per year or by 81 million people per year. Fortunately, renewables, espe-
cially PV, are predestined to provide fast and straightforward access to electricity in
remote and less developed regions. Multiple companies already offer stand-alone
island solutions based on renewables including energy storage.
What is the solution if adding substantial renewable capacity does not do the trick
yet? Humanity needs to lower its energy consumption substantially and do it quickly.
In the bigger picture, one needs to approach uncomfortable topics like sufficiency,
throwaway societies, and overpopulation, question economies based on growth, and
come up with an incorporating economic (and welfare) model that needs to include
a circular economy to have a realistic chance to significantly reduce the GHG emis-
sions and mitigate climate change in the coming decades. Some measurements do
not require overcoming technological or financial hurdles and can have an immedi-
ate impact. Countries with high per capita energy consumption can give up comfort
to reduce their carbon footprint immediately.
Only global and regional cooperation can achieve this huge task. An example is
the DESERTEC industrial initiative (Dii), launched in 2009, originally thought to
provide electricity to Europe harvesting solar energy in Middle East and Northern
Africa (MENA). It still exists (https://dii-desertenergy.org/) but failed for several rea-
sons, like being labeled green colonialism because the concept initially focused too
much on energy export, missing political support especially from Europe, counter
lobbyism from traditional energy economies, regional conflicts, and hovering uncer-
tainties. The idea was probably too big to be realized. Since then, many companies
have left the initiative. It now focuses on counseling in the MENA region and sup-
porting the establishment of a renewable market. However, there are success stories.
Morocco imported more than 90% of its energy but is now on track to generate 42%
of its electricity in 2020. An agreement with Spain, Portugal, Germany, and France
opened access to the European electricity market (https://www.masen.ma/en) [6].
There is an increasing competition between conserving the environment and
installing new renewables and its peripheries, thinking of wind farms in protected
natural zones to take advantage of favored wind conditions and available space,
flooding valleys to provide new massive hydro storage, and establishing energy
transmission corridors. This dilemma is imminent in industrialized and densely
populated countries like Germany. Any man-made changes to natural landscapes
get noticed. Often, the same people and organizations who demanded a change
toward a more sustainable energy generation 1 or 2 decades ago are now opposing
an alteration of their home landscape by renewables, especially by wind turbines,
resulting in extensive and delayed approval processes or the abandonment of
renewable projects. It comes down to choose between natural preservation and
climate change mitigation in these discussions.
Clean energy technologies are not free from GHG emissions. It is prudent to con-
duct a “cradle-to-grave” life-cycle assessment (LCA) of energy use, material demand,
and net GHG emissions for renewables similar to evaluating fossil-based energy
16 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

sources. Fabricating and deploying renewable and clean energy technologies also
exploit the environment. This exploitation includes emissions related to mining for
much-needed metals like lithium or rare earth metals, transport, fabrication, con-
struction, installation, metal refining, operation, maintenance, repair, waste man-
agement, and recycling. It can also include deforestation and water use.
However, open-cast lignite mining along with side effects like groundwater
lowering left a giant environmental footprint with the landscape’s alteration and
devastation. Open-cast lignite mining alone altered, more precisely devastated,
2350 km2 or nearly 0.7% of Germany’s area. The ground that is occupied by a turbine
and cannot be used in its original form anymore is about 4500 m2 per turbine and
results in 120 km2 occupied in Germany. A hypothetical wind capacity increase to
10× the existing capacity to meet the climate mitigation targets (see subchapter
Germany) would result in 1200 km2 , approximately half of the open-cast lignite
area. Regulations are in place that require planting new trees in compensation,
exceeding the area deforested to erect and maintain wind turbines. The actual
visual impact affects a wider area due to the height and number of wind turbines.
One megawatt of wind turbine power requires 7000 m2 in terms of spacing between
turbines (aerodynamics, air turbulence, efficiency reasons), and as of 2020, there
were 54 000 MW installed. That amounts to 3780 km2 or about 1.1% of Germany’s
area covered with wind turbines. Agriculture or forestry uses most of this area, but
the landscape is altered. However, there is a visual impact that increasingly reduces
public acceptance in Germany.
Most countries in the world are moving at different speeds toward sustainable
energy systems. Some countries show increasing GHG emissions. The prerequisites,
the commitments, and the levels of accomplishment are very different. Some coun-
tries need to fulfill pure needs first like establishing electricity access or even access
to clean water and food. A rebuild of any systems costs at the beginning, and often
the financial abilities are missing. The dedications to the Paris Agreement and its
support by a political agenda differ. It feels irritating when in one country forests are
cut down to install wind turbines while other countries continue to install new coal
power plants. Of course, this must be seen first with the fact that the so-called indus-
trialized countries are responsible for most of the emitted GHG so far. Again, this is
asking for enhanced global cooperation, technology transfer, and proper financing
mechanisms to share the burden of decarbonization.
The global energy transition index (ETI) annually calculated by the World Eco-
nomic Forum measures countries’ energy system performance and their readiness
for the energy transition. The numbers show steady progress overall but very slow
progress. Only 11 benchmarked countries out of 114 showed annual progress
from 2015 to 2020. Of the world’s top GHG emitters, only France and the United
Kingdom make to the top 10 in the ETI. China is at 78 position with 50.9 of 100
possible points, the United States at 30 with 60.7 points, India at 74, Russia at 80,
Japan at 22, and Germany at 20. Sweden is the top performer with 74.2 of 100 points
(http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ Fostering_ Effective_ Energy_ Transition_
2020_Edition.pdf).
Because the need to reduce GHG emissions is so urgent, fast and consequent mea-
sures have to be taken. The first step is to abolish all fossil fuel subsidies. These
2.2 China 17

amounted to more than 6000 billion US$ worldwide or more than 6% of the global
GDP in 2015. In comparison, clean energy technology and renewables were subsi-
dized by just 1200 billion US$. For many years now (2020), the generation costs for
electricity by wind and PV have been comparable or even lower than that of coal
and gas power plants, and costs for renewable technologies are continually decreas-
ing. Besides not looking into another 40 years of fossil-based electricity generation
by installing new coal and gas power plants and thereby losing the financial leeway
to follow a more sustainable path, every effort must be taken to invest in clean energy
technologies instead. Another necessary and timely step is to replace the energeti-
cally most inefficient fossil power plants with renewables. As energetic inefficiency
goes hand in hand with a higher cost, this would also free up money worth 1% of the
global GDP as cheaper renewables would replace the most costly power plants. Only
utilities who want to continue their paid-off power plants have the reason to argue.
The intense focus on the electricity sector resulted in underachievement and a con-
siderably lower share of renewables for the other sectors. Buildings account for 33%
of the final energy demand for heating, air conditioning, and lighting, but renew-
ables supply only 13.6%. Transport accounts for 32% of the final energy demand, but
renewables supply only 3.3% (3% by biofuels and 0.3% by renewable electricity). The
electricity sector shows a share of 28% renewables in comparison.

2.2 China
After the reform and opening up, China has maintained rapid economic growth over
the last four decades, often seen as the “China Miracle.” Such rapid growth cre-
ated an expansion of the energy market. According to data from the International
Energy Agency, China is now the world’s biggest energy consumer with a primary
energy supply of 3196 Mtoe in 2018 with subsequent CO2 emissions of 9528 Mt, 365%
up from 1990 (https://www.iea.org/countries/china). It is the largest producer and
consumer of coal, the second-largest importer of crude oil, and the leading country
in renewable energy development. China’s energy market is of great interest to the
international community, particularly after the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by
the Chinese central government in 2013, which will further boost global clean energy
cooperation and create an interconnected energy system worldwide. The world is
also looking at China’s brand-new nationwide emission trading system (ETS) that
started in February 2021; it is the largest cap and trade CO2 market by far.

2.2.1 How to Achieve Carbon Neutrality Before 2060 and Keep the
World’s Largest Economy Running
The Chinese government approved the 14th five-year plan in March 2021 covering
the period from 2021 to 2025. It aims at achieving carbon neutrality by 2060
as already proclaimed by President Xi Jinping in September 2020 (https://news
.cgtn.com/news/2020-12-12/Full-text-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-at-Climate-Ambition-
Summit-2020-WaztGQcuBO/index.html). Key targets include the following:
● 18% reduction of CO2 intensity.
● 13.5% reduction of energy intensity.
18 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

● Long-term objectives for 2035.


● Increase the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 20% (15.8%
in 2020).
● Four key indicators (“reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP(%),” “re-
duction of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%),” “forest coverage rate (%),” and
“comprehensive energy production capacity.”
● Construction of eight major clean energy bases across China and a modern energy
system.
The 14th five-year plan is a guideline, and more detailed plans describing specific
sector targets and a mandatory action plan on how to peak CO2 emission before 2030
will be finalized in 2021 and 2022.
The last plan reaffirmed the already existing targets from the nationally deter-
mined contributions (NDCs) in 2016 and 2020 [7–10] for 2030: China aims to peak
CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest and lower the carbon intensity by 60–64%
compared with 2005 levels by 2030. China aims to reduce carbon intensity by
increasing the share of non-fossil energy consumption among total primary energy
consumption to around 20%. If things work out, China can hit peak GHG emissions
before 2030.
The five-year plan sets binding targets of China’s energy intensity and carbon
intensity and shows the policymakers’ strong commitment to squeeze out share of
coal in the country’s energy mix. In April 2017, the “Energy Supply and Consump-
tion Revolution Strategy (2016–2030)” was released (Table 2.3). The main focus of the
strategy remains in line with the Energy 13th Five-Year Plan. However, it set up new
and higher targets for the future. For example, in 2030, primary energy consumption
should be capped to below 6 billion tons, and non-fossil energies should have a share
of more than 20%. China may well overachieve its NDC target levels, although the
total GHG emissions are likely to continue increasing until 2030, as China has not yet
implemented acceptable policies addressing non-CO2 GHG emissions (such as CH4 ,
N2 O, HFCs). With President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from
the Paris Climate Agreement, the global attention has further turned to China on
its role and potential leadership in global climate change policy. Given China’s eco-
nomic restructuring potential and its continuous efforts in energy efficiency, it will
continue being an active driver of global efforts in the transition toward sustainable
energy systems. China is already the most crucial player in 2021 in terms of installing
renewables, energy consumption, and therefore the potential to reduce emissions.
China’s energy consumption has increased dramatically since 2000. It increased
from 131 million tons oil equivalent in 1965 to 3274 million tons oil equivalent in
2018, with the GDP increasing from RMB 172 billion yuan to RMB 91 928 billion
yuan. In 2018, China remained the world’s largest energy consumer, accounting
for over 24% of global energy consumption and contributing 27% to global energy
demand growth. Also, China’s energy consumption is forecasted to keep rising until
2030 due to continued economic growth. China distinguishes primary energy con-
sumption in five main forms: coal, oil, gas, nuclear, and renewables. The three sec-
tors such as industry, transport, and buildings consume most of the energy. Ever
since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, coal is the dominant fuel in
the end-use sectors, accounting for 39% of the final energy consumption, followed
2.2 China 19

Table 2.3 Targets within China’s energy revolution targets.

Target 2020 2030

Carbon emission Carbon emission per unit of GDP −18%


(compared with 2015)
CO2 emission Peak or earlier
Carbon emission per unit of GDP −60% to −65%
(compared with 2005)
Non-fossil Non-fossil fuel in the energy mix 15% 20%
Natural gas in the energy the mix 15%
Non-fossil power generation 50%
account for total power
generation
New energy demand met by Should mostly
clean energy be done
Energy efficiency Energy consumption per unit of −15%
GDP (compared with 2015)
Primary energy consumption 5% 6%
(unit: billion tonne, tce)
Energy Energy self-sufficiency rate Above 80%
self-sufficiency
Energy By 2050, China shall become an
governance “important participant” of
international energy governance
Vision toward By 2050, primary energy
2050 consumption should be stable,
with more than half coming from
non-fossil energy

by oil (27%), electricity (19%), natural gas (7%), district heating (5%), and bioen-
ergy (2%). It remains the principal energy source in China due to its abundance and
strategic role in its economic growth. Over the last decades, the share of coal in the
total energy consumption has fallen from 87% in 1965 to 57% in 2020. According
to recent statistics, China has the 9th highest energy intensity in the world. How-
ever, it is worth noting that due to the significant reduction of coal consumption,
China’s energy intensity (total energy consumption per unit of GDP) decreased con-
tinuously over the last decade, from 0.47 toe/$ in 1990 to 0.13 toe/$ in 2018, and it
has contributed dominantly to the world energy intensity reduction (https://www
.iea.org/countries/china).

2.2.2 China as the World’s Leader in Renewable Installations


China leads the world in renewable installations per year and absolute numbers but
installed new coal power plants of 30 GW capacity only in 2020 while the rest of the
world’s coal capacity shrank by 17 GW.
20 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

China has made great achievements in its renewable market. In 2016, it overtook
the United States in becoming the largest consumer of renewables in power, with a
growth rate of 33.4%, and Chinese renewables accounted for 20.5% of the global total,
up from just 2% ten years before. Hydroelectric, wind, bioenergy, geothermal, and
solar supply most of China’s renewable electricity. The first account of renewable
electricity consumption in China dates back to the 1950s, and nationwide develop-
ment of renewable electricity started at the end of the 1970s, especially after the
reform and opening up in 1978. The development of renewable electricity in China
underwent four stages since 1973: the starting stage (1973–1992), the preliminary
stage of industrialization (1993–2004), the fast-developing stage (2005–2009), and
the industrial-scale stage (2010–now). Among non-fossil fuels, solar consumption
grew the fastest (71.5%), followed by wind (+29.4%) and nuclear (+24.5%). From
the perspective of energy consumption sectors, generally speaking, China’s energy
consumption is dominated by industry, although other sectors have increased their
share in recent years.
Even though China ranks third worldwide in terms of total coal reserves behind
the United States and Russia, with about 62 billion tons of anthracite and 52 billion
tons of lignite quality coal as of the end of 2014, China became a net importer of
coal since 2009, and the imports had reached 304 Mt in 2020, the highest since 2014.
China’s coal washing rate has remained at a lower level for many years, lower than
in developed countries (such as the United States or Germany). Traditional coal
production has suffered from excess capacity and higher inventory in China since
2012. China’s reliance on coal is expected to decline, and its investment in renewable
energy projects around the world will continue to grow, to be an unstoppable force in
the realm of renewable energy. For example, China alone is responsible for over 40%
of global renewable capacity growth and surpasses its 2020 solar PV target. The IEA
expected it to exceed its wind target in 2019. China is also the world market leader
in hydropower, bioenergy for electricity and heat, and electric vehicles. Renewables
such natural gas increasingly meet China’s growing energy needs. China diversifies
and cleans up its power mix – the share of coal in the total generation is foreseen
to drop from 57% in 2020 to less than 40% in 2040. It sees renewables as a source
of energy security and not just only to reduce carbon emission. The 13th five-year
plan’s renewable capacity targets for 2020 were: solar from 110 to 200 GW, wind from
210 to 350 GW, and bioenergy from 15 to 30 GW (“China Renewable Energy Outlook
2017” report). In 2019, a total renewable capacity of 419 GW was achieved, meaning
that the 2020 targets were most likely achieved.

2.2.3 Particular Measures to Reduce GHG Emissions


On 25 April 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and
National Energy Administration (NEA) released a strategic paper on the “Energy
Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy (2016–2030)” [7–11]. It sets out the
main overall targets and strategies of the Chinese energy sector for 2030 and a path-
way beyond the Energy 13th FYP (2016–2020). The document essentially recalls
existing targets for 2020, including primary energy consumption targets. Non-fossil
2.2 China 21

fuels in the energy mix must be higher than 15%, energy consumption per unit
of GDP decreased by 15% compared with 2015, carbon emission per unit of GDP
decreased by 18% compared with 2015, and energy self-sufficiency rate should be
above 80%. Nevertheless, the strategy also sets up new targets for 2030. The roadmap
for 2021–2030 envisions a sustained growth in the utilization of renewables, gas,
and nuclear power and a radical decrease in the consumption of high-carbon fossil
energy, shown as follows:
1. The control of primary energy consumption within 6 billion tce.
2. Non-fossil fuel in the energy mix should be higher than 20%.
3. Natural gas should account for more than 15% of the mix.
4. Non-fossil power generation accounts for more than 50% of total power genera-
tion.
5. Ultralow polluting coal-fired power plants shall represent more than 80% of the
fleet.
6. New energy demand should be met by clean energy.
7. Recall China’s climate change commitments (INDCs) by 2030: CO2 emission
peaks around 2030 or earlier, and carbon emission per unit of GDP decreased by
60–65% compared with 2005.
The total energy consumption would stabilize, and non-fossil would account for
more than half of the energy demand in 2050. To safeguard the modernization of
society, China should establish a modern energy system. The strategy envisions that
China would take on the leadership in energy efficiency, energy technology, and
energy equipment globally and would become a significant player in global energy
governance. This outlines 13 key measures to promote breakthroughs in the key
areas, which are as follows:
1. National energy conservation action.
2. Total energy consumption and intensity control action.
3. Demonstration action on near-zero carbon emissions.
4. Electricity demand-side management action.
5. Clean use of coal action.
6. Natural gas promotion and utilization.
7. Non-fossil fuel leap development action.
8. Rural new energy action.
9. Energy internet promotion action.
10. Breakthrough in energy technology and equipment action.
11. Energy supply-side structural reform action.
12. Energy standards improve and upgrade action.
13. Energy cooperation action through the Belt and Road Initiative.
This also has tremendous significance:
● Facilitate the ongoing supply-side structural reform.
● Enhance the quality and efficiency of economic growth.
● Support China’s stable move into a moderately developed economy.
● Enhance the energy security capability.
22 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

● Effectively respond to various risks and sudden events and elevate the overall
national security level.
● Optimize energy structure.
● Enhance the energy efficiency.
● Crack resource and environment constraints.
● Comprehensively advance ecological civilization.

It can also enhance independent innovation capability and realize the close inte-
gration of technology, energy, and economy and enhance China’s overall impact in
the global energy arena and manifest China’s positive image as a responsible great
nation in global climate change.
To achieve its ambitions in the sustainable energy transition, China has made
efforts to enhance its role in the global energy market: overseas investment
increased, and participation in global energy governance grows although/while
remaining relatively inactive. From a domestic perspective, taking the building,
heating, and transport sectors as examples, China has shown its strong willingness
to promote the renewable energy industry’s domestic growth. Heating energy
consumption in urban residential areas in China has increased dramatically during
the last decades, especially in the subsectors of “hot water supply” and “steam
supply.” The average annual heat consumption for households increased from
232 340 billion kilo-joules in 2000 to 938 410 billion kilo-joules in 2016. In compar-
ison, the steam supply capacity remains stable from 2000 to 2016, while the hot
water supply capacity increased rapidly, from 97 417 MW in 2000 to 493 254 MW
in 2016. One of the most critical notifications is that the electricity consumption
for household heating systems, such as air-conditioning and heating devices, is
not separately calculated in the statistical system. According to Hu et al. survey
(2016), the most common heating devices were electrical heaters and split air
conditioners, which accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total heating
consumption [12]. Transportation energy consumption is also a significant growth
factor in the growth of China’s total energy consumption because of the rapidly
increasing transport requirements, and China’s transport sectors are in the period
of large-scale construction and development. The rapid growth of road vehicles
and private cars had resulted in the continuing growth of petroleum demand.
Under such situations from conversation vehicles, China fosters the development
of new energy vehicles at various levels. The automobile industry in China has
also begun to develop a large and reputable electrical vehicle sector, supported by
both private and public sectors. According to the China Association of Automobile
Manufacturers, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest
automobile market in 2009, with record 13.9 million vehicles sold in the country
(25.8 million in 20219), compared with 10.43 million cars and light trucks sold
in the United States in 2009 (17.1 million in 2019). Chinese sales of new energy
vehicles in 2020 totaled 1.3 million units. The Chinese government uses the term
new energy vehicles (NEVs) to designate plug-in electric vehicles eligible for public
subsidies and includes only battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid
electric vehicles (PHEVs).
2.3 Germany 23

China’s energy transition is taking place under the double pressure of needing to
enhance the energy supply for its growing economy while changing to more sus-
tainable and less polluting sources to improve air quality. The key opportunity in
China’s energy transition lies in dual use. China can realize its return on investment
in new energy technologies, both as the largest energy consumer globally and as an
increasingly strong exporter of affordable non-fossil technologies emerging in the
global energy transition market. The most important motivation for China’s energy
transitions is to secure energy supply and improve environmental quality. A transfor-
mation in China toward a low-carbon energy system is vital for the world to combat
climate change. To support the 2 degrees Celsius goal, China will need to envisage
its long-term ambition beyond 2030. The ongoing rapid urbanization and industrial-
ization process require the sustainable energy transition to absolutely include both
industrial and household sectors in this process.

2.3 Germany

2.3.1 Climate Action and GHG Emission Reduction Targets


Germany is the first country in Europe that legally anchored the European climate
protection targets and the first country worldwide that legally committed to
the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in the global average temperature to
below 2 ∘ C and ideally below 1.5 ∘ C. The Federal Climate Change Act (in German
“Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz”) became effective on 18 December 2019 and stated
the long-term goal that is to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. It was
however partly nullified by the Federal Constitutional Court in April 2021 after
legal actions were taken by complaining that specific measurements are not existent
beyond 2030 to achieve the goals and that the planned reduction of GHG emissions
until 2030 is not sufficient and leaves future generations with a tiny GHG emission
budget until 2050. It is thus compromising their life and freedom. The Climate
Change Act was therefore ruled incompatible with fundamental rights, and the
court obligated Germany to rework and update the Climate Change Act accordingly
(https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/
2021/bvg21-031.html). Among the plaintiffs were people linked to the Friday for
Future movement and people living in Bangladesh and Nepal. As a consequence,
Germany tightened its goals and now aims to achieve carbon emission neutrality
until 2045 instead of 2050 [13]. It set new milestones, specific targets for all sectors,
and described the process in more detail.
A broad package of measures was actually written down in the Climate Protection
Program 2030 (Table 2.4), a substitute of the older Climate Protection Program
2050 (https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/climate-action; https://
www.bmu.de/en/publication/klimaschutzprogramm-2030/). A crucial step is the
complete coal exit until 2038 at the latest that passed legislation in July 2020. Due
to the amendment of the Climate Change Act in May 2021, the Climate Protection
Program 2030 is now partly outdated and will likely be updated.
24 2 Global Energy Transition and Experiences from China and Germany

Table 2.4 Specific sector targets after the amendment of the


Climate Change Act in May 2021 [13].

Sector 2020 reference 2030 target

Energy 280 108


Industry 186 118
Mobility/traffic 150 85
Buildings 118 67
Agriculture 70 56
Waste 9 4

Annual emission budgets in millions of tons of CO2 equivalent.

Gas
25.3% Nuclear
Biomass
6.3%
6.8%

Renewables
Biowaste 1.1%
14.8%
Biofuels 0.9%
Hydropower 0.6%
Oil Renewables
35.9% Wind 3.5% with
substantial
Hard coal growth
8.6% Photovoltaics 1.3% potential
5.4%
Brown coal
9.0% Solar heat 0.2% Ambient heat 0.4%

Figure 2.2 Primary energy consumption shares in Germany (2019). Source: Based on Ref.
[14].

2.3.2 System Requirements to Achieve the GHG Emission Reduction


Goals
Similar to the global perspective, the energy system transformation is not only about
transforming the electricity sector. The share of renewables of primary energy con-
sumption was 14.8% in 2019 and is still dominated by biomass that accounts together
with biowaste and biofuels for 58.8% of the renewable share for primary energy
consumption (Figure 2.2). Wind, as the second-largest renewable energy source,
accounts for 24.1% of all renewables and 3.5% of the primary energy consumption.
The portions for photovoltaics are 8.9% and 1.3%.
Germany wants to increase the share of renewables of the power generation mix
to 65% by 2030 (Table 2.5). By far, Germany exceeded its 2020 goal in supplying 35%
of consumed electricity by using renewable sources for electric energy generation.
During the first half of 2020, renewables had a share of 56% amid the COVID-19
2.3 Germany 25

Table 2.5 Climate action targets in May 2021a) (https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/


climate-action; https://www.bmu.de/en/publication/klimaschutzprogramm-2030/) [13].

Germany Europe
2020 2040/2045/
Goals 2020 (achievement) 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050

GHG −40% −42.3% −65% (was −88% by −20% −40% −80 to 95%
emissions −37.8% −55%) 2040
compared (without Neutrality by
with 1990 pandemic) 2045
Negative
balance
beyond 2050
Increase 18% 17.1% (2019) 30% 60% 20% 27% —
renewable
energy
share in
gross final
energy con-
sumption
Reduction −20% −18.7% −50% −20% −32.5% —
primary or compared compared
final energy with 2008 with 2008
consump-
tion

Due to the amendment of the Climate Change Act in May 2021, numbers have been and will be updated in
the future.
a) European Union.
Source: Based on Ref. [13].

pandemic and reduced activities in almost every sector, including industry and
declining demand due to imposed counter-measurements and lockdown. A mild
winter and favorable weather conditions might even allow Germany to reduce
GHG emissions by more than 40% compared with 1990 levels, which is the main
2020 climate change mitigation goal. It was not very likely to reach this goal if one
looked at the numbers during the last years because there were no achievements
in the heat and traffic sector and increased coal use due to the shutdown of nuclear
power plants nullified the rising share of renewables in electricity.
The German government amended the Renewable Energy Act to realize the
65% renewable share in the electricity sector by 2030. The changes become effec-
tive in 2021 and include specific expansion goals for wind (54 → 71 GW), solar
(52 → 100 GW) until 2030, and a stringent monitoring process [15]. To ensure a
continued operation of older renewable installments that face dismantling due
to much lower profits at the end of the 20-year fixed subsidization period, costly
requirements to install smart meters, and potential illegal operation, the extended
operation is supported by waiving the update requirements and continued – though
much lower – subsidization until 2027. Operators of onshore wind turbines have to
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The brooklet came from the mountain,
As sang the bard of old,
Running with feet of silver
Over the sands of gold!

Far away in the briny ocean


There rolled a turbulent wave,
Now singing along the sea-beach,
Now howling along the cave.

And the brooklet has found the billow,


Though they flowed so far apart,
And has filled with its freshness and sweetness
That turbulent, bitter heart.

—Longfellow.

A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a horse!

Marcellus. Peace, break thee off; look, where it comes again!

Bernardo. In the same figure, like the king that’s dead.

Marcellus. Thou art a scholar; speak to it, Horatio.

Bernardo. Looks it not like the king? mark it, Horatio.

Horatio. Most like: it harrows me with fear and wonder.

Bernardo. It would be spoke to.

Marcellus. Question it, Horatio.

Horatio. What art thou that usurp’st this time of night,


Together with that fair and warlike form
In which the majesty of buried Denmark
Did sometimes march? by heaven I charge thee, speak!
Marcellus. It is offended.

Bernardo. See, it stalks away!

Horatio. Stay! speak, speak! I charge thee, speak! [Exit Ghost.]

Marcellus. ’Tis gone, and will not answer.

Bernardo. How now, Horatio! you tremble and look pale:


Is not this something more than phantasy?
What think you on’t?

—Shakespeare.

Gloucester. Stay, you that bear the corse, and set it down.

Anne. What black magician conjures up this fiend


To stop devoted charitable deeds?

Gloucester. Villains, set down the corse; or, by Saint Paul,


I’ll make a corse of him that disobeys ...
Unmannered dog! stand thou, when I command:
Advance thy halberd higher than my breast,
Or, by Saint Paul, I’ll strike thee to my foot,
And spurn upon thee, beggar, for thy boldness.

—Shakespeare.

Brutus. What, Lucius! ho!—


I cannot, by the progress of the stars,
Give guess how near the day.—Lucius, I say!—
I would it were my fault to sleep so soundly.—
When, Lucius, when? Awake, I say! What, Lucius!

Lucius. Call’d you, my lord?

Brutus. Get me a taper in my study, Lucius:


When it is lighted, come and call me here.

Lucius. I will, my lord.

—Shakespeare.

Note: The following is good for the direct question and direct
answer:

Question. Hold you the watch to-night?

Answer. We do, my lord.

Question. Arm’d, say you?

Answer. Arm’d, my lord.

Question. From top to toe?

Answer. My lord, from head to foot.

Question. Then saw you not his face?

Answer. O, yes, my lord; he wore his beaver up.

Question. What, look’d he frowningly?

Answer. A countenance more in sorrow than in anger.

Question. Pale, or red?

Answer. Nay, very pale.

Question. And fix’d his eyes upon you?

Answer. Most constantly ...

Question. Stay’d it long?


Answer. While one with moderate haste might tell a hundred....

Question. His beard was grizzled? no?

Answer. It was, as I have seen it in his life,


A sable silver’d.

—Shakespeare (dialogue between Hamlet, Marcellus and


Bernardo).

“Yo ho, my boys!” said Fezziwig. “No more work to-night.


Christmas Eve, Dick. Christmas, Ebenezer! Let’s have the shutters
up, before a man can say Jack Robinson!”
You wouldn’t believe how those two fellows went at it! They
charged into the street with the shutters—one, two, three—had ’em
up in their places—four, five, six—barred ’em and pinned ’em—
seven, eight, nine—and came back before you could have got to
twelve, panting like race-horses.
“Hilli-ho!” cried old Fezziwig, skipping down from the high desk,
with wonderful agility. “Clear away, my lads, and let’s have lots of
room here! Hilli-ho! Dick! Chirrup, Ebenezer!”
—Dickens.

What, what, what? ill luck, ill luck?

I thank thee, good Tubal!—good news, good news! ha, ha!—


Where? In Genoa?

Exercises Developing Force and Rate of Speech

The Problem
Here is a classification of people who speak peculiarly, or
incorrectly, as far as voice is concerned, with exercises for
correction.
1. There are those who speak too fast.
2. There are those who speak too slow.
3. There are those who speak too low.
4. There are those who speak too loud.
5. There are those who speak too short with no melody of tone.
Yet all of these may enunciate and pronounce their words well.
Besides developing distinctness, we must gain control and
adaptability of speech. It is strange, yet true, that many speakers
never increase the force or volume of their voices when addressing a
large assembly. They use the same quiet, even tone appropriate in
addressing a single person. What is the result? They generally bore
the audience, even though their thoughts may be brilliant. There is
no excuse for this, as a few hours’ study and practice will change it.
Above all things one who attempts public speaking must speak so
that he can be heard. It is essential, therefore, to give ourselves
actual practice exercises which demand force of utterance. Each
student should demand of himself daily oral drill upon certain
exercises until he has mastered his own particular difficulty.
The best means of accomplishing this is to use material from good
literature. In the following pages, under several heads, is a variety of
splendid exercises for practice. Commit all, or at least a part, to
memory. Thus, while developing your speaking power, you will be
cultivating a taste for the best that our literature affords.

To Develop Rapid Speech


Note: In developing rapid speech be careful to retain clearness
and precision of utterance.

Now clear, pure, hard, bright, and one by one, like hail-stones,
Short words fall from his lips fast as the first of a shower,
Now in two-fold column Spondee, Iamb, and Trochee,
Unbroke, firm-set, advance, retreat, trampling along,—
Now with a sprightlier springingness, bounding in triplicate syllables,
Dance the elastic Dactylics in musical cadences on;
Now their voluminous coil intertangling like huge anacondas,
Roll overwhelmingly onward the sesquipedalian words.

—Browning.
(The above should be rendered in not less than eighteen
seconds.)

You couldn’t pack a Broadwood half a mile—


You mustn’t leave a fiddle in the damp—
You couldn’t raft an organ up the Nile,
And play it in an Equatorial swamp.
I travel with the cooking-pots and pails—
I’m sandwiched ’tween the coffee and the pork—
And when the dusty column checks and tails,
You should hear me spur the rearguard to a walk!
With my “Pilly-willy-winky-winky popp!”
(Oh, it’s any tune that comes into my head!)
So I keep ’em moving forward till they drop;
So I play ’em up to water and to bed.

—Kipling.

Under his spurning feet, the road,


Like an arrowy Alpine river flow’d
And the landscape sped away behind
Like an ocean flying before the wind;
And the steed, like a bark fed with furnace fire,
Swept on, with his wild eye full of ire.
But, lo! he is nearing his heart’s desire;
He is snuffing the smoke of the roaring fray,
With Sheridan only five miles away.
—Read.

Boot, saddle, to horse, and away!


Rescue my castle before the hot day
Brightens to blue from its silvery gray.
Boot, saddle, to horse, and away!

—Browning.

A hurry of hoofs in the village street,


A shape in the moonlight, a bulk in the dark,
And beneath, from the pebbles, in passing, a spark
Struck out by a steed flying fearless and fleet:
That was all! And yet, through the gloom and the light,
The fate of a nation was riding that night;
And the spark struck out by that steed, in his flight,
Kindled the land into flame with its heat.

—Longfellow.

So light to the croupe the fair lady he swung,


So light to the saddle before her he sprung!—
“She is won! we are gone, over bank, bush, and scaur;
They’ll have fleet steeds that follow,” quoth young Lochinvar.

There was mounting ’mong Graemes of the Netherby clan;


Forsters, Fenwicks, and Musgraves, they rode and they ran:
There was racing and chasing, on Cannobie Lee,
But the lost bride of Netherby ne’er did they see.
So daring in love, and so dauntless in war,
Have ye e’er heard of gallant like young Lochinvar?

—Scott.
And out of the houses the rats came tumbling.
Great rats, small rats, lean rats, brawny rats,
Brown rats, black rats, gray rats, tawny rats,
Grave old plodders, gay young friskers,
Fathers, mothers, uncles, cousins,
Cocking tails and pricking whiskers,
Families by tens and dozens,
Brothers, sisters, husbands, wives—
Followed the Piper for their lives.
From street to street he piped advancing,
And step for step they followed dancing,
Until they came to the river Weser,
Wherein all plunged and perished!

—Browning.

To Develop Slow Speech

Far-called, our navies melt away;


On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all the pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

—Kipling.

Do you know the pile-built village where the sago-dealers trade—


Do you know the reek of fish and wet bamboo?
Do you know the steaming stillness of the orchid-scented glade
When the blazoned, bird-winged butterflies flap through?
It is there that I am going with my camphor, net, and boxes,
To a gentle, yellow pirate that I know—
To my little wailing lemurs, to my palms and flying-foxes,
For the Red Gods call me out and I must go!
He must go—go—go away from here!
On the other side the world he’s overdue!
‘Send the road is clear before you when the Springfret comes o’er
you,
And the Red Gods call for you!

—Kipling.

Who hath desired the Sea?—the sight of salt water unbounded—


The heave and the halt and the hurl and the crash of the comber
wind-hounded?
The sleek-barreled swell before storm, gray, foamless, enormous,
and growing—
Stark calm on the lap of the Line or the crazy-eyed hurricane blowing

His Sea in no showing the same—his Sea and the same ’neath each
showing—
His Sea as she slackens or thrills?
So and no otherwise—so and no otherwise—hillmen desire their
Hills!

—Kipling.

Slowly the mist o’er the meadow was creeping,


Bright on the dewy buds glistened the sun,
When from his couch, while his children were sleeping,
Rose the bold rebel and shouldered his gun.

—Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this
continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal.
—Abraham Lincoln.
On a quiet autumn morning, in the land which he loved so well,
and, as he held, served so faithfully, the spirit of Robert Edward Lee
left the clay which it had so much ennobled, and traveled out of this
world into the great and mysterious land.

It was roses, roses, all the way,


With myrtle mixed in my path like mad:
The house-roofs seemed to heave and sway,
The church-spires flamed, such flags they had,
A year ago on this very day.

—Browning.

Toll for the brave!


The brave that are no more!
All sunk beneath the wave,
Fast by their native shore!

—William Cowper.

Break, break, break,


On thy cold gray stones, O sea!
And I would that my tongue could utter
The thoughts that arise in me.

Break, break, break,


At the foot of thy crags, O sea!
But the tender grace of a day that is dead
Will never come back to me.

—Tennyson.

Toll! Toll!
Toll! Toll!
All rivers seaward wend.
Toll! Toll!
Toll! Toll!
Weep for the nation’s friend.

Every home and hall was shrouded,


Every thoroughfare was still;
Every brow was darkly clouded,
Every heart was faint and chill.

...

Oh! the inky drop of poison


In our bitter draught of grief!
Oh! the sorrow of a nation
Mourning for its murdered chief!

Toll! Toll!
Toll! Toll!
Bound is the reaper’s sheaf—
Toll! Toll!
Toll! Toll!
All mortal life is brief.
Toll! Toll!
Toll! Toll!
Weep for the nation’s chief!

—Carmichael.

Beautiful was the night. Behind the black wall of the forest,
Tipping its summit with silver, arose the moon. On the river
Fell here and there through the branches a tremulous gleam of the
moonlight,
Like the sweet thoughts of love on a darkened and devious spirit.

—Longfellow.
To Develop Loud Speech

The great bell swung as ne’er before:


It seemed as it would never cease;
And every word its ardor flung
From off its jubilant iron tongue
Was “War! War! WAR!”

—T. B. Read.

Katherine, Queen of England, come into the court.


Where is that infernal boy?
As for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.
A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse.
Jove with us, Jove with us!
Forward, the Light Brigade.
A light! A light! A light! A light!

The words leapt like a leaping sword:


“Sail on! sail on! sail on! and on!”

Is the torrent in spate? He must ford or swim.


Has the rain wrecked the road? He must climb by the cliff.
Does the tempest cry “halt”? What are tempests to him?
The Service admits not a “but” or an “if.”
While the breath’s in his mouth, he must bear without fail,
In the name of the Empress, the Overland Mail.

—Kipling.

Ye crags and peaks, I’m with you once again!


I hold to you the hands you first beheld,
To show they still are free. Methinks I hear
A spirit in your echoes answer me,
And bid your tenant welcome home again!
Hail! Hail! Oh, sacred forms, how proud you look!
How high you lift your heads into the sky!
How huge you are! how mighty, and how free!
...
Ye are the things that tower, that shine,—whose smile
Makes glad, whose frown is terrible, whose forms,
Robed or unrobed, do all the impress wear
Of awe divine, whose subject never kneels
In mockery, because it is your boast
To keep him free! Ye guards of liberty,
I’m with you once again! I call to you
With all my voice! I hold my hands to you
To show they still are free!

—Knowles (“William Tell”).

Cannon to right of them,


Cannon to left of them,
Cannon in front of them
Volleyed and thundered.

—Tennyson.

Hurrah! the land is safe, is safe; it rallies from the shock!


Ring round, ring round, ye merry bells, till every steeple rock!
Let trumpets blow and mad drums beat! let maidens scatter flowers!
The sun bursts through the battle smoke! Hurrah! the day is ours!

Fight, gentlemen of England! fight, bold yeomen!


Draw, archers, draw your arrows to the head:
Spur your proud horses hard, and ride in blood;
Amaze the welkin with your broken staves.
A thousand hearts are great within my bosom:
Advance our standards, set upon our foes!
Our ancient word of courage, fair Saint George,
Inspire us with the spleen of fiery dragons!
Upon them! Victory sits on our helms.

To Develop Melody of Speech

Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,


Hath not old custom made this life more sweet
Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods
More free from peril than the envious court?
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam,
The seasons’ difference,—as the icy fang
And churlish chiding of the winter’s wind,
Which, when it bites and blows upon my body,
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say,
“This is no flattery: these are counselors
That feelingly persuade me what I am.”
Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.

—Shakespeare.

I dip and I surge and I swing


In the rip of the racing tide,
By the gates of doom I sing,
On the horns of death I ride.
A ship-length overside,
Between the course and the sand,
Fretted and bound I bide
Peril whereof I cry.
Would I change with my brother a league inland?
(Shoal! ’Ware shoal!) Not I!
—Kipling (“The Bell Buoy”).

Sometimes on lonely mountain-meres


I find a magic bark;
I leap on board: no helmsman steers:
I float till all is dark.

Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered, weak and weary,


Over many a quaint and curious volume of forgotten lore,
While I nodded, nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping,
As of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber door.
“’Tis some visitor,” I muttered, “tapping at my chamber door—
Only this, and nothing more.”

—Poe.

Heigh, ho! heigh, ho! unto the green holly: most friendship is
feigning, most loving mere folly: then, heigh, ho! the holly! this life is
most jolly.
—Shakespeare.

Waken, lord and ladies gay,


On the mountains dawns the day;
All the jolly chase is here
With hawk and horse and hunting-spear;
Hounds are in their couples yelling,
Hawks are whistling, horns are knelling,
Merrily, merrily mingle they,
Waken, lords and ladies gay.

—Scott.
And the humming-bird, that hung
Like a jewel up among
The tilted honey-suckle-horns,
They mesmerized, and swung
In the palpitating air,
Drowsed with odors strange and rare,
And, with whispered laughter, slipped away,
And left him hanging there.

...

By the brook with mossy brink


Where the cattle came to drink,
They thrilled and piped and whistled
With the thrush and bobolink,
Till the kine, in listless pause,
Switched their tails in mute applause,
With lifted heads, and dreamy eyes,
And bubble-dripping jaws.

—Riley.

It was a lover and his lass


With a hey and a ho, and a hey nonino!
That o’er the green cornfield did pass
In the spring-time, the only pretty ring-time,
When birds do sing hey ding a ding:
Sweet lovers love the Spring.

—Shakespeare.

The little bird sits at his door in the sun,


Atilt like a blossom among the leaves,
And lets his illumined being o’er-run
With the deluge of summer it receives.
—Lowell.

O wonderful! How liquid clear


The molten gold of that ethereal tone,
Floating and falling through the wood alone,
A hermit-hymn poured out for God to hear!

—Van Dyke.

Across the narrow beach we flit,


One little sandpiper and I;
And fast I gather, bit by bit,
The scattered driftwood, bleached and dry.

The wild waves reach their hands for it,


The wild wind raves, the tide runs high,
As up and down the beach we flit,
One little sandpiper and I.

—Celia Thaxter.

If all the skies were sunshine,


Our faces would be fain
To feel once more upon them
The cooling plash of rain.

If all the world were music,


Our hearts would often long
For one sweet strain of silence,
To break the endless song.

If life were always merry,


Our souls would seek relief,
And rest from weary laughter
In the quiet arms of grief.
—Van Dyke.

When May bedecks the naked trees


With tassels and embroideries,
And many blue-eyed violets beam
Along the edges of the stream,
I hear a voice that seems to say,
Now near at hand, now far away,
“Witchery—witchery—witchery.”

—Van Dyke.

Oh, the throb of the screw and the beat of the screw
And the swinging of the ship as she finds the sea.
Oh, the haze of the land as it sinks from view,
The land that is dear since it harbors you.

Up the airy mountain,


Down the rushy glen,
We daren’t go a-hunting
For fear of little men.

Wee folks, good folks,


Trooping all together,
Green jacket, red cap,
And white owl’s feather!

Who would be
A mermaid fair,
Singing alone,
Combing her hair
Under the sea,
In a golden curl
With a comb of pearl,
On a throne?

I would be a mermaid fair;


I would sing to myself the whole of the day;
With a comb of pearl I would comb my hair;
And still as I comb’d I would sing and say,
“Who is it loves me? who loves not me?”
I would comb my hair till my ringlets would fall
Low adown, low adown,
From under my starry sea-bud crown
Low adown and around,
And I should look like a fountain of gold
Springing alone
With a shrill inner sound,
Over the throne
In the midst of the hall;
Till that great sea-snake under the sea
From his coiled sleep in the central deeps
Would slowly trail himself sevenfold
Round the hall where I sate, and look in at the gate
With his large calm eyes for the love of me.
And all the mermen under the sea
Would feel their immortality
Die in their hearts for the love of me.

Who would be
A merman bold,
Sitting alone,
Singing alone
Under the sea,
With a crown of gold,
On a throne?

I would be a merman bold,


I would sit and sing the whole of the day;
I would fill the sea-halls with a voice of power;
But at night I would roam abroad and play
With the mermaids in and out of the rocks,
Dressing their hair with the white sea-flower;
And holding them back by their flowing locks.
I would kiss them often under the sea,
And kiss them again till they kissed me
Laughingly, laughingly;
And then we would away, away
To the pale-green sea-groves straight and high,
Chasing each other merrily.

—Tennyson.

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